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THE
REPUBLIC OF PLATO

Cambridge University Press
Fetter Lane, London

New York
Bombay, Calcutta, Madras
Toronto
Macmillan

Tokyo
Maruzen-Kabushiki-Kaisha

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THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO

EDITED

WITH CRITICAL NOTES, COMMENTARY AND APPENDICES

BY

JAMES ADAM, LITT.D.

VOLUME II

BOOKS VI—X AND INDEXES

CAMBRIDGE:
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
1929

Theodore Lownik Library
Illinois Benedictine College
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881
P5r
1902
v.2

First Edition 1902
Reprinted 1907, 1921, 1929

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

34867

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5.

484 I. Οἱ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς διεξελθόντος λόγου μόγις πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἵ εἰσιν ἑκάτεροι. Ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ ῥᾴδιον. Οὐ φαίνεται, εἶπον· ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιόνως φανῆναι, εἰ περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι 5

4. ἐμοὶ γοῦν Π: ἔμοιγ' οὖν A.

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484 A—**485** A *We have now to shew that Philosophers, as defined by us, should be entrusted with the government. It is they alone who, by virtue of the Ideal in their souls, are able to guard the laws and institutions of a city. We shall therefore make them our Guardians, if they possess the necessary practical qualifications. A study of their nature will shew that it is possible for them to unite both kinds of requisites.*

484 A 1 **διὰ μακροῦ — λόγου**: 'through the conclusion of a somewhat lengthy argument.' *διεξελθόντος* is intransitive, as Schneider saw: cf. *Laws* 805 B ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἶπον τὸν μὲν λόγον ἐᾶσαι διεξελθεῖν, εἰ διελθόντος δὲ οὕτω τὸ δοκοῦν αἱρεῖσθαι δεῖν. (The reference in εἶπον is to 799 E κἂν ἡ διέξοδος αὕτη ὅλη σχοῦσα τέλος ἱκανῶς ἂν μηνύσειε κτλ.) Cf. also Dem. *in Mid.* 84. The word *διεξελθόντος* is not otiose, because it is not till the very end of the argument that the *φιλόσοφος* is discovered (V 480 A). The mistaken notion (held by Stallbaum) that the word must be transitive induced Herwerden (*Mnem.* N. S. XIX p. 333) to propose *διεξελθοῦσι*, a conjecture repeated also by Richards. Baiter (after Hermann and Ast) reads *διεξελθόντες* with three inferior MSS, as if the philosophers had "run the gauntlet of the argument through which their nature is revealed" (J. and C.). *τοῦ λόγου* (found in a few MSS) is favoured by Stallbaum, and suggested as an alternative also by Herwerden, as if *διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς* could mean 'at some length.' The first hand in Ξ omits *διά*, but it occurs in all the other MSS. None of these expedients is nearly so good as the reading of the best MSS, if Schneider's explanation be adopted. *μακροῦ* has also caused difficulty, since the investigation extends over only six pages of Stephanus: see Krohn *Pl. St.* pp. 105 ff. By Pfleiderer (*Zur Lösung* etc. p. 54), who maintains (in partial agreement with Spengel) that V 471 C—VII (inclusive) embodies the dialogue Φιλόσοφος announced in the beginning of the *Politicus* and *Sophist*, *μακροῦ* is hailed as a significant *lapsus calami*, and referred to the investigations of the *Sophist*, *Euthydemus* and *Politicus*. But *μακροῦ* is qualified by *τινός*, and surely 474 C—480 A may be described as 'a somewhat lengthy enquiry.' There is no allusion to the proverbial *μακρὸς λόγος* of which Aristotle speaks in *Met.* N 3. 1091^{a} 7 ff. ὁ Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος· γίγνεται γὰρ ὁ μακρὸς λόγος ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν δούλων, ὅταν μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγωσιν.

2 **οἵ** is found only in A and Π^{1}: all the other MSS have *οἷοι*. For *οἵ* cf. (with Schneider) 493 B and VIII 559 A.

5 **πολλὰ κτλ.** Herwerden conjectures *πολλὰ <ἦν>*, which would weaken the emphasis on *πολλά*. For the omission of *ἦν* see Schanz *Nov. Comm. Pl.* p. 33. From the standpoint of Books VI and VII

κατόψεσθαι, τί διαφέρει | βίος δίκαιος ἀδίκου. Τί οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ B
μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν; Τί δ' ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τὸ ἐξῆς; ἐπειδὴ
φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι
ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ πάντως ἴσχουσιν
πλανώμενοι, οὐ φιλόσοφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως ἡγεμόνας εἶναι;
Πῶς οὖν λέγοντες ἂν αὐτό, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγοιμεν; Ὁπότεροι ἄν,
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνωνται φυλάξαι νόμους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα
πόλεων, τούτους | καθιστάναι φύλακας. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Τόδε δέ, C
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἆρα δῆλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν εἴτε ὀξὺ ὁρῶντα χρὴ φύλακα
τηρεῖν ὁτιοῦν; Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον; Ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι
τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς
γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα μηδὲ
δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφῆς εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκεῖσε
ἀεὶ ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα, οὕτω δὴ
καὶ | τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν D
τίθεσθαί τε, ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σῴζειν;
Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρει. Τούτους οὖν μᾶλλον

9. *πάντως* $A^1\Pi^1$: *παντοίως* in mg. $A^2\Pi^2$.

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it is impossible to say what 'just life' means unless we know the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* etc. (see 506 A): hence *πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν*.

484 B 9 **πάντως κτλ.** *παντοίως* was conjectured by Ast and is read by Stallbaum. It occurs as a late correction in Π as well as in A (see *cr. n.*), and has some insignificant MS authority besides. The difference is like that between *ὅς* and *οἷος*: see 484 A *n.* With *πλανώμενοι* cf. *πλανητόν* in V 479 D. It is the fluctuation of the Object which makes the Subject fluctuate.

484 C 13 **καθιστάναι:** "sc. *λέγοντες* h.e. *κελεύοντες*" Schneider.

16 **τυφλῶν.** They who cannot see the Ideas are blind: cf. Plato's retort to Antisthenes quoted on V 476 D.

17 **καὶ μηδὲν κτλ.** A transcendental *παράδειγμα* of which he knew nothing would be useless to the philosopher-king. It does not however follow that the Ideas are not *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά*, but merely that we are concerned with them in so far as they are known by the *φιλόσοφος*. See on V 476 A. *ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα* admits that he may not see them in all their fulness and purity.

18 **εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον κτλ.** Cf. 500 C, 500 E—501 C (where the same figure is employed). The political value of the Idea is here for the first time explicitly affirmed and explained: see V 479 D *n.*

ἐκεῖσε: because truth is 'yonder'—in the Heaven of the Ideas. The philosopher must call it from Heaven to Earth, by assimilating to it 'the earthly canons' (*τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα*).

19 **οὕτω δή** = 'then and not till then' suggests that it is otherwise in existing States.

484 D 21 **ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι.** If he has the happiness to be born 'in his own country' (IX 592 A), whose institutions are already modelled on the Ideas, he need only guard (*φυλάττοντες* suggests the *φύλακες*) and preserve what is already established. Otherwise he must himself become a legislator. Cobet's excision of *τίθεσθαι* is wholly gratuitous: his omission of *τά* in *τὰ κείμενα* is even worse, for the laws need not be of the philosopher's own making.

22 **διαφέρει.** It would be easy to write *διαφέρειν* (with *q* etc.), but *διαφέρει* may be impersonal, or Glauco may be

φύλακας στησόμεθα, ἢ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας μὲν ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν, ἐμπειρίᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἐκείνων ἐλλείποντας μηδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει ἀρετῆς ὑστεροῦντας; Ἄτοπον μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἄλλους αἱρεῖσθαι, εἰ γε τἆλλα μὴ ἐλλείποιντο· τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν
485 προέχοιεν. | Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ λέγωμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἱοί τ' ἔσονται οἱ αὐτοὶ κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ὁ τοίνυν ἀρχόμενοι τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖ καταμαθεῖν. καὶ οἶμαι, ἐὰν ἐκείνην ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὁμολογήσειν καὶ ὅτι οἷοί τε ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοί, ὅτι τε οὐκ ἄλλους πόλεων ἡγεμόνας δεῖ εἶναι ἢ τούτους. Πῶς;

II. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεων πέρι ὡμολογήσθω
B ἡμῖν, ὅτι μαθήματός γε ἀεὶ | ἐρῶσιν ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης καὶ μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.

4. δεῖ *q*: δεῖν ΑΠΞ.

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substituting the singular for the plural: see on I 347 A and V 465 E. Cf. also infra 496 A.

26 **ἐλλείποιντο.** Cf. Xen. *Mem.* II 6. 5 μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας ἑαυτόν and *Soph.* 258 B.

485 A 2 **κἀκεῖνα:** viz. τἆλλα, as defined in ἐμπειρίᾳ—ὑστεροῦντας.

ταῦτα: i.e. 'the special attributes of the philosopher' (J. and C.).

3 **ἐλέγομεν.** V 474 B.

4 **δεῖ.** See *cr. n.* and *Introd.* § 5.

485 A—**487** A *The philosophic nature loves eternal and changeless Being in its entirety. It follows that the philosopher naturally loves Truth, despises the pleasures of the body, is temperate, free from avarice, high-minded, courageous, just and gentle. He is also quick to learn, retentive in memory, not given to extravagance in conduct, but modest and well-bred. To such men, when years and education have perfected their natural qualities, we may fairly entrust our city.*

485 A ff. This section should be compared on the one hand with II 375 A—376 C, 377 B—III 391 E, and on the other with VII 535 A, B *nn.* In Book II the natural qualities insisted on were primarily moral; here and in VII they are primarily intellectual. This is in harmony with the difference between the earlier and later schemes of education: for the basis of the first was ὀρθὴ δόξα, whereas that of the second is ἐπιστήμη. There is little or no indication to shew that even the ἄρχοντες of I—IV knew or aspired to the Ideas (see 497 C *n.*) and the ἐπίκουροι certainly did not. Krohn is, in a certain sense, right when he maintains that in VI—VII we have "einen neuen Archontenstand und eine neue Archontendisciplin" (*Pl. St.* p. 107), but the distinction of the 'golden' and 'silver' races in III 415 A ff. prepares us for a more thorough-going discrimination between the two higher classes than was attempted in the earlier sketch, and we must of course remember that the new discipline is not intended to supersede, but to supervene upon the old. See also Hirzel *Der Dialog* I p. 236.

485 B 8 **ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας.** For the genitive cf. IV 445 E *n.*

9 **γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς** have not yet been employed in this half-technical sense (Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 112). The substance of the Ideas always 'is': that of phenomena 'is driven to and fro by generation and destruction'—by generation when it becomes determined in one particular direction (e.g. καλόν, ἵππος, ἄνθρωπος), by destruction when it loses that particular determination and puts on another. Cf. V 479 A, B. Plato's form of expression seems to imply that there is a sort of οὐσία or substratum in phenomena. At a later stage he seems to have identified this with space—the ἐκμαγεῖον —κινούμενόν τε καὶ διασχηματιζόμενον ὑπὸ

'Ωμολογήσθω. Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὅτι πάσης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικροῦ οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμιωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμοτέρου μέρους ἑκόντες ἀφίενται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν περί τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ ἐρωτικῶν διήλθομεν. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Τόδε τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τούτῳ ἐν τῇ φύσει οἳ ἂν μέλλωσιν | ἔσεσθαι οἵους ἐλέγομεν. Τὸ ποῖον; Τὴν ἀψεύδειαν καὶ C τὸ ἑκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν δ' ἀλήθειαν στέργειν. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ φίλε, εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐρωτικῶς του φύσει ἔχοντα πᾶν τὸ ξυγγενές τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαπᾶν. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Ἡ οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφίᾳ τι ἀληθείας ἂν εὕροις; Καὶ πῶς; ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἡ οὖν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ | φιλοψευδῆ; Οὐδαμῶς γε. Τὸν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι φιλομαθῆ πάσης D ἀληθείας δεῖ εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ὅ τι μάλιστα ὀρέγεσθαι. Παντελῶς γε. Ἀλλὰ μήν ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἕν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, ἴσμεν που ὅτι εἰς τἆλλα τούτῳ ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχετευμένον. Τί μήν; Ὅσοι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐρρυήκασιν, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, οἶμαι, ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς καθ' αὑτὴν εἶεν ἄν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐκλείποιεν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφός | τις εἴη. Μεγάλη ἀνάγκη. E

τῶν εἰσιόντων, φαίνεται δὲ δι' ἐκεῖνα ἄλλοτε ἀλλοῖον (*Tim.* 50 C): but of this there is no hint here. Cf. Zeller[4] II 1. p. 725.

10 **πάσης αὐτῆς**: i.e. *οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης*, not (as Ast) *ἐπιστήμης* or *μαθήσεως*.

11 **οὔτε τιμιωτέρου κτλ.** Cf. *Parm.* 130 C—E.

12 **πρόσθεν.** V 474 D—475 B.

485 C 15 **τὴν ἀψεύδειαν κτλ.** Cf. III 389 B.

16 **ἑκόντας εἶναι** is 'voluntarily,' not 'if it can be helped' (D. and V.): cf. I 336 E *n.*

ψεῦδος should be understood in its strict Platonic sense, as 'ignorance in the soul respecting the truth' (II 382 B *nn.*). The politician who knows not the Ideal is, according to Plato, a liar, not the statesman who employs for example *κλῆροί τινες κομψοί* to attain his Ideal. There is absolutely no reason to suppose (with Bosanquet) that Plato means to withdraw from the regulations of V 460 A.

18 **τὸν ἐρωτικῶς κτλ.** Love me, love my friend. The Philosopher loves Wisdom, and Truth is Wisdom's kinswoman and familiar friend.

485 D 25 **ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα κτλ.** The simile becomes almost an identification, as often in Greek: the desires *are* as it were a stream diverted *εἰς ἕν τι*. Cf. III 401 C (reading *τις—ὥσπερ αὖρα*), VII 519 A *τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας* and VII 534 D *n.* To explain *ἀπωχετευμένον* as for *ἀπωχετευμέναι* (with Stallbaum and others) is to obtrude our standpoint upon the Greeks. Schneider formerly agreed with Stallbaum, but afterwards drew back (*Addit.* p. 45) and translated "wie ein dorthin abgeleiteter Strom."

28 **τὰς δέ.** *τάς* is probably an 'internal accusative' depending on *ἐκλείποιεν*, though rendered easier by the occurrence of *περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν—εἶεν ἄν* just before. But the preposition is difficult to supply when the two clauses have different verbs. Cf. IV 428 C *n.*

Σώφρων μὴν ὅ γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῇ φιλοχρήματος· ὧν γὰρ ἕνεκα χρήματα μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης σπουδάζεται, ἄλλῳ τινὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τούτῳ προσήκει σπουδάζειν. Οὕτω. Καὶ μήν που καὶ
486 τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν | μέλλῃς φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μή. Τὸ ποῖον; Μή σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας· ἐναντιώτατον γάρ που σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Ἧι οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου,
B πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον; Ἀδύνατον, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος; Ἥκιστά γε. Δειλῇ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευθέρῳ φύσει φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἂν μετείη. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. Τί οὖν; ὁ κόσμιος καὶ μὴ φιλοχρήματος μηδ' ἀνελεύθερος μηδ' ἀλαζὼν μηδὲ δειλὸς ἔσθ' ὅπῃ ἂν δυσξύμβολος ἢ ἄδικος γένοιτο; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψυχὴν σκοπῶν

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485 E 30 **σώφρων κτλ.** Cf. III 389 D —390 E.

ὧν γὰρ ἕνεκα: i.e. such bodily and other delights as money can buy.

31 **χρήματα—δαπάνης:** 'wealth with its accompaniment of lavish outlay.' *μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης* should not, I think, be taken with *σπουδάζεται* (Schneider, D. and V., J. and C., although Jowett's translation takes the correct view), but rather with *χρήματα*. Herwerden formerly explained *δαπάνης* as=*τῆς τοῦ δαπανᾶν ἐπιθυμίας*, but afterwards (*Mnem.* N. S. XIX p. 333) took it to mean "pecunia cuius ope sumptus fieret" comparing *inter alia* VIII 550 D and *Laws* 718 A. This view agrees closely with mine, but it is not necessary to suppose that *δαπάνη* means more than simply 'outlay.'

486 A 2 **ἀνελευθερίας.** *ἀνελευθερία* or *σμικρολογία* is in Plato the antithesis of *ὑπερηφανία*: cf. II 391 C and *Critias* 112 C. The virtuous mean is *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, which is a sort of highmindedness (cf. 503 C): hence *μεγαλοπρέπεια* just below and *μεγαλοπρεπής* in the summary at 487 A. Plato does not, like Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* IV cc. 4—6), restrict *μεγαλοπρέπεια* and its opposing vices to pecuniary dealings, although *φιλοχρηματία*, for example, is a symptom of *ἀνελευθερία* (II 391 C).

3 **τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντός.** Cf. *Theaet.* 173 E ff. This and the following sentence admirably describe the peculiar genius of Plato himself. See the eloquent words of Longinus *περὶ ὕψους* 35, and compare them with Goethe's noble characterisation of Plato: "Er dringt in die Tiefen, mehr um sie mit seinem Wesen auszufüllen, als um sie zu erforschen. Er bewegt sich nach der Höhe, mit Sehnsucht seines Ursprungs wieder theilhaft zu werden. Alles, was er äussert, bezieht sich auf ein ewig Ganzes, Gutes, Wahres, Schönes, dessen Forderung er in jedem Busen aufzuregen strebt."

4 **ᾗ—διανοίᾳ.** *ᾧ—διανοίας* (the reading of *q* and some other MSS, followed by Ast and Stallbaum) is an obvious 'emendation,' to suit *τούτῳ* below. It is much less elegant, notwithstanding the irregularity involved in *τούτῳ*, for which Schneider compares *Gorg.* 523 B, a precise parallel, in spite of Stallbaum's assertion to the contrary. Cf. also X 606 B *n.* *ᾗ οὖν* is moreover found in the quotation of this passage by Marcus Aurelius, according to the text of Vaticanus A: see Stich's edition p. 87 *n.*

6 **μέγα τι δοκεῖν.** Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* IV 7. 1123^{b} 32 *τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρά, ᾧ οὐθὲν μέγα* (of the *μεγαλόψυχος*).

486 B 7 **θάνατον κτλ.** Cf. III 386 A ff.

11 **ἀλαζών** is a special case of *φιλοψευδής* (485 D). Cf. 489 E.

12 **ἄδικος** is used of course in the popular sense, not with the meaning assigned to it in Book IV.

φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς νέου ὄντος ἐπισκέψει, εἰ ἄρα δικαία τε καὶ ἥμερος, ἢ δυσκοινώνητος καὶ ἀγρία. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐ μὴν
15 οὐδὲ τόδε παραλείψεις, | ὡς ἐγῷμαι. Τὸ ποῖον; Εὐμαθὴς ἢ C δυσμαθής. ἢ προσδοκᾷς ποτέ τινά τι ἱκανῶς ἂν στέρξαι, ὃ πράττων ἂν ἀλγῶν τε πράττοι καὶ μόγις σμικρὸν ἀνύτων; Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. Τί δ'; εἰ μηδὲν ὢν μάθοι σῴζειν δύναιτο, λήθης ὢν πλέως, ἆρ' ἂν οἷός τ' εἴη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι; Καὶ πῶς;
20 Ἀνόνητα δὴ πονῶν οὐκ, οἶει, ἀναγκασθήσεται τελευτῶν αὐτόν τε μισεῖν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πρᾶξιν; Πῶς | δ' οὔ; Ἐπιλήσμονα ἄρα D ψυχὴν ἐν ταῖς ἱκανῶς φιλοσόφοις μή ποτε ἐγκρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν τό γε τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ ἀσχήμονος φύσεως ἄλλοσέ ποι
25 ἂν φαίμεν ἕλκειν ἢ εἰς ἀμετρίαν. Τί μήν; Ἀλήθειαν δὲ ἀμετρίᾳ ἡγεῖ ξυγγενῆ εἶναι ἢ ἐμμετρίᾳ; Ἐμμετρίᾳ. Ἔμμετρον ἄρα καὶ εὔχαριν ζητῶμεν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις διάνοιαν φύσει, ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἑκάστου τὸ | αὐτοφυὲς εὐάγωγον παρέξει. Πῶς δ' οὔ; E Τί οὖν; μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι
30 καὶ ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις τῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως

20. ἀνόνητα Π et γρ in mg. A^2: ἀνόητα A^1.

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14 **ἥμερος—ἀγρία.** Cf. II 375 B ff.

486 C 15 **εὐμαθὴς κτλ.** J. and C. wrongly supply *εἰ ἄρα*. *πότερον* is often omitted in such sentences: cf. *Phaedr.* 270 D and other examples in Ast's *Lexicon* s.v. *πότερον*.

486 D 23 **αὐτὴν—εἶναι.** The text is successfully defended by Vahlen (*Hermes* 1877 p. 196) who compares II 375 E *οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητοῦμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα* and (for the pleonasm) *Phaed.* 101 E *ἱκανοὶ γὰρ—δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν*. Madvig's proposal (adopted by Baiter) *αὖ ἣν ζητοῦμεν δεῖ εἶναι* is neat but unnecessary; still less should we (with Herwerden) bracket *δεῖν εἶναι*. With the sentiment Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 363) compares Xen. *Mem.* IV 1. 2.

24 ἀσχήμονος. Herwerden should not have conjectured *ἀμνήμονος*. We are passing to a fresh point. *ἀμουσία* and *ἀσχημοσύνη* ('bad form') tend to *ἀμετρία* 'excess,' 'extravagance' in behaviour (cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* IV 8. 1125^a 12—16); and extravagant behaviour is a form of untruth, because it makes a man appear what he is not. The love of truth will therefore save the philosopher from self-assertion and bad manners.

27 **φύσει κτλ.** The antecedent of *ἣν* is *διάνοιαν*: and *φύσει* ('by nature,' 'naturally') should be taken with the adjectives *ἔμμετρον* and *εὔχαριν*. It might seem possible to translate: 'Let us insist, then, on a modest and agreeable habit of mind for a nature whose innate disposition is to make it easy to lead to the Form of each essential Being,' making *φύσει* the antecedent to *ἣν*: but the ordinary view gives a better sense. The preceding note will explain how *ἐμμετρία* inclines one to the love of Truth or the Ideas. Stallbaum connects *ἑκάστου* with *τὸ αὐτοφυές*, but cf. V 480 A ad fin. and 484 D (*ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν*). *ἰδέαν* is, I think, 'Form,' 'Idea' (so Schneider etc.), rather than 'contemplation' (as Stallbaum translates). The word however suggests *ἰδεῖν*: see on V 479 A.

486 E 30 **ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις** is fully justified. The love of Truth begets the love of Wisdom (485 C) and the love of Wisdom Temperance (485 D, E). High-mindedness is connected with the contemplation *τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντός* (486 A), of which Courage is also a result (486 A, B).

487 ψυχῇ μεταλήψεσθαι; Ἀναγκαιότατα μὲν | οὖν, ἔφη. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπῃ μέμψει τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὃ μή ποτ' ἄν τις οἷός τε γένοιτο ἱκανῶς ἐπιτηδεῦσαι, εἰ μὴ φύσει εἴη μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπής, εὔχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ ξυγγενὴς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης; Οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Μῶμος, ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο. Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τελειωθεῖσι τοῖς τοιούτοις παιδείᾳ τε καὶ ἡλικίᾳ ἆρα οὐ μόνοις ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις;

B III. Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, πρὸς μὲν | ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἷός τ' εἴη ἀντειπεῖν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἑκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις· ἡγοῦνται δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀθροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες

C | ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ τι φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγωσιν ὑπὸ πεττείας

12. παραγόμενοι Π et in mg. A^2: παραγενόμενοι A^1. 13. μέγα Π: μετὰ A.

Justice and Kindness accompany the other moral virtues (486 B). Aptness to learn, memory, and the virtue of a modest and agreeable disposition also fit one for the study of the Ideas: cf. 486 D *n.* It will be noticed that all the Virtues receive an intellectual colouring from their connexion —direct or indirect—with 'amor intellectualis': see above on 485 A ff.

487 A 3 **μνήμων κτλ.** The summary is complete, *μεγαλοπρεπής* being the opposite of *ἀνελεύθερος* and *σμικρόλογος* (486 A *n.*).

487 A—**487** E *But, in point of fact, urges Adimantus, actual philosophers are regarded as useless, or worse. Socrates admits the correctness of this view, and proceeds to solve the difficulty by a parable.*

487 B 10 **οἱ ἀκούοντες — λέγεις:** 'those who from time to time hear what you now say.' The text has been suspected, but is, I think, sound. Adimantus implies that the philosopher-king was one of Socrates' favourite themes, as—in one form or another—it certainly was: see on V 473 C. The effect produced by Socrates' usual way of reasoning on the subject is illustrated by a *general* description of the unsatisfying nature of Socrates' dialectic; and *λέγω δ' εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέψας* recalls us to the special case. The looseness lies chiefly in the use of *ἅ*, where *οἷα*—Steinhart's conjecture — would be expected; but *ἅ* need not be taken too strictly. Ficinus omits *νῦν*.

ἡγοῦνται κτλ. Cf. *Euthyph.* 11 B—D, *Men.* 80 A, B and the description of the elenchus quoted by J. and C. from *Soph.* 230 B ff.

13 **μέγα — ἀναφαίνεσθαι.** For the anacoluthon cf. *Ap.* 21 C *καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι, Laws* 686 D and Xen. *An.* III 2. 12. In all these cases the verb used is *ἔδοξε*, and *ἀναφαίνεσθαι* is a word of the same kind. Other examples of similar anacolutha are cited by Engelhardt *Anacol. Pl. Spec.* III p. 39. Richards would read *παραγομένοις*, but *παραγομένοις* could hardly mean *παραγομένοις ἑαυτοῖς*.

487 C 15 **ἀποκλείονται κτλ.** The simile is probably taken from the game of *πόλεις*, on which see IV 422 E *n.* *φέρωσιν* is technical of a move at draughts: cf. *Laws* 739 A. The balance *φέρωσιν— λέγωσιν* deserves notice: in both words, stress should be laid on the first syllable. Cf. III 406 B *n.* and *Phaed.* 83 D with Geddes ad loc. *ἐν* is used as in *Euthyph.* 11 C *τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν.*

αὖ ταύτης τινὸς ἑτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις, ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ταύτῃ ἔχειν. λέγω δ' εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέψας. νῦν γὰρ φαίη ἄν τίς σοι λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν καθ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἔργῳ δὲ ὁρᾶν, ὅσοι ἂν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὁρμήσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαιδεῦσθαι | ἕνεκα ἀψάμενοι D νέοι ὄντες ἀπαλλάττωνται, ἀλλὰ μακρότερον ἐνδιατρίψωσιν, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ πάνυ ἀλλοκότους γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παμπονήρους εἴπωμεν, τοὺς δ' ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας ὅμως τοῦτό γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, οὗ σὺ ἐπαινεῖς, πάσχοντας, ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, Οἴει οὖν, εἶπον, τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας ψεύδεσθαι; Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὅς· ἀλλὰ τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούοιμι. | Ἀκούοις ἄν, ὅτι ἔμοιγε φαίνονται τἀληθῆ E λέγειν. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, εὖ ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι οὐ πρότερον κακῶν παύσονται αἱ πόλεις, πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἄρξωσιν, οὓς ἀχρήστους ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι; Ἐρωτᾷς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρώτημα δεόμενον ἀποκρίσεως δι' εἰκόνος λεγομένης. Σὺ δέ γε, ἔφη, οἶμαι, οὐκ εἴωθας δι' εἰκόνων λέγειν.

IV. Εἶεν, εἶπον· σκώπτεις ἐμβεβληκώς με εἰς λόγον οὕτω δυσαπόδεικτον; ἄκουε δ' οὖν τῆς εἰκόνος, ἵν' | ἔτι μᾶλλον ἴδῃς, 488

18. ταύτῃ Π: ταύτην A.

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18 **ταύτῃ**='isto modo,' 'as you say.' The simile is imitated by the author of the *Eryxias* (395 B).

20 **ἔργῳ δὲ ὁρᾶν κτλ.** expresses a widely prevalent view in ancient as well as in modern times. It is enunciated with admirable force and vigour by the Platonic Callicles in *Gorg.* 484 C—486 C: cf. also *Theaet.* 173 C ff. and *Phaed.* 64 B. Although Isocrates called himself a *φιλόσοφος*, he was in general agreement with the popular verdict on Philosophy in the Platonic sense of the term (*τήν τε γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τοὺς διαλόγους τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς καλουμένους*, as he calls it *Panath.* 26): see *adv. Soph.* 1—8, 20, *Antid.* 258—269 (*διατρῖψαι μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς παιδείας ταύτας χρόνον τινὰ συμβουλεύσαιμ' ἂν τοῖς νεωτέροις, μὴ μέντοι περιδεῖν τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτῶν κατασκελετευθεῖσαν ἐπὶ τούτοις κτλ.* 268) and *Panath.* 26—32 (Spengel *Isokr. u. Plato* pp. 15 ff., Dümmler *Chron. Beitr.* pp. 43 ff. and Teichmüller *Lit. Fehd.* I p. 103. Teichmüller supposes that *τις* in *νῦν γὰρ φαίη ἄν τις κτλ.* above is a specific reference to Isocrates, but this is very improbable). The well-known sentiment of Ennius' Neoptolemus "philosophari est mihi necesse, at paucis; nam omnino haut placet. Degustandum ex ea, non in eam ingurgitandum censeo" (ap. Gell. *Noct. Att.* V 15. 9, 16. 5: cf. Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* II 1. 1 ff. al.) is probably translated from Euripides, but it admirably expresses the ordinary Roman view. See also on V 473 C, D.

487 D 23 **ἀλλοκότους.** They have, as we should say, 'a twist.'

487 E 32 **σὺ δέ γε** is of course ironical, as *σκώπτεις* shews. Müller in his translation (p. 53) strangely misses this point.

487 E—**489** C *Imagine a ship, in which the sailors struggle with one another to gain possession of the helm, although they have never learnt the art of steering, and actually deny that steering can be taught at all. They overpower the master of the vessel by opiates or strong drink, and sail merrily away to shipwreck. It never occurs to them that in order to steer a ship, it is necessary to learn how. The true pilot is to them a star-gazer, an idle*

ὡς γλίσχρως εἰκάζω. οὕτω γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων, ὃ πρὸς τὰς πόλεις πεπόνθασιν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἔστιν ἓν οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοιοῦτον πεπονθός, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐκ πολλῶν αὐτὸ ξυναγαγεῖν εἰκάζοντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, οἷον οἱ γραφεῖς τραγελάφους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μιγνύντες γράφουσιν. νόησον γὰρ τοιουτονὶ γενόμενον εἴτε πολλῶν νεῶν πέρι εἴτε μιᾶς· ναύκληρον μεγέθει
B μὲν καὶ ῥώμῃ ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ νηΐ πάντας, ὑπόκωφον δὲ καὶ ὁρῶντα ὡσαύτως βραχύ τι καὶ γιγνώσκοντα περὶ ναυτικῶν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, τοὺς δὲ ναύτας στασιάζοντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως, ἕκαστον οἰόμενον δεῖν κυβερνᾶν, μήτε μαθόντα πώποτε τὴν τέχνην μήτε ἔχοντα ἀποδεῖξαι διδάσκαλον ἑαυτοῦ μηδὲ χρόνον ἐν ᾧ ἐμάνθανεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φάσκοντας μηδὲ

2. τὸ Π: om. A: γρ τὸ πλῆθος in mg. A^2.

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babbler, altogether useless. Our simile explains itself. What wonder that the philosopher is useless in a city? But the fault lies with those who make no use of him. It is not his part to sue for employment: those who need his services ought to appeal to him.

488 A 2 **ὡς γλίσχρως εἰκάζω**: 'how greedy I am of parables' (lit. 'how greedily I make parables), not (as J. and C.) 'what a poor hand I am' at similes, an interpretation which deprives ἔτι μᾶλλον of all its force. γλίσχρος (connected with γλία 'glue' and γλίχομαι) is used as in Ar. *Ach.* 452 γλίσχρος προσαιτῶν λιπαρῶν τε. 'Niggardly,' 'stingy' is a secondary meaning, as for example in VIII 553 C and *Crat.* 414 C. The idea is that a man must be greedy of similes when he runs all over the world to find one (ἐκ πολλῶν ξυναγαγεῖν). αὐτό should be taken with εἰκάζοντα, by an easy hyperbaton.

5 **τραγελάφους** and similar fantastic creations were of frequent occurrence in Oriental art. The word is fully illustrated by Blaydes on Ar. *Frogs* 937.

6 **μιγνύντες** should be taken with γράφουσι: 'as painters paint goat-stags and the like by fusing creatures together.'

τοιουτονὶ κτλ. There is no occasion to read τοιοῦτόν τι: see III 388 D *n.* For γενόμενον Richards would write γιγνόμενον, because of ὁρῶντα etc. in B ff. and γιγνομένων in 488 E. But Plato rightly asks us to *conceive* of the completed scene, although the scene itself must of course be described by present participles.

7 **ναύκληρον κτλ.** The ναύκληρος is the Demos, as Aristotle observed (*Rhet.* III 4. 1406^b 35): cf. also Olympiodorus *Proleg.* 27 ed. Hermann. Cope on Arist. l.c. erroneously asserts that the ναύκληρος is the 'governor or governors of the unruly mob of citizens'; and Windelband's identification of the ναύκληρος with the younger Dionysius is a strange freak of fancy: see Hirmer *Entsteh. u. Komp.* etc. p. 620. As the ναύκληρος owned his own ship (II 371 B *n.*), it is right that the Demos should be ναύκληρος in a democracy. For the frequent comparison of the State to a ship in Greek literature see Smyth's *Gk. Melic Poets* p. 215. With ὑπόκωφος cf. Ar. *Knights* 42, 43 Δῆμος πυκνίτης, δύσκολον γερόντιον|ὑπόκωφον and Blaydes ad loc. Plato's picture of the Δῆμος is not unamiable: cf. 499 E ff. Though unwieldy, sluggish, and dull-witted (cf. *Ap.* 30 E ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος), he is placid, and not deliberately vicious. It is the δημαγωγοί (in the widest sense of the term, including demagogues, sophists etc.), and not the δῆμος who are here attacked. With μεγέθει καὶ ῥώμῃ cf. μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ 493 A.

488 B 11 **μήτε μαθόντα—ἐμάνθανεν.** See V 473 C *n.* and Xen. *Mem.* IV 2. 4—7. Politics, according to both Socrates and Plato, is a science: see especially *Mem.* III 9. 11. The heaviest count in their indictment of Athenian democracy was its practical denial of this fact.

13 **φάσκοντας κτλ.** The thesis that

διδακτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λέγοντα ὡς διδακτὸν ἑτοίμους | κατα- C
τέμνειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ τῷ ναυκλήρῳ περικεχύσθαι δεομένους
καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας, ὅπως ἂν σφίσι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ, ἐνίοτε
δ' ἂν μὴ πείθωσιν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοι μᾶλλον, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἢ ἀπο-
κτεινύντας ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας ἐκ τῆς νεώς, τὸν δὲ γενναῖον ναύκληρον
μανδραγόρᾳ ἢ μέθῃ ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ συμποδίσαντας τῆς νεὼς ἄρχειν
χρωμένους τοῖς ἐνοῦσι, καὶ πίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους πλεῖν
ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς τοὺς τοιούτους, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπαινοῦντας, ναυτικὸν
μὲν καλοῦντας | καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστάμενον τὰ κατὰ ναῦν D

'Politics cannot be taught' was (in Plato's view) the theoretical basis of Athenian political life: see *Prot.* 319 A—320 D. We are here invited to suppose that it was actually maintained in so many words by sophists, demagogues, and others. Something of the sort is asserted by Isocrates *adv. Soph.* 14, 21; but it is unlikely that Plato is alluding to Isocrates in particular, as Teichmüller supposes (*Lit. Fehd.* I p. 104).

14 **τὸν λέγοντα κτλ.** as Socrates and Plato constantly did. **ἑτοίμους κατατέμνειν** admirably expresses the vindictive fury of the insulted demagogues, but should not be taken as an allusion to Socrates' fate. Plato felt his master's death too deeply to exaggerate on such a subject. See VII 517 A *n.*

488 C 15 **αὐτῷ** is ejected by Herwerden "quod omni vi caret." Bywater (*J. Ph.* X p. 73) proposes *αὖ*. The translators for the most part ignore the word, except Schneider, who translates 'him, the master of the ship.' Perhaps *αὐτῷ* is 'by himself,' *ipsi* in the sense of *soli*, as in *αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν*, and we should translate 'while they themselves constantly swarm around the solitary master of the ship.' Failing this explanation we must follow Schneider; unless we venture to take *αὐτῷ* in the sense of 'the Master' (cf. I 327 B *n.*) and regard *τῷ ναυκλήρῳ* as an explanatory gloss. On the whole I am inclined to think that Schneider is right.

περικεχύσθαι: an anacoluthon, like **ἄρχειν** and **πλεῖν** below: we should expect *περικεχυμένους*. For a parallel see *Laws* 686 A. Here, doubtless, the change of construction is in order to avoid too many participles.

17 **ἀποκτεινύντας.** On the orthography of this word see *Introd.* § 5. **ἀποκτεινῦντας** (*sic*) in *v* and Vind. F may also be a trace of the spelling with *ει*. The reference in *ἀποκτεινύντας ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας* is of course to the slaying or banishment of rival candidates for office: cf. *Gorg.* 466 B.

19 **μανδραγόρᾳ κτλ.** False rulers dull the senses of the Demos by the opiate of Pleasure, and so escape detection. With *μανδραγόρᾳ* cf. [Dem.] *Phil.* 4. 6 *ἀλλὰ μάνδραγόραν πεπωκόσιν ἢ τι φάρμακον ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἐοίκαμεν ἀνθρώποις.*

20 **πίνοντάς τε κτλ.** They are the *ἑστιάτορας εὐδαίμονας* of IV 421 B, where see note. For *ὡς τὸ εἰκός* Cobet writes *ὡς εἰκός*, and so also Herwerden, who suggests as an alternative that we should bracket *τοὺς τοιούτους*. The expression *ὡς εἰκός* would refer to *πίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους* ("and pass their time at sea in drinking and feasting, as you might expect with such a crew" D. and V.); but with *ὡς τὸ εἰκός* (sc. *πλεῖν*) the meaning is "make just such a voyage as might be expected of men like them" (J. and C. with Schneider, comparing *Pol.* 302 A and *Laws* 906 D), i.e. make shipwreck.

21 **ἐπαινοῦντας** is omitted by Cobet, but (as Richards points out) *ψέγοντας* supports it. Richards would transpose and read *μὲν ναυτικόν*. But *ναυτικὸν μὲν καλοῦντας* etc. is only an explanatory reduplication of *ἐπαινοῦντας*: hence *μέν* is placed where it would have been if *ἐπαινοῦντας* had been omitted. In any other position it would have failed to mark the antithesis between *ναυτικόν* (with its companion epithets) and *ἄχρηστον*. For the rhetorical asyndeton cf. II 362 B *n.* An alternative (less good) is to take *ἐπαινοῦντας* as logically subordinate to *καλοῦντας* ('in awarding praise they call' etc.).

ὃς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ᾖ, ὅπως ἄρξουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι τὸν ναύκληρον, τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ψέγοντας ὡς ἄχρηστον, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου πέρι μηδ' ἐπαΐοντες, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὡρῶν καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἄστρων καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τῇ τέχνῃ προσηκόντων, εἰ μέλλει τῷ ὄντι νεὼς ἀρχικὸς ἔσεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει, ἐάν

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23 **ὃς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν κτλ.** Jackson suggests that Isocrates is intended (*Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc.* XI 1882, p. 13). Possibly: but for my own part I do not think the description is sufficiently apposite to justify the identification.

488 D 25 **ἐπαΐοντες.** I should adopt the accusative with Stallbaum and others were it not for *οἰόμενοι*. Schneider is fully justified in saying "si Plato *ἐπαΐοντες* scripserat et *οἰόμενοι*, fieri vix poterat, quin prius vitiosum quibusdam et in accusativum mutandum videretur: alterum ipsa distantia tutum erat." This is precisely what has happened, for while *q* (with some other MSS, but not Π or Ξ) has *ἐπαΐοντας, all* the MSS, without exception, have *οἰόμενοι*. The anacoluthon is not harsher than other instances in which the best MSS have the nominative of the participle instead of the accusative, e.g. *Phaedr.* 241 D, *Soph.* 219 E, *Laws* 885 D, *Phaed.* 81 A. See also Classen on Thuc. II 53. 4, where many parallel instances are quoted from Thucydides. A long and unperiodic sentence like the present is peculiarly liable to anacolutha: and one has occurred already in 488 C. For these reasons I now agree with Schneider and others that the text is sound. The nominatives *πείθοντες* and *βιαζόμενοι* may have suggested the change to Plato: "*ψέγοντας* propter *ἐπαινοῦντας* tenuit, mox velut impatiens tenoris diu servati paullisper de via deflexit" (Schneider). Similar ungrammatical anacolutha are found occasionally also in Inscriptions, when the sentence runs to a considerable length: see Meisterhans[3] pp. 203, 205.

28 **ὅπως δὲ ... κυβερνητικήν.** The sailors, Plato has already told us, have not the smallest idea that the true pilot must study the year and the seasons etc., if he is to be truly qualified to rule a ship (that is to say, from Plato's point of view, *if he is to know how to steer*), but as for *how* he shall steer—let people wish him to or no—of *that* they think it impossible to acquire either art or study and therewith (lit. 'at-once-and') the art of steersmanship. We may translate the sentence thus: 'but art or system of *how* to steer, let alone whether people wish him to steer or no—that they think it impossible to acquire, and therewithal the art of steering.' The true pilot, according to Plato, is one who knows *how* to steer. Whether others wish him to steer or no, is wholly irrelevant; see *Pol.* 293 A ff., where this principle is declared to be of universal application, and illustrated as follows from the case of doctors: *ἰατροὺς δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα νενομίκαμεν, ἐάν τε ἑκόντας ἐάν τε ἄκοντας ἡμᾶς ἰῶνται—πάντως οὐδὲν ἧττον ἰατροὺς φαμεν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐπιστατοῦντες τέχνῃ—σῴζωσιν οἱ θεραπεύοντες ἕκαστοι τὰ θεραπευόμενα.* Cf. ibid. C *ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ πολιτειῶν—ταύτην ὀρθὴν διαφερόντως εἶναι καὶ μόνην πολιτείαν, ἐν ᾗ τις ἂν εὑρίσκοι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας καὶ οὐ δοκοῦντας μόνον, ἐάν τε κατὰ νόμους ἐάν τε ἄνευ νόμων ἄρχωσι, καὶ ἑκόντων καὶ ἀκόντων κτλ.* The expressions *ἐάν τε ἑκόντας ἐάν τε ἄκοντας*, and *καὶ ἑκόντων καὶ ἀκόντων* in these two passages, the general drift of which is the same as Plato's argument throughout this part of the *Republic*, exactly correspond to *ἐάν τέ τινες βούλωνται ἐάν τε μή*, and enable us to interpret that clause, as Schneider has already pointed out. Cf. also 296 E—297 B. Plato, indeed, is ready to go farther still, and would maintain that he who knows how to steer is a true pilot, even although he does not touch the helm (cf. ibid. 292 E). If others wish for his services, it is their business to apply to him, not his to sue for the opportunity of doing them a service (infra 489 B, C). A like principle holds good in the government of cities, and the Platonic Socrates, though abstaining from political life, may fairly claim *ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν* (*Gorg.* 521 D). The foolish sailors, on the other hand, desire only to get the

τέ τινες | βούλωνται ἐάν τε μή, μήτε τέχνην τούτου μήτε μελέτην E
οἰόμενοι δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικήν. τοιούτων
δὴ περὶ τὰς ναῦς γιγνομένων τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνητικὸν οὐχ
ἡγεῖ ἂν τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκόπον τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην καὶ ἄχρηστόν
σφισι καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς οὕτω κατεσκευασμέναις ναυσὶ 489
πλωτήρων; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος. Οὐ δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
οἶμαι δεῖσθαί σε ἐξεταζομένην τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ταῖς πόλεσι
πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φιλοσόφους τὴν διάθεσιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ μανθά-
νειν ὃ λέγω. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἐκεῖνον τὸν
θαυμάζοντα, ὅτι οἱ φιλόσοφοι οὐ τιμῶνται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, δίδασκέ
τε τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ πειρῶ πείθειν, ὅτι πολὺ ἂν θαυμαστότερον ἦν,
εἰ | ἐτιμῶντο. Ἀλλὰ διδάξω, ἔφη. Καὶ ὅτι τοίνυν τἀληθῆ λέγεις, B

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helm into their hands (488 C): how to handle it, they know not, and deny that it is possible to learn (*μήτε τέχνην—λαβεῖν*). What of *ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικήν*? These words should be taken closely with what goes before. The literal translation is (to acquire) 'at once and the art of steering': cf. *Phil.* 22 D *ὁ βίος οὗτος γέγονεν αἱρετὸς ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθός* 'this life is at once choiceworthy and good.' Now 'to acquire at once the art of how to steer (*ὅπως κυβερνήσει, τούτου τέχνην*) and the art of steering' is merely a way of saying 'to acquire the art of how to steer and therewith the art of steering.' He who learns the art and study of how to steer necessarily learns therewith the art of steering ("quarum qui compos factus sit, simul gubernatoriam artem teneat" Schneider): for *κυβερνητική* is, according to Plato, simply and solely the art of *how* to steer. *τὴν κυβερνητικήν*, in short, is nothing but the *τέχνη* and *μελέτη τούτου ὅπως κυβερνήσει*, expressed from Plato's point of view. Thus in denying that it is possible to learn either *τέχνη* or *μελέτη* of *how* to steer, the sailors are in effect emphatically denying that it is possible to learn *κυβερνητική* in Plato's sense of the word at all: cf. 488 B *φάσκοντες μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι.* So much for the meaning of this passage as a whole. In regard to details, it should be noted that *ὅπως* means 'how': *'ὅπως* ad *τούτου* spectans modum et rationem potius quam finem significat' (after Schneider). With Schneider also I understand *κυβερνήσει* as 'shall steer' and not 'shall get possession of the helm.' *μελέτη* is 'study' (in the more concrete sense of the word), rather than actual exercise or practice: cf. III 402 B *ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ μελέτης.* With *τέχνην λαβεῖν* cf. *Pol.* 300 E.

The above explanation agrees in the main with that of Schneider, and is in my opinion what Plato meant to say. For other views see App. I.

30 **οἰόμενοι.** *οἰομένους* is read by Stallbaum and others, but see note on line 25.

488 E 32 **μετεωροσκόπον κτλ.** A frequent taunt: cf. e.g. *Pol.* 299 B *μετεωρολόγον, ἀδολέσχην τινὰ σοφιστήν, Phaedr.* 270 A, *Parm.* 135 D, *Ap.* 18 B, Isocrates *adv. Soph.* 8, *Antid.* 262, and Ar. *Clouds* 228, 1480 with Blaydes' note. The implication is that *ὁ μετεωροσκόπος* is blind to *τὰ ἐν ποσίν*: cf. *Theaet.* 174 A. Cobet revives Porson's conjecture *μετεωροκόπον* (after *μετεωροκοπεῖς* in Ar. *Peace* 92), but the text is perfectly good: cf. *μετεωρολέσχας* in 489 C.

489 A 3 **ἐξεταζομένην**: 'cross-examined.'

489 B 8 **καὶ ὅτι—λέγεις.** 'And also that what you say is true' etc. Socrates identifies Adimantus with his hypothetical objector in 487 D; cf. *σε λέγειν* in D below. Another possibility—less good, I think—is to take *ὅτι* as introducing a direct address: "and say to him also 'You speak truly, when you say'" etc. *λέγειν* is found in a few inferior MSS; and *λέγει*, which Stallbaum and Baiter adopt, occurs in Par. D. *λέγειν* is indefensible, and the corruption of *λέγειν* or *λέγει* to *λέγεις* is exceedingly improbable here. On *τοίνυν* = 'also' see I 339 D *n.*

ὡς ἄχρηστοι τοῖς πολλοῖς οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ· τῆς μέντοι ἀχρηστίας τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους κέλευε αἰτιᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι ὑφ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἰέναι, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος ἐψεύσατο, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν, ἐάν τε πλούσιος ἐάν τε πένης κάμνῃ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ
C ἰατρῶν θύρας | ἰέναι καὶ πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν δυναμένου, οὐ τὸν ἄρχοντα δεῖσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων ἄρχεσθαι, οὗ ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τι ὄφελος ᾖ. ἀλλὰ τοὺς νῦν πολιτικοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀπεικάζων οἷς ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν ναύταις οὐχ ἁμαρτήσει, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ἀχρήστους λεγομένους καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνήταις. Ὀρθότατα, ἔφη. Ἐκ τε τοίνυν τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ῥᾴδιον εὐδοκιμεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτήδευμα ὑπὸ τῶν
D τἀναντία ἐπιτηδευόντων· | πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη καὶ ἰσχυροτάτη διαβολὴ γίγνεται φιλοσοφίᾳ διὰ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα φάσκοντας ἐπιτηδεύειν, οὓς δὴ σὺ φῂς τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγειν ὡς

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10 **τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους.** Those who will not *use* them are to blame for their *uselessness*. The etymological figure is of course intentional.

11 **οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κτλ.** See 488 D *n.*

12 **τοὺς σοφοὺς κτλ.** "The learned pate Ducks to the golden fool" (*Timon of Athens* IV 3). See also VIII 568 A *n.* The author of the saying was, according to Aristotle (*Rhet.* II 16. 1391ª 8 ff.), Simonides. Being asked on one occasion by Hiero's queen whether it was better to be a man of genius (*σοφός*) or rich, he replied "Rich; for men of genius are found at the court of the rich"—a characteristic reply, by which the courtliest of ancient poets contrived to flatter the queen without forgetting himself. (It should be remembered that *σοφός* often means 'poet'.) There is no reason for supposing (with e.g. Teichmüller *Lit. Fehd.* I p. 102) that Plato attributed the saying to Aristippus, although a witticism on the subject is ascribed both to him (D. L. II 8. 69) and to Antisthenes (Winckelmann *Antisth. Frag.* p. 58). Plato liked to get his knife into Simonides: see I 331 E ff.

489 C 16 **δεῖσθαι** is governed by the idea of obligation carried on from *ἀναγκαῖον*. The alternative suggested by J. and C., that the infinitive depends on *πέφυκεν*, is impossible.

20 **ἐν τούτοις.** *τούτοις* is neuter, like *τούτων*: otherwise *ὑπὸ—ἐπιτηδευόντων* is hardly necessary. The balance of clauses —'in consequence of these circumstances, and amid these circumstances'—is also in favour of this—Schneider's—view.

489 C—**491** A *So much for the 'uselessness' of the philosopher. But the most serious prejudice from which Philosophy suffers is owing to those who pretend to be philosophers when they are not. It is they who are meant, when people assert that the majority of philosophers are depraved. Let us endeavour to shew that Philosophy is not responsible for the corruption of the philosophic nature. The true philosopher, in spite of popular misconceptions, is, as we have seen, naturally a lover of Truth, and therefore possesses all the virtues of character already named. We have to enquire* (1) *how this disposition becomes in many cases depraved and* (2) *what is the character of the false philosophers who are responsible for the prejudice against Philosophy.*

489 D 24 **οὓς δή—λέγειν**: 'of whom it is that you say the accuser of philosophy declares that,' etc. For *τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα* see 487 C *n.*

παμπόνηροι οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἰόντων ἐπ᾽ αὐτήν, οἱ δὲ ἐπιεικέστατοι ἄχρηστοι, καὶ ἐγὼ συνεχώρησα ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν. ἦ γάρ; Ναί.

V. Οὐκοῦν τῆς μὲν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀχρηστίας τὴν αἰτίαν διειλήλυθαμεν; Καὶ μάλα. Τῆς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν πονηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διέλθωμεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ τούτου φιλοσοφία αἰτία, | ἂν δυνώμεθα, πειραθῶμεν δεῖξαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἀκούωμεν δὴ καὶ λέγωμεν ἐκεῖθεν ἀναμνησθέντες, ὅθεν διῆμεν τὴν φύσιν, οἷον ἀνάγκη φῦναι τὸν καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐσόμενον. | ἡγεῖτο δ᾽ 490
αὐτῷ, εἰ νῷ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἣν διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει, ἢ ἀλαζόνι ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς. Ἦν γὰρ οὕτω λεγόμενον. Οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν τοῦτο σφόδρα οὕτω παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις περὶ αὐτοῦ; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ἆρ᾽ οὖν δὴ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὂν

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25 **ἰόντων ἐπί** almost='woo her': cf. 495 C ff., *Symp.* 210 A. *πλησιάζω* is similarly used in 490 B.

28 **τὴν ἀνάγκην** should be taken strictly. There is no possibility of escape: the majority must inevitably succumb. Cf. 492 E *n.*

489 E 31 **ἐκεῖθεν—ὅθεν.** As *ἀναμμνήσκομαι* takes the genitive of a noun, so it can be followed by a genitival—originally ablatival—adverb. *ὅθεν* is attracted for *οὗ*: cf. Soph. *Tr.* 701 and other examples in Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 915.

32 **καλόν τε κἀγαθόν.** The fashionable Greek phrase *καλὸς κἀγαθός* for an *ἐλευθέριος*, or gentleman, was continually used by Socrates and his followers to express their ideal of what a man should be. An excellent discussion of the Socratic connotation of the word will be found in Döring *Die Lehre des Sokrates* pp. 398—415: for its usual implications reference may be made to Schmidt *Ethik d. alten Griechen* I pp. 328—334. In politics, the expression was applied to the wealthy or oligarchical party (cf. VIII 569 A and Thuc. VIII 48. 6). It is therefore probable that Socrates' habitual use of *καλὸς κἀγαθός* fostered the not unwarranted suspicion that he and his friends were out of sympathy with democracy, and so contributed in some measure to his condemnation and death.

490 A 2 **νῷ ἔχεις:** 'you remember.' *ἐν νῷ ἔχεις* (as in some inferior MSS) would mean 'you intend.' Compare *Euthyph.* 2 B with *Ap.* 20 B. The reference is to 485 B—487 A.

3 **ἦ**='alioquin.' Cf. V 463 D *n.*

5 **οὕτω κτλ.** *οὕτω* "ex Adimanti verbis repetitum et praecise dictum est pro *οὕτω λεγόμενον ἦν*." If the word is genuine, it must be taken in this way. J. and C. translate "to say no more," comparing *ῥᾳδίως οὕτω* and the like (see on II 377 B). But there appears to be no other instance of this idiomatic *οὕτω* with the adverb *σφόδρα*. *οὐτωσὶ σφόδρα* in Ar. *Frogs* 88 is quite different, in spite of Blaydes on Ar. *Wasps* 461. It is just possible that *οὕτω* is an interpolation from *οὕτω* just before.

παρὰ δόξαν. By selecting this form of expression Plato "opinionibus opinionem tribuit" (Schneider), loosely enough, but the words are practically equivalent to *ἐναντίον*. *παράδοξον* would be somewhat easier, but the text is probably sound. For a similar pleonasm see my note on *Crito* 44 C.

δοκουμένοις. With the passive cf. X 612 D.

αὐτοῦ is masculine, and means Plato's *καλὸς κἀγαθός*, i.e. the philosopher, whom popular opinion regards as an *ἀλαζών*, if not as a liar.

6 **ἆρ᾽ οὖν δὴ κτλ.** 'Shall we not then fairly plead that the true lover of learning was disposed by nature to strive towards Being and tarried not at the many particulars which are opined to be' etc.? Socrates has just said that Truth is the leading attribute of the Philosopher. This proposition is challenged by public opinion (*παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις*), and in support of it Socrates urges, what

πεφυκὼς εἴη ἀμιλλᾶσθαι ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθὴς καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένοι
B ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι | πολλοῖς ἑκάστοις, ἀλλ' ἴοι καὶ οὐκ
ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου
τῆς φύσεως ἅψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου· 10
προσήκει δὲ ξυγγενεῖ· ᾧ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως,
γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῴη καὶ τρέφοιτο
καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδῖνος, πρὶν δ' οὔ; Ὡς οἷόν τ', ἔφη, μετριώτατα.
Τί οὖν; τούτῳ τι μετέσται ψεῦδος ἀγαπᾶν, ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον

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he had asserted before (485 A—C) that the philosopher is a lover of *τὸ ὄν*. *εἴη* ('was,' i.e. 'is, as we saw') would be the 'philosophic imperfect' in direct speech. For the rare change from *ἦν* to *εἴη* after a primary tense cf. Xen. *Mem.* I 2. 34 *δῆλον* (sc. *ἐστὶν*) *ὅτι ἀφεκτέον εἴη τοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγειν*, where *εἴη* stands for *ἦν* (the usual 'erat' for 'esset' with words denoting obligation or necessity) of the direct, and Plato *Charm.* 156 B *λέγουσί που ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν.* (Madvig's insertion of *ἂν* after *ἀναγκαῖον* in this passage is without authority.) Cf. also II 361 C *n.* The sequence is all the more easy with the philosophic imperfect because its very nature involves a reference to the past. Ast's conjecture *ἀπελογησάμεθα* is incorrect; for the philosopher's zeal for Being has not yet been urged in *defence* of the statement—now for the first time formally challenged—that Truth is his leading characteristic. Madvig conjectures *ἀπελογισάμεθα*, which Baiter adopts, although the word is wholly inappropriate here. Cf. X 607 B *n.*

490 B 11 **ξυγγενεῖ.** *νοῦς* is akin to Being and the Eternal: cf. *Phaed.* 79 D, *Tim.* 90 A—C and infra X 611 E.

ᾧ πλησιάσας κτλ.: 'whereby having come nigh unto and married with true Being, begetting Reason and Truth, he attained unto knowledge and enjoyed true life and nourishment, and then but not before ceased from travail of the soul.' The mystic union of the Soul with Being is here described in passionate and glowing language. Cf. *Phaedr.* 246 E—247 D, *Symp.* 210 A—212 A, and many parallels in Plotinus, for whom, as for the Neoplatonists generally, the mystic side of Platonism had an extraordinary fascination: see Zeller[3] III 2, pp. 611—618. The imagery should be compared with *Theaet.* 156 A ff. where the phenomena of Perception are thus analysed. The Subject unites with the Object, and from this union are born two children, one the *αἴσθησις* e.g. Sight, the other the *αἰσθητόν* e.g. *τὸ μέλαν*. The former belongs more peculiarly to the Subject, the latter to the Object. Similarly with the phenomena of Knowledge. The Subject unites with the Idea, and the children of this union are *νοῦς* (or rather, strictly speaking, *νόησις* i.e. the *action* of *νοῦς*), on the side of the Subject, and the *νοητόν*, i.e. Truth, on the side of the Object. We miss an essential point if we take *νοῦν* as the *object* of Knowledge; it is the faculty of Reason, no longer dormant, but suddenly called into actuality. Plato means that Reason does not really live until it lays hold on the Idea. *γνοίη* corresponds to *νοῦν*; it is by the begetting of *νοῦς* that we come to know. The aorist denotes the instantaneous act; cf. *Symp.* 210 E *πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν—ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλὸν κτλ.* See also on 508 D and cf. VII 517 C. In like manner *ἀληθῶς ζῴη* balances *ἀλήθειαν*: there is no true life without knowledge of the Truth. *ἀληθῶς* goes also with *τρέφοιτο*: cf. *Phaedr.* 247 D and 248 B, C. With *ὠδῖνος* cf. *Phaedr.* 251 E (*ὠδῖνων ἔληξεν*) and *Symp.* 206 E. It is tempting to suppose that in *ὠδῖνος* Plato is thinking not merely of the lover's pangs, but also of the pangs of birth. The knowledge of the Idea is indeed in Plato's view an intellectual and moral regeneration. But *ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος* shews that *ὠδῖνος* means the throes of love; and the further view introduces a confusion of ideas which is alien to the peculiar character of Plato's 'mysticism.'

14 **μετέσται.** With *μετέσται* cf. X 606 B *λογίζεσθαι γὰρ—ὀλίγοις τισὶ μέτ-*

μισεῖν; | Μισεῖν, ἔφη. Ἡγουμένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἄν ποτε, C
οἶμαι, φαῖμεν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθῆσαι. Πῶς γάρ; Ἀλλ'
ὑγιές τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος, ᾧ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἕπεσθαι. Ὀρθῶς,
ἔφη. Καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορὸν τί δεῖ πάλιν
ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν; μέμνησαι γάρ που, ὅτι ξυνέβη
προσῆκον τούτοις ἀνδρεία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη· καὶ
σοῦ ἐπιλαβομένου, ὅτι πᾶς μὲν ἀναγκασθήσεται | ὁμολογεῖν οἷς D
λέγομεν, ἐάσας δὲ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀποβλέψας περὶ ὧν ὁ
λόγος, φαίη ὁρᾶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς
κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν, τῆς διαβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπισκοποῦντες ἐπὶ
τούτῳ νῦν γεγόναμεν, τί ποθ' οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, καὶ τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα

23. μὲν Π: om. A.

ἐστιν and *Theaet.* 186 E. τι is adverbial and does not go with ψεῦδος. There is no occasion for Madvig's conjecture ἐπιμελὲς ἔσται: nor need we write ψεύδους, as I formerly proposed.

490 C 15 **ἡγουμένης κτλ.** 'Now where Truth was leader' (as we saw it was with the φιλόσοφος) 'we shall never, I think, allow that a quire of evils joined her train.' ἡγουμένης is not the present, but the imperfect participle (cf. ἡγεῖτο δ' αὐτῷ—ἀλήθεια 490 A): the 'philosophic' past is carried on from the earlier sentence. The tense is strictly to the point, for our ἀπολογία is not yet finished: see 490 A *n.* We ought not to regard ἀκολουθῆσαι (with Goodwin *MT.* p. 55) as a gnomic aorist: still less should we read ἀκολουθήσειν with *g*, or φαμεν for φαῖμεν (Stobaeus *Flor.* 11. 18 and Vind. F), taking ἄν with ἀκολουθῆσαι (as I formerly suggested). The past tense is the only one appropriate to the situation both in Greek and in English. See also on line 17.

17 **ἦθος**: sc. ἀκολουθῆσαι. These 'joined the train' of virtue at 486 B.

18 **καὶ δὴ κτλ.** καί is 'also' and goes with τὸν ἄλλον: cf. καί—δή in 494 A.

19 **ἀναγκάζοντα** has been doubted. It is read by all the MSS except Ξ, which has ἀναλαμβάνοντα (cf. 490 D). Stallbaum accepts ἀναλαμβάνοντα, while Baiter adopts Madvig's picturesque conjecture ἀναβιβάζοντα. The text is perfectly sound. ἀναγκάζοντα is ἀναγκάζοντα τῷ λόγῳ, i.e. λέγων ἀναγκαῖα εἶναι, 'insisting on their necessity': see on II 363 D (ἀποτίνουσιν) and cf. X 611 B and *Theaet.* 153 C (where Cobet wrongly brackets ἀναγκάζω). Much the same view is taken by Jackson (*J. of Ph.* XIII p. 218), who compares 486 E μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι. J. and C.'s translation "compelling your assent" is scarcely accurate here.

490 D 23 **φαίη**. In 487 C we have φαίη ἄν τις, and Richards would add ἄν here. But the hypothetical critic (with whom Socrates himself agrees 487 E) is now treated as what he really is—the exponent of opinions held by all. We should translate 'after you objected that all men would be compelled to agree with what we say, but when they set words aside, and looked at the actual people of whom the argument spoke, they declared that' etc. For φαίη after ἀναγκασθήσεται (rather than ἀναγκασθήσοιτο) see Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 1061.

24 **τῆς διαβολῆς**. Π and the majority of MSS have τῇ ἥδῃ διαβολῇς. If ἥδῃ is right, it must, I think, be taken with τῆς διαβολῆς in the sense of 'ea διαβολή quae iam apparebat et in conspectum venerat, cum antea animadversa non fuisset' (so Bernhardy and Schneider *Addit.* p. 46). Even so, it is harsh, but not so harsh as if we take it with ἐπισκοποῦντες, as Stallbaum—and formerly Schneider—did. So extreme a hyperbaton would be more difficult than that in Soph. *O. T.* 1245, and scarcely admissible in prose. Perhaps Plato wrote τῆς διαβολῆς ἥδῃ. Otherwise we must suppose that A and other MSS are right in omitting the word.

πάλιν ἀνειλήφαμεν τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν καὶ ἐξ
E ἀνάγκης ὡρισάμεθα. Ἔστιν, ἔφη, ταῦτα.

VI. Ταύτης δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆς φύσεως δεῖ θεάσασθαι τὰς φθοράς, ὡς διόλλυται ἐν πολλοῖς, σμικρὸν δέ τι ἐκφεύγει, οὓς δὴ καὶ οὐ πονηρούς, ἀχρήστους δὲ καλοῦσι· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ τὰς 30
491 μιμουμένας ταύτην | καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καθισταμένας αὐτῆς, οἵαι οὖσαι φύσεις ψυχῶν εἰς ἀνάξιον καὶ μεῖζον ἑαυτῶν ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπιτήδευμα πολλαχῇ πλημμελοῦσαι πανταχῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας δόξαν οἵαν λέγεις φιλοσοφίᾳ προσῆψαν. Τίνας δέ, ἔφη, τὰς διαφθορὰς λέγεις; Ἐγώ σοι, εἶπον, ἂν οἷός τε γένωμαι, πειράσομαι 5
διελθεῖν. τόδε μὲν οὖν, οἶμαι, πᾶς ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσει, τοιαύτην φύσιν καὶ πάντα ἔχουσαν, ὅσα προσετάξαμεν νῦν δή, εἰ τελέως
B μέλλοι φιλόσοφος | γενέσθαι, ὀλιγάκις ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγας. ἢ οὐκ οἴει; Σφόδρα γε. Τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων σκόπει ὡς πολλοὶ ὄλεθροι καὶ μεγάλοι. Τίνες δή; Ὁ μὲν πάντων θαυ- 10

8. μέλλοι $A^2\Pi$: μέλλει A^1.

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490 E 31 **τὰς μιμουμένας κτλ.** Plato distinguishes between two kinds of πονηρία, that which results from the corruption of the truly philosophic nature, and the πονηρία of pretenders to philosophy. It is the latter—so we are told—which is responsible for the prejudice under which Philosophy labours (cf. 489 D): but the former is by far the more serious evil (491 E, 495 B), though engendered, not by Philosophy, but by the seductive influence of public opinion.

491 A—**495** B *The philosophic nature is a rare growth, whose very virtues render it peculiarly liable to corruption, when it is placed in unfavourable surroundings. The clamorous voice of public opinion, expressed in assemblies and other gatherings of the people, inevitably corrupts the youth by moulding them into conformity with itself. Where necessary, force is employed, under the name of punishment. Against these influences, no teacher can possibly contend, although the providence of God may save some. As for the Sophists, they do but make into a system and teach the opinions of the Multitude, which they are wholly unable to justify, but accept without reserve, as their profession requires them to do. Remember too that the Ideas are foolishness to the Many, so that they will never love Wisdom or her followers. Socrates concludes with a vivid and lifelike picture of a philosophic nature in process of corruption.*

491 A 2 **ἀνάξιον**='too good for': cf. *Prot.* 355 D and Soph. *Phil.* 1009. ἀντάξιον (Benedictus) and ἀνοίκειον (Herwerden) are unhappy conjectures.

3 **ἐπὶ πάντας**: 'all the world over.' Cf. ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους in *Tim.* 23 B.

7 **εἰ—γενέσθαι.** Cobet, who formerly proposed γενήσεσθαι, afterwards rejected the whole clause. The aorist infinitive with μέλλω is rare, but thoroughly established in Plato, if any reliance is placed on the best MSS: see the examples collected by Schanz Vol. V p. vii.

491 B 8 **ὀλιγάκις—ὀλίγας.** ὀλιγάκις καὶ ὀλίγας is half-proverbial. For καὶ ὀλίγας Stephanus conjectured καὶ ὀλίγοις or καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις, Richards κἀν ὀλίγοις, comparing Arist. *Eth. Nic.* VII 11. 1151^b 30 διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι φανεράν. But ἐν ὀλίγοις would be inelegant after ἐν ἀνθρώποις, and Plato could not have written ὀλίγην. A similar but easier change from the generic singular to the plural occurs III 408 B and infra 500 C. Translate, keeping the anacoluthon; 'that such a nature—one possessed of all the qualities' etc.—'such natures are few and far between among mankind.'

10 **ὃ—ὅτι.** Cf. I 330 B *n.*

μαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι ἓν ἕκαστον ὧν ἐπῃνέσαμεν τῆς φύσεως ἀπόλλυσι τὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν καὶ ἀποσπᾷ φιλοσοφίας. λέγω δὲ ἀνδρείαν, σωφροσύνην, καὶ πάντα ἃ διήλθομεν. Ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ἀκοῦσαι. Ἔτι τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ C
15 πάντα φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾷ, κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχὺς σώματος καὶ ξυγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτων οἰκεῖα· ἔχεις γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὧν λέγω. Ἔχω, ἔφη· καὶ ἡδέως γ' ἂν ἀκριβέστερον ἃ λέγεις πυθοίμην. Λαβοῦ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς, καί σοι εὐδηλόν τε φανεῖται, καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπα δόξει τὰ
20 προειρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, κελεύεις; Παντός, ἦν D δ' ἐγώ, σπέρματος πέρι ἢ φυτοῦ, εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζῴων, ἴσμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὴ τυχὸν τροφῆς ἧς προσήκει ἑκάστῳ, μηδ' ὥρας μηδὲ τόπου, ὅσῳ ἂν ἐρρωμενέστερον ᾖ, τοσούτῳ πλειόνων ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων·

20. παντὸς $A^2\Pi$: πάντως A.

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12 **ἀπόλλυσι κτλ.** Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 114) asks how courage and temperance can tend to corrupt the character. The answer is given by Plato in 494 B ff. They bring their possessor to the front, and therefore expose him to the solicitations of selfish and unscrupulous men. It should be carefully borne in mind that *ἀνδρεία* and the other virtues are here regarded, not as the result of education, but as natural qualities, derived from the philosopher's native love of truth. We are in fact dealing with the *potentiality* of the *τελέως φιλόσοφος* (491 A). It is this which suffers corruption, not the actualized philosopher. Cf. Krohn l.c. p. 115 and Pfleiderer *Zur Lösung* etc. p. 26.

491 C 17 **ἔχεις γὰρ—λέγω**: not "now I have given you an outline of my meaning" (D. and V.), but 'you understand the general type of the things I mean,' that is, the general character of things which *φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾷ*, though in themselves advantages or even virtues. Adimantus assents, but would like to have them specified more precisely. In reply, Socrates bids him grasp the notion of them correctly as a whole (*αὐτοῦ* is neuter and *ὅλου αὐτοῦ* is practically equivalent to *τύπου*), and it will become clear to him, and *τὰ προειρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν* (viz. that they *ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀποσπᾷ—φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾷ* B, C) will *not* appear *ἄτοπα* as before (*ἄτοπον—ἀκοῦσαι* in B). The passage is somewhat loosely written; but *αὐτῶν* is certainly neuter and not 'the philosophic natures,' as J. and C. suppose.

491 D 21 **ἐγγείων—ζῴων.** These are possessive genitives. Richards says that "*τῶν* should probably be omitted before *ζῴων* or added before *ἐγγείων*." Cf. however IV 438 C *n.* In this instance I think Plato wrote *τῶν ζῴων* in order to call special attention to *ζῷα* as opposed to *ἔγγεια*. They are not on the same level of importance, as far as the argument is concerned, for it is the degeneration of *ζῷα*, not of *ἔγγεια*, which Plato has to explain.

23 **πλειόνων** is much more elegant than Madvig's conjecture *πλεῖον*. Plato's position on this matter, in the way in which he states it, is open to objection. It might be argued that the naturally *strong* nature is the best fitted to resist the corrupting influences of its environment. But the philosophic nature is remarkable for sensibility as well as strength, and the sensitive plant needs careful fostering. The general sentiment of this passage is Socratic, as Hermann (*Gesch. u. System* p. 330 *n.* 33) and Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 365) have pointed out: cf. *Mem.* IV 1. 3, 4 *τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους ἐρρωμενεστάτους τε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντας—παιδευθέντας μὲν καὶ μαθόντας ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ἀρίστους τε καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτους γίγνεσθαι—ἀπαιδεύτους δὲ καὶ ἀμαθεῖς γενομένους κακίστους τε καὶ βλαβερωτάτους γίγνεσθαι.*

ἀγαθῷ γάρ που κακὸν ἐναντιώτερον ἢ τῷ μὴ ἀγαθῷ. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Ἔχει δή, οἶμαι, λόγον τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἐν ἀλλοτριωτέρᾳ οὖσαν τροφῇ κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαύλης. Ἔχει. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφυεστάτας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι; ἢ οἴει τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῇ διολομένης γίγνεσθαι, ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι; Οὔκ, ἀλλά, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως. Ἦν τοίνυν ἔθεμεν τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσιν, ἂν μέν, οἶμαι, μαθήσεως προσηκούσης τύχῃ, εἰς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἀνάγκη αὐξανομένην ἀφικνεῖσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐν προσηκούσῃ σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα τρέφηται, εἰς πάντα τἀναντία αὖ, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσας θεῶν τύχῃ. ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, διαφθείροντας δέ

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25 **τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν κτλ.** The contrast is between the *ἀρίστη φύσις* and the *φαύλη*, where *both* are subjected to (*οὖσαν ἐν* cf. 495 A) bad *τροφή*. The former 'comes off worse,' 'suffers more' (*κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν*), because the *τροφή* is more alien to *its* nature than to that of the others: cf. *τοσούτῳ πλειόνων ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων*. So Schneider correctly explains the passage. Cf. generally Dante *Inferno* VI 106—108 "Ritorna a tua scienza, Che vuol, quanto la cosa è più perfetta, Più senta 'l bene, e così la doglienza." Van Heusde's *ἐν ἀλλοτρίῳ τραφεῖσαν* misses the point. Even more unhappy is Boeckh's *κακίον' ἀπαλλάττειν*, which Stallbaum adopts. *κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν* is simply the comparative of *κακῶς ἀπαλλάττειν*: see Cobet in *Mnem.* XI p. 168, where Stallbaum is severely rebuked.

491 E 30 ἐκ νεανικῆς κτλ.: "out of a fulness of nature ruined by education" Jowett. Plato's attitude on this subject is highly characteristic. The educator's whole efforts are to be directed towards saving and improving strong and gifted natures: cf. VII 519 A, B. Weak natures may be almost neglected, without serious injury to the State. They will never do anything great—whether good or evil: see 495 B. For this and other reasons Plato does not trouble to lay down rules for the education of the lower classes in his city.

492 A 3 μὴ ἐν προσηκούσῃ: i.q. *ἐν μὴ προσηκούσῃ* (which Stephanus wrongly read), by a common hyperbaton: cf. *Crito* 47 D and other examples in Braun *De Hyperb. Pl.* p. 15. With *προσηκούσῃ* it is usual to supply *μαθήσει*. I think Plato intentionally selects a vague expression, intending *ἐν προσηκούσῃ* to be taken with *σπαρεῖσα—φυτευθεῖσα* as well as with *τρέφηται*: for it is just as important that the philosophic nature should be sown and planted in a proper soil (491 D), as that it should receive proper education. Morgenstern, who formerly proposed *προσηκούσῃ <γῇ>*, afterwards adopted much the same view as this: see Schneider *Addit.* p. 46.

5 **θεῶν**. See on *θεοῦ μοῖραν* 493 A.

ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ κτλ. This passage is appealed to by Grote (VIII pp. 200 ff.) in his famous defence of the Sophists. Plato certainly implies that the Sophists did not independently corrupt the young 'to any extent worth mentioning' (*ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου*). It is the Demos which is the primary source and fount of corruption; the Sophists are only the mouthpiece of a disgraceful public opinion which it is their profession to flatter and court (493 A—D). But from Plato's point of view this is itself a sufficiently grave indictment to bring against a professional teacher of Morality (see 493 C), so that the present attack on the Athenian people is far from being an apology for the Sophists.

τινας σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας μεγίστους μὲν | εἶναι σοφιστάς, παιδεύειν δὲ B τελεώτατα καὶ ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἵους βούλονται εἶναι καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; Πότε δή; ἦ δ' ὅς. Ὅταν, εἶπον, ξυγκαθεζόμενοι ἀθρόοι πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἤ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον ξὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως ἑκάτερα, καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦν- C τες, | πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς αἵ τε πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὦσιν ἐπηχοῦντες διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου. ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον, τίνα οἴει καρδίαν ἴσχειν; ἢ ποίαν ἂν αὐτῷ παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξειν, ἣν οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου ψόγου ἢ ἐπαίνου οἰχήσεσθαι φερομένην κατὰ ῥοῦν, ᾗ ἂν οὗτος φέρῃ, καὶ φήσειν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις καλὰ καὶ

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492 B 11 **ξυγκαθεζόμενοι κτλ.** The Athenians sat at an Ecclesia: see Ar. *Ach.* 24 f. with Blaydes' note. For πολλοί I formerly read *οἱ πολλοί* with Hermann; but *ἀθρόοι πολλοί* is sound, and means 'in large numbers together,' like *πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι* in *Gorg.* 490 B. The subject is of course *οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες*, i.e. *οἱ πολλοί* (492 A). The mention of numbers is to the point: how can one man stand against so many? Cobet is wrong in deleting *πολλοί*.

12 **ξύν.** See on IV 424 D.

14 **ὑπερβαλλόντως.** Cf. VIII 561 C ff. Exaggeration and excess are characteristic marks of democracy.

492 C 15 **πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς κτλ.** Plato is doubtless thinking of the Acropolis and the Dionysiac theatre. Cobet does ill to bracket *τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου*: for Plato characteristically makes the rocks themselves applaud. Cf. VIII 563 C. Translate 'Yea, and besides themselves, the rocks and the place wherein they are resound and give forth a reduplicated uproar of censure and applause.' Cf. *Euthyd.* 303 B *ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλίγου καὶ οἱ κίονες οἱ ἐν τῷ* Λυκείῳ *ἐθορύβησάν τ' ἐπὶ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν καὶ ἤσθησαν.*

17 **τίνα—ἴσχειν.** 'Where, think you, is a young man's heart?' For the saying cf. Isocr. *Trap.* 10 *τίν' οἴεσθέ με γνώμην ἔχειν;* and Dem. *adv. Aphob.* II 21 *τίν' οἴεσθε αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἕξειν; καρδία* as the seat of courage is colloquial and rare: cf. Archil. *Fr.* 58. 4 *καρδίης πλέος* and Plut. *Reg. et imp. apophthegmata* 185 E *τοὺς δὲ Ἐρετριεῖς—ἔλεγεν ὥσπερ τευθίδας μάχαιραν μὲν ἔχειν, καρδίαν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν. q* has *τίνα ἂν οἴει*, and Bywater and Herwerden propose *τίν' ἄν οἴει*, but the MS reading is better and more picturesque.

18 **ποίαν ἄν.** I agree with Goodwin (*MT.* pp. 66, 68, 71) and others that *ἄν* with the future was occasionally used by the best Attic prose writers. In Plato it occurs *Ap.* 29 C, 30 B, *Symp.* 222 A, *Rep.* X 615 D, *Crito* 53 D, *Euthyd.* 287 D, *Phaedr.* 227 B, and probably also elsewhere. All these instances have been 'emended,' and it is possible enough that some of them are corrupt. Here *ἄν* is in all the MSS, and is therefore better retained, although it may of course be an erroneous repetition of the last syllable of *ποίαν* (as Cobet and others suppose). We may regard the idiom as one of Plato's numerous half-poetical efforts: see X 615 D *n.* Richards proposes *δή*: but see V 450 C *n.*

20 **καὶ φήσειν κτλ.** In *oratio recta* the whole sentence would have run *ποία ἂν αὐτῷ παιδεία ἰδιωτικὴ ἀνθέξει, ἣ οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσα—οἰχήσεται φερομένη—καὶ φήσει—καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσει—καὶ ἔσται τοιοῦτος;* i.e. (literally translated) 'what private training of his will stand fast, which will not be swamped by such censure or praise, and carried down the stream wherever the stream leads, and he will say' etc. (The metaphor is from a mole or breakwater swept away by a

D αἰσχρὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσειν ¹ ἅπερ ἂν οὗτοι, καὶ ἔσεσθαι τοιοῦτον; Πολλή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνάγκη.

VII. Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔπω τὴν μεγίστην ἀνάγκην εἰρήκαμεν. Ποίαν; ἔφη. Ἣν ἔργῳ προστιθέασι, λόγῳ μὴ πείθοντες, οὗτοι οἱ παιδευταί τε καὶ σοφισταί. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις κολάζουσι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα. Τίνα οὖν ἄλλον σοφιστὴν οἴει ἢ ποίους ἰδιω-
E τικοὺς λόγους ἐναντία τούτοις ¹ τείνοντας κρατήσειν; Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδένα, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἄνοια. οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε· θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν

25. τὸν Π: τὸ A.

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flood.) In this there is nothing but the common passage of a relative into a main sentence (see II 357 B *n.* and cf. *Ap.* 40 A with my note ad loc.), coupled with an easy change of subject, as in *Crito* 46 A. The sentence assumes the form which it has in the text, because both subordinate and main clauses can take the accusative with infinitive in Greek *oratio obliqua*: see Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 1056. Stallbaum (followed by J. and C.) understands *οὐκ οἴει* to account for *φήσειν*, but the negative cannot be supplied, and if it could, it would give a wrong sense. Schneider's translation is correct, but not his note in the text. With the sentiment cf. *Gorg.* 510 D ff.

492 D 25 **σοφισταί.** The Demos is the Arch-Sophist: cf. 492 A *n.* *οὗτοι* is the contemptuous *isti*: 'these teachers and sophists of yours.'

26 **θανάτοις.** The fate of Socrates was the most conspicuous example of this in Plato's time, but it is hardly likely that Plato is specifically alluding to it here (as Steinhart and Susemihl suppose). The description is quite general. Contrast VII 517 A *n.*

492 E 30 **οὔτε γὰρ κτλ.** Plato has just declared that it would be the height of folly in a teacher even to attempt to make a young man run counter to public opinion. The present sentence explains why. There is not, never has been, and never will be produced a character different (from the Many) in respect of virtue, by having been educated on principles opposed to the education which the Many provide (the force of public sentiment, expressed in assemblies etc.). Consequently every attempt to produce such a character by means of education in the teeth of public opinion is foredoomed to failure. The statement appears at first sight extraordinary; but from Plato's point of view it is, with the limitations which he makes, strictly correct. Cities are either actual or ideal. In the ideal city, education does not produce a type of character which conflicts with public opinion, because public opinion is itself formed by education. In actual cities, education must conform to the same standard if it is to exist at all: for *τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις κολάζουσι* (492 D). How then are we to explain the presence of great and good men in existing cities? They are *θεῖοι ἄνδρες*, saved from corruption by grace of God: see on 493 A. In these circumstances, what is the political reformer to do? He must break with all existing cities (497 B), and found—as Plato now wishes to do—a new commonwealth in which sound education and public opinion no longer differ, but agree. In other words, his policy must be to make the Philosopher King. For other views of this passage see App. II.

32 **ἀνθρώπειον**: sc. *ἦθος*: 'a merely human character.' Plato makes an exception in favour of a *θεῖον ἦθος*, playing on the proverb *τὸ θεῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου*, for which cf. *Symp.* 176 C *Σωκράτη δ' ἐξαιρῶ*

ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου. εὖ γὰρ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅ τί περ ἂν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολι|τειῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν 493
αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς. Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἄλλως, ἔφη, δοκεῖ. Ἔτι τοίνυν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάτω. Τὸ ποῖον; Ἕκαστος τῶν μισθαρνούντων ἰδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι σοφισ-
5 τὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνους ἡγοῦνται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσιν, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν, οἷόνπερ ἂν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ τρεφομένου τὰς ὀργάς τις καὶ ἐπιθυμίας κατεμάνθανεν,
| ὅπῃ τε προσελθεῖν χρὴ καὶ ὅπῃ ἅψασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁπότε χαλε- B
10 πώτατον ἢ πραότατον καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίγνεται, καὶ φωνὰς δὴ ἐφ' οἷς ἑκάστας εἴωθεν φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ οἵας αὖ ἄλλου φθεγγομένου ἡμεροῦταί τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει, καταμαθὼν δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ξυνουσίᾳ

33. ἐξαιρῶμεν M: ἐξαίρωμεν AΠ: ἐξαίρω Ξ: ἐξαιροῦμεν *q*. 11. ἑκάστας v. Prinsterer: ἕκαστος AΠΞ: ἃς ἐφ' ἑκάστοις pro ἐφ' οἷς ἑκάστας *q*.

λόγου, *Phaedr.* 242 B Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου (a delicate way of hinting that Socrates and Simmias are *θεῖοι ἄνδρες*), and *Theaet.* 162 D. Any *ἦθος* which in existing cities conspicuously transcends the public standard of morality (and is thus *ἀλλοῖον πρὸς ἀρετήν*) is *θεῖον*, and for that very reason sporadic and exceptional (see next note).

493 A 1 θεοῦ μοῖραν is best explained by *Men.* 94 B ff. and 99 C, D. Distinguished statesmen like Pericles, Themistocles etc. are *θεῖοι*, just as much as the *χρησμῳδοί*, *μάντεις*, and *ποιητικοί*: they are *ἐπίπνοι—καὶ κατεχόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα* (99 D). Education did not produce them, nor have they any scientific knowledge of statesmanship; for which reason also they cannot teach their sons to be statesmen (*Men.* 94 B, *Prot.* 320 A). It was by this theory that Plato accounted for the fact that good men appear from time to time even in corrupt States: *εἰσὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρωποι ἀεὶ θεῖοί τινες, οὐ πολλοί—φυόμενοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ μή* (*Laws* 951 B). There is more than a touch of irony in the epithet *θεῖος* when Plato applies it to Themistocles, Pericles and other successful politicians with whom he had little sympathy, but *θεοῦ μοῖραν* is not ironical here (cf. 492 A), nor is Plato ever otherwise than grateful for the birth of statesmen who are truly *θεῖοι*. But they do not solve the difficulty, for the scientific knowledge of *πολιτική* is not only better and more stable in itself, but guarantees the permanent prosperity of a State, because it can be transmitted to posterity. Nor can we be sure that our statesmen 'by grace of God' will appear when they are most wanted. For a full discussion of *θεία μοῖρα* in Plato see Zeller[4] II 1, p. 594 *n.* 4.

4 **ἕκαστος**: sc. *δοξάτω*. Cf. I 334 B *n.* and *Phaed.* 80 A, B, where *ψυχή*, the reading of the best MSS, should be retained. Baiter is certainly wrong in reading *ἕκαστον* (with Stephanus and *v*): for with personal subjects *δοκεῖ* is used personally. Dümmler (*Chr. Beitr.* p. 12) and Teichmüller (*Lit. Fehd.* I p. 104) suppose that Plato means Isocrates in particular. It is possible enough that he had Isocrates in his mind, but the description applies to many besides him: cf. IV 426 C *n.*

6 **δοξάζουσιν** = 'opine' is technical: cf. V 479 E. With *θρέμματος* etc. cf. "The beast with many heads Butts me away" Shakespeare *Coriol.* IV 1; and a similar figure in Solon ap. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 12 ad fin. and *Theaet.* 174 D.

493 B 11 ἑκάστας. See *cr. n.* Van Prinsterer's emendation is now universally accepted.

οἵας αὖ κτλ. The party-cry.

τε καὶ χρόνου τριβῇ σοφίαν τε καλέσειεν καὶ ὡς τέχνην συστησάμενος ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαν τρέποιτο, μηδὲν εἰδὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὅ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ
C κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζῴου δόξαις, οἷς μὲν χαίροι ἐκεῖνο, ἀγαθὰ καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο, κακά, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα ἔχοι λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακὼς εἴη μήτε ἄλλῳ
D δυνατὸς δεῖξαι. τοιοῦτος δὴ ὢν πρὸς Διὸς οὐκ ἄτοπος ἂν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι παιδευτής; Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη. Ἡ οὖν τι τούτου δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὁ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν ξυνιόντων ὀργὴν καὶ ἡδονὰς κατανενοηκέναι σοφίαν ἡγούμενος, εἴτ' ἐν γραφικῇ εἴτ' ἐν μουσικῇ εἴτε δὴ ἐν πολιτικῇ; ὅτι μὲν γάρ, ἐάν τις τούτοις ὁμιλῇ ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἢ ποίησιν ἤ τινα ἄλλην δημιουργίαν ἢ πόλει διακονίαν, κυρίους αὐτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων,

25. εἴτε δὴ—ὁμιλῇ Π et in mg. A^2: om. A^1.

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13 **καλέσειεν** (though *κατεμάνθανεν*) is written because of *καταμαθὼν δέ*, after which *ἐκάλει* would be less suitable. The situation is now treated as a possible one, after the picture has once been allowed.

ὡς τέχνην συστησάμενος. Cf. the Stoic definition of *τέχνη* as a *σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων* κτλ. (Zeno *Fr.* 12 Pearson).

493 C 16 **ὀνομάζοι κτλ.**: 'employs all these terms in accordance with' (literally 'in dependence on') 'the opinions of the mighty Beast.' This interpretation is better than to suppose with Stallbaum that Plato means 'applies all these names to the opinions' etc., though *ὀνομάζειν τι ἐπί τινι* is idiomatically used in that way.

19 **τἀναγκαῖα—καλοῖ.** *τἀναγκαῖα* does not mean "the physical necessities and exigencies of the great beast's nature" (J. and C.), but simply 'the inevitable.' Whatever happens, a public teacher or Sophist must conform to the opinions of the Beast (492 D). In what follows there is a hint of the profound philosophical view that the Works of Necessity are evil (cf. *Tim.* 29 E, 47 E ff.), and that Moral Freedom consists in following what is good. See on X 617 E.

22 **δοκεῖ.** Ast would read *δοκοῖ*, but *ἄν* of course goes with *εἶναι*: cf. IV 422 B. See for this idiom my note on *Prot.* 351 B and Blaydes on Ar. *Wasps* 1405.

23 **ὁ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν κτλ.** Jackson thinks of Isocrates again (*Proceedings of the Camb. Philol. Soc.* II 1882 p. 13). See above on 493 A.

493 D 25 **ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κτλ.** An anacoluthon. The apodosis which requires to be supplied is 'that much is certain' or the like: cf. V 465 A *n.* I formerly thought the anacoluthon too harsh, and proposed to read *ὅ τι μὲν γὰρ ἄν—ἐπιδεικνύμενος, ἢ* κτλ., taking *ὅ τι* as the object of *ἐπιδεικνύμενος*, and *ἢ ποίησιν* ('either poetry' etc.) as in apposition to *ὅ τι*: but the text is better as it stands. Richards' proposal to read *ἔστι* for *ὅτι* is very unpleasing.

26 **ποίησιν.** Compare a striking passage in *Laws* 659 B, C, where Poetry is said to have deteriorated after she accepted *οἱ πολλοί* as her judge. See also *Laws* 700 E, 797 B, *Gorg.* 502 B ff. and infra X 605 A.

27 **κυρίους αὐτοῦ.** We should certainly (with Schneider and the majority of editors) read *αὐτοῦ* and not *αὑτοῦ* (which Stallbaum and others adopt, referring it to *ποίησιν* etc.). The MSS (except *q*) mostly read *αὑτοῦ*, but their authority in this matter is of no account. Cobet would read *αὐτούς* and eject *τοὺς πολλούς*—on what ground, it is difficult even to conjecture.

πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων. By coming forward in a public capacity as a poet or

ἡ Διομήδεια λεγομένη ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν οὗτοι ἐπαινῶσιν· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ταῦτα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ἤδη πώποτέ του ἤκουσας αὐτῶν λόγον διδόντος οὐ καταγέλαστον; Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, | οὐδ' ἀκούσομαι. E

VIII. Ταῦτα τοίνυν πάντα ἐννοήσας ἐκεῖνο ἀναμνήσθητι· αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ καλά, ἢ αὐτό τι ἕκαστον καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἕκαστα, ἔσθ' ὅπως | πλῆθος ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεται εἶναι; 494 Ἥκιστά γ', ἔφη. Φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι. Ἀδύνατον. Καὶ τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἄρα ἀνάγκη ψέγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν. Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι προσομιλοῦντες ὄχλῳ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ ἐπιθυμοῦσι. Δῆλον. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τίνα ὁρᾷς σωτηρίαν φιλοσόφῳ φύσει, ὥστ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι μείνασαν πρὸς τέλος ἐλθεῖν; ἐννόει δ' ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν. | ὡμολόγηται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν εὐμάθεια καὶ μνήμη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ B μεγαλοπρέπεια ταύτης εἶναι τῆς φύσεως. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν εὐθὺς ἐν

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statesman or the like, he 'makes the Many his masters more than is necessary.' In a private station, he is, comparatively speaking, independent; but even then the Many are (in a certain sense) of necessity his masters: see 496 D. Ast and Stallbaum take the phrase with ἡ Διομήδεια ἀνάγκη. "Iungenda sunt verba sic: ἀνάγκη (ἐστὶν) αὐτῷ πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων (ultra necessaria quae progrediatur) ἡ Διομήδεια λεγομένη, ut vocabulis ἡ λεγομένη Διομήδεια istud πέρα ἀναγκαίων declaretur" (Stallbaum). If this is what Plato meant, he expresses it in a harsh and dangerously ambiguous way, and it would be preferable to cancel πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων (with Cobet and Herwerden). But there is fortunately no occasion for such drastic treatment.

28 ἡ Διομήδεια κτλ. Most of the MSS write Διομηδεία (sic), but Διομήδειά γε at the end of a line in Ar. *Eccl.* 1029 makes it clear that the word is properoxyton, unless, as Schneider supposes (*Addit.* p. 47), Aristophanes shortens the final syllable by poetic license. The proverb, which is used of an overmastering necessity, is illustrated by Leutsch u. Schneidewin *Paroem. Gr.* I p. 59, II p. 367, and also by Blaydes on Ar. l.c. Two explanations of it were given. According to the first, which is adopted by the Scholiast on this passage, the phrase originated in the treatment meted out by Diomede to Odysseus, when they were returning from Ilium to the Greek camp after stealing the Palladium. Odysseus attempted to kill Diomede, but failed, and Diomede paid him out by tying his arms together and driving him home with blows from the flat of his sword. The Scholiast on Ar. l.c. explains differently. Διομήδεια: ὅτι Διομήδης ὁ Θρᾴξ, πόρνας ἔχων θυγατέρας, τοὺς παριόντας ξένους ἐβιάζετο αὐταῖς συνεῖναι ἕως οὗ κόρον σχῶσι καὶ ἀναλωθῶσιν οἱ ἄνδρες. ἃς καὶ ὁ μῦθος ἵππους ἀνθρωποφάγους εἶπεν. I agree with Schneider that the proverb is more likely to have originated from the first story than from a euhemeristic explanation of the man-eating mares of Diomede of Thrace.

30 αὐτῶν. The μισθαρνοῦντες ἰδιῶται, not 'the Many.' Plato is probably thinking of actual eulogies of the Athenians by Isocrates and others like him.

32 ἀναμνήσθητι. See V 475 E.

494 A 2 φιλόσοφον—εἶναι. The theory of Ideas is not a democratic philosophy. With Plato's attitude here to οἱ πολλοί cf. *Gorg.* 474 A τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι.

4 καὶ—δή. Cf. 490 C *n.*

494 B 8 ὡμολόγηται. See 486 C, 486 A, B: and cf. also 490 C.

παισὶν ὁ τοιοῦτος πρῶτος ἔσται ἐν ἅπασιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τὸ σῶμα φυῇ προσφερὴς τῇ ψυχῇ; Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη. Βουλήσονται δή, οἶμαι, αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν πράγματα οἵ τε οἰκεῖοι καὶ οἱ πολῖται. Πῶς δ' οὔ;
C Ὑποκείσονται | ἄρα δεόμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες, προκαταλαμβάνοντες καὶ προκολακεύοντες τὴν μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι. Τί οὖν οἴει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ποιήσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τύχῃ μεγάλης πόλεως ὢν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλούσιός τε καὶ γενναῖος, καὶ ἔτι εὐειδὴς καὶ μέγας; ἆρ' οὐ πληρωθήσεσθαι ἀμηχάνου ἐλπίδος, ἡγούμενον καὶ τὰ τῶν
D Ἑλλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἱκανὸν ἔσεσθαι πράττειν, | καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν αὐτόν, σχηματισμοῦ καὶ φρονή-

10. παισὶν de Geer: πᾶσιν codd. 21. ἐξαρεῖν $A^2 v$: ἐξαιρεῖν A^1: ἐξαίρειν Π Ξ *q*.

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10 **παισίν.** See *cr. n.* πᾶσιν is retained by Schneider, who takes it as masculine and ἅπασιν as neuter. Herwerden also approves of πᾶσιν: but εὐθὺς ἐν παισὶν (which most of the editors adopt) gives the only correct antithesis to ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται ('when he is growing older'). *a* and *αι* are easily interchanged in ninth century MSS: see *Introd.* § 5.

11 **φυῇ.** Herwerden proposes φύσῃ προσφερές, comparing Soph. *Ajax* 1077 κἂν σῶμα γεννήσῃ μέγα, but no change is necessary, as Herwerden himself allows. For προσφερής, some inferior MSS have προσφερές, an easier, but less elegant and idiomatic reading. Schneider also points out that if Plato had written προσφερές, he ought to have added αὐτοῦ with τὸ σῶμα.

14 **ὑποκείσονται**='they will lie prostrate at his feet' is the future perfect of ὑποπίπτω. ὑποπεσοῦνται, which Herwerden conjectures, would be less expressive, and denote an act, or series of acts, instead of a never-wearying attitude of supplication and adoration. They so to speak besiege his soul with flatteries and prayers.

494 C 17 **ἐὰν τύχῃ κτλ.** It has long been admitted that this picture is drawn chiefly from Alcibiades. In antiquity Plutarch seems to have suspected something of the sort, for he describes Alcibiades' degeneration in language adapted from the present passage (*Alc.* 4. 1). But the personal touches must not blind us to the fact that Plato is portraying the type, although Alcibiades sits for the portrait.

18 **πλούσιος—μέγας** describe Alcibiades exactly: cf. *Alc.* I 104 A, B, Thuc. VI 16 1—3, Isocr. περὶ ζεύγους 25 ff., Plut. *Alc.* 1. 4, 4. 1 and elsewhere. The Greeks thought tallness essential to beauty: see e.g. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* IV 7. 1123^b 7 and *Pol.* VII 4. 1326^a 33.

19 **ἡγούμενον κτλ.** Plutarch (*Alc.* 17. 2, 3) declares that Alcibiades intended the Sicilian expedition to be a step towards an almost universal empire: Sicily was to be merely the ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου. Alcibiades says nearly as much himself in Thuc. VI 90. 2, with which compare 15. 2. Grote (VII p. 79) is inclined to deny that even Alcibiades dreamt of anything beyond the conquest of Sicily, but the ancient historians thought differently: cf. also *Alc.* II 141 B ff. Many of the Athenians, probably not without reason (though Plutarch l. c. 35. 1 leaves the point unsettled), suspected him of aiming at a τυραννίς (Thuc. VI 15. 4 and Isocr. περὶ ζεύγους 38).

494 D 21 **ἐξαρεῖν κτλ.** See *cr. n.* ἐξαρεῖν appears also in several MSS besides *v*. The present, though retained by Schneider, is very difficult after πληρωθήσεσθαι. For the interchange of *αι* and *a* cf. *Introd.* § 5. Alcibiades' φρόνημα was notorious: see for example *Alc.* I 104 A, Thuc. V 43. 2, VI 16 ff., Plut. *Alc.* 34. 6 and the highly characteristic anecdote in 23. 8. Plato's words appear to embody

ματος κενοῦ ἄνευ νοῦ ἐμπιμπλάμενον; Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Τῷ δὴ οὕτω διατιθεμένῳ ἐάν τις ἠρέμα προσελθὼν τἀληθῆ λέγῃ, ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ, δεῖται δέ, τὸ δὲ οὐ κτητὸν μὴ δουλεύσαντι τῇ κτήσει αὐτοῦ, ἆρ' εὐπετὲς οἴει εἶναι εἰσακοῦσαι διὰ τοσούτων κακῶν; Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἐὰν δ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τῶν λόγων εἰς αἰσθάνηταί τέ[1] πῃ καὶ E κάμπτηται καὶ ἕλκηται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, τί οἰόμεθα δράσειν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἀπολλύναι αὐτοῦ τὴν χρείαν τε καὶ ἑταιρείαν; οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον, πᾶν δ' ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας, καὶ περὶ αὐτόν, ὅπως ἂν μὴ πεισθῇ, καὶ περὶ τὸν πείθοντα,

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an extract from some tragic poet (probably Euripides), as may be inferred both from the rhythm (*σχηματισμοῦ—κενοῦ*) and the language. *ἄνευ νοῦ* is declared by van Prinsterer, Cobet and others to be a gloss on *κενοῦ*. Possibly they are right; but (as Schneider remarks) *ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ* is in favour of retaining the words, and they occur in all the MSS.

23 οὕτω διατιθεμένῳ: not "while he is in this frame of mind" (D. and V.), but 'when he is sinking into this condition.'

ἐάν τις κτλ. As Socrates often did to Alcibiades: see VIII 560 D *n.* and *Symp.* 215 D ff. "The two conversations with Alcibiades are an example of this" (Thomas Gray).

24 τὸ δέ is not here the idiomatic *τὸ δέ* (as in IV 443 C), but 'hoc autem' i.e. *νοῦς* (Stallbaum).

27 τὸ ξυγγενὲς κτλ.: i.e. the affinity of what is said with his nature, "weil die Reden mit ihm verwandt sind" (Schneider). D. and V.'s translation "an inborn taste for philosophic inquiry" is wrong.

εἰς has often been doubted; but Schneider's explanation is certainly right, that *τῷ οὕτω διατιθεμένῳ* is the individual typifying a class, and that *εἰς* denotes *one* of the class. The idiom is analogous to the plural after a typical or generic singular: see on I 347 A. The emendations proposed (*διαισθάνηται* for *εἰς αἰσθάνηται* Stallbaum, *εἰσαΰθις* Richter, *εἴσω* Madvig, *εἰσακούων* or *εἰσακούσας* Richards) are not only superfluous, but indefensible in themselves. Plato hardly expects more than one such person to pause at all on his downward career. Here again we naturally think of Alcibiades, whose interviews with Socrates (according to *Symp.* 215 D) profoundly impressed him for the moment, but failed to effect a permanent reform in the midst of so many temptations (ib. 216 B). Perhaps Socrates once hoped that Alcibiades would be his 'scientific ruler,' and bring back true prosperity to Athens. A tone of sorrow for the 'lost leader' seems to make itself felt in Plato's words.

494 E 29 τοὺς ἡγουμένους: i.q. *οἱ ἡγοῦνται*, whence the article, which Herwerden wrongly rejects. The voice should pause a little between *ἐκείνους* (which refers to 494 C) and *τοὺς ἡγουμένους*.

30 λέγοντάς τε κτλ. We should expect the future indicative, and on this ground the insertion of *διατελεῖν* has been proposed by Richards (Stephanus had previously desiderated *διατελέσειν*). So serious an alteration lacks every element of probability. Ast must be wrong in making *λέγοντας* etc. depend on *οἰόμεθα*. If the text is sound, we should supply *πάντα δράσειν* or the like after *οὐ*, and regard the participles as agreeing with the subject of *δράσειν*. (Schneider and J. and C. take nearly the same view). *δράσειν* is of course easy to understand, but it is less easy to dispense with *πάντα*. Could Plato have written *οὐ <πᾶν>, πᾶν μὲν ἔργον κτλ.*? Cf. IX 575 E and *πᾶν ποιεῖν* in *Ap.* 39 A and *Gorg.* 479 C. I prefer the anacoluthon.

31 τὸν πείθοντα. Such was Socrates, and he was brought to trial. Plato may well have thought of his master when he wrote *δημοσίᾳ εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστάντας*. The most fatal count in the charge against Socrates was that he corrupted the youth (*Ap.* 24 B), and Alcibiades was held to be a case in point (Xen. *Mem.* I 2. 12). Plato now turns the tables on the Athenian people. He says in effect 'It was you who corrupted Alcibiades: and you impeached Socrates for trying to save him.'

ὅπως ἂν μὴ οἷός τ' ᾖ, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιβουλεύοντας καὶ δημοσίᾳ εἰς
495 ἀγῶνας καθιστάντας; | Πολλή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀνάγκη. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως
ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλοσοφήσει; Οὐ πάνυ.

IX. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐ κακῶς ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ
αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως μέρη, ὅταν ἐν κακῇ τροφῇ γένηται,
αἴτια τρόπον τινὰ τοῦ ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, καὶ τὰ 5
λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, πλοῦτοί τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη παρασκευή; Οὐ
γάρ, ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, ἐλέχθη. Οὗτος δή, εἶπον, ὦ θαυμάσιε,
B ὄλεθρός τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τοσαύτη τε | καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς βελτίστης
φύσεως εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὀλίγης καὶ ἄλλως γιγνομένης,
ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν. καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα 10
κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, καὶ οἱ
τἀγαθά, οἳ ἂν ταύτῃ τύχωσι ῥυέντες· σμικρὰ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα
οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ. Ἀληθέστατα, ἦ δ'
C ὅς. Οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐκπίπτοντες, οἷς μάλιστα | προσήκει, 15
ἔρημον καὶ ἀτελῆ φιλοσοφίαν λείποντες αὐτοί τε βίον οὐ προσή-
κοντα οὐδ' ἀληθῆ ζῶσιν, τὴν δὲ ὥσπερ ὀρφανὴν ξυγγενῶν ἄλλοι
ἐπεισελθόντες ἀνάξιοι ἤσχυνάν τε καὶ ὀνείδη περιῆψαν, οἷα καὶ σὺ
φῂς ὀνειδίζειν τοὺς ὀνειδίζοντας, ὡς οἱ ξυνόντες αὐτῇ οἱ μὲν οὐδενός,
οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἄξιοί εἰσιν. Καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, τά γε

3. ὁρᾷς Π: ἆρα Α.

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495 A **3** **ἐλέγομεν.** 491 B ff.

495 B **9** **εἰς** should be taken with **ὄλεθρος** and **διαφθορά**, as Schneider points out. They are spoiled 'with reference to' or 'for' the best of all vocations. Jowett wrongly connects **εἰς** with **βελτίστης**.

10 **φαμέν.** 491 A, B.

ἐκ τούτων κτλ. *Corruptio optimi pessima.*

οἱ—ἐργαζόμενοι was true of Alcibiades: see Grote VIII p. 116 and Lysias *In Alc.* I 16, 30, 35 ff. Isocrates' attempt in his **περὶ ζεύγους** to make out that Alcibiades was a benefactor to his city is a futile and fantastic performance.

12 **ῥυέντες κτλ.** With the metaphor cf. 485 D. For **σμικρὰ—δρᾷ** see 419 E *n.*

495 B—**496** A *Abandoned by her rightful lovers, Philosophy, alone and desolate, is forced into a shameful alliance with base pretenders. The offspring of this unhallowed union is a bastard brood of sophisms.*

495 C **14** **προσήκει**: sc. **φιλοσοφία**: "nam philosophia cum virgine **ἐπικλήρῳ** comparatur, qualem in matrimonium ducere proximis cognatis aut permissum aut iniunctum fuit" (Stallbaum). See Meier u. Schömann *Att. Proc.* pp. 614—617.

15 **ἀτελῆ κτλ.** **ἀτελῆ** is said with reference to the rites of marriage: cf. Philostrat. *Vit. Apoll.* IV 45 **ἐπ' ἀτελεῖ γάμῳ** and Soph. *Ant.* 1240 f. **τὰ νυμφικὰ | τέλη λαχὼν δείλαιος ἔν γ' Ἄιδου δόμοις.** With **τε** followed by **δέ** cf. X 611 D and other examples quoted by Hoefer *de part. Pl.* p. 16.

16 **ἀληθῆ** is like **ἀληθῶς ζῴη** in 490 B, a passage where the same kind of imagery is employed.

17 **ᾔσχυνάν τε κτλ.** Is the aorist gnomic or past? It is usually taken as gnomic, but Plato may be thinking of his own times, in which Philosophy had come to shame, because the unworthy had defiled her.

σὺ φῂς. Cf. 489 D and 487 C, D.

λεγόμενα ταῦτα. Εἰκότως γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λεγόμενα. καθορῶντες γὰρ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωπίσκοι κενὴν τὴν χώραν ταύτην γιγνομένην, καλῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων καὶ προσχημάτων | μεστήν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἱργμῶν D εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, ἄσμενοι καὶ οὗτοι ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐκπηδῶσιν εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἳ ἂν κομψότατοι ὄντες τυγχάνωσι περὶ τὸ αὑτῶν τεχνίον. ὅμως γὰρ δὴ πρός γε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας καίπερ οὕτω πραττούσης φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἀξίωμα μεγαλοπρεπέστερον λείπεται, οὗ δὴ ἐφιέμενοι πολλοί, ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηνται, οὕτω καὶ τὰς | ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμ- E μένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν· ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη; Καὶ

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495 D 23 **ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν κτλ.** It has been supposed that Plato has in view Antisthenes and the Cynic Diogenes, the latter of whom apparently started life as a moneychanger (D. L. VI 20). But the description which follows applies to sophists and sophistical rhetoricians rather than to the Cynic philosophers. The poet Gray says "this seems to be aimed at Protagoras, who was an ordinary countryman and a woodcutter" (see Gellius *Noct. Att.* V 3 and other authorities cited by Frei *Quaest. Prot.* pp. 6 ff.). Hermann (*Gesch. u. Syst.* p. 628) cites Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as cases in point (cf. 496 A *n.*). Each of these sophists had formerly taught the art of fighting in full armour (*Euthyd.* 271 C—272 B, 273 E). As speech-writing and rhetoric generally were counted among the arts, we may think also of Isocrates, who loved above everything to call himself a φιλόσοφος (*Antid.* 271 ff.). But although these and other examples may be quoted in illustration of what Plato here says, the tone of the whole passage shews that Plato is describing a familiar phenomenon of his own times, when clever and ambitious young men were in the habit of forsaking their handicrafts and devoting themselves to 'culture.' Cf. *Prot.* 318 E τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας (sc. Hippias etc.), λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες, and my article in *Cl. Rev.* XV p. 220.

27 **ἐφιέμενοι κτλ.** is an anacoluthon. The natural flow of the sentence is interrupted by the question ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη; which is intended to obtain Adeimantus' assent to τὰς ψυχὰς—τυγχάνουσιν. On resuming, Plato interposes a comparison, and to this the general idea which forms the logical predicate to πολλοί is accommodated in ποῖ' ἄττα—φαῦλα. The sentence was thus understood by the editor of *q*; for τυγχάνουσιν, which seems a difficulty on this theory, is in *q* τυγχάνοντες. But τυγχάνοντες would be extremely inelegant; and Plato writes τυγχάνουσιν to correspond to λελώβηνται. Even in other cases a finite verb sometimes replaces a participle in the second of two contrasted clauses, e.g. *Ap.* 21 E. J. and C. explain the passage in nearly the same way, as well as (apparently) Schneider and Stallbaum. It is impossible for many reasons to connect τυγχάνουσιν with ἐφιέμενοι and so escape the anacoluthon. I formerly suspected the text, and proposed <ἀπο>τυγχάνουσιν ('miss the mark,' i.e. fail to win the distinction which they covet). Another solution might be to place the troublesome τυγχάνουσιν after πολλοί. But neither change is in any degree probable; and it is better to acquiesce in the reading of the MSS. Plato's anacolutha are a device for imparting life and reality to his dialogues. A careful translation should preserve them all.

495 E 29 **ἀποτεθρυμμένοι:** lit. 'broken off' i.e. 'truncated,' 'maimed.' The word is rare, and apparently used only here by Plato. Schneider thus explains the preposition: "quorum animis quasi arboribus cacumina defracta et vires ad enitendum necessariae debilitatae sunt." A comparison of *Theaet.* 173 A πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλῶνται and *Prot.* 325 D ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ

μάλα, ἔφη. Δοκεῖς οὖν τι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖν ἀργύριον κτησαμένου χαλκέως φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ, νεωστὶ μὲν ἐκ δεσμῶν λελυμένου, ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ λελουμένου, νεουργὸν ἱμάτιον ἔχοντος, ὡς νυμφίου παρεσκευασμένου, διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἐρημίαν τοῦ
496 δεσπότου τὴν θυγατέρα μέλλοντος γαμεῖν; Οὐ | πάνυ, ἔφη, διαφέρει. Ποῖ' ἄττα οὖν εἰκὸς γεννᾶν τοὺς τοιούτους; οὐ νόθα καὶ φαῦλα; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Τί δέ; τοὺς ἀναξίους παιδεύσεως,

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πληγαῖς makes it not unlikely that the metaphor is as Schneider supposes. On the *vox nihili* ἀποτεθρυμμένοι (in the margin of Flor. A) see Ruhnken on Timaeus *Lex.* s.v. Timaeus seems to have found it in his text of the *Republic*.

30 **διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας.** Cf. Xen. *Oec.* 4. 2 αἵ γε βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι (sc. τέχναι)—καταλυμαίνονται—τὰ σώματα τῶν τε ἐργαζομένων καὶ τῶν ἐπιμελομένων, ἀναγκάζουσαι καθῆσθαι καὶ σκιατραφεῖσθαι, ἔνιαι δὲ καὶ πρὸς πῦρ ἠμερεύειν. τῶν δὲ σωμάτων θηλυνομένων καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ πολὺ ἀρρωστότεραι γίγνονται. It is probable that βαναυσία was "primarily a military conception, dependent for its origin on the obvious fact that certain modes of life and the exercise of certain trades disqualify from prowess in the field" (Greenidge *Gk. Const. History* p. 22, quoting in support Hdt. II 165—167). "Sedentary and within-door arts," says Bacon (quoted by Newman *Politics of Aristotle* I p. 105), "have in their nature a contrariety to a military disposition." In practice the term is freely applied by the writers of the best period to every kind of mechanical or illiberal labour or pursuit. Aristotle defines βαναυσία in these words: βάναυσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν (*Pol.* Θ 2. 1337^{b} 8 ff.). See also Whibley *Gk. Olig.* pp. 42 ff. and Newman l.c. pp. 104—115. The ancients mostly derived the word from βαῦνος 'a furnace' and ἄϋω, "quasi βάνausos qui caminum accendit" (Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s.v.). In view of the Boeotian βανά=γυνή and βανῆκας· γυναῖκας Βοιωτοί in Hesychius, I have conjectured in *Cl. Rev.* VII p. 112 that βάναυσος, which does not look like an Attic word, may be connected with βανά. If so, the word perhaps originally meant 'effeminate' 'unmanly': cf. θηλυνομένων in the extract quoted from Xenophon. In any case, however, the ancient etymology can hardly be right.

31 **δοκεῖς οὖν τι κτλ.** In the 'little bald tinker' several critics have recognised Isocrates: see for example Teichmüller *Lit. Fehd.* I p. 105 and Jackson's article on the Sophists in the *Enc. Brit.* ἐκ δεσμῶν λελυμένου—ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ λελουμένου is an admirable example of rhetorical παρομοίωσις, and satirises the tricks of style for which Isocrates was notorious. But all the sophistical rhetoricians of the school of Gorgias affected meretricious ornaments of this kind (see Hug on *Symp.* 194 E ff. and especially Cope's *Rhetoric of Aristotle* III pp. 105, 106), and Plato's shafts are not levelled at Isocrates alone. As usual, he individualises the type, and if the resultant picture resembles Isocrates, so much the worse for him. Plato would not be sorry (cf. *Euthyd.* 305 ff., with Spengel's *Isokr. u. Pl.* pp. 36—40), and doubtless intended his readers to think of Isocrates, as they certainly would. See also on 498 E.

32 **ἀργύριον κτλ.** Cf. Cratin. *Seriph.* 2 Meineke ἀνδρῶν νεοπλουτοπονήρων | αἰσχρῶν.

φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ. Was Isocrates bald and short? The bust of him in the Villa Albani is not bald, and it would be pressing the personality to the verge of absurdity to take these words so seriously. The poverty (πενίαν etc.) and loneliness is of course the daughter's (cf. 495 C ἔρημον καὶ ἀτελῆ φιλοσοφίαν λείποντες), not her father's, as D. and V. suppose. In other words τοῦ δεσπότου belongs only to τὴν θυγατέρα.

496 A 2 **διαφέρει.** See on 484 D. Herwerden ejects the word, quite needlessly, as usual.

ὅταν αὐτῇ πλησιάζοντες ὁμιλῶσι μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, ποῖ' ἄττα φῶμεν γεννᾶν διανοήματά τε καὶ δόξας; ἆρ' οὐχ ὡς ἀληθῶς προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα καὶ οὐδὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον; Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

X. Πάνσμικρον δή τι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, λείπεται τῶν κατ' | ἀξίαν ὁμιλούντων φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἢ που ὑπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθὲν B γενναῖον καὶ εὖ τεθραμμένον ἦθος, ἀπορίᾳ τῶν διαφθερούντων κατὰ φύσιν μεῖναν ἐπ' αὐτῇ, ἢ ἐν σμικρᾷ πόλει ὅταν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φυῇ

6. φρονήσεως Ast: φρονήσεως ἄξιον AΞ *q*: φρονήσεως ἄξιον ὡς Π.
8. ἔφην Π: ἔφη ἦν δ' A.

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4 ποῖ' ἄττα—δόξας. Cf. *Symp.* 210 D πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίκτῃ καὶ διανοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ. τίκτειν or γεννᾶν ἐν is the usual expression for begetting on or out of: cf. τόκος ἐν καλῷ *Symp.* 206 B.

5 προσήκοντα κτλ.: 'deserving to be called sophisms.' The fallacies in the *Euthydemus* are cases in point: cf. 495 D *n.* With φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον cf. *Euthyd.* 306 D. ἄξιον, which occurs in A after φρονήσεως, is probably, as Cobet supposed, a marginal note directing attention to this vigorous and highly elaborated passage: cf. 504 E *n.* and see the curious description by Diogenes Laertius (III 65 f.) of the different σημεῖα by which it was customary to draw attention to noteworthy or difficult places in the text of Plato. Schneider and Jowett can hardly be right in retaining the word. Stephanus' conjecture οὐδὲ ἄξιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς is awkward and not likely to be correct. Campbell neatly conjectures ἀξίως, but Cobet's solution, which Ast foreshadowed, is more probable.

496 A—497 A *The few who, from various reasons, remain faithful to philosophy, withdraw from political life. By so doing, they keep themselves unspotted from the world—no mean achievement, yet not the greatest. If they meet with a commonwealth appropriate to them, they will themselves attain a larger growth, as well as prove the saviours of their country.*

496 B 9 ὑπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθέν: 'arrested by exile,' so as not ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος (495 A): cf. κατασχεῖν below. Stallbaum's explanation 'overtaken by exile,' which D. and V. apparently accept, is in my judgment wrong. The reading καταλειφθέν (*q* and several other MSS, followed by Ast and one or two other scholars) is less expressive and picturesque, though it gives a fair sense if interpreted as καταλειφθὲν τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ. Van Heusde's conjecture ἀπὸ φυγῆς καταλειφθέν would (as Schneider observes) mean 'those who survived after exile' and is wholly inadmissible, as well as ἀπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθέν ('debarred from exile'), which Herwerden proposes, inserting also ἤ after ἦθος. Has Plato any special instances in view? Steinhart (*Einleitung* p. 208) thinks of Anaxagoras, and even of Plato himself. But it cannot be said that either of them was saved by exile from deserting Philosophy, and Plato was hardly exiled, even metaphorically speaking. Krohn (*Pl. St.* pp. 117, 384) declares for Xenophon. It is however more than doubtful, even after Boeckh's attempt to overthrow the tradition about unfriendliness between Xenophon and Plato (*De simultate quam Pl. c. Xen. exercuisse fertur* 1811), whether Plato would have gone out of his way to pay a compliment to his fellow-disciple. Can Plato be thinking of his friend Dio? If so, this passage must have been written in or after 367 B.C., the year of Dio's banishment from Syracuse. A personal reference is easily combined with the description of a class, and a tribute to Dio would be very pleasing here. I have lately found the same conjecture in Thomas Gray's notes on the *Republic*. See also *Introd.* § 4 and (for Plato's connexion with Dio) Grote X pp. 332 ff. See also 499 B *n.*

11 ὅταν κτλ. There is no reason to suppose (with e.g. Steinhart *Einleitung* p. 208) that Plato means Euclides of Megara. Heraclitus is a good instance, although Ephesus was hardly a σμικρὰ πόλις.

καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδῃ· βραχὺ δέ πού τι καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλης τέχνης δικαίως ἀτιμάσαν εὐφυὲς ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἂν ἔλθοι. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἑταίρου Θεάγους χαλινὸς οἷος κατασχεῖν·
C καὶ γὰρ Θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ¹ ἐκ- 15
πεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἡ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπείργουσα αὐτὸν τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει. τὸ δ' ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον· ἢ γάρ πού τινι ἄλλῳ ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονεν. καὶ τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι καὶ γευσάμενοι ὡς ἡδὺ καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν αὖ ἱκανῶς ἰδόντες 20
τὴν μανίαν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν περὶ τὰ τῶν
D πόλεων πράττει, οὐδ' ἔστι ξύμμαχος, μεθ' ὅτου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ ¹ τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν σῴζοιτ' ἄν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος

13. ἂν ἔλθοι Π: ἀνέλθοι A.

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12 **βραχὺ δέ πού τι κτλ.** Some have thought of Phaedo of Elis, and Simon the Athenian, both of whom were members of the Socratic circle (Steinhart l.c. p. 208). The latter (whose very existence has been denied by some recent critics, but—as Hirzel *Der Dialog* pp. 102 ff. shews—on wholly inadequate grounds) was once a shoemaker (D. L. II 122). We may also in some respects compare the architect-philosopher Hippodamus of Miletus: see Susemihl and Hicks' *Politics of Aristotle* I pp. 331—334. Zeller[4] II 1, p. 52 *n.* 1 thinks Plato may have had Socrates himself in view, but the *δαιμόνιον σημεῖον* accounts for him.

14 **Θεάγους.** Cf. *Ap.* 33 E, where it is implied that Theages died before Socrates. The tribute which Plato pays to his memory is all the more touching because Greek literature too seldom recognises that physical weakness may be combined with mental and moral strength: see III 406 C *n.* Plutarch (*de tuenda san. praecepta* 126 C, quoted by Stallbaum) remarks *καὶ γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀρρωστίαι πολλοὺς παρέχουσι*—a reminiscence, perhaps, of Plato.

496 C 18 **τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον.** Socrates regarded his divine sign as a special if not unique revelation from God, without submitting it to further analysis. As here, so in *Ap.* 31 D, it is this which forbids him to enter on political life (*τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν*). What the phenomenon really was, is a question which different writers have answered differently, according to their different points of view: see Zeller[4] II 1 pp. 75—91. The subject is treated with great fulness in Ribbing's *Socrat. Stud.* II pp. 1 ff. and in Riddell's edition of the *Apology* pp. 109—117. *τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε* does not deny that such a sign may be vouchsafed to others in the future. Schneider conjectures that Plato added this limitation with a view to himself—an unlikely supposition, although no doubt the present passage is in some measure intended as a defence of Plato's abstention from political life: cf. 496 D *n.*

ἢ γάρ που κτλ. Cobet and Herwerden reject *ἄλλῳ*, because *ἤ τις ἤ οὐδείς* is the regular phrase: cf. *Ap.* 17 B and Hdt. III 140. But the separation of *ἤ* from *τινι* makes *ἄλλῳ* desirable to help out the meaning of *τινι*, and to *ἄλλῳ* in itself there cannot possibly be any objection.

19 **τούτων—γενόμενοι:** 'those who have become members of this small band.' J. and C. quote an exact parallel from Thuc. III 56. 6 *ὧν ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι*: cf. also supra II 360 A, *Phaed.* 69 D, *Parm.* 127 D (*τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον*) and *Laws* 754 D. *γενόμενοι* is found in some inferior MSS, and was accepted till Schneider, who restored the true reading. Liebhold absurdly conjectures *ἑλόμενοι*.

21 **ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.** See on I 341 B.

496 D 23 **τῷ δικαίῳ** was restored by Schneider instead of *τῶν δικαίων*, on the sole authority of Vind. F. It has

ἐμπεσὼν οὔτε ξυναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε ἱκανὸς ὢν εἷς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις
25 ἀντέχειν, πρίν τι τὴν πόλιν ἢ φίλους ὀνῆσαι, προαπολόμενος
ἀνωφελὴς αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν γένοιτο, ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ
λαβὼν ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων, οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κονιορ-
τοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς,
ὁρῶν τοὺς ἄλλους καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας ἀγαπᾷ εἴ πῃ αὐτὸς
30 καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε | καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται E
καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἵλεώς τε καὶ εὐμενὴς
ἀπαλλάξεται. Ἀλλά τοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα ἂν | διαπραξά- 497
μενος ἀπαλλάττοιτο. Οὐδέ γε, εἶπον, τὰ μέγιστα, μὴ τυχὼν

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since been found that *τῷ δικαίῳ* is actually the reading of A. *ἡ τῶν δικαίων βοήθεια* would mean something quite different, as Schneider shews; viz. "auxilium vel a iustis vel rebus in iustis, vel contra iustos seu iusta latum vel ferendum." With the general sentiment cf. *Ap.* 31 E—32 A, a passage which proves —if proof were needed—that Liebhold's extraordinary proposal to read *σπουδάζοι* for *σφίζοιτο* is untenable.

εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος κτλ. Herwerden would read *ἀνθρώπους* 'among men who are as beasts.' But the point is that the philosopher in existing commonwealths is like a lonely human being in the midst of wild beasts. Cf. *Timon of Athens* IV 3 "The commonwealth of Athens is become a forest of beasts." The comparison may have been suggested to Plato by Pherecrates' Ἄγριοι, to which he alludes in *Prot.* 327 D. In Pherecrates' play the Ἄγριοι were savages, to whom apparently some Athenians betook themselves, in the hope of finding more happiness than they enjoyed in Athens: see Kock's *Com. Graec. Fr.* I pp. 146—150. Plato points out that there are savages enough at home. In *πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις* the emphasis is on *πᾶσιν*: we should translate 'to hold out alone where all are savages.' Cf. *ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων* IX 579 B. Herwerden weakens the effect by adding *οὖσιν* after *ἀγρίοις*.

27 **λαβών**: singular, in spite of *γενόμενοι* in 496 C. Cf. I 347 A *n.*

οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κτλ. Jowett construes *χειμῶνι* with *κονιορτοῦ*; but *χειμὼν κονιορτοῦ* for 'a storm of dust' is scarcely a Greek idiom. *κονιορτοῦ—φερομένου* is of course a descriptive genitive absolute. In this way Schneider also took the passage. *ζάλη* is 'tempestuous rain' *μετὰ ὄμβρου πνοή*, as Hesychius explains. *χαλάζης* was once conjectured by Ast, but he afterwards rightly withdrew the suggestion. Herwerden proposes *οἷον ἐν ζάλῃ κονιορτοῦ ὑπὸ κτλ.*, and Richards *ἐν χειμῶνι καὶ κονιορτοῦ ζάλῃ* (or *ζάλῃ κονιορτοῦ*). Neither proposal is supported by any of the ancient citations, except that of Themistius (*Or.* VIII p. 104 C) whose reproduction of this passage is in other respects, as in this, extremely inaccurate: see Schneider's note. And *ζάλη κονιορτοῦ* is, to say the least, a questionable phrase. It is not well to mar the wonderful force and beauty of writing such as this by tasteless and inept conjectures. The passage has often been compared with Lucretius' "Suave mari magno," but the difference is greater than the resemblance. The Platonic philosopher is content (*ἀγαπᾷ*), if he can keep his own soul pure, because he cannot, as things now are, save both himself and others. But it is no pleasure for him to see "quibus ipse malis careat," for he would fain help others if they would but let him. That they will not is a misfortune, not for others only, but for him (*αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται κτλ.*). We seem to catch in Plato's words a certain tone of sorrow, as if he had not himself attained the highest of which he was capable, because he could not find a philosophic city in which to dwell: see Morgenstern *De Plat. rep.* p. 161, where reference is made to *Ap.* 31 E and to the Platonic Epistles V 322 A, B, VII 324 B—326 B, 330 C—331 D: cf. also *Gorg.* 515 A—522 E, and Susemihl *Gen. Entw.* II p. 190.

πολιτείας προσηκούσης· ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει.

XI. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὧν ἕνεκα διαβολὴν εἴληφεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ δικαίως, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ μετρίως εἰρῆσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἔτ' ἄλλο λέγεις τι σύ. Ἀλλ' οὐδέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτι λέγω περὶ τούτου· ἀλλὰ τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῇ τίνα τῶν νῦν λέγεις πολιτειῶν; Οὐδ' B | ἡντινοῦν, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαιτιῶμαι, μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν κατάστασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως· διὸ καὶ στρέφεσθαί τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι αὐτήν· ὥσπερ ξενικὸν σπέρμα ἐν γῇ ἄλλῃ σπειρόμενον ἐξίτηλον εἰς τὸ ἐπιχώριον φιλεῖ κρατούμενον ἰέναι, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο τὸ γένος νῦν μὲν οὐκ ἴσχειν τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀλλότριον ἦθος ἐκπίπτειν· εἰ δὲ λήψεται τὴν ἀρίστην C πολιτείαν, | ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ ἄριστόν ἐστιν, τότε δηλώσει, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὄντι θεῖον ἦν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀνθρώπινα, τά τε τῶν φύσεων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων. δῆλος δὴ οὖν εἶ ὅτι μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρήσει τίς αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία. Οὐκ ἔγνως, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔμελλον, ἀλλ' εἰ αὕτη, ἣν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν οἰκίζοντες τὴν πόλιν, ἢ ἄλλη. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἐρρήθη μὲν καὶ τότε, ὅτι

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497 A 3 **προσηκούσης.** The only city suited to the philosophic nature is Plato's: cf. IX 592 A.

497 A—**498** C *Our justification of Philosophy is now complete. It remains to ask—Where is the political constitution adapted to the philosophic nature? Where, in other words, is the best polity? In the city which we have founded, except that the position of the Rulers requires to be more fully explained. A State, which is to handle Philosophy without danger, must assume a new attitude towards the subject. Philosophy should receive more, instead of less attention, as a man grows older.*

497 B 10 **κατάστασιν πόλεως** is treated as a single noun: cf. *πόλεως διοίκησις* in *Prot.* 319 D and *Pol.* 296 E.

11 **ὥσπερ—ἐκπίπτειν** explains and amplifies *στρέφεσθαί τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι*. Asyndeton is regular in such cases, and Stephanus ought not to have proposed the insertion of *καί* before *ὥσπερ*: cf. IV 432 D, VIII 557 C and *Prot.* 311 E, where more illustrations are cited in my note. Stallbaum's punctuation is here, I think, preferable to that of Schneider, who prints only a comma before *ὥσπερ*.

12 **εἰς τὸ ἐπιχώριον**: as though 'a foreign geranium, allowed to run wild in England' were to 'degenerate into one of the English wild geraniums.' The illustration is due to Bosanquet. Plato's botanical error, such as it is, does not affect the argument.

14 **ἦθος** is read by II as well as A. The majority of MSS read *εἶδος*, which was accepted till Schneider restored the better and more authoritative reading.

497 C 15 **δηλώσει**='experience will shew' is idiomatic. See Blaydes on Ar. *Frogs* 1261.

16 **ἦν**. The past does not exclude the present: cf. IV 436 C *n.*

17 **τίς—πολιτεία**: i.e. what the best constitution is. Adimantus was about to ask whether the *ἀρίστη πολιτεία* is not the one which they have described. The reply is yes, provided that the position and status of the Rulers is made clearer. As it stands it is *not* the best: cf. VIII 543 E *καλλίω ἔτι ἔχων* (imperfect participle) *εἰπεῖν πόλιν τε καὶ ἄνδρα* (the Philosopher's City and the Philosopher), where see note.

20 **ὅτι δεήσοι κτλ.**: 'that there would always have to be present in the city a

δεήσοι τι ἀεὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει λόγον | ἔχον τῆς πολιτείας τὸν D
αὐτόν, ὅνπερ καὶ σύ, ὁ νομοθέτης, ἔχων τοὺς νόμους ἐτίθεις. Ἐρρήθη
γάρ, ἔφη. Ἀλλ' οὐχ ἱκανῶς, εἶπον, ἐδηλώθη, φόβῳ ὧν ὑμεῖς
ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε μακρὰν καὶ χαλεπὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν
ἀπόδειξιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ πάντως ῥᾷστον διελθεῖν. Τὸ
ποῖον; Τίνα τρόπον μεταχειριζομένη πόλις φιλοσοφίαν οὐ διο-
λεῖται. τὰ γὰρ δὴ μεγάλα πάντα ἐπισφαλῆ, καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον τὰ
καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά. Ἀλλ' ὅμως, | ἔφη, λαβέτω τέλος ἡ ἀπόδει- E
ξις τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου. Οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
ἀλλ' εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλύσει· παρὼν δὲ τήν γ' ἐμὴν
προθυμίαν εἴσει. σκόπει δὲ καὶ νῦν, ὡς προθύμως καὶ παρακιν-
δυνευτικῶς μέλλω λέγειν, ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἢ νῦν δεῖ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύ-
ματος τούτου πόλιν ἅπτεσθαι. Πῶς; Νῦν μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ καὶ
ἁπτόμενοι μειράκια ὄντα ἄρτι | ἐκ παίδων τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας 498

21. ἐνεῖναι Ξq: ἓν εἶναι A: ἐν εἶναι (*sic*) Π.

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certain factor possessed of a reasoned theory of the constitution, identical with that possessed by you, the legislator, when you made the laws.' The rulers must understand the constitution and not merely accept it on the legislator's authority, if the spirit of the original legislator is to survive his death. *ὀρθὴ δόξα* is not enough; in order to fill the place of the founder of the city they require *ἐπιστήμη*. Plato confesses that he did not make this clear enough before (*οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἐδηλώθη*), and his confession is most true. In one passage (IV 429 C *n.*), indeed, he seems expressly to imply that the Rulers do not fill the legislator's shoes. But there are also some hints or traces of the later view: see on III 414 A, IV 423 E (to which, perhaps, *ἐρρήθη* is intended to refer, although the reference is hardly justified), and 442 C. Cf. 502 D, 503 A, 504 D *nn.*

497 D 23 **ὧν κτλ.** : i.e. *ἐκείνων ὧν κτλ.* The literal translation is 'through dread of the topics to which cleaving you have shewn that the demonstration thereof is long and difficult.' (So also Schneider.) *ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι* (the opposite of *ἀφιέναι* as used in V 449 B and infra 504 E) refers to Adimantus' and the others' resolute determination not to let Socrates slur over the questions relating to women and children (V 449 B ff.) and to the possibility of realising the perfect city (471 C ff.). Cf. infra 505 A. *φόβῳ* is explained by V 450 C ff., 457 C, 473 E. J. and C. take *ὧν* as "*ἐκείνων ἅ*" (cognate accusative)," understanding *ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι* as 'objecting to' or 'attacking,' but no objections were made by Glauco and Adimantus. They merely asked for further explanation, and were in fact favourably disposed rather than otherwise (V 450 D, 451 B). Herwerden's conjecture *ὡς* for *ὧν* refutes itself.

24 **αὐτοῦ** (like the subject of *ἐδηλώθη*) refers to the position of the Rulers in Plato's city—with everything that it involves, including the Community of wives and children, the Philosopher-king and all the leading topics discussed in V—VII; and *τὸ λοιπόν* is what remains of this topic —the rest of VI and VII in fact.

25 **πάντως**. Bekker's *πάντων* (cf. *Laws* 779 E *οὐ πάντων εὐκολώτατον*) is a neat emendation, which Baiter and others have accepted. But *οὐ πάντως ῥᾷστον* 'not in every respect quite easy' (with the usual Greek litotes), is quite unobjectionable, as Schneider points out, and the confusion of *s* and *ν* is rare.

27 **τὸ λεγόμενον κτλ.** D. and V. wrongly make *τῷ ὄντι* part of the proverb. Translate 'and it is true, as the proverb says, that beautiful things are hard.' Cf. IV 435 C and (for *τῷ ὄντι*) VIII 563 E.

497 E 33 **οἱ καὶ ἁπτόμενοι κτλ.** *καί* ='at all.' Cf. *ἐὰν καὶ—ἐθέλωσιν* 498 A.

498 A 1 **τὸ μεταξύ** means 'in the interval before entering upon' (Richards

καὶ χρηματισμοῦ πλησιάσαντες αὐτοῦ τῷ χαλεπωτάτῳ ἀπαλλάττονται, οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι· λέγω δὲ χαλεπώτατον τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἔπειτα, ἐὰν καὶ ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων παρακαλούμενοι ἐθέλωσιν ἀκροαταὶ γίγνεσθαι, μεγάλα ἡγοῦνται, πάρεργον οἰόμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν· πρὸς δὲ τὸ γῆρας ἐκτὸς δή τινων ὀλίγων ἀποσβέννυνται πολὺ μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἡρακλει-
Β τείου ἡλίου,[1] ὅσον αὖθις οὐκ ἐξάπτονται. Δεῖ δὲ πῶς; ἔφη. Πᾶν τοὐναντίον· μειράκια μὲν ὄντα καὶ παῖδας μειρακιώδη παιδείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μεταχειρίζεσθαι, τῶν τε σωμάτων, ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται, εὖ μάλα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτωμένους· προϊούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ᾗ ἡ ψυχὴ τελειοῦσθαι

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in *Cl. Rev.* II p. 324). The correlating or contrasting notion is idiomatically omitted: cf. note on περιαγωγῆς in VII 518 E. Plentiful examples of this usage are supplied by Shilleto on Dem. *F. L.* 181, and Blaydes on Ar. *Ach.* 434 μεταξὺ τῶν Ἰνοῦς and *Birds* 187. With the sentiment cf. 487 C *n.* Richards was, I believe, the first to point out the true meaning of this passage: see also Solomon in *Cl. Rev.* VII p. 11. The traditional view, that μεταξὺ κτλ. means 'in the spare moments of housekeeping and business,' though still given as an alternative by J. and C., is untenable.

3 **οἱ—ποιούμενοι**: 'and they it is, forsooth, who are regarded as accomplished in philosophy.' Sarcasm is often expressed by an appositional participial clause at the end of a sentence: cf. e.g. *Ap.* 34 A, *Crito* 51 A. ποιεῖσθαι here is the passive of ποιεῖν in the sense of 'to construct in fancy,' 'represent,' as e.g. in *Theaet.* 197 D and infra X 609 C. The usage is at first sight strange, but occurs again in VII 538 C, IX 573 B and 574 D, where no other meaning is suitable. Stallbaum's attempt to explain the passages differently is unsuccessful, and the proposed emendations (such as Ast's δοκούμενοι for ποιούμενοι) are unsatisfactory in each of the four cases. See notes ad ll.

4 **ἐὰν καί** goes with ἐθέλωσιν (Schneider): 'if they *do* consent' (cf. καὶ ἀπτόμενοι above). It is implied that many, or most of them, do not.

5 **μεγάλα κτλ.** Plato distinguishes three stages. In the first, τὸ περὶ λόγους is a man's ἔργον after boyhood until he begins practical life; it then becomes his πάρεργον, and he 'thinks it great things' to go to an occasional lecture: towards old age all but very few neglect philosophy entirely. The proper study of philosophy reverses all this (πᾶν τοὐναντίον) as is shewn in B and C.

7 **τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου ἡλίου.** Heraclitus *Fr.* 32 Bywater νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρῃ ἥλιος. Heraclitus meant the saying to be taken literally, and not merely as an expression of the universal law of change: see the authorities cited by Bywater ad loc. and Zeller[5] I p. 684 *n.* 2.

498 B 10 **φιλοσοφίαν κτλ.** φιλοσοφίαν in its wider sense denotes any 'liberal' training or study: cf. *Theaet.* 143 D, 172 C, and *Prot.* 335 D with my note ad loc. D. and V. are in error (as Bosanquet remarks) when they translate παιδείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν by 'a course of training in philosophy.' Nor is Susemihl (*Gen. Entw.* II p. 187) right in supposing that the reference is to the musical education of the earlier books. Plato explains what he means in VII 536 D, E.

11 **ἀνδροῦται.** The early editors read ἀδροῦται (with Ξ). ἀδροῦμαι is a rare and somewhat obscure word, nowhere found in Plato; and it is better to retain ἀνδροῦται, although the subject is not μειράκια, but σώματα.

ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτωμένους sums up in a single phrase the Platonic theory of athletics: see on III 410 A ff. and cf. IX 591 C, D.

12 **ἐν ᾗ.** Richards would write ἐν ᾧ as in ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει above, asserting that "ἡ ἡλικία is their years, not any particular time of life"; but ἡ ἡλικία is often so used, e.g. *Symp.* 209 B and *Men.* 89 B. Nor is ἐν ᾧ, 'while,' appropriate here. Translate 'when the years advance, in which the soul begins to reach its maturity.'

ἄρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια· ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν | δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς γίγνηται, τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους C
νέμεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν, ὅ τι μὴ πάρεργον, τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐδαιμόνως βιώσεσθαι καὶ τελευτήσαντας τῷ βίῳ τῷ βεβιωμένῳ τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν ἐπιστήσειν πρέπουσαν.

XII. Ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, λέγειν γε προθύμως, ὦ Σώκρατες· οἶμαι μέντοι τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀκουόντων προθυμότερον ἔτι ἀντιτείνειν οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν πεισομένους, ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξαμένους. Μὴ διάβαλλε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐμὲ καὶ Θρασύμαχον | ἄρτι D
φίλους γεγονότας, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἐχθροὺς ὄντας. πείρας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀνήσομεν, ἕως ἂν ἢ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢ προὔργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν αὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωσι λόγοις. Εἰς μικρόν γ', ἔφη, χρόνον εἴρηκας. Εἰς οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφην, ὡς γε πρὸς τὸν ἅπαντα. τὸ μέντοι μὴ

14. στρατειῶν *q*: στρατιῶν ΑΠΞ.

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498 C **14** **γίγνηται κτλ.** The subject is still ἡ ῥώμη, 'their physical strength,' not τις (as J. and C. assert). In ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι the metaphor (as observed by Heindorf on *Prot.* 320 A) is taken *de grege numini alicui consecrato:* cf. *Critias* 119 D ἀφέτων ὄντων ταύρων ἐν τῷ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἱερῷ. νέμεσθαι is properly 'to graze.' The effect of the Greek may be conveyed by rendering 'they roam the sacred fields at will,' although ἀφέτους of course agrees with the subject of νέμεσθαι.

498 C—**502** C *Adimantus hardly expects the reasoning of Socrates to carry conviction to most of his hearers. But Socrates will not despair, believing that his words may perhaps bear fruit hereafter, if not here. As for the Multitude, their dissent is easily explained. They have heard enough of jingling rhetoric, but they have never yet seen a Philosopher-king, nor are they accustomed to discourses whose only aim is truth. Our perfect city is realised always and everywhere, wheresoever and whensoever Philosophy sits on the throne. The Multitude will assent, if we approach them rightly; for their hatred is against the false philosophers, and not against the true. The lover of Truth is absorbed in contemplation of the changeless Realities, on the model of which he will frame human institutions, should he be called upon to enter public life. Point this out to the Many, and reason with them, and they will agree. Our proposals, though difficult, are not impossible.*

20 **ἀντιτείνειν κτλ.** I formerly read ἀντιτενεῖν with Stephanus and others; but the present, which is in all the MSS, gives a good sense and makes a better balance with λέγειν προθύμως. Translate 'offer a still more enthusiastic opposition, being not in the least likely to agree.' The majority of editors retain the present.

ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου κτλ. Thrasymachus was not likely to agree with so fierce an onslaught on his profession: see 493 A ff., 495 C ff.

498 D **22** **οὐδὲ — ὄντας.** Cf. I 354 A *n.*

24 **αὖθις γενόμενοι** 'born again' implies the re-incarnation of the Soul, as described in the end of Book X: see on 608 D ff. It is from casual allusions like the present, made in all seriousness, that we can best understand how profound and practical was Plato's belief in immortality. The seed sown here may bear its fruit in another life, so that the educator need not despair.

25 **εἰς μικρὸν κτλ.** is not merely ironical but incredulous. We need not therefore (with J. and C.) be surprised

πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις τοὺς πολλοὺς θαῦμα οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἶδον γενόμενον τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον
E | τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ῥήματα ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ὡμοιωμένα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ὥσπερ νῦν συμπεσόντα· ἄνδρα δὲ ἀρετῇ παρισωμένον καὶ ὡμοιωμένον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ, δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει ἑτέρᾳ τοιαύτῃ, οὐ πώποτε |
499 ἑωράκασιν οὔτε ἕνα οὔτε πλείους. ἢ οἴει; Οὐδαμῶς γε. Οὐδέ γε αὖ λόγων, ὦ μακάριε, καλῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἱκανῶς ἐπήκοοι γεγόνασιν, οἵων ζητεῖν μὲν τὸ ἀληθὲς ξυντεταμένως ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τοῦ γνῶναι χάριν, τὰ δὲ κομψά τε καὶ ἐριστικὰ καὶ μηδαμόσε ἄλλοσε τείνοντα ἢ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἔριν καὶ ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνουσίαις πόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένων. Οὐδὲ τούτων, ἔφη.
B Τούτων | τοι χάριν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτα προορώμενοι ἡμεῖς τότε καὶ δεδιότες ὅμως ἐλέγομεν, ὑπὸ τἀληθοῦς ἠναγκασμένοι, ὅτι οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδέ γ' ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μή ποτε γένηται τέλεος,

28. πολὺ $A^1\Pi$: πολλοὶ corr. A^2. 29. τοιαῦτ' ἄττα $A^1\Pi$: γρ τοιαυτὶ in mg. A^2. 32. ἑτέρᾳ Π: ἑτέρα A. 3. ξυντεταμένως $A^2\Pi$: ξυντεταγμένως A^1. 4. τρόπου Π et γρ in mg. A^2: προσώπου A^1.

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at Glauco's incredulity and wonder in X 608 D. For οὐδέν 'a mere nothing' 'nought,' the much less expressive οὐδένα was conjectured by Hirschig and others. An exact parallel may be found in X 608 C. The grandeur and elevation of this passage recall VI 486 A.

498 E 29 **τοιαῦτ' ἄττα κτλ.** Plato is here alluding to epideictic harangues by sophistical rhetoricians of the school of Gorgias. τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ῥήματα = 'expressions of this sort' refers to the jingle in γενόμενον—λεγόμενον, which is an example of the rhetorical device called παρομοίωσις: see Arist. *Rhet.* III 9. 1410^a 24 ff. παρομοίωσις δ' ἐὰν ὅμοια τὰ ἴσχατα ἔχῃ ἑκάτερον τὸ κῶλον, e.g. ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσι, and many other examples: see Cope ad loc. In ἐξεπίτηδες—ὡμοιωμένα, 'assimilated to one another of set purpose,' the same device is meant. Isocrates and his literary brethren employed it constantly: see the references on 495 E.

ἀλλ' οὐκ—συμπεσόντα κτλ.: 'instead of spontaneously chiming together, as in the present case' etc., where the παρομοίωσις of γενόμενον and λεγόμενον is ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ('natural,' 'spontaneous,' 'accidental' as opposed to ἐξεπίτηδες). παρισωμένον and ὡμοιωμένον are said with a reference to παρίσωσις (the equality of clauses, as for example in Isocr. *Paneg.* 76: see Cope l.c. p. 106) and παρομοίωσις. The Many have had quite enough of παρίσωσις etc. in *words*; but they have never seen a Man παρισώμενον τῇ ἀρετῇ. Plato means that the time for mincing Rhetoric is past; we want a *Man* (ἄνδρα is emphatic), "with heart and hand, One still strong man in a blatant land, Who can rule, and dare not lie" (Tennyson). It is highly probable, as Dümmler holds (*Chron. Beitr.* p. 14), that Plato has specially in view Isocrates' *Panegyricus* throughout this passage. The contemptible devices which Plato here ridicules are extraordinarily common in that harangue. For other views of this passage see App. III.

499 A 5 **δόξαν** is 'seeming,' 'appearance') (τὸ ἀληθές above (Schneider): cf. 505 D. The rendering 'applause' (D. and V.) or 'fame,' is, I think, less likely to be right. For ἔριν cf. V 454 A *n.*

499 B 7 **τότε.** V 473 D.

8 **οὔτε—οὔτε—οὐδέ γε** is a common sequence where stress is laid on the last alternative: cf. 492 E and X 608 B. οὐδέ γ' ἀνήρ = 'no, nor yet an individual man' is said because even the philosopher is not τέλεος except in the philosopher's city: cf. 497 A. ὁμοίως means simply 'in

πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς, ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης παραβάλῃ, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή, πόλεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι, καὶ τῇ πόλει κατηκόῳ γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὄντων υἱέσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἔκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας | ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας C ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ. τούτων δὲ πότερα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀμφότερα ὡς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδένα φημὶ ἔχειν λόγον. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἡμεῖς δικαίως καταγελῴμεθα, ὡς ἄλλως εὐχαῖς ὅμοια

11. παραβάλῃ Ξq: περιβάλῃ ΑΠ. 13. κατηκόῳ Schleiermacher: κατήκοοι ΑΞq: κατήκοι (*sic*) Π. 17. καταγελῴμεθα Π: καταγελώμεθα Α.

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like manner,' 'likewise,' and should not be construed with *τέλεος* in the sense of 'equally perfect,' as J. and C. translate.

11 **ἀνάγκη—παραβάλῃ.** See *cr. n.* *παραβάλλειν* means accedere (not, as has been asserted, accidere): cf. VIII 556 C and *Lys.* 203 B. The word is not however quite appropriate here: and I should much prefer a convincing emendation of the text of A, Π and other MSS (*ἀνάγκη—περιβάλῃ*). As it stands, *περιβάλῃ* must either be intransitive, or else the infinitive *ἐπιμεληθῆναι* serves as its object in place of an accusative. Neither view is supported by any evidence. I formerly conjectured *ἀνάγκην τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλῃ* 'until some one happens to compel these philosophers' etc., but *τις ἀνάγκη—γέγονεν* in C does not favour this remedy. It is perhaps safest to read *παραβάλῃ* provisionally and *pro tempore*. With *ἐκ τύχης* cf. IX 592 A *ἐὰν μὴ θεία τις ξυμβῇ τύχη* and *Ep.* VII 327 E.

13 **κατηκόῳ.** Schleiermacher's conjecture is accepted by Madvig, Baiter, and J. and C. Stallbaum was inclined to read *κατηκόοις*. If *κατήκοοι* is right, it must stand for *κατηκόοις*, the nominative being due to the interposition of *εἴτε βούλονται κτλ.* But the construction is difficult, and the sense unsatisfactory. We require some guarantee that the city will obey (cf. 502 B), and *κατηκόῳ* is the only reading which provides it.

τῶν νῦν—υἱέσιν. "I do not doubt but that this was meant as a compliment and incitement to the younger Dionysius (see Plato *Epist.* 7, p. 327). And I understand what follows p. 502 in the same manner. Hence it seems that this part of the dialogue was written after his first voyage to Sicily, and probably not long before his second, about Ol. 101, 3, when the elder Dionysius was just dead" (Thomas Gray *Works* ed. Gosse IV p. 251). In the parallel passage V 473 D Plato speaks of kings and *δυνάσται*, but not yet of kings' sons. The substance of Gray's conjecture is confirmed by recent criticism (see e.g. Hirmer *Entst. u. Kompos.* etc. p. 668): but Dionysius I died in Ol. 103, 2 (367 B.C.) and not in Ol. 101, 3 (374 B.C.), and Plato's second visit to Sicily seems to have taken place just after the old tyrant's death (Grote X pp. 346—356). See also on V 473 D, VI 496 B and *Introd.* § 4.

499 C 15 **τούτων δὲ πότερα κτλ.** Grote pronounces the Platonic commonwealth impossible because "we cannot understand from whence the force is to come, tending and competent to generate" it at the first. Once begun, he holds, "there is no reason why it might not have continued." That the real difficulty is in starting it, Plato himself clearly understands (cf. 501 A *n.*). He would not however allow that the difficulty is insurmountable; since a *θεία τις τύχη* (IX 592 A) may well occur. But the true fulfilment of Plato's Ideal, as he himself foretells in IX 592 B, is to be sought, not in any single earthly commonwealth, but in its influence, direct and indirect, upon the moral, political, religious, and intellectual progress of mankind: see V 470 E *n.* and Zeller's dissertation on *Der platonische Staat in seiner Bedeutung für die Folgezeit* in his *Vorträgen und Abhandlungen*[2] pp. 68 ff.

17 **ἄλλως κτλ.** For *ἄλλως* 'merely' cf. *Theaet.* 176 D *γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη.* On *εὐχαῖς* see V 450 D *n.*

λέγοντες. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Οὕτως. Εἰ τοίνυν ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεώς τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ, ἢ καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ἔν τινι βαρβαρικῷ τόπῳ 20
D πόρρω που ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς | ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως, ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἕτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἔστιν καὶ γενήσεταί γε, ὅταν αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γένηται. οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ' ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέγομεν· χαλεπὰ δὲ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ὁμολογεῖται. 25
Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, οὕτω δοκεῖ. Τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐκ
E αὖ δοκεῖ, ἐρεῖς; Ἴσως, ἔφη. Ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, | μὴ πάνυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγόρει. ἀλλοίαν τοι δόξαν ἕξουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς μὴ φιλονικῶν ἀλλὰ παραμυθούμενος καὶ ἀπολύόμενος τὴν τῆς φιλομαθίας διαβολὴν ἐνδεικνύῃ οὓς λέγεις τοὺς φιλοσόφους, καὶ διορίζῃ 30
500 ὥσπερ ἄρτι τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν | ἐπιτήδευσιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡγῶνταί σε λέγειν οὓς αὐτοὶ οἴονται. ἢ καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται, ἀλλοίαν τ' οὐ φήσεις αὐτοὺς δόξαν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἄλλα ἀποκρινεῖσθαι; ἢ οἴει τινὰ χαλεπαίνειν τῷ μὴ χαλεπῷ ἢ φθονεῖν τῷ μὴ φθονερῷ ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾶον ὄντα; ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ σε προφθάσας 5
λέγω, ὅτι ἐν ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἡγοῦμαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ πλήθει χαλεπὴν

23. αὕτη $A^1\Pi$: αὐτὴ A^2. 3. τ' οὐ Baiter: τοι $A\Pi\Xi q$. ἀποκρινεῖσθαι Π: ἀποκρίνεσθαι A.

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20 **βαρβαρικῷ—ἐπόψεως.** Cf. *Phaed.* 78 A. Touches of this kind are rare in Plato and generally full of pathos, as if the hope of mankind no longer lay in Hellas. The present sentence is a confession of the fact that the foundations of Plato's city are not laid in Hellenism, but in Humanity, understood as Plato himself understands the word in 501 B. See on V 470 E.

499 D 22 **ἕτοιμοι.** The ellipse of the first person of the copula is rare, except when *ἐγώ* or *ἡμεῖς* is expressed, but *ἕτοιμος* is a privileged word: cf. *Parm.* 137 B and other examples in Schanz *Nov. Comm. Pl.* p. 35.

23 **αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα.** Philosophy.

499 E 27 **μὴ πάνυ κτλ.** Plato's attitude to *οἱ πολλοί* (as Krohn remarks *Pl. St.* p. 118) has somewhat altered since 492 B ff., partly, perhaps, because his wrath has been diverted against the false philosophers. But this attempt to soothe the many-headed Beast should not be taken too seriously: see 501 E—502 A *n.*

28 **ἀλλοίαν τοι κτλ.** See App. IV.

500 A 2 **ἢ καὶ κτλ.** 'Or even if they view them in this light, will you deny that they will change their opinion?' Baiter's correction—see *cr. n.*—is, as I now think, the simplest, and best explains the corruption. I can see no ground for writing *ἐὰν οὕτω αἴσθωνται* or *ἐὰν τοῦτ' αἴσθωνται* with Richards. With *οὐ φήσεις* cf. VII 534 B. For other views on this passage see App. IV.

5 **πρᾶον** is an allusion to the universally admitted *πραότης* of the Athenian *δῆμος*; see Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22. 4 *τῇ εἰωθυίᾳ τοῦ δήμου πραότητι* (where Sandys quotes Dem. *Timocr.* 51) with Isocr. *Antid.* 20, 300. Hence (as Schneider points out) *δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρᾶον* in *Euthyd.* 303 D. Cf. also Soph. *O. C.* 1126 f.

6 **ἐν ὀλίγοις τισίν.** Dümmler (*Chr. Beit.* p. 45) thinks of Isocrates, but there is nothing to suggest a specific reference here.

οὕτω φύσιν γίγνεσθαι. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμέλει, ἔφη, ξυνοίομαι. | Οὐκοῦν B
καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ξυνοίει, τοῦ χαλεπῶς πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν τοὺς πολ-
λοὺς διακεῖσθαι ἐκείνους αἰτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἔξωθεν οὐ προσῆκον
ἐπεισκεκωμακότας, λοιδορουμένους τε αὐτοῖς καὶ φιλαπεχθημόνως
ἔχοντας καὶ ἀεὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένους, ἥκιστα
φιλοσοφίᾳ πρέπον ποιοῦντας; Πολύ γ', ἔφη.

XIII. Οὐδὲ γάρ που, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς
πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων
| πραγματείας καὶ μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας C
ἐμπίμπλασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ
ἔχοντα ὁρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὔτ' ἀδικοῦντα οὔτ' ἀδικούμενα
ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα
μιμεῖσθαί τε καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. ἢ οἴει τινὰ μηχανὴν
εἶναι, ὅτῳ τις ὁμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο; Ἀδύνατον,
ἔφη. Θείῳ δὴ καὶ κοσμίῳ ὅ γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμιός τε | καὶ D

17. ἀδικούμενα Ξ¹q: ἀδικούμενον ΑΠ¹Ξ²: ἀδικούμενος Π².

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500 B 9 **τοὺς ἔξωθεν κτλ.** Isocrates seems to have taken this as a personal attack, as perhaps it was intended to be. His reply may be found in *Antid.* 260 ff. *περὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους ἡμεῖς ὄντες, οὓς ἐκεῖνοί φασιν εἶναι φιλαπεχθήμονας* (cf. *φιλαπεχθημόνως ἔχοντας* here), *πολὺ πραότεροι τυγχάνομεν αὐτῶν ὄντες· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀεί τι περὶ ἡμῶν φλαῦρον λέγουσιν, ἐγὼ δ' οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποιμι τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις χρήσομαι περὶ αὐτῶν κτλ.* See the interesting discussion in Dümmler l.c. pp. 8 ff.

10 **αὐτοῖς** and not *αὑτοῖς* is certainly what Plato wrote. False philosophers, like bad scholars, are always abusing one another. The middle, which is reciprocal, is also decisive in favour of *αὐτοῖς*: cf. *Charm.* 154 A *λοιδορουμένους ἀλλήλοις.* J. and C. (with Stallbaum and the editors generally, except Schneider) read *αὑτοῖς*, remarking that "it was by no means an uncommon practice of the old philosophers to abuse the people." Plato is not speaking of the old philosophers at all, but only of sophists and pretenders, who do not abuse, but flatter and cajole the people (493 A ff.).

11 **ἀεὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων κτλ.** The seeker after Truth does not indulge in personalities (cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* IV 9. 1125ª 5 ff. and *Rhet.* II 4. 1381ᵇ 7), or scandal (*Theaet.* 173 D: cf. 174 E ff.). His single-minded pursuit of Truth leaves him neither time nor inclination to talk about people.

12 **πολύ γε**: sc. *ἥκιστα.* Adimantus accommodates his answer to the last clause of Socrates' question. See on V 465 E.

13 **σχολή.** Cf. *Theaet.* 172 D ff.

500 C 16 **εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα κτλ.** With the general sense cf. *Theaet.* 174 D ff., *Phaed.* 79 C, D, *Tim.* 47 B, C and Euripides *Fr.* 902 *ὄλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας | ἔσχε μάθησιν | μήτε πολιτῶν ἐπὶ πημοσύνην | μήτ' εἰς ἀδίκους πράξεις ὁρμῶν | ἀλλ' ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως | κόσμον ἀγήρων, πῇ τε συνέστη | καὶ ὅπη καὶ ὅπως. | τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις οὐδέποτ' αἰσχρῶν | ἔργων μελέτημα προσίζει.* Euripides' lines are conceived in the spirit of Plato and exactly illustrate his meaning, especially if, as is usually supposed, they refer to the philosopher Anaxagoras. An eloquent modern parallel may be found in Stevenson's '*Virginibus puerisque*' p. 260.

17 **ὁρῶντας.** For the change from singular to plural cf. I 347 A *n.*

21 **κοσμίῳ.** It has been thought that there is a play on *κόσμος* in the sense of the Universe or Heavens. But the philosopher's gaze outsoars the Heavens, and is fixed on the *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος*, where the Ideas dwell (*Phaedr.* 247 C).

θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται· διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πᾶσι πολλή. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Ἂν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἦθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἆρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἴει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ξυμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; Ἥκιστά γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἀλλ' ἐὰν δὴ αἴσθωνται
E οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγομεν, χαλεπανοῦσι δὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἀπιστήσουσιν ἡμῖν λέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσειε πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι; Οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐάνπερ
501 αἴσθωνται. ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα | λέγεις τρόπον τῆς διαγραφῆς; Λαβόντες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἤθη ἀνθρώπων πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν, ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον· ἀλλ' οὖν οἶσθ' ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν εὐθὺς τῶν ἄλλων διενέγκοιεν, τῷ μήτε ἰδιώτου μήτε πόλεως ἐθελῆσαι ἂν ἅψασθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους, πρὶν ἢ παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη. Οὐκ-

4. διενέγκοιεν *q*: διενεγκεῖν ΑΠ: διενεγκεῖεν (*sic*) Ξ.

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500 D 22 **διαβολὴ κτλ.** ἐν πᾶσι is neuter, 'albeit misrepresentation is rife everywhere,' "there is always detraction going on" (J. and C.).

23 **ἂν οὖν τις κτλ.** Cf. 484 C.

27 **δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς.** Not scientific virtue, because its intellectual basis in the minds of the people is *ὀρθὴ δόξα*, and not *ἐπιστήμη*. See IV 430 C *n.*, and on *δημοτικὴ ἀρετή* generally Zeller[4] II 1, pp. 593—601, and Archer-Hind's edition of the *Phaedo* App. I. The 'demotic virtue' which the philosopher constructs is of course the best of its kind.

501 A 3 **ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον.** Cf. 499 C *n.* Plato's *κάθαρσις* is sufficiently drastic. He would rusticate the entire population above ten years of age, and bring up the remainder in the principles of his *καλλίπολις* (VII 540 E ff. *n.*).

4 **διενέγκοιεν.** See *cr. n.* Schneider retains *διενεγκεῖν*, comparing other passages in which *ὅτι* is followed by an infinitive. Instances of this irregularity occasionally occur (Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 877), but it is unusually awkward here, and the majority of editors are probably right in following *q*. With the sentiment cf. *Laws* 735 B—736 C, where the necessity of an initial *κάθαρσις* is equally insisted on, and various forms of legislative purgation are described.

μήτε ἰδιώτου κτλ. The individual is cleansed by the Socratic elenchus, which purges him of his false persuasion of knowledge: cf. *Soph.* 230 B—E, where this kind of *κάθαρσις* is expounded in detail. Gildersleeve (*A. J. Ph.* III p. 201) points out that the 'articular infinitive' with *ἄν* is rare in Plato.

5 **γράφειν νόμους**: 'to paint or draft laws.' Richards is inclined to cancel *μηδὲ—νόμους* as involving "a most awkward and inartistic confusion of the figure (painting) with the thing figured (legislation)." Nothing is more usual in Plato than such a 'confusion,' if the phrase employed bears, like *γράφειν νόμους*, or is capable of bearing, like *ἀνδρείκελον* below, a meaning of its own as well as an application in the simile, and it is a narrow conception of art which pronounces the idiom inartistic. Cf. 507 A *n.* and *Euthyph.* 3 A with my note ad loc., and see also on V 451 B. Cobet's *ἐγγράφειν νόμους*, which Baiter adopts, is another unsuccessful attempt to obliterate this characteristic feature of Plato's style.

6 **παραλαβεῖν καθαράν.** Plato would cite as examples a tutor who is entrusted with the sole authority over a child, and legislators who (as in the *Laws* 702 B ff.) receive autocratic power in order to found a colony. Cf. 499 B *n.*

οὖν μετὰ ταῦτα οἴει ὑπογράψασθαι ἂν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας; Τί μήν; Ἔπειτα, οἶμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἐκατέρωσε B ἀποβλέποιεν, πρός τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, ξυμμιγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄν, οἶμαι, ἐξαλείφοιεν, τὸ δὲ πάλιν ἐγγράφοιεν, ἕως ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀνθρώπεια ἤθη εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται θεοφιλῆ C

8. ἐκατέρωσε *q*: ἑκατέρως ΑΠΞ. 10. ὃ Ξ et corr. *q*: τὸ ΑΠ. In A tamen cum non post ἀνθρώποις (quod affirmant Turicenses), sed post ἐμποιοῖεν interpunctum sit, videtur scriba neglegentius exarasse τὸ pro ὅ.

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501 B 9 **τὸ φύσει δίκαιον** is assuredly the Idea of Justice, as opposed to τὸ νόμῳ δίκαιον 'conventional justice': cf. 500 C and (for φύσει) V 476 B. See also on X 598 A. Bosanquet ignores the most essential and characteristic feature of Plato's teaching when he remarks that "the 'natural' principles of justice and other moral qualities are no doubt those which Plato believes himself to have found present, in various degrees, throughout inorganic and organic nature and the animal world, and culminating in the life of man." It is better to let Plato soar where we cannot follow him than thus to clip his wings. See the Appendix to Book VII *On Plato's Dialectic*.

10 **καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο κτλ.** The legislative painter looks now at his model (the φύσει δίκαιον etc.), now at his picture (the δίκαιον etc. which he is implanting among men), rubbing out one part and painting another in again (τὸ μὲν—ἐγγράφοιεν), till he is satisfied with the result. He combines and mixes various ἐπιτηδεύματα or institutions, till he produces the true ἀνδρείκελον or 'colour and likeness of true Manhood'; just as the painter mixes various colours to produce his ἀνδρείκελον or flesh-tint. ἀνδρείκελον in *painting* was a sort of flesh-colour, made by mixing various colours together: see *Crat.* 424 E, Xen. *Oec.* 10. 5, Arist. *de gen. an.* I 18. 725ᵃ 26 and Ruhnken on Timaeus *Lex.* s.v. To this Plato of course alludes, but he intends us also to take the word in its etymological signification, as is clear from θεοείκελον below. The stress in ἀνδρείκελον, as in θεοειδές and θεοείκελον, is on the first part of the compound: it is not the mere ἀνθρωποειδές, but the *Man*-like, at which the legislator aims: cf. the force of ἄνδρα in 498 E. ἀνδρείκελον might be translated by 'the human form divine,' except that 'form' suggests a wrong notion. For other views on this passage see App. V.

13 **θεοείκελον.** *Il.* I 131 et al. It is pleasing to meet with so cordial and spontaneous an acknowledgment of Homer as a kindred spirit in a passage so full of Plato's characteristic idealism. There is more than a grain of truth in Longinus' observation: μόνος Ἡρόδοτος Ὁμηρικώτατος ἐγένετο; Στησίχορος ἔτι πρότερον ὅ τε Ἀρχίλοχος, πάντων δὲ τούτων μάλιστα ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὁμηρικοῦ κείνου νάματος εἰς αὑτὸν μυρίας ὅσας παρατροπὰς ἀποχετευσάμενος (περὶ ὕψους 13. 3). By the words τὸ ἀνδρείκελον—θεοείκελον Plato means to suggest that Man is then most manlike when he most resembles God: and (as Tennyson says) "then most godlike being most a man." Cf. IX 589 D *n.* This sure and abiding conviction of the presence of a divine element within us, rendering our nature essentially and truly human, makes itself felt in nearly all the dialogues of Plato. It is the ultimate source of all his idealism, religious and metaphysical, no less than moral and political, and may well be considered the most precious and enduring inheritance which he has bequeathed to posterity.

501 C 15 **ὅ τι μάλιστα** should be taken with ποιήσειαν, and εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται with θεοφιλῆ: 'until, as far as possible, they have made mere human characters as dear to God as human

ποιήσειαν. Καλλίστη γοῦν ἄν, ἔφη, ἡ γραφὴ γένοιτο. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πείθομέν πῃ ἐκείνους, οὓς διατεταμένους ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἔφησθα ἰέναι, ὡς τοιοῦτός ἐστι πολιτειῶν ζῳγράφος ὃν τότ' ἐπῃνοῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, δι' ὃν ἐκεῖνοι ἐχαλέπαινον, ὅτι τὰς πόλεις αὐτῷ παρεδίδομεν, καί τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ νῦν ἀκούοντες πραΰνονται; Καὶ πολύ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰ σωφρονοῦσιν. Πῇ γὰρ δὴ ἔξουσιν ἀμφισβητῆσαι; πότερον μὴ τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐραστὰς εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσόφους; Ἄτοπον μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἴη. Ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀρίστου, ἣν ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Τί δέ; τὴν τοιαύτην τυχοῦσαν τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιτηδευμάτων οὐκ ἀγαθὴν τελέως ἔσεσθαι καὶ φιλόσοφον εἴπερ τινὰ ἄλλην; ἢ ἐκείνους φήσει μᾶλλον, οὓς ἡμεῖς ἀφωρίσαμεν; Οὐ δήπου. Ἔτι οὖν ἀγριανοῦσι λεγόντων ἡμῶν, ὅτι πρὶν ἂν πόλεως τὸ φιλόσοφον γένος ἐγκρατὲς γένηται, οὔτε πόλει οὔτε πολίταις κακῶν παῦλα ἔσται, οὐδὲ ἡ πολιτεία, ἣν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγῳ, ἔργῳ τέλος λήψεται; Ἴσως, ἔφη, ἧττον. Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ ἧττον φῶμεν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ παντάπασι πράους γεγονέναι καὶ πεπεῖσθαι, ἵνα εἰ μή τι ἄλλο, αἰσχυνθέντες ὁμολογήσωσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

20. καί τι Vind. E Flor. ACTV: καὶ τί A: καὶ ἔτι ΠΞ *q*. 27. φήσει nos: φήσειν ΑΠΞ: φήσεις *q*.

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characters can be.' For the σχῆμα ἐκ παραλλήλου see Schanz, *Nov. Comm. Pl.* pp. 12—15. Schneider can hardly be right in connecting ὅ τι μάλιστα with ἀνθρώπεια. For θεοφιλῆ Badham conjectured θεοειδῆ—a most arbitrary change, though approved by Cobet and Baiter. How could θεοειδῆ have degenerated into θεοφιλῆ, which is in all the MSS? The opposite corruption was far more likely. Plato means us to understand that God loves those most who most resemble Him: cf. X 612 E and *Laws* 716 C.

17 **ἔφησθα.** V 474 A.

20 **αὐτό**: viz. the statement ὡς τοιοῦτος—αὐτούς with its interpretation in the preceding exposition.

501 D 27 **φήσει.** We should expect φήσουσι, but the transition from plural to singular is common (see on I 347 A), and Plato is probably thinking of the objector in 487 C (φαίη ἄν τις κτλ.): cf. 489 D and 490 D. οὐκ ἀγαθήν just above (instead of μὴ ἀγαθήν as in μὴ τὴν φύσιν) prepares the way for φήσει, by shewing that the infinitives are beginning to escape from the sway of ἀμφισβητῆσαι. φήσει in φήσει λογιζόμενος II 366 A furnishes an exact parallel to φήσει here. The best MSS—see *cr. n.*—read φήσειν, which is retained by Schneider and others. If φήσειν is right, we must either (1) refer it to ἔξουσι, and suppose that the future is "ob ἔσεσθαι pro φάναι receptum" (Schneider, Stallbaum), or (2) supply an οἴει (J. and C.). Neither explanation is in my judgment possible. φήσεις, the reading of *q* and editors before Bekker, may be defended from 489 B and 489 D, where Adimantus is identified with the antagonist of 487 C, but the corruption is not a very likely one. Madvig, *more suo*, expels the word. Cf. *Introd.* § 5.

501 E 31 **μὴ ἧττον.** Herwerden would insert χαλεπούς or πικρούς, Richards ἀγρίους or ἀγριαίνειν. If ἧττον is pronounced with emphasis, its meaning is easily caught, after ἧττον in Adimantus' reply. It is virtually a quotation: "wollen wir nicht statt dieses weniger" etc. (Schneider).

XIV. Οὗτοι μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο πεπεισμένοι ἔστων· τοῦδε δὲ πέρι τις ἀμφισβητήσει, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τύχοιεν γενόμενοι βασιλέων ἔκγονοι ἢ δυναστῶν τὰς φύσεις φιλόσοφοι; Οὐδ' ἂν εἷς, ἔφη. Τοιούτους δὲ γενομένους ὡς πολλὴ ἀνάγκη διαφθαρῆναι, ἔχει τις λέγειν; ὡς μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν σωθῆναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς ξυγχωροῦμεν· ὡς δὲ ἐν παντὶ τῷ | χρόνῳ τῶν πάντων οὐδέποτε οὐδ' ἂν B εἷς σωθείη, ἔσθ' ὅστις ἀμφισβητήσει; Καὶ πῶς; Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἷς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν ἔχων πειθομένην, πάντ' ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστούμενα. Ἱκανὸς γάρ, ἔφη. Ἄρχοντος γάρ που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τιθέντος τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἃ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐ δήπου ἀδύνατον ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. Ἀλλὰ δὴ ἅπερ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, δόξαι καὶ ἄλλοις θαυμαστόν τι καὶ ἀδύνατον; Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, | ἦ δ' ὅς. Καὶ C μὴν ὅτι γε βέλτιστα, εἴπερ δυνατά, ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, διήλθομεν. Ἱκανῶς γάρ. Νῦν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι ἃ λέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε. Ξυμβαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.

XV. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μόγις τέλος ἔσχεν, τὰ ἐπίλοιπα δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον, τίνα | τρόπον ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τίνων μαθημάτων τε D

9. ἀμφισβητήσει *p*: ἀμφισβητήσειε AΞ: ἀμφισβητήσεως Π.

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502 A 3 **πεπεισμένοι ἔστων.** See on 499 E. Plato's attempt to conciliate the Many is obviously half-hearted. The Multitude can never be philosophers (494 A), and are not likely to believe in the Philosopher-king. But it was necessary to prove or postulate some degree of assent or at least quiescence on their part in order to demonstrate the possibility of the perfect city. Cf. 502 C *n.*

4 **τις.** *τίς* is read by A, but Adimantus's reply makes it probable that the indefinite pronoun is correct.

5 **βασιλέων ἔκγονοι.** See on 499 B.

502 B 10 **εἷς ἱκανὸς κτλ.** Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 125) justly sees in this sentence "an expression of the convictions which led Plato to Sicily" in 367 B.C. Cf. Grote *Plato* I p. 126 and supra 499 B *n.* Richards would read "<σῶς> γενόμενος or γενόμενός <τε καὶ σῶς γενόμενος> or something similar." <περι> γενόμενος would give the same sense, and be better Greek. But γενόμενος=εἰ γένοιτο, 'should he arise,' is sufficient. He could not be said to be *ἱκανός* if he were corrupted.

14 **ἅπερ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ:** i.e. the arrangements of Plato's καλλίπολις, as J. and C. point out. A ruler *may* arise who will approve of these, and frame laws accordingly. Plato is trying to prove that his ideal city is not impossible.

502 C 19 **οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε.** 'Not impossible' is the final verdict which Plato's readers, like Plato himself, will pass upon his city. His tone is far less hopeful than in Books II—IV, and even in V 473 B ff. he is, I think, more optimistic. It is impossible not to feel that 501 C—502 C is written, in some measure, *invita Minerva.* Plato is glad to escape from so difficult and uncongenial a topic into his native element again. He is beginning to see that the Perfect City is in truth a παράδειγμα ἐν οὐρανῷ (IX 592 B). See on V 470 E, VI 499 C, 499 E, 502 A and VII 540 D—541 B, and cf. Hirmer *Entst. u. Komp.* etc. p. 638.

502 C—**504** A *Our next duty is to*

καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων οἱ σωτῆρες ἐνέσονται τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ κατὰ
ποίας ἡλικίας ἕκαστοι ἑκάστων ἅπτόμενοι; Λεκτέον μέντοι, ἔφη.
Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ σοφόν μοι ἐγένετο τήν τε τῶν γυναικῶν τῆς
κτήσεως δυσχέρειαν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παραλιπόντι καὶ παιδογονίαν 25
καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων κατάστασιν, εἰδότι ὡς ἐπίφθονός τε καὶ
χαλεπὴ γίγνεσθαι ἡ παντελῶς ἀληθής. νῦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἧττον
E ἦλθεν τὸ δεῖν | αὐτὰ διελθεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ
παίδων πεπέρανται, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μετελθεῖν

27. ἡ Ξ: ἢ ΑΠ: εἰ καὶ *q*.

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describe the Rulers and their position in our city. We have already seen that they must be patriotic; let us now add that they must be philosophers. Those who combine the peculiar features of the philosophic temperament are necessarily few, and they must be submitted to stringent intellectual as well as moral tests, to see whether they will be able to endure the greatest of all studies.

502 D 22 **ἐνέσονται.** *ἐγγενήσονται* is conjectured by Richards, who compares 521 C and VIII 552 E, 557 C. The proposal is attractive, but involves too great a departure from the MSS. *ἐνέσονται* moreover is better suited to *καὶ κατὰ ποίας—ἁπτόμενοι* than *ἐγγενήσονται* would be. *τίνα τρόπον ἐνέσονται* means, I think, not how they will be produced (that is expressed in *ἐκ τίνων—ἐπιτηδευμάτων*), but how they will *be* in the city, i.e. the whole subject of their position and standing in the State. It is this, as well as their education, which is described in the sequel. The present sentence is intended as a full and accurate forecast of the rest of VI and VII. Ξ has *ἔσονται*, which was read till Bekker restored *ἐνέσονται*.

24 **οὐδὲν κτλ.** Cf. 497 C, D *nn.* There, as here, the *κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων* and the position of women and children etc. are treated as parts of one and the same question. The first obscure hint of this connexion is in IV 423 E, but it is not till V 471 C ff. that we begin to see the intimate relation between the two subjects. In V 450 C Socrates for the first time touches on the question 'Are our proposals about women' etc. 'possible?' The same question reappears in 471 C, but with a larger scope 'Is the perfect city possible as a whole?' The reply is 'Yes, if Philosophers are Kings'; and thus is re-opened the whole subject of the *κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων*. Plato is therefore justified in connecting, as he does, the two topics here mentioned. But he overstates the case when he asserts that the *κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων* has been omitted in Books III and IV (see III 412 B ff.), or slurred over in the same way as the Community of Wives and Children, in spite of various hints of a fuller treatment still to come (III 414 A: cf. IV 442 C *n.*). See also on 503 A and Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 127, Pfleiderer *Zur Lösung* etc. p. 28, with the replies of Grimmelt *de reip. Pl. comp. et unit.* p. 49 and Westerwick *de rep. Pl. comm.* pp. 54 ff.

26 **τὴν—κατάστασιν** = 'the appointment of the Rulers' is equivalent, as in the title or heading of a chapter, to *τὸ περὶ τῆς—καταστάσεως*. Of this subject the Rulers' education naturally forms the most important part; but we ought not to explain *τῶν ἀρχόντων* as brachylogical for *τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων παιδείας* (with Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 126).

27 **παντελῶς ἀληθής.** The adjective should be translated literally, so as to suggest that the best *κατάστασις* is also the truest. The ideal is the true in Plato: cf. V 473 A *n.*

502 E 29 **τὸ δὲ—δεῖ.** Plato admits that the subject of the Rulers requires to be reinvestigated practically from the beginning. Their strictly *intellectual* needs have hitherto been almost ignored: see 497 C *n.* But Plato does not propose to supersede the earlier education in Music and Gymnastic, nor are the two schemes theoretically incompatible, as Krohn appears to hold (*Pl. St.* p. 127). We are clearly intended to suppose that the

δεῖ. ἐλέγομεν δ', εἰ μνημονεύεις, δεῖν αὐτοὺς φιλοπόλι|δάς τε 503
φαίνεσθαι βασανιζομένους ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λύπαις καὶ τὸ δόγμα
τοῦτο μήτ' ἐν πόνοις μήτ' ἐν φόβοις μήτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ μηδεμιᾷ μετα-
βολῇ φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον, τὸν
δὲ πανταχοῦ ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα ὥσπερ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρὶ βασανι-
ζόμενον στατέον ἄρχοντα καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτή-
σαντι καὶ ἆθλα. τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἦν τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξιόντος καὶ
παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου, | πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν. B
Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις· μέμνημαι γάρ. Ὄκνος γάρ, ἔφην, ὦ
φίλε, ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν τὰ νῦν ἀποτετολμημένα· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν
τετολμήσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους
δεῖ καθιστάναι. Εἰρήσθω γάρ, ἔφη. Νόησον δή, ὡς εἰκότως
ὀλίγοι ἔσονταί σοι. ἦν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς,
εἰς ταὐτὸ ξυμφύεσθαι αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη ὀλιγάκις ἐθέλει, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ
διεσπασμένη φύεται. | Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες C

Rulers receive the moral as well as the intellectual training, although in practice, no doubt, some modifications might be necessary, so long as the two proceeded simultaneously. See VII 536 D and II 376 E *nn.*

30 **ἐλέγομεν.** III 412 C—414 B.

503 A 2 **τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο.** The patriot's creed: see III 412 E, 413 C.

4 **ἢ** = 'alioquin.' Cf. V 463 D *n.*

7 **καὶ ἆθλα** is ejected by Cobet. The precise words do not occur in III 414 A, but they are unobjectionable, and end the sentence well. Cf. V 460 B *καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ἆθλα,* and see also on V 465 D.

8 **παρακαλυπτομένου**: 'putting on her veil.' The *λόγος* is personified, as often.

κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν. There is perhaps a hint of the proverb *εὖ κείμενον κακὸν μὴ κίνει.* No one who reads III 412 B—414 B without reference to the present passage would detect that the *λόγος* 'leaves the high road' in 414 B because she is afraid to raise the question *ὅτ*' the Philosopher-king. The words *ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, εἰρῆσθαι* would not suggest to him anything of the kind; and the impression which the earlier account of the Rulers leaves on us is that it was intended by Plato himself to be complete in outline, though not in detail. From the standpoint of Book VI it is certainly even in outline incomplete. Cf. Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 126, where the case is somewhat overstated; and see on 497 C, 502 D. But there is nothing in all this to justify any chorizontic inference, if only we have regard to the laws of the Dialogue as a form of literary art. See *Introd.* § 4.

503 B 9 **ὄκνος κτλ.** Examples of the omission of *ἦν* will be found in Schanz *Nov. Comm. Pl.* p. 33. y^2 has *ὤκνουν*: but cf. V 450 D.

11 **ὅτι—καθιστάναι**: lit. 'that we must appoint philosophers in the persons of our most perfect guardians,' i.e. that the rulers we appoint must be philosophers. The *ἀκριβέστατοι φύλακες* are the same as the *τέλεοι φύλακες* of IV 428 D: and the whole expression is equivalent to *ὅτι φιλοσόφους δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας οὓς καθίσταμεν.* To read *καθεστάναι* for *καθιστάναι* (with *v*) is much less elegant; still less should we follow D. and V. in transposing *φύλακας* and *φιλοσόφους.* For the sense of *ἀκριβεστάτους* cf. (with Jackson) I 341 B, 342 D.

15 **διεσπασμένη.** Cobet proposes *διεσπασμένα,* which he wrongly asserts to be the reading of A. But the *parts* of the philosophic *φύσις* are not torn asunder; it is the *φύσις itself* which is *in partes disiuncta.* Bywater's *διεσπαρμένα* avoids this difficulty; but *διεσπασμένη* is much better, because it suggests that the disjunction is 'unnatural' (in the Platonic sense of *παρὰ φύσιν*): see on IV 443 B.

καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται καὶ νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἅμα φύεσθαι οἵοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσιν, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἤθη καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς ἄν τις μᾶλλον ὡς
D πιστοῖς | χρήσαιτο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα ὄντα πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὖ ποιεῖ ταὐτόν· δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς ὥσπερ ἀπονεναρκωμένα, καὶ ὕπνου τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίμπλανται, ὅταν τι δέῃ τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν. Ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔφη. Ἡμεῖς δέ γε ἔφαμεν ἀμφοτέρων δεῖν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς μετέχειν, ἢ μήτε παιδείας τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης δεῖν αὐτῷ μεταδιδόναι μήτε τιμῆς μήτε ἀρχῆς. Ὀρθῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν σπάνιον αὐτὸ οἴει ἔσεσθαι;
E Πῶς δ' οὔ; Βασανιστέον δὴ ἔν τε | οἷς τότε ἐλέγομεν πόνοις τε καὶ φόβοις καὶ ἡδοναῖς, καὶ ἔτι δὴ ὃ τότε παρεῖμεν νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν μαθήμασι πολλοῖς γυμνάζειν δεῖ σκοποῦντας εἰ καὶ τὰ μέγιστα
504 μαθήματα δυνατὴ ἔσται ἐνεγκεῖν, εἴτε καὶ ἀπο|δειλιάσει, ὥσπερ οἱ

16. καὶ νεανικοί τε—διανοίας post ἕπεται nos: post φύεσθαι codd.

The philosophic nature *ought* to be born whole.

503 C 15 **εὐμαθεῖς κτλ.** 'The faculty of learning easily, memory, sagacity, quickness, and so on, together with spirit and high-mindedness, are, as you know, not often naturally combined with the disposition to live soberly in quiet and stedfast ways' etc. Plato means that natural intelligence and vivacity, with their accompaniments of spirit and highmindedness, rarely go with moral stedfastness. A good illustration is afforded by the contrast between "the Athenian and the Spartan, the former 'neither resting themselves nor letting anyone else rest, the latter so slow that aggression can hardly rouse them to repel it'" (Bosanquet). Cf. Thucyd. I 70. For other views on the text and interpretation of this difficult passage see App. VI.

19 **ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος κτλ.** *Theaet.* 144 A *οἵ τε ὀξεῖς—καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες—ἅττοντες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα.*

20 **τὰ βέβαια κτλ.** *Theaet.* 144 B *οἵ τε αὖ ἐμβριθέστεροι νωθροί πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες.*

503 D 26 **ἔφαμεν.** 484 D—487 A.

ἀμφοτέρων is explained in 503 C *n.*

27 **αὐτῷ** is probably masculine (Schneider), in spite of *αὐτό* (the philosophic *ἦθος*) immediately following. We can hardly speak of assigning concrete *τιμή* or *ἀρχή* to an *ἦθος*. The pronoun refers to the philosophic guardian that is to be. See on *δυνατὴ ἔσται* 503 E.

503 E 29 **ἐλέγομεν.** III 413 A ff.

32 **δυνατὴ ἔσται:** sc. *ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν. φύσις* was last employed in 503 B, since when it has been represented both by the individual and by the *ἦθος* (*αὐτῷ* and *αὐτό* in 503 D). We must bear in mind that the Greek inflexions of gender made it easier for them than it is for us to tolerate such irregularities. No Greek could possibly misunderstand the reference, as soon as he heard the *-η* of *δυνατή*. A tolerably close parallel will be found in *Phaedr.* 254 B (not D, as Stallbaum prints). See also 508 D and X 605 C *nn.* Bywater conjectures *δυνήσεται*, but *δυνήσεται* is unlikely to have been corrupted into *δυνατὴ ἔσται.*

ἐν τοῖς ἄθλοις ἀποδειλιῶντες. Πρέπει γέ τοι δή, ἔφη, οὕτω σκοπεῖν· ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα;

XVI. Μνημονεύεις μέν που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τριττὰ εἴδη ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι ξυνεβιβάζομεν δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας ὃ ἕκαστον εἴη. Μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων, ἔφη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἴην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκούειν. Ἦ καὶ τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν; | Τὸ ποῖον δή; Ἐλέγομέν που, ὅτι, ὡς μὲν δυνατὸν ἦν κάλλιστα B αὐτὰ κατιδεῖν, ἄλλη μακροτέρα εἴη περίοδος, ἣν περιελθόντι κατα-

2. ἄθλοις Orelli: ἄλλοις codd.

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504 A 2 **ἄθλοις.** See *cr. n.* Orelli's emendation has met with considerable favour; but Schneider, Stallbaum, and J. and C. still retain ἄλλοις. With the MS reading we must, I think, translate 'in the other cases' i.e. in the πόνοι etc. spoken of just before. (If Plato merely meant 'in other kinds of effort' it was not worth his while to insert the clause at all.) But ὥσπερ certainly suggests something more than a mere comparison between flinching at moral, and flinching at intellectual tests; and nothing could be more appropriate, or more in Plato's way, than an allusion to the games: see on V 465 D. That ἄθλοι in this sense is half-poetic, "occurring only in the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*" (J. and C.), is scarcely an objection in Plato. ἄθλοις also suits well with γυμνάζειν. In [*Axioch.*] 365 A occur the words ὡς γὰρ ἀγωνιστὴς δειλός, ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις γενναῖος φαινόμενος, ἀπολέλοιπας ἐν τοῖς ἄθλοις. The author of the *Axiochus* may have been thinking of the present passage, and if so, he certainly read ἄθλοις. See also the fine anecdote in Plut. *Them.* II. 3.

504 A—**505** B *Adimantus enquires what these 'greatest studies' are. You will remember, says Socrates, that we described our earlier or psychological method of arriving at the Virtues as inadequate and incomplete. Our guardians must travel by a longer road, if they would reach their proper goal, i.e. the highest of all studies, which is something above and beyond even the virtues. And these very virtues must no longer be seen merely in outline; they must be studied in all their fulness and perfection. The highest study is the Idea of the Good, as Adimantus has often heard before. It is the knowledge of this Idea which alone renders all other knowledge useful and profitable.*

504 A 5 **διαστησάμενοι.** IV 436 A ff. **ξυνεβιβάζομεν:** 'we drew conclusions,' viz. in IV 441 C ff. The use of συμβιβάζειν as a synonym for συμπεραίνεσθαι, συλλογίζεσθαι, is common in Aristotle: for examples see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v.

504 B 8 **ἐλέγομεν.** See IV 435 D *n.* **ἦν:** "ut ἐχρῆν et similia dictum" (Schneider). There is no reason to eject the word (with Madvig) or to write εἴη: why should not the mood of the *oratio recta* be retained? εἴη would be unpleasing with εἴη following so soon. Liebhold's ὡς μὲν δυνατὰ ᾖ is unclassical: see on I 349 C. Richards conjectures ὡς μὲν <ὡς ὃν ὅσον ὃν εἰς τὸ> δυνατὸν κάλλιστα κτλ., taking ὡς with κατιδεῖν. But we ought not to multiply instances of ὡς for ὥστε in Plato (II 365 D *n.*). The infinitive means simply 'for descrying,' 'in order to descry them in the best possible way': see Goodwin *MT.* p. 308 and Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 586.

9 **αὐτά** is of course the four cardinal virtues, like ταῦτα in 504 D. The 'longer circuit' is the educational training necessary in order to enable the guardians to obtain scientific knowledge of the virtues by discerning their relation with the Idea of Good: cf. 506 A. In Book IV Justice, Temperance etc. were regarded as psychological qualities or relations; but the philosophic Guardians must learn their metaphysical import. Throughout the rest of VI and VII Plato, in short, discards Psychology for Metaphysics. Thus much is clear; but many difficult and interesting questions arise in connexion with this passage, as Krohn and others have pointed out. The μακροτέρα περίοδος mentioned in IV 435 D appears to be a longer way of determining, not the essential nature of the virtues, but whether Soul has 'parts' or not. (A

φανῆ γίγνοιτο, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν προειρημένων ἑπομένας ἀποδείξεις οἷόν τ' εἴη προσάψαι. καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐξαρκεῖν ἔφατε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐρρήθη τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐφαίνετο, ἐλλιπῆ, εἰ δὲ ὑμῖν ἀρεσκόντως, ὑμεῖς ἂν τοῦτο εἴποιτε. Ἀλλ' C ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, μετρίως· ἐφαίνετο μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. | Ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέτρον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολεῖπον καὶ ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ὄντος οὐ πάνυ μετρίως γίγνεται· ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς μέτρον. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοτέ τισιν ἱκανῶς ἤδη ἔχειν καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν περαιτέρω ζητεῖν. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, συχνοὶ πάσχουσιν αὐτὸ διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν. Τούτου δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦ παθήματος ἥκιστα προσδεῖ φύλακι πόλεώς τε καὶ νόμων. Εἰκός, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τὴν μακροτέραν τοίνυν, ὦ D ἑταῖρε, ἔφην, περιιτέον | τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἧττον μανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ· ἦ, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθήματος ἐπὶ τέλος οὔποτε ἥξει. Οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἔφη, μέγιστα, ἀλλ' ἔτι τι μεῖζον δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὧν

13. ἐλλιπῆ Π: ἐλλειπῆ (*sic*) A. 15. ἀπολεῖπον *v* et in mg. A^2 (*γρ* ἀπολεῖπον καὶ ὅτι ὁὺν τοιοῦτος οὐ πάνυ μέτριος): ἀπολείπων A^1: ἀπολειπὼν (*sic*) Π: ἀπολιπὸν *q*. 17. δεῖν Π: δεῖ A. 19. προσδεῖ Π: προσδεῖται A. 22. ἢ γυμναζομένῳ—τε Π: om. A.

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solution of this difficulty is suggested on 435 D). Socrates' shorter road, again, is not a way by which the Guardians are to go, but a method employed by himself in studying primarily the Soul, and secondarily the virtues. Finally, what is the relation between the psychological conception of Virtue and the metaphysical? And does the metaphysical conception involve a revised psychology or not? The last question is touched on in the notes to X 611 B, where Plato himself appears to raise it. For the last but one see on 504 D.

10 **ἑπομένας**: 'corresponding with' 'on a level with' (Jowett) viz. in point of *ἀκριβεία*: cf. IV 435 D *τῶν γε προειρημένων τε καὶ προεσκεμμένων ἀξίως*, where see note. For the genitive with *ἑπόμενος* cf. (with Stallbaum) *Pol.* 271 E and *Laws* 899 C (*ὁπόσα τούτων ξυνεπόμενα*, according to the best MS). Bywater would read *ἑχομένας* here and *ἑχόμενα* in the *Politicus*, but it is safer to make no change, although the reverse corruption of *ἑχόμενα* for *ἑπόμενα* apparently occurs in *Gorg.* 494 E, if Bekker's restoration is correct.

504 C 14 **ἀλλ' ὦ φίλε κτλ.** Socrates *σοφίζεται περὶ τὸ ὄνομα* (509 D)—plays on the etymological sense of *μετρίως*. In effect he says "Don't say '*μετρίως*': short measure in such cases is no measure at all: for—if 'Measure' be rightly understood—there can be no *imperfect* measure of anything." Etymologically, for example, *ἀτελὲς μέτρον ὕδατος* is a misnomer, for the measure must be exactly commensurate with the water. Hence the *μέτρον τῶν ἀκριβεστάτων* must itself be *ἀκριβέστατον* (cf. 504 E). The essential perfection of *μέτρον*, *τὸ μέτριον* and the like is expounded in *Pol.* 284 A ff., *Phil.* 64 D ff. and 66 A: cf. also *Laws* 716 C ff., where we read that God, not Man, is the Measure of all things. The translation 'Nothing imperfect is the measure of anything' (Jowett and others) suggests, I think, a wrong idea, and is not so well adapted to *μέτρον—γίγνεται*.

17 **τισιν**: with reference, perhaps, to Adimantus and the others (J. and C., comparing II 372 E. Cf. also V 465 E). Adimantus betrays no consciousness of the allusion in his reply.

504 D 22 **ἦ**=alioquin. Cf. V 463 D *n.*

νῦν δή. The reference (somewhat loose, as usual) is to 503 E.

διήλθομεν; Καὶ μεῖζον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι. ἢ οὐ γελοῖον ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίοις πᾶν ποιεῖν | συντεινομένους, ὅπως ὅ τι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ καθαρώτατα E ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. ὃ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ περὶ ὅ τι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἴει τιν' ἄν σε, ἔφη, ἀφεῖναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστιν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα. πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας, νῦν δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αὖ διανοεῖ ἐμοὶ πράγ|ματα παρέχειν 505 ἀντιλαμβανόμενος. οἶμαι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἡ τοῦ

30. ἔφη Ast: ἔφη, ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα codd.

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25 καὶ μεῖζον κτλ. *καὶ—καί* = 'not only—but also.' *αὐτῶν τούτων* is 'harum ipsarum virtutum.'

οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν—ὥσπερ νῦν is as clear a proof as we could wish that Justice and the other virtues, as described in Book IV, are not the transcendental *αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ εἴδη*: see on III 402 C. They are only a *ὑπογραφή* or 'adumbratio' of the Ideas, being, we may suppose, simply the psychological relations which result from the *παρουσία* of the Ideas in certain particulars, viz. in human souls, during their union with human bodies. *ὥσπερ νῦν* admits moreover that the Rulers of III and IV (apart from a few suggestions to the opposite effect: see on 497 C) had only 'correct opinion' and not 'knowledge' (in the strict Platonic sense): it was their duty to accept and carry out the precepts of Plato, the founder of the city (IV 429 C *n.*).

27 **παριέναι.** The present is better than *παρεῖναι*, which Herwerden conjectures.

504 E 30 καὶ μάλα. See *cr. n.* The words *ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα* are not strictly suitable to *ἢ οὐ γελοῖον*, and although *διανόημα* is of course a Platonic word, it is questionable whether Plato could have used it in this way. Perhaps we owe the comment to a gratified monk, who may have applied the observation to systematic theology. The comment is at all events a just one. Cf. 496 A *n.* Plato's remark is best illustrated by the case of the exact sciences; and in a certain sense it may be said that he wished to make Politics into an exact science.

ὃ μέντοι κτλ.: lit. 'but that which you call the greatest study, and that which you call its subject whatever it be—do you suppose any one would let you off without asking what they are?' Richards finds a difficulty, but there is none, if only we take *ὅ τι* not as interrogative, but as the indefinite relative. For *εἶναι* omitted see Schanz *Nov. Comm. Pl.* p. 33. The *μέγιστον μάθημα* is Dialectic; and its subject the Idea of Good, though of course the latter can itself be called the *μέγιστον μάθημα*, as in 505 A. For *ἐρώτα* Richards neatly conjectures *ἐρωτᾷς*, but the text ('You may ask it yourself if you like') is better. See next note.

505 A 2 ἀντιλαμβανόμενος: 'by holding on fast to me,' 'refusing to let me go,' is the opposite of *ἀφεῖναι*: cf. VIII 544 B *n.* 'By raising objections' (D. and V.) is incorrect: see on 497 D. Socrates means 'you intend to bother me as before'—*αὖ* refers to V 449 B ff.—'by not letting me off, but on this occasion you won't succeed, for I have the answer ready, so ask away!' Cf. *ἐρώτα* in *Gorg.* 448 B.

ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα κτλ. It is clear from *πολλάκις ἀκήκοας* that the supremacy of the Idea of Good was already a recognised tenet of the Platonic school. No proof of the doctrine is here attempted by Plato (cf. V 475 E *n.*): it is merely expounded and explained. *τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθόν* was in antiquity a proverb for any dark or obscure saying: see Amphis ap. D. L. III 27 *ἥττον οἶδα τοῦτ' ἐγώ, | ὦ δέσποτ', ἢ τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθόν*. (Another allusion occurs in Alexis ap. Athen. VIII

ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ἢ δίκαια καὶ
τἄλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. καὶ νῦν
σχεδὸν οἶσθ' ὅτι μέλλω τοῦτο λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν 5
οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἴσμεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα
τἄλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ
B | κεκτήμεθά τι ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οἴει τι πλέον εἶναι πᾶσαν
κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθήν; ἢ πάντα τἄλλα φρονεῖν ἄνευ
τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ 10
ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

8. εἶναι Ξ *q*: εἰδέναι ΑΠ, sed δ et έ punctis notavit A^2.

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354 D). Some account of the enormous literature of the subject will be found in Zeller[4] II 1. pp. 709 ff., 718 *n.* 1. In addition to Stumpf's treatise to be presently named, I have found the monograph by Biehl *Die Idee des Guten bei Platon* Graz 1870 particularly good and useful. Other special treatises are also referred to in the course of the notes. The majority of interpreters are now agreed in identifying Plato's Idea of the Good with his philosophical conception of the Deity. The best and fullest proof of the identity is still, I think, Stumpf's exhaustive dissertation *Das Verhältniss des Platonischen Gottes zur Idee des Guten* Halle 1869. There is only one passage in his works where Plato himself appears expressly to identify the two, viz. *Phil.* 22 C, but on the principle that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, the identification is complete, and I have therefore thought myself at liberty throughout the notes occasionally to illustrate Plato's metaphysics by his theology.

3 **δίκαια καὶ τἄλλα.** It is only by *κοινωνία* with the Idea of Good that *δίκαια*, *καλά* etc. become good i.e. useful and beneficial (synonyms of 'good': see V 457 B *n.*). Otherwise they are altogether useless. *δίκαια* does not of course mean the Idea of Justice, but *τὰ πολλὰ δίκαια* in the widest sense of the term, including *νόμιμα περὶ δικαίου*: see on V 476 A, 476 C, 479 D. Baiter's *δὴ καί* for *δίκαια καί* occurs in one or two inferior MSS, but is certainly wrong: see on 506 A.

5 **ὅτι—ἴσμεν.** Cf. 506 D ff., VII 517 B ff., 532 E ff. and *Tim.* 28 C, where much the same is said of the *πατὴρ τοῦ παντός*.

6 **εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν κτλ.**: 'and if we know it not, and should know all else excepting it never so well' etc. Cobet does ill to expunge *εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν*. The repetition of *εἰ* before *ἐπισταίμεθα* is necessary because, while *ἴσμεν* expresses a fact, *ἐπισταίμεθα* is only an improbable supposition: see next note. The sentiment is one of Plato's commonplaces: see for example *Alc.* II 144 D ff. (where it is expounded in detail), 147 B, *Charm.* 173 A ff., *Euthyd.* 280 E ff., 289 A ff., 291, and cf. also *Lach.* 199 C, *Lys.* 219 B ff., *Phaed.* 69 B. Stumpf *das Verhältniss* etc. p. 87 *n.* compares also the language about the Gods in *Laws* 905 C. The *Euthydemus* and *Charmides* already forecast the city of the Philosopher-king, in which the Knowledge of Good shall 'sit alone in the helm of the state' (*Euthyd.* 291 D): see Nohle *die Statslehre Pl.* pp. 39—48.

8 **κεκτήμεθα.** To possess a thing *ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* is matter of common and daily occurrence; to know everything (except the Good) is not. Hence the indicative *κεκτήμεθα* is as appropriate now as the optative *ἐπισταίμεθα* was before. I formerly read *κεκτήμεθα* with H and the majority of editors, but now agree with Schneider that there is no reason to depart from the text of A.

505 B 9 **φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.** The last three words were suspected by Morgenstern and bracketed by Stallbaum and others. If we take these words (like *ἄνευ ταύτης* above) with *τἄλλα*, they are not superfluous; 'eo enim quod quis reliqua omnia excepto bono intelligit, efficitur ut nihil, quod pulchrum et bonum sit, intelligat' (Schneider). That some writers might have omitted the

XVII. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι, ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοίως. Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, | εἰ C ὀνειδίζοντές γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσιν; φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ ὡς αὖ ξυνιέντων ἡμῶν ὅ τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγξωνται ὄνομα. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Τί δέ; οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὁριζόμενοι μῶν μή τι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἔμπλεοι τῶν ἑτέρων; ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι ἀναγκάζονται ὁμολογεῖν ἡδονὰς εἶναι κακάς; Σφόδρα γε. Συμβαίνει δὴ αὐτοῖς, οἶμαι, ὁμολογεῖν | ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ ταὐτά. ἦ γάρ; Τί μήν; D Οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν μεγάλαι καὶ πολλαὶ ἀμφισβητήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανερόν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τί δέ; τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν

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phrase is no ground for interfering with Plato's characteristic fulness of expression.

505 B—**506** A *What then is the Good? The majority answer 'Pleasure,' others, who are more refined, 'Knowledge.' Neither of these views is tenable. Men are constantly disputing about the Good, but its existence is practically admitted by all, for it is the ultimate object of all endeavour. The Idea of the Good must be known by our Guardians; for unless they know the connexion between the Good, and particular instances of the just, the honourable etc., they cannot guard the latter, or even indeed be said to know them in any adequate measure.*

12 **τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς κτλ.** We need not (with Tietzel *Die Id. d. Guten u. d. Gottesbegriff* p. 9) find in this an allusion to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics. Plato means what he says and no more. Pleasure is always the *summum bonum* of the Many: cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* I 3. 1095^{b} 16. In *τοῖς κομψοτέροις* Dümmler (*Antisth.* p. 43) and others have recognised Antisthenes: cf. RP^{7} § 218 B *n.* b. Hermann (*Gesch. u. System* p. 329 *n.* 323) interprets the words—more correctly, I think—of Socrates (cf. Xen. *Mem.* IV 5. 6) and his immediate followers, Antisthenes included. The Megarians sometimes held the same view (D. L. II 106). See also next note.

505 C 19 **ἐπειδὰν κτλ.**: "when they utter the mysterious word 'good'." For *φθέγγεσθαι* of a high-sounding, oracular, impressive utterance cf. VII 527 A, VIII 568 A, *Prot.* 342 E, *Phaedr.* 238 D, Ar. *Clouds* 315. Plato's criticism applies to himself, in common with the other pupils of Socrates, and was doubtless intended to do so. He constantly declares that 'knowledge of the good' is the all-important possession for man: see on *εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν* 505 A. The present discussion removes the *petitio principii* by explaining what the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* really means.

21 **ἦ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι κτλ.** This is exactly what happens to Callicles in *Gorg.* 495 A—499 C. If Plato is referring to any dialogue at all, the *Gorgias* l.c. illustrates his point much better than the *Philebus* (13 A—C), to which Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 548, Susemihl *Gen. Entw.* II p. 192, and others of the older generation of scholars suppose that Plato is alluding. But there is nothing to suggest any cross-reference at all. On the question whether the *Philebus* is or is not prior to the *Republic* see Jackson in *J. Ph.* XXV pp. 65—82.

505 D 25 **τόδε οὐ φανερὸν κτλ.** The contrast is between *δίκαια*, *καλά* on the one hand, and *ἀγαθά* or *ὠφέλιμα* (V 457 B *n.*) on the other. All men desire the reality of *good* (cf. IV 438 A *n.*), but many are content with the semblance of *honour*. Cobet expunges *τὰ δοκοῦντα*, and *καί* before *δοκεῖν*, thereby leaving a very crabbed piece of Greek. Ast's *καὶ διώκειν* for *καὶ δοκεῖν* is on a higher plane of criticism. The text is nevertheless sound. *δοκεῖν* 'to seem' is used absolutely, as in II 361 B,

καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἕλοιντο τὰ δοκοῦντα, κἂν μὴ ᾖ, ὅμως ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσιν, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα
E ἤδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, 30
ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ, οἵᾳ καὶ περὶ τἄλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὄφελος ἦν, περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον
506 καὶ τοσοῦτον | οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν; Ἥκιστά γ', ἔφη. Οἶμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινὸς ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα, μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι 5
ἱκανῶς. Καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, μαντεύει. Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία
B τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, ἐὰν ὁ τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων;

26. ᾖ ΘΦr: εἴη ΑΠΞ *q*.

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and prepares the way for δόξαν 'seeming' (cf. 499 A) below. So also Schneider and Stallbaum understand the passage. For ἔτι and ἤδη see on III 412 B.

29 **ὃ δὴ διώκει κτλ.** With ὃ followed by τούτου cf. II 357 B *n.* Cobet's ὅτου for τούτου is an unlucky venture. Stumpf justly observes that the Idea of Good is here regarded as the final cause: cf. *Phaed.* 98 B ff. and *Phil.* 20 D, 54 C. For a striking theological presentation of the same view see *Laws* 715 E ff. and 903 B—D. Plato's ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ laid "the foundations of the teleological view of the world" (Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 131).

505 E 30 ἀπομαντευομένη. Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* X 2. 1173ᵃ 4 f. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστι τι φυσικὸν [ἀγαθὸν] κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. ἀπομαντευομένη implies the same instinctive, half-unconscious, divination of something beyond our grasp.

32 **διὰ τοῦτο κτλ.** See 505 A *n.*

506 A 1 καὶ ἐκείνους: i.e. as well as οἱ πολλοί. For καί cf. VII 519 B.

3 **οἶμαι γοῦν κτλ.** No one who does not know the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ can possibly know in what respect or how far particular δίκαια (such as, for example, a particular νόμιμον περὶ δικαίου: see V 479 D *n.*) are good, because it is the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ in them which makes them good (505 A *n.*). And no one who is ignorant ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν can possibly defend δίκαια (such as for example the δίκαια ἐπιτηδεύματα of Plato's city), because he is at the mercy of anyone who attempts to shew that they are bad. Nor, until we know how far particular δίκαια are good (πρότερον), can we adequately know these δίκαια themselves, i.e. know which of these really *is* δίκαιον and which not, for we do not know how they stand in relation to the ultimate source of all justice, viz. the Idea of the Good. It is this which, in the last resort, is the true 'measure of all things' (*Laws* 716 C ff., where Plato employs the language of theology). Hence the supreme necessity for our Guardians to know the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Bekker first restored the true reading of this passage, which had been strangely mutilated in earlier editions. Stallbaum reads μηδ' ἂν ἕνα with *q*, but instances of the future with ἄν—see on 492 C—should not be wilfully multiplied.

506 B 8 τούτων: i.e. τὰ δίκαιά τε καὶ καλά, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν.

506 B—508 B *After some hesitation, Socrates undertakes to describe the Idea of Good, not as it is in itself, but through its image, analogue, or offspring.*

Let me remind you (he proceeds) of our

XVIII. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ σὺ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῂς εἶναι, ἢ ἡδονήν, ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα; Οὗτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνήρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανὴς ὅτι σοὶ οὐκ ἀποχρήσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιόν μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν δόγματα, τὸ δ' αὑτοῦ μή, τοσοῦτον χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευόμενον. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· | δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι περὶ C ὧν τις μὴ οἶδεν λέγειν ὡς εἰδότα; Οὐδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, ὡς εἰδότα, ὡς μέντοι οἰόμενον ταῦθ' ἃ οἴεται ἐθέλειν λέγειν. Τί δέ; εἶπον· οὐκ ἤσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί· ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες; Οὐδέν, ἔφη. Βούλει οὖν αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι, τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά, ἐξὸν | παρ' D

11. ἀνὴρ καλῶς Π: ἀνὴρ καλῶς A^1: ἀνὴρ καλὸς A^2.

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usual distinction between Particulars and Ideas, the former apprehended by Sight, the latter by Reason. In the case of most of the senses, nothing is required except the faculty and its object in order that a sensation may take place. But in order that we may see, a third requisite is necessary, viz. Light. Now the author of Light is the Sun, and we may therefore say that the Sun is the cause of Sight. We must not identify either Sight or the Eye with the Sun, although the Eye resembles the Sun more closely than any other organ of sense, and the Sun himself is seen by the Eye.

506 B 9 **πότερον ἐπιστήμην κτλ.** Even if it could be shewn that the *Philebus* is earlier than the *Republic*—and recent critics take the opposite view—there would be no sufficient reason for holding (with Zeller[4] II 1. p. 708 *n.*) that Plato is referring to that dialogue, although he there denies that either Knowledge or Pleasure is the Chief Good (20 B ff., 60 E). See also on 505 C and 506 E.

11 **οὗτος κτλ.** καλῶς has in reality—see *cr. n.*—more and better MS support than καλός, which Schneider retained in the belief that A read καλός. Used in this way, καλῶς is colloquial (Jebb on Soph. *O. T.* 1008 καλῶς εἶ δῆλος οὐκ εἰδὼς τί δρᾷς).

506 C 15 **δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον κτλ.** The sentence is ironical, as is clear from ἐξὸν παρ' ἄλλων (the Sophists forsooth) ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά in D below. Plato frequently feigns ignorance and self-distrust before expounding some great principle of whose truth he is himself profoundly convinced: cf. V 450 D. The notion that he really lays claim only to δόξα or even ὀρθὴ δόξα of the Good is hardly to be entertained, although he does not claim to have perfect knowledge: to that we may, perchance, attain hereafter. See 505 A *n.*

19 **ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι κτλ.** On ὀρθὴ δόξα see *Men.* 97 A—98 A, *Theaet.* 201 C, *Tim.* 51 D, E. Correct opinion believes, but does not know, and is therefore blind and insecure. Its ethical correlate is πολιτικὴ or δημοτικὴ ἀρετή: cf. 500 D and IV 430 C *nn.* See in general Zeller[4] II 1. pp. 588 ff.

21 **σκολιά**='crooked,' 'awry' is objected to by Hermann on the ground that ὀρθαὶ δόξαι may be blind, but cannot be 'crooked.' This is true, but αἱ ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξαι may be both blind and awry; and αἰσχρά, which looks back to αἰσχραί, shews that it is not correct opinions, but opinions without knowledge generally, which are described in τυφλά—σκολιά. Socrates' mock humility will not pretend to more than δόξα, let alone ὀρθὴ δόξα. If you wish for 'science,' go to your sophistical rhetoricians, forsooth, and 'hear things bright and beautiful.' φανά τε καὶ καλά may be an allusion to the 'lumina orationis' of Isocrates and his friends: see 498 E *n.* σκότια, which Hermann conjectures, is apparently not used by Plato.

ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά; Μὴ πρὸς Διός, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὢν ἀποστῇς. ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν, κἂν ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διῆλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθῃς. Καὶ γὰρ ἐμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ μάλα ἀρκέσει· ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι, προθυμούμενος δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλήσω. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριοι, αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τἀγαθόν, ἐάσωμεν τὸ | νῦν εἶναι· πλέον γάρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὁρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν· ὃς δὲ ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω, εἰ καὶ ὑμῖν φίλον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν. Ἀλλ', ἔφη, λέγε· εἰσαῦθις γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτείσεις τὴν διήγησιν. Βουλοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν | ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς τόκους μόνον. τοῦτον δὲ δὴ

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506 D 23 **ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὤν**: not 'just as you are reaching the goal' (Jowett), but 'as if you were at the end.' Jowett practically omits *ὥσπερ* in his translation.

506 E 29 **ὁρμήν**. The idea is as of a start or impulse which enables one to clear the obstacles in the way: cf. V 451 C.

30 **τὰ νῦν** should be taken with *ἐφικέσθαι*. If we take it with *δοκοῦντος*, we must suppose that Socrates intends to suggest that his view of the matter may change (so D. and V.). He is hardly likely to have made such a suggestion, even ironically. *ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι* is also in favour of connecting *τὰ νῦν* with *ἐφικέσθαι*. Cf. *Tim.* 48 C f. *τὴν μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἁπάντων εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε ἀρχὰς—τὸ νῦν οὐ ῥητέον, δι' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, διὰ δὲ τὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τῆς διεξόδου δηλῶσαι τὰ δοκοῦντα κτλ.* The emphasis on *τὸ νῦν εἶναι* and *τὰ νῦν* seems to hint that a description of the *ἀγαθόν*, as it is in itself, may be expected on some future occasion. But there is no dialogue in which the Idea of Good is so clearly described as in the *Republic*, and it is not without reason that every historian of Philosophy regards this passage as the *locus classicus* on the subject. O. Schneider (*Versuch einer genet. Entw. d. Pl. ἀγαθόν* p. 15) thinks of the *Philebus*; Susemihl (*Gen. Entw.* II p. 193) of the *Φιλόσοφος*, which was perhaps planned, but probably never executed (see on 484 A). The *Philebus* is unsuitable; and of the *Φιλόσοφος* we know nothing. I am inclined to think—in view especially of *βουλοίμην ἄν κτλ.* below—that, although Plato may have cherished the idea of describing the Good without the aid of a simile—*εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν*—, he never, at all events in any of his dialogues, did so. In a certain sense, perhaps, the *Timaeus* describes the Good (see Archer-Hind's edition p. 27), but even there, we study the 'Father of all' not in himself so much as in his works. I agree with Stumpf's conclusion (l.c. p. 75) that Plato could hardly have depicted the Idea of Good at all except by means of a comparison. Certainly nothing else could have made it equally clear; and, in point of fact, 'es wird nirgends Mehr gegeben' (Stumpf, l.c. p. 59 *n.*). See also next note.

ὃς δὲ ἔκγονος κτλ. The *ἔκγονος* is the Sun, as presently appears. Socrates' procedure in *Phaed.* 99 C—E is in some respects like his procedure here. A nearer parallel is *Phaedr.* 246 A, where, before describing the soul, Socrates observes *οἷον μέν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος.* The Idea of Good, like the Soul, is best described by one man to another in a figure. On *εἰσαῦθις* see last note and IV 430 C *n.*

507 A 2 **τοὺς τόκους**. The comparison, which is already suggested in *ἀποτείσεις*, *ἀποδοῦναι* ('pay' as well as 'render'), and *κομίσασθαι*, culminates in the word *τόκος* ('interest' and 'offspring'). See on *γράφειν νόμους* 501 A and (for a

οὖν τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κομίσασθε· εὐλαβεῖσθε μέντοι, μή πῃ ἐξαπατήσω ὑμᾶς ἄκων, κίβδηλον ἀποδιδοὺς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου. Εὐλαβησόμεθα, ἔφη, κατὰ δύναμιν· ἀλλὰ μόνον λέγε. Διομολογησάμενός γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἀναμνήσας ὑμᾶς τά τ' ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρημένα. Τὰ | ποῖα; ἦ δ' ὅς. Πολλὰ καλά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ B ἕκαστα οὕτως εἶναί φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ. Φαμὲν γάρ. Καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων, ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν· πάλιν αὖ καὶ ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου, ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης, τιθέντες, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὁρᾶσθαί φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι δ' οὔ, τὰς δ' αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μέν, | ὁρᾶσθαι δ' οὔ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Τῷ οὖν C ὁρῶμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ὁρώμενα; Τῇ ὄψει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά; Τί μήν; Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐννενόηκας τὸν τῶν

3. κομίσασθε $A^2\Pi$: κομίσασθαι A^1. 11. καὶ nos: κατ' codd.

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similar play on τόκος) cf. VIII 555 E and Ar. *Thesm.* 842—845. κίβδηλον below is a metaphor from counterfeit coinage.

6 **διομολογησάμενός γε.** γε ('yes,' 'not until': cf. with Schneider *Phaedr.* 228 D δείξας γε πρῶτον κτλ.) was restored by Bekker from the best MSS. Stephanus (with Ξ etc.) read δέ.

7 **ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν.** Cf. V 475 E *n.*

507 B 9 **εἶναι** is not of course used in its technical sense, otherwise it would be inconsistent with the end of Book V. Socrates means only that the Platonist distinguishes between two categories—τὰ πολλά, and the Ideas.

10 **καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ κτλ.** The literal meaning of the text above printed is as follows: 'So likewise a Beautiful itself, and a Good itself and similarly about all which we formerly took' (or 'postulated') 'as many: reversing our procedure (πάλιν αὖ), we postulate also one Idea of each, believing that there is but one, and call it the essential so-and-so.' καὶ—ἐτίθεμεν is best explained as still under the influence of φαμέν—λόγῳ. τότε (as Schneider observes) refers 'ad eam, quae modo facta est, multorum commemorationem': cf. 510 B. Stallbaum is mistaken in supposing that the allusion is to V 475 E ff. Plato's meaning will appear from a single example. We postulate both πολλὰ δίκαια and also ἓν δίκαιον, viz. the ἰδέα μία δικαίου, and we call the latter ὃ ἔστιν δίκαιον: cf. *Phaed.* 75 B τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, *Symp.* 211 C and elsewhere. We postulate only one ἰδέα δικαίου, because we believe that there is but one: see X 597 C, D, where Plato shews why there cannot be more. For αὐτό used of the Ideas, see on IV 438 B, 438 C and V 476 A *n.* Instead of καὶ ἰδέαν, the MSS—see *cr. n.*—read κατ' ἰδέαν (κατιδέαν Vind. F.). For the interchange of καί and κατά see Schaefer's *Greg. Cor.* p. 234 *n.* 26. An unduly sloping accent is enough to account for the corruption of ΚΑΪΙΔΕΑΝ into ΚΑΤΙΔΕΑΝ (as in uncial MSS it would be written: see Thompson *Gk. Palaeogr.* p. 127). See also my article in *Cl. Rev.* XIII p. 100. Other views on the text and interpretation of this difficult passage are discussed in App. VII.

507 C 17 **ἆρ' οὖν κτλ.** On the unique position of Sight among the senses see *Phaedr.* 250 D and Bonitz on Arist. *Met.* A 1. 980^a 23: cf. also *Phaed.* 65 B, *Tim.* 47 A ff., *Hipp. Maior* 297 E ff. It is the costliest (πολυτελεστάτη) because it requires an additional precious or valuable element (μὴ ἄτιμον 508 A) beyond what is necessary for the operation of the others, viz. Light: cf. *Tim.* 45 C, D and Arist. *de An.* II 7. 418^b 2 ff.

αἰσθήσεων δημιουργὸν ὅσῳ πολυτελεστάτην τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν ἐδημιούργησεν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη. Ἀλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. ἔστιν ὅ τι προσδεῖ ἀκοῇ καὶ φωνῇ γένους ἄλλου εἰς τὸ
D τὴν μὲν ἀκούειν, τὴν δὲ ἀκούεσθαι, ὃ ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται | τρίτον, ἡ μὲν οὐκ ἀκούσεται, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἀκουσθήσεται; Οὐδενός, ἔφη. Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδ' ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω ὅτι οὐδεμιᾷ, τοιούτου προσδεῖ οὐδενός. ἢ σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τὴν δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι προσδεῖται; Πῶς; Ἐνούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χρόας ἐν αὐτοῖς,
E ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ | ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα, ὅτι ἥ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται τά τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα. Τίνος δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, τούτου; Ὃ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶς. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐ σμικρᾷ ἄρα ἰδέᾳ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶν αἴσθησις καὶ
508 ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύνα|μις τῶν ἄλλων ξυζεύξεων τιμιωτέρῳ ζυγῷ

30. *σὺ—ὁρώμενα* (515 D) om. Π, duobus excisis foliis.

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20 ἔστιν ὅ τι κτλ. Steinhart (p. 689 *n.* 213) and others remark on Plato's error in denying that a medium is necessary in Hearing etc. Aristotle was well aware of this fact (see his *de An.* II 7. 419ᵃ 25 ff.), and there are several indications that it was not altogether unknown to Plato. In *Tim.* 67 B, for example, air is regarded as in a certain sense the medium of sound. Here, however, where a scientific analysis of perception is not proposed, Plato takes his stand upon the broad fact of experience, that whereas we can hear, touch, etc. either in light or in darkness, we can see only where there is light.

507 D 23 οὐδ' ἄλλαις πολλαῖς. 'Non *αἰσθήσεσι* supplendum est, quippe quae non amplius tres supersint, sed *δυνάμεσι* vel *δυνάμεων συζεύξεσι*' (Schneider). It may be added that the antecedent of *ἄλλαις* is the same as that of *τινα* and *τὴν τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ*, and *τὴν* is certainly for *τὴν δύναμιν*: cf. *τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν* in C. Plato is thinking quite generally of *δυνάμεις τοῦ ποιεῖν τε καὶ πάσχειν*: cf. *Theaet.* 156 A.

27 ἐν αὐτοῖς κτλ. If *ἐν αὐτοῖς* is right, *αὐτοῖς* must be interpreted as *τοῖς ὁρωμένοις*, for it is clear from 508 C *ὧν ἂν τὰς χρόας τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ* that colour is here regarded as inherent in the object. Grammatically, however, *αὐτοῖς* can scarcely mean anything except *τοῖς ὄμμασιν*, and in my edition of 1897 I accordingly proposed to read *ἐν αὐτοῖς <τοῖς ὁρωμένοις>*. Ficinus translates *praesente item colore*, omitting *ἐν αὐτοῖς* altogether. For other views see App. VIII.

507 E 30 τίνος—τούτου; The genitive has been variously explained as (1) dependent on *γένος* (Schneider), (2) in agreement with *παραγενομένου* understood (Stallbaum, Campbell), (3) like *ἵππων* in *τί δὲ ἵππων οἴει;* V 459 B (Jowett). (2) is in my opinion grammatically impossible. For (3) cf. V 470 A *n.* Jowett's view is perhaps possible, but we should have expected simply *τί δὴ λέγεις—τοῦτο;* Schneider's explanation ('Pray what is this whose *γένος* you mention?') is, I think, the least unsatisfactory. Perhaps we should read *δεῖν* for *δή*.

ὃ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς. Herwerden needlessly writes *ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ καλεῖς*.

31 οὐ σμικρᾷ κτλ. *ἰδέα*, 'kind,' 'class,' is here a synonym for *γένος* as in *Theaet.* 184 D, *Pol.* 289 B. The dative expresses the 'amount of difference' after the comparative *τιμιωτέρῳ* ('more precious:' cf. *πολυτελεστάτην* in 507 C). Cf. II 373 E and IX 579 C *τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς πλείω καρποῦται* with note ad loc.

ἐζύγησαν, εἴπερ μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ ἄτιμον εἶναι.

XIX. Τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν τούτου κύριον, οὗ ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς ὄψιν τε ποιεῖ ὁρᾶν ὅ τι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι; Ὅνπερ καὶ σύ, ἔφη, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι· τὸν ἥλιον γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς. Ἆρ' οὖν ὧδε πέφυκεν ὄψις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν; Πῶς; Οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἡ ὄψις οὔτε αὐτὴ οὔτ' ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καλοῦμεν ὄμμα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἀλλ' ἡλιοειδέστατόν γε οἶμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων. Πολύ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχει, ἐκ τούτου ταμιευομένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος δ' ὢν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης; Οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ

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508 A **4 τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν**: the heavenly constellations, which form the *οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος* (*Tim.* 40 A). Plato's description of the sun is instinct with religious feeling. The 'clear god and patron of all light, From whom each lamp and shining star doth borrow The beauteous influence that makes him bright' claims adoration from Plato not merely as an *οὐράνιος θεός*, like the other stars, but as the symbol and scion (*ἔκγονος*) of the Supreme Idea or God. Cf. Bonitz *Disp. Plat. duae*, p. 6 *n.* 3, and especially Paul Shorey in *Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil.* Vol. I pp. 224 ff. The sun-worship of some of the Neo-Platonists was inspired in no small measure by this passage of the *Republic*; see in particular Julian's 'Address to the Sovereign Sun' (*εἰς τὸν βασιλέα ἥλιον*) *Or.* IV. Cf. 508 D *n.*

508 B **9 ἡλιοειδεστάτην**. The Eye is the Body's Sun: cf. Ar. *Thesm.* 16, 17 *ᾧ μὲν βλέπειν χρὴ πρῶτ' ἐμηχανήσατο | ὀφθαλμὸν ἀντίμιμον ἡλίου τροχῷ*. A similar idea appears in St Matth. 6. 22 *ὁ λύχνος τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ὁ ὀφθαλμός*. Conversely, the Sun is often in Greek poetry called the Eye of the World or of Day, and Shakespeare invokes the Sun in the words 'O eye of Eyes!' (*Rape of Lucrece*): cf. also Milton *Par. Lost* V 171 'Thou Sun! of this great world both eye and soul.' Both comparisons rest ultimately on the favourite Greek idea of the Universe as the Macrocosm, and Man as the Microcosm. See on this subject Zeller[3] II 2. p. 488, III 2. pp. 136, 397 *nn.*, and Stein *Psych. d. Stoa* I pp. 205—214.

11 οὐκοῦν κτλ. Pindar *Fr.* 107 (Bergk) expresses the same idea in the language of poetry: *Ἀκτὶς ἀελίου, τί πολύσκοπ' ἐμήσαο, θεῶν μᾶτερ ὀμμάτων.* **τὴν δύναμιν** is of course *τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ ὁρᾶν*, 'the power of seeing.' The translation 'faculty' (D. and V.) for *δύναμιν* is incorrect; for the faculty of *ὄψις* is supposed to be present in the eyes even when there is no light (507 D). But the eye has no 'power' to see, i.e. cannot *exercise* the faculty of *ὄψις* unless such a power is constantly dispensed (*ταμιευομένην*) to it from the Sun. Cf. Biehl *die Id. d. Guten* p. 52, where the same view is taken. The word *ἐπίρρυτον* ('flowing over,' 'overflowing it,' cf. *Tim.* 80 D) as well as *ταμιευομένην* unmistakably points the allusion to Light. See also on *ὅταν μὲν κτλ.* and *τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ.* in 508 D.

508 B—**509** A *So much for our similitude. The interpretation is as follows. The offspring and image of the Good is the Sun, whose relation to Sight and its objects is the same as that of the Good to Thought* (*νοῦς*) *and the objects of Thought. The analogue of Light is Truth; as we cannot see without Light, so, where Truth is absent, we cannot know. The Idea of the Good is the source of Truth and Knowledge, although itself apprehended by Knowledge. As Light and Sight resemble the Sun, so Truth and Knowledge resemble the Good, but the Good is not identical with either, for it transcends both.*

14 φάναι. Cf. 473 A *n.*

C ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τἀγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον | ἑαυτῷ, ὅ τί περ 15
αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον
ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα. Πῶς; ἔφη· ἔτι δίελθέ
μοι. Ὀφθαλμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἶσθ' ὅτι ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνά τις
αὐτοὺς τρέπῃ, ὧν ἂν τὰς χρόας τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ, ἀλλὰ ὧν
νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, 20
ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὄψεως. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ὅταν δέ
D γ', οἶμαι, ὧν ὁ ἥλιος | καταλάμπει, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς
τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται. Τί μήν; Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ
τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει· ὅταν μέν, οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ

24. καταλάμπει A^1q: καταλάμπῃ $A^2\Xi$.

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508 C 15 **ὅ τί περ—ὁρώμενα** explains *ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ*, which should be understood in its strict sense of proportionate or 'geometrical equality': see *Gorg.* 508 A *ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται.*

16 **τοῦτον** after *τοῦτο* is needed to balance *αὐτό* (cf. 511 E): in construction, it depends, like *ὅν*, on *ἐγέννησεν* (Schneider). *τοῦτο* itself, like *ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ*, is predicative ('ut hoc esset'). Stallbaum erroneously supplies *φάναι με λέγειν* to govern *τοῦτον*.

19 **ὧν ἂν—ἐπέχῃ**. *ἐπέχῃ* 'occupat' as in the Homeric *ἑπτὰ δ' ἐπέσχε πέλεθρα* and the like. With *ἐπί* of light cf. Mimn. 2. 8 *ἐπὶ γῆν κίδναται ἠέλιος*. The Greek will not admit of D. and V.'s translation 'upon which the light of day is shedding colour'; and Plato moreover, both here and in *Tim.* 67 C, looks on Colour as something inherent in the Object, not imparted by Light, although Light is of course necessary in order to see it. Cf. 507 D *n.*

φῶς—φέγγη: 'lux—lumina.' The words are constantly interchanged, but, when contrasted with *φέγγος*, *φῶς* denotes a natural or primary, *φέγγος* an artificial or derivative light. See Neil on Ar. *Knights* 1319. Plato knew that the Moon's light is borrowed from the Sun (X 616 E).

22 **ὧν ὁ ἥλιος κτλ.** 'The Sun' is here said loosely for 'the Sunlight' or 'light of Day' (*τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς* above); for, as appears from 508 E, 508 A, it is not the Sun, but Light, which is to be equated with Truth and Being (*οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν* in D). See also on *τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ.* in 508 D. Instead of *καταλάμπει*, *καταλάμπῃ* is read by a majority of editors, with several MSS, including Ξ: but *ὅς* for *ὃς ἄν* is, to say the least, extremely rare in prose, and the corruption *καταλάμπῃ* was easy after *ὅταν*. *καταλάμπει* was, if I mistake not, originally the reading of A (see *cr. n.*), and is at least as well supported by the other MSS as *καταλάμπῃ*. J. and C., reading *καταλάμπῃ*, strangely observe that '*ἄν* would be felt as superfluous after *ὅταν*.'

508 D 23 **ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται**: sc. *καθαρὰ ὄψις*, supplied from *καθαρᾶς ὄψεως* above. '<*ὄψις*> *ἐνοῦσα* <*σαφὴς*> lubens suppleverim' says Herwerden, and *ὄψις* is found in a few MSS, including *q*. But the feminine inflexion prevents the possibility of mistake: cf. 503 E *n.* The initial syllable of *ἐνοῦσα* should be emphasized to point the contrast with *οὐκ ἐνούσης*, where *οὐκ* is also emphatic.

24 **ὅταν μὲν κτλ.** *ἀπερείσηται*='is stayed upon' (cf. IX 581 A), not 'has fastened upon' (D. and V.), which suggests an altogether different and much less appropriate idea. Cf. *Phaed.* 79 D *πέπαυται τοῦ πλάνου*, Plot. XX 4 Kirchhoff *παύσασα δὲ τῆς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πλάνης ἐνιδρύει τῷ νοητῷ*, and Dante *Parad.* 4. 124, 125 Io veggio ben che giammai non si sazia Nostro intelletto, se 'l ver non lo illustra. The soul can find no rest except in that 'whereon Truth and Being shine': elsewhere she is tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine (*ἄνω—μεταβάλλον*. For *ἄνω καὶ κάτω* see Heindorf on *Gorg.* 495 A). Instead of *οὗ*, van Heusde proposes *ὅ*, but *οὗ* is proved correct by *ὧν* above. With *ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω* cf. 490 B *n.* Here, as there, the aorists

ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται· ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον καὶ ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι. Ἔοικε γάρ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ | τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ E τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι

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denote instantaneous action. The faculty of *νοῦς* is suddenly actualized into *νόησις* by being turned upon its proper object. Then and not till then does the Soul 'appear to have reason,' for Reason has hitherto lain dormant within. Cf. (with Biehl l.c. p. 51) *Tim.* 37 C, *Parm.* 136 E and VII 518 C—519 A. See also on *τοῦτο τοίνυν* κτλ. below, and 508 E *n.*

26 **κεκραμένον.** The suggestion *κεκρυμμένον* forgets that *τὸ γιγνόμενον* is not total darkness but only twilight. It is *ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι* (V 478 E: cf. also 479 C)—a halfway house between absolute Not-Being and absolute Being.

27 **δοξάζει** is explained by V 476 D ff.

29 **τοῦτο τοίνυν κτλ.** The following equations are involved:

	τόπος ὁρατός	=	*τόπος νοητός.*
(1)	Sun	=	Idea of Good.
(2)	Light	=	Truth.
(3)	Objects of Sight (Colours)	=	Objects of Knowledge (Ideas).
(4)	Seeing Subject	=	Knowing Subject.
(5)	Organ of Sight (Eye)	=	Organ of Knowledge (*νοῦς*).
(6)	Faculty of Sight (*ὄψις*)	=	Faculty of Reason (*νοῦς*).
(7)	Exercise of Sight (*ὄψις, ὁρᾶν*)	=	Exercise of Reason (*νοῦς* i.e. *νόησις, γνῶσις, ἐπιστήμη*).
(8)	Ability to see	=	Ability to know.

With regard to (2), Light has been variously interpreted as symbolizing the Idea of Good (Plotinus, as appears from XXIII 4), Reason (Steinhart, *Einleitung* pp. 212 ff.), and the Ideas (Susemihl *Gen. Entw.* II pp. 195 ff.). But the chiasmus in 508 E, 509 A (*ἐπιστήμην*—*ὄψιν*) clearly establishes equation (2) as well as (6), and the entire simile is plunged in confusion if Light is equated with anything except Truth. Cf. Stumpf l.c. p. 60 *nn.* and Biehl l.c. pp. 50—53. Plato means that as Light, coming from the Sun, enables colours to be seen, and the faculty of Sight to see, so Truth (or rather Trueness, as Bosanquet remarks), coming from the Good, enables the Ideas to be known, and the faculty of *νοῦς* to know. It should be carefully noted that Truth (or its source, the Idea of Good) is not yet regarded as creating, but only as actualizing the faculty of Reason. The conception of the Good as the ultimate cause of all Existence follows later (509 B ff.): here it is represented only as the cause of Knowledge. See also on 490 B, 508 D (*ὅταν μὲν* κτλ.). If we would grasp the full significance of Plato's comparison, we must not be content with the merely philosophical interpretation of Light, but remember also the many poetical and religious associations which attached themselves to such words as *φῶς* and *φέγγος*, especially in the Mysteries: see Neil on Ar. *Knights* 1319, Mommsen *Feste d. Stadt Athen* pp. 229 f., 238 f. and Hatch on *The influence of the Mysteries upon Christian usages* in his *Hibbert Lectures* pp. 283—309. The prominent position occupied by Light in the half-religious, half-philosophical teaching of Plotinus (see Zeller[3] III 2 pp. 498 f., 500 *n.* 2, 616 al.) may to a large extent be attributed to the elaboration and expansion of the mystical elements involved in Plato's simile, the whole of which, together with the similes of the Line and the Cave, is of the greatest importance for the history of Neoplatonism. Cf. also 508 A, B *nn.*

508 E 30 **τὴν δύναμιν** sc. *τοῦ γιγνώσκειν* is not the faculty of Knowledge or Reason, but the power to exercise that faculty, hardly different, indeed, from the actual exercise of Reason ('die thatkräftige Aeusserung' Biehl l.c.). Hence *γνώσεως* ('the exercise of knowledge,' cf. *ὅρασις, νόησις* and the like) below. Plato's

εἶναι, αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας ὡς γιγνωσκομένην
μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ
ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς
509 ἡγήσει· ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φῶς τε | καὶ ὄψιν
ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δ' ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω
καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτ' ἀμφότερα ὀρθόν, ἀγαθὸν
δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ' ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον
τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν. Ἀμήχανον κάλλος, ἔφη, λέγεις, εἰ ἐπιστήμην 5
μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δ' ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει ἐστίν· οὐ
γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις. Εὐφήμει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ'
Β ὧδε μᾶλλον τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐπισκόπει. | Πῶς; Τὸν ἥλιον
τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐ μόνον, οἶμαι, τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν
φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν 10
αὐτὸν ὄντα. Πῶς γάρ; Καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ

31. γιγνωσκομένην nos: γιγνωσκόμενης codd.

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exposition suffers somewhat from the want of a strict philosophical nomenclature. Aristotle would have expressed the same meaning by saying that ὄψις and νοῦς are two *δυνάμεις*, which *ἐνεργοῦσι* through Light and Truth respectively, becoming in the one case ὅρασις, in the other *νόησις*. Plato's *τὴν δύναμιν*, in fact, is nearly equivalent to Aristotle's *τὴν ἐνέργειαν*. Cf. Biehl l.c. pp. 50—53.

31 **αἰτίαν κτλ.** 'And being the cause of Knowledge and Truth, I would have you conceive of it as apprehended, no doubt, by Knowledge, but beautiful as is the act of Knowledge, and beautiful though Truth be, you will be right in thinking that it is something other and even more beautiful than these.' The words *αἰτίαν—ἀληθείας* sum up and carry on *τὸ—ἀποδιδόν*. *ὡς γιγνωσκομένην* is in predicative agreement with *αἰτίαν* after *διανοοῦ* (cf. *Pol.* 258 C *πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὡς οὔσας δύο εἴδη διανοηθῆναι*): the words are the counterpart of *ὁ ἥλιος—ὁρᾶται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης* (sc. *τῆς ὄψεως*) in the simile 508 B. *μέν* after *γιγνωσκομένην* balances *δέ* after *οὕτω*: though apprehended by Knowledge, and therefore in some sense subject thereto, the Idea of Good is (as being the cause of both) more beautiful than Knowledge and Truth. I have (with van Heusde) altered *γιγνωσκόμενης* of the best MSS—see *cr. n.*—to *γιγνωσκομένην*. On other interpretations of this difficult passage see App. IX.

509 A 5 **τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν**: i.q. *τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει* (J. and C.).

6 **οὐ γὰρ δήπου κτλ.** is said in view of the question in 506 B. There is certainly no allusion to the *Philebus*: see 505 C *n.*

509 A—C *In the second place the Sun also provides the objects of sight with generation* (γένεσις), *increase, and nutriment, although generation is not identical with the Sun. In like manner, the objects of Knowledge receive their Being and Existence from the Good, which is itself distinct from and higher than Existence.*

509 B ff. 8 **τὸν ἥλιον κτλ.** The Good has been shewn to be the cause of Knowledge: Socrates now proceeds to shew that it is also the cause of Being. In the philosophy of Plato, Knowledge is the epistemological counterpart of Being, Being the ontological counterpart of Knowledge: see V 476 E ff. *nn.* The final unity in which both Knowledge and Being meet is the Idea of the Good, which is therefore the supreme and ultimate cause of the Universe. See also on *οὐκ οὐσίας κτλ.* below and the Appendix to Book VII *On Plato's Dialectic.*

10 **οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα.** See on *οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* below.

μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

XX. | *Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων μάλα γελοίως, Ἀπολλον, ἔφη, δαιμονίας* C *ὑπερβολῆς. Σὺ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αἴτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν. Καὶ μηδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ*

18. ἀλλὰ Ξ *q*: ἄλλα A.

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12 **φάναι.** V 473 A *n.*

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι κτλ. Cf. Arist. *Met.* A 6. 988[a] 10 *τὰ γὰρ εἴδη τοῦ τί ἔστιν αἰτία τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ' εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν.* Plato identified *τἀγαθόν* and *τὸ ἕν* : see the anecdote in Aristox. *Harm.* § 30 Marquard.

13 **οὐκ οὐσίας κτλ.** has occasioned a vast amount of discussion. Krohn boldly declares that 'Die *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* ist keine Idee, denn sie hat keine *οὐσία*, sondern es ist eine Macht, die mit unserer Denkweise nur als die Gottheit begriffen werden kann' (*Pl. St.* p. 146). Fouillée *La Philosophie de Platon* II p. 109 draws an over-subtle distinction between *εἶναι* and *οὐσία*, holding that although the Good is not *οὐσία*, it nevertheless is *ὄν* (cf. VII 518 C). Others have suspected the text, O. Schneider, for example, proposing *οὐ <μόνον> οὐσίας κτλ.* (*Versuch einer genet. Entw. d. Plat. ἀγαθόν* p. 16). That the text is right, the balance with *οὐ γένεσιν—ὄντα* conclusively shews. The Sun, said Socrates, is the cause of *γένεσις*, though not himself *γένεσις*. Just so the Good is the cause of *οὐσία*, though not itself *οὐσία*, but (to use a Neoplatonic expression) *ὑπερούσιος*. Plato's meaning is as follows. The Sun is not *γένεσις* in the sense in which the objects which he produces are *γιγνόμενα*. Yet in a certain sense he too is *γένεσις*, for he is *ὁρατός* : see VII 529 C ff. and *Tim.* 28 B. (Bosanquet cannot be right in denying that Plato regards the Sun as a *γιγνόμενον*). As the cause of *γένεσις*, we may, in fact, regard the Sun as the only true *γένεσις*, for all *γιγνόμενα* are derived from him. Similarly the Good is not *οὐσία* in the sense in which the Ideas are *οὐσίαι*; but in a higher sense it is the only true *οὐσία*, for all *οὐσίαι* are only specific determinations of the Good. The *ὑπερουσιότης* of the Good is merely Plato's way of saying that the first Principle of all existence must itself be underived. See on *ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον* 510 B and cf. Biehl l.c. p. 62 and Fouillée l.c. II pp. 105—111, where the matter is very clearly explained. The doctrine of the *ὑπερουσιότης* of the Highest afterwards became a cardinal point with the Neoplatonists : see Plotinus ap. RP.[7] p. 528, and for other references Hermann *Vind. disp. de id. boni* pp. 40 *n.* 84, 41 *n.* 87, Zeller[3] III 2. pp. 490 ff., Fouillée *La Philosophie de Platon* III pp. 289, 291 *nn.*, and Shorey *Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil.* I p. 188 *n.* 1. It is highly characteristic of Plato's whole attitude that he finds the true keystone of the Universe—the ultimate fountain from which both Knowledge and Existence flow—in no cold and colourless ontological abstraction, like Being, but in that for which *πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις συστενάζει καὶ συνωδίνει* (*Rom.* 8. 22)—viz. *τὸ ἀγαθόν*. Cf. *Phaed.* 97 C ff. and see also on 508 D. The conception is poetical and religious no less than philosophical, and may be compared with Dante's 'L' Amor che muove il Sole e l' altre Stelle' and Tennyson's 'For so the whole round earth is every way Bound by gold chains about the feet of God,' as well as with Aristotle's *πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον Met.* Λ 7 et al.

509 C 16 **καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων κτλ.** "Glauco exclaimed, very comically, 'Save us all, what an amazing transcendence!'" It is Glauco's *προθυμία* which is *γελοῖον* : see 506 D. *ὑπερβολῆς* is not 'exaggeration' (Jowett), but refers to *ὑπερέχοντος* : cf. *ἀμήχανον κάλλος λέγεις* 509 A. A *ὑπερβολή* which transcends existence may well be called *δαιμονία* ('supernatural,' 'miraculous').

18 **εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ κτλ.** Stephanus proposed ἄλλο for ἀλλά (as in 501 E), but cf. *Men.* 86 E *εἰ μή τι οὖν, ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον.*

509 C—**511** E *Socrates, at Glauco's*

τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὖ διεξιών, εἴ πῃ ἀπολείπεις. Ἀλλὰ μήν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπολείπω. Μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοίνυν, ἔφη, παραλίπῃς. Οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολύ· ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γ' ἐν τῷ
D παρόντι δυνατόν, ἑκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω. Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη. | Νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύο αὐτὼ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ' αὖ ὁρατοῦ, ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἴδη, ὁρατόν, νοητόν; Ἔχω. Ὥσπερ τοίνυν γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβὼν ἄνισα τμήματα πάλιν τέμνε ἑκάτερον τὸ τμῆμα

24. οὐρανοῦ Ξq: οὐρανὸν A. 27. τὸ Ξq: om. A.

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request, now proceeds to expound the similitude more fully. Let us take a line, and divide it into two unequal parts, to represent the objects of Sight and the objects of Thought respectively. If we further subdivide each part in the ratio of the original sections, we shall have four segments, representing, in order of clearness, (1) *Images and the like,* (2) *so-called real things,* (3) *the objects of that intellectual method which descends from assumptions to a conclusion, using sensible objects as images or illustrations,* (4) *the objects of that intellectual method, which ascends from assumptions to an unassumed first principle, without making use of any sensible illustrations whatsoever, and thereafter descends to a conclusion. The third section represents the subjects investigated by the so-called 'Arts' or mathematical sciences; the fourth is the sphere of Dialectic. The corresponding mental states are called by Socrates* εἰκασία, πίστις, διάνοια, *and* νόησις. *Each of these is clear or sure exactly in proportion as its objects are true.*

509 D ff. The simile of the Line contains perhaps more Platonic teaching than any passage of equal length in Plato's writings, and is of primary and fundamental importance for the interpretation of his philosophy. I have discussed the various difficulties as they occur, partly in the notes and partly in the Appendices to this Book. For a consecutive exposition of the whole simile in its connexion with the simile of the Cave see App. I to Book VII.

509 D 23 **αὐτώ**: the Sun and the Idea of the Good.

24 **ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ κτλ.** "I do not say 'of heaven,' lest you should imagine that I am etymologising on the name." The Sun might well be called *βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ*. Socrates pretends to avoid the word *οὐρανός*, lest by thus equating it with *ὁρατόν* (for the contrast with *νοητοῦ* would suggest that *οὐρανοῦ* = *ὁρατοῦ*) he should be accused of deriving *οὐρανός* from *ὁρᾶν*, as certain clever people did in Plato's time (*Crat.* 396 B. The same derivation is given by Philo Jud. *de mund. opif.* 10). For *σοφίζεσθαι* in this sense cf. *σοφία* in *Crat.* 396 C, D. E. S. Thompson (*Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc.* 1888 p. 14) takes *σοφίζεσθαι* simply as 'pun' and thinks that the pun is between *νοῦ* (suggested in *νοητοῦ* above) and *οὐρα-νοῦ*, quoting *ἀπ' ὄνου πεσεῖν*, and the anecdote in D. L. II 118, VI 3: cf. also Isocrates *Apophth. Fr.* 8 ed. Blass. But such a pun is both far-fetched and pointless, and in view of the passage from the *Cratylus* there should be no doubt that Plato *more suo* is merely scoffing at a well-known contemporary etymology. The reading *οὐρανόν*—see *cr. n.*—would be fatal to Thompson's theory, but *οὐρανοῦ* (which most MSS read) is more pointed and idiomatic, and perhaps right, though the accusative is not indefensible.

27 **ἄνισα.** It appears from the Scholiast that even ancient critics debated whether *ἄνισα* or *ἴσα* (*εἰς ἴσα ν*) should be read. Proclus (*in Plat. remp.* I p. 288 Kroll) and the author of the third *Quaest. Plat.* in Plutarch (1001 C ff.) read *ἄνισα*: *ἴσα* appears in a grammarian cited by Stallbaum from Villoison *Anecd. Gr.* II p. 199. The dispute still reigns, Stallbaum and some others

ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τό τε τοῦ ὁρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου, καί σοι ἔσται σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν τῷ
30 ὁρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμῆμα | εἰκόνες. λέγω δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας E
πρῶτον μὲν | τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ 510
ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ ξυνέστηκεν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς. Ἀλλὰ κατανοῶ. Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον τίθει ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν, τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ

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preferring ἴσα, others, such as Richter (*Fl. Jahrb.* 1867 p. 145) and Dümmler (*Antisth.* p. 80) ἂν' ἴσα, others even ἂν ἴσα (which is certainly not Greek, though found in a few inferior MSS); but there should be no question that Plato wrote ἄνισα. If the line is bisected, all four segments are equal, and the elaborate proportions drawn in 510 A, 511 E, VII 534 A represent no corresponding relations between the different segments of the line. The inequality, as Schneider and Steinhart point out, is intended to represent the difference in σαφήνεια or ἀλήθεια between the δοξαστόν (or ὁρατόν) and the γνωστόν (or νοητόν): cf. σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ below and 510 A. (So also Benson in Nettleship's *Lect. and Rem.* II p. 239 *n.*). For this reason the νοητόν should be represented by a longer segment. Others assign the larger part to the ὁρατόν, as being the region of τὰ πολλά (Plutarch l.c. and Espinas in his edition of Book VI), but the length of the two main segments should follow the primary and fundamental principle of Plato's classification. The relevant consideration is not at present multiplicity *versus* unity, but different degrees of clearness and truth. Beckman's excision of ἄνισα τμήματα (*num Plato artefactorum ideas statuerit* p. 38) needs no refutation. See also next note.

27 **πάλιν τέμνε κτλ.** See Figure 1 on p. 65.

$$AD : DC :: AC : CB,$$

and $$CE : EB :: AC : CB.$$

It follows (1) that $AD : DC :: CE : EB$, (2) that $DC = CE$; for

$$\frac{CE}{EB} = \frac{AC}{CB}, \quad \therefore \frac{CE}{CE+EB} = \frac{AC}{AC+CB},$$

i.e. $$\frac{CE}{CB} = \frac{AC}{AB}, \quad \therefore CE = \frac{AC \cdot CB}{AB}.$$

Similarly

$$\frac{DC}{AC} = \frac{CB}{AB}, \quad \therefore DC = \frac{AC.CB}{AB}.$$

But $\frac{AC \cdot CB}{AB}$ has been proved equal to CE.

$$\therefore DC = CE.$$

(This last equality—so far as it goes—is a slight though unavoidable defect in the line, for DC is not equal to CE in point of clearness. See last note). Neither of these inferences is expressly drawn by Plato himself; but he appears to make use of the first in 532 A ff.

29 **καί σοι ἔσται κτλ.**: 'and when classified according to their relative clearness and obscurity, the different segments will represent—in the visible sphere, segment 1, Images' etc. The datives, like ἀληθείᾳ in 510 A, are causal, and state the principle on which the entire classification (of νοητά as well as ὁρατά) rests. With ἐν μὲν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ Socrates begins to describe the contents of the particular segments. This is interrupted by the definition of εἰκόνες, and resumed, in a different form, at τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον in 510 A. μέν before τῷ ὁρωμένῳ contrasts with σκόπει δὴ αὖ in B, much as τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον balances the second μέν. On σαφηνείᾳ see below 511 C *n.*

510 A 2 **ὅσα πυκνὰ κτλ.** Cf. *Tim.* 46 A ff. πυκνά)(μανά is 'of close texture,' 'close grained' (D. and V.), not exactly 'solid' (as Jowett).

πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον. Although the productions of imitative art and the like must be held to belong to this category (see App. I to Book VII), there is nothing to shew that Plato was thinking of them when he wrote this sentence.

3 **ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν**: 'whereof this is an image.' ἔοικεν corresponds to εἰκόνας above.

FIG. i. THE LINE.



FIG. ii. TO ILLUSTRATE THE CAVE.

ef. ὁδός.
gh. τειχίον.
ab. Row of Prisoners.
cd. Wall on which the Shadows are thrown.

σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος. Τίθημι, ἔφη. Ἦ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, διῃρῆσθαι ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μή, ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ᾧ ὡμοιώθη; Ἔγωγ', ἔφη, καὶ μάλα. Σκόπει δὴ αὖ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ᾗ τμητέον. Πῇ; Ἧι τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσιν χρωμένη ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτήν, τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον ἐξ ὑποθέ-

11. ἕτερον Ast: ἕτερον τὸ codd.

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5 **αὐτό**: viz. *τὸ ὁρώμενον*, with reference to *ἐν μὲν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ* above.

6 **ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν κτλ.** i.e.

AD : *DC* :: *AC* : *CB*.

Hitherto *AC* has not been called *δοξαστόν*, only *ὁρατόν*. The new terminology appears again in 511 D (*δόξης*) and VII 534 A: see also on VII 516 D, 523 C. *δοξαστόν* is of course a wider term than *ὁρατόν*, for it includes the entire domain of *τὰ πολλά*, by whatever sense or faculty apprehended (V 479 D ff.). *δόξα* is, in fact, the intellectual state of the ordinary uneducated man. This further specification of *AC* is of no small importance for the understanding of the similes of the Line and Cave: see VII 514 A, 517 A *nn.* and App. I to Book VII.

510 B 9 ᾗ κτλ. With *ᾗ* cf. *Theaet.* 172 D. *τὸ μέν* is *CE*.

τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν: i.e. the objects represented by *CD*, which were 'imitated' or copied in *AD*. They were originals then, but are only images now: this is the force of the collocation *μιμηθεῖσιν—εἰκόσι*. Cf. 510 E *ἃ πλάττουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσί, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι*, 511 A *εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι*, and for the meaning of *μιμηθεῖσιν* X 599 A *τό τε μιμηθησόμενον καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον* and *Laws* 668 B. I have restored the reading of A, *μιμηθεῖσιν*, with which Proclus (*in Plat. remp.* I p. 291 Kroll) also agrees. *τμηθεῖσιν*, which appears to be adopted by all other editors, occurs in all the available MSS except A. But *τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσι* would include *AD* as well as *DC*, and the illustrations employed in the inferior *νοητόν* are drawn solely from *DC*, as is proved by 510 E (cited above), as well as by the actual facts of the case. The sole objection to *μιμηθεῖσι* is that the word is generally used only of "artificiosa imitatio" (Schneider): yet in *Pol.* 293 E, 297 C, *Phil.* 40 C and Arist. *Hist. An.* II 8. 502^{b} 9 the 'imitatio' can hardly be called 'artificiosa.' 511 A seems to me sufficient by itself to prove that A is right. Schneider (*Addit.* p. 51) refers to a dissertation by Mommsen published in 1842 as taking the view here advocated.

10 ἐξ ὑποθέσεων. *ὑπόθεσις* is correctly defined in the Platonic *ὅροι* (415 B) as *ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος*, a starting-point which is not demonstrated, but taken for granted, assumed, postulated. The arithmetician, for example, *ὑποτίθεται* the odd, the even, etc., i.e. assumes that his definition of odd, even, etc. is correct, and draws conclusions from his *ὑπόθεσις* of the odd, the even, etc. by means of exclusively deductive reasoning: cf. H. Sidgwick in *J. Ph.* II p. 100. If we attack his *ὑπόθεσις*, as Lucian for example does (*Hermot.* 74, quoted by Stallbaum), he must, *quâ* arithmetician, throw up the sponge, for the *ὑποθέσεις* of the inferior *νοητόν* can be demonstrated (or overthrown) only by Dialectic. Cf. generally *Men.* 86 E ff. Schneider may be right in supposing that Aristotle had the present passage in view when he wrote *εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν* (*Eth. Nic.* I 2. 1095^{a} 32), though it is perhaps better (with Zeller^{4} II 1, p. 587 *n.* 2) to suppose that he is alluding to Plato's oral instruction.

11 τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον κτλ. *τὸ ἕτερον* is *EB*. The article after *ἕτερον* (see *cr. n.*) stands self-condemned, although its intrusion is difficult to explain. *δ*, which Schneider proposes, is also difficult, though in harmony with Ficinus (alterum vero, quod excogitat animus), for the verb of the relative clause can hardly be omit-

σεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἄνευ ὧνπερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων αὐτοῖς εἴδεσι δι' αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη. Ταῦτ', ἔφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἔμαθον. C *Ἀλλ' αὖθις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ῥᾷον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων μαθήσει.*

ted. λόγῳ, once proposed by Hermann, has nothing in its favour. ζητεῖ must be supplied to govern τὸ ἕτερον.

ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον. The only ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος is the Idea of the Good: cf. VII 532 A f. Towards this the Dialectician travels, starting from ὑποθέσεις. He may begin, for example, by 'assuming' the 'just.' In such a case he assumes that his definition of 'just' is correct, i.e. corresponds exactly to the Idea of 'Just.' But whereas the arithmetician treats his ὑπόθεσις as an ultimate truth, and proceeds deductively to a conclusion, making use of sensible images by way of illustration, the dialectician treats his hypothesis as purely provisional, testing, revising, rejecting (VII 533 C *n.*), and reconstructing, and gradually ascending step by step to the first principle of all (τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχήν), without employing any sensible objects to illustrate his reasoning. The one gives no account of his ὑπόθεσις (οὐδένα λόγον—φανερῶν in C below); the other not only does, but must do so, just because he *is* a dialectician: cf. VII 533 C ff. He connects his ὑποθέσεις with others, subsuming them under higher and yet higher —better and truer—ὑποθέσεις, until at last he has traversed the whole region of νοητά. Such of his ὑποθέσεις as survive will be improved at each stage in the ascent, and finally, as soon as the Idea of Good is reached, all his surviving ὑποθέσεις will actually have become perfect counterparts of the Ideas which they have hitherto been only *assumed* to represent. In the meantime the ἀρχὴ τοῦ παντός, which Plato himself described dogmatically δι' εἰκόνος in 507 A—509 C, will have ceased to be a mere ὑπόθεσις: it will have become, in the fullest sense of the term, an ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος: for the highest rung of the ladder is not reached until the entire domain of the knowable has been exhausted, and shewn to be the expression of the Idea of Good. Plato's ideal—it is no more—is a comprehensive and purely intellectual view of the totality of νοητά, in which every department is seen in its connexion with every other, and all in their dependence on the Good, which is in itself ἀνυπόθετος and ὑπερούσιος—ἀνυπόθετος because higher than all ὑποθέσεις and itself proved by an exhaustive scrutiny of νοητά, ὑπερούσιος because higher than, and the cause of, all existence. See also on 511 B and the Appendix to Book VII *On Plato's Dialectic*, together with Jackson *J. of Ph.* X pp. 145 f., where the distinctive peculiarities of the two methods are very clearly explained.

12 **ὧνπερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων:** i.q. ἄνευ τῶν αἴσπερ ἐκεῖνο (ζητεῖ) εἰκόνων. I formerly read τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων (with *q*), but now think (with Schneider and others) that A is right. The attraction of a relative in the dative case is rare, but not unexampled. Van Cleef (*de attract. in enunt. rel. usu Plat.* p. 45) cites *Gorg.* 509 A, *Prot.* 361 E, *Theaet.* 144 A, *Rep.* VII 531 E (all examples of ἐντυγχάνω, whose proper construction in the sense of 'fall in with' is the dative, not the genitive), and *Ep.* VII 327 A (with προσέτυχον); for examples in other authors see Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 914. If ἄνευ and ἐκεῖνο are pronounced with emphasis, the meaning, I think, is easily caught. Stallbaum reads ὧν περὶ κτλ. with one Vienna MS, understanding, I suppose, χρῆται.

αὐτοῖς—δι' αὐτῶν. αὐτοῖς (*ipsis* = *solis*) is further accentuated by δι' αὐτῶν ('through themselves alone'): cf. 511 C. The εἴδη of the dialectician do not employ the adventitious aid of εἰκόνες: see on 511 B. The use of εἴδεσι here must not be held to imply that even the dialectician's conceptions of the Ideas are correct *before* he has reached the Idea of the Good. Till then, they are only ὑποθέσεις, though the false ὑποθέσεις are weeded out (VII 533 C *n.*), and the hypothetical character of the survivors is gradually eliminated in the course of the ascent. See on ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον above, and contrast 511 C.

14 **ἀλλ' αὖθις κτλ.** 'Then have it over again, said I.' The ellipse has a colloquial effect. Ast's εὐθύς for αὖθις is unlikely: nor does Cobet's <ἐρῶ> after ἐγώ sound right. If Plato had written ἐρῶ, he would, I think, have placed it after αὖθις. μάνθανε, or the like, supplied from ἔμαθον, suits the con-

οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι, ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἴδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ' ἑκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δ' ἀρχόμενοι | τὰ D λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο, οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήσωσι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων πέρι, οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους

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text (ῥᾷον γὰρ—μαθήσει) best. Similarly in D below, οἶσθα is understood out of Glauco's reply. Cf. also ἀλλ' ὧδε in I 352 E.

510 C 15 **οἱ περὶ κτλ.** In *CE*, as will afterwards appear, are included five sciences, which form the *προοίμιον* (VII 531 D) or *προπαιδεία* (ib. 536 D) to Dialectic, represented by *EB*. They are the Science of Number, Plane Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy, and Harmonics: VII 522 C—531 C. In each of these the method, according to Plato, is the same. Certain *ὑποθέσεις* are taken for granted, and inferences drawn from them by purely deductive reasoning, aided by the use of sensible likenesses or illustrations. See also App. I to Book VII.

18 **ὡς εἰδότες.** They have no *knowledge* of their *ὑποθέσεις*, otherwise they would be able to give an account of them: see VII 533 C and 531 E *μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες δοῦναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἰσεσθαί ποτέ τι ὧν φαμὲν δεῖν εἰδέναι; Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.*

510 D 21 **ὁμολογουμένως**="folgerechterweise" (Cohen *Pl. Ideenl. u. d. Math.* p. 29) refers to the agreement between premises, intermediate steps, and conclusion: cf. VII 533 C, where *ὁμολογία* is used in the same way. "With perfect unanimity" (D. and V.) is incorrect and pointless.

23 **τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι κτλ.** They use the 'visible kinds,' i.e. visible squares, visible diagonals, etc., but they are thinking about mathematical squares and diagonals etc. Cf. generally *Euthyd.* 290 B *οἱ δ' αὖ γεωμέτραι καὶ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι καὶ οἱ λογιστικοί· θηρευτικοὶ γάρ εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι· οὐ γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα ἕκαστοι τούτων ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ἀνευρίσκουσιν*, and VII 527 A.

25 **ἔοικε.** Visible *σχήματα* are imperfect copies of 'mathematical' *σχήματα*: cf. VII 526 A and App. I to Book VII.

τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ κτλ.: 'for that with a view to which they are discoursing is the square itself and a diagonal itself, not this which they draw' etc. *αὐτοῦ* ('by itself,' i.e. apart from its embodiment in perceivable squares) is ambiguous, and might (so far as language is concerned) refer either to the Idea of Square (cf. V 476 A ff.) or to the Mathematical Square (cf. VII 525 D, E *nn.*), which—see App. I to Book VII—Plato holds to be *distinct* from the Idea. But the ambiguity is resolved as soon as we are shewn (in 511 C ff.) how to interpret *διανοούμενοι* and *διανοίᾳ* (511 A), and we then see that Plato is here speaking of the *mathematical* square. The singular *τοῦ τετραγώνου* is generic (cf. *ὁ σοφιστής* for the whole class of Sophists), for there are many 'mathematical' squares, diagonals etc. (VII 526 A *n.* and App. I to Book VII). It is conceivably for this reason that Plato drops the article with *διαμέτρου* ('a diagonal itself'), thereby also getting a more precise antithesis to *ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης*, or else (if this suggestion is hypercritical) *διαμέτρου* is also generic. Sidgwick is, I think, mistaken when he says (*J. Ph.* II p. 103) that the language of this passage "in no way supports the interpolation of intermediates (Aristotle's *τὰ μεταξύ*) between particulars and Ideas": for *διανοούμενοι* involves *διάνοια*, and since *διάνοια* is intermediate between *νοῦς* and *δόξα* (511 D), we may reasonably suppose that its objects are likewise intermediate

ποιούμενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης, ἣν γράφουσιν, καὶ
E τἆλλα οὕτως, | αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα, ἃ πλάττουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν,
ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσίν, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ
χρώμενοι ζητοῦντές τε αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι
511 τις | ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. 30

XXI. Τοῦτο τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσεσι δ'
ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπ'
ἀρχὴν ἰοῦσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν,
εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν καὶ 5
ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις.

6. τετιμημένοις A^2mr : τετμημένοις $A^1\Xi q$.

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between the higher *νοητά* and *δοξαστά*. See App. I to Book VII.

27 πλάττουσιν: with reference to models of geometrical figures, orreries etc., all of which belong to *CD*, and may themselves have shadows and likenesses in *AD*.

28 **ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι.** See 510 B *n.* The anacoluthon in *αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα—τούτοις μὲν χρώμενοι* is illustrated by Engelhardt *Anac. Pl. Spec.* III p. 8 : cf. also VII 520 D.

29 **ζητοῦντές τε.** Instead of *τε*, I formerly read *δέ* (on slight MS authority), with Ast and Stallbaum; but the corruption of *δέ* to *τε* is exceedingly improbable here. The antithetical force of the clause *ζητοῦντες—ἰδεῖν* is weakened by the occurrence of the words *ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ* in the *μέν* clause. If the objects in question are used as images, the further statement that the real object of investigation is their originals (*αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα*) loses its antithetical force, and becomes a sort of adjunct. Hence *τε* following *ζητοῦντες* is more appropriate than *αὐτὰ δὲ ἐκεῖνα ζητοῦντες ἰδεῖν*, which would be the natural way of expressing an antithesis. Cf. *Laws* 927 B *ὀξὺ μὲν ἀκούουσι βλέπουσί τε ὀξύ* (where the order is the same as here), *Phaedr.* 266 C and other examples cited by Hoefer *de part. Pl.* pp. 17 f.

511 A 1 τῇ διανοίᾳ. See on *τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ* 510 D.

2 **ἔλεγον.** 510 B.

3 **ἀναγκαζομένην.** For the participle we might expect *ἀναγκάζεσθαι*. But *ἀναγκαζομένην* gives a better balance with *νοητόν*, and the meaning is 'Accordingly I described this class as intelligible indeed, but the soul as compelled' etc.

4 **τῶν ὑποθέσεων—ἐκβαίνειν**: 'to step out of and above assumptions,' viz. by reaching the *ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος*: cf. 510 B *n.*

5 **αὐτοῖς τοῖς κτλ.** *αὐτοῖς* is 'the actual things,' 'the originals,' as in *αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα* 510 E: 'employing as images the originals *from* which images were made' (lit. 'the imaged-from' "abgebildet" Schneider) 'by the objects below,' i.e. employing as images the originals in *CD*, which were copied by the shadows etc. in *AD*. For *ἀπεικασθεῖσι* in this sense cf. *ἀπεικασθῆναι* in *Tim.* 48 C and (with J. and C.) *εἰκασθέντος* in *Phaedr.* 250 B. Other views of this passage are discussed in App. X.

καὶ ἐκείνοις κτλ.: 'those also, in comparison with those remoter objects, being esteemed and honoured as palpable and clear.' *καί* is 'also' and not 'and,' as some have supposed. *ἐκείνοις* is *DC*, and *ἐκεῖνα AD*. Plato uses the pronoun *ἐκείνοις* to indicate that the objects in *CD* are less near to the mind of the mathematician than those in *CE*, which are the immediate object of his study (cf. Sidgwick in *J. Ph.* II p. 98). He could not, even if he had wished to, have written *καὶ αὐτοῖς* (et ipsis) without sacrificing *αὐτοῖς* just before. *ἐκεῖνα* is said because *AD* is remoter still. See also App. X.

6 **δεδοξασμένοις** means, I believe, 'esteemed,' 'valued' as in Polyb. VI 53. 9 *τῶν ἐπ' ἀρετῇ δεδοξασμένων ἀνδρῶν*: cf. the regular use of *δοξάζειν* for 'glorify' in the N. T. No other certain instance of this usage appears to occur in Plato, or even in classical Greek: at all events neither Thuc. III 45. 6 nor Dionys.

Μανθάνω, ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ | ταῖς γεωμετρίαις τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης B
ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις. Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον μάνθανε τμῆμα τοῦ
νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο, οὗ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἅπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέ-
γεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ
ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυπο-
θέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰών, ἁψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ

Thesm. 1. 24 Meineke, cited by L. and S., is a case in point. But the collocation with *τετιμημένοις* makes it probable that the usage, though rare, is Platonic; and every other interpretation of the word is beset with serious difficulties, as is shewn in App. X.

τετιμημένοις. *τετμημένοις* is read by Schneider, with several MSS (see *cr. n.*), and understood as 'cut off' (abgeschnitten); but, as J. and C. observe, this does not suit *δεδοξασμένοις*, and it is doubtful if the *objects* can be said to be 'cut,' although the line is: see on *τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν* 510 B.

511 B 7 ταύτης in spite of *γεωμετρίαις* because Geometry is itself one art: cf. VII 533 C *γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ ἑπομένας*. The plural *γεωμετρίαις* does not mean the 'various branches of geometry' (as D. and V. suppose), but geometrical investigations: cf. *λογισμούς* for 'Arithmetic' in 510 C.

9 **αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος κτλ.**: 'the argument grasps by itself, through the power of dialectic.' *λόγος* is not the faculty of reason ("Vernunft" Schleiermacher), which is *νοῦς*, or even 'thought' ("Gedanke" Schneider), but rather "the impersonal reason, or drift of the argument" (Bosanquet), the instrument by which *νοῦς* works (Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 140). *ὁ λόγος* is of course personified, as it constantly is in this sense.

10 **δυνάμει** should not be translated 'faculty,' but simply 'power' (cf. 508 E *n.*): the argument, unaided by *εἰκόνες* (*αὐτός* 'by itself,' cf. *αὐτοῖς εἴδεσι* 510 B *n.*), grasps its object by the inherent power of dialectical argumentation (*διαλέγεσθαι*), and nothing else. In spite of Grimmelt (*de reip. unit.* etc. p. 52) it is certainly an error to identify *ὁ λόγος* with *νοῦς*. Why does Dialectic dispense with all sensible images or illustrations? Plato (it should be remembered) holds that the intrusion of any element of sense-perception, however small, impedes the exercise of thought: see *Phaed.* 79 C ff. The *ὑποθέσεις* of the dialectician may be and often are generalisations from *αἰσθητά*, but a generalisation, regarded in itself, is wholly *νοητόν*. These *ὑποθέσεις* it is the province of Dialectic to test in every possible way, to demolish where necessary (VII 533 C *n.*), to correct by one another, to classify according to their mutual coherence and interdependence, until by an exhaustive scrutiny of all *νοητά* we grasp the unifying principle of all existence—the Idea of the Good. Cf. VII 517 C *n.* and see on *τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου* below and the Appendix to Book VII *On Plato's Dialectic.*

τῷ ὄντι indicates that we are to take the word in its literal etymological signification, 'literally hypotheses or underpositions, stepping-stones as it were and starting-points.' For this use of *τῷ ὄντι* and kindred expressions see I 343 C, V 474 A *nn.* and W. G. Headlam *On editing Aeschylus* pp. 138 ff. With *ἐπιβάσεις* cf. *Symp.* 211 C *ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον.*

11 **τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου.** See on *ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον* 510 B. Plato makes no attempt in the *Republic* to classify Ideas in such an ascending scale as he here suggests, though it is probable from 509 A that Knowledge and Truth would rank near to the Good. Nor is there any dialogue in which an exhaustive classification is even attempted. Such hints as Plato gives us throughout his writings are enumerated in Stumpf *das Verhältniss* etc. pp. 50, 56, 76, and in Zeller[4] II 1, pp. 704—707: cf. also Fouillée *La Philosophie de Platon* II pp. 99—104. We must suppose that each higher Idea will excel all the lower both in range and in excellence. These two characteristics are, from Plato's point of view, the same. The wider an Idea is in range and extension, the greater will be the sum of existences of which it is the cause. But the Idea of Good is the cause of all existence, so that each higher Idea will be better than all below it, because it contains more of

ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνῃ
C αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, | ἀλλ' εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς
δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη. Μανθάνω, ἔφη, ἱκανῶς 15
μὲν οὔ· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν· ὅτι μέντοι βούλει
διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης
τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλου-
μένων, αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοίᾳ μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ

16. οὔ $A^2\Xi q$: οὖν A^1.

Good. Beyond this it is perhaps safer not to go. A systematic attempt to correlate all intelligibles among themselves and in their connexion with the Good would have been premature in Plato's day, and is premature still. The permanent value of Plato's conception lies in the ideal which it sets before every succeeding generation of investigators.

12 **πάλιν αὖ κτλ.** The dialectician's progress involves both an ascent and a descent—an ascent *ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν*, and a descent *ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὴν τελευτήν* (cf. Aristotle quoted on 510 B). By the time that he reaches the Idea of the Good, all his surviving *ὑποθέσεις* have become exact counterparts of the Ideas which are their objective correlates; the others have all of them been demolished (VII 533 C *n.*). The conclusions (*τελευταί*) of dialectic are therefore impregnable; *ψευδὴς ἐπιστήμη* is a contradiction in terms (V 477 E *n.*). For more on this subject see the Appendix to Book VII *On Plato's Dialectic*.

511 C 14 **εἴδεσιν—εἴδη.** On *αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν* see 510 B *n.* *εἴδεσιν* may now be taken in its full force; for after the Idea of Good has been reached, the dialectician's conception of each *εἶδος* is accurate and complete: see last note. I formerly read *αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν*, rejecting *εἰς αὐτά* as superfluous on account of *καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη*. But *αὐτῶν* is certainly wrong (cf. 510 B), and *εἰς αὐτά*, which may well be taken loosely with *καταβαίνῃ* or a participle supplied from it, merely states that the conclusions of dialectic are likewise *εἴδη*: whereas *καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη* seems to lay emphasis on the fact that dialectic never descends below *εἴδη* to particulars ("und bei Begriffen endigt" Schneider). We may translate 'and with Ideas end.' Plato means to emphasize the fact that the Dialectician *quâ* Dialectician does not draw conclusions as to particulars: if he did, he could scarcely be said *αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρῆσθαι*. See the Appendix to Book VII *On Plato's Dialectic*.

16 **ὅτι μέντοι κτλ.** There is no anacoluthon as Engelhardt (*Anac. Pl. Spec.* III p. 9) supposes, but *ὅτι* depends on *μανθάνω*. With *σαφέστερον* cf. V 478 C and 509 D above. *σαφής*, originally 'clear,' often = 'true' in Greek. Plato's comparison between Light and Truth in 507 C ff. gave a new and profound significance to the equation. The present passage should be compared with *Phil.* 57 B ff., where Dialectic is said to excel mathematical and all other sciences in respect of 'the clearness' (*τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τἀκριβὲς καὶ τἀληθέστατον*) of its object. In general, the higher a science is, the greater (according to Plato) is the amount of truth or knowability which its subject-matter contains. Plato's theory on this subject is the source of Aristotle's doctrine of *ἁπλῶς γνώριμα* or *γνωριμώτερα φύσει*, for which see Stewart on *Eth. Nic.* I 4. 1095^b 2.

18 **τὸ—καλουμένων.** *καλουμένων* implies that *τέχναι* ('Arts') sometimes bore the specific meaning of 'mathematical sciences' as early as the time of Plato. This use of the word may have been introduced by some of the Sophists, perhaps Hippias: cf. *Prot.* 318 E, where Protagoras says *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν* (the medieval *quadrivium*) *διδάσκοντες—καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὸν Ἱππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν*. If we can understand *μουσικήν* as 'theory of Music,' Hippias' *quadrivium* is identical with Plato's, except that Plato would like to add Stereometry. Cf. also *Theaet.*

μὴ αἰσθήσεσιν αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ | τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν D
ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ
δοκοῦσί σοι, καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς. διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν
μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἕξιν, ἀλλ'
οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν. Ἱκανώ-
τατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι
τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν
ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτω, | διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν E
ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον,

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145 A, B and see Tannery *L'Éducation Platonicienne* in *Rev. Philos.* X p. 523, the Appendix to Book VII *On the propaedeutic studies of the Republic* and my article in *Cl. Rev.* XV p. 220, where I have tried to shew that our use of the word 'Arts' in 'Bachelor of Arts' etc. is an inheritance from the Platonic Academy.

19 **καὶ—θεώμενοι.** The relative sentence passes into a main clause, as in II 357 B, where see note.

20 **αὐτά:** viz. the subject-matter of the so-called 'Arts': cf. VII 518 B.

511 D 22 **καίτοι—ἀρχῆς:** 'although they are intelligibles with a first principle.' The mathematician does not ascend to an *ἀρχή*, and therefore does not exercise—for *ἴσχειν* in its original half-inchoative sense cf. IX 585 B and Kühner-Blass *Gr. Gr.* I 2, p. 434 *n.*—*νοῦς* on his subject, but nevertheless his subject is *νοητόν* (as we have been told before 510 B, 511 A, C) and has an *ἀρχή*, viz. his *ὑποθέσεις* (*αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί* above). *καίτοι* is not found elsewhere in Plato for *καίπερ* with a participle (Hoefer *de part. Pl.* p. 28) but occurs in Simonides ap. *Prot.* 339 C, in *Axioch.* 364 B and Lysias 31. 34. To write *καίπερ* (with Kugler *de part. τοι* etc. p. 18) would be rash. For other views on this difficult clause see App. XI.

καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς. See 510 D *n.*

24 **ὡς—οὖσαν.** *διάνοια* is the most general word for a state (*ἕξις*) of mind or mode of thought in Greek; and the limitation here introduced is entirely Plato's own. Plato apparently attempts to fortify his innovation by etymology, hinting that the word *διάνοια* is by derivation that which is between (*διὰ μέσου*) *νοῦς* and *δόξα*. So also J. and C. Cf. *εἰκασία* (with allusion to *εἰκόνες*) in E. On *δόξης* see 510 A *n.*

26 **νόησιν** is used in its strict sense of *νοῦς* in actual exercise, not merely the faculty of *νοῦς*: cf. 508 E *n.* The exercise of *νοῦς* is correctly spoken of as a *πάθημα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον*, but the faculty itself could hardly be thus described.

511 E 27 **πίστιν κτλ.** If we strictly limit *DC* to *ὁρατά*, *πίστις* must be understood as the state of mind which believes only in visible, palpable (*ἐναργῆ*) things (*τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος* 510 A): 'seeing,' as we still say, 'is believing.' But Plato has already spoken of *AC* as *δοξαστόν* (510 A *n.*); so that *πίστις* should not be confined to the objects of sight. It is in fact a subdivision of *δόξα*, superior in point of 'clearness' (*σαφήνεια*) to *εἰκασία*. We may regard it as the normal condition of the average uneducated mind. *εἰκασία* is the state of mind in which *εἰκόνες* are held to be true. Here again, if *εἰκόνες* are strictly limited to images of *ὁρατά* (cf. 509 E, 510 A), *εἰκασία* must be similarly confined in its scope, and loses all metaphysical interest and importance: see VII 517 A *n.* But since the *εἰκόνες* are a lower grade of *δοξαστά* (510 A *n.*), *εἰκασία* should be understood as a lower variety of *δόξα* (as in VII 534 A), viz. the state of mind which accepts as true that which is a copy of a copy (*τρίτον πρὸς ἀλήθειαν*). In this sense *εἰκασία* (with a play on *εἰκόνες*) is a new coinage of Plato's. The translation 'conjecture' is misleading, for conjecture implies conscious doubt or hesitation, and doubt is foreign to *εἰκασία* in Plato's sense. Plato may however have intended to suggest that such a state of mind is in reality no better than conjecture. See also X 598 A *n.* and Bosanquet *Companion* pp. 261 f. with Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II pp. 242—246.

ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας μετέχειν, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν. Μανθάνω, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ὡς λέγεις.

τέλος πολιτείας ϛ'.

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29 **ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς κτλ.**: "attributing to them such a degree of clearness as their objects have of truth" J. and C. Liebhold's *ἐφ' ὅσον* for *ἐφ' οἷς* is an unhappy suggestion: cf. VII 534 A. A corrector in *q* changed the first *μετέχειν* to *μετέχει*, which, in deference to Schneider's arguments, I formerly printed. But the text is quite sound. Stated categorically, the clause would run *ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας μετέχει, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας μετέχει*. Under the government of *ἡγησάμενος*, the first as well as the second *μετέχει* becomes *μετέχειν*; for the accusative with infinitive may be employed even in the subordinate clauses of Indirect. See on 492 C. The jingle *μετέχειν—μετέχειν* is inoffensive: cf. X 614 A, 621 B.

APPENDICES TO BOOK VI.

I.

VI 488 D. *ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει ἐάν τέ τινες βούλωνται ἐάν τε μή, μήτε τέχνην τούτου μήτε μελέτην οἰόμενοι δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικήν.*

Schneider's translation of this sentence is as follows:—"wie aber zu steuern sei, es mögen nun einige wollen oder nicht, davon glauben sie nicht dass es eine Kunst und Uebung gebe, mit der man dann eben die Steuermannskunst habe." The view which I have given in the notes is in general harmony with this interpretation; but I think that the word *μελέτη* denotes 'study' rather than actual 'practice' ("Uebung" or "exercitatio" Schneider): see the notes.

The strength of Schneider's explanation lies in its conformity with the whole course of Plato's argument both here and in the passages which I have cited from the *Politicus*. In particular, the exact parallel between *ἐάν τέ τινες βούλωνται ἐάν τε μή* and *ἐάν τε ἑκόντας ἐάν τε ἄκοντας* (in *Pol.* 293 B) appears to me the strongest possible confirmation of the general soundness of his view. No interpretation that I know of, Schneider's alone excepted, assigns its proper force to *ἐάν τέ τινες βούλωνται* (cf. *ἐάν τε ἑκόντας*, *Pol.* l.c.) as well as to *ἐάν τε μή*. The true pilot cares just as little whether people wish him to steer as whether they do not: his art has nothing whatever to do with the sentiments with which his passengers regard his rule. Schneider's interpretation is also supported by the emphatic *μήτε τέχνην—μήτε μελέτην*: the false pilot will not allow that you can learn 'either art or theory' of how to steer, because according to him there is absolutely nothing technical or theoretical about steering. The only 'art of steering' which he will admit is the art of collaborating with himself in order to get command of the ship (*ναυτικὸν μὲν καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστάμενον τὰ κατὰ ναῦν ὃς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ᾖ ὅπως ἄρξουσιν κτλ.*). It must, however, be admitted that *ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικήν* is not altogether easy on Schneider's view. The reader naturally expects *τὴν κυβερνητικήν* to be different from the *τέχνη* and *μελέτη*: for on a first examination of the passage, Plato seems to be speaking of the impossibility of acquiring *at the same time* two *different* arts: whereas Schneider holds that the two arts are the same, *τὴν κυβερνητικήν* being only Plato's way of expressing the *τέχνη* and *μελέτη τούτου ὅπως κυβερνήσει*.

Is it possible to devise any explanation which, while agreeing in the main with Schneider's, will escape the apparent difficulty to which I have just drawn attention?

We note that *κυβερνητικήν* has already been implicitly defined by the sailors as the art of helping them to get command (*κυβερνητικὸν κτλ.*

above). Why then should we not suppose that the sailors 'think it impossible to acquire an art of how to steer (ὅπως κυβερνήσει) along with κυβερνητική' in *their* sense of the term, i.e. (practically) along with the art of making themselves masters of the ship? This interpretation, as far as concerns the language, seems to me possible enough; but it implies that the sailors do think it possible to learn the art of how to steer independently and by itself: whereas they have already said that such an art cannot be taught at all (φάσκοντας μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι 488 B). For this among other reasons I think that this solution should not be entertained.

I have endeavoured in the notes to justify Schneider's explanation of ἅμα καί, and here it need only be added that one source of embarrassment is the tendency which we feel to give to ἅμα more of a strictly temporal signification than necessarily belongs to it in that idiomatic phrase.

An entirely different view of the sentence is taken by Ast and others. According to Ast, Plato is here distinguishing between two arts, viz. (1) scientific pilotage (the knowledge of astronomy etc.), and (2) the "ars imperandi—ut quae scientia et ars ipsum doceant, a multitudine ipsi subdita fieri curet." τὴν κυβερνητικήν is (1), and τέχνην τούτου (2). On this view Plato asserts that the crew in general consider it impossible to acquire both the art of steering (τὴν κυβερνητικήν) and that of steering whether people wish it or no (ὅπως κυβερνήσει τέχνην τούτου), i.e. in other words, enforcing and maintaining authority. Both arts—so Ast interprets—are united, according to Plato, in the true pilot.

This explanation Stallbaum apparently accepts, conjecturing only τῇ κυβερνητικῇ for τὴν κυβερνητικήν. I do not deny that it can be elicited from Plato's language, if we take this sentence by itself: but it is open to serious objection on the score of meaning, as has been pointed out by H. Sidgwick (*J. Ph.* v pp. 274—276), Richards (*Cl. Rev.* VIII p. 23), and Shorey (*A. J. Ph.* XVI p. 234)[1]. It represents the sailors as admitting that there is a *true* art of steering, which under certain circumstances it is possible to acquire. But this is precisely what they deny (see 488 B πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φάσκοντας μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι), nor could they possibly admit it, so long as they 'have not so much as a notion that the true Pilot should study the year and the seasons' etc. (488 D). Their solitary notion of an art of steering is how to get the helm into their hands (488 C πάντα ποιοῦντας ὅπως ἂν σφίσι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ and C, D ναυτικὸν μὲν καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικὸν —ὃς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ᾖ κτλ.). Moreover, even if they were to allow that there is an art of steering, they would certainly not allow that others possessed it rather than themselves: cf. *Pol.* 302 A, B. Nor, again, does Plato ever admit that the art of enforcing one's authority has anything whatever to do with the art of steering. In the *Politicus*, he is careful to point out that they are entirely distinct: see the passages referred to in the note.

[1] For another special discussion of the passage see Richter in *Fleckeisen's Jahrbuch*, 1867, p. 145.

Jowett and Campbell's explanation is somewhat different. They do not suppose that Plato himself means to attribute to the true pilot both knowledge and power to enforce his authority; but apparently agree with Ast that the false pilot admits the existence of a scientific κυβερνητική, which can be acquired by itself, but cannot be combined with the art of getting possession of the helm. This view is open to all except the last of the objections already noted.

Sidgwick and Richards both agree with Grote (*Plato* III p. 80) that Plato does not regard scientific κυβερνητική as involving the power to enforce one's authority as well as knowledge of steering. According to Richards, we should read ἀδύνατον instead of δυνατόν. "The crew deem it by no means as impossible as it really is that, while a man acquires κυβερνητική, he should at the same time acquire this other art" (viz. ὅπως κυβερνήσει, ἐάν τέ τινες βούλωνται ἐάν τε μή). This view is attractive in some ways, but the corruption of ἀδύνατον to δυνατόν is not a very probable one, and it would still seem to be implied that the crew admit the existence of a true art of steering, which is, under certain circumstances, capable of being learnt. If, with Sidgwick, we read οἰομένῳ, in agreement with αὐτῷ, this particular difficulty disappears. I formerly accepted Sidgwick's proposal, but there is force in Richards' criticism that "the sentence would be most clumsy in form, nor is it to the point what the true steersman thinks; Plato is describing the state of mind of the crew." δέ after ὅπως is also a difficulty.

On the whole, I am now inclined to think that Schneider's interpretation has the most numerous and important arguments in its favour, and for this reason I have adopted it in the notes.

II.

VI 492 E. οὐ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἄνοια. οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε· θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου.

I agree in the main with Schneider's view of this passage, which he translates—more freely than usual—as follows: "Denn keine Erziehung, o Freund, vermag oder vermochte oder wird auch vermögen der Erziehung dieser gegenüber ein Gemüth zur Tugend umzulenken, nämlich ein menschliches; das göttliche freilich müssen wir wie es im Sprichwort heisst, ausnehmen von unserer Rede." J. and C. (with Ast) connect πρὸς ἀρετήν with πεπαιδευμένον, comparing *Prot.* 342 D Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν—ἄριστα πεπαίδευνται and *Gorg.* 471 D εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι, but the adverbs make all the difference. Without an adverb Plato writes εἰς ἀρετὴν παιδεύειν (e.g. *Gorg.* 519 E). An entirely different explanation is given by Stallbaum and others. Stallbaum translates as follows: "neque enim indoles iuxta istorum erudita disciplinam neque fit neque facta est, nec vero unquam fiet *ad virtutem* (virtutis habita ratione) *aliusmodi* (ἀλλοῖον) humana quidem" etc. But (1) Plato is professedly giving a reason (οὔτε γὰρ

κτλ.) why it is the height of folly to attempt to teach a young man what is opposed to public opinion, and Stallbaum's translation gives no such reason: (2) παρά cannot mean 'iuxta' 'according to,' but only 'opposed to.' Stallbaum's view, which is as old as Ficinus, has been widely accepted, but no one has yet explained how παρά can be used for κατά.

The adherents of this erroneous view have also in many cases suspected the word ἀλλοῖον. Even if we adopt Schneider's explanation, ἀλλοῖον seems at first sight strange: should not Plato have written ἄμεινον, which Vermehren (*Pl. Stud.* p. 95) considers more natural? I think not, for Plato means to suggest that public opinion will not tolerate any kind of dissent, whether better or worse than itself, except the θεῖον ἦθος, which is a special example of the ἀλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετήν. Instead of ἀλλοῖον the following proposals have been made, all of them (except the last) on the mistaken assumption that παρά means κατά: (1) οὐκ ἀλλοῖον ('not alien to' Nägelsbach), (2) <ἄλλο ἢ> ἀλλοῖον ('other than alien to,' Hermann, who also suggests ἄλλο ἢ ὄνειδος for ἀλλοῖον ἦθος), (3) ἀξιόλογον (Vermehren), (4) ἀληθινόν (Richards). The last of these critics 'strongly suspects' that Plato also wrote κατὰ and not παρά.

III.

VI 498 D, E. οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἶδον γενόμενον τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ῥήματα ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ὡμοιωμένα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ὥσπερ νῦν, συμπεσόντα· ἄνδρα δὲ ἀρετῇ παρισωμένον καὶ ὡμοιωμένον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ, δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει ἑτέρᾳ τοιαύτῃ, οὔ πώποτε ἑωράκασιν κτλ.

The view which I take of this passage is new in some of its details, but Reinhardt had already pointed out that Plato is referring to Isocrates (*de Isocr. aem.* p. 39), and Dümmler has made it probable that the reference is specifically to the *Panegyricus* (probably published about 380 B.C.). The same general view is adopted by the French editors of Book VI (Espinas and Maillet), and was also held by Schneider, as appears from his translation "denn sie haben das jetzt aufgestellte niemals in der Wirklichkeit gesehen, sondern viel eher etwa solche Worte, sorgfältig mit einander in Gleichklang gebracht, nicht zufällig, wie diese, zusammengesetzt; einen Mann aber, der sich mit der Tugend in Einstimmung und Gleichklang gebracht so vollkommen wie möglich in Werk und Wort—haben sie niemals gesehen" etc. See also Hirmer *Entstehung u. Kompos. d. pl. Pol.* pp. 664, 665. Schneider appears to understand τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ῥήματα as referring only to what follows (ἐξεπίτηδες—συμπεσόντα), and the same view is apparently taken by Dümmler (*Chr. Beitr.* p. 14). That they refer more naturally to what precedes will hardly be denied, and γενόμενον—λεγόμενον is as good an example of παρομοίωσις as one could wish. Reinhardt (l. c.) supposes that τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ῥήματα means proposals for political reform, resembling Plato's ideal State, and on this ground holds

that it is the *Areopagiticus*, and not the *Panegyricus*, of which Plato is thinking. But Plato would hardly have compared any of Isocrates' political speeches to his own *Republic*, and the following words shew that the contrast is intended to be between mere vapouring rhetoricians and true Men. Nor is it likely that the *Republic* alludes to a work published so late as 354, the approximate date of the *Areopagiticus* (Christ *Litteraturgesch.* p. 297). The interpretation which I have given of τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ῥήματα appears to me exactly to suit ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ὥσπερ νῦν, συμπεσόντα. It is perfectly true, as Plato says, that the figure of παρομοίωσις is never deliberately aimed at by him; or, if it is, he has the good manners to conceal his art. Isocrates' ῥήματα, on the other hand, are correctly described as ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ὡμοιωμένα.

Davies and Vaughan completely miss the meaning of the passage when they translate "they have met with proposals somewhat resembling ours, but forced expressly into appearing of a piece with one another, instead of falling spontaneously into agreement, as in the present case." Jowett errs in much the same way, except that he seems to have suspected an allusion to the sophistical rhetoricians in ῥήματα—ὡμοιωμένα. The view adopted in J. and C.'s note is practically identical with that of D. and V.

IV.

VI 500 A. ἦ καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται, ἀλλοίαν τ' οὐ φήσεις αὐτοὺς δόξαν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἄλλα ἀποκρινεῖσθαι;

The reading of the best MSS ἦ καὶ—ἀλλοίαν τοι κτλ. is retained by Schneider and (with *v*'s change of τοι to τε) by Stallbaum and Hermann. On this view ἀλλοίαν δόξαν λήψεσθαι must be understood as denoting a *change* of opinion from the ἀλλοίαν δόξαν of 499E. But it is extremely awkward to suppose that the ἀλλοία δόξα is different in the two cases; nor can men be said to *change* an opinion which it is doubtful if they ever held. These difficulties have led Hermann to read ἀλλ' οἷαν τοι (with Stephanus and some inferior MSS) in 499E, understanding λογιζόμενος before οἷαν τοι—surely a strange ellipse, and otherwise an insufficient remedy. ἀλλ' οἷαν τοι in 499E was also adopted by Ast, with other changes much too extensive to need refutation, though supported in part by the reading of inferior MSS. There should be no doubt that ἀλλοίαν τοι in the earlier passage is sound. In 500A Jowett proposes to read ἦ καί, joining καί and οὕτω, and placing a full stop after ἀποκρινεῖσθαι. A similar view was held by Ast. But καί could hardly be taken with οὕτω, and ἦ καὶ would strike every reader as the usual particle of interrogation. ἦ γάρ (interrogative), which Vermehren conjectures (*Pl. Stud.* p. 98), is highly improbable. I formerly read ἦ οὐκ, and altered τοι to τε. ἦ οὐκ is favoured also by Campbell, but the authority for the negative—*q* and Flor. U—is extremely slight, and Baiter's emendation accounts more easily for the reading of the oldest MSS. The retention of καί 'even' is also an improvement: if a negative had been used, we should have expected rather οὐδέ than οὐκ.

V.

VI 501 A, B. *Ἔπειτα, οἶμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἑκατέρωσε ἀποβλέποιεν πρός τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, ξυμμιγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον κτλ.*

My view of this passage agrees closely with that of Schneider (see his translation pp. 169, 303) except that I think it is better to translate *ἀνδρείκελον* by the 'colour and likeness of true Manhood,' rather than by "die Farbe des Menschen," so as to bring out the double signification of the word (see on *γράφειν νόμους* 501 A). Schneider formerly denied that *ἀνδρείκελον* meant anything beyond "imago hominis," but he retracts this view in his *Additamenta* (p. 49) and Translation.

Schneider's text is followed also by Baiter. The majority of editors prefer *καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν ξυμμιγνύντες* κτλ. (see *cr. n.*). In that case we must emend and write either *ἐμποιοίη τε* (Schleiermacher) or *καὶ ἐμποιοῖεν* (Ast), or *ἀποβλέποντες* instead of *ἀποβλέποιεν* (Stallbaum), or something else to the same purpose. Hermann and J. and C. ignore the difficulty altogether. But even with such an emended text, the sense is faulty; for the legislator who starts with a *tabula rasa* need not trouble about *τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δίκαιον* etc. His constitution is not a compromise between for example Athens and the World of Ideas, but something as near the latter as the limitations of earthly existence will allow—in other words such a polity as is described in the *Republic*. The Philosopher-king is not the man to paint an imperfect picture, though he knows that it will be but a picture after all.

Burnet prints *ἔπειτα—πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖν' αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, κτλ.* This emendation appears to me to deprive *ἑκατέρωσε* of all meaning and point.

VI.

VI 503 C. *Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἅμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας οἷοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσιν, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται.*

Such is the reading of A and Π: and none of the other MSS have any variant worth discussing.

Of the qualities named, the following appear in the description of the philosophic character (485 C—487 A): *εὐμάθεια, μνήμη, μεγαλοπρέπεια.* It is also clear that *οἷοι κοσμίως—ζῆν* represents *σωφροσύνη* (485 E). *ἀγχίνοι* and *ὀξεῖς* certainly refer to intellectual qualities, as appears from their combination with *εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες*, and with *ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται*: cf. also *Theaet.* 144 A. *νεανικοί* 'spirited' has af-

finities with ἀνδρεῖοι (486 B—487 A), but Vermehren (*Pl. Stud.* pp. 98—103) is mistaken in holding that the two notions are identical.

According to Schneider, who retains the reading of the MSS, εὐμαθεῖς—μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας forms the predicate, the subject being οἷοι—ζῆν. This interpretation gives the right sense, but is otherwise forced and unnatural in the last degree. Moreover, if οἷοι is the subject, we can scarcely dissociate οἱ τοιοῦτοι from it, and even on Schneider's view οἱ τοιοῦτοι refers to εὐμαθεῖς—διανοίας.

Stallbaum prints a comma after φύεσθαι, and understands Plato to mean that a combination of the intellectual virtues enumerated in εὐμαθεῖς—ὀξεῖς is itself rare, as well as the union of spirit and sobriety. Such a view, even if grammatically possible, is certainly awkward; and we have every reason to suppose that Plato did not consider the union of kindred intellectual qualities as in any way exceptional. It is the union of certain intellectual and moral virtues with certain other moral virtues which he considers rare: cf. *Theaet.* 144 A, B, the whole of which passage is important for the understanding of Plato here.

Others, such as Vermehren l.c. and J. and C., suppose that οἷοι—ζῆν is a consequence of νεανικοί—μεγαλοπρεπεῖς. This is however (as Shorey points out *A. J. Ph.* XVI p. 236) opposed to every statement made by Plato on the subject. The opposition between θυμοειδές, νεανικόν, ἀνδρεῖον (by which is meant, in this particular contrast, the active side of Courage) and πρᾶον, κόσμιον, σῶφρον etc., is regarded by him as the fundamental antithesis of human character: see for example II 375 C, III 399 C, 410 D, *Pol.* 306 C ff., 307 C, 309 E, 311 B, *Tim.* 18 A and *Laws* 731 B. We have no right to hide this fact by explaining away νεανικόν. The word means 'full of youthful vigour,' 'spirited,' and nothing more. νεανικόν is of course a constituent factor in ἀνδρεῖον, but it is not identical with it, nor do any of the passages which Vermehren cites (*Theaet.* 168 C, *Rep.* 425 C, 491 E, 563 E, *Lys.* 204 E, *Alc.* 104 A) prove any such identity. Still less does the word mean "generous" (J. and C.), or "kräftig, mannhaft, und *sittlich tüchtig*" (Vermehren).

We may therefore be certain that νεανικοί—μεγαλοπρεπεῖς is opposed to οἷοι—ζῆν. The MS reading will admit of this only if we construe φύεσθαι with οἷοι, and suppose that καὶ νεανικοί—διανοίας is added parenthetically as a sort of afterthought. This was Schleiermacher's view, and it is also one of J. and C.'s alternatives. It is certainly right in sense, but the construction is intolerably ambiguous and awkward (cf. Susemihl, *Gen. Entw.* II p. 191 *n.*).

Various solutions are possible. I formerly (with Heindorf on *Theaet.* 144 A) transposed καί, reading φύεσθαι νεανικοί—καὶ οἷοι κτλ. Heindorf's remedy is however not quite satisfactory, because it lays all the stress upon the difficulty of finding the two opposite kinds of *moral* qualities united with intellectual sagacity, whereas—as appears from the next sentence—the relevant point is that intellectual vivacity and acumen are seldom found along with *one* of the two phases of moral character, viz. sobriety and stedfastness. For this reason I now venture on the transposition printed in the text. It is worthy of note that in two places where the scribe of A omitted a passage of some length,

without the excuse of homoioteleuton, the number of letters is 41 and 39. (See *cr. nn.* on 504 D, X 601 A and *Introd.* § 5). Here it is 40. καὶ νεανικοί—διανοίας *may* of course be an interpolation, but it is more likely to be an omitted line or lines wrongly replaced.

VII.

VI 507 B. καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, πάλιν αὖ καὶ ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου, ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης, τιθέντες, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν.

The difficulties of this sentence have hardly received sufficient attention at the hands of editors.

If κατ' ἰδέαν—the reading of all the MSS—is genuine, what is the grammatical object of τιθέντες?

Two possibilities suggest themselves. One is to understand ἕν or the like, as parallel to αὐτὸ καλόν and αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. This view is apparently adopted by Schneider, who translates "Und dann ein schönes selbst und ein gutes selbst und so bei allem, was wir dort als vieles setzten, wiederum *eins* nach der angenommenen Einheit des Begriffs eines jeden setzend nennen wir jedes das, was ist." Stallbaum seems to have taken a similar view, although his note is not quite explicit. But it is so difficult to supply ἕν as an object to τιθέντες that we must, I think, reject this interpretation altogether. The second and more plausible alternative is—with Prantl, and the English editors and translators—to regard the object of τιθέντες as identical with that of ἐτίθεμεν. But κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν τιθέντες is far from clear. τιθέντες ought clearly to be understood in the same sense as ἐτίθεμεν, and the whole phrase should express the antithesis of ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν. We are hardly justified in translating τιθέναι κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν as 'reduce to a single form' (D. and V.) or 'bring under a single idea' (Jowett), although the phrase might possibly here mean 'regard as belonging to one Idea.' If κατ' ἰδέαν is sound, the least unsatisfactory course is perhaps to print a colon after ἐτίθεμεν, and explain thus: 'reversing our procedure, we view them as falling under a single Idea of each,...and call each that-which-*is*': i.e. for example δίκαιον, σῶφρον etc., each of which we took as πολλά, we now regard as belonging to or falling under one Idea of δίκαιον, one of σῶφρον etc. But neither this interpretation nor any other which I can devise (such as 'regard according to' or 'in the light of' one Idea of each) furnishes a thoroughly clear and simple sense, or a satisfactory antithesis to ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν. The only suitable contrast is that between the one Idea itself and the πολλά. For this reason I have ventured to replace κατ' by καί. The occurrence of τὰς δ' αὖ ἰδέας in the next sentence is also, so far as it goes, in favour of the proposed correction.

If we read καί for κατά, we ought certainly (with Bosanquet) to take ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον as a secondary predicate after προσαγορεύομεν. The translation "we call each 'that-which-is'" (Schneider and others) is grammatically possible and even necessary, I think, if κατά is retained; but it will scarcely be denied that ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, taken by itself, is

most easily and naturally understood as the generalised form of the idiom ὃ ἔστιν καλόν, ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν etc. If so, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον is an additional reason for reading καί instead of κατά. We postulate 'one Idea of each' and call it 'what each is.' The balance between ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου and ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον could not be more precise.

In order to provide an object for τιθέντες, I formerly read ἕκαστον, instead of ἑκάστου, but the correction now suggested appears to me better and more likely to be right.

VIII.

VI 507 D, E. Τὴν δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι προσδεῖται; Πῶς; Ἐνούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χρόας ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα, ὅτι ἥ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται τά τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα.

The MSS have no variant of any consequence.

Schneider boldly understands αὐτοῖς as τοῖς ὄμμασιν, referring to *Tim.* 67 C ff., where it is virtually said that Colour, in an act of Sight, ἐμπίπτει εἰς τὴν ὄψιν. But a careful study of the analysis of Sight in the *Timaeus* will shew that Schneider's view is not supported by that dialogue. If ἐν αὐτοῖς = ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασιν, it is clear from the rest of the sentence that Plato thinks Colour may be present in the eyes even where there is no light. But in the *Timaeus* Colour does *not* ἐμπίπτειν εἰς τὴν ὄψιν when light is absent: see 45 C with Archer-Hind ad loc. The fact is that both in the *Timaeus* and in the *Republic* Colour is regarded as inherent in things and not in the eyes: see *Tim.* 67 C χρόας ἐκαλέσαμεν, φλόγα τῶν σωμάτων ἑκάστων ἀπορρέουσαν and *Rep.* 508 C ὧν ἂν τὰς χρόας τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ.

By Schmelzer and the Oxford editors, αὐτοῖς is interpreted as τοῖς ὁρατοῖς "from τοῦ ὁρατοῦ supra." Plato certainly allows himself great latitude in matters of this kind, but not, I think, where the result would be that he must inevitably be misunderstood; and even an intelligent reader might here be forgiven if he referred αὐτοῖς to τοῖς ὄμμασιν.

Various corrections have been proposed. ἐν αὖ τοῖς <ὁρατοῖς> is Richards' conjecture; but Plato is careful throughout this whole discussion to use ὁρατόν only in the singular, as a general term for the visible: cf. 508 C, 509 D (bis). For 'things seen' he uses ὁρώμενα 507 C, 508 A, 508 C, 510 D. On this account ἐν αὖ τοῖς <ὁρωμένοις> or (better) ἐν αὐτοῖς <τοῖς ὁρωμένοις> appears to me preferable, if the passage is to be emended on these lines.

In *Cl. Rev.* XIII p. 99 I ventured to submit another emendation. It will be observed that in the latter part of the sentence Plato treats the colours themselves as the objects of vision (τά τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα), without alluding to the visible objects in which the colours inhere. Cf. also *Tim.* 67 C ff., and Arist. *de An.* II 7. 418^{a} 26 ff. Hence I proposed to read παρούσης δὲ χρόας, ἓν αὐτοῖς ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται κτλ., i.e. 'unless they' (viz. ἡ ὄψις and χρόα s. τὰ χρώματα) 'are re-

inforced by *one* genus—making three in all—specially adapted by Nature for this very purpose, you are aware that Sight will see nothing and the colours will be invisible.' The order of words recalls ὃ ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον above, and the position of ἕν may perhaps be defended as calling special attention to this *one* thing without which an act of sight is altogether impossible, and as inviting Glauco's question τίνος δή—τούτου; Morgenstern retained ἐν αὐτοῖς and connected it with the following clause, but ἐν does not go well with παραγένηται, and the emphasis on ἐν αὐτοῖς is excessive.

Other suggestions are ἐφ' ᾗ ἔστι for ἐν αὐτοῖς (Biehl *Die Id. d. Guten* p. 52), [ἐν] αὐτοῖς (Stallbaum) and ἐπ' αὐτοῖς (Ast).

If we might venture to read παρούσης δὲ χρόας, ἐὰν (or ἣν) αὐτοῖς μὴ παραγένηται κτλ., all difficulty would disappear. Meantime, as none of the remedies hitherto suggested is convincing, I have thought it safest to retain the MS reading, understanding αὐτοῖς perforce as τοῖς ὁρωμένοις. The interesting analysis of Sight in *Theaet.* 156D ff. is unfortunately of no use for emending the present passage.

IX.

VI 508 D, E. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι, αἰτίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσει.

So A reads. The only important variant is διὰ νοῦ (Ξ *v* and several other MSS) for διανοοῦ.

Jowett and Campbell, following Schneider and Hermann, retain the text of A, and translate as follows: "This then, which imparts truth to the things that are known and gives to the knower the power of knowing, is what I would have you call the idea of good: and this you will deem to be the cause of knowledge and of truth so far as the latter is known: but fair as are both these, knowledge and truth, you will be right in thinking that it is something fairer than these." μέν is explained as belonging strictly to αἰτίαν and "opposed to the following δέ: the idea of good is indeed (μέν) the cause of knowledge and truth, but (δέ) it is other and fairer than they." Schneider's explanation and translation differs hardly at all from that of the Oxford editors.

The above rendering is open to grave objections both on the score of grammar and of sense. διανοεῖσθαι can hardly be used with a participle (οὖσαν) without ὡς: and ὡς γιγνωσκομένης surely cannot mean '*so far as* known.' It is also, to say the least, extremely difficult to explain the position of μέν. διὰ τὸν ἐγγεγονότα μὲν ἔρωτα, which Schneider (*Addit.* p. 51) cites from X 607E, is a very remote parallel. Nor is there any point, so far as I can discover, in saying that the Idea of the Good is the cause of truth *so far as truth is known.* The Idea of the Good is the cause of all Truth, known and unknown. And

there is no echo of any such limitation in the analogous description of Light.

For these and other reasons, Schneider's explanation is, in my opinion, untenable. Nor can I devise any other reasonable solution without altering the text. Of emendations there is, as usual, no lack.

The smallest change is to read διὰ νοῦ, with Ξ etc. and the editors down to Bekker. But the construction remains extraordinarily obscure. Few will agree with Schmelzer in construing ἡγούμενος δὲ (τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν) αἰτίαν ἐπιστήμης—νοῦ, ἡγούμενος δὲ οὕτω καλῶν κτλ. Other proposals are (1) to omit μέν (Stephanus, who also suggests that a clause may be lost), (2) δι' αὐτοῦ (viz. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) for διανοοῦ (Nägelsbach), (3) to omit αἰτίαν—διανοοῦ or ὡς—διανοοῦ, in the latter case reading γ' for δ' after αἰτίαν (Ast), (4) to transpose and read φάθι εἶναι, ὡς γιγνωσκομένην μὲν διὰ νοῦ, αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας (van Heusde), (5) to cancel ὡς—ἡγήσει as a gloss (Stallbaum), (6) to read δι' for δέ after αἰτίαν and διὰ νοῦ for διανοοῦ (Richter *Fleck. Jb.* 1867 p. 143). Of these suggestions (1) is inadequate; (2) and (6) only make matters worse; (3) and (5) fail to provide a parallel to ὁρᾶται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης (sc. τῆς ὄψεως) in 508 B, and are also in themselves too drastic. Van Heusde's solution, which (in common with Baiter) I formerly adopted, gives a good sense, if ὡς be taken principally with the δέ clause ('as being the cause of Knowledge and Truth, although it is itself known by means of Reason'). But it is impossible to assign any probable motive for so serious a dislocation of the text of the MSS. The usual devices of homoioteleuton and the accidental omission of a line in the archetype fail us here. See *Introd.* § 5.

The explanation given in the notes is, I think, satisfactory in point of sense, and assumes no corruption except that of γιγνωσκομένην to γιγνωσκομένης—a natural error after ἀληθείας. I now regard it as much more probable than Van Heusde's solution (see his *Init. Phil. Pl.* ed. 1842 p. 388 *n.*).

X.

VI 511 A. εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις.

The difficulties of this sentence are familiar to all students of Plato. After much consideration, I believe the text to be sound, and the meaning to be as explained in the notes.

In *J. Ph.* x p. 76 Bywater objects to taking ἀπεικασθεῖσιν as 'copied' or 'imitated,' urging that it must refer to the actual copies themselves. In order to obtain this meaning, he would read ὑποκάτω for ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω, and explain ὑποκάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν as the 'sensible *copies*, and not the (intelligible) originals,' i.e. as *CD* and not *CE*. But (1) on this view αὐτοῖς loses its force, and (2) αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἃ πλάττουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσίν, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι in 510 E and τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν in 510 B (where see note) prove that ἀπεικασθεῖσιν means not 'copies' but 'copied.'

It is true that this sense of ἀπεικασθέντα is extremely rare, but *Tim.* 48 C furnishes a close parallel, and εἰκασθέντος in *Phaedr.* 250 B (quoted by J. and C.) certainly means 'copied.' In this passage ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω, and ἀπ- in ἀπεικασθεῖσι (combined with the play on εἰκόσι), as well as the precise parallel in 510 E, would make it impossible for a Greek to mistake Plato's meaning. Stallbaum's explanation ("formae rerum adspectabilium intelligibiles, sive abstractae ab ipsis rebus et una mentis cogitatione conceptae, quae a rebus inferioribus, i.e. concretis, tanquam similitudine expressae sunt") is in my judgment wholly wrong: see below. Liebhold's conjecture ἀπό for ὑπό would make the higher segment a copy of the lower! His further proposal, to read αὐταῖς (viz. ταῖς ὑποθέσεσιν) ὁμοίως τοῖς κτλ. plunges everything into hopeless confusion. The explanation which I have given of this part of the sentence agrees with that of Schneider and the Oxford editors.

καὶ ἐκείνοις is also undeniably difficult; but κἀκεῖ (proposed by Bywater l.c.) is hardly less so; and we are certainly not justified in transposing αὐτοῖς and ἐκείνοις, as Richards proposes to do. Should we perhaps punctuate ἀπεικασθεῖσι καὶ ἐκείνοις, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα κτλ., and understand καὶ ἐκείνοις as only 'et illis,' 'illis quoque' as in *Symp.* 212 A καὶ εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων, ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ? The objects in *CD* are 'also' copied by those in *AD*, exactly as the νοητόν is by *CD* (510 A).

If δεδοξασμένοις is not 'valued,' it can only mean 'opined,' and we must translate either (1) 'being opined and honoured as palpable,' or else (2) 'being opined as palpable' ("für wirklich gehalten" Schneider), 'and honoured accordingly.' If we adopt the second alternative, ὡς ἐναργέσι belongs only to δεδοξασμένοις: but τε καί strongly suggests that ὡς ἐναργέσι was meant to be taken also with the second participle. The first alternative remedies this defect, but is hardly less unsatisfactory than the second. For ὡς ἐναργέσι must then mean one thing with δεδοξασμένοις, and another with τετιμημένοις—'opined as palpable,' i.e. 'opined *to be* palpable' and 'honoured as palpable,' i.e. 'honoured *because* they are palpable.' Or is δεδοξασμένοις used absolutely, in the sense of 'the objects of opinion'? If so, this particular difficulty disappears, and Plato means that the contents of *CD* are the 'objects of opinion' (and not of some inferior ἕξις) because they are ἐναργῆ, and honoured for the same reason. The sentence would then prepare us for the distinction to be presently drawn between δόξα and εἰκασία (511 E). This interpretation is perhaps the least vulnerable, if δεδοξασμένοις can mean no more than 'opined,' but it is too subtle and obscure.

A wholly different explanation is given by Stallbaum, and adopted by D. and V. Stallbaum understands ἐκεῖνα as the objects contained in *CE*, compared with which, those in *DC* are 'vulgarly esteemed distinct and valued accordingly.' On this view ὡς would hint that the objects in *DC* are not in reality, compared with those in *CE*, ἐναργῆ: and the same insinuation would be still further emphasized by δεδοξασμένοις ('opined' as opposed to 'known'). This interpretation is possible so far as the Greek is concerned, except that ἐκεῖνα can hardly mean anything but *AD*. Nevertheless, even if we allow that ἐκεῖνα could refer

to *CE*, an allusion to the popular prejudice in favour of materialism would be out of place in a scientific classification of τὰ ὄντα in their order of 'clearness.' And Plato has already shewn a tendency to introduce the shadow segment at each stage "in order to make it quite clear at each step how the whole classification coheres" (Bosanquet): hence τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν (510 B) and ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσίν (510 E). Finally, the whole description in τοῦτο—ἀπεικασθεῖσιν passes first from *CE* to *DC*, and then from *DC* to *AD* (ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω), and a return to *CE* in the last clause of the sentence, such as Stallbaum supposes, would be artistically unpleasing.

XI.

VI 511 C, D. ὅτι μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοίᾳ μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰσθήσεσιν αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι, καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετ' ἀρχῆς.

The ordinary view of the last clause of this sentence appears to be "obwohl es in Verbindung mit dem Anfange denkbares ist" (Schneider: cf. Jowett's "although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason"). Some of the difficulties which this translation involves are pointed out by Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 141). The most serious of them is that it makes Plato imply that the objects of mathematical study as pursued by mathematicians are not νοητά, whereas he has repeatedly said that they are (see note ad loc.). It may be urged on the other hand that we ought not to take the words too strictly, and that νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι prepares us for taking νοητῶν in a narrower sense than it has hitherto had. But νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν is a different thing from the assertion that the objects are not νοητά, for νοῦς is expressly limited by Plato to the higher intellectual method throughout the whole of this passage, διάνοια being used for the lower, as the next sentence carefully explains. In a passage expressly occupied with defining terms, Plato is not, I think, likely to have contradicted himself within a single sentence, by first saying that μαθηματικά (as ordinarily studied) are νοητά and afterwards implying that they are not. μετ' ἀρχῆς is also far from clear on the ordinary view, for (1) the use of the preposition is obscure, unless something like λαμβανομένων is understood, and (2) it is not easy to interpret ἀρχῆς of the ἀρχὴ κατ' ἐξοχήν, i.e. the Good, just after we have been told that μαθηματικά possess ἀρχαί of their own (αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί). It may be said that ἀρχήν in ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες is the Good. So no doubt it is, from Plato's point of view; but we should translate this also 'a beginning,' for the contrast is between the dialectician who *ascends* (ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες) to an ἀρχή and the mathematician who does not, but nevertheless has one (without ascending) in his ὑπόθεσις.

On these grounds I am unable to accept what seems to be the current interpretation. Campbell appears to take *νοητὰ μετ' ἀρχῆς* as a single phrase denoting a special sort of *νοητά* ("while not absolute *νοητά*, they are *νοητὰ μετ' ἀρχῆς*" Vol. II p. 16). This is certainly better than Jowett's view, but linguistically it is a little harsh, and in point of fact the higher *νοητά* (except of course the Good itself) are also *νοητὰ μετ' ἀρχῆς*, for *μετ' ἀρχῆς* cannot be construed 'with a *hypothetical ἀρχή*.' The interpretation which is given in the notes agrees with that of Prantl, and (if I understand him rightly) Krohn. It is, in my opinion, the only natural meaning of the Greek, and what Plato, if Plato wrote the words, intended to say.

The explanation of this clause is a matter of some importance because, if Schneider's translation is right, it would appear that *μαθηματικά* can, under certain circumstances, be apprehended by the higher noetic process, and on this an argument might conceivably be founded for identifying them with Ideas. In App. I to Book VII I have tried to shew that Plato himself distinguishes no less clearly between the contents of the two higher segments of the line than Aristotle assures us that he did. In reality however the present sentence does not affect the question either way.

The use of *καίτοι* is so strange that some may be inclined to suspect interpolation. It is noticeable that *καίτοι* was often thus used by Plotinus (e.g. X 9. 490 init.). The clause could easily be spared, and may be spurious; but the evidence is not sufficient to justify its exclusion from the text.

Z.

I. Μετὰ ταῦτα δή, εἶπον, ἀπείκασον τοιούτῳ πάθει τὴν 514
ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας. ἰδὲ γὰρ

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514 A—**517** A *The following comparison represents our nature in respect of education and the absence thereof. Let us imagine a number of prisoners confined in a subterranean cave, and unable to see anything except shadows of images and other such objects, cast by the light of a fire. Such men will believe that shadows of manufactured things are the only truth. If they are released, and led up step by step towards the light, they will turn and flee back into the cave; but if we compel them to emerge, they will gradually grow accustomed to the brightness, and be able to gaze upon the Sun and understand his sovereignty in the domain of visible things. Pity for their former friends will then begin to mingle with joy at their own escape. Should they redescend into their former place, the darkness will at first affect their vision, and expose them to the laughter of the others, who will, it may be, lay hands upon their deliverer and slay him.*

514 A ff. The simile of the Cave presents us with a picture of the life of the uneducated man (*τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας* 514 A: cf. also 515 A). From this point of view it should be compared with *Theaet.* 172 C—177 C, and (in spite of the different situation) with *Phaed.* 109 A—E, where the equation is:—Depths of Ocean : Hollows of Earth = Hollows of Earth : The true Earth. Plato bids us connect the Cave with the Line (517 A), and does so himself (l.c., and 532 C). We have seen that the lower segment of the line (*A C*) is spoken of sometimes as *ὁρατόν*, sometimes as *δοξαστόν* (VI 510 B *n.*). Plato does not even now distinguish between the two terms; and since the *ἀπαίδευτος* is concerned with *τὸ δοξαστόν* in general rather than with *τὸ ὁρατόν* exclusively, we shall best apprehend Plato's meaning if we interpret the simile by the following proportion:—Cave : *ὁρατὸν s. δοξαστόν* = *δοξαστὸν s. ὁρατόν* : *νοητόν*. See on 517 A and App. I.

2 **ἰδὲ γὰρ κτλ.** Empedocles spoke of the terrestrial region as a cave (*ἠλύθομεν τόδ' ὑπ' ἄντρον ὑπόστεγον* 31 ed. Karsten), and similar expressions occur in the Orphic verses e.g. *ταῦτα πατὴρ ποίησε κατὰ σπέος ἠροειδές* (ap. Procl. *in Tim.* 95 D): see Rohde *Psyche*[2] II p. 178 *n.* and Dieterich *Nekyia* p. 159 *n.* There is however nothing to shew that Plato borrowed the underlying idea, much less the details, of his simile from any previous writer: for the metaphorical application of *ἄνω, ὑψόθεν* and kindred words in connexion with true *παιδεία* is a favourite usage of Plato's (cf. *Theaet.* 175 B, *Soph.* 216 C, *Phaed.* 109 A ff.), and the simile might easily have been elaborated from such a metaphor. For a strikingly eloquent imitation see Cic. *de nat. deor.* II 95 (translated from Aristotle: see *Frag.* 14. 1476[a] 34 ff.). With the life of the cave-dwellers Bosanquet aptly compares the account of uncivilized humanity in Aesch. *Prom.* 447—453. A kindred though not identical figure is employed in Fitzgerald's Omar Khayyám LXVIII: "We are no other than a moving row Of magic Shadow-shapes that come and go Round with the Sun-illumined Lantern held In Midnight by the Master of the Show."

ἀνθρώπους· οἷον ἐν καταγείῳ οἰκήσει σπηλαιώδει ἀναπεπταμένην πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχούσῃ, μακράν, παρ' ἅπαν τὸ σπήλαιον, ἐν ταύτῃ ἐκ παίδων ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς αὐχένας, 5
B ὥστε μένειν τε αὐτοῦ εἴς τε [1] τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὁρᾶν, κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν, φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς πυρὸς ἄνωθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν καόμενον ὄπισθεν αὐτῶν, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν δεσμωτῶν ἐπάνω ὁδόν, παρ' ἣν ἰδὲ τειχίον παρῳκοδομημένον, ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς πρὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόκειται 10

6. αὐτοῦ Hirschig: αὐτοὺς codd. τὸ $A^2\Xi q$: om. A^1.

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3 **ἀναπεπταμένην κτλ.** Herwerden suspects corruption, on the ground that the cave is dark, except for the light of the fire. But unless the *entrance* to the cave is open to the light of day, how are the prisoners ever to emerge, as they ultimately do (515 E)? The *εἴσοδος* is long (*μακρά*) and steep (515 E), so that the daylight cannot reach the cave in any case. Prantl is right, I think, in understanding *μακράν* of *length* and not width, although Schneider and the English translators apparently hold the other view. See next note.

4 **παρ' ἅπαν τὸ σπήλαιον** should (I believe) be taken separately from *μακράν*. The words define the *width* of the entrance, which is 'along the whole of,' i.e. 'as wide as,' the cave. The reason will appear later: see on *ὅρα τοίνυν* 514 B. The translation "extending along the entire length of the cavern" (D. and V.) seems to render *μακράν* altogether otiose. See Fig. ii on p. 65.

6 **μένειν τε αὐτοῦ.** See *cr. n.* Hirschig's emendation, which Cobet approves and Hermann and others adopt, I now think right. *μένειν* is not, I believe, used absolutely in the sense of *μένειν αὐτοῦ*, which is the meaning required here. It might be possible to understand *μένειν* as equivalent to *μένειν ἀκινήτους*, in view of *Crat.* 426 E and *Phaedr.* 261 D, but 'remain motionless' is not quite suitable in point of sense. Still less does the possible rendering 'remain by themselves' fit the situation. On the other hand *μένειν τε αὐτοῦ* 'remain where they are,' 'remain in one place' (cf. I 327 C, II 371 C), corresponds exactly to *ἐν δεσμοῖς τὰ σκέλη*, just as *εἴς τε τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὁρᾶν* echoes *ἐν δεσμοῖς τοὺς αὐχένας*. The *τε—τε* after *καὶ—καί* suggests that Plato intended this correspondence. There is nothing to be said for Herwerden's proposal to insert *ἀκινήτους*.

514 B 7 **ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ κτλ.** "Puerile interpretamentum" says Herwerden, quite superfluously. Hirschig's *ἀδυνατοῦντας* for *ἀδυνάτους* is no improvement. The word, like *ὄντας*, depends of course on *ἰδέ*. For *καόμενον*, Hirschig, with Cobet's approval, conjectures *καομένου*, and so Baiter also reads: but *καομένου* leaves *αὐτοῖς* out in the cold. "Vide ne *φῶς πυρὸς* ita in unam notionem coalescant, ut alterius attributum simul etiam alteri conveniat" Hermann. This explanation is correct: cf. 517 B.

9 **ἐπάνω ὁδόν.** *ἐπάνοδον* (Badham), which means 'ascensum,' is out of place here. *ἐπάνω* means only that the road is at a higher elevation than the prisoners (so also Schneider): it should not be taken with *ὁδόν* in the sense of a 'raised way' (Jowett). There is no reason why the *ὁδός* should be raised above the level of the ground, and it is unnecessarily harsh to construe the adverb with the noun. The fact that verbal nouns occasionally take an adverb in Plato (see on IV 434 C) does not justify Jowett's construction in this passage.

10 **ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς κτλ.** As in a Punch and Judy show. Cf. [Arist.] *de Mundo* 6. 398^b 16 ff. *οἱ νευροσπάσται μίαν μήρινθον ἐπισπασάμενοι ποιοῦσι καὶ αὐχένα κινεῖσθαι καὶ χεῖρα τοῦ ζῴου καὶ ὦμον καὶ ὀφθαλμὸν κτλ.* (Blümner, *Privatalterth.* p. 503 *n.* 5, where other references are given). I agree with the Oxford editors in holding that *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* denotes the performers, and not, as Schneider and others translate, the spectators. *οἱ ἄνθρωποι* could not, without further specification, stand for the spectators, and no further specification is given. But Jowett and Campbell are, I think, in error when they distinguish between the *θαυματοποιοί* and the *ἄν-*

τὰ παραφράγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν τὰ θαύματα δεικνύασιν. Ὁρῶ, ἔφη. Ὅρα τοίνυν παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τειχίον φέροντας ἀνθρώπους σκεύη τε παντοδαπὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ τειχίου καὶ ἀνδριάντας | καὶ ἄλλα ζῷα 515 λίθινά τε καὶ ξύλινα καὶ παντοῖα εἰργασμένα, οἷον εἰκός, τοὺς μὲν φθεγγομένους, τοὺς δὲ σιγῶντας τῶν παραφερόντων. Ἄτοπον, ἔφη, λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτόπους. Ὁμοίους ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τοὺς γὰρ τοιούτους πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων οἴει ἄν τι ἑωρακέναι ἄλλο πλὴν τὰς σκιὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ αὐτῶν τοῦ σπηλαίου προσπιπτούσας; Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ ἀκινήτους γε τὰς κεφαλὰς ἔχειν ἠναγκασμένοι | εἶεν διὰ βίου; Τί δέ; τῶν παραφερομένων οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο; Τί μήν; Εἰ οὖν διαλέγεσθαι οἷοί τ' εἶεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ ταῦτα ἡγεῖ ἂν τὰ

10. ταῦτα Ξq: ταὐτὰ A.

θρωποι, and suppose that the θαυματοποιός is "not the actual exhibitor or puller of the strings, but the master of the show." The ἄνθρωποι and the θαυματοποιοί are the same, and Plato might, if he had been so minded, have written ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς πρὸ ἑαυτῶν κτλ. The substitution of τῶν ἀνθρώπων for ἑαυτῶν puts the matter in a more objective way, and has also a contemptuous effect.

12 ὅρα τοίνυν κτλ. τοίνυν is 'also' (I 339 D *n.*). The low wall which crosses the εἴσοδος at a point between the prisoners and the fire intercepts the shadows of the παραφέροντες: but the σκεύη which they carry, presumably on their heads, overtop the wall, and are reflected on the wall of the cave in front of the prisoners. See Fig. ii on p. 65. Plato adopts various devices in order to suggest a due proportion between the objects inside and outside the cave in point of reality. Thus (1) the typical examples ἀνδριάντες etc. are themselves images of the natural objects of the superior ὁρατόν: (2) the originals of the Cave are all (except the prisoners themselves 515 A) σκευαστά, whereas those of the superior ὁρατόν are —primarily speaking—φυτευτά (for the significance of this see 532 C *n.*): (3) the contents of the Cave, both originals and shadows, may be regarded as less luminous and true than the ὁρατά outside, because they derive their light and truth, not from the Sun, but from an artificial Fire (see also on 517 C). The interpretation of the simile is to be sought in the δοξαστόν generally as well as in the ὁρατόν in particular (see on 517 A), but we need not suppose that every detail is significant. Comparisons have been made between the παραφέροντες and (in the ὁρατόν) δαίμονες (Campbell II p. 16, comparing *Tim.* 43), or (in the δοξαστόν) Sophists etc. (Shorey, *Idea of Good* etc. p. 238). The latter analogy is the more fruitful, but neither of them is altogether free from difficulty, and Plato may have intended the παραφέροντες only as part of the machinery of his similitude. If the Cave is to represent the world of τὰ πολλά, it must have a semblance of life and motion; and without the παραφέροντες the shadows would be motionless and dead.

515 A 2 οἷον εἰκὸς should be taken with what follows: cf. IV 419 A *n.*

3 φθεγγομένους merely prepares the way for 515 B εἰ καὶ ἠχὼ κτλ., and beyond this, it has, I think, no meaning. It certainly does not "prepare for the science of harmonics" (as J. and C. hold): see 532 B *n.* and App. I.

τῶν παραφερόντων (bracketed by Baiter) is natural enough, παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τειχίον φέροντας being too distant to cause difficulty.

515 B 8 τί δέ; τῶν παραφερομένων κτλ. After τοῦτο supply οἴει ἂν ἑωρακέναι αὐτούς. I have placed a mark of interrogation after τί δέ, in order that τῶν παραφερομένων may have its proper emphasis: cf. V 470 A *n.*

10 οὐ ταῦτα κτλ.: 'do you not suppose they would believe that they were

παριόντα αὐτοὺς νομίζειν ὀνομάζειν, ἅπερ ὁρῷεν; Ἀνάγκη. Τί δ'; εἰ καὶ ἠχὼ τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐκ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ἔχοι, ὁπότε τις τῶν παριόντων φθέγξαιτο, οἴει ἂν ἄλλο τι αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ φθεγγόμενον ἢ τὴν παριοῦσαν σκιάν; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.
C Παντάπασι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ | τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ 15
ἀληθὲς ἢ τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν λύσιν τε καὶ ἴασιν τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, οἵα τις ἂν εἴη, εἰ φύσει τοιάδε ξυμβαίνοι αὐτοῖς· ὁπότε τις λυθείη καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἐξαίφνης ἀνίστασθαί τε καὶ περιάγειν τὸν

11. παριόντα Flor. T: παρόντα AΞ *q.* τοιάδε *q* praebet εἴη φύσει τοιᾶδε, εἰ. 18. εἰ $A^2\Xi$: om. A^1. Pro εἴη, εἰ φύσει

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naming these particular passing objects which they saw?' They have never seen anything of the *real* παριόντα (or παραφερόμενα): therefore (οὖν) they suppose themselves to be naming, i.e. using the name of, not (as is in point of fact the case) the *real* παριόντα, but only *these* παριόντα which they see. For example, they call the shadow of a table 'a table,' and in so doing they are, without knowing it, naming, not, as they suppose, the shadow, but the substance. J. and C. remark that "παριόντα is rather confusing as it might signify either the shadows" (cf. 516 C) "or the realities" (cf. 515 D). True: but ταῦτα τὰ παριόντα, ἅπερ ὁρῷεν can signify *only* the shadows. The corruption παρόντα for παριόντα (see *cr. n.*) is easy, and occurs in some MSS at 516 C (where παριόντα again = παριοῦσαι σκιαί). Plato means (to interpret the allegory) that what the ἀπαίδευτος calls a substance is only a shadow. For other views of this sentence see App. IV.

12 **εἰ καὶ ἠχὼ κτλ.** The voices heard by the ἀπαίδευτος are as shadowy as the forms he sees: βλέποντες ἔβλεπον μάτην, | κλύοντες οὐκ ἤκουον, ἀλλ' ὀνειράτων | ἀλίγκιοι μορφαῖσι τὸν μακρὸν βίον | ἔφυρον εἰκῇ πάντα (Aesch *P. V.* 447—450).

515 C 15 **νομίζοιεν κτλ.** νόμος, not φύσις, is the watchword of ἀπαιδευσία.

16 **σκευαστῶν** is said by J. and C. to be "diminutive *images* of ordinary artificial objects," but the word does not convey this meaning. For the purposes of this simile σκευαστά are reckoned as less real than φυτευτά: see on ὅρα τοίνυν κτλ. 514 B and φαντάσματα θεῖα 532 C. Plato takes no account of the fact that the prisoners also see shadows of themselves (515 A).

17 **λύσιν κτλ.** According to 532 B (where see note), λύσιν—τῶν ἄλλων εἴδωλα (516 A) symbolizes Plato's προπαιδεία or inferior νοητόν.

18 **εἰ φύσει τοιάδε κτλ.** φύσει has been variously interpreted as follows. (1) 'φύσει est revera' (Ast, Stallbaum): (2) 'si res et natura ferret,' 'in the course of nature' (Schneider, J. and C., D. and V.): (3) 'φύσει, no one knows how' (Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II p. 260). None of these explanations is either linguistically easy or altogether suitable in point of meaning. It should be remembered that the condition of the prisoners, shut out as they are from light and truth amid the darkness of the Cave, is 'unnatural' (παρὰ φύσιν) in the Platonic sense of the word (see IV 443 B *n.*). Their release is therefore a return to their true nature, and may for this reason be described as 'natural.' This, I think, is what Plato means to suggest by φύσει. It is true, as we are presently told (515 E βίᾳ), that force has to be employed in order to drag the prisoners on high; but their deliverance is none the less 'natural' in Plato's way of thinking. Schleiermacher and Herwerden wish to read οἷα τις ἂν εἴη φύσει, εἰ τοιάδε κτλ. The fact that εἰ was omitted by A^1, and is absent from five other MSS, may appear to favour this conjecture. We might suppose that εἰ fell out by ὁμοιοτέλευτον after φύσει, disappeared altogether from several MSS, and was wrongly replaced in A. (The evidence of Π is unfortunately wanting here.) But on this view it is difficult to see what φύσει adds to οἷα τις ἂν εἴη, and for this and other reasons I prefer the solution which I have given.

20 αὐχένα καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἀναβλέπειν, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶν ἀλγοῖ τε καὶ διὰ τὰς μαρμαρυγὰς ἀδυνατοῖ καθορᾶν ἐκεῖνα, ὧν | τότε τὰς σκιὰς ἑώρα, τί ἂν οἴει αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τις αὐτῷ λέγοι, D ὅτι τότε μὲν ἑώρα φλυαρίας, νῦν δὲ μᾶλλόν τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα τετραμμένος ὀρθότερον βλέποι, καὶ δὴ καὶ
25 ἕκαστον τῶν παριόντων δεικνὺς αὐτῷ ἀναγκάζοι ἐρωτῶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἔστιν; οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸν ἀπορεῖν τε ἂν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ τότε ὁρώμενα ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα; Πολύ γ', ἔφη.

II. Οὐκοῦν κἂν εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζοι | αὐτὸν βλέ- E
πειν, ἀλγεῖν τε ἂν τὰ ὄμματα καὶ φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον πρὸς
30 ἐκεῖνα, ἃ δύναται καθορᾶν, καὶ νομίζειν ταῦτα τῷ ὄντι σαφέστερα τῶν δεικνυμένων; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Εἰ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐντεῦθεν ἕλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους καὶ μὴ ἀνείη πρὶν ἐξελκύσειεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἆρα οὐχὶ ὀδυνᾶσθαί τε ἂν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἑλκόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς | ἔλθοι, 516
αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα μεστὰ ὁρᾶν οὐδ' ἂν ἓν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν; Οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, ἐξαίφνης γε. Συνηθείας δή, οἶμαι, δέοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μέλλοι τὰ ἄνω ὄψεσθαι, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς

23. τι $A^2\Xi$: om. $A^1 q$. 24. καὶ δὴ καὶ Ξq: καὶ δὴ A. 25. ἕκαστον $A^2\Xi q$: ἕκαστων nisi fallor A^1. 33. ἀνείη A^1: ἀνίη $A^2\Pi\Xi$: ἀνίοι q.

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20 **τὸ φῶς** is the light of the fire (514 B): contrast *αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς* 515 D.

ἀναβλέπειν. *ἀνα-* is appropriate, for the fire is *ἄνωθεν* (514 B). Education always points upward in Plato (514 A *n.*).

515 D 23 **ἐγγυτέρω.** It is needless to add *<ὂν>*, as I formerly did (with Richards, who compares I 330 E). The copula is easily supplied, especially with *τετραμμένος* following.

24 **ὀρθότερον** and not *ὀρθότερα* (as seems to be generally believed, even by J. and C.) is the reading of A. The adverb ('more truly sees') can alone be justified. For the meaning see VI 490 B *n.*

βλέποι. The indicative *βλέπει* (which I formerly read, with *q*, Flor. U, Bekker and others) would be more usual, "in an indirect quotation depending on an optative which refers to the future" (Goodwin *MT.* p. 61). But the rule which excludes the optative in such cases is not absolute, as appears from Dem. 16. 5 (cited by Goodwin l.c.), and *ἔχοι* in VIII 544 A is in principle the same as *βλέποι* here. For the collocation of indicative (*ἑώρα*) with optative Schneider quotes *Phaed.* 96 B and 95 D.

καὶ δὴ κτλ. *ἀπορεῖν* is almost a technical term of Socrates' dialectic (cf. Xen. *Mem.* III 10. 7 and *Theaet.* 149 A ff.), but Plato has in mind the effect of his own *προπαιδεία*, as appears from 532 B, C.

515 E 29 **φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον κτλ.** As when a bewildered disputant takes refuge again in the fallacious position from which he has been dislodged: see I 334 B *n.* For *δύναται* Richards would read *δύναιτο*, comparing *ἅπερ ὁρᾷεν* in 515 B. *δύναται* treats the simile as a reality, exactly like *ἀμβλυώττει* in 516 E: compare also 538 A *n.*, and (for the construction) *Phaed.* 67 E *οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν, οἷ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπὶς ἔστιν οὗ διὰ βίου ἥρων τυχεῖν.*

31 **ἕλκοι κτλ.** Cf. *Theaet.* 175 B *ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὦ φίλε, ἑλκύσῃ ἄνω κτλ.* The alliteration of *ἀν-* (*ἀναβάσεως, ἀνάντους, ἀνείη, ἀγανακτεῖν*) should be noticed: see on 514 A. With *αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα κτλ.* we may compare *Theaet.* 175 D *βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων κτλ.*

516 A 4 **πρῶτον μὲν κτλ.** *πρῶτον μὲν—εἴδωλα* (the lower *ὁρατόν* of the line)

σκιὰς ἂν ῥᾷστα καθορῷ καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τά τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἴδωλα, ὕστερον δὲ αὐτά· ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν νύκτωρ ἂν ῥᾷον
B θεάσαιτο, προσβλέπων τὸ τῶν ἄστρων τε καὶ σελήνης | φῶς, ἢ μεθ' ἡμέραν τὸν ἥλιόν τε καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Τελευταῖον δή, οἶμαι, τὸν ἥλιον, οὐκ ἐν ὕδασιν οὐδ' ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἕδρᾳ φαντάσματα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν καθ' αὑτὸν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ χώρᾳ δύναιτ' ἂν κατιδεῖν καὶ θεάσασθαι οἷός ἐστιν. Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἤδη συλλογίζοιτο περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τάς τε ὥρας παρέχων καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ πάντα ἐπιτροπεύων τὰ ἐν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ
C τόπῳ καὶ ἐκείνων, ὧν | σφεῖς ἑώρων, τρόπον τινὰ πάντων αἴτιος. Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἂν μετ' ἐκεῖνα ἔλθοι. Τί οὖν; ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενον αὐτὸν τῆς πρώτης οἰκήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ σοφίας καὶ τῶν τότε ξυνδεσμωτῶν οὐκ ἂν οἴει αὐτὸν μὲν εὐδαιμονίζειν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τοὺς δὲ ἐλεεῖν; Καὶ μάλα. Τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ ἔπαινοι εἴ τινες αὐτοῖς ἦσαν τότε παρ' ἀλλήλων καὶ γέρα τῷ ὀξύτατα καθορ-
D ὥντι τὰ παριόντα καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα, ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ | ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ δυνατώτατα ἀπομαντευομένῳ τὸ μέλλον ἥξειν, δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτὸν ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ' ἐκείνοις τιμωμένους

13. οὗτος Π : αὐτὸς A.

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symbolizes the higher stages of Plato's *προπαιδεία*, and *ὕστερον δὲ αὐτά—οἷός ἐστιν* (the higher *ὁρατόν*) corresponds to the higher *νοητόν*. See 532 B, C *nn.* *αὐτά, τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ—νύκτωρ* and *τὸν ἥλιον* represent an ascending scale of Ideas up to the Good: cf. note on *τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου* VI 511 B. It may be doubted whether in point of fact the released prisoner would not be able to look on the heavens by night sooner than upon 'objects themselves' (*αὐτά*) by day. But the simile holds good in so far as the eye mounts ever higher: and the moon and stars are nearest to the sun (*ἡλιοειδῆ*, says Proclus *in remp.* I p. 294. 6 Kroll), which is the ultimate goal.

516 B 13 **συλλογίζοιτο κτλ.** should be interpreted by VI 509 B (the Good as the cause of Being). *οὗτος* is preferred by Stallbaum and others to *αὐτός* (see *cr. n.*), in which J. and C. find "a solemn emphasis." There is no difficulty about the repetition (*αὐτοῦ—αὐτός*), but *αὐτός* 'ipse' is less suitable here than the deictic *οὗτος*: cf. *αὕτη* in 517 C and VI 462 E *n.*

516 C 20 **τῷ ὀξύτατα καθορῶντι κτλ.** "Induction conceived as inference from particulars to particulars, its test being prediction (not explanation), and its method being association of images or unanalysed likenesses, by contiguity in co-existence or succession" Bosanquet. Plato is thinking chiefly of the empirical politician and political adviser, who foretells the future from the present and the past (cf. Thuc. I 22), but limits his intellectual horizon by his own experience, and knows nothing of the real determining causes of events. The vast majority of Athenian statesmen belonged in Plato's opinion to this category: see on V 473 C and VI 488 B.

22 **αὐτῶν** does not of course depend on *πρότερα* (as D. and V. translate), but is a partitive genitive after *ὅσα*.

τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας, ἢ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἂν πεπονθέναι καὶ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι ἐπάρουρον ἐόντα θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ, ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἂν πεπονθέναι μᾶλλον ἢ 'κεῖνά τε δοξάζειν καὶ ἐκείνως ζῆν; Οὕτως, | ἔφη, ἔγωγε οἶμαι, πᾶν μᾶλλον Ε πεπονθέναι ἂν δέξασθαι ἢ ζῆν ἐκείνως. Καὶ τόδε δὴ ἐννόησον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. εἰ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος καταβὰς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν θᾶκον καθίζοιτο, ἆρ' οὐ σκότους <ἂν> ἀνάπλεως σχοίη τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐξαίφνης ἥκων ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου; Καὶ μάλα γ', ἔφη. Τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιὰς ἐκείνας πάλιν εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν γνωματεύοντα διαμιλλᾶσθαι τοῖς ἀεὶ δεσμώταις ἐκείνοις, ἐν ᾧ ἀμβλυώττει, πρὶν | καταστῆναι τὰ ὄμματα, οὗτος δ' 517 ὁ χρόνος μὴ πάνυ ὀλίγος εἴη τῆς συνηθείας, ἆρ' οὐ γέλωτ' ἂν παράσχοι, καὶ λέγοιτο ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἀναβὰς ἄνω διεφθαρμένος ἥκει τὰ ὄμματα, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι ἄνω ἰέναι; καὶ τὸν

30. ὁ τοιοῦτος Π: ὅτι οὗτος A. 31. <ἂν> Baiter: om. codd.

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516 D 25 **τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου κτλ.** I formerly proposed to omit *πεπονθέναι*, but a precise parallel is furnished by *Symp.* 198 C *ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἐπεπόνθη*. *ἄν* makes *πεπονθέναι* equivalent to the future perfect—a more vigorous form of expression than the future (or aorist with *ἄν*) would be. The quotation (which is from *Od.* XI 489, cf. supra III 386 C) "has a curious felicity, being the words of Achilles in expressing his detestation of the world of shades (lit. shadows) in comparison with the world of human life" (Bosanquet). It is better, I think, to connect *ἄλλῳ* with *θητευέμεν* (Ameis on *Od.* l.c.) than with *παρά* (as Schneider does).

27 **καὶ ὁτιοῦν κτλ.** *ἄν* (which Richards would alter to *δή*) is as suitable here as before, since *ἂν πεπονθέναι* depends in both cases directly on *δοκεῖς*. The confusion of *ἄν* and *δή* is not so frequent as some have thought: see on V 450 C.

28 **δοξάζειν** = 'opine' is technical: for the cave is an allegory of *τὸ δοξαστόν* (514 A *n.*).

516 E 31 **ἄν.** See *cr. n.* and IV 437 B *n.* Stallbaum proposes *ἂν πλέως*, but Baiter's solution (which Cobet and Herwerden also recommend) is easier and better. *ἀνάπλεως* suggests contagion: see Ruhnken on Tim. *Lex.* s. v. **σχοίη** as usual is inchoative or ingressive ('get'): cf. 520 D and 527 B.

33 **γνωματεύοντα**: 'discriminating,' 'distinguishing,' 'judging,' as explained by the Scholiast (*διακρίνοντα, διαγιγνώσκοντα ἀκριβῶς*), Suidas and Timaeus (if with Ruhnken we read *γνωματεύοντα* for *γνωμονεύοντα*). A similar explanation appears in the margin of A (*γρ κρίνοντα γρ γιγνώσκοντ' ἀκριβῆ*). The word is derived of course from *γνῶμα* ('means of judging,' 'test'), for which see Jebb on Soph. *Tr.* 593. *γνωματεύω* occurs only here in good Greek, but became more frequent afterwards (for instances see Ruhnken in Tim. *Lex.* s. v.). Here, as J. and C. remark, it seems to be "used with some degree of contempt" (like *τευτάζω* in 521 E).

34 **ἀμβλυώττει.** For the mood see 515 E *n.* *ἀμβλυώττοι* occurs in *q* and Flor. U, and is read by Bekker and others. Herwerden adds *ἔτι* after *ἀμβλυώττει*, comparing 517 D, but the text is sound.

517 A 1 **οὗτος δ' ὁ χρόνος κτλ.** is still under the influence of *εἰ*. With *ἆρ' οὐ γέλωτ' ἂν κτλ.* cf. *Phaedr.* 249 D *ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος, νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθε τοὺς πολλούς*, *Theaet.* 172 C, 174 C—175 B, *Soph.* 216 D and infra 517 D.

4 **οὐκ ἄξιον κτλ.** The prisoners are almost relieved to find themselves able to suppress their higher promptings and sink back into indolence and self-complacency.

καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα κτλ. is a mani-

ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν, εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναιντο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι, ἀποκτείνειαν ἄν; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

III. Ταύτην τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, προσαπτέον ἅπασαν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν | λεγομένοις, τὴν μὲν δι' ὄψεως φαινομένην ἕδραν τῇ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου οἰκήσει ἀφομοιοῦντα, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει· τὴν δὲ ἄνω

6. καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι, ἀποκτείνειαν ἄν nos: καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν Α Π et (nisi quod ἀποκτιννῦναι scribit) *q*: καὶ ἀποκτιννύειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν Ξ. 10. αὐτῇ A^2Π: fortasse ἑαυτῇ A^1.

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fest and touching allusion to the death of Socrates, whose fate was the most conspicuous example in Greek history of the principle here laid down. See Zeller[4] II 1, pp. 223—227 and cf. VI 496 C, D *nn.* Read in the light of another and even more momentous sacrifice, the sentence assumes a kind of prophetical import, like the famous passage about the λόγος θεῖος in the *Phaedo* (85 C, D). See Geddes's *Phaedo of Plato* pp. 280—283. The text is difficult to determine. If we retain λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν, we must either (*a*) regard ἆρ' οὐ— λέγοιτ' ἄν as equivalent to ἆρ' οὐκ οἴει γέλωτ' ἂν αὐτὸν παρασχεῖν καὶ λέγεσθαι ἄν, and take λέγεσθαι ἄν as equivalent to ἐκείνους ἂν εἰπεῖν, carrying on ἐκείνους as subject to ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν (Schneider), or (*b*) supply οὐκ οἴει, although these words do not occur after 516 C (J. and C.). The second solution is preferable to the first, but either is a *tour de force.* No satisfactory explanation of the infinitive ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν appears to be possible, and the immediate juxtaposition of the two forms of the infinitive is also in itself suspicious. A few inferior MSS read ἀποκτενεῖν for the ἀποκτείνειν and αὖ for the ἄν of A: but otherwise there is no important variant. The emendations proposed are (1) λαβεῖν, κἂν ἀποκτείνειαν (Ast), (2) λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτείνοιεν ἄν (Stallbaum), (3) λαβεῖν, κἂν ἀποκτιννύοιεν (Cobet), (4) λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτείνειαν ἂν (Baiter). The correction in the text appears to me not only easier, but more in harmony with Plato's fulness of expression. I suppose that the error arose thus. A scribe accidentally omitted ἀποκτιννύναι, and the infinitive was wrongly replaced after, instead of before, ἀποκτείνειαν. This would give λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειαν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν, from which the change is inevitable to the text of A.

517 A—518 B *The simile of the Cave should be connected with the Line. The Cave is the visible world, the fire is the Sun, and the prisoners' journey towards the light resembles the ascent of the soul into the intelligible sphere, in which the Idea of Good reigns supreme. We need not wonder that the philosopher is unwilling to leave the light of thought for the darkness of practical affairs, or that he is dazed and confused when he does.*

7 **ταύτην κτλ.** If we interpret the lower section of the line as ὁρατόν and nothing more, the following comparisons are involved:—(1) Fire = Sun: (2) Shadows of ἀνδριάντες and other σκευαστά cast by Fire = Shadows etc. of φυτευτά and σκευαστά cast by the Sun: (3) ἀνδριάντες and other σκευαστά in the Cave = φυτευτά and σκευαστά in the ὁρατόν: (4) the ascent from the Cave into the ὁρατόν = the ascent from the ὁρατόν into the νοητόν. The second comparison is of little or no importance, for the ἀπαίδευτος, of whose condition the Cave is an allegory, does not contemplate exclusively or even principally natural shadows of φυτευτά and σκευαστά (cf. VI 511 E *n.*). Nor do the other comparisons exhaust the significance of the Cave as an allegory of ἀπαιδευσία. In order fully to apprehend its meaning, we must regard the lower section of the line as δοξαστόν in the sense of V 475 E ff. Plato himself does so: see VI 510 A *n.* The shadows and originals within the cave will then symbolise δόξαι which are respectively twice and once removed from the truth which they seek to portray (see on 517 D), and the ascent from the Cave into the ὁρατόν will represent the soul's ascent from the δοξαστόν into the νοητόν—from the πολλά (in the widest sense) to the ἕν. Cf. 514 B and 532 B, C *nn.*

ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεὶς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσει τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος, ἐπειδὴ ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀκούειν· θεὸς δέ που οἶδεν, εἰ ἀληθὴς οὖσα τυγχάνει. τὰ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι, ὀφθεῖσα δὲ | συλλογιστέα C εἶναι ὡς ἄρα πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, ἔν τε ὁρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τούτου κύριον τεκοῦσα ἔν τε νοητῷ αὐτὴ κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ. Ξυνοίομαι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγώ, ὅν γε δὴ τρόπον δύναμαι. Ἴθι τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τόδε ξυνοιήθητι καὶ μὴ θαυμάσῃς, ὅτι οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω ἀεὶ ἐπείγονται | αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ διατρίβειν· εἰκὸς γάρ που οὕτως, εἴπερ αὖ κατὰ D τὴν προειρημένην εἰκόνα τοῦτ' ἔχει. Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τόδε οἴει τι θαυμαστόν, εἰ ἀπὸ θείων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, θεωριῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπειά τις ἐλθὼν κακὰ ἀσχημονεῖ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοῖος ἔτι ἀμβλυώττων καὶ πρὶν ἱκανῶς συνήθης γενέσθαι τῷ παρόντι σκότῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί, καὶ διαμιλλᾶσθαι περὶ τούτου, ὅπῃ ποτὲ | ὑπολαμβάνεται ταῦτα E

17. αὐτὴ *q*: αὕτη ΑΞ: αὐτῇ (sic) Π.

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517 B **12** **ἐλπίδος**: 'surmise': cf. II 383 B *n.* The diffidence of tone recals VI 506 E: cf. infr. 523 A.

14 **φαίνεται.** For the construction cf. I 334 B *n.*

τελευταία as well as *μόγις* should be taken predicatively with *ὁρᾶσθαι*. The sentiment is as in VI 505 A (*ὅτι—ἴσμεν*), where see note.

517 C **17** **τεκοῦσα κτλ.** *τεκοῦσα* reminds us that the Sun is the *ἔκγονος* of the Good (VI 506 E). On *ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν* see VI 508 D *n.* *ὅτι δεῖ* depends on *φαίνεται*, not (as D. and V. translate) on *συλλογιστέα*. Cf. VI 505 A, 506 A *nn.* Plato's guardians are not to rest satisfied with the *εἰκών* or *ἔκγονος* of the Good; they must see the Good itself, and infer (not by intuition, but) by means of *reasoning* (*συλλογιστέα*) that it is the cause of all. See the notes on VI 511 B (*αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος* and *τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου*).

517 D **26** **ἀσχημονεῖ κτλ.** Cf. *Theaet.* 174 B, C *ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας—διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει—ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινὴ—γελοῖος φαίνεται.* The whole of the description of the *φιλόσοφος* in the *Theaetetus* should be carefully compared with this passage.

27 **ἔτι ἀμβλυώττων** is logically subordinate to *ἀναγκαζόμενος*.

29 **τῶν τοῦ δικαίου κτλ.** treats the Cave as an allegory of *δοξαστά* (see on VI 510 A, VII 517 A). The expression 'shadows of the just' is vague (cf. *σκιαμαχούντων* in 520 C), and *ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί* introduces more precision. We may regard *ἀγαλμάτων* as symbolising the enacted laws of a city, and their shadows as the "representation or misrepresentation of the existing laws (themselves only 'images' of justice) by a rhetorician or pleader" (Nettleship *Hell.* p. 141 *n.* 1). Compare (with Shorey *Idea of Good* etc. p. 287) *Soph.* 234 C and *Pol.* 303 C.

30 **ὅπῃ ποτὲ—ἰδόντων.** For the real

ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην μὴ πώποτε ἰδόντων; Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν
518 θαυμαστόν, ἔφη. Ἀλλ' εἰ νοῦν γε ἔχοι τις, | ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεμνῆτ' ἄν, ὅτι διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίγνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὄμμασιν, ἔκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς. ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομίσας γίγνεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, ὁπότε ἴδοι θορυβουμένην τινὰ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦσάν τι καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἂν ἀλογίστως γελῷ, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοποῖ ἄν, πότερον ἐκ φανοτέρου βίου ἥκουσα ὑπὸ ἀηθείας
B ἐσκότωται, ἢ ἐξ ἀμαθίας πλείονος εἰς φανότερον | ἰοῦσα ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἂν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου, τὴν δὲ ἐλεήσειεν, καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπ' αὐτῇ βούλοιτο, ἧττον ἂν καταγέλαστος ὁ γέλως αὐτῷ
εἴη ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ ἄνωθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἡκούσῃ. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγεις.

IV. Δεῖ δή, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ· τὴν παιδείαν οὐχ οἵαν τινὲς ἐπαγγελλόμενοί φασιν εἶναι,

9. εὐδαιμονίσειεν *q*: εὐδαιμονήσειεν ΑΠΞ.

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point at issue is not the law, but the judges' interpretation thereof. Plato is doubtless thinking of Socrates and his judges throughout the whole of this passage.

518 A 7 **φανότερον** ('greater brightness,' 'more light') and λαμπροτέρου are neuter. The omission of articles elevates the style. Richards would delete ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου, but the words balance ὑπὸ ἀηθείας exactly as ἐσκότωται balances μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται ('has been dazzled'). Any stronger antithesis than ὑπὸ ἀηθείας would give a false meaning, for the blindness is not caused by σκότος, but only by ἀήθεια: ξυνεθιζόμενοι γὰρ μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ κτλ. (520 C).

518 B 10 **εἰ γελᾶν κτλ.** Cf. *Theaet.* 175 B, D. There is more of pity than of malice in Plato's philosophic smile.

518 B—**521** B *It follows that Education is not a way of putting knowledge into empty souls, but a revolution of the Reason or organ of Knowledge, whose gaze must be directed upon Being and the brightest part thereof, which is the Good. The entire soul turns round along with Reason in this revolution. Other virtues are secondary and adventitious, but Reason never loses its power, and works weal or woe, according as it is or is not converted by means of Education. The best natures in our city, after they have ascended to the Good, must rejoin the prisoners whom they have left. To force them thus to redescend, may seem unjust; but Law seeks to make the whole city prosperous rather than a single class. And indeed it is also just that they should thus repay their country for having reared and educated them. They will themselves admit the force of our demands, and take their turn in the work of government, not eagerly, but as a necessity. We have seen that a well governed city is impossible unless a life better than that of ruling is open to its rulers, and the life of true philosophy is better.*

518 B ff. Nothing that Plato has bequeathed to us is more valuable than his theory of education as developed in this part of the *Republic*, and there is probably nothing in the whole range of educational literature, ancient or modern, which takes so far-reaching and profound a view of the aim and scope of education, or is so well fitted to inspire the teacher with indomitable courage and inextinguishable hope. See on 518 C and App. II.

13 **αὐτῶν**: 'the subject before us': cf. VI 511 C, and αὐτό in I 339 E *n.*

14 **ἐπαγγελλόμενοι κτλ.** ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι of sophistic 'professions' is almost technical: cf. e.g. *Prot.* 319 A, *Gorg.* 447 C and Isocr. *Soph.* 1. τινές from its

τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. φασὶ δέ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπι- C
στήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθέναι, οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέντες.
Φασὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. Ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σημαίνει ταύτην
τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἑκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον, ᾧ κατα-
μανθάνει ἕκαστος, οἷον εἰ ὄμμα μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν ἄλλως ἢ ξὺν ὅλῳ
τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω ξὺν
ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιακτέον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὂν

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position is emphatic, and makes us half-suspect some allusion to a particular Sophist: cf. Aristotle's use of τινές (Bonitz *Ind. Arist.* p. 598). Similar sophistic ἐπαγγέλματα are ridiculed, though on different grounds, by Isocrates *Soph.* 2 ff.: see also *Prot.* 318 E ff. and *Euthyd.* 273 D ff. (ἀρετήν, ἔφη sc. ὁ Εὐθύδημος,— οἰόμεθα οἵω τ' εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα), and cf. Newman *Politics of Aristotle* I p. 387. It should be mentioned that the double εἶναι has been suspected by Richards, who would omit the first; but Plato himself is not averse to such repetitions: cf. μετέχειν—μετέχειν in VI 511 E and X 621 B *n.*

518 C 16 **ἐντιθέναι.** Cf. Theognis 429—438 (εἰ δ' ἦν ποιητόν τε καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα 435). The grossly material and mechanical view of education which Plato here attacks has some affinity with what is sometimes called 'cram.' ἐντιθέναι was used of a nurse feeding children (I 345 B *n.*); but such an allusion, though not in itself inappropriate, is scarcely intended here. Cf. also *Symp.* 175 D, E.

17 **ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος κτλ.** Sophists profess to put ἐπιστήμη into the soul; but Plato's argument indicates that the power or faculty of ἐπιστήμη (ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν), and its organ νοῦς are *already* present in the soul of each individual, just as ὄψις and ὄμμα are *already* possessed by the prisoners in the cave. νοῦς is in fact the θεῖόν τι ἐν ἡμῖν, according to Plato, through whose indwelling man is most truly man by being like to God (VI 501 B, IX 589 D *nn.*). The doctrine that μάθησις is ἀνάμνησις implies what is fundamentally the same view: see *Meno* 81 A ff. and *Phaed.* 72 E—76 D, especially 73 A ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτῷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἃ ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιήσειν. We may even go further and say that Plato's conception of the divine element in man is the ultimate basis of all his proofs of Immortality. In its deeper bearings, therefore, the view of education here presented is incomparably grander and more profound than the usual connotation of the word either in ancient or in modern times. We educate our pupils not only for time, but for eternity, and therefore πείρας οὐδὲν ἀνήσομεν, ἕως ἂν ἢ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢ προὔργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν αὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωμεν λόγοις (VI 498 D). See also X 618 C ff. and *Phaed.* 107 D f. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς κτλ. Michael Angelo used to say that every block of marble contained a statue, and that the sculptor brings it to light by cutting away the encumbrances by which the 'human face divine' is concealed. In like manner, according to Plato, it is the business of the teacher to prune the soul of his pupil of those unnatural excrescences and incrustations which hide its true nature (519 A, B *n.*), until the human *soul* divine (VI 501 B *n.*) stands out in all its pristine grace and purity. It should carefully be noted that in Plato's theory of education the entire soul is involved (ξὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ). The Platonic περιαγωγή, although, or rather, perhaps, because, it applies primarily and immediately to the intellect, effects a moral no less than an intellectual revolution. The moral discipline of Books II—IV, so far from being overthrown, is strengthened and consolidated by being intellectualised. Cf. also 519 A B *n.*

18 **ἑκάστου.** ἑκάστῳ was read by Iamblichus (*Protrept.* 16) for ἑκάστου: but cf. 527 D *n.*

19 **ξύν.** See on IV 424 D. Here, as in *Gorg.* 513 A and *Laws* 678 C, it implies an intimate, almost organic, connexion ('in conjunction with'). Lina (*de praepos. usu Plat.* p. 33) is mistaken in holding that ξύν introduces a mere "Anhängsel" in this passage.

καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ γένηται ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη·
D τοῦτο δ' εἶναί φαμεν | τἀγαθόν· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Τούτου τοίνυν,
ἣν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἴη τῆς περιαγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον ὡς
ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα μεταστραφήσεται, οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι
αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν αὐτό, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ
οὐδὲ βλέποντι οἷ ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι. Ἔοικεν γάρ, ἔφη.
Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν
ἐγγύς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον
E ὕστερον | ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι

27. διαμηχανήσασθαι Π et nisi fallor A^1: δεῖ μηχανήσασθαι A^2.

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518 D 23 **τούτου τοίνυν κτλ.** "Construe: (*ἡ παιδεία*) *εἴη ἂν τέχνη τῆς περιαγωγῆς* (i.q. *τοῦ περιάγειν*, quod praecedit) *τούτου αὐτοῦ* (*τοῦ ὀργάνου τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος*)—*οὐ* (*τέχνη*) *τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν*—*ἀλλὰ* (*τοῦ*) *μηχανήσασθαι τοῦτο* (*ὥστε βλέπειν οἷ ἔδει*)" Ast. This interpretation is, I believe, correct. Plato began by asserting that Education is not what certain Sophists declare it to be—the putting of sight, as it were, into blind eyes. For there is already in every man's soul an eye or *ὄργανον*, which sees or learns already; what is required is to turn this *ὄργανον* round. Hence he concludes (*τοίνυν*) Education is not (as the Sophists say) an art of putting sight into the soul's eye (*τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν* refers to *τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέντες*), but an art of turning round just this very eye or *ὄργανον* which is present in every soul from the first. The prevailing view since Schneider regards *τούτου αὐτοῦ* as anticipating and explained by, not as depending on, *τῆς περιαγωγῆς*. This yields a tolerable sense, but makes it difficult to supply the subject of *μεταστραφήσεται*, and *αὐτῷ* is also awkward. On Ast's view *τίνα—μεταστραφήσεται* explains *τούτου αὐτοῦ τῆς περιαγωγῆς*, and the subject of *μεταστραφήσεται* as well as the antecedent of *αὐτῷ* is at once seen to be *τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος*, for it is identical with the antecedent of *τούτου αὐτοῦ*.

25 **τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι κτλ.** The genitive has been wrongly taken as one of the rare examples in good Greek of an independent final infinitive (Weiske quoted in *A. J. Ph.* IV p. 418), a construction for which see Jannaris *Historical Greek Grammar* pp. 483, 578. It depends on *τέχνη*: see last note. For *διαμηχανήσασθαι* Ast (with some inferior MSS) reads *δὴ μηχανήσασθαι*: but cf. (with Schneider) *Laws* 746 C *τοῦτ' αὐτὸ διαμηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως ἂν γίγνηται*.

28 **αἱ μὲν τοίνυν κτλ.** *ἄλλαι* is anticipative)(*ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι* below. *καλούμεναι* (as Bosanquet points out) should be taken with *ψυχῆς* (lit. 'which are called soul's' i.e. 'which are commonly said to belong to the soul'). Plato does not mean to deny that they are virtues, but they do not belong to soul essentially and from the first. Krohn (*Pl. St.* pp. 185 ff.), who, with the editors generally, takes *καλούμεναι* as 'sogenannten,' affirms that Plato here discards the virtues of Book IV; but he is merely contrasting these and other virtues or excellencies with *νόησις*.

29 **ἐγγύς τι εἶναι.** Campbell conjectures *ἐγγύς τι τείνειν*. I once thought of *ἐγγύς τι τεῖναι*, taking the aorist as an explicit reference to the ethical virtues already discussed; but the text is doubtless sound: cf. V 472 C and VIII 544 D (*μεταξύ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν*).

518 E 30 **ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν.** Aristotle *Nic. Eth.* II 1 is in effect a commentary on this text: note in particular *ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ* (*ἀρετὴ*) *ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται* (1103ª 17)—*οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται* (ibid. 19)—*τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον* (1103ª 31).

ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι κτλ. The *ἀρετή* of *φρονῆσαι* (=*νόησις* or the exercise of *νοῦς*) is not merely *καλουμένη ψυχῆς*, but does in reality belong to (for *τυγχάνει οὖσα* cf. I 337 B *n.*)—is an essential attribute of—something more divine (than that to which the other virtues belong),

παντὸς μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὖσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς χρήσιμόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἄχρηστον αὖ | καὶ βλαβερὸν γίγνεται. ἢ 519
οὔπω ἐννενόηκας τῶν λεγομένων πονηρῶν μέν, σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμὺ μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξέως διορᾷ ταῦτα ἐφ' ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαύλην ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακίᾳ δ' ἠναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν,
5 ὥστε ὅσῳ ἂν ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ, τοσούτῳ πλείω κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως εἰ ἐκ παιδὸς εὐθὺς κοπτόμενον περιεκόπη τὰς τῆς γενέσεως

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viz. *νοῦς*. The meaning of *φρόνησις* has changed since IV 433 B (see on IV 428 B) in conformity with the intellectualism of Books VI and VII.

31 **παντὸς μᾶλλον** has been suspected, and Madvig proposes *ὑφάσματος* or *πλάσματος μᾶλλον*, Richards *ὀργάνου μᾶλλον*: but the text is indubitably sound. The phrase, like *πάντων μάλιστα*, means 'most assuredly,' and has nothing to do with the comparative *θειοτέρου*, but emphasises the whole assertion exactly as in *Crit.* 49 B and *Prot.* 344 B.

τὴν μὲν δύναμιν κτλ. Plato means that *νοῦς* can never lose its power or function, which is *νόησις*. *οὐδέποτε* should not be limited to this life. The Peripatetic doctrine of "das unsterbliche Attribut der denkenden Function" is here foreshadowed, as Krohn observes (*Pl. St.* p. 160). See also on 518 C.

32 **ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς** is equivalent to *ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς τε καὶ μή* ('according as it is or is not turned round'). See on VI 498 A.

519 A 2 **δριμὺ μὲν κτλ.** *δριμύ* is 'shrewdly,' 'astutely,' like a quick-sighted lawyer: cf. (with J. and C.) *Theaet.* 175 D *τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικόν*. For *ταῦτα* Cobet needlessly proposes *τά*: cf. 519 B *n.* Instead of *ὥστε* (which three MSS omit) Ast conjectured *καί*, and E. S. Thompson (*Camb. Phil. Soc. Proceed.* XXI p. 13) *ὥς τε*: but the clause *ὅσῳ—ἐργαζόμενον* is a logical inference from *οὐ φαύλην—ὑπηρετεῖν* and should not therefore be introduced by *καί*, still less by *ὥς τε*. I formerly printed *ἐργάζεται* (Ξ and the three MSS already referred to reading *ἐργάσεται*), but the finite verb is not likely to have been corrupted into a participle, and exactly the same ungrammatical assimilation appears with *ὥστε* in Andoc. 4. 20, Isaeus 9. 16 and Isocr. *Paneg.* 64, 65 (quoted by Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 1015 *n.* 3). The instances cited by Schneider (*Addit.* p. 52) viz. *Tim.* 56 B, [*Eryx.*] 404 A and Thuc. I 25 are not strictly parallel to this.

519 A, B 7 **τὰς τῆς γενέσεως κτλ.**: 'as it were the leaden weights, which are of the family of Becoming, and which, through indulgences in eating and through pleasures and gluttonous desires connected with such like indulgences, adhere to it' (i.e. to such a nature, *τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως*) 'and turn the soul's vision round below.' The eye of the soul ought to be turned round *ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου* (518 C): and it is our duty to shake the soul clear of *τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς μολυβδίδας*. For *γενέσεως* see on VI 485 B, and cf. *μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ' ἀληθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν* infra 525 C and 525 B, 526 E, 534 A al. With *ξυγγενεῖς* cf. VIII 554 D where *τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος ξυγγενεῖς ἐπιθυμίας* = *τὰς κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίας*. The *μολυβδίδες* are the accumulated products of sensual indulgence and desire: see X 611 C ff., especially *ἃ νῦν αὐτῇ, ἅτε γῆν ἐστιωμένῃ, γεηρὰ καὶ πετρώδη πολλὰ καὶ ἄγρια περιπέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων λεγομένων ἑστιάσεων* 611 E—612 A, and *Phaed.* 81 C together with *Ep.* VII 326 B. Cf. also Clement *Strom.* IV 4 p. 1228 C Migne *ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας*. These *μολυβδίδες* are akin to the world of *γένεσις* because they are *σωματοειδῆ, γεώδη, γεηρά* (Plato ll. cc.), of the earth earthy. They become incorporate with the soul (*προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι*, cf. *προσπεφυκέναι* X 611 D), making it, as Plato does not hesitate to say, *σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ* (*Phaed.* 83 D, cf. ib. 82 E, 83 C). Milton is platonizing when he tells how the soul "grows clotted by con-

B ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, | αἳ δὴ ἐδωδαῖς τε καὶ τοιούτων
ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λιχνείαις προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι περικάτω στρέ-
φουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν· ὧν εἰ ἀπαλλαγὲν περιεστρέφετο εἰς
τὰ ἀληθῆ, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων
ὀξύτατα ἑώρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ' ἃ νῦν τέτραπται. Εἰκός γε, ἔφη.
Τί δέ; τόδε οὐκ εἰκός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων,
μήτε τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους καὶ ἀληθείας ἀπείρους ἱκανῶς ἄν ποτε
C πόλιν ἐπιτροπεῦσαι, | μήτε τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἐωμένους διατρίβειν
διὰ τέλους, τοὺς μὲν ὅτι σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἕνα, οὗ
στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν, ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ
δημοσίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ὅτι ἑκόντες εἶναι οὐ πράξουσιν, ἡγούμενοι ἐν
μακάρων νήσοις ζῶντες ἔτι ἀπῳκίσθαι; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Ἡμέτερον
δὴ ἔργον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν οἰκιστῶν, τάς τε βελτίστας φύσεις
ἀναγκάσαι ἀφικέσθαι πρὸς τὸ μάθημα, ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἔφαμεν
D εἶναι μέγιστον, ἰδεῖν τε τὸ ἀγαθὸν | καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν
ἀνάβασιν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀναβάντες ἱκανῶς ἴδωσι, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν
αὐτοῖς ὃ νῦν ἐπιτρέπεται. Τὸ ποῖον δή; Τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
καταμένειν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν πάλιν καταβαίνειν παρ' ἐκείνους τοὺς
δεσμώτας μηδὲ μετέχειν τῶν παρ' ἐκείνοις πόνων τε καὶ τιμῶν, εἴτε

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tagion, Imbodies and imbrutes, till she quite lose The divine property of her first being" (*Comus* 464 ff.). Through the weight of these encumbrances the eye of the soul is turned down (cf. IX 586 A *κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας* κτλ.), nor can the soul look upwards until they are knocked away (*περιεκόπη*: cf. *περικρουσθεῖσα* in X 611 E). We may again compare the lines of Milton "Mammon, the least erected spirit that fell From Heaven; for e'en in Heaven his looks and thoughts Were always downward bent" (*Par. Lost* I 679 ff.). For *περικάτω* cf. Photius *περικάτω τραπήσεται· ἀντὶ τοῦ περιτραπήσεται κάτω*. The *περι-* balances *περι-* in *περιεστρέφετο* just below. Instead of *ἐδωδαῖς*, Jackson suggests *ἐδωδῆς*, comparing III 389 E *τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡδονῶν*. The proposal is attractive and may be right; but I think there is hardly sufficient reason for departing from the MSS. See also on *περικάτω* and the whole of this difficult and highly important sentence, App. V.

519 B 10 **ὧν εἰ ἀπαλλαγὲν** κτλ. For the anacoluthon cf. *Laws* 810 D, E (Engelhardt *Anac. Pl. Spec.* III p. 37). Cobet gratuitously adds *τά* before *ἐφ' ἃ*. Cf. 519 A *n.* With the sentiment cf. VI 491 C, D *nn.*, 494 C ff. *nn.* Plato may well be thinking of Alcibiades again. The present passage is a conspicuous proof of the almost boundless influence which Plato ascribed to education, when applied to gifted natures.

519 C 16 **σκοπὸν—ἕνα** κτλ. The *εἰς σκοπός* of Plato's guardians is the Idea of Good, which is therefore clearly not only a metaphysical but also an ethical concept—the goal of conduct as well as the ultimate cause of knowledge and existence. Cf. 540 A and App. III.

18 **ἑκόντες εἶναι.** I 336 E *n.*

20 **τῶν οἰκιστῶν**='the founders' is in explanatory apposition with *ἡμέτερον*.

21 **ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν.** VI 505 A.

22 **ἰδεῖν τε** κτλ. depends on *ἀναγκάσαι* and explains *ἀφικέσθαι—μέγιστον* (J. and C.). *τε* balances *καί* before *ἀναβῆναι*. This explanation is better than to regard *τε* as 'and' (with Schneider and D. and V.).

φαυλότεραι εἴτε σπουδαιότεραι. Ἔπειτ', ἔφη, ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς, καὶ ποιήσομεν χεῖρον ζῆν, δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὂν ἄμεινον;

V. Ἐπελάθου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι νόμῳ οὐ τοῦτο **E**
μέλει, ὅπως ἕν τι γένος ἐν πόλει διαφερόντως εὖ πράξει, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τοῦτο μηχανᾶται ἐγγενέσθαι, ξυναρμόττων τοὺς πολίτας πειθοῖ τε καὶ ἀνάγκῃ, ποιῶν μεταδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις τῆς ὠφελείας, ἣν ἂν ἕκαστοι τὸ κοινὸν | δυνατοὶ ὦσιν ὠφελεῖν, καὶ 520
αὐτὸς ἐμποιῶν τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ πόλει, οὐχ ἵνα ἀφιῇ τρέπεσθαι ὅπῃ ἕκαστος βούλεται, ἀλλ' ἵνα καταχρῆται αὐτὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸν ξύνδεσμον τῆς πόλεως. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη· ἐπελαθόμην γάρ. Σκέψαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδικήσομεν τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν φιλοσόφους γιγνομένους, ἀλλὰ δίκαια πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐροῦμεν προσαναγκάζοντες τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαί τε καὶ φυλάττειν. ἐροῦμεν γάρ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι **B**
εἰκότως οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς πόνων· αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείας, δίκην δ' ἔχει τό γε αὐτοφυές, μηδενὶ τροφὴν ὀφεῖλον, μηδ' ἐκτίνειν τῳ προθυμεῖσθαι τὰ τροφεῖα· ὑμᾶς δ' ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς τῇ τε ἄλλῃ πόλει ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐγεννήσαμεν, ἄμεινόν τε καὶ

11. τῳ Π: τῷ A.

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27 **ἔπειτα** and *εἶτα* are used like our 'what!' in indignant or quasi-indignant questions. Cf. *Gorg.* 466 C, *Ap.* 28 B and elsewhere, with Blaydes on Ar. *Av.* 911.

519 D, E 29 **ἐπελάθου κτλ.** *πάλιν* does not mean that Glauco has forgotten twice, but only that he remembered before. The emphasis falls on *ἐπελάθου* rather than on *πάλιν*. Plato is thinking of V 466 A, where Glauco says *μέμνημαι* when challenged on this point. To this explanation, which he gives as an alternative, Schneider inclines to prefer the view which sees in *πάλιν* a reference directly to IV 419 Aff. But the interlocutor there is Adimantus, not Glauco, and even Adimantus in IV could not strictly be said to forget what Socrates for the first time expressly asserts (IV 420 B *οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο—ἡ πόλις*) in reply to Adimantus' difficulties.

νόμῳ is the reading of all the best MSS, and was restored by Schneider for *νομοθέτῃ*. Law is personified throughout the whole sentence: cf. (with Schneider) *Tim.* 24 B. *νομοθέτῃ* gives a good sense, but is weaker than *νόμῳ*: Law, we feel, is free from selfishness and partiality, but a legislator need not be.

520 A 4 **ἐπὶ τὸν ξύνδεσμον** is not 'so as to be the bond of the State' (as J. and C. suggest), but 'for binding the city together,' with reference to *ξυναρμόττων τοὺς πολίτας*. Cf. *Laws* 921 C.

5 **τοίνυν**='further' (I 339 D *n.*). Socrates has not yet replied to Glauco's indignant *ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς;* but proceeds to do so now.

οὐδ' ἀδικήσομεν: (besides what I have just said) we shall not be wronging them either. *οὐδέ* is used in the same way in *Euthyph.* 12 A and *Laws* 673 C. *δέ* in *οὐδέ* cannot mean 'in spite of what you say' (as J. and C. imagine).

520 B 12 **ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν κτλ.** is probably a Socratic comparison: cf. Xen. *Cyr.* V 1. 24 (quoted by Ast) *βασιλεὺς μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς σὺ πεφυκέναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ σμήνει φυόμενος τῶν μελιττῶν ἡγεμών.* See also Pöhlmann *Gesch. d. ant. Komm.* p. 134 *n.*

C τελεώτερον ἐκείνων πεπαιδευμένους | καὶ μᾶλλον δυνατοὺς ἀμ-
φοτέρων μετέχειν. καταβατέον οὖν ἐν μέρει ἑκάστῳ εἰς τὴν τῶν 15
ἄλλων ξυνοίκησιν καὶ συνεθιστέον τὰ σκοτεινὰ θεάσασθαι· ξυνεθι-
ζόμενοι γὰρ μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ γνώσεσθε ἕκαστα
τὰ εἴδωλα ἄττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὧν, διὰ τὸ τἀληθῆ ἑωρακέναι καλῶν τε
καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν πέρι. καὶ οὕτω ὕπαρ ἡμῖν καὶ ὑμῖν ἡ
πόλις οἰκήσεται, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄναρ, ὡς νῦν αἱ πολλαὶ ὑπὸ σκιαμα- 20
D χούντων τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων | περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν
οἰκοῦνται, ὡς μεγάλου τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος. τὸ δέ που ἀληθὲς ὧδ'
ἔχει· ἐν πόλει ᾗ ἥκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν,
ταύτην ἄριστα καὶ ἀστασιαστότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖσθαι, τὴν δ'
ἐναντίους ἄρχοντας σχοῦσαν ἐναντίως. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 25
Ἀπειθήσουσιν οὖν ἡμῖν, οἶει, οἱ τρόφιμοι ταῦτ' ἀκούοντες καὶ οὐκ
ἐθελήσουσιν ξυμπονεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἕκαστοι ἐν μέρει, τὸν δὲ πολὺν
χρόνον μετ' ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ; Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη·

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520 C 14 **ἀμφοτέρων**: "et publicorum negotiorum et philosophiae" Stallbaum. Cf. *Gorg.* 485 A ἀλλ', οἶμαι, *τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν*. Is the *θεωρητικός* or the *πρακτικὸς βίος* the better? It is clear that the subject was often debated in Plato's time: see the fragments of Euripides' *Antiope* in Pl. *Gorg.* 484 E ff. and Arist. *Eth. Nic.* I 3. 1095^{b} 17 ff., X 7. 1177^{a} 12 ff. If we contrast them with each other, Plato would reply, the *θεωρητικός* easily wins the prize, but under the existing conditions of human nature the best life is a combination of both. The practical statesman must derive his inspiration from *θεωρία*, and experience of affairs is an advantage as well as a duty to the thinker. Cf. VI 496 D—497 A *nn.*

16 **ξυνεθιζόμενοι κτλ.** Cf. 518 A *n.*

18 **εἴδωλα.** 517 D *n.* The word is here used quite generally of all the idols of Plato's cave. "We have risen to a point of view from which the *σκευαστά* and the *σκιαί* are included under one notion as *εἴδωλα*" (J. and C.).

19 **ὕπαρ κτλ.** Cf. V 476 C. The Homeric line *οὐκ ὄναρ, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἐσθλόν, ὅ τοι τετελεσμένον ἔσται* (*Od.* 19. 547) is in Plato's mind, though *ὕπαρ* and *ὄναρ* are here adverbial accusatives (cf. Cobet *V. L.*^{2} pp. 523 ff.).

20 **σκιαμαχούντων**: 'fighting about shadows.' See 517 D *n.* and cf. IX 586 C *n.* Dreamland is also shadowland.

520 D 23 **ἐν πόλει ᾗ κτλ.** On *ᾗ* for *ἐν ᾗ* see note on *ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστι* III 402 A. Van Cleef (*de attr. in enunt. rel. usu Plat.* p. 46) explains the construction as equivalent to *ἐν ᾗ πόλει*, comparing *Men.* 96 C, which is however (like *Tim.* 45 D) only an example of inverse attraction.

24 **ταύτην**: an anacoluthon, as in VI 510 E. For the sentiment see I 347 D *n.*

25 **σχοῦσαν** = 'which gets': a gnomic aorist participle. See Goodwin *MT.* p. 55. Richards conjectures *ἔχουσαν*, and *ἴσχουσαν* (which appears in the margin of A) has slight MS authority; but the inchoative sense (516 E *n.*) is better suited to *οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν*.

27 **ἕκαστοι.** The plural implies relays of governors relieving one another from time to time: cf. *ἑκάστοις* in 540 B.

28 **μετ' ἀλλήλων κτλ.** "Far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife." *ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ* means 'in the undefiled.' The phrase is half-mystical, as *καθαρόν* constantly is in Plato. It is natural to think of the myth of the *Phaedo* (109 B ff. *αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ*), but we should not translate "sub divo" (Ast), nor even "auf der reinen Höhe" (Schneider). Either version is too precise, and *ἐν καθαρῷ* does not mean *sub divo* even in Homer. The Ideas in Plato are *τὸ καθαρόν*: see *Phaed.* 79 D *ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον.*

δίκαια | γὰρ δὴ δικαίοις ἐπιτάξομεν. παντὸς μὲν μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπ' E
30 ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν ἕκαστος εἶσι τὸ ἄρχειν, τοὐναντίον τῶν νῦν ἐν
ἑκάστῃ πόλει ἀρχόντων. Οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε·
εἰ μὲν βίον ἐξευρήσεις ἀμείνω τοῦ ἄρχειν τοῖς | μέλλουσιν ἄρξειν, 521
ἔστι σοι δυνατὴ γενέσθαι πόλις εὖ οἰκουμένη· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ
ἄρξουσιν οἱ τῷ ὄντι πλούσιοι, οὐ χρυσίου, ἀλλ' οὗ δεῖ τὸν εὐ-
δαίμονα πλουτεῖν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ ἔμφρονος· εἰ δὲ πτωχοὶ καὶ
5 πεινῶντες ἀγαθῶν ἰδίων ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἴασιν ἐντεῦθεν οἰόμενοι
τἀγαθὸν δεῖν ἁρπάζειν, οὐκ ἔστι· περιμάχητον γὰρ τὸ ἄρχειν
γιγνόμενον, οἰκεῖος ὢν καὶ ἔνδον ὁ τοιοῦτος πόλεμος αὐτούς τε
ἀπόλλυσι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Ἔχεις οὖν,
| ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βίον ἄλλον τινὰ πολιτικῶν ἀρχῶν καταφρονοῦντα B
10 ἢ τὸν τῆς ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.
Ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε μὴ ἐραστὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἐπ' αὐτό·
εἰ δὲ μή, οἵ γε ἀντερασταὶ μαχοῦνται. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Τίνας οὖν
ἄλλους ἀναγκάσεις ἰέναι ἐπὶ φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως, ἢ οἳ περὶ
τούτων τε φρονιμώτατοι, δι' ὧν ἄριστα πόλις οἰκεῖται, ἔχουσί τε
15 τιμὰς ἄλλας καὶ βίον ἀμείνω τοῦ πολιτικοῦ; Οὐδένας ἄλλους,
ἔφη.

12. μαχοῦνται $A^2\Pi$: μάχονται A^1. 13. οἳ Π : οἱ A.

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520 E 29 **παντὸς μὲν κτλ.** The *πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν* has now been found. That Plato intended to recal the prophecy of I 347 D is clear from the verbal echoes between the two passages. On the absence of the preposition before *τὸ ἄρχειν* see VIII 553 B *n.*

521 A 3 **οὐ χρυσίου κτλ.** Cf. VIII 547 B *φύσει ὄντε πλουσίω τὰς ψυχάς* and *Phaedr. ad fin. πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν.*

4 **πτωχοὶ κτλ.**: 'men who are poor and an-hungered for lack of goods of their own.' So Schneider and Bosanquet rightly explain the passage. *πεινᾶν* is used almost in its original etymological sense (*πεῖνα* from *πέν-ης, πέν-ομαι*): cf. Xen. *Cyr.* VII 5. 50 and VIII 3. 39 *ὦ μακάριε σὺ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐκ πένητος πλούσιος γεγένησαι· πολὺ γὰρ οἶομαί σε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἥδιον πλουτεῖν, ὅτι πεινήσας χρημάτων πεπλούτηκας.* The contrast with *πλούσιοι*, and the presence of *πτωχοί*, make it easy to catch the meaning. The translation 'hunger after private advantages' (D. and V., Jowett) is in my opinion incorrect.

6 **τἀγαθόν** 'their good' (Bosanquet), hardly 'the chief good' (Jowett). Not possessing any *ἴδια ἀγαθά* in the shape of virtue, they are fain to make up for it at the expense of the State.

περιμάχητον κτλ. For the construction cf. (with J. and C.) *Phaed.* 69 B.

521 B 11 **τοῦ ἄρχειν** is personified and *ἰέναι ἐπ' αὐτό* should be translated 'woo her.' Cf. VI 489 D *n.*

13 **οἳ κτλ.** The copula is rarely omitted in a relative clause except in statements of proportion like *Gorg.* 465 C. An example occurs in II 370 E: see also Kühner-Blass *Gr. Gr.* II 1, p. 41. We ought not to revert to the old reading *οἵπερ* for *οἳ περί* (with *q* and E. S. Thompson, *Camb. Phil. Soc. Proc.* XXI p. 14, who also suggests *οἵπερ περί*), even if—which is far from clear—*ὅσπερ* can, as Thompson says, dispense with the copula more easily than *ὅς.*

521 C—**523** A *We have next to consider how we can lead our guardians up into the light. The studies which we re-*

C VI. Βούλει οὖν τοῦτ' ἤδη σκοπῶμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐγγενήσονται, καὶ πῶς τις ἀνάξει αὐτοὺς εἰς φῶς, ὥσπερ ἐξ Ἅιδου λέγονταί δή τινες εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἔφη. Τοῦτο δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὀστράκου ἂν εἴη περιστροφή, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν, τοῦ ὄντος

17. σκοπῶμεν $A^2\Pi$: σκοπῶμεν A^1.

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quire are such as will tend to draw the soul from Becoming to Being, and are at the same time of some practical utility in war. Our earlier training in gymnastic and music will not serve the purpose; nor yet will the mechanical arts. What do you say to Number and Calculation, which enter into every art and science? Their importance in strategy is obvious, and we shall find that they do emphatically, if rightly used, lead the soul towards Intelligence and Being.

521 C ff. For Plato's theory of the higher education see Appendix II on '*The Propaedeutic Studies of the Republic*' and Appendix III on '*Dialectic*.'

19 **λέγονται δή τινες κτλ.** With *εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν* cf. Plut. *de ser. num. vind.* 566 A ἔλεγε δὲ ταύτῃ τὸν Διόνυσον *εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν*. If Plato's words are to be taken in their full significance, we can hardly (with J. and C.) suppose that the allusion is to Heracles, Pollux etc., for Heracles' descent to Hades was an incident which happened long before his ascent to Heaven; and Pollux's life among the gods was intermittent. Cf. Schneider in his translation p. 304 *n.* 187. Schneider himself suggests that Plato is thinking of legends about e.g. Aesculapius' deliverance from Hades, after Zeus had smitten him (cf. III 408 C and Roscher's *Lexicon d. Mythologie* I p. 620), and others have thought of Briareos and the *ἑκατόγχειροι*: see *Il.* I 402—405 and cf. Hes. *Theog.* 617—721. Mr Walter Headlam has pointed out to me that Semele was also raised from Hades to Heaven, citing Paus. II 31. 2 and ib. 37. 5: cf. also Plut. l.c. *Διόνυσον εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν καὶ τὴν Σεμέλην ἀνάγειν ὕστερον*. These examples are certainly more to the point. It is worthy of remark that Justin Martyr in a remarkable passage of his *Apologia pro Christianis* speaks of the ascent of Asclepius and others into Heaven as Pagan parallels to the Christian doctrine of the Ascension: Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν—σταυρωθέντα καὶ ἀποθανόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα ἀνεληλυθέναι *εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, οὐ παρὰ τοὺς παρ' ὑμῖν λεγομένους υἱοὺς τῷ Διΐ καινόν τι φέρομεν. πόσους γὰρ υἱοὺς φάσκουσι τοῦ Διὸς οἱ παρ' ὑμῖν τιμώμενοι συγγραφεῖς ἐπίστασθε, Ἑρμῆν μὲν λόγον τὸν ἑρμηνευτικὸν καὶ πάντων διδάσκαλον· Ἀσκληπιὸν δὲ καὶ θεραπευτὴν γενόμενον, κεραυνωθέντα, ἀνεληλυθέναι εἰς οὐρανόν· Διόνυσον δὲ διασπαραχθέντα κτλ.* (l.c. I 21: cf. also *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 69). I was once half inclined to suspect that the clause *ὥσπερ ἐξ Ἅιδου —ἀνελθεῖν* (although it appears in all MSS) might be an early satirical adscript by some Pagan scribe on the doctrine of our Lord's descent into Hell, and subsequent resurrection and ascent into Heaven. *τινες* might well be a specific allusion (518 B *n.*), and there is more than a suspicion of satire in *δή*. But I have no longer any doubt that the text is sound.

20 **ὀστράκου—περιστροφή.** On the different interpretations given by the ancients of this proverb see App. VI. The proverb is derived from the game of *ὀστρακίνδα*, the authorities for which are cited by Grasberger *Erziehung u. Unterricht* I pp. 57—60. The players were divided into two parties, separated by a line. A shell, black on one side, and white on the other, was thrown on the ground by one of the boys, who shouted *νὺξ ἡμέρα* or *νὺξ ἢ ἡμέρα*, 'Heads or Tails,' as he threw it. According as the white or black fell uppermost, one side ran away and the other gave chase. Plato means that education is not, like the 'spinning of a coin,' an affair of no consequence, to be settled off-hand, and by chance, but a slow and laborious scientific process, dealing with the gravest of all possible issues. See also App. VI.

ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ κτλ.: 'the turning round of a soul from a day which is as night into the true day, that is, the ascent into Being' (not the tarrying in *γιγνόμενον*, which is the *νυκτερινὴ ἡμέρα*). In *νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας* (for which see 520 C *nn.*) Plato, *more suo*, plays on the

οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι, τί τῶν μαθημάτων ἔχει τοιαύτην | δύναμιν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τί ἂν οὖν εἴη, ὦ Γλαύκων, μάθημα ψυχῆς D
25 ὁλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν; τόδε δ' ἐννοῶ λέγων ἅμα· οὐκ ἀθλητὰς μέντοι πολέμου ἔφαμεν τούτους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νέους ὄντας; Ἔφαμεν γάρ. Δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα, ὃ ζητοῦμεν, πρὸς ἐκείνῳ. Τὸ ποῖον; Μὴ ἄχρηστον πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶναι. Δεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη, εἴπερ οἷόν τε. Γυμναστικῇ | μὴν E
30 καὶ μουσικῇ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπαιδεύοντο ἡμῖν. Ἦν ταῦτα, ἔφη. Γυμναστικὴ μέν που περὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον τετεύτακεν· σώματος γὰρ αὔξης καὶ φθίσεως ἐπιστατεῖ. Φαίνεται. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὃ ζητοῦμεν μάθημα. | Οὐ γάρ. Ἀλλ' 522
ἆρα μουσικὴ ὅσην τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν; Ἀλλ' ἦν ἐκείνη γ', ἔφη, ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστικῆς, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἔθεσι παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας, κατά τε ἁρμονίαν εὐαρμοστίαν τινά, οὐκ ἐπιστήμην,
5 παραδιδοῦσα, καὶ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν εὐρυθμίαν, ἔν τε τοῖς λόγοις ἕτερα τούτων ἀδελφά, ἔφη, ἅττα ἔχουσα, καὶ ὅσοι μυθῴδεις τῶν λόγων

29. γυμναστικῇ—μουσικῇ Π: γυμναστικὴ—μουσικὴ A.

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exclamation 'νὴ ἡμέρα': cf. IV 422 D, E *nn.* (It may be noted that Plato's adaptation is from νὴ ἡμέρα rather than from νὴ ἡμέρα.) The words τοῦ ὄντος—ἐπάνοδον explain the figure, οὖσαν 'that is' being used as in φορὰν οὖσαν βάθους 528 D. The daylight in which the ἀπαίδευτος lives is darkness; the true day is the ascent of the soul out of the ὁρατόν and δοξαστόν into the νοητόν: cf. 517 B τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεὶς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσει τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος. This and this alone is true philosophy. The phrase τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἐπάνοδον is copied by Alcinous from Plato (*Isag.* p. 7 ed. Hermann). Cf. also Clement *Strom.* V 14 p. 196 Migne ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινὴν τοῦ ὄντος (vv. ll. ὄντος and ὄντως ὄντος) οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον κτλ. Other views on the text and interpretation of this passage are discussed in App. VI.

521 D 26 **μέντοι.** For μέντοι in questions see on I 339 B.

ἔφαμεν. Cf. III 403 E, 416 D and VIII 543 B.

27 **δεῖ ἄρα κτλ.** The subject of προσέχειν is τὸ μάθημα ὃ ζητοῦμεν: its object is τοῦτο. With προσέχειν 'insuper habere' (a rare use) cf. προσγενέσθαι II 375 E *n.*

521 E 30 **ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν.** II 376 E ff.

32 **τετεύτακεν.** τευτάζων· πραγματευόμενος, ἐνδιατρίβων (Tim. *Lex.* s.v., where Ruhnken elaborately illustrates the word. See also Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s.v.). τευτάζω is always, I believe, semi-contemptuous in Plato (*Phil.* 56 E, *Tim.* 90 B). Brugmann's connexion of the word with σεύω (*Vergl. Gr.* I p. 362) may not be right, but the notion that τευτάζω is for ταὐτάζω (L. and S.) is certainly wrong.

522 A 2 **ὅσην κτλ.** There is (as J. and C. remind us) a sense in which φιλοσοφία itself is μουσική: cf. III 403 C *n.* and VI 499 D.

3 **ἀντίστροφος κτλ.** is best explained by III 410 C—412 A, and κατά τε ἁρμονίαν—εὐρυθμίαν by III 400 D, E.

5 **τοῖς λόγοις.** II 377 ff., III 392 A ff.

6 **ἔφη** is repeated as in *Phaed.* 78 A: cf. I 348 D *n.* and VIII 557 C, *Euthyd.* 296 D (ἦν δ' ἐγώ repeated). Here "iteratum ἔφη—ethicam, ut ita dicam, vim habet" (Schneider). I formerly omitted the word (with Flor. T), but now believe it genuine. ἔθη (Π^2, *v* and two other MSS,

καὶ ὅσοι ἀληθινώτεροι ἦσαν. μάθημα δὲ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ἀγαθόν,
B οἷον σὺ νῦν ζητεῖς, οὐδὲν ἦν | ἐν αὐτῇ. Ἀκριβέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναμιμνήσκεις με· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν εἶχεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Γλαύκων, τί ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτον; αἵ τε γὰρ τέχναι βάναυσοί πού ἅπασαι ἔδοξαν εἶναι. Πῶς δ' οὔ; καὶ μὴν τί ἔτ' ἄλλο λείπεται μάθημα, μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν κεχωρισμένον; Φέρε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μηδὲν ἔτι ἐκτὸς τούτων ἔχομεν
C λαβεῖν, τῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεινόντων τι λάβωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον; | Οἷον τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται τέχναι τε καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, ὃ καὶ παντὶ ἐν πρώτοις ἀνάγκη μανθάνειν. Ποῖον; ἔφη. Τὸ φαῦλον τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἕν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγιγνώσκειν· λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἀριθμόν τε καὶ λογισμόν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω περὶ τούτων ἔχει, ὡς πᾶσα τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῶν μέτοχος γίγνεσθαι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ πολεμική; Πολλή, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη. Παγ-
D γέλοιον γοῦν, ἔφην, | στρατηγὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις

12. κεχωρισμένον $A^2\Pi$: κεχωρισμένων A^1.

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with Eusebius *Praep. Ev.* XIV 13. 3) is unsuitable in point of sense, and also because of ἅττα.

7 **ἀληθινώτεροι**: not = 'more true' but 'true on the other hand.' The comparative only points the contrast with μυθώδεις: cf. Homer's well-known γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων.

πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι κτλ.: 'useful for any such purpose as you now require.' ἀγαθόν goes with πρός: cf. with Schneider Xen. *Mem.* IV 6. 10 ἆρ' οὖν τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἐπικίνδυνα ὄντας ἀνδρείους ἡγεῖ εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς δειλούς; The words οἷον—ζητεῖς are equivalent to πρὸς οἷον—ζητεῖς sc. μάθημα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι: cf. ἐν πόλει ᾖ = ἐν πόλει ἐν ᾗ (520 D *n.*), and (for ζητεῖς with infinitive) IV 443 B. The Oxford editors connect ἀγαθόν with τοιοῦτον and not with μάθημα, referring οἷον σὺ νῦν ζητεῖς 'probably to μάθημα'—a highly unnatural interpretation, because it separates οἷον from τοιοῦτον, and leaves πρός out in the cold. ἄγον (γρ Π and Eusebius l. c.) for ἀγαθόν is an obvious but wholly unnecessary 'emendation.' The present passage is Plato's authoritative statement of the relation between his two curricula of education. The aim of the first is morality, and its method habituation; in the second knowledge is attained by a scientific discipline. Cf. II 376 E, VI 502 E *nn.*

522 B 10 **αἵ τε κτλ.** On τε used ἀνακολούθως see II 373 B *n.* "Quid addere Socrates in animo habuerit, Glauconis intercipientis verba docent: καὶ μὴν τί ἔτ' ἄλλο λείπεται μάθημα" (Schneider).

11 **ἔδοξαν.** VI 495 D.

522 C 15 **διάνοιαι** scarcely means the mathematical sciences here, as J. and C. suggest, but simply 'modes of thought': cf. VI 511 D *n.* Plato does not, I believe, use the plural of διάνοια in its peculiar technical sense, and in any case such a meaning is here unsuitable.

17 **τὸ ἕν τε κτλ.** Cf. *Laws* 818 C μήτε ἓν μήτε δύο μήτε τρία μήθ' ὅλως ἄρτια καὶ περιττὰ δυνάμενος γιγνώσκειν, μηδὲ ἀριθμεῖν τὸ παράπαν εἰδώς and [*Epin.*] 977 C.

18 **ἀριθμόν τε καὶ λογισμόν.** See on λογιστική τε καὶ ἀριθμητική 525 A.

522 D 22 **ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις κτλ.** Plato speaks as if he were bored to death by Palamedes' damnable iteration. Plays on the subject of Palamedes were written by all three dramatists (see the fragments of Aeschylus 180 ff., Sophocles 426 ff., Euripides 582 ff. Dindorf), and the invention of number or the like is ascribed

Παλαμήδης ἑκάστοτε ἀποφαίνει. ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας, ὅτι φησὶν ἀριθμὸν εὑρὼν τάς τε τάξεις τῷ στρατοπέδῳ καταστῆσαι ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ ἐξαριθμῆσαι ναῦς τε καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ ἀναριθμήτων ὄντων καὶ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδ' ὅσους πόδας εἶχεν εἰδότος, εἴπερ ἀριθμεῖν μὴ ἠπίστατο; καίτοι ποῖόν τιν' αὐτὸν οἴει στρατηγὸν εἶναι; Ἄτοπόν τιν', ἔφη, ἔγωγε, εἰ ἦν τοῦτ' ἀληθές.

VII. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μάθημα ἀναγκαῖον πολεμικῷ Ε ἀνδρὶ θήσομεν καὶ λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ ἀριθμεῖν δύνασθαι; Πάντων γ', ἔφη, μάλιστα, εἰ καὶ ὁτιοῦν μέλλει τάξεων ἐπαΐειν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἔσεσθαι. Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, εἶπον, περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα ὅπερ ἐγώ; Τὸ ποῖον; Κινδυνεύει τῶν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν ἀγόντων φύσει εἶναι ὧν ζητοῦμεν, χρῆσθαι δ' οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ 523 ὀρθῶς, ἑλκτικῷ ὄντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν. Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Ἐγὼ πειράσομαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τό γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν δηλῶσαι. ἃ γὰρ

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to him by Aesch. l.c. Soph. *Fr.* 379 and Eur. l.c. Aeschylus also gives Prometheus the credit of the discovery (*P. V.* 459 f.).

27 **καίτοι κτλ.** 'Well, what d'ye think of Agamemnon for a general now?' *καίτοι* (lit. 'and yet' sc. if this was true) is often thus used to introduce a question 'cum quadam indignatione' (real or, as here, feigned); for examples see Kugler *de part. τοι ap. Pl.* p. 18. *ποῖόν τινα* is derisive, as *ποῖος* constantly is: see on 1330 A. D. and V.'s translation "Yet what do you think of Agamemnon as a general?" misses the *ἦθος* of the original, which is correctly reproduced by Schneider and Jowett.

522 E 30 **καὶ λογίζεσθαί τε κτλ.** *καί* 'also,' because "et aliarum rerum et arithmetices peritum imperatorem esse decet" (Schneider). Cf. VI 506 A. The word is omitted by Π^1 *q* Ξ and some other MSS. *καί* may of course be spurious, but it was not likely to have been added by a scribe, and the balance of MS evidence is in its favour. The other variants (*ἤ* and *ἤ τό* and *μᾶλλον ἤ* in place of *καί*) are corruptions due to the erroneous idea that *ἄλλο τι* is 'any other' and not 'nonne.'

31 **μᾶλλον δὲ κτλ.** *μᾶλλον δέ* is 'vel potius,' as usual. *ἄνθρωπος* = 'human being,' not 'anything of a man' (D. and V.), which suggests an entirely wrong idea. We may compare the Latin use of *homo*, for example in Cic. *ad Quint.* II 11. 5 "sed cum veneris, virum te putabo, si Sallusti Empedoclea legeris: *hominem* non putabo." For the sense cf. *Laws* 819 D, where the Greek ignorance of arithmetic appears to Plato *οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλὰ ὑηνῶν τινῶν εἶναι μᾶλλον θρεμμάτων*. The knowledge of number is one of the characteristic differences between man and the lower animals: see *Tim.* 39 B and [*Epin.*] 978 C.

523 A 1 **φύσει** belongs to *ἀγόντων* (Schneider) rather than to *εἶναι* (Stallbaum and others), as is clear from the antithesis *χρῆσθαι δ' οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς* (explained in 525 C).

3 **τό γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν.** Cf. 517 B *n.* Plato is careful to eschew the appearance of dogmatism, even where his convictions are most profound.

523 A—**524** C *I distinguish* (*says Socrates*) *between two classes of perceptions, those which stimulate the intellect, and those which do not. To the former belong all such sense-presentations as are self-contradictory. We have here, for example, three fingers. Sight tells us that each is a finger. So far there is no contradiction and the intellect is not roused. But it is otherwise with size and smallness, thickness and thinness, and the like. The perception which reports that such-and-such a thing is hard frequently tells us that it is also soft, and the same,* mutatis mutandis, *may be said of all perceptions which deal with relative qualities of this kind. In such cases the soul is perplexed, and appeals to the intellect for help. The intellect, promptly respond-*

διαιροῦμαι παρ' ἐμαυτῷ ἀγωγά τε εἶναι οἷ λέγομεν καὶ μή, ξυνθεατὴς γενόμενος ξύμφαθι ἢ ἄπειπε, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο σαφέστερον ἴδωμεν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον μαντεύομαι. Δείκνυ', ἔφη. Δείκνυμι δή, εἶπον, εἰ καθορᾷς, τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα
B τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρινόμενα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελευόμενα ἐκείνην ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιούσης. Τὰ πόρρωθεν, ἔφη, φαινόμενα δῆλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα. Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτυχες οὖ λέγω. Ποῖα μήν, ἔφη, λέγεις; Τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακα-
C λοῦντα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα μὴ ἐκβαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα· τὰ δ' ἐκβαίνοντα ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθημι, ἐπειδὰν ἡ αἴσθησις μηδὲν

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ing, apprehends 'great' and 'small' (for example) as distinct and separate from one another, unlike the senses, by which they were seen together and in confusion. It is thus that we are first led to ask 'What is the great?' 'What is the small?'

523 B ff. In this section of the *Republic*, Plato ascribes the originating impulse of his intellectual discipline to the stimulus supplied by the self-contradictory evidence of sense-perception. On the connexion of this principle with earlier Greek philosophy see 523 C *n.*, and on the aim and scope of Plato's theory of Education as a whole App. II.

8 **ὡς ἱκανῶς κτλ.** is taken by Krohn (*Pl. Fr.* p. 91) as excluding the possibility of Ideas of concrete things. Such an inference is unwarranted. *ἱκανῶς*, 'adequately' 'satisfactorily' (cf. E below), does not imply that sensation can apprehend *everything* there is to know about e.g. a finger, but merely that in the case of a finger etc., sensible perception is as a rule all that we demand: we are not impelled to summon *νόησις* to our aid. Even the perception of a finger *may* awaken the intelligence, and in such cases we shall be led to the Idea of finger (523 D *n.*).

9 **ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως κτλ.** On *αἰσθήσεως* see 523 C *n.* *ποιούσης* has been doubted by Ast, who conjectures *νοούσης*; "sed *αἰσθήσεως* non est *νοεῖν*" (Schneider). The Greek means 'produces no sound result,' "nichts zuverlässiges giebt" (Schneider): the product of sensation is, in such cases, *ὕπουλον* or *νοσῶδες*. For *οὐδὲν ὑγιές* metaphorically used cf. *Phaed.* 90 E and (with Schneider) Ar. *Plut.* 50, 355 (*πρὸς ἀνδρὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἔστ' εἰργασμένου*).

10 **τὰ πόρρωθεν κτλ.** readily suggest themselves to Glauco, for they were familiar examples of optical delusion in the Platonic school: cf. (for *πόρρωθεν φαινόμενα*) *Prot.* 356 C, *Theaet.* 191 B, infra X 602 C ff., and (for *ἐσκιαγραφημένα*) II 365 C *n.*

523 C 13 **αἴσθησιν.** Strictly speaking, of course, *αἴσθησις* by itself does not, and cannot, present us with a judgment of any kind. It merely furnishes a particular sensation, which is referred to our mental picture of the objects in question, and the resulting judgment is not *αἴσθησις*, but *δόξα*, which is, according to Plato, a combination of *μνήμη* and *αἴσθησις* (see *Phil.* 38 B ff. with Bury's notes). And in point of fact, the sort of contradictory judgments which are here ascribed to the initial step in the psychological process, viz. *αἴσθησις* (524 A), have already been attributed to *δόξα* in V 479 B—479 E. We have already seen that Plato throughout the whole of this part of the *Republic* is not careful to distinguish between *αἰσθητόν* (especially *ὁρατόν*) and *δοξαστόν* (VI 510 A *n.*); and the same tendency shews itself again here. But in this part of the dialogue, Plato's argument is no way affected by his imperfect analysis of the psychological process involved in such a judgment as 'This is a finger.' The relevant consideration is that in such cases the intellect is not, as a rule, aroused, and this is equally true whether we regard the judgment as an act of *αἴσθησις* alone or as the joint product of *αἴσθησις* and *μνήμη*.

μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, εἴτ' ἐγγύθεν προσπίπτουσα εἴτε πόρρωθεν. ὧδε δὲ ἃ λέγω σαφέστερον εἴσει. οὗτοι, φαμέν, τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν δάκτυλοι, ὅ τε σμικρότατος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος καὶ ὁ μέσος. Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Ὡς ἐγγύθεν τοίνυν ὁρωμένους λέγοντός μου διανοοῦ. ἀλλά μοι περὶ αὐτῶν τόδε σκόπει. Τὸ ποῖον; Δάκτυλος μὲν αὐτῶν φαίνεται ὁμοίως ἕκαστος, | καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἐάν D τε ἐν μέσῳ ὁρᾶται ἐάν τ' ἐν ἐσχάτῳ, ἐάν τε λευκὸς ἐάν τε μέλας, ἐάν τε παχὺς ἐάν τε λεπτός, καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι τοιοῦτον. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι, τί ποτ' ἔστι δάκτυλος· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἡ ὄψις αὐτῇ ἅμα ἐσήμηνεν τὸν δάκτυλον τοὐναντίον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰκότως τό γε τοιοῦτον νοήσεως οὐκ ἂν παρακλητικὸν οὐδ' | ἐγερτικὸν εἴη. Εἰκότως. Τί δὲ δή; τὸ μέγεθος E αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα ἡ ὄψις ἆρα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾷ, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ ὡσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ἡ ἁφή; καὶ

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15 **εἴτ' ἐγγύθεν κτλ.** (like *ὡς ἐγγύθεν* etc. below) is said to prevent misapprehension, in view of Glauco's *τὰ πόρρωθεν* etc. in B.

16 **ὧδε δὲ κτλ.** The best commentary on the following exposition is *Phaed.* 101 A ff., especially 102 B ff. : cf. also *Theaet.* 154 C. These passages should be carefully read in connexion with the view enunciated here. I have endeavoured to explain some of the wider bearings of Plato's principle in a pamphlet on Classical Education published by Deighton, Bell and Co. 1895: see also App. II and Nettleship *Hellen.* pp. 152 ff. We should bear in mind that the antithesis of *ἕν* and *πολλά* was the *fons et origo* of Greek philosophy, and runs throughout its entire history. In Plato's time the question had become acute in connexion particularly with the problem of predication, and it was in trying to solve this special form of the antinomy that Plato devised his theory of Ideas. Nothing could be more natural or just than that his philosopher-kings should receive their first scientific impulse from the problem which had proved so great an intellectual stimulus in the past, and which had also led Plato himself to the goal whither he would have his guardians arrive, the contemplation of the Idea.

523 D 20 **ἐάν τε ἐν μέσῳ κτλ.**: i.q. *ἐάν τε ἐν μέσῳ ᾖ ὁ ὁρώμενος κτλ.* This is said with reference to their size: cf. E below and *Phaed.* 102 B, C, where the difficulty is explained by the theory of Ideas. Thus *b* is both great and small, great relatively to *a*, small relatively to *c*. Similarly with the other antinomies. The *Philebus* dismisses such puzzles as *τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά* (14 D)—an indication perhaps of the priority in date of the *Republic* (cf. VI 505 C *n.* and Jackson in *J. Ph.* X pp. 263 ff.).

23 **ἀναγκάζεται** is said of the 'Drang nach Wahrheit': cf. 524 C, E, 525 D and 518 E ff. It is not the 'nature' of Soul to acquiesce in falsehood: for man is an *οὐράνιον φυτόν, οὐκ ἔγγειον* (IV 443 B *n.*).

τῶν πολλῶν. Some exceptional natures, who are endowed with an uncommon share of noble curiosity, may find intellectual stimulus even in perceptions such as these: cf. 523 B *n.* Ast, who missed the point, wanted to excise the phrase. Herwerden seriously proposes *<μὰ>τὸν Ἀπόλλω.*

24 **οὐδαμοῦ**: 'at no stage' viz. in the psychological process, not exactly 'never' (as Jowett, D. and V. etc.).

αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις ἆρ' οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν; ἢ ὧδε
524 ποιεῖ ἑκάστη αὐτῶν· πρῶτον | μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τεταγμένη
αἴσθησις ἠνάγκασται καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μαλακῷ τετάχθαι, καὶ παραγ-
γέλλει τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς ταὐτὸν σκληρόν τε καὶ μαλακὸν αἰσθανομένη;
Οὕτως, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις αὖ
τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπορεῖν, τί ποτε σημαίνει αὕτη ἡ αἴσθησις τὸ σκληρόν, 5
εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μαλακὸν λέγει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ἡ τοῦ
βαρέος, τί τὸ κοῦφον καὶ βαρύ, εἰ τό τε βαρὺ κοῦφον καὶ τὸ κοῦφον
B βαρὺ σημαίνει; | Καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, αὗταί γε ἄτοποι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ
ἑρμηνεῖαι καὶ ἐπισκέψεως δεόμεναι. Εἰκότως ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν
τοῖς τοιούτοις πρῶτον μὲν πειρᾶται λογισμόν τε καὶ νόησιν ψυχὴ 10
παρακαλοῦσα ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε δύο ἐστὶν ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγ-
γελλομένων. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν δύο φαίνηται, ἕτερόν τε καὶ

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524 A 2 **παραγγέλλει κτλ.**: 'intimates to the soul that the same thing is both hard and soft when it perceives it to be so.' With *παραγγέλλει* (needlessly suspected by Stephanus) cf. *Tim.* 70 B *τοῦ λόγου παραγγείλαντος ὥς τις ἄδικος περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται πρᾶξις*. The English translators, together with Schneider, appear to take *ὡς* with *αἰσθανομένη* ("that it feels the same thing to be both hard and soft" D. and V.). But such a construction is difficult (cf. Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 652) and the meaning scarcely satisfactory. It should be remembered that touch does not always report that an object is both hard and soft, but only when it feels the object hard in relation to one thing and soft in relation to another, and similarly in other cases. This limitation is expressed by *αἰσθανομένη* (as well as by *ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις*), and explains its emphatic position. I have sometimes thought that <*οὕτως*> should be added after *αἰσθανομένη*, but the object can be supplied from *ὡς—μαλακόν*. Prantl understands the construction in somewhat the same way as I do.

5 **ἀπορεῖν**. The word is Socratic: see on 515 D. It is worthy of note that Plato, like Socrates, makes intellectual *ἀπορία* the beginning of Education. See App. II.

αὕτη ἡ αἴσθησις means 'this present sensation,' not the sense of touch in general, and similarly with *ἡ τοῦ κούφου κτλ.*, which J. and C. erroneously understand as a special *sense*, apparently 'the same which modern philosophers call the sense of resistance.' But Plato nowhere recognises any such sense, and if he did, he would call it *ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ βαρέος*, and not *ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαρέος*. The parallel in *τί ποτε σημαίνει—λέγει* shews that Plato means: 'what do the sensation of light and the sensation of heavy mean by light and heavy, if they indicate, the one that the heavy is light and the other that the light is heavy?' The last clause contains an elegant chiasmus. Schneider understands *αὕτη ἡ αἴσθησις* as *ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ σκληροῦ*, but it is better taken as deictic: cf. 516 B, 523 C. Otherwise his view agrees with mine.

524 B 8 **ἄτοποι**. Herwerden's *ἄποροι* is an elegant conjecture, in view of *ἀπορεῖν* in A and 524 E; but the text is more forcible.

9 **ἑρμηνεῖαι** = 'communications,' not 'interpretations,' as D. and V. translate. *αἴσθησις* is as it were the *ἑρμηνεὺς καὶ ἄγγελος* (*Crat.* 407 E) between the object of the perception and the soul: cf. *παραγγέλλει* in A.

10 **λογισμόν**. See on *λογιστικῷ* 525 B.

12 **οὐκοῦν ἐὰν κτλ.** Thus: Perception reports 'This finger' (let us say) 'is big-and-little.' Thereupon the soul is puzzled (*ἀπορεῖ*), and calls in *νόησις*. If big-and-little appear (viz. to *νόησις*) not one but two, then each of them appears distinct from the other, and one: cf. V 476 A and *Parm.* 143 D. 'Accordingly—if each appears one, and both together two—*νόησις*, conceiving as it does of two (*τά γε δύο*), will conceive of them as separate; for otherwise it would

ἓν ἑκάτερον φαίνεται; Ναί. Εἰ ἄρα ἓν ἑκάτερον, ἀμφότερα δὲ δύο, τά γε δύο κεχωρισμένα νοήσει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀχώριστά γε δύο ἐνόει, | ἀλλ' ἕν. Ὀρθῶς. Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, C φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον, ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν μέγα αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἡ νόησις ἠναγκάσθη ἰδεῖν, οὐ συγκεχυμένα, ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τοὐναντίον ἢ 'κείνη. Ἀληθῆ. Οὐκοῦν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν πρῶτον ἐπέρχεται ἐρέσθαι ἡμῖν, τί οὖν ποτ' ἔστι τὸ μέγα αὖ καὶ τὸ σμικρόν; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δ' ὁρατὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν. | Ὀρθότατ', D ἔφη.

VIII. Ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν λέγειν, ὡς τὰ μὲν παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας ἐστί, τὰ δὲ οὔ, ἃ μὲν εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἑαυτοῖς ἐμπίπτει, παρακλητικὰ ὁριζόμενος, ὅσα δὲ μή, οὐκ ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοήσεως. Μανθάνω τοίνυν ἤδη, ἔφη, καὶ δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω. Τί οὖν; ἀριθμός τε καὶ τὸ ἓν ποτέρων δοκεῖ εἶναι; Οὐ ξυννοῶ, ἔφη. Ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ἔφην, ἀναλογίζου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ὁρᾶται ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται | τὸ ἕν, οὐκ ἂν ὁλκὸν εἴη ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, E

27. ποτέρων $A^2\Pi$: πότερον A^1.

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have conceived, not of two, but of one.' Plato's object is to make out that *νόησις*, in order to clear up the *συγκεχυμένον τι* of sensation (*διὰ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν*) is compelled to view sensation's *μέγα-καὶ-σμικρόν* (for example) *separately*, i.e. as *τὸ μέγα* and *τὸ σμικρόν*. These antinomies consequently force us to ask 'What is the great?' 'What is the small?' etc.; and just herein consists their periagogic or educative value, for to such questions the theory of Ideas alone furnishes an adequate and final answer (*Phaed.* 99 B ff.). *κεχωρισμένα νοήσει* perhaps = 'are separate to *νόησις*,' but the ordinary view, which understands *νόησις* as subject to *νοήσει*, is better. It may have been this passage of the *Republic*, or *Phaed.* 96 E ff., or both which inspired the line of Theopompus *τὰ δὲ δύο μόλις* (sic) *ἓν ἐστιν, ὥς φησιν Πλάτων* (D. L. III 26).

524 C 15 **καὶ ὄψις**: 'sight also' sc. as well as *νόησις*.

17 **ἠναγκάσθη**. See 523 D *n.*

524 C — **526** C *Now consider — to which of these classes do number and 'one' belong? Our perception of 'one' is self-contradictory; for any unit which we see, we see both as one and as infinite in number. This is also true of number generally, since it is true of 'one.' The science of number is therefore a suitable study on educational as well as on utilitarian grounds, provided it is pursued in such a way as to lead the soul from visible to the invisible numbers of true mathematics. We may add that arithmetical studies are an excellent test of general capacity, a good intellectual discipline, and difficult.*

524 D ff. On Plato's treatment of *ἀριθμητική*—i.e. the Science of Number, not Arithmetic in the modern sense of the word: see on 525 A—reference may be made to Blass *de Platone mathematico* (Bonnae 1861), Cantor *Gesch. d. Mathem.* pp. 183 ff., and especially Rothlauf's excellent monograph *Die Mathem. z. Platons Zeit u. s. Beziehungen zu ihr* (Jena 1878) pp. 19—49. See also App. II.

524 D 27 **ποτέρων** is intrinsically better than *πότερον*, which has considerable MS authority (including A^1, Ξ and M), and is read by Hermann and Baiter. Cf. *τῶν ἀγωγῶν ἂν εἴη κτλ.* 525 A. For the error see *Introd.* § 5.

ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν· εἰ δ' ἀεί τι αὐτῷ ἅμα ὁρᾶται ἐναντίωμα, ὥστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον φαίνεσθαι, τοῦ ἐπικρινοῦντος δὴ δέοι ἂν ἤδη καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτ' ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν κινοῦσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ ἀνερωτᾶν, τί
525 ποτε ἔστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, καὶ οὕτω τῶν | ἀγωγῶν ἂν εἴη καὶ μετα- 35
στρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἓν μάθησις. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτό γ' ἔχει οὐχ ἥκιστα ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄψις· ἅμα γὰρ ταὐτὸν ὡς ἕν τε ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τὸ ἕν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ξύμπας ἀριθμὸς ταὐτὸν πέπονθε τοῦτο; Πῶς 5
δ' οὔ; Ἀλλὰ μὴν λογιστική τε καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ ἀριθμὸν πᾶσα.
B Καὶ μάλα. Ταῦτα δέ γε φαίνεται ἀγωγὰ | πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν. Ὧν ζητοῦμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, μαθημάτων ἂν εἴη· πολεμικῷ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὰς τάξεις ἀναγκαῖον μαθεῖν ταῦτα, φιλοσόφῳ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἁπτέον εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι, ἢ 10
μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι. Ἔστι ταῦτ', ἔφη. Ὁ δέ γε ἡμέτερος

5. τοῦτο Π: τούτῳ Α.

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524 E 31 **εἰ δ' ἀεί τι κτλ.** A *visible* **ἕν** is always seen both as ἕν and πολλά (one wood, many trees; one tree, many branches etc.).

33 **ἐν αὐτῷ** is not *ἐν τῷ ἑνί*, but 'in the case in question,' 'in such a case,' "dabei" (Schneider): cf. I 339 E *n.*

35 **αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν.** See on *αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν* 525 D.

525 A 3 **ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄψις.** I formerly read *αὐτό* instead of *τὸ αὐτό* with Ξ and a few inferior MSS. *αὐτό*, which Bekker, Schneider and Stallbaum adopt, is easier, but lacking in authority; and *τὸ αὐτό* is in reality more elegant. The marked antithesis between *ἡ περὶ τὸ ἓν μάθησις* ('the *intellectual* apprehension of the one') and *ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄψις* ('the *visual* apprehension of the same') makes it clear that *τὸ αὐτό* means 'the same' as that with which *ἡ μάθησις* was concerned (viz. *τὸ ἕν*), and not (as Hermann imagined) 'one and the same object of vision' (like *ταὐτόν* presently). Plato may have deliberately employed the two forms *τὸ αὐτό* and *ταὐτόν* in order to dissociate them from one another.

5 **καὶ ξύμπας ἀριθμὸς κτλ.** Because *ἀριθμός* is *τὸ ἐκ μονάδων συγκείμενον πλῆθος* (Euclid VII *def.* 2), or in other words a *σύστημα μονάδων* (Theo Smyrn. p. 18 ed. Hiller), and thus for example a visible three (i.e. three visible things) presents us with three separate cases of the contrast between ἕν and πολλά.

τοῦτο (see *cr. n.*) is preferable to *τούτῳ*, which appears in no MS except A, and would be superfluous after *εἴπερ τὸ ἕν*. Two MSS do in point of fact omit the word altogether.

6 **λογιστική τε καὶ ἀριθμητική.** Greek mathematicians distinguished between *ἀριθμητική* 'the science of numbers' and *λογιστική* 'the art of calculation' (Gow *Greek Math.* p. 22). It has been doubted whether Plato also held this distinction; but a comparison of *Gorg.* 451 B, 453 E, *Theaet.* 198 A (on *ἀριθμητική*) with *Gorg.* 451 C, *Charm.* 166 A, *Pol.* 259 E (on *λογιστική*) proves that he did (Rothlauf, l. c. pp. 19—21). Plato does not insist on the distinction here, but we may reasonably suppose that his pupils would begin with *λογισμοί* (*λογιστική*) and rise from thence to *ἀριθμητική*: cf. C, D and *Laws* 817 E, 819 A ff. See also on *λογιστικῷ* in B.

7 **ταῦτα**: i.e. *τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ*.

525 B 7 **ἀλήθειαν**: viz. the Ideas, and ultimately the Idea of Good (517 B).

10 **γενέσεως.** See on 519 A.

ἤ = 'alioquin' (V 463 D *n.*). Liebhold absurdly adds *ἔστιν* after *γενέσθαι*.

11 **λογιστικῷ**: 'a reasoning proficient in the art of calculation,' with a play on *λογιστικός* in its deeper sense, as

φύλαξ πολεμικός τε καὶ φιλόσοφος τυγχάνει ὤν. Τί μήν; Προσῆκον δὴ τὸ μάθημα ἂν εἴη, ὦ Γλαύκων, νομοθετῆσαι, καὶ πείθειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν μεγίστων μεθέξειν ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν
15 ἰέναι καὶ ἀνθάπτεσθαι αὐτῆς μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ θέαν C τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσει αὐτῇ, οὐκ ὠνῆς οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν ὡς ἐμπόρους ἢ καπήλους μελετῶντας, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα πολέμου τε καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ῥᾳστώνης μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ' ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν. Κάλλιστ', ἔφη, λέγεις. Καὶ
20 μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ ῥηθέντος τοῦ περὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς μαθήματος, ὡς κομψόν ἐστι καὶ πολλαχῇ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν πρὸς ὃ D βουλόμεθα, ἐὰν τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἕνεκά τις αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύῃ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ καπηλεύειν. Πῇ δή; ἔφη. Τοῦτό γε, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς σφόδρα ἄνω ποι ἄγει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν

18. ῥᾳστώνης Π : ῥᾳστώνης τε A.

Shorey points out (*Chicago Studies* I p. 222 *n.* 4), comparing the double meaning of *παρανομία* in IV 424 D. λογισμόν in 524 B prepared the way for this; and the same ambiguity partly explains why Plato puts λογιστική rather than *ἀριθμητική* in the forefront of this discussion (cf. λογιστικήν below and λογισμούς in C). We readily feel that λογιστική will arouse *τὸ* λογιστικόν. Cf. also X 602 E *n.*

13 καὶ πείθειν. *προσῆκον ἂν εἴη* is carried on: cf. I 334 B *n.* and infra 530 B. J. and C.'s explanation, that "*μάθημα* (or *αὐτό*) is to be repeated in the accusative after *νομοθετῆσαι* and *πείθειν ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι*," is untenable.

14 τῶν μεγίστων is idiomatically used of government: cf. 534 D and *Apol.* 22 D with my note ad loc.

525 C 15 **θέαν—αὐτῇ.** The 'nature of numbers' cannot be *fully* seen except in their connexion with the Good and with all other *νοητά* (VI 511 B—D *nn.*). Plato does not of course imply that *ἀριθμητική by itself* will achieve this result (although it may be doubted whether some of his successors did not exalt the science to something like this dignity: see e.g. the *Epinomis*): neither *ἀριθμητική* nor all the propaedeutic studies taken together will ever carry us so far. He only means that the student, having once set foot on the ladder, must not redescend until he reaches the Good. Then and then only will he understand the 'nature of numbers' i.e. the *Ideas* of 1, 2, etc., because only then will he know Numbers dialectically (VI 511 B). On the use of *φύσις* see X 597 B *n.*

16 τῇ νοήσει αὐτῇ: 'by thought alone.' *αὐτῇ* is 'by itself' i.e. (in this case) unadulterated with *αἴσθησις*: cf. 525 D *n.* and supra IV 437 E, 438 B, VI 510 B, D *nn.*

18 ῥᾳστώνης. A few inferior MSS add *καί* after this word: A alone has *ῥᾳστώνης τε*. I agree with Schneider in holding that the conjunctions are interpolated to avoid the concurrence of genitives, in which there is, however, no difficulty at all: cf. V 449 A *n.*

20 νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ. Cf. (with J. and C.) II 370 A *ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σοῦ.*

λογισμούς: see on λογιστικῷ in B.

525 D 24 **αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν**: 'numbers themselves,' e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4 etc., in other words individual mathematical numbers and nothing more. *αὐτῶν* means 'by themselves,' 'alone,' i.e. with nothing *αἰσθητόν* about them, such as is present in the *ὁρατὰ ἢ ἁπτὰ σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμούς* (= Aristotle's *αἰσθητικοὶ* or *σωματικοὶ ἀριθμοί*: v. Bonitz *Ind. Arist.* s. v. *ἀριθμός*), e.g. one man, two men etc. These mathematical numbers are not Ideas, but (like *τὰ μαθηματικά* generally) a half-way house between sensibles and Ideas, and for this reason valuable as a *προπαιδεία* to Dialectic: cf. 526 A *n.* and see on VI 510 D

ἀναγκάζει διαλέγεσθαι, οὐδαμῇ ἀποδεχόμενον, ἐάν τις αὐτῇ ὁρατὰ 25
ἢ ἁπτὰ σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμοὺς προτεινόμενος διαλέγηται. οἶσθα
Ε γάρ που τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα δεινούς[1], ὡς ἐάν τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ἐπιχειρῇ
τῷ λόγῳ τέμνειν, καταγελῶσί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλ' ἐὰν σὺ
κερματίζῃς αὐτό, ἐκεῖνοι πολλαπλασιοῦσιν, εὐλαβούμενοι μή ποτε
φανῇ τὸ ἓν μὴ ἓν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μόρια. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. 30
526 Τί οὖν οἴει, ὦ Γλαύ|κων, εἴ τις ἔροιτο αὐτούς, Ὦ θαυμάσιοι, περὶ
ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἓν οἷον ὑμεῖς ἀξιοῦτέ ἐστιν,

27. δεινοὺς Ξq: δεινοὺς δύο ΑΠ, sed δύο punctis notavere $A^2\Pi^2$. 2. ἀξιοῦτέ ἐστιν Ξq: ἀξιοῦτε· ἔστιν A: ἀξιοῦντε (sic) ἐστὶν Π.

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and App. I. For αὐτῶν in this sense cf. αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν in E, αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει 526 B and ἀριθμῶν αὐτῶν ἀλλ' οὐ σώματα ἐχόντων [*Epin.*] 990 C.

27 **δεινούς.** The word δύο, which was originally written after δεινούς (see *cr. n.*) in A and Π, is probably due to a marginal adscript on the words ἐάν τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ἐπιχειρῇ—τέμνειν. Burnet neatly conjectures δεινοὺς αὖ, but αὖ is inappropriate here.

525 E 27 ἐάν τις κτλ. αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν means 'the unit itself' i.e. the mathematical number 'one' which is *ex hypothesi* and by definition ἀμέριστον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον (Theo Smyrn. 18). If any one maintains that the mathematical unit *is* divisible, the mathematicians καταγελῶσί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται. *Quâ* mathematicians, they never condescend to justify either this or any other mathematical definition (οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι—διδόναι VI 510 C), and think it ridiculous that any one should question the foundations of their science. The moment they begin to render an account of their ὑποθέσεις they cease to be mathematicians and become διαλεκτικοί. See also on VI 510 C and App. III.

28 **ἐὰν σὺ κερματίζῃς κτλ.**: 'if *you* mince it, *they* multiply it.' If *you* insist on *dividing* their unit, *they* insist on *multiplying* it (viz. by your divisor), and so defeat your purpose and keep the unit one and indivisible as before. 'I cut that unit up!' you exclaim. 'I multiply it!' is their reply; and you are checkmated. *They* have just as much right to *multiply* it as *you* to *divide* it; for the mathematical unit is only a ὑπόθεσις when all is said and done. Plato is humorously describing a passage-at-arms between mathematicians and some obstinate fellow who will not admit the indivisibility of their unit. The words 'back again' in D. and V.'s translation "they multiply it back again" correspond to nothing in the Greek and suggest an erroneous idea; nor can the Greek mean "that division is regarded by them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be units" (as Jowett suggests). Each of these explanations misses the humour of the original. The word μόρια is doubtless genuine, though its rejection (proposed by Herwerden) would improve the antithesis. Cf. μορίῳ τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν (526 A), for which μόρια here prepares the way.

526 A 1 περὶ ποίων κτλ. On the derisive ποῖος see 522 D *n.* *Mathematical* units are in every case (ἕκαστον) equal each to each (πᾶν παντί), and destitute of parts; whereas *sensible* units (e.g. one horse, one cow etc.) are *not* equal to each other, and *are* divisible. In πᾶν παντί Plato copies the formal language of mathematics: cf. ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρᾳ and the like in Euclid *passim.* For the sense see *Phil.* 56 C ff., where these two kinds of number are made the basis of a distinction between philosophical or scientific and popular or unscientific ἀριθμητική. It should be carefully noted that a plurality of mathematical units is expressly recognised both here (ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντὶ κτλ.) and in *Phil.* l. c. (μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσαν). This entirely confirms what Aristotle tells us, viz. that Plato placed μαθηματικά between αἰσθητά and εἴδη, τῷ τὰ μὲν πόλλ' ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον μόνον (*Met.* A 6. 987^b 14 ff.). There are therefore three kinds of μονάδες in Plato's scheme—the Ideal μονάς, of

ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρον μόριόν τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν; τί ἂν οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀποκρίνασθαι; Τοῦτο ἔγωγε, ὅτι περὶ τούτων λέγουσιν, ὧν διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ, ἄλλως δ' οὐδαμῶς μεταχειρίζεσθαι δυνατόν. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν κινδυνεύει εἶναι τὸ μάθημα, ἐπειδὴ φαίνεταί γε προσαναγκάζον αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει χρῆσθαι τὴν B ψυχὴν ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν; Καὶ μὲν δή, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε ποιεῖ αὐτό. Τί δέ; τόδε ἤδη ἐπεσκέψω, ὡς οἵ τε φύσει λογιστικοὶ εἰς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὀξεῖς φύονται, οἵ τε βραδεῖς, ἂν ἐν τούτῳ παιδευθῶσι καὶ γυμνάσωνται, κἂν μηδὲν ἄλλο ὠφεληθῶσιν, ὅμως εἴς γε τὸ ὀξύτεροι αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν γίγνεσθαι πάντες ἐπιδιδόασιν; Ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτω. Καὶ μήν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἅ γε C

8. τῇ Π: om. A.

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which only one exists, the Mathematical and the Sensible, of each of which there are many. See on VI 510 D and App. I, where I have quoted further evidence on this subject, and endeavoured to explain the philosophical truth which is contained in the Platonic doctrine of mathematical numbers, magnitudes etc. as intermediates between the Ideas and sensibles.

5 **ὧν κτλ.** ὧν is for *περὶ ὧν* rather than ἃ (as J. and C. hold): cf. VI 510 D *οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοούμενοι*, and (for the grammatical construction) III 402 A *n. διανοηθῆναι* should be understood in the technical sense of VI 511 E.

7 **τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖον.** Perhaps with a play on *προσαναγκάζον* (J. and C.): see on *τῷ ὄντι* VI 511 B.

526 B 11 **ὀξεῖς κτλ.** Plato was very emphatic on this point: see *Laws* 747 B and 819 C. *φύονται* was restored by Schneider from the best MSS. Earlier editions read *φαίνονται* on inferior authority.

ἂν—γυμνάσωνται κτλ. Even Isocrates admits this, although his self-styled 'Philosophy' was something very different from Plato's: see *Antid.* 265—266, especially *γυμνασίαν μέντοι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ παρασκευὴν φιλοσοφίας καλῶ τὴν διατριβὴν τὴν τοιαύτην* (mathematical studies).

526 C 14 **ἅ γε μείζω κτλ.** is an important principle with Plato, who does not believe in any royal road to learning: cf. 530 C and VI 503 E. In antiquity, while algebra was still unknown, *ἀριθμητική* must have taxed the powers of thought far more than now, and been, from the Platonic point of view, all the more valuable on that account as an educative discipline. The treatment of numbers by Euclid Books VII—X will illustrate Plato's observation: see Gow *Gk Math.* pp. 74—85, with De Morgan's remarks there quoted.

16 **ὡς τοῦτο.** ὡς = 'quam' instead of ἤ is found sporadically in Greek literature after comparatives: see my note on *Ap.* 30 B, 36 D. To say that in all such cases the comparative is equivalent to *οὕτω* with the positive is only to shelve the difficulty; and it is better to recognise the usage as exceptional than summarily to dismiss it as a barbarism (with Thompson on *Gorg.* 492 E). J. and C. after *οὐδὲ πολλά* supply *ἃ πόνον οὕτω μέγαν παρέχεται*, but the ellipse is too difficult, especially as *οὐδὲ πολλά* is only a kind of afterthought to or elaboration of *οὐ ῥᾳδίως*.

526 C—**527** C *Next in order comes Plane Geometry. On its practical uses we need not dilate; the important question is whether it tends to turn the soul towards Being. A mere tiro in Geometry knows that it is not a practical art, in spite of such terms as 'squaring' etc., which the poverty of language compels it to employ. The object of geometrical knowledge is ever-existent Being. For this reason we shall prescribe the study of Geometry, a subject which is moreover practically useful and an excellent educational propaedeutic.*

526 C ff. On the subject of this

μείζω πόνον παρέχει μανθάνοντι καὶ μελετῶντι, οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὕροις ὡς τοῦτο. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Πάντων δὴ ἕνεκα τούτων οὐκ ἀφετέον τὸ μάθημα, ἀλλ' οἱ ἄριστοι τὰς φύσεις παιδευτέοι ἐν αὐτῷ. Ξύμφημι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

IX. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, εἶπον, ἓν ἡμῖν κείσθω· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου σκεψώμεθα ἆρά τι προσήκει ἡμῖν. Τὸ ποῖον; ἢ γεωμετρίαν, ἔφη, λέγεις; Αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ὅσον μέν, D ἔφη, πρὸς | τὰ πολεμικὰ αὐτοῦ τείνει, δῆλον ὅτι προσήκει· πρὸς γὰρ τὰς στρατοπεδεύσεις καὶ καταλήψεις χωρίων καὶ συναγωγὰς καὶ ἐκτάσεις στρατιᾶς καὶ ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζουσι τὰ στρατόπεδα ἐν αὐταῖς τε ταῖς μάχαις καὶ πορείαις, διαφέροι ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ μὴ ὤν. Ἀλλ' οὖν δή, εἶπον, πρὸς μὲν τὰ

16. ἂν εὕροις Π: ἀνεύροις A. 19. ἓν Ξ *q*: ἐν ΑΠ. 26. δὴ A^2Π: om. A^1.

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section consult Blass and Cantor referred to on 524 D, Rothlauf l.c. pp. 50—69, and App. II to this book. The great importance attached by Plato and his school to geometry and kindred studies is attested from many sources: see for example Philoponus *in Arist. de an.* I 3 (*Comment. in Arist.* p. 117. 26 ὁ Πλάτων οὗ καὶ πρὸ τῆς διατριβῆς ἐπεγέγραπτο Ἀγεωμέτρητος μὴ εἰσίτω, Tzetzes *Chil.* VIII 973 *μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω μου τὴν στέγην*, Proclus *in Euclid.* pp. 29 f. Friedlein Πλάτων καθαρτικὴν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἀναγωγὸν τὴν μαθηματικὴν εἶναι σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεται, τὴν ἀχλὺν ἀφαιροῦσαν τοῦ νοεροῦ τῆς διανοίας φωτὸς κτλ., and D. L. IV 10 πρὸς δὲ τὸν μήτε μουσικὴν μήτε γεωμετρίαν μήτε ἀστρονομίαν μεμαθηκότα, βουλόμενον δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν (Ξενοκράτη) φοιτᾶν· Πορεύου, ἔφη· λαβὰς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεις φιλοσοφίας. Among Plato's companions or pupils in the Academy, Eudoxus and Menaechmus rendered the most conspicuous services to mathematical science (see Allman *Greek Geometry from Thales to Euclid* pp. 129—179), and Euclid himself, according to Proclus (*in Euclid.* p. 68), was τῇ προαιρέσει Πλατωνικὸς καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ ταύτῃ οἰκεῖος. That ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖ was a characteristic and profound saying of Plato's (Plut. *Conv. Disp.* VIII 2. 718 C ff.), on the meaning of which see App. I.

19 **τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου.** If γεωμετρία i.e. ἡ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου (plane surfaces) πραγματεία (528 D) concerns itself with δεύτερα αὔξη, and Stereometry with τρίτη αὔξη, we may infer that ἀριθμητική deals with the πρώτη αὔξη, i.e. presumably the line, which, according to the Pythagoreans, is a collection of points (cf. *Laws* 894 A and Rothlauf l.c. p. 51). And in point of fact the line represented number among the Pythagoreans exactly as the point is the geometrical symbol for the unit: cf. IX 587 D *n.* Hence ἐχόμενον τούτου: we take the δεύτερα αὔξη after the first. See also App. II to this Book, and App. I to Book VIII Part I § 2.

21 **ἦ γεωμετρίαν κτλ.** The sequence —Geometry after ἀριθμητική—was probably a usual one with teachers, even in Plato's time: see Grasberger *Erziehung u. Unterricht* II p. 340 and cf. App. II.

ὅσον μὲν κτλ. is exactly the attitude of the historical Socrates, as Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 376) and others have pointed out, comparing Xen. *Mem.* IV 7. 2 ff. Practical necessities of this kind probably originated the science (Gow *Gk Math.* pp. 134 ff.) and gave it its name γεωμετρία. The name μαθήματα (or μαθηματικά) in the special sense of Mathematics owes its origin, no doubt, to the position occupied by mathematical studies in Plato's μαθήματα: but the usage itself is not found till Aristotle (Rothlauf l.c. p. 18), although it is clear from [*Epin.*] 990 D, that some Platonists resented the γελοῖον ὄνομα γεωμετρίαν. Glauco represents the practical point of view throughout: cf. 527 D.

526 D 25 καὶ πορείαις. "Scriptum vellem καὶ ἐν πορείαις" (Stallbaum). The idiom is common enough: see Kühner-Blass *Gr. Gr.* II 1, p. 548.

τοιαῦτα βραχύ τι ἂν ἐξαρκοῖ γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν μόριον· τὸ δὲ πολὺ αὐτῆς καὶ πορρωτέρω προϊὸν σκοπεῖσθαι | δεῖ εἴ τι E
πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τείνει, πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν κατιδεῖν ῥᾷον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
30 ἰδέαν. τείνει δέ, φαμέν, πάντα αὐτόσε, ὅσα ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς
ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον μεταστρέφεσθαι, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον
τοῦ ὄντος, ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.
Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν ἀναγκάζει θεάσασθαι, προσήκει, εἰ δὲ γένεσιν,
οὐ προσήκει. Φαμέν γε δή. Οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γε, | ἦν δ' ἐγώ, 527
ἀμφισβητήσουσιν ἡμῖν ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι, ὅτι
αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἔχει τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ λόγοις λεγο-
μένοις ὑπὸ τῶν μεταχειριζομένων. Πῶς; ἔφη. Λέγουσι μέν που
5 μάλα γελοίως τε καὶ ἀναγκαίως· ὡς γὰρ πράττοντές τε καὶ πρά-
ξεως ἕνεκα πάντας τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι λέγουσιν τετραγωνίζειν
τε καὶ παρατείνειν καὶ προστιθέναι καὶ πάντα οὕτω φθεγγόμενοι·

28. προιὸν Π: προσιὸν A. 32. ὃ Π: οὐ A^1: οὗ A^2.

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526 E 31 **τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος** is cited by Stumpf (l.c. p. 95 *n.* 3) in support of his identification of the Idea of Good with God: see on VI 505 A.

33 **γένεσιν.** 519 A *n.*

527 A 3 **αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη κτλ.**: 'the nature of this science is in precise contradiction to' etc. **πᾶν τοὐναντίον** is adverbial, and **ἔχει** intransitive. In what follows Plato is not (as Stallbaum strangely supposes) censuring contemporary geometricians, "sed vitium quoddam ipsius scientiae" (Schneider, who refers to VI 510 B—511 A), for even those **ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι** agree with him. It is however probable on other grounds that Plato himself was afraid lest his pupils should depend too much on geometrical figures and instruments; and Plutarch tells us that he reproved Eudoxus and others for this very fault: **ἀπόλλυσθαι γὰρ οὕτω καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι τὸ γεωμετρίας ἀγαθὸν αὖθις ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ παλινδρομούσης, καὶ μὴ φερομένης ἄνω μηδὲ ἀντιλαμβανομένης τῶν ἀϊδίων καὶ ἀσωμάτων εἰκόνων, πρὸς οἷσπερ ὢν ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ θεός ἐστι** (*Conv. Disp.* VIII 2. 718 F: cf. also *Vit. Marc.* 14. 5—7. The anecdote refers in particular to stereometrical instruments, but its moral applies equally to the study of plane geometry). See Rothlauf l.c. pp. 66 ff. and Gow *Gk Math.* p. 181.

5 **ἀναγκαίως** 'in beggarly fashion' ("nothgedrungenen Weise" Prantl). They are 'hard up' for words to express their meaning, and must consequently use language which does not: cf. VI 510 D. J. and C.'s explanation "with merely practical needs in view" is quite wrong; nor does the word appear to me to contain "a facetious allusion to geometrical necessity" (in the sense of V 458 D), as they assert. Madvig's **ἀκάκως** for **ἀναγκαίως** is a singularly unhappy suggestion.

7 **παρατείνειν** = 'to apply,' e.g. a parallelogram to a given line: cf. *Men.* 87 A (**παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν—γραμμὴν παρατείναντα κτλ.**) with E. S. Thompson's note. Blass takes the same view (*de Pl. math.* p. 19). Euclid's expression for this is **παραβάλλειν** (X 18 ff. and *passim*: cf. Cantor l.c. p. 145). The ordinary translation 'produce' (as e.g. a line) has no authority, and Euclid's word for 'producing' a line is **ἐκβάλλειν** or **προσεκβάλλειν** (I 5, 17 and *passim*. So also in Aristotle: see the *Ind. Arist.* s.v.).

προστιθέναι: 'to add,' sc. one **μέγεθος** to another in any geometrical construction: cf. Nicom. *Introd. Ar.* II 12. 2. Euclid uses **συντιθέναι, σύγκειμαι** (X 16 and *passim*) of such an operation.

φθεγγόμενοι is said "non sine eleganti quadam irrisione" (Stallbaum): cf. VI 505 C *n.*

B τὸ δ' ἔστι που πᾶν τὸ μάθημα | γνώσεως ἕνεκα ἐπιτηδευόμενον.
Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔτι διομολογητέον; Τὸ
ποῖον; Ὡς τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος γνώσεως, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ποτέ τι γιγνομένου 10
καὶ ἀπολλυμένου. Εὐομολόγητον, ἔφη· τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἡ
γεωμετρικὴ γνῶσίς ἐστιν. Ὁλκὸν ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε, ψυχῆς πρὸς
ἀλήθειαν εἴη ἂν καὶ ἀπεργαστικὸν φιλοσόφου διανοίας πρὸς τὸ
ἄνω σχεῖν ἃ νῦν κάτω οὐ δέον ἔχομεν. Ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ἔφη.
C Ὡς οἷόν τ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' | ἐγώ, μάλιστα προστακτέον, ὅπως οἱ ἐν τῇ 15
καλλιπόλει σοι μηδενὶ τρόπῳ γεωμετρίας ἀφέξονται. καὶ γὰρ τὰ

11. εὐομολόγητον Π et γρ in marg. A^2: εὖ διομολογητέον A^1. 16. ἀφέξονται Ξ: ἀφέξωνται AΠ *q*.

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8 **τὸ δέ**: 'whereas': cf. I 340 D *n*.

527 B 10 **τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος**. Plato held the objects of mathematical study to be *ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα* 'eternal and unchangeable' (Arist. *Met.* A 6. 987^b 16: cf. VI 510 C ff., VII 526 A *n*.), but not Ideas. The Platonic meaning of *τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος* is certainly not exhausted by the observation that "the truths of every science are always true" (Bosanquet). *ὄντος* implies substantial existence, independently of our thoughts, and independently also of particulars. The existence of *τὰ μαθηματικά* as *μιμήματα τῶν ὄντων* or copies of the Ideas, 'moving in and out of' the material substance of the Universe, which they stamp with an infinite diversity of forms and shapes, is a cardinal doctrine of Plato's physics (*Tim.* 50 C al.), and Bosanquet appears to me to rob the words of Plato of half their significance, in the fruitless attempt to find in his ontology nothing but what commends itself to certain schools of philosophy in the present day. See V 476 E and App. I.

10 **τοῦ ποτέ κτλ.**: 'that which at some particular time is a particular instance of becoming and perishing.' *τι γιγνομένου=ὄντος* (the copula) *γιγνομένου τινός*, but *γιγνομένου* itself involves the copula, the presence of which would here be intolerable. Cf. V 473 D *n*. and *Euthyph.* 10 C *εἴ τι γίγνεται ἢ τι πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι, γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι γίγνεται, γιγνόμενόν ἐστι*. Here *τι* is indeclinable like *τι* in *Lach.* 200 B, *Menex.* 247 B (*οἰομένῳ τι εἶναι*), *Euthyd.* 303 C (*δοκούντων τι εἶναι*), *οὐδέν, μηδέν* etc. tolerably often in tragedy, and the adverbial use of *ἀμφότερα* and *τἀναντία* (e.g. *Lach.* 185 A *νέων γὰρ που ἢ χρηστῶν ἢ τἀναντία γενομένων κτλ.*): cf. also (with Schneider *Addit.* p. 57) Procl. *in Tim.* 136 E *τοῦ—ἀδιαιρέτως πάντα ὄντος* et al. The indeclinable form adds to the emphasis, and indeed *τινὸς* (if placed after *ποτέ*) could hardly stand at all. Schneider translates "des etwas werdenden und vergehenden," apparently taking *τι* predicatively with *γιγνομένου*. But the expression 'that which becomes something' suggests a substratum underlying *γιγνόμενον*, whereas the only correct antithesis to *ὄν* (*τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος*) is *γιγνόμενον* itself. Stallbaum wrongly explains *τι* as "aliqua ratione." A few inferior MSS omit the word. I believe the text is sound, though possibly *τι* should be accented, as in the exactly similar Aristotelian usage of *τις* "ad significandam *τὴν ἀτομότητα*" (Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* p. 763) e.g. *ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος*. The use of *ποτέ* also reminds us of the *ποτέ* of the Categories.

12 **γεωμετρική** is an adjective (Schneider).

14 **σχεῖν**. The tense is inchoative or ingressive, as usual: see 516 E *n*.

527 C 16 **καλλιπόλει**. Socrates rallies Glauco on his 'braif toun.' The word, as J. and C. point out, is full of tenderness and affection. Callipolis was the name of several cities in Greece (Pape-Benseler *Gr. Eigennam.* s.v.), a fact which sufficiently refutes Herwerden's doubts as to the formation of the word: see also (with Schneider) Lobeck's *Phrynichus* pp. 600—607. Herwerden ought not to have revived the tasteless and prosaic conjectures *καλῇ πόλει* (Π^2) and *καλλίστῃ πόλει* (Ξ).

πάρεργα αὐτοῦ οὐ σμικρά. Ποῖα; ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἃ τε δὴ σὺ εἶπες, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς πάσας μαθήσεις, ὥστε κάλλιον ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἴσμεν που ὅτι τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ διοίσει ἡμμένος τε γεωμετρίας καὶ μή. Τῷ παντὶ μέντοι νὴ Δί', ἔφη. Δεύτερον δὴ τοῦτο τιθῶμεν μάθημα τοῖς νέοις; Τιθῶμεν, ἔφη.

X. Τί δέ; | τρίτον θῶμεν ἀστρονομίαν; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ; Ἐμοὶ D γοῦν, ἔφη· τὸ γὰρ περὶ ὥρας εὐαισθητοτέρως ἔχειν καὶ μηνῶν καὶ

24. ἐμοὶ γοῦν Π: ἔμοιγ' οὖν A.

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17 **αὐτοῦ**: viz. *τοῦ μαθήματος*.

18 **καὶ δὴ καὶ κτλ.** See on 526 B.

20 **ἡμμένος τε.** Herwerden excises *τε*, comparing 526 D; but the MSS are a safer guide.

527 C—528 E *Shall we prescribe Astronomy as our third subject? Glauco approves, pointing to its usefulness in practical affairs. After reproving his friend for advocating the Platonic curriculum chiefly on this ground, Socrates observes that the solid should first be studied in itself, and afterwards the solid in motion. In other words Stereometry should precede Astronomy. Although the problems of Stereometry are not yet solved, we may hope for success under proper guidance, and with the support of the State.*

527 D ff. On stereometry in the age of Plato see Rothlauf l.c. pp. 69—74, Cantor l.c. pp. 194—202, Tannery *Rev. Phil.* X (1880) pp. 523 ff. The most famous stereometrical problem of Plato's time was the so-called 'Delian problem' or duplication of the cube, and it is highly probable that Plato had this question in his mind when he wrote the present chapter. A dramatic poet, whom Valckenaer supposed to be Euripides, had already made allusion to it in the lines *μικρὸν γ' ἔλεξας βασιλικοῦ σηκὸν τάφου· | διπλάσιος ἔστω. τοῦ καλοῦ* (v.l. *κύβου*) *δὲ μὴ σφαλεὶς | δίπλαξ' ἕκαστον κῶλον ἐν τάχει τάφου* (Nauck *Trag. Gr. Fr.* p. 676). The story runs that the Delians, having been commanded by an oracle to double a certain altar, were in great perplexity, *διαπεμψαμένους δὲ τοὺς παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ γεωμέτρας ἀξιοῦν αὐτοῖς εὑρεῖν τὸ ζητούμενον* (Eratosthenes, quoted by Eutocius in Archimed. III pp. 102 ff. Heiberg. See also Plut. *de gen. Socr.* 7. 579 B—D and *de el ap. Delphos* 6. 386 E f., and Johannes Philop. quoted by Sturm *Das Delische Problem* p. 10). Plato favourably entertained their application, and the students of the Academy set to work with extraordinary enthusiasm. A remarkable stimulus was thereby given to the study of stereometry, and the Delian problem was successfully solved. The anecdote may of course be apocryphal, but we have not the smallest reason for rejecting it. The memory of such incidents is usually cherished with peculiar care in the history of a College, and Eratosthenes (276—194 B.C.) was born only seventy-one years after Plato's death. In any case the duplication of the cube may well have seemed in Plato's time a question of the first importance for the purposes of stereometrical science, for, as Tannery remarks (l.c. p. 256), the duplication of the square, which had already been discovered (*Men.* 82 B ff.), was believed to be the key to plane problems, and so it was probably surmised that the *διπλασιασμὸς τοῦ κύβου* would give the solution of a whole series of solid problems. English readers will find a short account of this classical *ἀπορία* with some of its ancient solutions in Rouse Ball's *Math. Recreations and Problems* pp. 154 ff. The most elaborate and exhaustive history of the problem and its solutions in antiquity is that of Sturm *Das Delische Problem* 1896.

23 **ἐμοὶ γοῦν.** Schneider and others write *ἔμοιγ' οὖν* (see *cr. n.*), but *οὖν* is too strongly illative for this passage. Cf. I 335 E *n.*

24 **τὸ γὰρ περὶ κτλ.** Cf. 526 C *n.* and Xenophon there quoted, esp. § 4 *ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ ἀστρολογίας ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτης μέντοι μέχρι τοῦ νυκτός τε ὥραν καὶ μηνὸς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύνασθαι γιγνώσκειν κτλ.* and infra *τὰς ὥρας τῶν εἰρημένων διαγιγνώσκοντες*. The ana-

ἐνιαυτῶν οὐ μόνον γεωργίᾳ οὐδὲ ναυτιλίᾳ προσήκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ 25
στρατηγίᾳ οὐχ ἧττον. Ἡδὺς εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἔοικας δεδιότι τοὺς
πολλούς, μὴ δοκῇς ἄχρηστα μαθήματα προστάττειν. τὸ δ' ἔστιν
οὐ πάνυ φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς
μαθήμασιν ἑκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεταί τε καὶ ἀναζω-
E πυρεῖται | ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευ- 30
μάτων, κρεῖττον ὂν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ
ἀλήθεια ὁρᾶται. οἷς μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ ἀμηχάνως ὡς εὖ
δόξεις λέγειν· ὅσοι δὲ τούτου μηδαμῇ ἠσθημένοι εἰσίν, εἰκότως

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logy of this passage suggests that in Plato καὶ ('both') μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν depends on ὥρας, which is the accusative plural: cf. *Laws* 812 B εὐαισθήτους δεῖν γεγονέναι περί τε τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς κτλ. Practical astronomy will enable one to tell both the time of month and the time of year by looking at the moon and the sun. For ὥρας μηνῶν cf. also, besides the passage of Xenophon just quoted, Eur. *Alc.* 449 f. Σπάρτᾳ κυκλὰς ἀνίκα Καρνείου περινίσσεται ὥρα | μηνός κτλ. Schneider and the English translators take ὥρας as genitive and parallel with μηνῶν κτλ., but it is difficult to see what εὐαισθητοτέρως ἔχειν περὶ ἐνιαυτῶν can mean: for ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὡρῶν in VI 488 D is quite different. Schleiermacher translates the passage correctly.

εὐαισθητοτέρως. For this form of the comparative adverb see I 343 E *n.*

26 **ἡδὺς εἶ**: 'you amuse me.' See I 337 D *n.*

27 **μὴ δοκῇς κτλ.** The usefulness of 'useless' studies is a fundamental principle in Plato's theory; and (as Schneider points out) ὅτι ἐν τούτοις κτλ. is intended to shew that liberal studies *are* in the highest and truest sense useful.

τὸ δ' ἔστιν. I 340 D *n.*

28 **χαλεπόν.** Cobet's παγχάλεπον (after Nicom. *Introd. Ar.* III 7) is a wholly gratuitous change: see App. VII.

29 **ἑκάστου.** *Every* human being has an ὄργανον ψυχῆς viz. νοῦς: it is indeed the possession of νοῦς which makes him at once truly human and therewithal divine (VI 501 B *n.*). The genitive is much more expressive than ἑκάστῳ, which Herwerden proposes: cf. 518 C *n.*, and for the combination of genitives V 449 A *n.*

ἐκκαθαίρεται κτλ.: 'is purged and rekindled.' In passages like this Plato hurls his metaphors about with Shakespearian vehemence and profusion. Cf. II 365 C *n.*, and see the admirable remarks on metaphor by the author of the treatise περὶ ὕψους 32. 4 πλήθους καὶ τόλμης μεταφορῶν—τὰ εὔκαιρα καὶ σφοδρὰ πάθη καὶ τὸ γενναῖον ὕψος εἶναί φημι ἴδιά τινα ἀλεξιφάρμακα, ὅτι τῷ ῥοθίῳ τῆς φορᾶς ταντὶ πέφυκεν ἅπαντα τἄλλα παρασύρειν καὶ προωθεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ὡς ἀναγκαῖα πάντως εἰσπράττεσθαι τὰ παράβολα, καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν σχολάζειν περὶ τὸν τοῦ πλήθους ἔλεγχον διὰ τὸ συνενθουσιᾶν τῷ λέγοντι. The eye of soul is purged of its blindness: its smouldering fires flame forth afresh. To translate "'is polished' like a soiled mirror" (J. and C.), besides being wrong, falls far below the level of Plato's ὕψος. The chiasmus in ἐκκαθαίρεται—τυφλούμενον adds to the literary effect. On other readings in this passage see App. VII.

527 E 32 οἷς μὲν οὖν κτλ. The logical sequence is somewhat difficult. Do not (says Socrates) be so anxious to persuade οἱ πολλοί of the usefulness of our curriculum. Its *true* utility is difficult to understand, and οἱ πολλοί will not easily be persuaded of it. Those who agree with us about its *true* utility will highly approve of your proposals; but οἱ πολλοί will not, for they can see no *practical* advantage (worthy of mention) accruing from them. δόξεις λέγειν attributes the proposals to Glauco as in D μὴ δοκῇς—προστάττειν, and ἄλλην is said with reference to τούτου. To the ὠφελία of intellectual salvation such persons are blind; and they cannot see any other, i.e. any *practical* ὠφελία worth mentioning in Plato's studies. ἄλλην cannot be understood as "beyond their practical applications" (D. and V.) unless we refer it to Glauco's remark τὸ γὰρ περὶ κτλ. in D, to the detriment both of grammar and of sense.

ἠγήσονταί σε λέγειν οὐδέν· ἄλλην γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν οὐχ ὁρῶσιν
35 ἀξίαν λόγου ὠφελίαν. σκόπει οὖν αὐτόθεν, πρὸς ποτέρους διαλέγει·
ἢ οὐ | πρὸς οὐδετέρους, ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιεῖ 528
τοὺς λόγους, φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλῳ, εἴ τίς τι δύναιτο ἀπ'
αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι; Οὕτως, ἔφη, αἱροῦμαι, ἐμαυτοῦ ἕνεκα τὸ πλεῖστον
λέγειν τε καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Ἄναγε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
5 εἰς τοὐπίσω· νῦν δὴ γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸ ἑξῆς ἐλάβομεν τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ.
Πῶς λαβόντες; ἔφη. Μετὰ ἐπίπεδον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν περιφορᾷ ὂν
ἤδη στερεὸν λαβόντες, πρὶν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ λαβεῖν· | ὀρθῶς δὲ B
ἔχει ἑξῆς μετὰ δευτέραν αὔξην τρίτην λαμβάνειν. ἔστι δέ που
τοῦτο περὶ τὴν τῶν κύβων αὔξην καὶ τὸ βάθους μετέχον. Ἔστι
10 γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖ οὔπω ηὑρῆσθαι.

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527 E—**528** A 35 **σκόπει οὖν κτλ.** 'Very well: make up your mind once for all with which of these parties you are discoursing: or are you not addressing your remarks to either, but' etc.? Glauco's insistence on the practical uses of astronomy may be all very well with a popular audience, but are out of place in a philosophical discussion. For this peremptory *αὐτόθεν* cf. *Symp.* 213 A. *οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους* lit. 'not to neither': cf. the familiar *μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ* for *μᾶλλον ἤ* (Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II pp. 771—773). I understand *ἢ—ὄνασθαι* (with Ast) as an independent question: for it is difficult to supply 'whether.' Schneider's objections to this view are based on the idea that *ἢ οὐ* (if interrogative) must have an affirmative answer; but *οὐ* has nothing to do with *ἤ*, and only balances *ἀλλά*: cf. Ar. *Plut.* 372 *μῶν οὐ κέκλοφας, ἀλλ' ἥρπακας*; Plato makes this clear by placing the two contrasting clauses in close juxtaposition. *οὐ* is omitted by Ξ and some inferior MSS. The text is, however, sound, and none of the proposed corrections—*σὺ* for *οὐ* (Schneider), *εἰ πρὸς οὐδετέρους* (Madvig), *οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους* (Cobet), *εἰ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους* (Baiter), *ἢ που πρὸς οὐδετέρους* (Liebhold)—will bear examination, though Cobet's deserves the praise of elegance.

528 A 4 **ἄναγε—εἰς τοὐπίσω**: 'fall back then': cf. Ar. *Birds* 383 *ἄναγ' ἐπὶ σκέλος*, with Blaydes' note. The metaphor is not naval (as Ast and Stallbaum hold), but military, nor is *ἀνάγειν* (*ναῦν*) even in naval language 'inhibere,' but 'put out to sea,' as in Hdt. VII 100, VIII 76 et al. and occasionally in Attic (for *ἀνάγεσθαι*). Cf. *ἀνεχώρησας* 528 D.

5 **οὐκ ὀρθῶς**: see on *τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου* 526 C. The subjects ought to follow each other in the order of their complexity: see App. II. Plato's error was of course deliberately "contrived to emphasize the principle which it violated" (Bosanquet), and also, it may be added, to enable him to call especial attention to the study of Stereometry, on which he laid very great stress (527 D *n.*).

7 **ἤδη** should be taken with *ὄν* ('already in revolution'), not (as D. and V.) with *λαβόντες*.

528 B 8 **δευτέραν αὔξην κτλ.** It is better (with Schneider) to translate *αὔξη* by 'increase' than by 'dimension'; for *αὔξη* always implies something increased, and in the phrases *δευτέρα αὔξη* etc. this 'something' is the point. Among the Pythagoreans, who probably originated these expressions, the line was regarded as an *αὔξη* of the point, the plane of the line, the solid of the plane. See App. II.

9 **κύβων αὔξην**: 'cubic increase,' i.e. the increase which belongs to, or results in, cubes, with perhaps also a play on a different sense of *κύβων αὔξην*, 'how to increase cubes,' as in the famous 'Delian problem' of the *διπλασιασμὸς κύβου* (so also Tannery l. c. X p. 525). See on 527 D. But as cubes are not the only solid bodies, Plato adds *τὸ βάθους μετέχον*. By Aristotle's time the name *στερεομετρία* had been invented to designate the science as a whole (*An. Post.* II 13. 78^{b} 38).

10 **ταῦτά γε—ηὑρῆσθαι.** Plato does not of course mean to say that the *study* of Stereometry had not yet been invented, for the subject had already in one form or another engaged the attention of the Py-

Διττὰ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὰ αἴτια· ὅτι τε οὐδεμία πόλις ἐντίμως αὐτὰ ἔχει, ἀσθενῶς ζητεῖται χαλεπὰ ὄντα, ἐπιστάτου τε δέονται οἱ ζητοῦντες, ἄνευ οὗ οὐκ ἂν εὕροιεν· ὃν πρῶτον μὲν γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, ἔπειτα καὶ γενομένου, ὡς νῦν ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν πείθοιντο οἱ περὶ
C ταῦτα ζητητικοὶ μεγαλοφρονούμενοι. | εἰ δὲ πόλις ὅλη ξυνεπιστατοῖ 15

12. τε $A^2\Pi$: om. A^1. 14. οὐκ—μεγαλοφρονούμενοι Π et in marg. A^2: om. A^1.

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thagoreans, Anaxagoras and Democritus (Blass l.c. p. 21, Tannery l.c. X p. 524), not to speak of Hippocrates of Chios, who had concerned himself in the fifth century B.C. with the question of the duplication of the cube (Allman *Gk Geometry* etc. pp. 84 ff.). He only means that its problems had not yet been 'discovered' (*ηὑρῆσθαι* as in Pythagoras' *ηὕρηκα*) or solved. When and by whom the 'Delian problem' in particular was definitively solved to the satisfaction of the Academy, is not quite clear. The tradition which ascribes a solution of it to Plato himself is beset with grave difficulties, as Blass (l.c. pp. 21—30) and others have pointed out (see especially Cantor l.c. pp. 194—202 and Sturm *Das Delische Problem* pp. 49 ff.). It is however universally allowed that the principle involved —the finding of "two mean proportionals between one straight line and another twice as long" (Gow *Gk Math.* p. 169) —was first stated by Hippocrates of Chios and well known to Plato, at all events when he wrote the *Timaeus* (32 A ff. : see also Häbler *Ueber zwei Stellen in Platons Timaeus* etc. pp. 1—17). We may perhaps infer from *οὔπω ηὑρῆσθαι* that Plato did not think a final solution of this as of other stereometrical problems had yet been reached: there is at all events nothing in the *Republic* to justify the curious statement of Diogenes Laertius that ('Αρχύτας) *πρῶτος κύβου διπλασιασμὸν εὗρεν, ὥς φησι* Πλάτων *ἐν πολιτείᾳ* (VIII 83), although it is probably true that Archytas was the first to offer a solution of the famous difficulty (see Sturm l.c. pp. 22—32). In D. L. l.c. Cobet reads *πρῶτος κύβον εὗρεν* κτλ., whether on his own responsibility, or on MS authority, he does not tell us. See also on 527 D, 528 C.

11 **ὅτι τε κτλ.** In *Laws* 819 E ff. Plato reproaches the Greeks for their ignorance of and indifference to stereometrical questions.

ἐντίμως ἔχει: 'holds in honour,' as in VIII 548 A. The expression usually means 'is honoured' (Xen. *An.* II 1. 7): hence *ἄγει* for *ἔχει* is proposed by Herwerden, who compares 528 C, 538 E. But the error is not an easy one in such a MS as A, and it is safer to keep *ἔχει* and take the phrase as=*ἐν τιμῇ ἔχει* (cf. *ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ ἔχει* Hdt. III 3, *ἐν εὐνοίᾳ ἔχειν* [Dem.] 284. 11, and Jebb on Soph. *Ant.* 639) as *ἄγειν ἐντίμως*=*ἄγειν ἐν τιμῇ* (538 E).

14 **ὡς νῦν ἔχει** belongs no doubt to the following clauses (IV 419 A *n.*): but see also on 528 C.

15 **μεγαλοφρονούμενοι** is condemned as un-Attic by Cobet (*V. L.*^{2} pp. 232, 531); but *μεγαλόφρων*, *μεγαλοφροσύνη* are Attic, and Xenophon uses *μεγαλοφρονεῖν*. *μεγαλαυχούμενοι* (Cobet's emendation) would mean 'vaunting': cf. III 395 D.

528 C 15 εἰ δὲ πόλις κτλ. is perhaps the earliest demand in literature for the State-encouragement—we might almost say the State-endowment—of pure science (cf. Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 169). Plato implies that in his city this claim will be fully satisfied; and the Platonic Utopia is in fact "la revendication du pouvoir pour la science" (Tannery l.c. p. 521).

ξυνεπιστατοῖ κτλ.: 'should cooperate with the superintendent' etc. not (as Jowett) 'become the director of these studies': for a special *ἐπιστάτης*—Plato has just said—is needed in any case. Plato's picture of the *odium stereometricum*, if the phrase may be allowed, is evidently drawn from life. He seems to speak as if he had himself an *ἐπιστάτης* ready, and wished to secure for him public support in order that students might be willing to work under him. Now although *ὡς νῦν ἔχει* belongs, strictly speaking, to the following clause, the words *may*, so far as the Greek is concerned, be connected with *ἔπειτα καὶ γενομένου*, and will then be equivalent to *ὡς νῦν ἐγένετο ἐπιστάτης*. I think it not impossible that Plato intended his readers to suspect him

ἐντίμως ἄγουσα αὐτά, οὗτοί τε ἂν πείθοιντο, καὶ ξυνεχῶς τε ἂν καὶ ἐντόνως ζητούμενα ἐκφανῆ γένοιτο ὅπῃ ἔχει· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητούντων, λόγον οὐκ ἐχόντων καθ' ὅ τι χρήσιμα, ὅμως πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα βίᾳ ὑπὸ χάριτος αὐξάνεται, καὶ οὐδὲν ' θαυμαστὸν αὐτὰ φανῆναι. Καὶ μὲν D

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of this further meaning. If there is anything in this conjecture, to whom does Plato allude? Not, surely, to himself, although some have suspected the philosopher of blowing his own trumpet in a somewhat similar passage of the *Phaedo* (78 A): see Lutoslawski's *Plato's Logic* pp. 263 f. We are told by Plutarch *de genio Socratis* 7. 579 C that Plato referred the Delian deputation to Eudoxus, telling them that the problem was *οὔ τοι φαῦλον οὐδ' ἀμβλὺ διανοίας ὁρώσης, ἄκρως δὲ τὰς γραμμὰς ἠσκημένης ἔργον εἶναι· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν Εὔδοξον αὐτοῖς τὸν Κνίδιον ἢ τὸν Κυζικηνὸν Ἑλικῶνα συντελέσειν* κτλ. Now we know that Eudoxus not only himself achieved a solution of the Delian problem (Sturm l.c. pp. 32—37), but was also, in the fullest sense of the term, 'the founder of scientific Stereometry' (Günther in Müller's *Handbuch* V 1, p. 30), and did more for the subject than any of Plato's disciples (Cantor l.c. pp. 208—210). For these reasons I think it not unlikely that Plato has Eudoxus in his mind. Eudoxus and his pupils seem to have been living and working in the Academy along with the followers of Plato some time between Plato's second and third visits to Sicily (368 B.C. and 361 B.C.: see Allman *Gk Geometry* etc. p. 178), and it is a pleasing and I hope pardonable conjecture—I do not claim that it is more—to suppose that Plato avails himself of this opportunity to pay a graceful compliment to his fellow-workers. See also on line 19 below and *Introd.* § 4.

16 **ἐντίμως ἄγουσα.** The phrase is illustrated by Lobeck *Phryn.* p. 419.

18 **ὑπὸ δὲ** κτλ. *ὑπὸ* depends on *ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα*. There is a sense in which the students also *ἀτιμάζουσι καὶ κολούουσι* a subject, which they *ἀσθενῶς ζητοῦσιν* (B above). *κολουόμενα* is in harmony with *αὐξάνεται*—though cut short, the study still grows or advances. For other views on this sentence see App. VIII.

λόγον κτλ. The *ζητοῦντες* are the *ζητητικοί* of B—not, I think, Plato's pupils, but men who cannot explain the *true* utility of stereometry (as described in 527 D, E), and are unwilling to throw their whole hearts into a 'useless' study.

19 **βίᾳ—αὐξάνεται.** Blass (l.c. p. 22) observes that in these words "sine dubio mathematici ex schola Platonis profecti intelligendi sunt." It is just conceivable —though of course no stress should be laid on the conjecture—that *ὑπὸ χάριτος* conceals some complimentary allusion to a particular person. If so, Eudoxus may be intended (see above on 528 C). There is, it is true, a tradition that Plato and Eudoxus had not always been on the best of terms (Allman *Gk Geom.* pp. 128 f.), but during the visit of Eudoxus to Athens between 368 and 361 B.C., they appear to have worked harmoniously and even cordially together (ib. pp. 133, 178). See also 530 A *n.* But we have no evidence to shew that Eudoxus bore the sobriquet of *χάρις*, though his character and personality (see Arist. *Eth. Nic.* X 2. 1172^{b} 15 ff.), and even perhaps his name, deserved such a compliment. I think Plato means merely 'through elegance,' i.e. through the inherent elegance of the subject: cf. *τό γε ἐπίχαρι καὶ διαφερόντως ἔχει*. The use of *ὑπό* is as in *ὑπὸ δέους φωνὴν ἔρρηξε* and the like: see Kühner-Gerth *Gr. Gr.* II 1, p. 523. Badham's *ἐπιχάριτα* for *ὑπὸ χάριτος* is an unlucky venture. Dr Jackson suggests that *ὑπὸ χάριτος* may perhaps mean 'by grace, favour,' 'on sufferance': but Glauco's reply appears to me against this view.

528 C, D 20 **οὐδὲν—φανῆναι:** 'be brought to light,' 'discovered,' 'solved': cf. X 602 D and *ἠὑρῆσθαι* and *ἐκφανῆ* above. Unless Badham, Madvig, and Baiter had entirely mistaken the meaning of *φανῆναι*, they could scarcely have conjectured or approved of *τοιαῦτα* in place of *αὐτά*. Plato's language seems to point to some exceptional activity in connexion with the study of stereometrical problems, such as may have been occasioned by the application from Delos (527 D *n.*), and to encourage his pupils to hope for success at no distant date.

δή, ἔφη, τό γε ἐπίχαρι καὶ διαφερόντως ἔχει. ἀλλά μοι σαφέστερον εἰπὲ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες. τὴν μὲν γάρ που τοῦ ἐπιπέδου πραγματείαν γεωμετρίαν ἐτίθης. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἶτά γ', ἔφη, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀστρονομίαν μετὰ ταύτην, ὕστερον δ' ἀνεχώρησας. Σπεύδων γάρ, ἔφην, ταχὺ πάντα διεξελθεῖν μᾶλλον βραδύνω· ἐξῆς γὰρ οὖσαν 25
τὴν βάθους αὔξης μέθοδον, ὅτι τῇ ζητήσει γελοίως ἔχει, ὑπερβὰς
E αὐτὴν μετὰ γεωμετρίαν ἀστρονομίαν ἔλεγον, φορὰν | οὖσαν βάθους.
Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Τέταρτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τιθῶμεν μάθημα ἀστρονομίαν, ὡς ὑπαρχούσης τῆς νῦν παραλειπομένης, ἐὰν αὐτὴν πόλις μετίῃ. Εἰκός, ἦ δ' ὅς· καὶ ὅ γε νῦν δή μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, 30

29. παραλειπομένης $A^2\Pi^2\Xi q$: παραλιπομένης $A^1\Pi$.

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528 D 21 **ἀλλά μοι κτλ.** The recapitulation is intended to emphasize once more the principle regulating Plato's sequence of subjects (528 A *n.* and App. II).

24 **σπεύδων—βραδύνω**: a proverbial saying, like our 'more haste, less speed': cf. (with Stallbaum) *Pol.* 264 B. If we *σπεύδομεν ταχέως*, we are apt *σπεύδοντες βραδύνειν*; hence the proverb *σπεῦδε βραδέως* 'Eile mit Weile.' See Jebb on Soph. *Ant.* 231.

26 **ὅτι τῇ ζητήσει κτλ.**: not "quia ita est comparata, ut de ea quaerere ridiculum sit" (Stallbaum), but 'quia ridicule tractatur': cf. (with Schneider) 529 E.

528 E—**530** C *Astronomy will accordingly be fourth in order, and Stereometry third. Yes, says Glauco; for assuredly Astronomy compels the soul to look 'on high.' On the contrary, Socrates replies, as studied at present, Astronomy turns the soul's eye down, though the bodily eye looks upward. True astronomy is not observation of the visible heavens, which are, like all things seen, imperfect and subject to change; it is a mathematical science, which studies the true movements of intelligible stars and uses the visible firmament as its orrery. We shall therefore pursue Astronomy by making use of problems and leave the heavens alone.*

528 E ff. We have seen that the study of Stereometry, the science which deals with *τριτη αὔξη*, naturally follows the study of Geometry, in which *δευτέρα αὔξη* is investigated (526 C *n.*). Astronomy, like Stereometry, is still concerned with bodies of three dimensions, but in Astronomy we have one additional element, viz. Motion, so that the study of Astronomy, as Plato conceives it, is a degree more complicated than Stereometry, and forms its natural sequel: cf. 528 A, B. Plato's conception of *ἀριθμητική* and *γεωμετρική* would have commended itself in the main to the mathematicians of his day (cf. 525 D ff., 527 A), although they might not have accepted his view of the ontology of these sciences; but in the two remaining subjects of his curriculum, Astronomy and Harmonics, he consciously and deliberately parts company with his contemporaries (see 529 A—530 C, 530 E—531 C). After every allowance has been made for the perfervid enthusiasm of Plato's style, it must be confessed that the application of the principles laid down in this chapter would have checked the progress of astronomical science. Both Astronomy and Harmonics are treated by Plato as branches of pure rather than applied mathematics; and in each of these sciences Plato either discredits or altogether prohibits observation. It must be remembered, on the other hand, that Plato's object is not to promote the study of physical science for its own sake, but to provide a suitable *προπαιδεία* for those who are to crown their lives by the contemplation of the Idea, from which every element of sense-perception is far removed. The astronomy which Plato sketches in this chapter is a unique compound of poetry, metaphysics and mathematics. Besides the powerful appeal which it makes to the poetical imagination, it has a permanent value even in the

ἐπέπληξας περὶ ἀστρονομίας ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπαινοῦντι, νῦν ᾗ σὺ μετέρχει ἐπαινῶ. | παντὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ δῆλον, ὅτι αὕτη γε ἀναγκάζει 529
ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ ἄνω ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε ἄγει. Ἴσως, ἦν
δ' ἐγώ, παντὶ δῆλον πλὴν ἐμοί· ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ἀλλὰ
πῶς; ἔφη. Ὡς μὲν νῦν αὐτὴν μεταχειρίζονται οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν
ἀνάγοντες, πάνυ ποιεῖν κάτω βλέπειν. Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Οὐκ
ἀγεννῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν λαμβάνειν
παρὰ σαυτῷ ἥ ἐστι· κινδυνεύεις γὰρ | καὶ εἴ τις ἐν ὀροφῇ ποικίλ- B
ματα θεώμενος ἀνακύπτων καταμανθάνοι τι, ἡγεῖσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν
νοήσει ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄμμασι θεωρεῖν. ἴσως οὖν καλῶς ἡγεῖ, ἐγὼ δ'

7. ᾗ Ξq: ᾗ $A^2\Pi$: η (sic) A^1. 9. νοήσει Π: νοήσειν A. ἴσως—εὐηθικῶς Glauconi tribuit A^2.

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history of Astronomy as a passionate protest against mere empiricism, and an emphatic if exaggerated vindication of the theoretical side of the science. See also on 529 C, D and App. II.

528 E—529 A 31 ᾗ σὺ μετέρχει: lit. 'in respect of that, in respect of which *you* pursue it,' i.e. 'in the way in which *you* pursue it,' no longer for its practical uses, as I did before (527 D), but because it leads the soul 'on high,' and from things here yonder ("from the things of this world to the next," say D. and V., quite wrongly). The object of ἐπαινῶ is not ᾗ σὺ μετέρχει, but astronomy. Glauco has assimilated the phraseology of Socrates without its meaning. 'On high' and 'yonder' mean to Glauco the material heavens, not the νοητὸς τόπος: and he thinks the soul looks upwards if the bodily eye is turned aloft! The essence of Glauco's error consists in materializing the spiritual; and Plato here warns us against a danger which is responsible for countless errors, not only in Platonic criticism, but in every department of human thought and dogma. See also on 529 B, C.

529 A 4 οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες: 'those who would lead us upwards to philosophy ("welche zur Wissenschaftsliebe hinaufführen wollen," Schneider). Plato is thinking of teachers who recognise (with Isocr. *Antid.* 261) that Astronomy and kindred subjects are the παρασκευὴ φιλοσοφίας, but nevertheless teach Astronomy on methods directly calculated to turn the soul's eye down. His description fits some of the Sophists, particularly Hippias (see *Prot.* 318 E and cf. Isocr. *Pan.* 26—28). In οἱ—ἀνάγοντες Plato takes them at their own valuation. For the Greek cf. 521 C ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν, τοῦ ὄντος οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι, where ἀληθῆ points the contrast with the false philosophy to which some would lead the soul. ἀνάγοντες preserves the idea of education as an ascent, in harmony with the prevailing metaphor throughout this book. The translation "those who embark on philosophy" (D. and V.) is untenable: so also are the two other versions in J. and C. ('raise astronomy to the rank of a science,' 'refer astronomy to philosophy'), as Shorey—whose view is more nearly correct—has pointed out (*A. J. Ph.* XVI p. 237).

5 **οὐκ ἀγεννῶς:** 'with a fine audacity,' "non sine generosa fiducia" (Schneider), as in *Gorg.* 492 D οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε—ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος, and elsewhere.

529 B, C 7 κινδυνεύεις γὰρ κτλ. Glauco conceives of astronomy in exactly the same way as the Aristophanic Socrates; and this indignant repudiation by the Platonic Socrates is the more intelligible, if (with Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II p. 274 *n.*) we suppose that Plato is thinking of the *Clouds*. *Our* astronomy (says Plato in effect), *our* vision upward, is not what Aristophanes made it appear to be, but something very different. See below on ἄνω κεχηνώς in B and ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων in C.

εὐηθικῶς. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἄνω ποιοῦν ψυχὴν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν περὶ τὸ ὄν τε ᾖ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον, ἐάν τε τις ἄνω κεχηνὼς ἢ κάτω συμμεμυκὼς τῶν αἰσθητῶν τι ἐπιχειρῇ μανθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ἄν ποτέ φημι αὐτόν—ἐπιστήμην C γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔχειν τῶν τοιούτων—οὔτε ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ | βλέπειν τὴν ψυχήν, κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μανθάνῃ.

XI. Δίκην, ἔφη, ἔχω· ὀρθῶς γάρ μοι ἐπέπληξας. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ ἔλεγες δεῖν ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν παρὰ ἃ νῦν μανθάνουσιν, εἰ μέλλοιεν ὠφελίμως πρὸς ἃ λέγομεν μαθήσεσθαι; Ὧδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ·

12. ἢ κάτω Π: ᾗ κάτω A. 15. νέων Π: μὲν A.

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529 B 10 **ἄλλο τι νομίσαι κτλ.**: 'think any other study one that makes,' etc. "Aliud esse puto *νομίσαι τι ποιεῖν*, aliud *ποιοῦν* idque huic loco magis aptum, scilicet non solum facere sive faciendo in praesentia occupatum esse, sed vim et consuetudinem faciendi habere aliquid existimare" (Schneider). *ποιοῦν* is half adjectival, like *συμφέρον* in Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 1 6 (quoted by Ast) *τοῦτο συμφέρον τῇ εὐγονίᾳ νομίζων*. Heindorf's conjecture *ποιεῖν* was approved by Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 631; but *ποιοῦν* is in all the MSS, and should be retained.

12 **ἐάν τέ τις κτλ.**: 'and if any one attempts to learn aught which is *perceivable* I care not whether his open mouth yawn upwards or his closed mouth look below—he will *never*, as I hold, learn' etc. For *ἐάν τε*, Hermann and Stallbaum read *ἐὰν δέ* on slight MS authority; but *οὐ δύναμαι* and *οὔ (τε)—φημι* are properly joined by *τε* (Schneider). The English translators understand *συμμεμυκώς* of closed eyes; but the eyes must of course be open in any case, and the balance with *ἄνω κεχηνώς* is conclusive against this view. *συμμύω*, as the *Lexica* shew, is used of closing any bodily aperture. The state of the mouth is ludicrously irrelevant, but *κεχηνώς*, which betokens rapt stupidity, inevitably suggests *συμμεμυκώς*, and the whole expression is a finely indignant outburst of exuberant and extravagant satire on a gross misapprehension of Socratico-Platonic views.

ἄνω κεχηνώς refers perhaps specifically to *Clouds* 171—173 *ζητοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῆς σελήνης τὰς ὁδοὺς | καὶ τὰς περιφορὰς εἶτ' ἄνω κεχηνότος | ἀπὸ τῆς ὀροφῆς νύκτωρ γαλεώτης κατέχεσεν*. It will be admitted that Plato had some ground for his anger. I don't in the least care, he says in effect to Aristophanes, whether your Socrates looks up or down: so long as he studies *αἰσθητά*, he is not *my* Socrates, and I disown your caricature. For the general sense cf. (with J. and C.) *Tim.* 91 D.

13 **ἐπιστήμην — ἔχειν**: 'admits of knowledge.'

529 C 15 **τὴν ψυχήν**: though his bodily eye looks upwards.

κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας κτλ.: 'aye, even though the learner float face upwards on land or in the sea.' I understand *ἐξ ὑπτίας νεῖν ἐν γῇ* as an allusion to Socrates in the *κρεμάθρα*: cf. *Ap.* 19 C *ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν κτλ.* and see Ar. *Clouds* 218—226. If we suppose that Socrates lay supine in his swinging *κρεμάθρα*, as presumably he did, since he was looking at the moon, then any one who had seen the *Clouds* would at once catch the allusion, especially after *ἄνω κεχηνώς* and the other references just above. For *νεῖν* of floating in the air, cf. *ἀερονηχής* Ar. *Clouds* 337, with Blaydes ad loc. and on *Peace* 831.

ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ is thrown in by Plato with the same extravagant mockery as *κάτω συμμεμυκώς*. Float him on land, float him, if you like, in the sea; but though his body's eye looks upward, his soul looks down. On the text and other views of this passage see App. IX.

ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπείπερ ἐν ὁρατῷ πεποί-

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529 C, D 19 **ταῦτα μὲν κτλ.** 'Yonder embellishments in the heavens, forasmuch as they are wrought in that which is seen with the bodily eye, we should indeed consider more beautiful and perfect than anything visible, but far inferior to those which are genuine and true—far inferior to the movements wherewith essential speed and essential slowness, in true and genuine number and in all true forms, are moved in relation to each other and therewithal make that which is essentially in them to move: the true adornments, which are apprehended by reasoning and the mathematical intelligence, but not by sight.' The clause *κάλλιστα μὲν —ἔχειν* is concessive, and *ἐπείπερ ἐν ὁρατῷ πεποίκιλται* gives the reason why *τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα πολὺ ἐνδεῖ τῶν ἀληθινῶν* (sc. *ποικιλμάτων*), for the *ἀληθινὰ ποικίλματα* are wrought, not *ἐν ὁρατῷ*, but *ἐν νοητῷ*, i.e. in the lower *νοητόν*, with which and which alone the true astronomer as such is conversant. See App. I. The clause *ἃς τὸ ὂν τάχος—φοράς κτλ.* explains *τῶν ἀληθινῶν* (*ποικιλμάτων*), being equivalent, as Schneider points out, to *τοῦτ' ἔστι, τῶν φορῶν, ἃς κτλ.*, 'that is, the movements which' etc. So much for the relation between the different members of the sentence. In order to grasp the meaning of Plato, we should read the sentence aloud, letting the full stress of the voice fall on the words *ἀληθινῶν, ὄν, οὖσα, ἀληθινῷ, ἀληθέσι* and *-όντα* in *τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει*. Each of these words is emphatic, and expresses that degree of Truth or Being which belongs to the mathematical realities of true astronomy, as opposed to the sensibles or *αἰσθητά* which form the subject-matter of the astronomy which Plato has just condemned. Popular astronomy observes with the bodily eye the movements of visible and material planets, e.g. Mercury and Mars. These two planets *φορὰς πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρει* in *γιγνόμενος* or *κινητὸς ἀριθμός*, i.e. in time (cf. *Tim.* 37 C ff.), Mercury, as astronomers tell us, completing his orbit in about three, and Mars in about twenty-three, months. In the second place, these planets travel in *γιγνόμενα* (not *ἀληθῆ*) *σχήματα*, i.e. in forms or orbits which belong to the world of *γιγνόμενα*, and as they travel they carry with them the *γιγνόμενα* which they contain, Mars for example his snow-caps and canals. The Platonic astronomer, on the other hand, looks with the eye of *διάνοια* at the *ἀληθινὰ ποικίλματα*, i.e. at the motions of true or mathematical stars. These mathematical stars *φορὰς πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ*, i.e. in mathematical number, e.g. in 3 and 23 (not three *months*, etc.), and also *ἐν ἀληθέσι σχήμασιν*, i.e. in mathematical orbits, viz. the perfect ellipses which are imperfectly reproduced in the orbits of the visible material planets. Furthermore, although here perhaps our imagination may refuse to follow Plato in his flight, just as the visible Mars in his journey carries with him the *γιγνόμενα* which he contains, so Plato represents the true stars of mathematical astronomy as carrying round with them *τὰ ἐνόντα*, i.e. the mathematical *realities* which are in them. The mathematical counterpart of Mars, for example, will take with it in its revolution those perfect mathematical forms which are imperfectly reproduced in the canals and snow-caps of the visible Mars. Plato in short conceives of a mathematical *οὐρανός* of which the visible heavens are but a blurred and imperfect expression in time and space, just as every visible and material triangle is only an approximation to a true or perfect, i.e. a mathematical, triangle. The following remark of Aristotle's is intended as an objection to Plato's theory, but, according to the doctrine of this part of the *Republic*, Plato would have accepted the criticism as containing a just and true account of the astronomy which he prescribes: *ἔτι δὲ εἴ τις παρὰ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τὰ μεταξὺ θήσεται, πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἕξει. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὁμοίως γραμμαί τε παρ' αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἔσονται καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν. ὥστ' ἐπείπερ ἀστρολογία μία τούτων ἐστίν, ἔσται τις καὶ οὐρανὸς παρὰ τὸν αἰσθητὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἥλιός τε καὶ σελήνη καὶ τἆλλα ὁμοίως τὰ κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν* (*Met.* B 2. 997^{b} 12 ff.). It remains to speak of two particular difficulties. What does Plato mean by *ταῦτα τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα*, and by *τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής*? The *ποικίλματα* seem to be generally identified with the stars and nothing more. But inasmuch as astronomy deals with *φορὰ βάθους*, and the ordinary astronomer, according to Plato, studies *τὰς τῶν ἄστρων φοράς* (cf. 533 A) rather than

D κιλται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ἃς τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτὴς ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει. ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτά, ὄψει δ' οὔ· ἢ σὺ ο�ei; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, τῇ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλίᾳ παραδείγμασι χρηστέον τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἕνεκα, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις E ἐντύχοι ὑπὸ Δαιδάλου ἢ τινος ἄλλου δημιουργοῦ ἢ γραφέως διαφερόντως γεγραμμένοις καὶ ἐκπεπονημένοις διαγράμμασιν. ἡγήσαιτο γὰρ ἄν πού τις ἔμπειρος γεωμετρίας ἰδὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλλιστα μὲν ἔχειν ἀπεργασίᾳ, γελοῖον μὴν ἐπισκοπεῖν ταῦτα

28. διαφερόντως A²Π: διαφέροντος A¹.

ἄστρα themselves, it may be presumed that the ποικίλματα ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ in reality denote the stars regarded as moving bodies, i.e., strictly speaking, the movements of the heavenly bodies revolving in their orbits (cf. *Tim.* 39 D and 40 C); and the presumption becomes a certainty when we reach the words τῶν ἀληθινῶν, ἃς—φέρει, for since the true ποικίλματα which true astronomy studies are identified with the movements of true stars, we are bound in like manner to suppose that the γιγνόμενα ποικίλματα which observational astronomy studies are the movements of γιγνόμενα ἄστρα. Some may be disposed to think that τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα refers to the intricate and complex patterns which the orbits of the celestial bodies weave upon the Heavens: cf. *Tim.* 39 D τὰς τούτων πλάνας, πλήθει μὲν ἀμηχάνῳ χρωμένας, πεποικιλμένας δὲ θαυμαστῶς. But in view of expressions like Aesch. *P. V.* 24 ἡ ποικιλείμων νύξ and Eur. *Hel.* 1102 ἀστέρων ποικίλματα, it is better to hold that Plato adopts the word which was usually applied to the 'spangles' in the heavens, the "patines of bright gold," with which "the floor of heaven is thick inlaid" (*Merchant of Venice* V 1), and uses it of the movements of the stars, especially as throughout this chapter he consistently represents the visible stars which popular astronomy investigates as nothing but visible or material φοραί. I understand τὸ ὂν τάχος and ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής as the mathematical counterparts of visible stars. This interpretation is, I think, the only one which gives a proper sense to φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει, and no other solution preserves in its full and unimpaired significance the necessary contrast between the astronomy of observation and Plato's form of the science. The place which in popular astronomy is occupied by a γιγνόμενον τάχος, e.g. the planet Mercury, and a γιγνομένη βραδυτής, e.g. the planet Mars, is in true astronomy filled by ὂν τάχος and οὖσα βραδυτής. Plato's conception of a true science of Astronomy is a remarkable product of his peculiar half-poetical, half-philosophical imaginative faculty, and differs fundamentally from the theory and practice of the science both in antiquity and now. But it must in fairness be allowed that if a science of astronomy could be constructed on Platonic principles, admitting no element of sense-perception, and dealing exclusively with incorporeal mathematical abstractions, it would prove a better prelude to the study of the ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία (*Phaedr.* 247 C) than could ever be provided by the astronomy which depends on observation of the heavenly bodies. See further App. II, and for other views of this passage App. X.

529 D, E 25 παραδείγμασι κτλ. The visible heavens may be used as a moving orrery, but nothing more. ὁμοίως κτλ. is a singularly apt illustration, because the special feature of Daedalus' statues was that they moved (*Euthyph.* 11 B ff., *Men.* 97 D ff., Eur. *Frag.* 373).

σπουδῇ, ὡς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ληψόμενον ἴσων ἢ διπλασίων
| ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς συμμετρίας. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει γελοῖον εἶναι; ἔφη. 530
Τῷ ὄντι δὴ ἀστρονομικόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὄντα οὐκ οἴει ταὐτὸν πείσεσθαι
εἰς τὰς τῶν ἄστρων φορὰς ἀποβλέποντα; νομιεῖν μέν, ὡς οἷόν τε
κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα συστήσασθαι, οὕτω ξυνεστάναι τῷ τοῦ
οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ· τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς πρὸς
ἡμέραν ξυμμετρίαν καὶ τούτων πρὸς μῆνα καὶ μηνὸς πρὸς ἐνιαυτὸν
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων πρός τε ταῦτα | καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα οὐκ B
ἄτοπον, οἴει, ἡγήσεται τὸν νομίζοντα γίγνεσθαί τε ταῦτα ἀεὶ ὡσαύ-
τως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν, σῶμά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα,
καὶ ζητεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν; Ἐμοὶ γοῦν
δοκεῖ, ἔφη, σοῦ νῦν ἀκούοντι. Προβλήμασιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
χρώμενοι ὥσπερ γεωμετρίαν οὕτω καὶ ἀστρονομίαν μέτιμεν, τὰ δ'

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530 A 2 **τῷ ὄντι δὴ κτλ.** It has been conjectured by Brandt (*z. Entw. d. plat. Lehr. v. d. Seelenteilen* p. 8) that Plato is thinking of Eudoxus; but there is nothing to suggest a specific reference here, as there was in 528 B, C, and as Eudoxus, "the father of scientific astronomical observation in Greece" was preeminently "a practical observer" (Allman *Gk. Geometry etc.* p. 142), he would hardly be described by Plato in this passage as *τῷ ὄντι ἀστρονομικός*. See also Hirmer *Entst. u. Komp. d. plat. Pol.* p. 667.

4 **τὰ τοιαῦτα**: i.e. *ὁρατά, σωματοειδῆ*.

τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ: the Demiurgus of the *Timaeus*.

5 **τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς κτλ.**: with which astronomical observation is concerned. Plato's tone is very different in the *Timaeus* (47 A ff.) as Grote points out (*Plato* III p. 235 *n.*, where also an amusing parallel is quoted from Malebranche); but it should be remembered that it is with the educational value of astronomy as a preparation for Dialectic that we are here concerned (note *εἰ μέλλομεν—ποιήσειν* in B, and see App. II).

7 **τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων**: 'the other stars' (Schneider), as *ταῦτα* shews, not 'the stars besides' (as Stallbaum).

ταῦτα: viz. the Sun and Moon, which make day, night, year, and month.

530 B 9 **παραλλάττειν—ὁρώμενα** is a cardinal principle with Plato: see *Tim.* 28 A, B, 37 D and especially *Pol.* 269 D, E. *παράλλαξις* is used half-technically of any change or deviation in the courses of the heavenly bodies, as for example in the legend of Atreus (*Pol.* 269 A): cf. *Tim.* 22 C.

10 **ζητεῖν** depends on *ἄτοπον ἡγήσεται, ἄτοπον* being now taken as neuter. A reference to 525 B *n.* will shew that Madvig's *ζητήσει* (or *ζητεῖν δεῖν*), and Richards' *ζητοῦντα*, with other conjectures, are wholly beside the mark. J. and C. (following Stallbaum) say *ζητεῖν* "depends on *νομίζοντα* with the common ellipse of *δεῖν*": but *δεῖν* is not commonly omitted. In *ζητεῖν—λαβεῖν* there is a slight suggestion of something like the historical Socrates' distrust of astronomy (Xen. *Mem.* IV 7. 6).

11 **προβλήμασιν κτλ.** Some have cited in illustration "Leverrier and Adams calculating an unknown planet into existence by enormous heaps of algebra" (De Morgan, quoted by Bosanquet p. 293: cf. Lutoslawski *Plato's Logic* p. 300). The example is striking but inapposite; for, according to this passage, the visible perturbations of Uranus, which occasioned the search for Neptune, would not have seemed to Plato anything very extraordinary. Unless he is greatly exaggerating here, and I do not deny that throughout this passage there is a touch of *γενναῖον πάθος, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ μανίας τινὸς καὶ πνεύματος ἐνθουσιαστικῶς ἐκπνέον καὶ οἱονεὶ φοιβάζον τοὺς λόγους* (Longinus *περὶ ὕψους* 8. 4), Plato's views on law in the heavens must have undergone considerable modification before he wrote the *Laws*: see the striking passage 821 B ff., and *Tim.* 47 A ff.

12 **τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐάσομεν**: 'we

C ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐάσομεν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὄντως ἀστρονομίας μεταλαμβάνοντες χρήσιμον τὸ φύσει φρόνιμον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐξ ἀχρήστου ποιήσειν. Ἢ πολλαπλάσιον, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον ἢ ὡς νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται προστάττεις. Οἶμαι δέ γε, εἶπον, καὶ τἄλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον προστάξειν ἡμᾶς, ἐάν τι ἡμῶν ὡς νομοθετῶν ὄφελος ᾖ.

14. ἀχρήστου $A^2\Pi$: ἀρχῆς τοῦ A^1.

will dispense with the starry heavens.' There is a touch of fine audacity, not to say impiety, in Plato's phrase. Greater than the starry heavens is the mind of man. Nettleship (*Lect. and Rem.* II pp. 271—277) and Bosanquet (*Companion* pp. 290—293) are, as it seems to me, unduly anxious throughout the whole of this episode to minimise and explain away Plato's depreciation of the senses and their objects, although by so doing they can make his theories harmonize more nearly with the views of certain modern philosophers, and possibly also with the truth. Krohn (*Pl. St.* pp. 170—174) inclines to the opposite error, although, except perhaps on verbal grounds, Plato would not quarrel with his definition of Platonic astronomy as "die Wissenschaft von den Bewegungen intelligiblen Körper." Plato's Astronomy is in fact a kind of idealised Kinematics, with occasional illustrations from the visible movements of the heavenly bodies (*τῇ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλίᾳ παραδείγμασι χρηστέον* κτλ. 529 D).

16 **οἶμαι δέ γε κτλ.** 526 C *n.*

530 C—**531** C *Next will come the science which is sister to Astronomy, viz. Harmonics. For particulars we will refer to the Pythagoreans, taking care, however, to maintain our leading principles intact. We may ignore the good people who try to determine a minimum interval and unit of measurement by the ear; but the Pythagoreans are also wrong, for it is the numerical ratios of audible consonances which they study. They ought to ascend to problems and examine which numbers are consonant, which not, and why. The science of Harmonics is useless for our purpose if otherwise pursued.*

530 C **ff.** With the science of Harmonics we reach the end of Plato's *προπαιδεία*. Plato's conception of Harmonics is in all respects analogous to his view of Astronomy. We have seen that the visible movements of the celestial bodies are only imperfect copies of those mathematical movements which true Astronomy seeks to apprehend. In like manner, the audible movements which produce audible consonances are imperfect reproductions of those mathematical movements from which result mathematical consonances, and it is these true consonances which the *ἁρμονικός* should study. The methods of pure mathematics are to be employed in Harmonics as well as in Astronomy, and observation and experiment are forbidden. If we criticise Plato from the standpoint of acoustical science, we must allow that he falls into the same error as before, but the emphasis, however exaggerated, which he lays on the mathematical and theoretical element in Harmonics, is not without importance in the history of the science; and we must remember that the study of Harmonics is valuable to Plato only as a preparation for Dialectic. The poetical affinities of the Platonic science of Harmonics are worthy of remark, though this chapter refrains from any allusion to them. It is altogether in harmony with Plato's theory to hold that 'the solemn and divine harmonies of music, heard or learned,' appeal to us so powerfully because they are one expression of those 'unheard harmonies' which are also expressed in the sister souls of Nature and of Man (*Tim.* 35 A ff.), and although there is much in Browning's Abt Vogler to which Plato would demur, the idea which inspires that noble poem has its philosophical basis in some such theory as Plato here suggests.

"But here is the finger of God, a flash of the will that can,
Existent behind all laws, that made them and lo they are!
And I know not, if, save in this, such gift be allowed to man,
That out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound, but a star.

XII. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τί ἔχεις ὑπομνῆσαι τῶν προσηκόντων μαθημάτων; Οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη, νῦν γ' οὐτωσί. Οὐ μὴν ἔν, ἀλλὰ πλείω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴδη παρέχεται ἡ φορά, ὡς ἐγῷμαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν | πάντα ἴσως ὅστις σοφὸς ἔξει εἰπεῖν· ἃ δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν προφανῆ, δύο. D Ποῖα δή; Πρὸς τούτῳ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντίστροφον αὐτοῦ. Τὸ ποῖον; Κινδυνεύει, ἔφην, ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὡς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα παγῆναι, καὶ αὗται ἀλλήλων ἀδελφαί τινες αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, ὡς οἵ τε Πυθαγόρειοί φασι καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὦ Γλαύκων, συγχωροῦμεν. ἢ πῶς ποιοῦμεν; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ πολὺ | τὸ ἔργον, ἐκείνων πευσόμεθα, πῶς λέγουσι E περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις· ἡμεῖς δὲ παρὰ πάντα

Consider it well: each tone of our scale in itself is nought;
It is everywhere in the world—loud, soft, and all is said:
Give it to me to use! I mix it with two in my thought;
And there! ye have heard and seen: consider and bow the head!"

It is perhaps because he believed that the Soul of the Universe no less than that of Man is attuned to these eternal harmonies, as well as for other reasons, that Plato makes his *προπαιδεία* culminate in Harmonics. See also App. II.

530 C 18 **ἀλλὰ γὰρ κτλ.** Socrates means: If you criticise my curriculum (as in *ἢ πολλαπλάσιον—προστάττεις*), you are doubtless ready with suggestions of your own: hence I appeal to you: 'what suitable study can you suggest?' 'I cannot,' says Glauco, 'make *any* suggestion straight off.' ἀλλὰ *γάρ* ('however' as in *Theaet.* 144 B, *Symp.* 220 E) goes closely with the previous sentence; if it were otherwise, Plato would have added *ἦν δ' ἐγώ* or the like. The reading ἀλλὰ *γάρ τι* (*q* Vind. F, Hermann etc.) can hardly stand; nor is Steinhart's ἄλλο *γάρ τι* κτλ., or Richards' ἀλλὰ *γὰρ* <ἄλλο> *τι* (or ἀλλὰ *γὰρ* <*ἔτι*> *τι*) pleasing or probable. I formerly suggested ἀλλὰ *γάρ τι ἔχεις* <*σὺ*> *ὑπομνῆσαι* κτλ., the other subjects having all been suggested by Socrates and not Glauco, with the partial exception of geometry 526 C; but now believe (with Schneider) that the text is sound.

20 **πλείω κτλ.** *φορά* is (according to both Plato and Aristotle) a specific variety of *κίνησις*, being in fact, *ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις*. Of the genus *κίνησις* Plato enumerates ten varieties in *Laws* 893 B ff.; of *φορά* in particular some specific *εἴδη* are mentioned by Arist. *Eth. Nic.* X 3 1174ª 30 ff.

530 D 22 **πρὸς τούτῳ:** "praeter astronomicum *φορᾶς* s. motus genus" (Stallbaum).

23 **ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν κτλ.** *ἀστρονομία* is *φορὰ βάθους* (528 E *n.*), and appeals to the eye in the same way as *ἐναρμόνιος φορά*, or movement in accordance with the laws of *ἁρμονία* (III 397 B, 398 D, E *nn.*), appeals to the ear. In *ἐναρμόνιος φορά* the air moves more or less quickly etc., and this accounts for the different pitch etc. of notes: see *Tim.* 67 B, 80 A ff. and Theo Smyrn. p. 50 Hiller, where this—Pythagorean as well as Platonic—theory of sound is very clearly explained. Cf. also von Jan *Musici Scriptores Graeci* pp. 130 ff.

24 **ἀδελφαί τινες.** Cf. [Archytas] in Mullach *Frag. Phil. Graec.* I p. 564 *περί τε δὴ τᾶς τῶν ἄστρων ταχυτᾶτος καὶ ἐπιτολᾶν καὶ δυσίων παρέδωκαν ἁμῖν διάγνωσιν καὶ περὶ γαμετρίας καὶ ἀριθμῶν καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα περὶ μωσικᾶς· ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ μαθήματα δοκοῦντι εἶμεν ἀδελφά*, ib. p. 565 and (with J. and C.) *Tim.* 47 B, C. The sisterhood of Music and Astronomy is best seen in the 'harmony of the Spheres': see X 617 B *n.* and RP⁷. 68 B *nn.*

530 E 27 **ἐκείνων πευσόμεθα κτλ.** Plato does not claim to be a specialist in musical matters: cf. III 400 A. The words *καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις* look like a general acknowledgment of obligation throughout this part of the *Republic* to the Pythagoreans. See App. II.

ταῦτα φυλάξομεν τὸ ἡμέτερον. Ποῖον; Μή ποτ' αὐτῶν τι ἀτελὲς
ἐπιχειρῶσιν ἡμῖν μανθάνειν οὓς θρέψομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐξῆκον ἐκεῖσε 30
ἀεί, οἳ πάντα δεῖ ἀφήκειν, οἷον ἄρτι περὶ τῆς ἀστρονομίας ἐλέγομεν.
531 ἢ οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἕτερον | τοιοῦτον ποιοῦσι; τὰς
γὰρ ἀκουομένας αὖ συμφωνίας καὶ φθόγγους ἀλλήλοις ἀναμε-
τροῦντες ἀνήνυτα ὥσπερ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι πονοῦσιν. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς,
ἔφη, καὶ γελοίως γε, πυκνώματ' ἄττα ὀνομάζοντες καὶ παραβάλ-

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30 **ἐξῆκον κτλ.** The MS reading *ἀεί, οἳ* gives a weightier and better meaning than *οἳ ἀεί*, which Richards proposes. For *ἀφήκειν* Eusebius (*Praep. Ev.* XIV 13. 5) has *ἀνήκειν*, also a rare word: Stephanus conjectured *ἐφήκειν*. *ἀφήκειν* is better, though rarer, than either: cf. (with Schneider) *ἀφίκηται* in 531 D. The reference in *ἄρτι* is to 529 A ff.

531 A 1 **τὰς γὰρ ἀκουομένας κτλ.** The intervals reckoned as consonant (*σύμφωνα*) were such as the octave, double octave, fifth and fourth: see on IV 430 E. These the Pythagoreans 'measure by' (or 'against') 'one another,' by comparing the lengths of vibrating strings of the same material, thickness and tension. It is thus found that the octave is 2 : 1, the double octave 4 : 1, the fifth 3 : 2, and the fourth 4 : 3. See *Dict. of Ant.* II p. 193 with Theo Smyrn. pp. 48—51, 56—61 Hiller, and Aristox. *Harm.* 20 ff. Marquard. Richards proposes <*ἐν*> *ἀλλήλοις*, but the dative is strictly accurate: cf. *Tim.* 39 D *τῷ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἰόντος ἀναμετρηθέντα κύκλῳ*.

3 **ὥσπερ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι.** The parallel is exact: as the astronomers studied visible, so the Pythagoreans investigated audible *φοραί* (Theo l.c.). To Plato, on the other hand, *ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείσσων* (Heracl. *Fr.* 47 Bywater). 'Heard harmonies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter.' See above on 530 C.

3 **νὴ τοὺς θεούς κτλ.** There were two rival schools of musical theory in Greece, viz. "(1) the Pythagorean or mathematical, who identified each interval with a ratio, (2) the 'musical' (*μουσικοί*), who measured all intervals as multiples or fractions of the Tone" (Monro in *Dict. Ant.* II p. 193). Cf. *Modes of Anc. Gk. Mus.* p. 124. Plato's criticism was intended to apply to the first school; but Glauco erroneously understands it of the second.

4 **πυκνώματα κτλ.** *ἄττα* (*nescio quae*) and *ὀνομάζοντες* shew that *πυκνώματα* is a technical term. The word *πύκνωμα* does not appear to occur elsewhere in this sense, but *πυκνόν* was a favourite word with writers of the 'musical' school, as may be seen from its constant employment by Aristoxenus. *πυκνόν* is thus defined: *τὸ ἐκ δύο διαστημάτων συνεστηκὸς ἃ συντεθέντα ἔλαττον διάστημα περιέξει τοῦ λειπομένου διαστήματος ἐν τῷ διὰ τεσσάρων* (Aristox. *Harm.* 24. 10 ff. Marquard) i.e. any combination of two intervals which are together less than the interval remaining in the Fourth when the *πυκνόν* is subtracted from the Fourth, e.g. two quarter tone intervals, or even two semitone intervals (but not more): see Aristox. l.c. 50. 15 ff. The definition in Bacchius *Isag.* 20 von Jan *τὸ ἐκ δύο διαστημάτων ἐλαχίστων συγκείμενον ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει* is less exact, but not, so far as it goes, inconsistent with that of Aristoxenus. Plato's *πυκνώματα* must be "haec ipsa *πυκνά* vel alia parva et tamen composita intervalla," so called "propter sonorum in angusto spatio quasi confertorum frequentiam" (Schneider). Cf. *πυκνότης* in *Laws* 812 D, *καταπυκνοῦσθαι*, *καταπύκνωσις* etc. in Theo 91 and often in Aristoxenus, and see generally Westphal and Rossbach *Gr. Harm.* etc. pp. 105 ff. It is possible that the musical application of these terms was originally a metaphor borrowed from the art of weaving: for "vestes *spatha textae*, ob densitatem, quam inde consequebantur, *πυκνώματα* dictae ap. Aesch. *Suppl.* 235 *πέπλοισι βαρβάροισι, καὶ πυκνώμασι*" (Stephanus-Hase s.v. *πύκνωμα*, where reference is made also to Hesych. s.v. *σπάθημα* and a Scholiast on Ar. *Ach.* 180). I agree with Schneider in doubting whether Gellius' "frequentamenta" (I 11. 12, V 1. 1) are the same as Plato's *πυκνώματα*.

λοντες τὰ ὦτα, οἷον ἐκ γειτόνων φωνὴν θηρευόμενοι, οἱ μέν φασιν ἔτι κατακούειν ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ ἠχὴν καὶ σμικρότατον εἶναι τοῦτο διάστημα, ᾧ μετρητέον, οἱ δὲ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ὡς ὅμοιον ἤδη φθεγγομένων, ἀμφότεροι ὦτα ! τοῦ νοῦ προστησάμενοι. Σὺ μέν, B ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλόπων στρεβλοῦντας· ἵνα δὲ μὴ μακροτέρα ἡ εἰκὼν γίγνηται πλήκτρῳ τε πληγῶν γιγνομένων καὶ κατηγορίας πέρι καὶ ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας χορδῶν,

8. *φθεγγομένων* A[1]Π : *φθεγγόμενον* corr. A[2].

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5 **οἷον ἐκ γειτόνων κτλ.**: 'as if they were trying to catch a sound in the neighbourhood.' Cf. Heliod. I 17 *πίνει δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἐκ γειτόνων* and Blaydes on Ar. *Plut.* 435 or Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s.v. *γείτων*, where numerous examples of this highly idiomatic phrase are quoted. J. and C.'s translation "from a neighbour's house" is incorrect and pointless: still worse is Westphal's "als ob sie die Intervallgrösse dem Nachbarton ablauschen wollen." The idiom was understood by Ficinus, who translates it by "viciniore loco."

οἱ μέν φασιν κτλ. Some will have it that they overhear a note between (let us say) B and C, and that this is the smallest interval, and should be the unit of measurement: others say 'No! it is not different from B.' Plato (who is all for simplicity in music *Laws* 812 C) here satirises the *μουσικοί*, who made the quartertone or *διέσις* their unit: see Theo 55 *διέσιν δὲ καλοῦσιν ἐλαχίστην οἱ περὶ Ἀριστόξενον τὸ τεταρτημόριον τοῦ τόνου, ἥμισυ δὲ ἡμιτονίου, ὡς ἐλάχιστον μελῳδητὸν διάστημα*, and on the *ἐναρμόνιον γένος* generally, which Plato strongly disliked (Theo 56; cf. also Procl. *in Tim.* 191 E), and in which the *διέσεις* played a large part, *Dict. of Ant.* l.c. and Westphal and Rossbach l.c.

7 **ἀμφισβητοῦντες.** We should expect *ἀμφισβητοῦσιν* (so Theo 6) or else *φάσκοντες* instead of *φασιν* above. Cobet would emend, but the anacoluthon is not difficult in a writer like Plato: see on VI 488 C, D and supra 519 A *n.*

8 **φθεγγομένων**: sc. *τῶν χορδῶν*, omitted as in *ἡ διὰ πασῶν*.

ὦτα κτλ. This bitter epigram was applied by Adrastus to Aristoxenus (Procl. *in Tim.* 192 B). The cap fits admirably; for Aristoxenus was afterwards the leader of the *μουσικοί* whose principle is here ridiculed. With the expression itself cf. Pliny *Epp.* VII 27. 8 sed offirmare animum *auribusque praetendere.*

531 B 8 **σὺ μὲν κτλ.** Socrates now corrects Glauco's error: see on *νὴ τοὺς θεούς κτλ.* 531 A. *τοὺς χρηστούς* is of course contemptuous. Plato has no sympathy with the '*μουσικοί*.'

9 **τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς κτλ.**: 'who persecute and torture the strings, racking them upon the pegs. But lest my figure become somewhat tedious if I dwell upon the blows delivered with the plectrum, and the accusations brought against the strings, as well as their denials and braggadocio behaviour' etc. The figure (*εἰκών*) is from torturing and beating slaves, as *βασανίζοντας, στρεβλοῦντας* and *πληγῶν* shew: even *πράγματα παρέχοντας* suggests a court of law (cf. *Crit.* 44 E). The strings are the victims, while the pegs are the pulleys by which they were racked upon the *τροχός* (see *Dict. Ant.* s. v. eculeus). For *ἐπί* Herwerden proposes *ὑπό*: but the strings are racked *by* the musicians *upon* the pegs.

11 **πλήκτρῳ τε πληγῶν κτλ.** The etymological meaning of *πλῆκτρον* adds point to this part of the comparison.

12 **πέρι** from its position divides *πληγῶν* and *κατηγορίας*, which refer to the behaviour of the musicians, from *ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας*, in which the behaviour of the strings is described. For the anastrophe of *πέρι* see Lina *de praeposit. usu Plat.* pp. 26—30. The angry musician is like the prosecutor, and blames the strings, which in their turn repudiate the charge and swagger away like a stubborn slave however savagely the screw is turned. For a further discussion of this passage see App. XI.

παύομαι τῆς εἰκόνος καὶ οὗ φημι τούτους λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους οὓς ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἐρήσεσθαι. ταὐτὸν γὰρ ποιοῦσι
C τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἀστρονομίᾳ· | τοὺς γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκουομέναις ἀριθμοὺς ζητοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα ἀνίασιν, | ἐπισκοπεῖν τίνες ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τίνες οὔ, καὶ διὰ τί ἑκάτεροι. Δαιμόνιον γάρ, ἔφη, πρᾶγμα λέγεις. Χρήσιμον μὲν οὖν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ζήτησιν, ἄλλως δὲ μεταδιωκόμενον ἄχρηστον. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

XIII. Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ τούτων πάντων ὧν
D διειληλύθαμεν μέθοδος ἐὰν | μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν ἀφίκηται καὶ ξυγγένειαν, καὶ ξυλλογισθῇ ταῦτα ᾗ ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοις οἰκεῖα, φέρειν τι αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ βουλόμεθα τὴν πραγματείαν, καὶ οὐκ

14. ἐρήσεσθαι $A^2\Pi^2\Xi q$: αἱρήσεσθαι $A^1\Pi^1$. 16. ἀνίασιν $A^2\Pi$: ἀνιᾶσιν A^1.

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13 **ἐκείνους**: i.e. the Pythagoreans, and not the *μουσικοί*, as Glauco supposed.

531 C 15 **τοὺς γὰρ κτλ.** It is strange that in spite of *οὓς ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ κτλ.* this should have been so frequently understood as referring to the school satirised by Glauco: see for example Susemihl *Gen. Entw.* II p. 210. Plato is of course, as Schneider pointed out, speaking about the Pythagoreans who investigated the numbers or ratios of *audible* consonances: see 531 A *n.* and RP.^{7} § 56 C.

16 **ἀλλ' οὐκ κτλ.** Cf. 530 B. *ἀνίασιν* is undoubtedly present, and not future, here: see on V 473 C.

17 **τίνες ξύμφωνοι κτλ.** As the true astronomer should study intelligible stars with the mathematical intelligence, using the visible stars only as imperfect *παραδείγματα* (529 C, D *n.*), so the true *ἁρμονικός* must investigate intelligible, and not audible, consonances. In the words of a modern writer, he must "look, not into the tone-world here, but into the world of harmony beyond." Plato holds that certain mathematical numbers are in themselves *ξύμφωνοι*, and others not: see Theo 72—75, where examples of both varieties are given. The numbers or ratios of audible consonances are only particular and imperfect embodiments or expressions of these numbers: they may serve as *παραδείγματα*, but nothing more. In the *Timaeus* Plato represents the World-soul as the grandest expression of certain *ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοί*, so that it is natural enough for him to crown his *προπαιδεία* with the study of mathematical *ξυμφωνία*, and say that it is 'useful in seeking out the beautiful and good.' It must nevertheless be admitted that Plato's conception of Harmonics as well as of Astronomy is fundamentally different from that of modern science, in spite of the attempts which Bosanquet and others have made to prove their essential harmony. See on 530 C and App. II.

531 C—**533** D *The pursuit of these studies, if carried far enough to reveal their mutual relationship, will contribute to the end which we desire; but after all, they are only the prelude to Dialectic. We may compare Dialectic to the prisoner's progress from looking on real animals to beholding the sun, and these preparatory studies to his release and ascent from shadows and images within the cave to shadows of real objects in the world above. Socrates declines to give an account of the method and object of Dialectic; but insists that the Good must be seen, and that Dialectic alone can reveal it, for Dialectic is the only study which ascends on the ruins of its hypotheses to the Idea of Good, leading the soul on high, and using the 'Arts' as handmaidens and helpers in the process of education.*

531 D ff. Plato's conception of Dialectic and dialectical science is fully discussed in App. III.

23 **ᾗ—οἰκεῖα κτλ.** Cf. [*Epin.*] 991 E ff. *πᾶν διάγραμμα ἀριθμοῦ τε σύστημα καὶ ἁρμονίας σύστασιν ἅπασαν τῆς τε τῶν ἄστρων περιφορᾶς τὴν ὁμολογίαν οὖσαν*

ἀνόνητα πονεῖσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνόνητα. Καὶ ἐγώ, ἔφη, οὕτω μαντεύομαι. ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ ἔργον λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τοῦ προοιμίου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τίνος λέγεις; ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ὅτι πάντα ταῦτα προοίμιά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου, ὃν δεῖ μαθεῖν; οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦσί γέ σοι οἱ ταῦτα | δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, εἰ μὴ E
μάλα γέ τινες ὀλίγοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα. Ἀλλ' ἤδη, εἶπον, μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες δοῦναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἴσεσθαι ποτέ τι ὧν φαμὲν δεῖν εἰδέναι; Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. | Οὐκοῦν, 532
εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὗτος ἤδη αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ νόμος, ὃν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι περαίνει; ὃν καὶ ὄντα νοητὸν μιμοῖτ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ὄψεως δύναμις, ἣν ἐλέγομεν πρὸς αὐτὰ ἤδη τὰ ζῷα ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς

30. μὴ Π: οἱ μὴ A, sed οἱ punctis notavit A^2. 3. περαίνει *q*: παραινεῖ ΑΠΞ.

μίαν ἁπάντων ἀναφανῆναι δεῖ τῷ κατὰ τρόπον μανθάνοντι, ἀναφανήσεται δὲ ἂν—ὀρθῶς τις εἰς ἓν βλέπων μανθάνῃ· δεσμὸς γὰρ πεφυκὼς πάντων τούτων εἰς ἀναφανήσεται διανοουμένοις· εἰ δ' ἄλλως πως ταῦτα μεταχειριεῖταί τις, τύχην δεῖ καλεῖν. The apprehension of the 'one in the many' in these preliminary studies prepares us for the dialectical conception of the universe of Thought as an organic and correlated whole (VI 511 B—D *nn.*); but the mere specialist in mathematics for example, or astronomy, can never become a dialectician. Cf. 537 C and *Euthyd.* 290 B ff.

28 **νόμου**: 'song' or 'strain.' There is no pun on *νόμος* 'law,' as Bosanquet supposes. Dialectic is not a 'law' in the Greek sense of the word.

οὐ γάρ που κτλ. Theodorus in the *Theaetetus* (146 B) is a good example, and everyone who knows men who are distinguished mathematicians and nothing more will heartily echo Glauco's emphatic *οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία*. Taught on the Platonic method, not as an end, but as a means, by teachers who have themselves penetrated into regions beyond and above the sphere of pure mathematics, and who are constantly on the alert to direct their pupils thither, the study of mathematics may prove one of the most valuable of all instruments of education. See App. II.

531 E 30 **ὧν**. For the attraction see VI 510 B *n.*

ἀλλ' ἤδη κτλ. 'Well, did it ever seem to you that persons who are unable' etc. The subject is *μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες—λόγον*, and after *ἤδη* "supplendum est *ἔδοξαν*, quod ipsum Glauconis verbis magis accommodatum est quam *δοκοῦσι*" (Schneider). The form of Socrates' question is in fact affected by Glauco's reference to the past in *ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα*. I formerly, with *v* and three other MSS, including Vind. F, read *ἀλλὰ δή*, understanding *δοκοῦσι*: but *ἀλλὰ δή* is scarcely appropriate here (see on II 365 C), and Schneider's explanation gives a satisfactory meaning to *ἤδη*. J. and C. take *ἤδη* with *μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες* ('persons who are as yet unable' etc.); but the hyperbaton is too difficult, and the meaning (which Plato would rather have expressed by *μήπω δυνατοί κτλ.*) unsuitable. Few will approve of Badham's *ἀλλ' οἱ δὴ κτλ.* or even of Burnet's *ἀλλὰ δή, εἶπον, μὴ δυνατοὶ οἵτινες δοῦναί τε κτλ.* For the sentiment, which is a commonplace of the Socratic school, cf. Xen. *Mem.* IV 6. 1, *Prot.* 336 C, *Phaed.* 76 B, *Crat.* 390 C ff. al.

32 **οὐδ' αὖ κτλ.** 'My answer to this question is also no.'

532 A 3 **περαίνει**='performs': cf. Plut. *Crass.* 33. 3 *ἀναβακχεύσας ἐπέραινεν ἐκεῖνα τὰ μέλη κτλ.*, *Tim.* 29 D *τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου, τὸν δὲ δὴ νόμον ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς πέραινε*, and *Laws* 723 E. The metaphor is still from music, though D. and V. erroneously translate "of which dialectical reasoning is the consummation."

ἣν ἐλέγομεν κτλ. It follows that the progress of the prisoner after he has begun to look on real objects outside the Cave represents Dialectic: cf. 516 A *n.* and 532 B.

αὐτὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τελευταῖον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον; οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὁρμᾶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ, πρὶν
B ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν | αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τότε ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; οὐ διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην τὴν πορείαν καλεῖς; Τί μήν; Ἡ δέ γε, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφὴ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδωλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείου εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, καὶ ἐκεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ζῷά τε

7. ἕκαστον Π: om. A. ὁρμᾶν Ast: ὁρμᾷ codd. 9. τοῦ ὁρατοῦ $A^2Π$: ὁρατοῦ A^1.

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5 **αὐτὰ ἄστρα.** I formerly read αὐτὰ <τὰ> ἄστρα with Baiter; but there is no MS authority for the article, and its presence is unnecessary between *αὐτὰ τὰ ζῷα* and *αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον*.

οὕτω καὶ κτλ.: 'so also whenever by means of dialectic one attempts through discourse of reason' etc. On *τοῦ λόγου* and *ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων* see VI 511 B *n.* and App. III. Ast's conjecture *ὁρμᾶν* (see *cr. n.*) is supported by Clement *Strom.* V 112 B Migne (quoted by Schneider) *ἐὰν ἐπιχειρῇ τις ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὁρμᾶν* κτλ., and closely corresponds with *ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν* in the last sentence. There is no occasion for Stallbaum's professional ridicule of Schneider's view: 'quasi vero recte dici potuerit: *τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖν διὰ τοῦ λόγου ὁρμᾶν ἐπί τι*!' for *οὗ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἅπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει* in VI 511 B is an exact parallel. On other views see App. XII.

7 **ἕκαστον** is omitted in A (see *cr. n.*) and some other MSS. It is however necessary both in itself, and in order to provide a proper contrast with *αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν*. For the process here described see App. III.

532 B 9 **τότε.** 516 B.

11 **ἡ δέ γε κτλ.** Having described *διαλεκτική* in terms of the cave-simile, Plato now proceeds to describe his *προπαιδεία* in the same way: cf. 515 C, 516 A *nn.* Bosanquet finds a difficulty in *ἡ λύσις—ἐπάνοδος*, and thinks it just conceivable that these words describe the training in music and gymnastic and not the *προπαιδεία* (so also Susemihl *Gen. Entw.* II p. 201). But Plato's language is perfectly definite; and *τῶν τεχνῶν ἃς διήλθομεν* (532 C) cannot mean anything beyond or except the five studies just described. Nor is this the only passage where the 'turning round' of the prisoners while still in the cave and their gradual ascent are identified with the *προπαιδεία*, or with part of it: see 521 C. Plato means that the emancipation of the soul is a gradual process, and that we are not to expect our mathematical studies to deliver us from *δόξα* all at once. *ἡ λύσις—εἴδωλα* suggests that their first effect will be to loosen our intellectual bonds, and turn us as it were from reflected to original *δόξαι*—from *εἰκασία* to *πίστις* (VI 511 E, VII 517 A *nn.*). The higher we mount, the less of *δόξα* we retain, and in the higher stages of the *προπαιδεία* (symbolized by *ἐκεῖ—ἀποσκιαζομένας*) we escape from *δόξα* altogether. See App. I.

532 B, C 13 **καὶ ἐκεῖ κτλ.** 'and when there, their inability still to look upon animals and plants and the light of the sun, but upon divine reflections in water and shadows of things real, not, as before, shadows of images thrown by a light which is itself but an image compared with the sun.' Cf. 516 A, B. *ἔτι ἀδυναμία* is due to Iamblichus: see *cr. n.* and cf. Bywater in *J. Ph.* X p. 78. Nägelsbach also conjectured *ἔτ' ἀδυναμία*. The difference between *ἔτι* and *ἐπ* in an uncial MS is practically *nil*. With *πρὸς δὲ τὰ κτλ.* the positive counterpart of *ἀδυναμία* (*βλέπειν*) is to be supplied: cf. *Ap.* 36 B (where Schanz's insertion of *οὔ* after *οἱ πολλοί* is inelegant and unnecessary) and Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 1072. For *ἔτι* with a verbal noun cf. IV 434 C *n.* 'Divine' *φαντάσματα* is a half-technical

καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἔτι ἀδυναμία βλέπειν, | πρὸς δὲ C
τὰ ἐν ὕδασι φαντάσματα θεῖα καὶ σκιὰς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ
εἰδώλων σκιὰς δι' ἑτέρου τοιούτου φωτὸς ὡς πρὸς ἥλιον κρίνειν
ἀποσκιαζομένας, πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν, ἃς διήλ-
θομεν, ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου
ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν, ὥσπερ τότε τοῦ
σαφεστάτου ἐν σώματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φανοτάτου ἐν τῷ σωματοειδεῖ |
τε καὶ ὁρατῷ τόπῳ. Ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, ἀποδέχομαι οὕτω. καίτοι D
παντάπασί γέ μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπὰ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι εἶναι, ἄλλον δ'
αὖ τρόπον χαλεπὰ μὴ ἀποδέχεσθαι. ὅμως δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν
παρόντι μόνον ἀκουστέα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὖθις πολλάκις ἐπανιτέον—
ταῦτα θέντες ἔχειν ὡς νῦν λέγεται, ἐπ' αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν νόμον ἴωμεν,
καὶ διέλθωμεν οὕτως, ὥσπερ τὸ προοίμιον διήλθομεν. λέγε οὖν,
τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμεως, καὶ | κατὰ ποῖα δὴ E
εἴδη διέστηκεν, καὶ τίνες αὖ ὁδοί. αὗται γὰρ ἂν ἤδη, ὡς ἔοικεν,
αἱ πρὸς αὐτο ἄγουσαι εἶεν, οἱ ἀφικομένῳ ὥσπερ ὁδοῦ ἀνάπαυλα
ἂν εἴη καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας. Οὐκέτ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων,

14. ἔτι ἀδυναμία Iamblichus (Villoison *Anecd.* II p. 196): ἐπ' ἀδυναμίᾳ ΑΠΞ² *q*: ἐπὶ δυναμία (*sic*) Ξ¹. 26. διέλθωμεν Ξ *q*: ἔλθωμεν ΑΠ.

Platonic phrase for reflections of natural objects produced by natural lights: they are *θεῖα* because *θείας ἔργα ποιήσεως* (*Soph.* 266 C, where the whole matter is very clearly explained). Even without the aid of the *Sophist*, we might deduce the meaning from the antithetical clause *ἀλλ' οὐκ —ἀποσκιαζομένας*, if we remember that the sun is a *θεός* (VI 508 A). The adjective is regularly placed after the substantive when two coordinate qualifications have to be expressed (here *ἐν τοῖς ὕδασιν* and *θεῖα*): cf. III 397 D *τὸν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς μιμητὴν ἄκρατον*, IX 573 A *τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν ἀνειμένων*. Other examples are given by Jebb on Soph. *O. T.* 1245 and Sandys on Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 51. 3: cf. also Stallbaum on *Phil.* 20 B. The present passage explains why Plato was so careful to make the originals in the Cave *σκευαστά* and *εἴδωλα*, and not *φυτευτά*: see on 514 B. Other views of this sentence are discussed in App. XIII.

17 **πᾶσα κτλ.** The anacoluthon is illustrated by Engelhardt *Anac. Pl. Spec.* III p. 45.

18 **ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν**: viz. *λύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν κτλ.*

532 D 23 **οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν κτλ.** We ought not to interpret this as a promise of future dialogues (with Siebeck *Unters. z. Phil. d. Griechen* p. 118); it is only a way of indicating, before we pass on, that the subject is not exhausted. See on IV 430 C.

532 E—**533** A 30 **οὐκέτι κτλ.** With the general tenour and form of the sentence cf. (with Jackson) *Symp.* 210 A. I can see no reason for suspecting the text (with Madvig, who proposes *εἴ γ' ἔτι*, or *εἰ σύ γ' ἔτι*, and Badham, who would insert *εἰ* before *οἷός τ' ἔσει*). Glauco has not without difficulty (517 C) followed Socrates thus far: nor is there anything rude in telling him frankly that he has reached his limit, and even if there were, Socrates does not spare Glauco's feelings (cf. 527 D, 529 A). That his audience would not be able to follow a description of the Good, has already been implied in VI 506 E ff. *βουλοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν* (the account of the Good itself) *ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι*. Here Socrates appears to be a trifle more confident of his own expository powers, though he is careful, as before, to avoid

533 οἷός τ' | ἔσει ἀκολουθεῖν· ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας
ἀπολίποι, οὐδ' εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι οὗ λέγομεν ἴδοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθές,
ὅ γε δή μοι φαίνεται· εἰ δ' ὄντως ἢ μή, οὐκέτ' ἄξιον τοῦτο διισχυρί-
ζεσθαι· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν δεῖ τοιοῦτόν τι ἰδεῖν, ἰσχυριστέον. ἢ γάρ;
Τί μήν; Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις μόνη ἂν
φήνειεν ἐμπείρῳ ὄντι ὧν νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἄλλῃ δὲ οὐδαμῇ δυνα-
τόν; Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἄξιον διισχυρίζεσθαι. Τόδε γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
B οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν | ἀμφισβητήσει λέγουσιν, ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου πέρι
ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἄλλη τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὁδῷ περὶ παντὸς

2. ἀπολίποι $A^1\Pi^1$: ἀπολείποι $A^2\Pi^2$. 4. δεῖ ut videtur Ficinus: δὴ codd., exceptis Φ et Mon. C, qui pro μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτον praebent δεῖ μὲν τοιοῦτο.

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the appearance of dogmatism and therefore introduces the expressions ὅ γε δή μοι φαίνεται etc. (cf. τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοί l.c.) and προθυμίας (cf. προθυμούμενος δὲ κτλ. VI 506 D). Krohn (*Pl. St.* pp. 179 ff.) bitterly complains of Socrates for drawing back; and Whewell (*Phil. of Discovery* p. 436) observes "We may venture to say that it does not appear that he had any answer ready." The dialectical method recommended by Plato in the *Republic* is doubtless, in its full significance, an unrealised ideal (cf. *nn.* on ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον VI 510 B and τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου 511 B), just as the ultimate object of Dialectic, the Idea of Good, will still recede as we approach it. The description which follows merely recapitulates the account already given in Book VI, with a few additional characteristics already familiar in the Socratic school: but the majority of the Platonic dialogues furnish practical illustrations of many essential features in Plato's dialectical method: so that it is possible to form a tolerably clear idea of the kind of answer which the Platonic Socrates might have made in reply to Glauco's invitation. See on the whole subject App. III.

533 A 2 οἷός' εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι κτλ.: such as we saw before in VI 506 E ff. Glauco's question refers to the method, Socrates' reply to the object, of Dialectic: it is of course impossible to separate the two. On διισχυρίζεσθαι followed by ἰσχυριστέον see I 336 E *n.*

4 ὅτι μὲν δεῖ κτλ. Cf. VI 505 E ff., supra 517 C (δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν κτλ.), 519 C, 526 E (ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν). These passages are strongly in favour of δεῖ as against δή (see *cr. n.*), which Schneider, Hermann, and Stallbaum retain. ἰδεῖν is unpleasing if we read δή, and μὲν δή is not free from difficulty here. For μέν without δέ following see V 475 E *n.*

533 A, B 7 τόδε γοῦν κτλ. Socrates proceeds to establish what he has just asserted, viz. that only dialectic can reveal the Good to those who are versed in the propaedeutic 'arts' or sciences. In this at least (he says) every one will agree with us, viz. 'that it is some *other* μέθοδος' (different from the five propaedeutic 'arts') 'which endeavours in every case to apprehend by scientific procedure concerning each several self' (e.g. αὐτοῦ καλοῦ, αὐτοῦ δικαίου, etc.) 'that which they severally *are*' (the οὐσία of each) e.g. ὃ ἔστιν καλόν, etc. Cf. 531 D οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦσί γε σοι οἱ ταῦτα (the five propaedeutic 'arts') δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι. Socrates continues: while all the other arts (except τὰ μαθηματικά) address themselves πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων, etc., even the mathematical 'arts' give no λόγος of their ὑποθέσεις (and so do not apprehend the ὃ ἔστιν of their subject). Dialectic and Dialectic *alone* does this (533 C), so that Dialectic is the ἄλλη τις μέθοδος and *alone* satisfies our needs. τόδε is the object of λέγουσιν, on which, and not on ἀμφισβητήσει, ὡς depends. ἄλλη means other than ὧν νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν. ἀλλά is opposed to the negative notion contained in ἄλλη (another μέθοδος, *not* that of the five 'arts,' but etc.). Badham arbitrarily proposes to read ὅρῳ περιλαμβάνειν for ὁδῷ περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν. The expression περὶ παντός 'about everything' is of course different from αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου πέρι, and μέθοδος ὁδῷ is the kind of collocation in which Plato delights. For other views on this sentence see App. XIV.

λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι τέχναι ἢ πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσίν, ἢ πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις, ἢ πρὸς θεραπείαν τῶν φυομένων τε καὶ συντιθεμένων ἅπασαι τετράφαται, αἱ δὲ λοιπαί, ἃς τοῦ ὄντος τι ἔφαμεν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ | ἑπομένας, ὁρῶμεν ὡς ὀνειρώττουσι μὲν περὶ τὸ C ὄν, ὕπαρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἰδεῖν, ἕως ἂν ὑποθέσεσι χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἐῶσι, μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν. ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὃ μὴ οἶδε, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδεν συμπέπλεκται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι; Οὐδεμία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

XIV. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα

12. ἅπασαι Π: ἄπασα A.

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10 **αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι κτλ.** Cf. *Phil.* 55 E—58 E. Plato is thinking of a threefold classification of arts under *κολακική*, *ποιητική*, and *ἐπιμελητική* or the like (J. and C., comparing *Gorg.* 463 ff., 501, 502, *Soph.* 222 E, 265 ff., *Pol.* 261 ff.).

12 **τετράφαται** is one of Plato's archaisms: see on I 330 B. Such forms are not found in inscriptions after 410 B.C. (Meisterhans[3] p. 166).

13 **γεωμετρίας—ταύτῃ.** For the syntax cf. VI 511 B *n.*

533 C 14 **ὀνειρώττουσι κτλ.** Krohn (*Pl. St.* pp. 179—181) accuses Plato of a sudden *volte face* in regard to mathematical studies. It is true that the same language is used of *δόξα* in V 476 C (cf. VII 520 C), but there are dreams and dreams, and we may fairly say that if the *προπαιδεία* is only a dream in comparison with Dialectic, at least it is one of those dreams which come through the gates of horn.

16 **ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κτλ.** See VI 510 C, D *nn.* *ὁμολογίαν* means 'agreement' 'harmony' ("Übereinstimmung" Schneider), viz. of *ἀρχή*, *τελευτή* and *τὰ μεταξύ*, not 'admissions' (as D. and V. translate): cf. *ὁμολογουμένως* l.c.

20 **οὐκοῦν κτλ.** 'Well then,' said I, 'the method of dialectic alone proceeds by the destruction of hypotheses to the actual first principle, in order to make its results secure.' Dialectic examines and cancels (*ἀναιρεῖ*) one *ὑπόθεσις* after another, till in the end it reaches the Idea of Good. Suppose for example that *ὁσιότης* is the subject of discussion. Various *ὑποθέσεις* are proposed, tested, and overthrown. Out of the ruins of the former *ὑποθέσεις* we built a new and better one, which must in its turn be thoroughly tested, tried, and perhaps overthrown, before it can serve as a stepping-stone to one which is higher, truer and better: cf. 534 B, C. Now this process of testing, revising, discarding, is not, ideally speaking, complete until we examine the relations of our *ὑπόθεσις* of *ὁσιότης* with all *νοητά*, and in such an examination we apply the same 'hypothetical method' throughout the whole noetic sphere, testing and correcting all our *ὑποθέσεις* by one another. In the final stage, which is of course only an ideal, all our *ὑποθέσεις* become exact counterparts of the Ideas, and we have reached the *ἀρχή* or Good. Thereafter the results of Dialectic are *βέβαια*: see VI 511 B. The earlier steps in this dialectical ascent may be illustrated from many, if not most, of the Platonic dialogues. For *ἀναιροῦσα* cf. Arist. *Topic.* Γ 6. 120[a] 6—31, and especially *Eth. Eud.* II 6. 1222[b] 27 f. *κινουμένης τῆς ἀρχῆς πάντα μάλιστ' ἂν τὰ δεικνύμενα μεταβάλλοι, αὐτὰ δ' αὐτὰ οὐ μεταβάλλει ἀναιρουμένου θατέρου ὑπὸ θατέρου, ἂν μὴ τῷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ δι' ἐκείνης δεῖξαι.* The word is often used in connexion with the Eleatic dialectic, of which Plato's *ἡ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀνάλυσις* (Alcin. *Isag.* 7), here described, is a development: see RP[7]. §§ 95 *n.* a, 105 A—106, 110—115. For other views on this passage see App. XV: and for a farther discussion of the method itself and its permanent value in the history of investigation consult App. III.

D βεβαιώσηται, καὶ τῷ | ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωρυγμένον ἠρέμα ἕλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω, συνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγοῖς χρωμένη αἷς διήλθομεν τέχναις· ἃς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης· διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν που ὡρισάμεθα· ἔστι δ', ὡς E ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων | πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. Ἀρέσκει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ τὸ πρότερον, τὴν μὲν πρώτην μοῖραν ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν, δευτέραν δὲ διάνοιαν, | τρίτην δὲ πίστιν καὶ εἰκασίαν τετάρτην, καὶ ξυναμφότερα μὲν ταῦτα δόξαν, ξυναμφότερα δ' ἐκεῖνα νόησιν, καὶ δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν, καὶ ὅ τι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν, καὶ ὅ τι νόησις πρὸς δόξαν, ἐπιστήμην πρὸς πίστιν καὶ διάνοιαν πρὸς εἰκασίαν· τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν διχῇ ἑκατέρου, δοξαστοῦ τε καὶ

ις

29. ἔφη Ξ: ἔφη· ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ A: ἔφη· ἄλλο (ἀλλ' ὃ Π²) ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν (*sic*) σαφηνεία λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ Π: ἔφη· ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν σαφηνεία ὃ λέγοι ἐν ψυχῇ *q*. ἀρέσκει οὖν Π: ἀρέσκει γοῦν A. 5. ἐπιστήμην A¹Π: ἐπιστήμη A².

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533 D 22 **βορβόρῳ.** The image is taken from Orphic theology: cf. II 363 D *n.*

27 **ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν.** VI 511 D, E.

ἔστι δ', ὡς κτλ. Cf. *Laws* 864 A. Plato constantly reminds us that he has no fixed terminology (see Hirmer *Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol.* p. 647 and Hirzel *Der Dialog* pp. 246 ff.), and the ancients were well aware of this fact, though modern interpreters of Plato too often forget it; see the references collected by Hermann *Gesch. u. Syst.*, p. 573 *n.* 106 and D. L. III 63 (quoted by Hirmer).

533 E—**534** E *In conclusion, after pointing out the proportions between the different intellectual states, Socrates declares that the essential feature of Dialectic is its power to grasp the reason or principle of all Being, separating the Idea of Good, for example, from everything else, defining it in words, and scrutinizing the definition by tests, from each and all of which it must emerge triumphantly. Glauco agrees that such a study is indispensable to the rulers, and that the curriculum is now complete.*

533 E 29 **οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.** See *cr. n.* The interpolation which follows these words in all MSS except Ξ is discussed in App. XVI.

ἀρέσκει οὖν. See *cr. n.* Though γοῦν is in A and Ξ, a majority of MSS read οὖν, which is alone suitable. The same error occurs in one or more MSS in V 455 E and VI 506 C (Schneider).

534 A 4 **ὅ τι νόησις—εἰκασίαν.** That is to say, in the Simile of the Line (see Fig. 1 on p. 65), (1) *CB* : *AC* :: *EB* : *DC* and (2) *CB* : *AC* :: *CE* : *AD*. We have already seen that *CE* : *EB* :: *AD* : *DC* (VI 509 D *n.*); ∴ *componendo*

CE+*EB* : *EB* :: *AD*+*DC* : *DC*

i.e. *CB* : *EB* :: *AC* : *DC*; ∴ *alternando* *CB* : *AC* :: *EB* : *DC*. This proves (1), and (2) is proved as follows. Since

CE : *EB* :: *AD* : *DC*,

∴ *invertendo* *EB* : *CE* :: *DC* : *AD*;

hence *componendo*

EB+*CE* : *CE* :: *DC*+*AD* : *AD*

i.e. *CB* : *CE* :: *AC* : *AD*; ∴ *alternando* *CB* : *AC* :: *CE* : *AD*. I owe this proof to the kindness of a mathematical friend.

5 **τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς κτλ.** Liebhold (who also conjectured καὶ ἔτι νόησις for καὶ ὅ τι νόησις) makes the extraordinary

νοητοῦ, ἐῶμεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἢ ὅσων οἱ παρεληλυθότες. | Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγ', ἔφη, τά γε B ἄλλα, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι ἕπεσθαι, ξυνδοκεῖ. Ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν; Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, φαίην; Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως· ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν καὶ | ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιών, μὴ C

8. ὅσων Ξq: ὅσον ΑΠ.

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suggestion *τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτ' ἂν διέχῃ ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαιρεσιν ἑκατέρου* (*Philol.* 1876 p. 372). The text is of course quite sound and=*τὴν δὲ <τούτων> ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτά <ἐστιν> ἀναλογίαν* κτλ.: cf. VI 511 E. I cannot agree with Shorey when he says (*Idea of Good* etc. p. 235) that Plato "avoids drawing out the proportion *εἴδη*: objects of. *διάνοια=σκευαστά* etc.: *εἰκόνες*, because he is aware that the second member is a blank and the fourth is largely fantastic." Both of these assertions are in my opinion quite wrong, and if they were true, Plato would have refrained from drawing out the proportions between the faculties themselves for exactly the same reasons. See App. I. As it is, we should take Plato at his word. He may well decline to enter on the tedious and unprofitable task of expounding and illustrating in detail the proportions which may be conjectured to obtain between the different objects of our intellectual powers. It would for example lead to no useful result if we tried to establish a proportion between a particular *εἶδος*, one of the five *μαθήματα*, a particular object of *πίστις*, and a particular object of *εἰκασία*. Such attempts would certainly involve us in an endless amount of talk, and would hardly result in anything but a series of barren and pedantic formulae and subdivisions.

8 **ἢ ὅσων.** See *cr. n.* *ὅσων* is read by a large majority of MSS, and the confusion of o and ω is common: see *Introd.* § 5. The construction (as Schneider points out) is *ἢ ὅσων λόγων οἱ παρεληλυθότες λόγοι ἡμᾶς ἐνέπλησαν*: cf. (with Schneider) *παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις* VI 490 A. Madvig's *ὅσοι* has little probability, although it avoids a certain awkwardness.

534 B 9 **ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν κτλ.** Cf. 531 E *n.* As far as words go, this definition of Dialectic might almost have come from the historical Socrates, although of course *λόγον λαμβάνειν*, *οὐσία* and *λόγον διδόναι* meant less to him than to Plato.

12 **οὐ φήσεις**='negabis.' *οὐ* is not here 'nonne.' The interrogation is carried on from the last clause.

14 **διορίσασθαι—ἀφελών** perhaps suggests the *διαίρεσις*, which was an essential part of Plato's dialectical method: see App. III. It is noteworthy however that the *Republic* lays far more stress on *συναγωγή* than on *διαίρεσις*: cf. 537 C, Zeller[4] II 1. p. 617 *n.* and App. III.

534 C 15 **ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ κτλ.**: 'as it were in a battle, exhausting every elenchus, striving to test his view not by that which *seems*, but by that which *is*' etc. For *διὰ πάντων—διεξιών* cf. Thuc. III 45. 3 *διεξεληλύθασί γε διὰ πασῶν τῶν ζημιῶν* and *Parm.* 136 E *διὰ πάντων διεξόδου*. We apply the *ἔλεγχοι* ourselves: cf. *ἐξελέγξωμεν* in X 610 A. The ordinary interpretation supposes that the *ἔλεγχοι* are applied by others ('running the gauntlet of all questionings' J. and C.); but in that case we must take *ἐλέγχειν* as=*ἐλέγχειν τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων ἐλέγχους*, which is difficult, because *ἐλέγχειν* is most naturally interpreted by *ἐλέγχων* just before, and *ἐλέγχων* certainly means tests or elenchi which are applied to the theory which the dialectician is himself maintaining. Plato means that the dialectician tests his view of good not by 'seeming' i.e. by what 'seems' (good, bad etc.) to the many, but by the Truth i.e. by that which 'is' in the Platonic sense of *οὐσία*, viz. the Ideas, such as (let us say) the Ideas of *κάλλος*, *δίκαιον*

κατὰ δόξαν, ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἁπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φήσεις εἰδέναι τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' εἴ πῃ εἰδώλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξῃ, οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐφάπτεσθαι, καὶ τὸν νῦν βίον ὀνειροπολοῦντα καὶ ὑπνώττοντα, πρὶν ἐνθάδ' ἐξεγρέσ- 20
D θαι, εἰς Ἅιδου | πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν; Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα γε πάντα ταῦτα φήσω. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τούς γε σαυτοῦ παῖδας, οὓς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμάς, ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίους τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι. Οὐ 25
γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. Νομοθετήσεις δὴ αὐτοῖς ταύτης μάλιστα τῆς παιδείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐξ ἧς ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπι-
E στημονέστατα οἷοί τ' ἔσονται; Νομοθετήσω, | ἔφη, μετά γε σοῦ. Ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἄλλο τούτου μάθημα 30
ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν
535 | μαθημάτων; Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη.

21 ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν $A^2\Pi$: ἐπικαταδαρθανεῖν (*sic*) A^1.

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and so forth. The Idea of Good has connexions and relations with all the other Ideas (cf. VI 510 B, 511 B *nn.*); and our knowledge of these may therefore be used to test the accuracy of our conception of Good. Zeller[4] II 1. p. 620 *n.* rightly compares the present passage with *Parm.* 135 C—136 E: see App. III. It is perhaps unnecessary to notice Liebhold's foolish conjecture *νόησιν* for *οὐσίαν*.

20 **ὀνειροπολοῦντα κτλ.** 533 C *n.*

534 D 24 **οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαις κτλ.**: 'you will not suffer to be mere irrational quantities, if they are to rule in the city and control the higher issues.' *ἄλογοι γραμμαί* are irrational magnitudes (cf. Arist. *περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν* 968[b] 18), which Greek mathematicians treated "geometrically through a symbolism of irrational lines," as in Euclid Bk. X (Gow *Gk Math.* p. 78). They are *ἄλογοι* or *ἄρρητοι* because "nicht aussprechbar" (Cantor *Gesch. d. Math.* p. 154 *n.*), whereas rational lines are *ῥηταί*, 'expressible' (cf. Blass *de Pl. Math.* p. 18). In its application to Glauco's 'children,' *ἄλογοι* is active, and means of course *μὴ λόγον ἔχοντες διδόναι* (534 B). Has *γραμμάς* also any special application? Probably it has: otherwise the witticism seems unnecessarily far-fetched and frigid, even if we make every allowance for Plato's love of a mathematical jest (cf. *Pol.* 266 B), as well as for the interest which the subject of irrationals seems to have excited among the mathematicians of his day (see *Theaet.* 147 D ff. and Cantor l.c. pp. 182, 191, 203). Lucilius (II 20) has the line "vix vivo homini ac monogrammo" ("a dead-alive sketch of an anatomy" Tyrrell *Lat. Poetry* p. 175), and Cicero mocks at Epicurus' gods as "monogrammos" (*N. D.* II 59: cf. I 123 homunculi similem deum—liniamentis dumtaxat extremis, non habitu solido—praeditum etc., and other passages in Usener *Epicurea* p. 234). Perhaps Plato means to suggest that his "airy burgomasters," as Milton calls them, would in such a case be only as it were mere silhouettes ("Schattenrisse" Bertram *Bilderspr. Pl.* p. 46) of rulers moving blindly to and fro in a sort of dreamland (cf. *ὀνειροπολοῦντα* 534 C and 533 C *n.*). For other views see App. XVII.

25 **τῶν μεγίστων.** 525 B *n.*

27 **ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι κτλ.** Plato concludes by emphasizing the most conspicuous and characteristic feature of the Socratic method: cf. *Crat.* 390 C.

XV. Διανομὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λοιπόν σοι, τίσιν ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα δώσομεν καὶ τίνα τρόπον. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἵους ἐξελέξαμεν; Πῶς γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὔ; Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκείνας τὰς φύσεις οἷον δεῖν ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι· τούς τε γὰρ βεβαιοτάτους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρειοτάτους προαιρετέον καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τοὺς εὐειδεστάτους· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ζητητέον | μὴ μόνον γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς B τὰ ἤθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ τῇδε τῇ παιδείᾳ τῆς φύσεως πρόσφορα ἐκτέον αὐτοῖς. Ποῖα δὴ διαστέλλει; Δριμύτητα, ὦ μακάριε, ἔφην, δεῖ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς μανθάνειν· πολὺ γάρ τοι μᾶλλον ἀποδειλιῶσι ψυχαὶ ἐν ἰσχυροῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐν γυμνασίοις· οἰκειότερος γὰρ αὐταῖς ὁ πόνος, ἴδιος, ἀλλ' οὐ

6. οἷον Π: οἵου A.

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535 A—**536** B *It only remains to apportion these studies and prescribe how they are to be pursued. Our pupils must possess not only the qualities of stedfastness and courage etc., but also those other natural qualifications which our peculiar course of training demands. These are now enumerated by Socrates.*

535 A 2 **διανομὴ κτλ.** Herwerden needlessly and wantonly inserts *σκεπτέα* after *τὸ λοιπόν*.

4 **τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογήν.** III 412 B ff.

5 **ἐκείνας τὰς φύσεις κτλ.** 'I would have you suppose that it must be *those* natures which are to be selected,' lit. '*those* natures must be to-be-selected.' Kopetsch (*de verbalibus Plat.* p. 29) confesses himself unable to quote any parallels for the 'pleonasm.' We might compare the use of *δεῖν* in *μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι* VI 486 D, where see note; but the fact is that *δεῖν* is not altogether pleonastic in the present passage. Without *δεῖν* we should translate 'that it *is* those natures' etc. and not 'that it must be those natures' etc.; and there is a slight but appreciable difference between the two. Richards would expunge *δεῖν* or read *ἀεί*, but *ἀεί* is quite unsuitable here. *ἐκλεκτάς* (which I once proposed, taking the words as = 'ought to have been selected') is equally unsatisfactory, nor does *θεῖναι*, which might be suggested in place of *εἶναι*, carry conviction. The text is in my judgment sound.

6 **βεβαιοτάτους—ἀνδρειοτάτους.** The contrast is between stedfastness and spirit: cf. II 375 A ff. and VI 503 C with Appendix VI to Book VI. *εὐειδεστάτους* has not hitherto been mentioned as a qualification of Plato's rulers: for VI 494 C cannot be interpreted in such a sense. The word is however certainly genuine: cf. *ἀρτιμελεῖς* in 536 B.

535 B 8 **γενναίους—τὰ ἤθη**: 'of noble and masculine characters.' Cf. *Theaet.* 149 A *μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς*, Nicostrat. *Frag.* 35 ed. Kock *νὴ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην, ὦ ξένη, βλοσυράν γε τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχεις*, and Aelian *Var. Hist.* 12. 21 *σεμνὸν ἅμα καὶ βλοσυρὸν ὁρῶσαι* (of Spartan women). In *Cl. Rev.* XIII p. 10 I have tried to shew that the original meaning of this vigorous and expressive word is 'hairy,' 'shaggy,' 'bristling' (horridus), from which to 'virile' the transition is natural enough. Mr L. D. Barnett has since supplied me with an interesting confirmation from Pollux IV 136 (on tragic masks) *ὁ δὲ οὖλος, ξανθός, ὑπέρογκος. αἱ τρίχες τῷ ὄγκῳ προσπεπήγασιν, ὀφρύες ἀνατέτανται, βλοσυρὸς τὸ εἶδος.*

9 **ἃ—πρόσφορα**: 'the natural characteristics suitable for our scheme of education.' *τῆς φύσεως* depends on *ἅ*, not (as Stallbaum supposes) on *τῇδε τῇ παιδείᾳ*. The following list of qualifications should be compared with that in VI 485 A ff. The difference is slight, but *φιλοπονία* as a special attribute is new, and on the other hand some of the secondary moral qualities are not insisted upon here.

12 **ἀποδειλιῶσι κτλ.** Cf. VI 504 A.

κοινὸς ὢν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Καὶ μνήμονα δὴ καὶ
C ἄρρατον καὶ | πάντῃ φιλόπονον ζητητέον. ἢ τίνι τρόπῳ οἴει τά τε
τοῦ σώματος ἐθελήσειν τινὰ διαπονεῖν καὶ τοσαύτην μάθησίν τε
καὶ μελέτην ἐπιτελεῖν; Οὐδένα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν μὴ παντάπασί γ' ᾖ
εὐφυής. Τὸ γοῦν νῦν ἁμάρτημα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία φιλοσοφίᾳ
διὰ ταῦτα προσπέπτωκεν, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἶπον, ὅτι οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν
αὐτῆς ἅπτονται· οὐ γὰρ νόθους ἔδει ἅπτεσθαι, ἀλλὰ γνησίους.
D Πῶς; ἔφη. Πρῶτον μέν, εἶπον, φιλοπονίᾳ | οὐ χωλὸν δεῖ εἶναι τὸν
ἀψόμενον, τὰ μὲν ἡμίσεα φιλόπονον, τὰ δ' ἡμίσεα ἄπονον· ἔστι δὲ
τοῦτο, ὅταν τις φιλογυμναστὴς μὲν καὶ φιλόθηρος ᾖ καὶ πάντα τὰ
διὰ τοῦ σώματος φιλοπονῇ, φιλομαθὴς δὲ μή, μηδὲ φιλήκοος μηδὲ
ζητητικός, ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις μισοπονῇ· χωλὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ τἀναν-
τία τούτου μεταβεβληκὼς τὴν φιλοπονίαν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη,
λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταὐτὸν τοῦτο
E ἀνάπηρον ψυχὴν θήσομεν, | ἢ ἂν τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον ψεῦδος μισῇ καὶ
χαλεπῶς φέρῃ αὐτή τε καὶ ἑτέρων ψευδομένων ὑπεραγανακτῇ, τὸ
δ' ἀκούσιον εὐκόλως προσδέχηται καὶ ἀμαθαίνουσά που ἁλισκομένη
μὴ ἀγανακτῇ, ἀλλ' εὐχερῶς ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ μολύνη-
536 ται; Παντά|πασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην, ἦν δ'
ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς

28, 29. μισῇ—φέρῃ $A^2\Pi$: μισεῖ—φέρει A^1.

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15 **ἄρρατον.** The word *ἄρρατος*, which occurs again in *Crat.* 407 D, is apparently, like *βλοσυρός*, an expressive vulgarism *de foro arreptum*. There is considerable variety here in the inferior MSS, but the evidence of the Scholiast places the reading beyond doubt. *ἄρρατος* is explained by Timaeus (s. v.) as *ἰσχυρός*, *στερεός*, and with this explanation the Scholiast and Lexicographers agree. Some of the ancients derived the word from an obsolete verb *ῥάω* = *ῥαίω*. Schneider remarks that the *α* must be long "si verum est quod scholiastes Victorianus ad *Il.* XIIII 56 tradit, pro *ἄῤῥηκτον* alios legisse *ἄῤῥατον*." See Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s. v.

535 C 17 **οὐδένα:** 'I think no one will.' Van Prinsterer's *οὐδενί*, as Stallbaum observes, is unnecessary. In written dialogue, as in actual conversation, the answer does not always accommodate itself to the exact form of the question: cf. V 465 E *n.*

19 **πρότερον κτλ.** The reference in *πρότερον* is to VI 495 C—496 A. In *οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτῆς ἅπτονται* Dümmler sees an allusion to Antisthenes (*Antisth.* p. 34), but see on 535 D, E.

535 D 22 **ἄπονον:** not *μισόπονον*, although *μισοπονῇ* appears below. Plato loves variety as well as uniformity, and Herwerden should not have proposed to write *μισόπονον*.

23 **φιλόθηρος.** Dümmler thinks Plato perhaps means Xenophon, who loved the chase; but it is unlikely that any personal reference is intended either here or in 535 C. See also on 535 E.

25 **ὁ—φιλοπονίαν:** 'whose love of work has taken the opposite direction.'

535 E 29 **αὐτή τε καὶ κτλ.** See on *αὐτός τε καί—παρακάλει* IV 427 D.

τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον. See II 382 A—C.

31 **θηρίον ὕειον.** Dümmler again recognises the unhappy Antisthenes, remembering, no doubt, the 'city of pigs.' See however on II 372 D.

536 A 2 **μεγαλοπρέπειαν:** 'high-mindedness,' not (as Jowett) 'magnificence.' See VI 486 A *n.*

μέρη οὐχ ἥκιστα δεῖ φυλάττειν τὸν νόθον τε καὶ τὸν γνήσιον. ὅταν γάρ τις μὴ ἐπίστηται τὰ τοιαῦτα σκοπεῖν καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις, λανθάνουσι χωλοῖς τε καὶ νόθοις χρώμενοι πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι τούτων, οἱ μὲν φίλοις, οἱ δὲ ἄρχουσι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει. Ἡμῖν δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διευλαβητέον, B
ὡς ἐὰν μὲν ἀρτιμελεῖς τε καὶ ἀρτίφρονας ἐπὶ τοσαύτην μάθησιν καὶ τοσαύτην ἄσκησιν κομίσαντες παιδεύωμεν, ἥ τε δίκη ἡμῖν οὐ μέμψεται αὐτή, τήν τε πόλιν καὶ πολιτείαν σώσομεν, ἀλλοίους δὲ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ ταῦτα τἀναντία πάντα καὶ πράξομεν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἔτι πλείω γέλωτα καταντλήσομεν. Αἰσχρὸν μέντ' ἂν εἴη, ἦ δ' ὅς. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, εἶπον· γελοῖον δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἔοικα παθεῖν. Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. Ἐπελαθόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπαίζομεν, C

3. δεῖ $A^2\Pi$: δὴ A^1.

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4 **τὰ τοιαῦτα** ("das dazu gehörige" Schneider) is quite general, and means how so-and-so is in respect of the virtues just enumerated: cf. VIII 549 D. The Oxford editors wrongly understand *τὰ τοιαῦτα* as *τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη*.

5 **λανθάνουσι κτλ.**: 'they unconsciously use cripples and bastards for any of these services that happen, as friends in the one case, and in the other rulers.' Schneider explains *τούτων* as "horum negotiorum, hoc est, aliquam ex his, quae dictae sunt, virtutibus requirentium." This is perhaps safer than to understand it merely of the services rendered by friends and rulers. In either case cf. for *τούτων* VIII 543 C *n.* J. and C. have rightly noted that "the subject of *τύχωσι* is the same with that of *λανθάνουσι*": but they are mistaken in referring *τούτων* to *τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη*, and in connecting *πρός* with *χωλοῖς τε καὶ νόθοις*. It is certain that *χρώμενοι* is understood with *τύχωσι*, and, if so, *πρός* can belong only to *χρώμενοι*. D. and V. are consistently wrong in the translation of this somewhat perplexing little clause.

536 B 8 **ἀρτιμελεῖς κτλ.** For *ἀρτιμελεῖς* cf. 535 A. *ἄσκησιν* is of course the *physical* discipline: note the chiasmus.

9 **ἥ τε δίκη κτλ.** Cf. VI 487 A where *οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Μῶμος, ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο* similarly concludes the earlier enumeration of qualities necessary to the philosophic ruler.

11 **καὶ πράξομεν.** *καί* (which some inferior MSS omit) is "paullo insolentius positum, sed ita ut *τἀναντία πάντα* partim ad civitatis conditionem—partim ad opinionem hominum atque existimationem philosophiae, quam sequi errorem istum oporteat, spectare et *utramque* contra, quam dictum optandumque sit, casuram esse significet" (Schneider).

13 **γελοῖον** takes up *γέλωτα* just before, hence *καί*. My extreme *προθυμία*, says Socrates in effect, was fitted to provoke a smile (cf. VI 506 D).

ἐν τῷ παρόντι. The reference is to 535 C and VI 495 C—496 A. After *παρόντι* Burnet adds *<τι>*, needlessly: see on III 388 D.

536 B—**537** C *After apologising for his excessive zeal in defence of Philosophy, Socrates lays down his ordinances. We must select our pupils while they are young, and put before them in their boyhood all the propaedeutic studies, taking care to avoid compulsion. At the same time they will be brought on the field of battle and receive their baptism of fire. From eighteen to twenty, gymnastic exercises claim their undivided attention. At twenty, those who have proved themselves the best will enter on a systematic comparative study of mathematics etc., lasting ten years.*

536 C 14 **ἐπαίζομεν.** Literature is not life, but 'noble play'—*παγκάλην—παιδιὰν—τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν* (*Phaedr.* 276 E. Cf. also X 599 A *n.*). See Hirzel *der Dialog* I p. 180, where this thoroughly Platonic view is admirably expounded. There is a touch of pathos in Plato's application of it to his own dialogues, recalling to my mind, I know not exactly why, the saying of Isaac Newton about gathering pebbles by the

καὶ μᾶλλον ἐντεινάμενος εἶπον. λέγων γὰρ ἅμα ἔβλεψα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἰδὼν προπεπηλακισμένην ἀναξίως ἀγανακτήσας μοι δοκῶ καὶ ὥσπερ θυμωθεὶς τοῖς αἰτίοις σπουδαιότερον εἰπεῖν ἃ εἶπον. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὔκουν ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ ἀκροατῇ. Ἀλλ' ὡς ἐμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥήτορι. τόδε δὲ μὴ ἐπιλανθανώμεθα, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκλογῇ πρεσβύτας ἐξελέγομεν, ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐκ ἐγχωρήσει· Σόλωνι γὰρ οὐ πειστέον, ὡς γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς μανθάνειν, ἀλλ' ἧττον ἢ τρέχειν· νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

XVI. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν λογισμῶν τε καὶ γεωμετριῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαιδείας, ἣν τῆς διαλεκτικῆς δεῖ προπαιδευθῆναι, παισὶν οὖσι χρὴ προβάλλειν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπάναγκες μαθεῖν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς διδαχῆς ποιουμένους. Τί δή; Ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρὴ μανθάνειν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος πόνοι βίᾳ πονούμενοι χεῖρον οὐδὲν τὸ σῶμα ἀπεργάζονται, ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Μὴ τοίνυν βίᾳ, εἶπον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοὺς παῖδας ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν, ἀλλὰ παίζοντας τρέφε, ἵνα καὶ μᾶλλον οἷός τ' ᾖς καθορᾶν ἐφ' ὃ ἕκαστος πέφυκεν.

21. πειστέον $A^2\Xi q$: πιστέον $A^1\Pi$.

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shore, as well as Heraclitus' *αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι παίζων πεσσεύων* (*Fr.* 79 Bywater).

15 **μᾶλλον ἐντεινάμενος.** Plato's apology is by no means intended to appease the 'bald little tinker' (VI 495 E) and his crew; for he still holds them responsible for the insults levelled at philosophy (*τοῖς αἰτίοις*). He is merely apologising, not without a characteristic touch of irony, for an offence against the canons of literary taste. One ought not to turn 'play' into earnest, and, as Longinus remarks, *κἂν βακχεύμασι νήφειν ἀναγκαῖον* (*περὶ ὕψους* 16. 4).

20 **πρεσβύτας ἐξελέγομεν.** III 412 C. It is quite clear that the *προτέρα ἐκλογή* is not supplemented but superseded by the provisions now laid down. Cf. VIII 543 D *n.*

536 D 21 **γηράσκων κτλ.** *γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος* Solon *Fr.* 18 Bergk. The line is quoted in [*Erast.*] 133 C and alluded to again in *Lach.* 188 B, 189 A.

22 **ἧττον.** *ἔτι ἧττον*, which Herwerden proposes, is no improvement, but rather the reverse. Plato may be alluding to some proverbial saying, as D. and V. appear to believe, translating thus: "an old man can sooner run than learn."

νέων δὲ κτλ. Cf. Eur. *I. T.* 122 *μόχθος γὰρ οὐδεὶς τοῖς νέοις σκῆψιν φέρει* and *Theaet.* 146 B, *Symp.* 175 E.

25 **παισὶν οὖσι κτλ.** This preliminary survey is clearly meant to take place in the years during which 'Music' and Gymnastic are chiefly cultivated. See Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II p. 290.

26 **οὐχ ὡς ἐπάναγκες κτλ.** We must bear in mind throughout the whole of this subject that Plato is legislating for a select class who naturally love labour and truth. They alone are nature's freemen and must be treated as such in their education, but the compulsory method may be necessary, Plato would say, in order to educate others, so far as others can be educated at all. With the general sense cf. *Phaedr.* 240 C and Theogn. 472 *πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμ' ἀνιηρὸν ἔφυ.*

536 E 31 **παίζοντας:** with a play on *παῖδας*: cf. infra VIII 545 E and *ἀτεχνῶς παισὶν—μετὰ παιδιᾶς—μανθάνειν* in *Laws* 819 B, a passage in which the general idea is that play should be study, whereas here it is that study should be play.

Ἔχει ὃ λέγεις, ἔφη, λόγον. Οὐκοῦν μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἔφαμεν τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων θεωρούς, καὶ ἐάν που ἀσφαλὲς ᾖ, προσακτέον ἐγγὺς καὶ γευστέον αἵματος, ὥσπερ τοὺς σκύλακας; Μέμνημαι, ἔφη. Ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τούτοις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῖς τε πόνοις καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβοις ὃς ἂν ἐντρεχέστατος ἀεὶ φαίνηται, εἰς ἀριθμόν τινα ἐγκριτέον. | Ἐν τίνι, **B**
ἔφη, ἡλικίᾳ; Ἡνίκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων μεθίενται. οὗτος γὰρ ὁ χρόνος, ἐάν τε δύο ἐάν τε τρία ἔτη γίγνηται, ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι· κόποι γὰρ καὶ ὕπνοι μαθήμασι πολέμιοι· καὶ ἅμα μία καὶ αὕτη τῶν βασάνων οὐκ ἐλαχίστη, τίς ἕκαστος ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις φανεῖται. Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη. Μετὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκ τῶν εἰκοσιετῶν οἱ προκριθέντες τιμάς τε μείζους τῶν ἄλλων οἴσονται, τά τε | χύδην μαθήματα παισὶν ἐν τῇ **C**
παιδείᾳ γενόμενα τούτοις συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν οἰκειότητος ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως. Μόνη γοῦν, εἶπεν, ἡ τοιαύτη μάθησις βέβαιος ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐγγένηται. Καὶ μεγίστη γε,

3. ὃ $A^1\Pi$: ὦ A^2. 14. *εἰκοσιετῶν* Schneider secundum *εἴκοσιετῶν* (*sic*) Vind. F.: *εἴκοσι ἐτῶν* AΠ: *εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν* Ξ *q*. 16. *παιδείᾳ* Ξ: *παιδειᾷ* (*sic*) A^1: *παιδιᾷ* corr. A^2: *παιδία* vel *παιδίᾳ* Π *q*.

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537 A 4 **ἔφαμεν.** V 467 C—E.

8 **ἐντρεχέστατος**: 'most agile in' ("der rührigste" Schneider). The word is rare, and apparently not elsewhere found in writers of the best period. It occurs in Longinus *περὶ ὕψους* 44. 1 *δριμεῖαί τε καὶ ἐντρεχεῖς* (*φύσεις*) and Marc. Aur. VI 14: cf. id. VII 66 (*ἐντρεχέστερον*) and I 8 (*ἐντρέχεια*). For a kindred use of the verb *ἐντρέχειν* see Hom. *Il.* 19. 385 *εἰ οἵ ἐφαρμόσσειε* (sc. *ἔντεα*) *καὶ ἐντρέχοι ἀγλαὰ γυῖα*.

537 B 10 **οὗτος—ὁ χρόνος κτλ.** The compulsory military or militia service of Athenian youth during their eighteenth and nineteenth years is probably in Plato's mind: see Gilbert *Gk. Const. Ant.* E. T. pp. 311—313.

14 **προκριθέντες.** See on 537 D.

537 C 15 **ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ.** It is difficult to decide whether Plato in this instance wrote *παιδιᾷ*, *παιδίᾳ* or *παιδείᾳ*. *παιδιᾷ* is supported by three inferior MSS as well as by A^2 and the oldest MS of Theo (see Hiller's edition p. 3), and *παίζοντας τρέφε* in 536 E seems at first sight to favour it. But *ἐν τῇ παιδιᾷ* is different from *ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει*, and ought to mean 'in their play'; whereas 536 E does not distinguish between 'study' and 'play' (see note ad loc.). *παιδίᾳ* 'boyhood' has also some MS support, and the existence of the word in Greek is fully proved by Schneider in his elaborate note. But *ἐν τῇ παιδίᾳ* would be superfluous after *παισίν*, and on the whole I now prefer the traditional reading *παιδείᾳ*, which appears to be in a majority of MSS.

16 **τούτοις συνακτέον κτλ.** *τούτοις* (sc. *τοῖς προκριθεῖσι*) goes with *συνακτέον*. The propaedeutic studies now begin to be pursued no longer *χύδην*, but systematically and comparatively, so as to reveal the 'kinship of the studies with one another and with the nature of Being': cf. 531 D *n.*, and (for the meaning of *οἰκειότης*) 526 C *n.* Platt would omit *τῶν μαθημάτων* as a gloss on *ἀλλήλων*, but without these words the Greek might mean 'their mutual kinship and the kinship of true being' (with itself). *τῶν μαθημάτων* is also in Theo (l. c.). For the genitives *ἀλλήλων* and *τῆς—φύσεως*, (which D. and V. wrongly connect with *σύνοψιν*), cf. VI 501 D *τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀρίστου*.

ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πεῖρα διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως καὶ μή. ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὔ. Ξυνοίομαι, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' 20
D ἐγώ, δεήσει σε ἐπισκοποῦντα[1] οἳ ἂν μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι ἐν αὐτοῖς ὦσι καὶ μόνιμοι μὲν ἐν μαθήμασι, μόνιμοι δ' ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, τούτους αὖ, ἐπειδὰν τὰ τριάκοντα ἔτη ἐκβαίνωσιν, ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων προκρινάμενον εἰς μείζους τε τιμὰς καθιστάναι καὶ σκοπεῖν τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει βασανίζοντα, τίς ὀμμάτων καὶ 25
τῆς ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως δυνατὸς μεθιέμενος ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν μετ' ἀληθείας ἰέναι. καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς ἔργον, ὦ ἑταῖρε.
E Τί μάλιστα; ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκ ἐννοεῖς,[1] ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ νῦν περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι κακὸν γιγνόμενον ὅσον γίγνεται; Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. Παρανομίας που, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐμπίμπλανται. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Θαυμασ- 30
τὸν οὖν τι οἴει, εἶπον, πάσχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐ ξυγγιγνώσκειs; Πῇ μάλιστα; ἔφη. Οἷον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴ τις ὑποβολιμαῖος τραφείη
538 ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν χρήμασι, πολλῷ δὲ καὶ μεγάλῳ γέ|νει καὶ κόλαξι πολλοῖς, ἀνὴρ δὲ γενόμενος αἴσθοιτο, ὅτι οὐ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν φασκόντων γονέων, τοὺς δὲ τῷ ὄντι γεννήσαντας μὴ εὕροι, τοῦτον ἔχειs

23. τούτους q^1: τούτοις ΑΠΞ q^2. 29. κακὸν Π: καλὸν A. 30. ἐμπίπλανται A^2: ἐμπίπλαται A^1ΠΞ q^1: ἐμπίπλασθαι q^2.

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19 **ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς κτλ.** Cf. 531 D *n.*: also *Phaedr.* 265 D ff. *εἰς μίαν—ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα*, *Laws* XII 965 B (*συνορῶντα*), *Phaedr.* 273 E, *Soph.* 253 D ff. and other passages cited by Zeller[4] II 1. p. 616 *n.* 3. See also App. III.

21 **ἐν αὐτοῖς.** *αὐτοῖς* is masculine (Schneider), not neuter (as D. and V. translate).

537 D—**540** C *At this stage the best proficients will be advanced to higher honours, and tested by Dialectic. Great care must be taken in introducing them to this study; for where the character is immature and weak, dialectical debate too frequently engenders lawlessness, by overthrowing inherited beliefs. We shall therefore forbid such disputations to the young. After five years devoted solely to Dialectic, the next fifteen will be spent in acquiring experience of government and practical affairs. At the age of fifty those who have triumphantly passed through every trial, will thenceforward contemplate the Good, descending when their turn comes into the Cave to order human institutions after its likeness. All these regulations apply of course to women as well as to men.*

537 D 23 **ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων.** *πρόκριτοι* was a familiar term in the organisation of Greek polities: see Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 8. 1 with Sandys ad loc., and cf. also Pl. *Laws* 753 C f.

25 **ὀμμάτων—μεθιέμενος.** See VI 511 B *n.*

537 E 29 **παρανομίας κτλ.** Like Phidippides in Ar. *Clouds* 1399 ff. *ὡς ἡδὺ καινοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ δεξιοῖς ὁμιλεῖν | καὶ τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων ὑπερφρονεῖν δύνασθαι* κτλ. Schneider retains *ἐμπίπλαται* (see *cr. n.*), making the subject *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι*, but the present tense ('they become filled with lawlessness') favours the plural. Or does Plato mean that the dialectic of his day was degenerating? I think not; for that is scarcely a reason for exercising special care in connexion with his own (*ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς ἔργον*). *αὐτούς* is not decisive, though it points to the plural, which is also supported by 539 A *παράνομος δὴ—δόξει γεγονέναι ἐκ νομίμου.*

538 A 2 **τῶν φασκόντων γονέων:** 'his self-styled parents.' For the omission

μαντεύσασθαι, πῶς ἂν διατεθείη πρός τε τοὺς κόλακας καὶ πρὸς
5 τοὺς ὑποβαλομένους ἐν ἐκείνῳ τε τῷ χρόνῳ, ᾧ οὐκ ᾔδει τὰ περὶ τῆς
ὑποβολῆς, καὶ ἐν ᾧ αὖ ᾔδει; ἢ βούλει ἐμοῦ μαντευομένου ἀκοῦσαι;
Βούλομαι, ἔφη.

XVII. Μαντεύομαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν τιμᾶν ἂν τὸν
πατέρα καὶ τὴν | μητέρα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους δοκοῦντας ἢ τοὺς B
10 κολακεύοντας, καὶ ἧττον μὲν ἂν περιιδεῖν ἐνδεεῖς τινός, ἧττον δὲ
παράνομόν τι δρᾶσαι ἢ εἰπεῖν εἰς αὐτούς, ἧττον δὲ ἀπειθεῖν τὰ
μεγάλα ἐκείνοις ἢ τοῖς κόλαξιν, ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὴ εἰδείη.
Εἰκός, ἔφη. Αἰσθόμενος τοίνυν τὸ ὄν, μαντεύομαι αὖ περὶ μὲν
τούτους ἀνεῖναι ἂν τὸ τιμᾶν τε καὶ σπουδάζειν, περὶ δὲ τοὺς
15 κόλακας ἐπιτεῖναι καὶ πείθεσθαί τε αὐτοῖς διαφερόντως ἢ πρότερον
| καὶ ζῆν ἂν ἤδη κατ' ἐκείνους, ξυνόντα αὐτοῖς ἀπαρακαλύπτως, C
πατρὸς δὲ ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιουμένων οἰκείων, εἰ μὴ πάνυ
εἴη φύσει ἐπιεικής, μέλειν τὸ μηδέν. Πάντ', ἔφη, λέγεις οἷά περ ἂν
γένοιτο. ἀλλὰ πῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἁπτομένους τῶν λόγων αὖτη φέρει ἡ
20 εἰκών; Τῇδε. ἔστι που ἡμῖν δόγματα ἐκ παίδων περὶ δικαίων καὶ

13. *αἰσθόμενος* A[1] cum ceteris, excepto M, ubi secundum Rostagno legitur *αἰσθόμενον*: idem ut videtur corr. A[2].

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of *εἶναι* see Schanz *Nov. Comm. Pl.* p. 34. *γονέων <εἶναι>*, which Herwerden proposes, is weaker and less emphatic.

5 **ὑποβαλομένους** is the reading of A and Cesenas M; whereas all, or nearly all, the other MSS have *ὑποβαλλομένους*. "Ac nescio an qui suppositum sibi aliquando filium pro suo habere et venditare pergunt, *ὑποβαλλόμενοι* dici potuerint" (Schneider, comparing *καθιστάντες* in III 410 B). This is true, and the present may be right, especially as in V 469 E, A has *βαλόντος* (wrongly, as I think) for the *βάλλοντος* of all the other MSS. But M may here perhaps be allowed to turn the scale.

ἤδει. *εἰδείη* (suggested by Richards) would be more regular (as in B below), but cf. *δύναται* 515 E *n.*

538 B 11 **εἰς αὐτούς.** *εἰς* (which Herwerden brackets) is used as in *ὑβρίζειν εἰς.*

13 **αἰσθόμενος.** *αἰσθόμενον*, which is read by Hermann and others, has no MS authority except a variant, perhaps an early variant, in A, and apparently also M. The anacoluthon will of course be scouted by many scholars; but although it is ungrammatical, no doubt, it is scarcely harsher than many anacolutha in Plato; see Schneider on IV 430 E and Engelhardt *Anac. Pl. Spec.* III p. 40, where numerous examples of the *nominativus pendens* are given. Plato begins as if he were going to write *δοκεῖ μοι* instead of *μαντεύομαι*: compare *Ap.* 21 C *διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι κτλ.*, where *ἔδοξέ μοι* is substituted for *ἔγνων* or the like. Here the nominative seems to me to emphasize the contrast with *ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ—εἰδείη* better than the accusative could have done; but in any case it is safer to retain than to expunge such echoes of conversational style in Plato wherever the weight of MS evidence is in their favour. For this reason I now, with Schneider and others, revert to *αἰσθόμενος.*

538 C 17 **πατρὸς δὲ ἐκείνου κτλ.**: 'his former father' etc. i.e. the reputed father of his earlier days. *ποιουμένων* 'reputed' (J. and C.), lit. 'made out to be,' is scarcely different from *δοκούντων* (*τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους δοκοῦντας* in B). Cobet conjectures *προσποιουμένων*, but the text is sound: cf. VI 498 A *n.*

20 **ἔστι που κτλ.** Plato, as Bosanquet points out (*Companion* p. 305), seems to

καλῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐκτεθράμμεθα ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῦσι, πειθαρχοῦντές τε
D καὶ τιμῶντες αὐτά. Ἔστι γάρ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ | ἄλλα ἐναντία
τούτων ἐπιτηδεύματα ἡδονὰς ἔχοντα, ἃ κολακεύει μὲν ἡμῶν τὴν
ψυχὴν καὶ ἕλκει ἐφ' αὑτά, πείθει δ' οὔ τοὺς καὶ ὀπηοῦν μετρίους·
ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα τιμῶσι τὰ πάτρια καὶ ἐκείνοις πειθαρχοῦσιν. Ἔστι 25
ταῦτα. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅταν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐλθὸν ἐρώτημα
ἔρηται, τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἀποκριναμένου ὃ τοῦ νομοθέτου
ἤκουεν ἐξελέγχῃ ὁ λόγος καὶ πολλάκις καὶ πολλαχῇ ἐλέγχων εἰς
E δόξαν καταβάλῃ, ὡς τοῦτο | οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, καὶ
περὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἦγεν ἐν τιμῇ, 30
μετὰ τοῦτο τί οἴει ποιήσειν αὐτὸν πρὸς αὐτὰ τιμῆς τε πέρι καὶ
πειθαρχίας; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, μήτε τιμᾶν ἔτι ὁμοίως μήτε πείθεσθαι.
Ὅταν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτε ταῦτα ἡγῆται τίμια καὶ οἰκεῖα ὥσπερ
539 πρὸ τοῦ, τά τε ἀληθῆ μὴ εὑρίσκῃ, ἔστι πρὸς ὁποῖον βίον | ἄλλον ἢ
τὸν κολακεύοντα εἰκότως προσχωρήσεται; Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη. Παρά-
νομος δή, οἶμαι, δόξει γεγονέναι ἐκ νομίμου. Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν,
ἔφην, εἰκὸς τὸ πάθος τῶν οὕτω λόγων ἁπτομένων καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον,
πολλῆς συγγνώμης ἄξιον; Καὶ ἐλέου γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἵνα μὴ 5
γίγνηται ὁ ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ τοὺς τριακοντούτας σοι, εὐλαβουμένῳ

28. ἤκουεν A¹Π: ἤκουσεν corr. A². ἐξελέγχῃ A¹Π: ἐξελέγξῃ corr. A².
29. καταβάλῃ Ξ: καταλάβῃ A: καταβάλλῃ (*sic*) Π *q*.

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think it possible enough that the higher education will lead his rulers to criticise the *δόγματα* of the earlier 'musical' training. "But if this criticism is only the negative side of the deepening grasp with which a mature and stedfast mind lays hold on reality, no harm, he urges, will be done" (Bosanquet l.c.). We may even go farther and say that Dialectic and its ancillary studies are expressly intended to place the Guardians in the same position as the original legislator (VI 497 D) and enable them within limits to modify and reconstruct the authoritative *δόγματα* of the city (VI 500 E ff.).

538 D 26 **ἐλθὸν ἐρώτημα.** See IV 434 D *n.*

27 **ἀποκριναμένου.** The genitive is defended by Schneider from IX 590 D. *ἀπυκρινάμενον* (Ξ and two other MSS) is obviously a 'correction.'

28 **καὶ πολλάκις κτλ.** The whole of this passage should be compared with the account of the genesis of *μισολογία* in *Phaed.* 90 B ff.

538 E 33 **μήτε—τε.** See on IV 430 B.

539 A 2 **τὸν κολακεύοντα** is explained by the Oxford editors as 'the life that is flattering him,' with reference to 538 D. It is rather, I think, 'the flattering life' i.e. the life of the *κόλαξ* (cf. *ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος* and the like in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* I 2. 1095ᵇ 17 ff.). In other words the epithet which properly belongs to the person who lives the life is transferred to the life which he lives. Aristotle reminds us that *ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον* (*Pol.* Δ 4. 1292ᵃ 20), and the demagogic life may be taken as one among many illustrations of Plato's meaning, especially as in *παράνομος κτλ.* he seems to be thinking of Alcibiades: cf. Thuc. VI 15. 4 and 28. 2. See VI 494 C ff. *nn.* and Bosanquet *Companion* p. 306.

3 **δόξει.** The appearance does not exclude the reality: cf. (with J. and C.) Soph. *O. T.* 402 and Thuc. III 10. 1.

6 **εὐλαβουμένῳ** refers not to the pupils, but to Glauco as legislator, who

παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν λόγων ἁπτέον; Καὶ μάλ', ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ μία μὲν εὐλάβεια αὕτη συχνή, τὸ | μὴ νέους ὄντας αὐτῶν γεύεσθαι; B οἶμαι γάρ σε οὐ λεληθέναι, ὅτι οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύωνται, ὡς παιδιᾷ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ἀεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὥσπερ σκυλάκια τῷ ἕλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πλησίον ἀεί. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δὴ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοὶ ἐλέγξωσιν, ὑπὸ πολλῶν δὲ ἐλεγχθῶσι, σφόδρα καὶ | ταχὺ ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ὧνπερ C πρότερον· καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοί τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Ὁ δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης μανίας οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι μετέχειν, τὸν δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἐθέλοντα καὶ σκοπεῖν τἀληθὲς μᾶλλον μιμήσεται ἢ τὸν παιδιᾶς χάριν παίζοντα καὶ ἀντιλέγοντα, καὶ αὐτός τε μετριώτερος | ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα τιμιώτερον ἀντὶ D ἀτιμοτέρου ποιήσει. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ προειρημένα τούτου ἐπ' εὐλαβείᾳ πάντα προείρηται, τὸ τὰς φύσεις κοσμίους εἶναι καὶ στασίμους οἷς τις μεταδώσει τῶν λόγων, καὶ μὴ ὡς νῦν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ οὐδὲν προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ' αὐτό; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

XVIII. Ἀρκεῖ δὴ ἐπὶ λόγων μεταλήψει μεῖναι ἐνδελεχῶς καὶ ξυντόνως μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττοντι, ἀλλ' ἀντιστρόφως γυμναζομένῳ τοῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα γυμνασίοις, ἔτη διπλάσια ἢ τότε; | Ἐξ, ἔφη, ἢ E τέτταρα λέγεις; Ἀμέλει, εἶπον, πέντε θές· μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο κατα-

14. ἐλέγξωσιν $A^2\Pi$: fortasse ἐλέγχωσιν A^1. 28. ἔτη $A^2 q$: ἔτι $A^1\Pi\Xi$.

'meddles with Dialectic' by introducing the Guardians to it. This appears clearly both from εὐλάβεια and from ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς ἔργον in 537 D. εὐλαβουμένους (Madvig) and εὐλαβουμένοις (Baiter) are therefore wrong.

539 B 8 **μὴ νέους κτλ.** Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* I 1. 1095^a 2 τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος. It is clear from the present passage that Dialectic is largely concerned with moral and religious questions, as Bosanquet (*Companion* p. 302) and Nettleship (*Lect. and Rem.* II p. 291) remark. See App. III. Grote (III pp. 237—239) has some interesting observations on Plato's exclusion of the young from dialectical debate; but it is scarcely right to say that the *Parmenides* (135 C—136 E) contradicts Plato's precept in the *Republic*, for the disputations in the *Parmenides* are a preliminary exercise (γυμνασία 135 D) to be undertaken before we attempt to define καλόν τε τί καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν (135 C).

9 **οἶμαι γάρ σε κτλ.** The same phenomenon is similarly described in *Phil.* 15 D—16 A: cf. also *Ap.* 23 C and Isocr. *Panath.* 26.

10 **ἀντιλογίαν.** See on V 454 A.

539 D 23 **τούτου**: this provision, viz. that they shall not begin Dialectic in youth (539 B). The genitive depends on προειρημένα (which refers to passages like VI 485 ff., 490, 503 C, VII 535 A ff.), and not, as J. and C. suggest, on εὐλαβείᾳ.

24 **ὡς—ἔρχεται.** On the construction see III 410 B *n.*

28 **ἔτη—τότε.** 537 B.

539 E 29 **πέντε θές.** Krohn thinks five years very short, compared with the

βιβαστέοι ἔσονταί σοι εἰς τὸ σπήλαιον πάλιν ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ἀναγ- 30
καστέοι ἄρχειν τά τε περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ὅσαι νέων ἀρχαί, ἵνα
μηδ' ἐμπειρίᾳ ὑστερῶσι τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐν τούτοις βασα-
540 νιστέοι, εἰ ἐμμενοῦσιν ἑλκόμενοι παν|ταχόσε ἤ τι καὶ παρακινήσουσι.
Χρόνον δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, πόσον τοῦτον τίθης; Πεντεκαίδεκα ἔτη, ἦν δ'
ἐγώ. γενομένων δὲ πεντηκοντούτων τοὺς διασωθέντας καὶ ἀρις-
τεύσαντας πάντα πάντῃ ἐν ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις πρὸς τέλος
ἤδη ἀκτέον καὶ ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλίναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγὴν 5
εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον, καὶ ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν
αὐτό, παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνῳ, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ
B ἑαυτοὺς | κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει ἑκάστους, τὸ μὲν
πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας, ὅταν δὲ τὸ μέρος ἥκῃ, πρὸς
πολιτικοῖς ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑκάστους τῆς πόλεως 10
ἕνεκα, οὐχ ὡς καλόν τι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας, καὶ οὕτως
ἄλλους ἀεὶ παιδεύσαντας τοιούτους, ἀντικαταλιπόντας τῆς πόλεως
φύλακας, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντας οἰκεῖν· μνημεῖα δ' αὐτοῖς
C καὶ θυσίας τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ | ποιεῖν, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία ξυναναιρῇ,

9. φιλοσοφίᾳ corr. A^2: φιλοσοφίαν A^1 cum ceteris. 14. ξυναναιρῇ Ξq: ξυναιρῇ A: ξυναίρη (*sic*) Π.

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time allotted to the *προπαιδεία*, and suspects that we have here 'a silent confession that there is not so very much to say about the Ideas after all.' (*Pl. St.* p. 187). Five years devoted *ἐνδελεχῶς καὶ ξυντόνως* to Dialectic exclusively is a good deal; and we may be sure that Plato does not intend his Guardians to neglect the subject between 35 and 50, although practical duties occupy most of their time. Moreover at 50, Dialectic is resumed, and it is not till then that the Idea of Good is fully apprehended, so that the five years from 30 to 35 were certainly not thought by Plato to exhaust the subject. We must also beware of supposing that there is any break of continuity in the education of the Guardians. The study of each propaedeutic 'art' by itself prepares us for seeing all the 'arts' in their mutual relations and interdependence, and the comparative survey of the 'arts' in turn prepares us for Dialectic (537 C), nor need the subjects of the *προπαιδεία* be finally abandoned after we enter on Dialectic. See Appendices II and III.

540 A 3 **πεντηκοντούτων.** We are told that in Chalcis the magistrates had to be at least 50 years of age: *νόμος δὲ ἦν Χαλκιδεῦσι μὴ ἄρξαι μηδὲ πρεσβεῦσαι νεώτερον ἐτῶν πεντήκοντα* (Heraclides *Fr. Hist. Gr.* II p. 222), but advanced age was rarely a condition of holding office in Greek states. See Whibley *Gk. Olig.* pp. 148 f.

5 **τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγήν:** 'the radiant light of the soul.' *αὐγή* is highly poetic in this sense: cf. Soph. *Ajax* 70. There is more than a touch of mysticism in this and similar passages throughout Books VI and VII (cf. especially VI 490 A, B), but it is exaggerated by Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 187), who boldly declares that "the only person who correctly understood the later phase of the *Republic* was Plotinus," and that "the so-called Platonic Dialectic is a *Missverständniss*."

7 **παραδείγματι κτλ.** See VI 484 C, 501 A—C *nn.*

540 B 10 **ἑκάστους.** See 520 D *n.*

11 **οὐχ ὡς καλόν τι κτλ.** 520 E *n.*

540 C 14 **ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία κτλ.** See on IV 427 B, C.

ξυναναιρῇ. See *cr. n.* The error in A, II, and several MSS besides, is a pretty example of lipography: contrast

ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς εὐδαίμοσί τε καὶ θείοις. Παγκάλους, ἔφη, τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιὸς ἀπείργασαι. Καὶ τὰς ἀρχούσας γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων. μηδὲν γάρ τι οἷου με περὶ ἀνδρῶν εἰρηκέναι μᾶλλον ἃ εἴρηκα ἢ περὶ γυναικῶν, ὅσαι ἂν αὐτῶν ἱκαναὶ τὰς φύσεις ἐγγίγνωνται. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, εἴπερ ἴσα γε πάντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι κοινωνήσουσιν, ὡς διήλθομεν. Τί οὖν; **D** ἔφην· ξυγχωρεῖτε περὶ τῆς πόλεώς τε καὶ πολιτείας μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μέν, δυνατὰ δέ πῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῃ ἢ εἴρηται, ὅταν οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται, ἢ πλείους ἢ εἷς, ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι τῶν μὲν νῦν τιμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ἡγησάμενοι ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίας, τὸ δὲ ὀρθὸν περὶ πλείστου ποιησάμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτου τιμάς, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ **E** ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ὑπηρετοῦντές τε καὶ αὔξοντες αὐτὸ διασκευωρήσωνται τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν; Πῶς; ἔφη. Ὅσοι μὲν ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρεσβύτεροι τυγχάνωσι δεκετῶν ἐν τῇ

21. ξυγχωρεῖτε $A^2 q$: ξυγχωρεῖν τε $A^1 Π$: ξυγχωρεῖς Ξ. 29. δεκετῶν Π : δέκ' ἐτῶν A.

προσαναιρῇ in V 461 E, where the temptation is absent and the MSS right. Burnet says that A^2 has ξυναναιρῇ, I know not on what authority: I found no trace in the MS of anything except ξυναιρῇ.

15 **εὐδαίμοσι.** If not δαίμοσιν, then εὐ-δαίμοσιν.

16 **ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιός.** Jowett seems to find an allusion to the fact that Socrates had been a sculptor; but the same words might have been used if he had not: cf. (with J. and C.) II 361 D.

20 **ὡς διήλθομεν.** V 451 C ff.

540 D—**541** B *Finally, we repeat, our perfect city is not an idle aspiration, but capable of being realised, when true philosophers become kings and educate the young themselves, after banishing every one above the age of ten. Our account of the perfect city and man is now completed.*

540 D 22 **εὐχάς.** V 450 D *n.*

χαλεπὰ κτλ. See VI 502 C *n.*

23 **ἢ πλείους ἢ εἷς.** See on IV 445 D.

540 E 27 **ἀναγκαιότατον.** They will admit no compulsion save that of Right; Non civium ardor prava iubentium Non vultus instantis tyranni Mente quatit solida. Contrast VI 492 B—493 D.

29 **ὅσοι μὲν ἂν κτλ.** Newman (*Aristotle's Politics* I p. 413 *n.*) thinks this proposal is "a softened version of the sentence which Heraclitus passed on the Ephesians for expelling Hermodorus" (Bywater's Heracl. *Fr.* 114), but the parallel is not very close. Plato's **καθαρμός** is sufficiently explained by the precepts which he himself lays down in VI 501 A: see also *Pol.* 293 D and especially *Laws* 735 B—736 C, where he gives an interesting survey of the various **καθαρμοί** applicable to commonwealths, and 752 B ff. Whether the **καθαρμός** of the *Republic* is itself either possible or adequate is another matter: Grote pronounces it an **εὐχή** (*Plato* III p. 218 *n.*). An age which had witnessed the **διοικισμός** of Mantinea (Xen. *Hell.* V 2.7) might well have regarded it as feasible. 'Possible, but difficult' is perhaps the safest verdict. The purgation, even if successfully applied, might not be sufficient to start the city well, but it would be a useful auxiliary to that "express initiative force, exceptional and belonging to some peculiar crisis," which (according to Grote l. c.) would float the enterprise. Bosanquet raises the question how far the **καθαρμός** is seriously meant. To me it appears to be neither more nor less serious than Plato's treatment of the general question as to the possibility of his ideal city: see on VI 502 C and Hirmer *Entstehung u. Komp. d. pl. Pol.* p. 638.

541 πόλει, πάντας ἐκπέμψωσιν εἰς τοὺς | ἀγρούς, τοὺς δὲ παῖδας αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες ἐκτὸς τῶν νῦν ἠθῶν, ἃ καὶ οἱ γονῆς ἔχουσι, θρέψωνται ἐν τοῖς σφετέροις τρόποις καὶ νόμοις, οὗσιν οἵοις διεληλύθαμεν τότε, καὶ οὕτω τάχιστά τε καὶ ῥᾷστα πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν, ἣν ἐλέγομεν, καταστᾶσαν αὐτήν τε εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ τὸ ἔθνος, ἐν ᾧ ἂν
B ἐγγένηται, πλεῖστα ὀνήσειν; Πολύ γ', ἔφη· | καὶ ὡς ἂν γένοιτο, εἴπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ εἰρηκέναι. Οὐκοῦν ἄδην ἤδη, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἔχουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι περί τε τῆς πόλεως ταύτης καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου ταύτῃ ἀνδρός; δῆλος γάρ που καὶ οὗτος, οἷον φήσομεν δεῖν αὐτὸν εἶναι. Δῆλος, ἔφη· καὶ ὅπερ ἐρωτᾷς, δοκεῖ μοι τέλος ἔχειν.

τέλος πολιτείας ζ'.

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30 **ἐκπέμψωσιν—θρέψωνται.** Stephanus (with some inferior MS authority) reads the future, which Liebhold also would restore; but *ὅταν* is carried on. Cf. II 359 B *n.*

541 A 31 **θρέψωνται κτλ.** J. and C. accuse Plato of barely considering "how the provision, which he here abruptly introduces, is to be reconciled with what precedes. For how are the children to be taught music and gymnastic when all their elders have been sent away? From what other State are the new teachers to be brought?" Plato is perfectly consistent. The new teachers are *οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι* (540 D: cf. VI 499 B, 502 A ff.), and they rusticate the parents etc. just *because* their presence makes it impossible to bring up children on the new lines. If 'their elders' could teach the young children, it would be unnecessary and wrong to send them into the country. Jowett seems to forget for the moment that Plato is not here speaking of his own city, but of an actual city which he wishes to transform into his *καλλίπολις.*

4 **καὶ οὕτω κτλ.** The infinitives still depend on *ξυγχωρεῖτε.*

5 **ἐλέγομεν.** Liebhold's *λέγομεν* is harmless, but unnecessary: cf. *διεληλύθαμεν τότε* above.

541 B 7 **εἴπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο.** Cf. VI 502 C *n.*

10 **ὅπερ ἐρωτᾷς** refers to Socrates' question *οὐκοῦν—ἀνδρός;* Cf. X 595 C *ἀλλ' ὃ λέγω, ῥητέον.* "The present inquiry is, I believe, concluded" (D. and V.) is an erroneous translation.

APPENDICES TO BOOK VII.

I.

ON THE SIMILES OF THE LINE AND THE CAVE.

The famous similitudes in Books VI and VII have claimed the attention of every writer who has seriously attempted to expound the philosophy of Plato. It must suffice to refer generally to Ueberweg-Heinze *Grundriss*[8] etc. pp. 167—174: and in particular to Whewell, *Philosophy of Discovery*, pp. 429—448; Sidgwick, *Journal of Philology*, II pp. 96 ff.; Jackson ib. X pp. 132 ff.; and Shorey *On the Idea of Good in Plato's Republic* (Chicago Studies in Classical Philology I pp. 188—239). The aim of the present Appendix is not polemical, but explanatory, and its scope is limited to an exposition of the difficulties of the subject in a more consecutive and reasoned manner than was possible in the notes.

An interpreter ought in the first instance to confine himself to such express statements, hints, and indications as are furnished by Plato himself in the *Republic*. The evidence of other Platonic dialogues and of Aristotle is certainly admissible, and may prove extremely useful in supplementing and confirming our results; but it ought not to be appealed to until the testimony of the *Republic* has been heard.

I will try to conform to these canons of interpretation.

The line is divided into two unequal parts, each of which is sub-



FIG. i. THE LINE.

divided according to the proportions of the original section. Thus (Fig. i.) $AD : DC :: AC : CB$, and $CE : EB :: AC : CB$.

CB represents the νοητόν: and AC is called sometimes ὁρατόν, sometimes δοξαστόν.

AD stands for εἰκόνες, i.e. πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ ξυνέστηκεν,

καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον: *DC* for τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος (509 D—510 A *nn.*). It is clear, therefore, that if Plato means what he says, the objects represented by *AD* are distinct from those represented by *DC*, though they are each of them ὁρατά (δοξαστά).

CE stands for one part of τὸ νοητόν, *EB* for the other: see 510 B τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ—τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον and 511 C σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων. Here again, if Plato's words are to be taken strictly, the objects represented by *CE* are distinct from those represented by *EB*. This conclusion is confirmed by 516 A compared with 532 A ff., where the objects of the lower intellectual method are compared with shadows of so-called real things (*AD*), whereas the higher νοητά correspond to ζῷα etc. (*DC*): cf. 511 E ἐφ' οἷς ἔστιν and 534 A.

So far, it will scarcely, I think, be denied that Plato's language points to a fourfold division, in which there are two main segments, each with two subsections. This view, which had hitherto been generally approved, was attacked by Jackson on the ground that "the introduction of the first segment is unmeaning and worse than unmeaning, on the assumption that 'the universe is compared to a quadripartite line'" (see *Journal of Philology* X pp. 132—150). Let us therefore examine the evidence of the *Republic* on the subsection *AD*.

AD is part of *AC*, and *AC* is called by Plato sometimes δοξαστόν and sometimes ὁρατόν: see 510 A and the other passages cited in my note ad loc. What then is the meaning of δοξαστόν? The word is certainly not synonymous with ὁρατόν, and we are surely bound to interpret its meaning here by the meaning which Plato has already given to it in the *Republic*. Now according to the explanation of δόξα in V 476 B—480 A, δοξαστόν includes not only the objects of sight and the other senses, but also, for example, τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (479 D, with note ad loc.). It would appear therefore that *AC* embraces not only ὁρατά, but other δοξαστά also, and that among these δοξαστά are contained *inter alia* popular canons or opinions on the subject of what is beautiful, ugly, right, wrong etc., as explained in 479 D. If Plato intended us to restrict *AC* to ὁρατά, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have used the term ὁρατά throughout, instead of employing a word which he has already defined as including not only visibles, but other opinables as well. That visible εἰκόνες of ὁρατά are of little or no metaphysical importance, is doubtless true; but there are other δοξασταὶ εἰκόνες besides those which are visible, and some of these are by no means destitute of significance and value.

For examples of such εἰκόνες we have not far to seek. Plato himself appears to recognize them in 517 D, 520 C, D (see the notes on these passages, and on 514 A, 517 A). They include the νόμιμα on subjects of taste, morality, truth etc. expressed or embodied in the works of poets, painters, and artists generally, sophists and rhetoricians, demagogues, statesmen, and others, in so far as these canons and

opinions are copied from τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, or from any other opinions and 'appearances' whatsoever: see VI 492 A—493 E, III 401 B ff., 402 B ff. and X 595 B—602 B. Much the same view is held by Nettleship (*Lect. and Rem.* II pp. 242—246) and others, although they have not, I think, sufficiently insisted on the fact that Plato stamps this interpretation as legitimate and correct by calling *AC* δοξαστόν, and including among δοξαστά (in Book V) not only ὁρατά but also τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

If we now look for confirmations in other dialogues, the *Sophist* is ready at hand with its elaborate amount of εἰκαστική and φανταστική (233 E—236 C, 264 C ff.). The objects with which these two arts are concerned cannot be placed in any segment of the line except *AD*. In the *Sophist* Plato distinguishes between θεία ποιητική and ἀνθρωπίνη ποιητική (θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ, τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων ξυνιστάμενα ἀνθρωπίνῃ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ θεῖον 265 E), and between θεία εἰδωλοποιική and ἀνθρωπίνη εἰδωλοποιική (266 B ff.: see on VII 532 C). Now the works of ἀνθρωπίνη (as well as θεία) ποιητική are expressly recognized in *DC*, which includes σκευαστά as well as φυτευτά. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that *AD* includes the works of ἀνθρωπίνη (as well as θεία) εἰδωλοποιική. And the sophistic art is one among several varieties of ἀνθρωπίνη εἰδωλοποιική, being a subdivision of δοξομίμησις. Compare also, for Poetry, Music, and the imitative arts in general, *Laws* 669 D ff. It may be noted that this is not the only part of the *Republic* in which we meet with doctrines and ideas which are more fully developed in the *Sophist* and other dialogues which are now commonly considered to be relatively late: see on V 476 A.

On these grounds I am unable to look upon the first section of the line as in any way otiose or destitute of importance. It would be strange if in an enumeration of the objects of knowledge and opinion Plato should have left no room for the whole domain of 'imitation,' with which, in the *Republic* and elsewhere, he is continually concerned. In the analogous classification of *Phil.* 55 D—58 A μουσική is similarly placed in the lowest of the four divisions: cf. Bosanquet *Companion* p. 262.

The second division of the line need not detain us long. In so far as it is ὁρατόν, it includes the originals, whether natural or artificial, of the ὁραταὶ εἰκόνες in *AD*. Regarded in its wider meaning, it embraces all the other δοξαστά of which *AD* presents us with δοξασταὶ εἰκόνες, and doubtless also more; for we need not suppose that everything in *DC* has its counterpart in *AD*. The corresponding state of mind is πίστις, or 'belief': cf. *Tim.* 26 C ὅ τί περ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια and *Gorg.* 454 D ff., from which and other passages it is clear that πίστις (in the widest sense) is the normal attitude of the ἀπαίδευτος towards his δοξαστά in general as well as his αἰσθητά in particular. The difference between πίστις and εἰκασία, both of which are here regarded as varieties of δόξα, is a varying quantity; for πίστις may be right or wrong. I think the particular contrast which Plato

has in view is best illustrated by such a case as he himself describes in X 601 D—602 B, where the maker of a σκεῦος is said to have πίστις ὀρθή, ξυνὼν τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος, whereas the imitator οὔτε εἴσεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει, so that his state of mind can only be εἰκασία. In view of this passage in Book X, we may also (with Bosanquet, *Companion*, p. 262) compare *Phil.* 56 B ff. The arts of carpentry, ship-building, house-building etc., as well as 'popular' ἀριθμητική, μετρητική etc. (56 E—57 D: cf. VII 526 A *n.*) are placed in the second lowest category of the *Philebus*. They are all of them concerned with objects belonging to the second division of the line, and we may therefore take it that the intellectual condition of those who profess and practise these arts is also, according to Plato, πίστις.

It is about the third division of Plato's line that the greatest disputes have raged.

We have already seen that Plato verbally distinguishes between the contents of *CE* and those of *EB*. It is difficult to conceive why he should have done so unless he meant them to be really distinct; for the resources of his language were certainly equal to expressing his real view, whatever it was. There is moreover an exact correspondence between the objects of the different psychical affections or states (παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) and the states themselves; and διάνοια, which Plato regularly uses in connexion with *CE* (510 D, 511 A, 511 C, 511 D, 511 E, 526 A, 529 D, 533 D, 533 E, 534 A), is expressly distinguished from νόησις or νοῦς in 511 D. We are, therefore, prepared to find a similar distinction between the objects of the two mental states. What is the positive evidence on the subject? That the lower νοητά are the subjects of Plato's propaedeutic studies, viz. mathematical numbers, mathematical plane surfaces, mathematical βάθος, mathematical φοραὶ βάθους, and 'consonant' mathematical numbers, appears from 510 C—E, 511 A, B, 511 C (τεχνῶν), 525 C—526 A, 527 B, 532 C (τεχνῶν) 533 D συνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγοῖς χρωμένη αἷς διήλθομεν τέχναις· ἃς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης. διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν που ὡρισάμεθα, and 534 A. They are ἀεὶ ὄντα (see 527 B and cf. 529 C, D *nn.*), but nevertheless πολλά, i.e. there are many mathematical units etc. (526 A *n.*), many mathematical triangles, squares[1] etc., many mathematical cubes etc., many specimens (if the word may be allowed) of each mathematical φορά, many of each particular set of ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοί. Finally these μαθηματικά occupy an intermediate position between αἰσθητά (δοξαστά) and Ideas. We learn this (1) from their position in the line, (2) from the statement that the mathematical intelligence or διάνοια, which cognizes them, is μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ 511 D, (3) from the constantly repeated observation that such studies 'tend to drag us towards Being' (i.e. towards *EB*) etc. 523 A, 525 A, 527 B: cf. also 525 C, 526 B, (4) from the fact that while αἰσθητά are perishable

[1] A hasty perusal of 510 D might lead us to suppose that there is but one 'mathematical' square, and even to identify it with the Idea; but see the notes *ad loc.*

and πολλά, μαθηματικά are πολλά (526 A) and ἀεὶ ὄντα (527 B), whereas the Idea is ἀεὶ ὄν and ἕν.

Aristotle's evidence is in complete accord with these statements of Plato himself in the *Republic*. The relevant passages are cited by Bonitz on *Met.* A 6. 987^{b} 14 ff. ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναί φησι (sc. Πλάτων) μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πόλλ' ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον μόνον. "Tria rerum genera posuisse Platonem, sensibilia mathematica ideas, constanter multis locis refert Aristoteles, cf. 9. 992^{b} 14, B 1. 995^{b} 16, 2. 997^{b} 12, 6. 1002^{b} 12 sqq., Z 2. 1028^{b} 19, K 1. 1059^{b} 4 sqq., Λ 1. 1069^{a} 34. Et a sensibilibus quidem rebus differre mathematicas aeterna et immutabili natura (ἀκίνητα ^{b}16...), ab ideis autem eo, quod mathematicae quidem res eiusdem formae indefinitae numero sunt, idea vero quaelibet simpliciter est una, cf. B 6. l. l.: τὰ μὲν μαθηματικὰ τῶν δεῦρο (i.e. τῶν αἰσθητῶν) ἄλλῳ μέν τινι διαφέρει, τῷ δὲ πόλλ' ἄττα ὁμοειδῆ εἶναι οὐθὲν διαφέρει. Ita quum sua natura in medio posita sint mathematica inter sensibilia et ideas (μεταξύ ^{b}16), saepe ea Platonico sensu significat hoc ipso vocabulo τὰ μεταξύ, cf. 9. 991^{b} 29, 992^{b} 16, B 2. 997^{b} 2, 13, 998^{a} 7, 6. 1002^{b} 13, 21, K 1. l. l., M 2. 1077^{a} 11" (Bonitz). It may be desirable to quote one of the numerous criticisms which Aristotle makes on Plato's view of μαθηματικά, because it appears to allude directly to the educational curriculum of the *Republic*: ἔτι δὲ εἴ τις παρὰ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τὰ μεταξὺ θήσεται, πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἕξει. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὁμοίως γραμμαί τε παρ' αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἔσονται καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν· ὥστ' ἐπείπερ ἡ ἀστρολογία μία τούτων ἐστίν, ἔσται τις καὶ οὐρανὸς παρὰ τὸν αἰσθητὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἥλιός τε καὶ σελήνη καὶ τἆλλα ὁμοίως τὰ κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν (cf. 529 C, D *nn.*)—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ὧν ἡ ὀπτικὴ πραγματεύεται καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἁρμονικὴ (531 C *n.*) κτλ. (*Met.* B 2. 997^{b} 12 ff., cf. M 2. 1076^{b} 11—1077^{b} 14). These words are, in my judgment, an altogether just and relevant criticism on Plato from the standpoint of a man of science, and one with which Plato himself, when he wrote the *Republic*, would not have quarrelled.

In spite of this body of evidence, Shorey speaks of "futilissima illa hariolatio de numeris mathematicis inter numeros sensiles et numeros ideales positis" (*de Pl. id. doctr.* p. 33), refuses to attribute the doctrine to Plato, and is surprised that Zeller should have been led astray. The entire theory, according to the American critic, arose from a mistaken interpretation of 523 D—526 E, where αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί (525 D), he declares, are "nihil aliud quam ideae numerorum, sicut αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα est ipsius magnitudinis idea" (l. c.). I have stated my view of αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν in the notes on 525 D. Here it need only be said that if αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν, about which mathematicians converse, means Ideas of numbers, then αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν (525 D), i.e. the ἓν about which mathematicians converse (526 A), is the Idea of 'one.' But Plato speaks of a *multiplicity* of mathematical units: περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἓν οἷον ὑμεῖς ἀξιοῦτέ ἐστιν, ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρον (526 A). Are we then to suppose that there are *many* Ideas of 'one'? It may be added that in his later treatise on 'The

Idea of Good in Plato's Republic,' Shorey still adheres to his old view.

The explanation which I am advocating has the support of Zeller[4] II 1. pp. 679 ff., Trendelenburg *Plat. de id. et num. doctr.* pp. 70—80, Bonitz *l.c.* and a majority of scholars. To me it appears fully demonstrated by the evidence of the *Republic* alone; and Aristotle's testimony is a welcome confirmation from a source which is only second in value to Plato's own writings.

The ontological theories of the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* are, I believe, in harmony with the position here assigned to μαθηματικά. In the *Republic*, τὰ μαθηματικά are the link between αἰσθητά and εἴδη, regarded as objects respectively of sensible apprehension and knowledge; in the *Philebus* and especially the *Timaeus*, they are the cosmological μεταξύ τι. The αἰτία τῆς μίξεως of the *Philebus* (23 C ff.) is the Idea, and πέρας in that dialogue is τὰ μαθηματικά. Professor G. Schneider has pointed out that Plato "machte für alle Erscheinungen der Welt und des Geistes das Mathematische zum Gesetze für die Verwirklichung des Guten," and the *Timaeus* is an elaborate commentary on his remark. We see the soul and body of the Universe and Man built up by means of the μεταξύ or μαθηματικά of the *Republic*, ἀριθμητική supplying numbers (32 B et al.), Plane Geometry ἐπίπεδα (53 D ff.), Stereometry βάθη (54 B ff.), Astronomy φυραὶ βάθους (36 C ff., 39 A ff., 40 C ff.), and Harmonics the ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοί (35 B ff.), according to which the Souls of the world and man are framed. The εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα, τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ μιμήματα, τυπωθέντα ἀπ' αὐτῶν τρόπον τινὰ δίσφραστον καὶ θαυμαστόν (50 C), which enter into the ἐκμαγεῖον and leave it according as mortal things arise and perish, are nothing but mathematical forms—the contents of *CE.* It is impossible to pursue the subject farther here; but reference may be made to F. Schmitt's Dissertation on *die Verschiedenheit d. Ideenlehre in Pl. Rep. u. Phil.* (Giessen 1891) and G. Schneider's admirable work on *Das Princip d. Maasses in d. Pl. Philos.* (Gera 1878), where this interpretation of the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* is expounded and justified in detail.

There remains the further question whether these μαθηματικά have, like the Ideas themselves, a real and substantial existence, apart from, as well as in, sensible particulars. Plato speaks of the object of geometrical study as ἀεὶ ὄν, οὐ ποτέ τι γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον (527 B *n.*: cf. 529 C, D *nn.*), and in the *Timaeus* (l.c.) they are εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα. In the passages already referred to, Aristotle states or implies that Plato regarded them as χωριστά, not merely in thought, but actually, although in *Met.* B 2. 998[a] 7 ff. he informs us that another interpretation of τὰ μεταξύ was current, according to which they do exist, οὐ μὴν χωρίς γε τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν τούτοις. The evidence of the *Republic* and *Timaeus* is in my opinion altogether in favour of the view which Aristotle attributes to Plato.

The Platonic theory on this subject will be most easily apprehended if we contrast it with that of a very different school of Philosophy. According to John Stuart Mill "there exist no real things exactly conformable to the definitions" (of geometrical science). "There exist no

points without magnitude; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight; no circles with all their radii exactly equal, nor squares with all their angles perfectly right." The "really existent" lines, angles, and figures are those which we apprehend through the senses, and "the definitions, as they are called, must be regarded as some of our first and most obvious generalisations concerning those natural objects" (*Logic*, Book II ch. 5 § 1). To Plato, on the other hand, the "really existent" straight lines are just those of which the definition speaks: whereas visible lines and magnitudes do not exist, but only 'become.' It is the true μαθηματικά described in his definitions of mathematical science which the γεωμετρικός investigates, and if they do not correspond with the forms which we see, so much the worse for Nature! The fault lies not with them nor with the δημιουργός, but with the conditions of finite existence: μεμιγμένη γὰρ ἦ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγεννήθη (*Tim.* 48 A).

If the interpretation which I have given is correct, we can at once see why Plato makes the study of μαθηματικά his προπαιδεία. τὰ μαθηματικά are, objectively and *de facto*, according to Plato, the 'golden chain' between Ideas and particulars, and he who would ascend to Ideas must climb by the ladder which the Architect of the Universe—θεὸς ἀεὶ γεωμετρῶν—has himself provided. Cf. Schneider l. c. p. 54.

If the question is asked 'What is the element of truth embodied in Plato's theory of τὰ μαθηματικά as μεταξύ?,' the answer is not far to seek. "All objects in the world," says Whewell, "which can be made the subjects of our contemplation are subordinate to the conditions of Space, Time, and Number; and on this account, the doctrines of pure mathematics have most numerous and extensive applications in every department of our investigation of nature" (*Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, p. 153). It is an admitted fact that "all causes operate according to mathematical laws" (Mill, *Logic*, Book III, ch 24 § 9). The position which Plato assigns to τὰ μαθηματικά as intermediates between Ideas and sensible things is at once an affirmation of this fact and an explanation, from the Platonic point of view, of the reason which underlies it. The supreme Cause of the Universe, according to Plato, is the Idea of Good, of which, in the last analysis, the other Ideas are special determinations, and τὰ μαθηματικά are the instruments by means of which that Idea works in Nature. This and nothing else is the meaning of Plato's profound and famous text θεὸς ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖ, on which the bulk of the *Timaeus* is only an elaborate commentary. Why is it, to take an obvious illustration, that the laws of physical science are habitually expressed in terms of mathematics? Plato's reply would be: simply because God made use of μαθηματικά in constructing the world, and we must interpret the Universe as God made it. The Laws of Kepler have been described as "three Laws of Divine Working in Nature, discovered by Kepler," and the description is in full harmony with Plato's conception. For the rest it should be noted that such a view of μαθηματικά appeals in its broader outlines with peculiar force to the religious and poetical imagination, as is often the case with the

speculative flights of Plato. We may compare not only the lines of Milton (*Paradise Lost*, VII 221 ff.)

> "Him all his train
> Followed in bright procession, to behold
> Creation, and the wonders of his might.
> Then stayed the fervid wheels, and in his hand
> He took the golden compasses, prepared
> In God's eternal store, to circumscribe
> This Universe, and all created things.
> One foot he centred, and the other turned
> Round through the vast profundity obscure,
> And said, 'Thus far extend, thus far thy bounds;
> This be thy just circumference, O world'!";

but also the famous passage in Isaiah xl 12 "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance?"

For special discussions on 'The propaedeutic studies of the Republic' and 'On Plato's Dialectic' see Appendices II and III.

The view which I take of the simile of the Cave and its connexion with that of the Line is fully explained in the notes on Book VII (514 A, B, 515 A, 515 C, 516 A—C, 517 A, 517 D, 519 B, C, 520 C, 532 A—C). It is only necessary to add here that Jowett and Campbell's interpretation (Vol. II pp. 14—18, III pp. 315—317 and elsewhere) appears to me somewhat seriously wrong in regard to the ἀγάλματα or εἴδωλα of the allegory, which, according to Campbell, "constitute a lower stage of the ideal which in Plato's language is alone the real, not the immediately visible, but the truth of phenomena, the ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἑκάστων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, the *infima species*, the first intention of the ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον" (II p. 17). Jowett, if I understand him rightly, goes even farther, and apparently regards some of the propaedeutic studies as symbolized by the εἴδωλα (III pp. 316, 317). It seems to me quite clear from the general proportions of the simile (514 A *n.*) that the εἴδωλα in the cave represent nothing beyond the higher ὁρώμενα and the higher δοξαστά (517 A, 532 B, C *nn.*), which are emphatically πολλά and not ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, still less "the world as conceived of by the mathematician" (Jowett), which might possibly be figured as a φάντασμα θεῖον (532 C *n.*), but certainly not as a σκευαστὸν εἴδωλον: τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γνῶσίς ἐστιν (527 B).

II.

ON THE PROPAEDEUTIC STUDIES OF THE REPUBLIC.

Plato's higher scheme of education has formed the subject of a large number of dissertations and articles, besides the attention which it has received at the hands of commentators and historians of philosophy. The best and ablest discussion of the method and general principles of the system is still, I think, Nettleship's article in *Hellenica* (pp. 135—180), to which the second volume of his *Lectures and Remains*

(pp. 238—294) is a welcome supplement. Tannery's articles in the *Revue Philosophique* (x pp. 517 ff. and xi pp. 283 ff.) are concerned chiefly with the scientific aspect of Plato's curriculum. The mathematical difficulties have been to a large extent cleared up by historians of mathematics, and other authors of special monographs mentioned in the notes. Theo's treatise *περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸ μαθηματικὸν χρησίμων εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνάγνωσιν*, which Dupuis has edited and translated (Paris 1892), will be found extremely useful, all the more so that it is largely a compilation from earlier sources.

In this appendix I propose to touch on some questions which could not be adequately treated in the notes.

The novelty of Plato's curriculum lies in the interpretation which he puts upon the subjects prescribed, and in his conception of scientific method, rather than in his selection of studies to be pursued. It will be observed that he confesses his debt to the Pythagoreans (530 E *n.*); and, as Tannery points out (l.c. x pp. 521 ff.: cf. Diels *Dox. Gr.* 555. 17), there is no reason to doubt that the Pythagoreans made use of a *quadrivium* embracing (1) *ἀριθμητική*, (2) *μουσική*, (3) *γεωμετρία*, (4) *σφαιρική* (see *Theol. Ar.* 4. 19 Ast and Hippolytus in Diels l.c., where the order is (1) <*ἀριθμητική*>, (2) *μουσική*, (3) *γεωμετρία*, (4) *ἀστρονομία*). See also [Archytas] quoted on 530 D. The allusions in Isocrates (*Panath.* 26, *Antid.* 261 ff., 266) to an educational curriculum of this kind may of course be aimed at Plato, but it is, I think, more probable, in view of some passages in the Platonic dialogues, that *ἡ ἐφ' ἡμῶν κατασταθεῖσα παιδεία* (*Panath.* l.c.) has a wider reference. In *Theaet.* 145 A Theodorus is said to be *γεωμετρικὸς—καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας* (liberal education) *ἔχεται*, and Theaetetus professes to have learnt from him *γεωμετρίας ἅττα—καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ λογισμούς* (ib. 145 C, D). The studies in question were called 'Arts,' and Hippias was one of those who professed to teach them under this name, as appears from *Prot.* 318 E (see 511 C *n.* and *Hipp. Mai.* 285 B ff.). From these passages we are justified in drawing the inference that the Pythagorean *quadrivium* was in some form or another becoming recognized in the early part of the fourth century B.C., and even earlier (cf. Grasberger *Erziehung u. Unterr.* II p. 340). The addition of Stereometry as a separate and independent branch of study is doubtless due to Plato, as may indeed be inferred from his own remarks (528 B ff.); but stereometrical problems had been handled before his time not only by the Pythagoreans, but also by Anaxagoras and Democritus (528 B, C *nn.*), and were probably reckoned as part of *γεωμετρία*.

The studies are arranged by Plato in the sequence, Theory of Numbers, Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy and Harmonics. It is not, of course, to be supposed that each of the earlier subjects is dismissed as soon as its successor comes upon the stage; Plato indeed implies the opposite in 531 C ff. and elsewhere. The order which he prescribes is the order in which the subjects are to be begun. I have touched on the principle underlying the sequence of studies in the notes on 526 C and 528 A. We proceed from number, which is presumably the

first 'increase,' to plane geometry and stereometry, which are concerned respectively with the second and third 'increases,' and thence to *φορὰ βάθους*, taking Astronomy, the intellectual counterpart of visible *φορά*, before Harmonics, which deals with the intellectual counterpart of audible *φορά*, viz. 'consonant' and 'dissonant' numbers. The general principle plainly is that we should progress from the less to the more complex (Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II p. 269), each successive study adding a fresh element to those which have preceded it and presupposing them all. Plato would not, I think, allow that his intention was 'to arrange the sciences according to their object-matter in a direction from abstract to concrete' (Bosanquet *Companion* p. 288), for the Platonic sciences of Astronomy and Harmonics are, to say the least, as 'abstract' as the sciences of Number. But inasmuch as a solid concrete thing is after all an embodiment, though only an imperfect embodiment, of mathematical *βάθος*, Plato's curriculum, so far, and only so far, as it does in reality teach us to understand the visible concrete universe, may, if we are so minded, be held to proceed, in Aristotelian language, from the *πρότερα φύσει* to the *πρότερα πρὸς ἡμᾶς*.

Except in the position ascribed to 'Music' or 'Harmonics,' the order of studies in the *Republic* agrees with that of the Pythagorean *quadrivium*. The phraseology of 526 C and 528 A makes it probable that the principle of the Pythagorean arrangement was the same. 'Second increase' can only mean 'second increase' of the point or unit, the 'first increase' being the line or number. Now the Pythagoreans, as is well known, built up the line out of points, the plane out of lines, and the solid out of planes: see RP.[7] § 64. (This is equally true whether we suppose that they consciously or unconsciously regarded the cosmogonical unit or point as having *μέγεθος*, though for my own part I agree with Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* pp. 312—315, that they consciously so regarded it, at all events in the earlier and more original form of their theory: see Arist. *Met.* M 6. 1080[b] 20, 32 and N 1091[a] 15 with *Phys.* Z 1. 231[a] 24, 10. 241[a] 3, and other passages cited in Burnet, l.c. p. 315 *n.*) It may therefore be inferred that the expressions 'second' and 'third increase' are in their origin Pythagorean, and, if so, we cannot doubt that Plato's principle of arrangement agrees on the whole with that of his predecessors.

The position of Harmonics in the Platonic scheme is however a remarkable divergence, especially as the study, according to 531 C, is concerned with numbers. In discussing this point Theo, who himself expounds the *σύμφωνοι ἀριθμοί* in connexion with *ἀριθμητική*, distinguishes between three kinds of *ἁρμονία*, viz. *ἡ ἐν ὀργάνοις αἰσθητή*, *ἡ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς νοητή*, and *ἡ ἐν κόσμῳ ἁρμονία* (pp. 16, 47 ed. Hiller). Plato's *ἁρμονική* deals of course with the second of these *ἁρμονίαι*. The first would have seemed to him educationally useless except by way of illustration, like mathematical diagrams (cf. 527 A, 529 D). *ἡ ἐν κόσμῳ ἁρμονία*, which is described in X 616 D ff., *Tim.* 35 B ff. and by Theo 139—147, could not serve this purpose, because it is inaudible. If we take Plato at his word, we are bound to suppose that the Music of the Spheres, though more beautiful and perfect than any audible 'harmonies,' is nevertheless inferior to that which the student of harmonics

apprehends in his mind (cf. 529 C, D with 531 C), because it is produced by the movements of visible and corporeal stars; but it is permissible to suppose that the sublime Pythagorean conception of the Universe as 'God's organ' (Censor. *de die nat.* 13) may have induced him to crown his προπαιδεία with the study of those numerical 'consonances' whose grandest expression in time and space is the harmony of heaven. See also on X 617 B.

The most characteristic and essential feature of the Platonic curriculum is, as I have already remarked, its method: see on 523 B, C, 528 E, 529 C, D, 530 C. Plato himself obviously claims it as new (523 A, 530 C, 530 E ff.), and there can be little doubt that the claim is just. The modern scientific reader cannot fail to be surprised and perhaps shocked by Plato's unconcealed distrust of observation and the use of the senses. In the Theory of Numbers and pure mathematics generally, this is natural and right; but what hope, he will ask, is there for Astronomy if we 'dispense with the starry heavens' (530 B)? And how can Harmonics be advanced if we prohibit all inquiry into οἱ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκουομέναις ἀριθμοί (531 C)? It has, indeed, been maintained that 'the discovery of Neptune is a fulfilment of Plato's anticipations' (Bosanquet *Companion* p. 293), and that 'the mathematical treatment of the analysis of wave-forms (see Helmholtz, *Popular Lectures*, E.T. 1 75) seems to be an example of research which would have been after Plato's own heart' (ib. p. 294). There is something to be said in favour of such a view, and Bosanquet and Nettleship plead their case valiantly and well. But was it possible to discover the perturbations of Uranus without observation? And even supposing they had been observed, would Plato, at the time when he wrote 530 A ff., have suspected that they were due to the influence of an unknown planet, and betaken himself to his desk? If Professor Adams' calculations had failed, Plato might have called him ἄτοπος for thinking γίγνεσθαί τε ταῦτα ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν and seeking παντὶ τρόπῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν, although he would have emphatically approved of the algebra. The fact is that Plato and Professor Adams began at different ends—Plato with problems, Adams with observation. That which is only an orrery to the former (529 D f.) is to the latter the reality which calls for explanation. It is true, of course, that Plato makes the primary impulse to reflection come from contradictory sense-perceptions (523 A ff.), but as soon as the intellect is fairly roused, the senses are dispensed with as much as possible, because they thwart and debilitate the operations of the mind, rendering its conclusions less scientific and exact (525 D, 529 C, 531 A, 532 A). Nor does this conclusion rest on a few isolated passages, which may well be tinged with exaggeration, owing to Plato's contempt for the empiric sciolism of certain Sophists. The whole of the seventh book breathes a spirit of uncompromising hostility to the senses, and the same attitude is characteristic of many other dialogues, and, in particular, of the *Phaedo* (65 A—67 B).

The fact is that the Astronomy and Harmonics of the *Republic* are fundamentally different from the Astronomy and Harmonics of modern, as well as of ancient science. The objects which they investigate are

not sensible phenomena, but intelligible realities occupying an intermediate position between sensibles and Ideas, and resembling Ideas much more than they resemble sensibles. Plato's whole conception of these sciences is idealistic; nor need we wonder if some light from the land of Ideas irradiates the path of the pilgrim as he nears the end of his propaedeutic journey. Platonic Science, like Platonic Metaphysics, can of course be arrayed in modern attire; but it may be doubted whether Plato does not lose more than Science, or even the cause of liberal education gains, by having his philosophy called down from heaven to earth. See also Appendix III. The famous words of Goethe, which I have already quoted on 486 A, express the true spirit of Plato's teaching in Books VI and VII, and are a loftier and juster tribute to his genius than any panegyric on his contributions to the cause of science: "Er bewegt sich nach der Höhe, mit Sehnsucht seines Ursprungs wieder theilhaft zu werden. Alles, was er äussert, bezieht sich auf ein ewig Ganzes, Gutes, Wahres, Schönes, dessen Forderung er in jedem Busen aufzuregen strebt. Was er sich im Einzelnen von irdischem Wissen zueignet, schmilzt, ja man kann sagen, verdampft in seiner Methode, in seinem Vortrag" (*Farbenlehre* Vol. III p. 141 Weimar 1893).

Plato's error lies in an undue extension of the method of pure mathematics to Astronomy and Harmonics: see on 529 D ff. His theory of these sciences is geometrical, and the heavens are actually compared to a mathematical diagram or orrery. It is not the visible movements of the visible heavens, but the intelligible movements of certain mathematical heavens which the pupil is to investigate. Even apart from his unquenchable idealism, we shall not find it difficult to account for Plato's attitude, if we remember the extraordinary value which he attached to Geometry (see on 526 C), and if we also accept his assurances that the astronomy and acoustics of his day were grossly empirical. It should likewise be borne in mind that his primary aim throughout the whole of this *προπαιδεία* is to discipline the intellectual powers and prepare the student to enter on the higher dialectic, in which all employment of the senses is rigidly proscribed. The goal is never for a moment lost sight of, and to a large extent affects the method by which the preliminary studies are to be themselves pursued. If his aim had been to make his pupils merely specialists in mathematics or astronomy, he might have taught them these subjects on other lines, but the man who is a mathematical specialist and nothing more is unfitted to be a Guardian, for we cannot allow 'our children' *ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμὰς ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίους τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι* (VII 534 D). Plato endeavours to treat the study of mathematics and the mathematical sciences not as an end in itself, but as a means whereby to "revolutionize the whole state of mind[1]" of his pupils; and his vindication of the 'Arts' as the indispensable basis of a liberal training has been justified by history. Even the very name survives in the degrees which our Universities confer (see my article in *Cl. Rev.* XV p. 220). After Stereometry resumed its place as a department of Geometry, the four Sciences, Arithmetic, Music, Geometry and Astronomy, gradually established themselves as

[1] The phrase is applied by Herbert Spencer (*Education*, p. 86) to the effects of mathematics as an educative discipline, provided the teacher knows how to teach.

the *Quadrivium* of the Middle Ages, and room was also found for a pale and ghostly shadow of Dialectic in the *Trivium* (see Grasberger *Erzieh. u. Unterricht* pp. 235—237). Finally it is clear from some notable passages in his later writings (see on 530 B) that Plato's feeling about the visible heavens underwent a change as he grew older. In the *Laws* the very name of 'planets' or 'wanderers' sounds blasphemous in his ear (821 C). Such a change of sentiment is characteristic of his later dialogues in general, and in the *Laws*, perhaps, there is an added touch of the old man's feeling 'ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν.' But Plato may also have felt that his magnificent dream of a starry firmament more beautiful and perfect than the visible sky had served its purpose in the stimulus which it had given to a more theoretical and educative interpretation of physical science within the Academy. See Cantor *Gesch. d. Math.* pp. 202—216.

But, when all is said and done, the abiding value of Plato's theory of Education is not affected by his misconception, if such it be, of the sciences of Astronomy and Harmonics. It may be doubted whether any writer has ever held so inspiring and profound a view of the aim and scope of education. Regarding man's reasoning faculty as the element of God within him, Plato makes it the supreme and only duty of education to foster and develop this element, not by feeding it with dull and lifeless dogma, but by emancipating it from the noxious influences which impede its growth. Nothing is admitted into his scheme except what tends to keep alive humanity's most precious heritage, the love of truth and knowledge. By nurturing and cherishing this instinct, Education, according to Plato, turns the moral as well as the intellectual nature of man from darkness to light, until he becomes 'like God as far as it is possible for man to be.' Nor is the horizon of the educator limited to this life. The soul is but a sojourner on earth, and its union with a particular body only a single episode in a life which reaches through 'both eternities.' Plato believes that the teacher can influence the pupil for hereafter as well as for life here, and that the soul which is once smitten with the love of truth may still advance from knowledge to more knowledge throughout unnumbered lives and phases of existence on earth and elsewhere. The sea of knowledge stretches wide, its waves unharvested as ever.

> "Nay, come up hither.....
> Unto the furthest flood-brim look with me;
> Then reach on with thy thought till it be drown'd.
> Miles and miles distant though the last line be,
> And though thy soul sail leagues and leagues beyond,
> Still leagues beyond those leagues there is more sea."

III.

ON PLATO'S DIALECTIC.

Although Socrates professes to decline the invitation of Glauco to expound Dialectic (532 E *n.*: cf. 506 E), he gives us in Books VI and VII plentiful indications of its method and content, and an editor of

the *Republic* is bound, I think, to face the task of reconstructing, in its general outlines, the science as it appeared to Plato when he wrote that dialogue. The literature of the subject is immense, as may be seen from the notes in Zeller[4] II 1. pp. 614—632, pp. 643—718: cf. also Lutoslawski *Plato's Logic* pp. 21—27.

It will be convenient to separate, as far as possible, the discussion of the objects of dialectical study from that of its method. Its supreme object, the Idea of the Good, is treated of in VI 504 E—509 B: VI 510 B, 511 B, C, and VII 531 D—534 E, 537 D—540 B are concerned chiefly with the method, although the objects are occasionally mentioned. Other passages in the *Republic* which throw light upon Plato's theory will be mentioned in the course of the discussion.

It is hardly necessary to say that Dialectic is concerned with the Ideas. What Plato meant by the 'Ideas,' is a question which has been, and in my opinion always will be, much debated. I have explained my general view in the note on V 476 A; and it is only necessary to add here that the *Republic*, as I interpret it, nowhere indicates that the Ideas are only thoughts, whether of the divine or human mind[1], and lends no support whatever to any of the "mildere Auslegungen" by means of which certain modern philosophers try to reconcile their own doctrines with those of Plato (see on X 597 B). Each Idea, according to the *Republic*, is a single independent, separate, self-existing, perfect and eternal essence, forming the objective correlate of our general notion (596 A), which may or may not, and usually does not, reproduce it with accuracy and completeness. Any milder interpretation cannot be reconciled either with Plato's language or with the evidence of Aristotle. It may be well to take as an illustration the view of Lotze. "The truth which Plato intended to teach is no other than that which we have just been expounding, that is to say, the validity of truths as such, apart from the question whether they can be established in relation to any object in the external world, as its mode of being, or not....But the Greek language then, as afterwards, was wanting in an expression for this Validity (*Gelten*) as a form of Reality not including Being or Existence; and this very expression Being came, often indeed quite harmlessly, but in this instance"—viz. in the interpretation of Plato's Theory of Ideas—"with momentous consequences, to fill the place."... "The reality of Being, indeed, they"—the Platonic Ideas—"have or have not, according as transient things of sense are clothed with them or not; but that reality which consists in Validity, which is a reality all their own, remains untouched by all this change."..."It seems incredible that the most acute of Plato's disciples, informed by personal intercourse with their master, should have misunderstood him in a point of such

[1] Lutoslawski's formidable array of authorities who support the view that the Ideas are "a kind of notions of the human mind" (l.c. 26, 27) is not always accurate, and I suspect that some of the authors whom he cites would disown the interpretation which he puts upon their works. Among others, Shorey is claimed as holding this view, although he expressly repudiates it in the treatise referred to in App. I, and also in his *De Plat. idearum doctr. atque mentis humanae notionibus comment.*, the very treatise which Lutoslawski refers to in support of his assertion: see p. 22, *n.* 2: "Opinio—ideas Platonicas meras mentis humanae notiones fuisse iamdudum explosa est."

serious moment as this" (*Logic* E. T. pp. 441, 444). We may fairly reply that it does not seem, but is, incredible that Aristotle should have been guilty of so gross a blunder. It is far less incredible that Lotze is himself mistaken; nor indeed can I believe that any scholar who is capable of understanding Greek could read Books V—VII of the *Republic* and still agree with Lotze. "The truth which Plato intended to teach is *no other than that which we have just been expounding*." In this we have, I think, the key to a whole school of interpreters of Plato. "Hic liber est, in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque: Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua." It is perhaps the highest tribute which can be offered to the strength and vitality of Plato's influence that successive generations of idealists rejoice to discover themselves anew in him: but only by employing the methods of Procrustes can we force Plato into the habiliments of modern philosophy. Even if it were granted that the transcendence of the Ideas is, philosophically speaking, absurd (see Lotze l.c. p. 440), we cannot too strongly insist that Plato's thought is steeped in poetical and religious fervour: "Verlangen zum Guten und Göttlichen pulsirt durch alle seine Adern" (Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 191): and I confess that Plato, without transcendent Ideas to fire the imagination and generate philosophical and even religious enthusiasm, appears to me perhaps an eagle still, but chained. Those critics who deny the transcendence of the Platonic ideas are compelled to discredit the authority of Aristotle, who assures us that the Ideas were χωρισταί: but in reality such writers resemble Aristotle far more than Plato, for their eagerness to acquit Plato of such a 'poetical absurdity' (Lutoslawski *Plato's Logic*, p. 447) springs from the same scientific instinct which made Aristotle attack the doctrine, as in Aristotle's day they also would assuredly have done. Zeller's discussions, with the results of which I in the main agree, appear to me both temperate and sound[1].

It is clear that in the *Republic* Plato believes in the existence of an Idea corresponding to every class or group of particulars, artificial as well as natural. See on V 476 A and X 596 A ff. If we are mainly concerned in that dialogue with Ideas like Justice and its sister Virtues, the sole and sufficient reason is that the *Republic* is an ideal city, and the institutions of an ideal city must be regulated chiefly by ethical and political principles: see on VI 484 C and 501 A ff. The totality of Ideas forms an hierarchy reaching in just and well-ordered sequence to the Idea of the Good, of which each individual Idea must be held to be one particular form, aspect, or determination. The hints which the *Republic* furnishes as to the place of the several Ideas in this hierarchy are enumerated in the notes on VI 510 B, 511 B. On the supremacy of the Good, there is little to add beyond what the notes contain: see on VI 506 E ff. The Idea of the Good transcends Knowledge and is its source and fountain, as well as the ultimate cause of whatsoever shadow of Truth still clings to the lower grades of intellectual apprehension enumerated in the simile of the Line. Itself above and beyond Being,

[1] In edition 4, Vol. II 1. pp. 658-679. See also Krohn *Pl. St.* pp. 188—192, and Kramm *De Ideis Platonis a Lotzei iudicio defensis* Halae 1879. The last-named writer appears to me to have completely refuted Lotze's interpretation of Plato's theory of Ideas.

the Good is the author of the other Ideas, and through them of the realities which the mathematician studies: it is also the cause of that image or semblance of reality which remains in the objects comprehended under the name of γένεσις. We may therefore call the Idea of Good the 'Maker and Father of all' (cf. *Tim.* 28 C), and identify it, in this aspect, as in others, with the supreme God (505 A *n.*). Its relation to the Universe of Mind and the objects which are apprehended by mind may be expressed by the following diagram, in which the lines *A'B'* and *AB* are divided according to the proportions of the simile of the Line:



A further and perhaps still more significant presentation of the Good in the *Republic* is as the true and ultimate object of all creation—the οὗ ἕνεκα of the whole universe and every part thereof, and consequently at once the regulating law of everything which exists, so far as it exists, both organic and inorganic, and the πρῶτον φίλον for which the whole of Nature, with greater or less degree of consciousness, for ever yearns and strives. See on VI 505 D f. It is, I think, scarcely more than half the truth to say that the Idea of Good, "means, when stripped of its poetic vesture, a rational consistent conception of the greatest possible attainable human happiness, of the ultimate laws of God, nature or man that sanction conduct, and of the consistent application of those laws in legislation, government and education" (Shorey *On the Idea of Good* etc. p. 239). Man is not the whole of creation, though its highest product; and the Good is the final as well as the efficient cause, not only of human institutions, but also of the rest of nature—the ἀρχὴ ἀφ' ἧς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις (cf. Arist. *Met.* Λ 7. 1072^{b} 14). The reason why in the *Republic* Plato deals, not indeed by any means exclusively, but chiefly perhaps, with the bearings of the Good on human life and interests, is because that aspect of the Idea is more relevant than any other for the founder of a city. In the *Timaeus* Plato completes his account of the Good by tracing its operation in the works of Nature. It helps us to understand the many-sidedness of Plato's conception if we remember that 'good' was a term of wide application among the Greeks in general, and that the Socratic school in particular regarded things as good in proportion as they fulfilled their proper office in the economy of Nature and Society. See I 353 A—E, V 457 B and the suggestive remarks of Nettleship *Lectures and Remains* II pp. 221—225.

There remains the further question: How does the Supreme Cause operate in the Universe? or in other words, What is the mode or kind of relationship existing between the Idea of Good and the particular of which it is the cause? The subject is full of difficulties, and it must be premised at the outset that the relation between the eternal and self-existent and the derivative and transient cannot be otherwise expressed than by a metaphor. Cf. A. E. Taylor in *Mind* N. S. V pp. 309 f. But we are none the less bound to examine the metaphors employed in describing the connexion if we would see how the relationship was figured by Plato in his own mind. If we follow the indications furnished in our dialogue, we may suppose that Plato, when he wrote the *Republic*, conceived of the matter somewhat in the following way. The Idea of Good is the principle from which the other Ideas derive their existence (VI 509 B ff. *nn.*), and may therefore be regarded as the ultimate cause of everything which they in their turn produce. The immediate cause accounting for the existence of a particular is the 'presence' (παρουσία) of an Idea. Thus for example the cause which enables us to say that Socrates is a just and pious man is the 'presence' in Socrates of the Ideas of Justice, Piety, and Man. The Ideas are therefore the immanent causes of particulars, each of which is the meeting-ground of as many Ideas as there are predicables rightfully belonging to it. Thus much may be

inferred from *Republic* V 476 A ff., not to mention other dialogues; but the difficulties attending such a theory of Causation, if it is strictly interpreted, are great and numerous, and in particular the immanence of the Ideas can hardly be reconciled with their self-existence and unity. Plato was well aware of this objection, at all events when he wrote the *Parmenides*[1] (see *Parm.* 130 E—132 B, and Waddell's edition of that dialogue pp. xliii f. and lxix), but in the *Republic*, whether because he had not yet realised the difficulty, or because he was occupied with other and more fruitful topics, he ignores it altogether. The more poetical and figurative conception of the Idea as a παράδειγμα, whereof the particular is an image or likeness or shadow, visible beauty, for example, being only, in the words of Shelley, the "shadow of Beauty unbeheld," is also found in the *Republic*, as in other dialogues, side by side with the doctrine of παρουσία, μέθεξις, or κοινωνία. See on V 476 D and A. E. Taylor in *Mind* l.c. pp. 308—311. This view, like the other, is by no means free from philosophical difficulties, as has been pointed out by, among others, Waddell l.c. pp. li f., and Taylor l.c. pp. 307, 312, but the paradeigmatic relation of the Idea to the particular is more in keeping with the Platonism of Books VI and VII than the theory of participation, and it is the form in which the relationship presented itself to Plato in the last of his great metaphysical dialogues, the *Timaeus*. Finally, it should be remarked that in applying his doctrine of causation to sensible or concrete numbers and numerical relations, concrete mathematical figures and the like, Plato introduced a fresh link between the Idea and the particular in the shape of τὰ μαθηματικά. See on this subject App. I to Book VII.

I pass now to the subject of dialectical method, as expounded in the *Republic*. Formally considered, it proceeds, like the Socratic cross-examination, by question and answer (534 D). Dialectic is above all things synoptical, striving everywhere to see the one in the many (531 D, 537 B, C). Hence the coordination of the Sciences is a good preparation for the higher study (ll. cc.: cf. also Zeller[4] II 1. p. 616 *n.* 1). This synoptical faculty is akin to the συναγωγή of the *Phaedrus* and other dialogues (see on 537 C), although the word συναγωγή does not occur with this meaning in the *Republic*. But whereas the dialectic of the *Phaedrus* includes the combination of particular sense-perceptions εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον (249 B, cf. 265 D), that of the *Republic* aims at combining different Ideas under yet higher and higher Ideas, and all of them finally under the Idea of the Good. Cf. [Archytas] in Mullach *Frag. Phil. Gr.* I p. 599 ὅστις ὢν ἀναλῦσαι οἷός τ' ἐντὶ πάντα τὰ γένεα ὑπὸ μίαν τε καὶ τὰν αὐτὰν ἀρχάν, καὶ πάλιν συνθεῖναί τε καὶ συναρθμήσασθαι, οὗτος δοκεῖ μοι καὶ σοφώτατος ἦμεν καὶ παναλαθέστατος, ἔτι δὲ καλὰν σκοπιὰν εὑρηκέναι, ἀφ' ἃς δυνατὸς ἐσσεῖται τὸν θεὸν κατοψεῖσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τᾷ συστοιχείᾳ καὶ τάξει τὰ ἐκείνω κατακεχωρισμένα, καὶ ταύταν τὰν ἁρματήλατον ὁδὸν ἐκπορισάμενος τῷ νόῳ κατ' εὐθεῖαν ὁρμαθῆμεν καὶ

[1] I assume that the theory of Ideas which the Platonic Parmenides criticises is that which appears in the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*. The resemblance is so exact that I cannot see how we can escape from this assumption. Cf. Jackson in *J. of Ph.* XI p. 296. A different view is maintained by Taylor l.c. p. 317.

τελεοδρομᾶσαι τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῖς πέρασι συνάψας τε καὶ ἐπιγνούς, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἀρχά τε καὶ τέλος καὶ μέσον ἐντὶ πάντων τῶν κατὰ δίκαν τε καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον περαινομένων. Neither in his ascent nor in his descent does the dialectician have anything to do with sense-perception, or 'particulars' in the ordinary acceptation of the term (511 B f.). It is clear therefore, as Oldenberg has pointed out[1], that the dialectic of Books VI and VII is a higher dialectic, to be compared in some respects with the intellectual discipline recommended in the *Parmenides* (135 C—136 E, especially 135 E οὐκ εἴας ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστά τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἴδη ἂν ἡγήσαιτο εἶναι). In taking this view I do not mean to deny that dialectic in the *Phaedrus* embraces the higher as well as the lower branches of the study; but in the stricter dialectic of VI 510 B—511 B the lower variety is expressly excluded. Of διαίρεσις the *Republic* says comparatively little. There is a casual reference to the process in V 454 A, and it is of course represented in an idealized form by the descent of the dialectician from the Idea of the Good (511 B, C: cf. 534 B *n.*). But the full development of this side of Dialectic belongs to a later period of Plato's life, if, as is now widely believed, the *Sophist* and *Politicus* are later than the *Republic*. It should also be remarked that definition, which belongs to Dialectic (534 D) and depends on grasping the Essence of the object to be defined (533 B, 534 B: cf. 531 E), involves διαίρεσις in a certain sense as well as συναγωγή.

We have still to discuss the most serious difficulty in Plato's description of the dialectician's progress, viz. the ascent ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον (510 B, 511 B, 533 C). Socrates gives no precise explanation of this part of the subject, although it is not, in my opinion, this particular difficulty which makes him say that Glauco will be unable to follow him any farther (532 E).

The principal passages in other dialogues which appear to throw light on Plato's meaning are *Men.* 86 E ff. and *Phaed.* 100 A ff. In the *Meno* Socrates proposes ἐξ ὑποθέσεως σκοπεῖσθαι εἴτε διδακτόν ἐστιν (sc. ἡ ἀρετή) εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν, and proceeds as follows. We will, he says, assume (ὑποτίθεσθαι) that Virtue is Knowledge, and see what follows. On this assumption Meno at once admits that Virtue is teachable. Thereupon Socrates says we must examine his original ὑπόθεσις of Virtue, viz. that Virtue is Knowledge, and begins the examination by propounding a fresh ὑπόθεσις, viz. that Virtue is good. From this second ὑπόθεσις he arrives by a series of steps at the conclusion that Virtue is Knowledge and thus proves that Virtue can be taught. We may compare Aristotle's συλλογισμὸς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, on which see Wallace *Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle* pp. 41 f., and Waitz

[1] *De Plat. arte dialectica* (1873) p. 48. Lutoslawski must himself have read this work very superficially before he could have described it as "very superficial" (*Plato's Logic* p. 21 *n.* 58). The judgment of Peipers, though he frequently disagrees with Oldenberg, is very different: "quae Herm. Oldenberg egregie disputat in commentatione de Platonis arte dialectica" (*Ontol. Plat.* p. 402 *n.*). So also is that of Zeller[4] II 1. pp. 619, 620 *nn.* et al. I am far from accepting the whole of Oldenberg's results, but his treatise is anything but superficial, and a large part of it is in my judgment true and admirable.

on Arist. *Analyt. Pr.* A 23. 40^{b} 25. This method is parallel to that described in Book VI in so far as the original ὑπόθεσις is not left ἀκίνητος (533 C), but itself deduced from something higher. It is not parallel in so far as this 'higher something' is itself only a ὑπόθεσις and not an ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος. Much the same is true of the well-known passage in the *Phaedo*. That which Socrates ὑποτίθεται is his conception or definition of αἰτία as the presence of the Idea in the particular thing making it what it is (100 B, C). From this he deduces the immortality of the Soul. So far, I agree, in the main, with Jackson (*J. of Ph.* X p. 149) and Archer-Hind that the δεύτερος πλοῦς of the *Phaedo* follows the same method as the διάνοια of Book VI, although, as already stated in Appendix I, διάνοια in the *Republic* is, I believe, occupied with τὰ μαθηματικά alone. But when in 101 D, E Plato writes ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, he has in mind a possible defence of the original ὑπόθεσις by deducing it, as in the *Meno*, from some ὑπόθεσις still higher, and the διάνοια of the *Republic, quâ* διάνοια, never defends its ὑποθέσεις at all (510 C, 533 C), not even by any other hypothesis. There is also in 107 B an express direction to examine the ὑποθέσεις themselves: τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσίν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. These two passages of the *Phaedo* therefore resemble the dialectic of the *Republic* inasmuch as they contemplate and prescribe an examination of the ὑποθέσεις with which we start. In the first, however, no hope is held out of ever rising above ὑποθέσεις, for ἱκανόν τι is not the unhypothetical Idea, although it may very well happen in any given case to be a ὑπόθεσις, of Good. The exhortation in 107 B is different, and seems to hint at something like the dialectic of VI and VII, for the original ὑποθέσεις cannot be satisfactorily proved (κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται) except by connecting them with the Idea of Good, and this involves an exhaustive survey of the whole field of νοητά such as Plato sketches in the end of Book VI.

It appears, therefore, that the ὑποθέσεις of Dialectic are not, like those of Mathematics, immovable and fixed, and that we may be called upon to render an account of them, nay more, that it is our duty to submit them to examination ourselves. To this extent the *Meno* and *Phaedo*, taken together, are in agreement with the *Republic* on the nature of Dialectic. But by what means is the dialectician to scrutinize his ὑποθέσεις? In what way is he to ascend from ὑποθέσεις to the ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή? The passages in the *Republic* which help us to answer these questions are VI 511 B τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, VII 533 C ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται, and 534 B, C ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιὼν μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὕτε

αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φήσεις εἰδέναι τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν κτλ. With the substance of these extracts the student should carefully compare the intellectual discipline recommended in the *Parmenides* (135 C—136 E) as an indispensable preliminary for the dialectical study of καλόν, δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν and the other Ideas, noting in particular 136 A—C and 136 E: Πῶς λέγεις; φάναι. Οἷον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἣν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἐστι, τί χρὴ ξυμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ πρός τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλά· καὶ αὖ εἰ μή ἐστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί ξυμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ αὖθις αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ, εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μή ἐστι, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως ξυμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ἀεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅ τι ἂν προέλῃ, καὶ πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς ξύμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τἆλλα αὖ πρὸς αὑτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅ τι ἂν προαιρῇ ἀεί, ἐάν τε ὡς ὂν ὑποθῇ ὃ ὑπετίθεσο, ἐάν τε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές...ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν ἔχειν.

The key to the solution of the difficulty is furnished by the words ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα 533 C, and διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιών 534 C. In my notes on these two phrases I have tried to indicate the general character of the dialectician's ascent ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον. He begins by offering a ὑπόθεσις on the subject to be discussed, and then proceeds to test his ὑπόθεσις by the conclusions to which it leads. If these conclusions are untenable, the original ὑπόθεσις is cancelled or annulled (ἀναιρεῖται), and a new suggestion takes its place, only to suffer the same fate. The process is repeated again and again, until at last we reach an ἀρχή which will withstand every test (ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιὼν κτλ. 534 C). Thus each successive ὑπόθεσις serves as an additional step in the stair by which we ascend, and is useful to the dialectician just because he is willing to leave it and mount higher. Cf. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, I pp. 303—306, where the scientific value and importance of this method is very clearly explained. In the completed Dialectic which Plato adumbrates in Books VI and VII, we are invited to suppose that the whole kingdom of knowables, in the spheres alike of Nature and of Man, has been surveyed and mapped out by this method, of which the intellectual γυμνασία of the *Parmenides* is a kind of example on a lower plane. The result is a number of true and irrefragable ἀρχαί, apprehended not only in their mutual coherence and interdependence, but also in their relationship to the supreme Idea, which is itself, when we have climbed to the summit, no longer a ὑπόθεσις, but an ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος, because the exhaustive scrutiny of all νοητά has demonstrated that the Universe of thought and things is in reality nothing but the expression or embodiment of the Good. See on VI 510 B. If it be urged against Plato that we have no right to assert that the Universe and all its

parts are only the expression of the Good unless and until we have found it to be so by such an exhaustive scrutiny as Plato describes, Plato might reply: 'True, we have not as yet complete scientific knowledge of this fact; but knowledge is not everything; we have *ἀνάμνησις* also.'

> "Not in entire forgetfulness
> And not in utter nakedness,
> But trailing clouds of glory do we come
> From God, who is our home."

The progress of human knowledge from generation to generation will help to demonstrate the supremacy of the Good, of which, by virtue of the *θεῖόν τι ἐν ἡμῖν*, we are already well assured.

The later stages in the dialectician's journey belong to an ideal which human investigation can hardly hope to reach (VI 511 B *n.*), but, as I have hinted on 533 C, the general character of his progress may be illustrated from many Platonic dialogues. In the *Laches*, for example, we have several *ὑποθέσεις* of courage, each of which is treated as a stepping-stone—*οἷον ἐπίβασίς τε καὶ ὁρμή*—on the way to a better and truer conception of the virtue. The first definition given by Laches, that courage is *καρτερία τις ψυχῆς*, Socrates attacks with the elenchus and overthrows (192 C, D), but a new and better *ὑπόθεσις* rises on its ruins, viz. that courage is *φρόνιμος καρτερία ψυχῆς* (192 D). A further application of the Socratic weapon shews that this *ὑπόθεσις* must also be revised (192 E—193 D), and Nicias suggests a third, defining courage as *τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν* (195 A). In the sequel, this definition is widened into *ἡ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων ἐπιστήμη* (199 C), whereby courage becomes, no longer a specific part of virtue, *ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἀρετή* (199 E), and the unity of virtue is affirmed. The final definition is not refuted on its merits, although Socrates declares it to be inconsistent with the position already assigned to courage as one of the parts of virtue. It will be observed that each *ὑπόθεσις* owes something to its predecessor, that in the progress of the argument courage is brought into connexion with other *ὑποθέσεις*, such as *τὸ δεινόν* and *τὸ θαρραλέον*, and that the last *ὑπόθεσις* is wider and more comprehensive than any which has preceded. A cursory glance at the course of the argument in the *Charmides* and *Euthyphro* will provide many illustrations of the process which Plato calls *τὸ ἀναιρεῖν τὰς ὑποθέσεις*, and a more careful analysis will reveal a gradual advance in both dialogues from the accidental and superficial to the essential and profound. See for the *Euthyphro* my edition of that dialogue pp. vii—xxii. These distinguishing characteristics of Plato's method are easiest to trace in his simpler and less elaborate dialogues, but nearly all his writings shew analogous features, and the *Republic* is itself a conspicuous example of the same method. It is not too much to say that the true unity of the *Republic*, as of many other dialogues of Plato, consists in a continuous ascent from stage to stage, each successive elevation not only revealing new and wider prospects, but also enabling us to modify, correct and enlarge our apprehension of that which we have seen before.

It lies beyond the scope of this Appendix to discuss the origin of Plato's dialectical method, and I must here content myself with saying that although it owes not a little to the Eleatics, still more to Socrates, and something perhaps to geometrical analysis, which Plato is said to have invented (see Hardie in *Mind* N.S. v p. 180), the full development of the method must be ascribed to Plato himself. Rightly understood and practised, the method is extraordinarily valuable and fruitful, not merely for purposes of education, but as a weapon of scientific discovery. Every teacher who is worthy of the name employs it to kindle and feed the love of knowledge in his pupils. It is the method which an editor of necessity adopts in endeavouring to explain and expound the text of an ancient writer. The conjectural emendations and interpretations by which his pathway is beset are all of them ὑποθέσεις of more or less value, and the very process of testing and rejecting these ὑποθέσεις frequently brings to light the true interpretation. An editor, in short, ἀναιρεῖ τὰς ὑποθέσεις, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν πορευόμενος, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται, and ought not to rest content until διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιὼν—ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται (534 c). And that which takes place on a small scale in the exposition of an ancient text is reproduced on a larger scale in the history of investigation and discovery not only in the humanities, but also in natural science. Speaking of the part played by hypotheses in the progress of scientific discovery, Professor Rücker in his Presidential Address at the British Association, 1901, remarks: "The wraiths of phlogiston, caloric, luminiferous corpuscles, and a crowd of other phantoms haunt the investigator, and as the grim host vanishes into nothingness he cannot but wonder if his own conceptions of atoms and of the ether

> 'shall dissolve
> And, like this unsubstantial pageant faded,
> Leave not a rack behind.'"

But though science, like Bunyan's hero, has sometimes to pass through the 'Valley of Humiliation,' the spectres which meet it there are not really dangerous if they are boldly faced. The fact that mistakes have been made, that theories have been propounded and for a time accepted, which later investigations have disproved, does not necessarily discredit the method adopted. For scientific theories, as in the world around us, there is a survival of the fittest, and Dr James Ward's unsympathetic account of the blunders of those whose work, after all, has shed glory on the 19th century, might, *mutatis mutandis*, stand for a description of the history of civilisation. "The story of the progress so far," he tells us, "is briefly this—divergence between theory and fact one part of the way, the wreckage of abandoned fictions for the rest, with an unattainable goal of phenomenal nihilism, and ultra-physical mechanism beyond" (James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. I p. 154). "The path of progress," says Professor Karl Pearson, "is strewn with the wreck of nations. Traces are everywhere to be seen of the hecatombs of inferior races, and of victims who found not the narrow way to the greater perfection. Yet these dead peoples are, in very truth, the stepping-stones on which mankind has arisen to the

higher intellectual and deeper emotional life of to-day" (Karl Pearson, *National Life from the Standpoint of Science*, p. 62). When hypotheses are mistaken for established and unquestionable truths, the love of knowledge gives place to the love of dogma, and progress is arrested. In Plato's way of thinking, the path of knowledge is and must be paved out of the ruins of generalisations, if we are to tread firmly on the road to

> "That untravelled world whose margin fades
> For ever and for ever as we move."

IV.

VII 515 B. *εἰ οὖν διαλέγεσθαι οἷοί τ' εἶεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ ταῦτα ἡγεῖ ἂν τὰ παριόντα αὐτοὺς νομίζειν ὀνομάζειν, ἅπερ ὁρῷεν;*

ταὐτά appears for *ταῦτα* in A and some other MSS. Instead of *παριόντα*, all the MSS except Flor. T have *παρόντα*, while Iamblichus (*Protrept.* 15) and Proclus (*in remp.* 1 p. 293 Kroll) appear to have read *ὄντα*.

The following are the principal solutions which have been proposed.

(1) With *ταῦτα—τὰ παρόντα*. "Hoc rogat Socrates—an haec, quae viderent, tamquam res praesentes, non tamquam umbras appellare, de praesentibus, non de absentibus loqui sese opinaturi essent?" (Schneider). "Do you not suppose that they would believe that they were naming those things that they actually saw before them?" (J. and C.). This interpretation separates *ταῦτα* from *τὰ παρόντα*, and makes the whole force of *τὰ παρόντα* depend upon its antithesis ('non de absentibus'), which is not expressed, and difficult to supply. Other objections are urged by Vermehren *Plat. Stud.* p. 105. Prantl (after Schleiermacher) takes *νομίζειν* as "für üblich halten" (cf. *Laws* 637 E), translating "glaubst du nicht, dass sie es für üblich halten würden, eben die je anwesenden Dinge, welche sie sehen, mit Namen zu nennen?" (So also D. and V.) Prantl's view has been demolished by Schneider: "non hoc rogat Socrates, an nomina umbris imponenda existimaturi aut re vera impositurі essent, *quippe quod citra errorem facere eis liceret.*" The progress of the argument, as well as the close parallelism with the next sentence, makes it clear that the prisoners *are* in error. The same criticism applies to the view of Ast, who reads *ταῦτα—τὰ παριόντα*, and translates "Nonne censes eos res praeterlatas arbitraturos esse nominandas quas viderent?"

(2) With *ταὐτὰ—τὰ παριόντα* (Hermann, Stallbaum). Stallbaum translates "nonne putas eas res, quae praeterveherentur, iisdem nominibus atque quae viderent nominare solituros esse?", explaining *ταὐτὰ* (predicative after *ὀνομάζειν*) *ἅπερ ὁρῷεν* as equivalent to *ταὐτὰ τούτοις ἅπερ ὁρῷεν*. "Sententia igitur haec est: vinctos illos nonne putas nomina rerum, quas conspicerent (conspicere sibi viderentur) ad umbras illarum praetereuntes esse de more translaturos?" But what objects at all except shadows can the prisoners see?

(3) Emendations. (*a*) Cobet (*Mnem.* XI p. 173 and *V. L.*[2] p. 531) proposes *οὐ ταὐτὰ ἡγεῖ ἂν—τὰ παριόντα νομίζειν* [*ὀνομάζειν*] *ἅπερ ὁρῷεν.* The word *ὀνομάζειν* is rejected also by Baiter, who further changes *οὐ ταῦτα* to *οὐκ αὐτά*, following Vermehren and Madvig: see below. Neither of these critics appears to have noticed that *εἰ οὖν διαλέγεσθαι οἷοί τε εἶεν* becomes altogether superfluous if *ὀνομάζειν* is omitted. For this reason Richards' insertion of *καί* between *νομίζειν* and *ὀνομάζειν* (*Cl. Rev.* VIII p. 192) is preferable to the suggestion of Cobet. (*b*) Vermehren, in an elaborate and careful examination of the passage (*Plat. Stud.* pp. 103—106), argues that the sense required by the context is "dass die Höhlenbewohner die vorüberziehenden Schatten für die Gegenstände selbst nehmen und sie demgemäss benennen würden, gerade wie sie die vernommenen Töne vermöge des Widerhalls den Schattenbildern, nicht aber den sie erzeugenden Originalen zuschreiben würden." He therefore conjectures *οὐκ αὐτὰ—τὰ παριόντα κτλ.* "glaubst du nicht, dass sie in ihrer Lage die vorüberziehenden Gegenstände selbst zu benennen meinen würden, die sie—ihrer Meinung nach—sähen?" According to this view, *τὰ παριόντα* denotes the real *παραφερόμενα*: but how could the prisoners *suppose* themselves to be naming the real *παραφερόμενα*, of which, *ex hypothesi*, they know nothing whatever?

The interpretation given in the notes appears to me to give the sense required, without attributing to the prisoners any knowledge from which their situation excludes them. I have not seen it anywhere in print, but I am glad to say that Dr Jackson writes as follows: "So I have long taken this passage. I copy my old note. 'Read *ταῦτα*, retain *ὀνομάζειν*, and translate: Don't you think they would suppose the names which they used to belong to the passing objects which they saw before their eyes?'"

V.

VII 519 A, B. *τοῦτο μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως εἰ ἐκ παιδὸς εὐθὺς κοπτόμενον περιεκόπη τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἳ δὴ ἐδωδαῖς τε καὶ τοιούτων ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λιχνείαις προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι περικάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν.*

This passage has been strangely misunderstood by many editors and critics.

γενέσεως is taken as 'birth' by (among others) Schneider, Stallbaum, Jowett ('attached to them at their birth'—an impossible construction), although the correct translation (which has recently been reaffirmed by Seymour in *Cl. Rev.* X p. 325) was already given by Schleiermacher and afterwards by Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 161). Others, such as Schneider and D. and V., make the weights adhere to the pleasures of eating etc. It is, however, obvious that they must adhere to that from which they are to be knocked off (*περιεκόπη*), and it is *τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως* from which they have to be removed (*κοπτόμενον περιεκόπη*). Moreover X 611 E—612 A, quoted in the notes, conclusively disproves this view.

As regards the text, *τὰ τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενῆ* is read by many editors on the authority of some inferior MSS. To me the neuter appears a manifest 'correction,' and far less elegant and expressive than the feminine, which has the support (among other MSS) of A, Π and *q*. See also on III 401 C. It is strictly true, according to Plato, that the leaden weights of appetite and self-indulgence are 'kindred with,' 'of the family of' *γένεσις* (see especially, in addition to the evidence adduced in the note, IX 585 B—586 B), so that the adjective ought to agree with *μολυβδίδας*.

Instead of the *περὶ κάτω* of the best MSS, Hermann, who is followed by Burnet, reads *κάτω*, adopting a suggestion of Schneider's. Schneider himself, with Stallbaum and other editors, chose the reading of *q* (*περὶ τὰ κάτω*), which is unexceptionable in point of sense, and which I also once thought right. Longer reflection has however convinced me that Madvig is right in restoring *περικάτω*. The strongest evidence (other than that of the best MSS) in its support is furnished by Photius (see note) and Plutarch. The latter certainly read *περικάτω* or *περὶ κάτω* (the reading of A): see *de fac. quae in orb. lun. app.* 943 D *ἐνίας δὲ* (sc. *ψυχὰς*) *καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ περὶ κάτω τρεπομένας* (v.l. *τερπομένας*) *οἷον εἰς βυθὸν αὖθις ὁρῶσι καταγινομένας*, an obvious imitation of this passage of Plato. J. and C. object that *περικάτω* could only mean 'upside down.' Such a translation is of course ridiculous here, but it does in point of fact accurately represent the situation. The eye of the soul, according to Plato in this passage, naturally looks up; so that when forced to look down, it is itself, strictly speaking, turned 'upside down.' The fact is that *περικάτω στρέφειν* (*τρέπειν*) simply means 'turn round downwards,' and the translation 'upside down' is suitable only when it is applied to goblets (as in Strattis ap. Ath. XI 467 E) and similar objects which can *themselves* be said to have an 'up' and 'down,' or perhaps in cases like Lucian *Adv. ind.* 1 (where Cobet restores *περικάτω*). The word is discussed by Madvig *Adv. Cr.* I p. 27 and by Cobet *Mn.* N.S. XI p. 174 and *V. L.*[2] p. 90. It is doubtless better (with Photius) to write *περικάτω* as one word, than (with A, Π, etc.) as two. The analogy of *ὑποκάτω*, *ἐπάνω*, *ὑπεράνω* etc. favours this accentuation: cf. Lobeck *Phryn.* p. 48. For other instances of prepositions combined with adverbs see Kühner-Gerth *Gr. Gr.* II 1, pp. 538—540.

VI.

VII 521 C. *τοῦτο δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὀστράκου ἂν εἴη περιστροφή, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν, τοῦ ὄντος οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι.*

The proverb *ὀστράκου περιστροφή* was variously explained by the ancients as (1) *ἐπὶ τῶν ταχέως τι ποιούντων*: (2) *ἐπὶ τῶν εὐμεταβόλων*: (3) *ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ κρειττόνων εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον μεταβαλλόντων*: (4) *ἐπὶ τῶν ἀθρόως καὶ ἀνελπίστως ὑφισταμένων*: (5) *ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ τάχους εἰς φυγὴν ὁρμώντων* or the like (Schol. l.c. and on *ὀστράκου μεταπεσόντος* in *Phaedr.* 241 B). See Leutsch und Schneidewin *Paroem. Gr.* I p. 285 f., II p. 84.

The last of these explanations touches on an essential feature of the game, which was itself also (according to Pollux IX 112 and the Scholiast on this sentence of the *Republic*) called ὀστράκου περιστροφή, but does not fully elucidate the meaning of the phrase when it is used as a proverb. None of the ancient interpretations is exactly suited to the present passage, and it is clear from their number and diversity that the phrase was not clearly understood. As the proverb is believed to have originated with Plato (Leutsch und Schneidewin l.c. I p. 285 *n.*), we are bound to interpret it as the context requires, and Schleiermacher's solution appears to me to come nearest to the truth: "hier ist mehr zu denken theils an die Flüchtigkeit, mit welcher solche Spiele überhaupt behandelt werden, theils an die Zufälligkeit, mit welcher die Scherbe auf diese oder jene Seite zu fallen scheint" (*Translation of the Republic* p. 577 *n.* 372). This view combines the first and second explanations, and is in no way invalidated by the criticisms of Schück (*de Schol. ad Pl. civ. pertinentibus* p. 31). Plato is perhaps aiming a taunt at the educational theory and practice of contemporary sophists (cf. 518 B *n.*).

The details of the game itself have been often discussed, and are now tolerably clear. See (besides Grasberger quoted in the notes) Blümner *Privatalt.* p. 298 and Förster in *Rh. Mus.* 1875, pp. 287 ff. The latter was, I believe, the first to point out the allusion in νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας to 'νὺξ ἡμέρα.'

I think that the placing of a comma after ἀληθινήν restores sense to the latter part of the passage. The reading in the text has the support of A, Π, and a great majority of MSS; and the comparison with 517 C seems to me conclusive in favour of the view taken in the notes. Hermann and others have pointed out that ἡμέραν should be supplied with ἀληθινήν, but those who take this view have hitherto (with, so far as I know, the single exception of Jackson) connected τοῦ ὄντος with ἀληθινὴν (ἡμέραν). It was perhaps on this ground that Schneider peremptorily declined to admit such an explanation. In any case the emphatic opposition between νυκτερινῆς and ἀληθινήν invites us to supply ἡμέραν, and the transition from the metaphor to its interpretation would be too abrupt if ἀληθινήν were connected with ἐπάνοδον. οὖσαν is a further difficulty on this view; and Ξ accordingly omitted the word, while *q* boldly changes it to ἰούσης. Schneider, with whom J. and C. are inclined to agree, joins ἀληθινήν with ἐπάνοδον, and argues that οὖσαν is added partly on account of ὄντος, but more "ad augendam veritatis significationem." But, as J. and C. remark, οὖσαν still drags, "and ἐπάνοδον gives a feeble antithesis to ἡμέρας." The passage from the *Laws* (728 B) which Schneider quotes in support of his interpretation is not parallel.

Of emendations there has been no lack. ἰούσης is adopted by Stephanus, Bekker, Ast and Stallbaum, the last of whom construes ἰούσης ἐπάνοδον by 'adscendentis' and supplies ἡμέραν with ἀληθινήν, as Schleiermacher also did. This yields a better sense than the old view, which connected ἀληθινήν with ἐπάνοδον, but is harsh in point of syntax, and ἰούσης has been demolished on its own merits by Schneider. Hermann read οὖσα ἐπάνοδος, quoting Iamblichus in Villoison's *Anecd.* II p.

194, where οὖσα ἐπάνοδον (not ἐπάνοδος, as J. and C. assert) is found. But the περιαγωγὴ ψυχῆς is not itself the ἐπάνοδος, and οὖσα ἐπάνοδος drags unpleasantly.

Cobet's emendation, which is partially adopted by Baiter, changes οὖσαν to οὐσίαν, inserts καὶ before ἐκ νυκτερινῆς, and reads ἐπάνοδος for ἐπάνοδον. But, apart from other objections, τοῦ ὄντος οὐσίαν, in spite of *Soph.* 262 C, is extremely unpleasing. Jowett and Campbell's otherwise excellent note appears to me fatal to their own as well as to every other solution proposed before they wrote, and overthrows all the emendations except ἄγουσα for οὖσαν, which I suggested in 1897. I take this opportunity of withdrawing so hasty a proposal, and restoring the text of the best MSS, which I am glad to say that Jackson also defended when in a letter to me some years ago he remarked "I have been in the habit of putting a comma after ἀληθινήν, and otherwise keeping the reading of A."

VII.

VII 527 D. τὸ δ' ἔστιν οὐ πάνυ φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἑκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεταί τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον δὲ σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὁρᾶται.

This eloquent sentence was deservedly famous in antiquity, and is constantly quoted or alluded to by many authors: see the references in Ast, Schneider, Wex (*Fleck. Jb.* 1864 p. 381), and Hiller (on Theo Smyrn. 3).

An attempt has been made by Cobet (*Mnem.* XI p. 177) to remodel the text in accordance with Theo's citation, which is as follows: τὸ δ' ἔστιν οὐ πάνυ φαύλοις, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι χαλεπὸν πιστευθῆναι, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἑκάστου οἷον ὀργάνοις τὸ ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεται καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ὄμμα τυφλούμενον καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον ὂν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὁρᾶται (ed. Hiller p. 3). Wex (l.c. 1863 pp. 692 ff.) had maintained, strangely enough, that ὄργανον ψυχῆς would mean something bodily, e.g. the bodily eye; and Cobet accordingly adopts Theo's version οἷον ὀργάνοις—ὄμμα. Neither of these critics appears to have remembered ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἑκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος in 518 C, a passage to which, as ἑκάστου shews, this sentence expressly refers. ὄργανον ψυχῆς was also, as Wex admits, the reading of Plutarch (*Conv. Disp.* VIII 718 E). ἀποσβεννύμενον, which Cobet substitutes for ἀπολλύμενον, is in itself good, and may point to an early variant, but ἀπολλύμενον is supported by the evidence of Plutarch (l.c.) and Alcinous (*Isag.* c. 27).

Nothing could be a more instructive lesson on the almost utter worthlessness of early citations of Plato for determining the text of the *Republic* than to compare A's readings in this passage with its reproduction by Theo and Nicomachus (*Intr. Ar.* I 3. 7). Even the meanest and most corrupt of our MSS is, from the literary point of view, superior; and there is not in these citations a single variant to which any of our MSS here lends support.

VIII.

VII 528 C. *ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητούντων, λόγον οὐκ ἐχόντων καθ' ὅ τι χρήσιμα, ὅμως πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα βίᾳ ὑπὸ χάριτος αὐξάνεται.*

I have returned in this edition to the reading of the best MSS, which is kept also by Schneider, Hermann, Stallbaum, and J. and C.

The explanation in the notes appears to me required by the grammatical construction, as well as suitable in point of meaning if we remember that the mode in which stereometricians 'dishonour' their subject has already been explained. The Many dishonour Stereometry negatively, *ὅτι οὐδεμία πόλις ἐντίμως αὐτὰ ἔχει*, and thereby negatively clip or curtail the study, for until it receives public support, it will not attain to its natural and proper growth. The students of stereometry dishonour and curtail their study positively by prosecuting it feebly and in a slight degree, because they do not know its real utility, and (as was said before) have no public encouragement to support them in so difficult a subject. The omission of *μέν* before *τῶν πολλῶν* was apparently a stumbling-block, for it is replaced in Ξ and some other MSS of second-rate authority. See however I 340 D *n.* If *ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν* were read, we should, I think, expect another passive participle to be present in the balancing clause. As it is, *δέ* merely marks the formal contrast between *οἱ πολλοί* and *οἱ ζητοῦντες*.

Schneider understands *ζητούμενα* or the like after *χρήσιμα*, and takes *ὑπὸ τῶν ζητούντων* with *αὐξάνεται*. This explanation is too tortuous, nor is *δέ* accounted for by calling it "quasi primitivae orationis monumentum." Stallbaum's solution is in principle the same as Schneider's. According to the Oxford editors, *ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητούντων* "may depend on some general idea of disadvantage, e.g. *κωλυόμενα* understood from the previous clause." The zeugma is however difficult, and *ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα* are just as true of the *ζητοῦντες* as of the *πολλοί*.

The following emendations have been proposed. (1) *ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν ζητούντων* ('dishonoured by the many and curtailed by students'). I formerly accepted this change, which is due to Voegelin, and has the support of Madvig and Baiter. The sense is excellent, but the intrusion of *δέ* into all the MSS is very difficult to account for satisfactorily. (2) *ὑπὸ—κολουόμενα, τῶν δὲ ζητούντων κτλ.* (Cobet). This correction, which (with the addition of *μέν* before *τῶν πολλῶν*) commends itself to a reviewer of my *Text of the Republic* in *Lit. Centralblatt* 1898 pp. 296 f., is much too drastic. The same criticism applies to (3) Badham's *ἀτιμαζόμενα, κολουόμενα δ' ὑπὸ κτλ.*, and also (4) to Liebhold's *ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν—ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητούντων <ἀμελούμενα> κτλ.*

IX.

VII 529 C. *κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μανθάνῃ.*

The MS tradition in this difficult passage points to the existence of two early variants, viz. *ὑπτίας μέν* and *ὑπτίας νέων*. The former is read by A, Cesenas M, and two other MSS; probably also *μήν* (Vind. B) is a corruption of *μέν*, and *μή* (Vind. E) of *μήν*. *ὑπτίας νέων* has the authority of Π, *q* and other MSS. *ναίων* and *νεῶν*, which some MSS read, are corruptions of *νέων*.

No one, so far as I know, has defended *μέν*. For the obnoxious particle Madvig proposes *ἤ*, Richards *θεώμενος* or *κείμενος*, while J. J. Hartman ejects it altogether. None of these conjectures is in the least degree convincing. By far the best suggestion on these lines is Marindin's *ἐξυπτιασμένος* for *ἐξ ὑπτίας μέν* (*Cl. Rev.* VIII p. 193 *n.*): cf. *ἐξυπτιάζονται τὴν κεφαλήν* in Arist. ap. Ath. I 34 B and *ἐξυπτιάζων ὄμμα* (Schütz's conjecture for *ὄνομα*) in Aesch. *Sept.* 577. The active is three times used by Lucian intransitively for throwing the neck or body back (*Gall.* 12, *Heracl.* 3, *Adv. ind.* 21), and once with *ἑαυτόν* in the same sense (*Catapl.* 16). But the accidental omission of *-ος* is not easy to explain in a MS of the ninth century or its progenitors, though natural enough at a later date (see Bast *Comm. Pal.* p. 772 and *Tab.* IV 18).

If *μέν* and *νέων* each contain an element of truth (a very improbable supposition), it may be thought that *μένων* is what Plato wrote. But the word is much too feeble and pointless.

The editors, except Baiter, unanimously and (I think) rightly, read *νέων*. A confirmation of this reading is supplied by Pollux VII 138 *νεῖν δ' ἐξ ὑπτίας μάθημα κολυμβητῶν Ἀριστοφάνης εἶπε καὶ Πλάτων*: for it is unlikely that Pollux is thinking of the more artificial passage in *Phaedr.* 264 A *οὐδὲ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον*. Schneider's translation "und wenn er auch auf dem Rücken schwimmen in Landes- oder in Meeresgewässern lernt" is in harmony with his note "in ea orbis terrarum parte, quae *γῆ* vocatur, non minus quam in altera natari potest. *γῆ* non idem est, quod *χέρσος*." But even if we allow that *ἐν γῇ* may bear this meaning, there must be some more specific reference, or else the phrase is pointless; for there is no object in swimming on one's back in a river with a view to watching the heavens, when the adjoining bank affords a more secure and stedfast post of observation. Stallbaum avoids the difficulty, merely translating "etiamsi (more urinatorum) resupinus natans in terra vel mari discat," with the note "dictio *ἐξ ὑπτίας νεῖν* vel *διανεῖν* ab arte urinatorum petita." J. and C. see in Plato's phrase "a piece of extravagance" and nothing more; but even the extravagance of Plato is never destitute of point. To understand *νέων ἐν γῇ* as no more than *lying* on the land (with some older translators, including Ficinus), and to transpose *ἐν γῇ* and *ἐν θαλάττῃ* (with *q* and Flor. U) are of course wholly illegitimate resources. I have sometimes suspected that *ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων* (*ἐν γῇ*) may be a slang phrase borrowed from the language of Greek athletics: sometimes it has seemed to me to refer to the story of Thales in the well (*Theaet.* 174 A and cf.

D. L. I 34). That it has some peculiar and specific meaning I am convinced; and the explanation offered in the notes appears to me far more probable than any other. The Aristophanic instance of ἐξ ὑπτίας νεῖν does not occur in any of the extant plays. It should be added that ἐπὶ γῆς μὴ πλεῖν was a Pythagorean σύμβολον (Clement *Strom.* V 5. 49 A Migne), but I do not think there is any allusion to the maxim here. See also my article in *Cl. Rev.* XIII p. 11.

X.

VII 529 C, D. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπείπερ ἐν ὁρατῷ πεποίκιλται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ἃς τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτὴς ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει· ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτά, ὄψει δ' οὔ.

This famous and difficult sentence has occasioned a vast amount of debate. I may refer in particular, besides the editors, to Schleiermacher in his Translation pp. 580 f., Steinhart *Einleitung* pp. 691 f., Susemihl *Gen. Entw.* II p. 209, Krohn *Pl. St.* pp. 170 ff., Cohen *Ideenlehre u. die Mathematik* pp. 22 ff., Richards *Cl. Rev.* VIII p. 194, Nettleship *Lectures and Remains* II p. 275 and Bosanquet *Companion* p. 290. Krohn's discussion, though not free from errors, is particularly able and suggestive.

A large majority of editors and critics approve the MS tradition, but there is no consensus of opinion as to the meaning among those who have seriously attempted to grapple with the unusual difficulties of the sentence.

On grammatical grounds, there should be no doubt that τῶν ἀληθινῶν means τῶν ἀληθινῶν ποικιλμάτων. It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand φορῶν after ἀληθινῶν (with Steinhart and Susemihl), or to take τῶν ἀληθινῶν absolutely in the sense of 'the true' sc. system, as Bosanquet desires to do. The accusative ἃς—φοράς is believed by Schleiermacher and others to be equivalent to κατὰ τὰς φοράς, but the construction, to say the least, is difficult and obscure. Schneider, who as usual is clear and precise, repeats ποικιλμάτων with ἀληθινῶν, and holds that ἃς—φορὰς κτλ. defines the true ποικίλματα "quasi dicat τῶν ἀληθινῶν ποικιλμάτων, τοῦτ' ἔστι τῶν φορῶν ἃς" etc. This view, which I have adopted in the notes, appears to me unquestionably correct.

Schneider interprets the whole passage as follows:—"quemadmodum —sensibilis coeli varietas eo efficitur, quod stellas in coelo conspicuas alias celerior, alias tardior motus per definita temporis spatia certasque figuras circumagit, qui motus est non verae, sed sensibilis celeritatis tarditatisque et per numeros atque figuras item sensibiles decurrit, ita veram varietatem vera celeritas et tarditas efficiunt eo, quod veras stellas secundum verum numerum verasque figuras movent, qui motus partim ipsarum est, quia celeritas et tarditas motu carere non possunt, partim ad res motas seu veras stellas pertinet, quae τὰ ἐνόντα dicuntur quia celeritas et tarditas cum eis sese coniungentes eas amplectuntur et

continent." It will be observed that Schneider identifies *τὰ ἐνόντα* with 'verae stellae,' 'die intelligiblen Analogen' of the visible stars (Krohn), and *τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής* with 'vera celeritas et tarditas'; whereas, according to my interpretation, *τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής* represent the 'verae stellae,' and *τὰ ἐνόντα* the mathematical *ὄντα* which they contain, analogous to the sensible *γιγνόμενα* which are present in visible stars. Others, such as Steinhart and Susemihl, have actually recognised in *τὰ ἐνόντα* the visible stars themselves. To the latter view there are many objections, and it may be urged against both Schneider and Steinhart that neither intelligible nor visible stars can reasonably be said *ἐνεῖναι τῷ ὄντι τάχει* etc. *τὰ ἐνόντα* is a precise and definite expression which Plato ought not to have employed if he merely meant that 'celeritas et tarditas cum eis' (i.e. according to Schneider 'veris stellis') '*sese coniungentes* eas amplectuntur et continent.' The meaning which I have given to *τὰ ἐνόντα* appears to me the only one which assigns its full and proper connotation to the word.

It has been thought by some critics that *τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής* are the self-existent Ideas of Speed and Slowness. Apart from other objections to this view (see Zeller[4] II 1, p. 697 *n.* 3), we must insist that the astronomer as such is not yet concerned with the Ideas at all, but only with *τὰ μεταξύ* i.e. *τὰ μαθηματικά*, which, though *πολλά*, are nevertheless both *ὄντα* (hence *τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής*) and *ἀίδια*: see 527 B *n.*, with App. I and Zeller[4] II 1, p. 701 *n.* 1 and Susemihl l.c. p. 209. The whole structure of the sentence in my opinion compels us to find the mathematical analogues of the visible stars not in *τὰ ἐνόντα*, but in *τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής*, and I have tried in the notes to indicate the reason which induced Plato to express his meaning in this particular way.

The text has of course often been called in question. The first to suspect corruption was apparently Ast, who suggested *ὧν τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτὴς <καὶ> ἐν κτλ.*, and Richards accepts the principle of this proposal, merely substituting *οἷς* for *ὧν*. I was myself once inclined to read *ἃ ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ κτλ.*, omitting *τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής* as well as the final *ς* of *ἅς*, but *τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτής* is in all the MSS and was read by Proclus (*in Tim.* 244 C and elsewhere), and it is hardly necessary to say that 'emendations' on passages of this kind are peculiarly liable to error. I see no good reason for doubting the accuracy of the MSS.

XI.

VII 531 B. *σὺ μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλόπων στρεβλοῦντας· ἵνα δὲ μὴ μακροτέρα ἡ εἰκὼν γίγνηται πλήκτρῳ τε πληγῶν γιγνομένων καὶ κατηγορίας πέρι καὶ ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας χορδῶν, παύομαι τῆς εἰκόνος κτλ.*

I take *ἡ εἰκών* with *πέρι* in the sense virtually of *λέγουσα πέρι*. This construction appears to be generally accepted, but there is considerable diversity of opinion as to the meaning of *κατηγορίας κτλ.* Many inter-

preters understand κατηγορίας as something which is done by the strings, and not by the musicians, in which case χορδῶν is a subjective genitive going with κατηγορίας as well as with the other two nouns. Grammatically, this view is defensible enough: but whom, and how, do the strings κατηγορεῖν? Is it the musician? If so, the tortured slave should 'accuse' the executioner, but he does not, although he may revile him. The slave upon the rack may denounce or accuse his accomplices, but the strings can hardly be said κατηγορεῖν in any sense analogous to this. Others, as for example Schneider, suppose that κατηγορία is a technical term in music ("hoc quoque artis vocabulum esse liquet"). For this idea there is no authority in any ancient writer, so far as I can discover. D. and V. translate "the peevishness, reserve and frowardness of the strings," but the word κατηγορίας does not mean peevishness, but 'accusation.' On the other hand the contrast between κατηγορίας and ἐξαρνήσεως is strongly in favour of holding that it is the musicians who accuse, and the strings that deny. Stallbaum and others think ἐξαρνήσεως means giving out no sound, and ἀλαζονείας 'nimis acute sonant.' This too is in my judgment far-fetched and weak. Plato's words should be taken in their full sense. The musician accuses the strings; the strings protest their innocence like an obstinate slave upon the rack. If more point is needed, we should remember that if the strings are innocent, the musician is guilty.

Jowett apparently makes κατηγορίας govern ἐξαρνήσεως: "they have a controversy with the strings and torture them: they accuse them of refusing to speak or of speaking too much." But the grammatical construction is harsh and the sense inadequate. The alternative view in J. and C. is in my opinion correct, except that ἀλαζονείας is rather 'effrontery,' 'swagger,' than 'exaggeration.'

XII.

VII 532 A. *οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὁρμᾶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ, πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει κτλ.*

The MS reading ὁρμᾷ is retained by J. and C., as well as by Richter in *Fleck. Jb.* 1867 p. 145. The Oxford editors treat ἄνευ—ἀποστῇ as explanatory of οὕτω—ἐπιχειρῇ, remarking, truly enough, that such an asyndeton is "not without parallel in Plato." But the objection is not so much to the asyndeton in itself, as to the misunderstanding which it would occasion. No one would readily imagine that ὁρμᾷ is a subjunctive dependent upon ὅταν: it would naturally be construed as an indicative, and the words ἄνευ—ὁρμᾷ would almost inevitably be taken as the apodosis corresponding to ὅταν—ἐπιχειρῇ. Richter is certainly wrong in supposing that ἄν can be understood before ἄνευ πασῶν κτλ. out of ὅταν.

Ast's emendation is in my opinion all but certain. Other proposals are (1) ἐπιχειρῇ, ἄνευ—ὁρμᾷ, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἀποστῇ κτλ. (Stephanus, with

whom Hermann and Stallbaum, reading *κἄν*, virtually agree): (2) *ἐπιχειρῇ, <ἂν> ἄνευ—ὁρμᾷ, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ* (Baiter): (3) *ἐπιχειρῶν* for *ἐπιχειρῇ* (mentioned in J. and C.). The last conjecture is too drastic; of the others, (2) is better than (1), but neither is satisfactory. On the one hand, if *ἄνευ—ὁρμᾷ* is in the apodosis, it is too prominent, and looks too much like a definition of the dialectical method; on the other hand, Baiter's remedy seems to imply that it is or may be possible to attempt dialectic without dispensing with *πᾶσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις*. Neither of these objections applies to Ast's conjecture, which is also more in harmony with the previous sentence than any other emendation.

XIII.

VII 532 B, C. *ἡ δέ γε, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφὴ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδωλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείου εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, καὶ ἐκεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ζῷά τε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἔτι ἀδυναμία βλέπειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν ὕδασι φαντάσματα θεῖα καὶ σκιὰς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδώλων σκιὰς δι' ἑτέρου τοιούτου φωτὸς ὡς πρὸς ἥλιον κρίνειν ἀποσκιαζομένας κτλ.*

The reading *ἐπ' ἀδυναμίᾳ* has the support of the best MSS and is retained by Schneider, Stallbaum, and J. and C., not to mention older editors.

According to Schneider's explanation (with which the Oxford editors agree), *βλέπειν* is a substantival infinitive, parallel to *ἐπάνοδος*, and *ἐπ' ἀδυναμίᾳ* is adverbial ('with inability' or the like), while *ἐπὶ δυνάμει βλέπειν* (or something of the kind) is to be supplied with the contrasting clause. But *ἐπ' ἀδυναμίᾳ*, if taken adverbially with *βλέπειν*, is an extraordinary phrase, and none of the instances cited—chiefly from the tragedians—by Schneider and J. and C. is comparable to it. Stallbaum makes *βλέπειν* depend on *ἀδυναμίᾳ* ("bei dem Unvermögen hinzublicken nach" etc.), and supplies *ἐπὶ δυνάμει* to govern the *βλέπειν* which has to be supplied in the next clause. This explanation does more justice to the Greek, as far as *ἐπ' ἀδυναμίᾳ* is concerned, but 'bei dem Unvermögen' etc. could not be coupled with *ἐπάνοδος* unless we admit an extremely offensive anacoluthon. Schneider appears to have felt that a nominative was needed, and would have liked to write *ἀδυναμία* (with *v* and two other MSS). This is also Herwerden's proposal, but *ἔτι* is a great improvement, and fitly reminds us of the continuity of the prisoner's progress. Other and older emendations, mentioned by Schneider, in which *ἐπ' ἀδυναμίᾳ* is retained, are none of them in the least degree probable, and it may now, I think, be taken as certain that Iamblichus was right.

The words *ἐνταῦθα δὲ πρὸς φαντάσματα*, which formerly appeared between *φαντάσματα* and *θεῖα*, were rightly rejected by Schneider. They occur in no MS except Ξ, which is the basis of the Aldine and Stephanus' text. *ἐνταῦθα δέ* in this connexion could only mean the region of intelligibles, as Schneider points out; and the whole passage is plunged into confusion if these words are introduced. It is remark-

able that Herwerden alone of recent critics has proposed this reinsertion, beguiled, perhaps, by the homoioteleuton, which Schneider thinks was a deliberate artifice of the forger ("quis non glossema ex male intellecto adverbio ἐκεῖ vel undelibet oriundum et de industria homoeoteleuton factam agnoscat?").

The adjective θεῖα has caused a great deal of discussion. I once unhappily proposed to read <καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λ>εῖα, comparing VI 510 A. The correct view was pointed out by Shorey in his severe though just denunciation of my remedy (*Cl. Rev.* IV p. 480). Schneider takes φαντάσματα θεῖα as virtually φαντάσματα θεοῦ, supposing that φαντάσματα of the sun alone are meant (cf. 516 B), but this is scarcely adequate. Against Stallbaum, who (without quoting the *Sophist*) bracketed θεῖα, Richter (*Fleck. Jb.* 1867 p. 145) rightly argued that the epithet was indispensable "um den Unterschied zu markieren zwischen den φαντάσματα und den im κατάγειον vorkommenden εἴδωλα." Ast's conjecture θέα is neat, and has won considerable favour (see E. J. Palmer in *Cl. Rev.* V p. 278 and Apelt in *Fleck. Jb.* 1891 p. 556, where Apelt makes the same proposal independently), while Madvig's ἄδεια has been deservedly ignored. I have no longer any doubt that the text is sound. Some may find a difficulty because the *Sophist* is now believed by many to be later than the *Republic*; but θεῖα in this sense may have been familiar in the Platonic school, and in any case (see note ad loc.) the meaning can be inferred from the context, even without the aid of the *Sophist*, whose theory of a θεία and an ἀνθρωπίνη εἰδωλοποικική may, if we think fit, be viewed as a further development of the expression in the *Republic*. There are also other traces in the *Republic* of doctrines supposed to be especially characteristic of the so-called 'dialectical dialogues': see App. VII to Book V. Finally, it should be noted that Herwerden's excision of σκιάς after εἰδώλων is not only unnecessary but wrong, because ἀποσκιαζομένας would then be most naturally taken with σκιὰς τῶν ὄντων.

XIV.

VII 533 B. τόδε γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσει λέγουσιν, ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου πέρι, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, ἄλλη τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὁδῷ περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι κτλ.

The ordinary explanation of this passage takes ὡς with ἀμφισβητήσει and not with λέγουσιν, interpreting ἄλλη as 'other than dialectic' (Schneider in *Addit.* p. 58, Stallbaum and J. and C.). But it is scarcely possible to separate ὡς from λέγουσιν, and for this reason J. J. Hartman (who understands ἄλλη in the same way as Schneider) cuts λέγουσιν out.

If λέγουσιν is retained, and connected, as it must be, with ὡς, either ἄλλη does not mean 'other than dialectic,' or else we must read <οὐκ> ἄλλη. The latter alternative was adopted by Stephanus, Ast, and Bekker, whose *apparatus criticus* stated by implication that οὐκ was actually written in Paris A. Recent editors have rightly rejected οὐκ

after it was found to have no MS authority. It is clear, therefore, unless we resort to unjustifiable emendation or excision, that ἄλλη does not mean 'other than dialectic.' The only other possible explanations are (1) other than all the arts spoken of in ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι—αὐτῶν, (2) that given in the notes. Against (1) it might be urged that ἄλλη does not easily look forward in a sentence of this kind, and (2) is in every way simpler and more natural, provided we observe that the stress falls on αἱ δὲ λοιπαί rather than on αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι etc. ('while all the other arts—the remainder' etc.).

XV.

VII 533 C. *οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται.*

The MSS without exception have ἀναιροῦσα, which a majority of editors retain. ἀνάγουσα was read by Canter (Stob. II p. 157), and is found as a correction in one MS of Stobaeus (*Ecl.* II 2. 1 Wachsmuth). I formerly printed ἀναφέρουσα, which Oldenberg (*de Pl. arte dial.* p. 38 *n.*) had already (as I have since found) mentioned as possible, though he himself preferred ἀνάγουσα. On an earlier occasion I conjectured ἀνιοῦσα (*Cl. Rev.* IV p. 357), thinking of *Symp.* 211 B: cf. also Alcin. *Isag.* 5 and 7. Schneider's ἀναίρουσα is an excessively rare word, and has met with little favour from critics; but ἀνάγουσα has been approved by various writers, among others Oldenberg (l.c.) and Richards (*Cl. Rev.* VIII p. 194).

Further investigation into Plato's 'hypothetical method' has now convinced me that the reading and punctuation of Paris A represent the truth. See App. III, where the subject is discussed at length.

The expression τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα throws a much-needed light on the real nature of the process described here and in VI 511 B, VII 532 A. It is not, as has been asserted, inconsistent with the description of Book VI, for although we demolish our ὑποθέσεις and must do so if we are ever to rise above them, they are none the less τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμαί, without which we cannot even make a start. The path of knowledge is strewn with the wrecks of hasty generalisations, which have served as stepping-stones to students in the very act of their demolition: and in this sense, if in no other, it is true that "Error in the round of time Still fathers Truth."

It is perhaps necessary briefly to advert to some erroneous interpretations of the authoritative text. Steinhart (*Einleitung* p. 693) translates "die Voraussetzungen aufhebend, um das Princip zu gewinnen," taking ἐπί with ἀναιροῦσα: but ἐπί cannot be separated from πορεύεται, and such a sense of ἐπί in this connexion is harsh and unnatural. Stallbaum's attempt to shew that ἀναιροῦσα ἐπί can mean 'taking up to' is unsuccessful, for all the parallels which he quotes are cases of ἀναφέρειν ἐπί. Finally Jowett and Campbell remark "The hypotheses are done away with; that is, when seen in their relation to

the good they cease to be *ὑποθέσεις*": but *ἀναιρεῖν* cannot be thus pared down, and should be taken in its full force as explained in the note.

XVI.

VII 533 E. *Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη* [*ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ*]. *Ἀρέσκει οὖν* κτλ.

The words within brackets are printed as they appear in A. Π agrees, except that it has *ἄλλο* (corrected to *ἀλλ' ὃ*) and *ἕξιν* (*sic*). In *q* and Flor. U we find *ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν σαφηνεία* (i.e. *σαφηνείᾳ*) *ὃ λέγοι ἐν ψυχῇ*, and this reading is adopted by Bekker. There is also some slight authority (in addition to Π') for *ἄλλο* instead of *ἀλλ' ὅ*, for *σαφηνείαν* instead of *σαφηνείᾳ*, and for *λέγειν* instead of *λέγει*.

Jowett and Campbell remain faithful in their allegiance to A, except that with *q* they insert *ὅ* before *λέγει*. "The words in the text," they remark, "are very possibly genuine and may be rendered—'we only require' (the verb is gathered from *οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις*) 'an expression which may indicate *with a clearness proportioned to the mental condition*, that of which it speaks *as existing* in the mind. For example, *διάνοια* may not be a very clear or definite expression, but the state of mind which it expresses is also far from clear." But they do not explain how the words which I have italicised represent the Greek, and few will find themselves able to accept the translation which they offer.

The reading of *q* is carefully examined by Schneider, who justly characterises it in these words "sententia mihi tam absona videtur, ut eam vix interpolatori mediocri, nedum Platoni tribuere audeam."

The chief emendations are (1) *ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἐξέτασιν σαφηνείᾳ <ὃ> λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ* (Winckelmann), (2) *ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξω σαφήνειαν <ἃ> λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ <ἀρκέσει>* (Hermann, and Badham, except that the latter writes *ἔχει* for *λέγει*, and begins the next sentence with *Ἀρκέσει*), (3) *ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν ὄνομα δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν λέξεως σαφήνειαν <ὃ> λέγει* (or *ἂν λέγοι*) *ἐν ψυχῇ <ἀρκέσει>* (Steinhart), (4) *ἄλλο ἂν ὄνομα δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ, <ἄλλο> λέγοι ἂν ψυχή* (Richter in *Fleck. Jb.* 1867, p. 146), (5) *ἀλλ' ὃ—ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ, λέγ', εἰ ἐν ψυχῇ* (Madvig, Baiter), (6) *ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ τὴν ἕξιν <πῶς ἔχει> σαφηνείας <ἃ> λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ* (Bywater), (7) *ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πῶς αὐτὴν ἔχειν σαφηνείας λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ <ἀρκέσει>. Ἀρκέσει* (or *ἀρέσκει*) *γοῦν* κτλ. (Richards), (8) *ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πως τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ λέγειμ ἐν ψυχῇ <ἀρκέσει; Ναί.> Ἀρκέσει* κτλ. (Burnet).

Some of these conjectures are ingenious and scholarly, but none of them, nor any other which I can devise, is altogether satisfactory in point of sense, or diplomatically probable. (The last remark does not apply to Madvig's correction, which is easy enough, but *κακὸν κακῷ ἰᾶται* and does not attempt to cure *πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ* at all.)

The independent reasons for holding the clause to be interpolated are:—(1) it is absent in Ξ, which the Aldine edition and Stephanus as usual follow: (2) "in Platonis dialogis quum negationi assensus per formulam *οὐ γὰρ οὖν* praebetur, nusquam assentiens quicquam addit, quod ex contrario petitam negati descriptionem contineat idque per affirmationem cum particula *ἀλλά* definiat" (Schneider). Little weight need be attached to the first argument, in view of the general character of Ξ, but if (as I believe in opposition to Schanz *Platocod.* etc. p. 81) Ξ is sometimes independent of A, it is possible enough that the words were omitted in the MS (or MSS) from which Ξ was copied in this passage. The second consideration, which Schneider establishes by a vast number of instances, is extremely weighty.

As regards the origin of the gloss Schneider observes (*Addit.* p. 59) "ceterum primitivam formam et originem glossematis investigaturos contulisse iuvabit Platonis verba *Leg.* I p. 633 A: *περὶ τῶν τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς εἴτε μερῶν εἴτε ἅπτ' αὐτὰ καλεῖν χρεών ἐστι, δηλοῦντα μόνον ἃ λέγει*, et haec Galeni *Εἰσαγωγῆς διαλεκτικῆς* p. 12: *οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν διαφέρει συμπεπλεγμένην λέγειν ἀποφατικὴν ἢ συμπλοκὴν ἀποφατικήν, ἔχοντός γέ σου σκοπὸν ἐν ἁπάσῃ λέξει τὸ δηλῶσαι τοῖς πέλας, ὅ τι περ ἂν αὐτὸς ἐννοῇς.*" Cf. also *Theaet.* 177 D, E, *Soph.* 218 B, *Hipp. Mai.* 296 D. The sentence is evidently an attempt to say that we should be content if the words we use express our meaning clearly. In *λέγει* (and still more *λέγεις*) *ἐν ψυχῇ* we may detect an allusion to the Platonic theory of thought as the conversation of the soul (see on III 400 D) and perhaps also to the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* of the Stoics. On this account, and also because of *ἕξιν*, I am inclined to attribute the interpolation to some adherent of the Stoic school, of which, in point of style, it is not unworthy.

XVII.

VII 534 D. *Ἀλλὰ μὴν τούς γε σαυτοῦ παῖδας, οὓς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμάς, ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίους τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι.*

Schneider was the first to discover in this passage a punning reference to mathematical *ἄλογοι γραμμαί*, as defined by Euclid X *Deff.* 5—11. The same explanation, although it did not commend itself to Stallbaum, is apparently accepted by the Oxford editors, who aptly quote *Theaet.* 146 A *προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθαι.* It is to Theodorus the mathematician that these words are spoken, and Campbell is, I believe, right in thinking that *προσηγόρους* is quasi-mathematical: cf. VIII 546 B *πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν.*

It is better, I think, and more pointed to connect *ἀλόγους* directly with *γραμμάς* (cf. 519 A *τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας* with note ad loc.), than to translate "incapable of reason, like irrational lines" (with Schneider and J. and C.). In order to extract this meaning from the Greek, we must understand *γραμμάς* as = *ἀλόγους γραμμάς*, which is doubtless possible, but less natural than the view given in the notes.

J. and C.'s translation also gives to ὥσπερ γραμμάς a certain otiose appearance, as if Plato had deliberately gone out of his way to drag in a mathematical allusion. On this account we may wonder that none of the Dutch critics has hitherto proposed, so far as I know, to excise ὥσπερ γραμμάς.

There is little to be said in favour of the non-mathematical interpretations, though perhaps the following contain an element of truth: "unvernünftig wie Figuren" (Schleiermacher), "unvernünftig wie todte Striche" (Prantl), "lineae penecillo praeformatae" (Stallbaum). γραμμάς has, I think, a non-mathematical as well as mathematical meaning in this place, and the former is fairly expressed by Prantl's "todte Striche." Ast thought of "literae s. scriptiones," remembering the well-known passage about dumb books in *Phaedr.* 275 ff.; but γραμμάς cannot be thus interpreted. Others have thought of pictures, as for example Stallbaum, who refers to Plut. *Lycurg.* 10. 3 ὥσπερ γραφὴν ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον, and is inclined to read γραφάς instead of γραμμάς. The correction γεγραμμένους is suggested by Steinhart (*Einleitung* p. 694) and γράμμα or γράμματ' (with reference to v 472 D) by Apelt (*Fleck. Jb.* 1893 p. 556). The eccentric proposal ὡς Φρύγας Μίδας ἄρχοντας is due to Cornarius, who remarks "coniectura est nostra, qua falli possum: sed tolerari poterit donec rectior occurret" (*Eclog.* p. 101). Stallbaum's conjecture is neat and elegant, but the text is indubitably sound.

H.

543 I. Εἶεν· ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὡμολόγηται, ὦ Γλαύκων, τῇ μελλούσῃ

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543 A—**545** C *Socrates now returns to the point at which the digression occupying Books V—VII began. There are, as we observed, four leading varieties of States and individuals, in addition to the perfect polity and perfect man. In order of merit they are* (1) *Timarchy, or the Cretan and Laconian State,* (2) *Oligarchy,* (3) *Democracy,* (4) *Tyranny. All other kinds of commonwealths, such as dynasties etc., lie somewhere between these primary and conspicuous varieties. Furthermore, inasmuch as the specific character of States is determined by that of individuals, there will be five leading types of individual character, embodied respectively in* (1) *the aristocratic,* (2) *the timarchical,* (3) *the oligarchical,* (4) *the democratical,* (5) *the tyrannical man. The first of these we have already described; but we must review the others also, in order that, by contrasting the best and worst, we may apprehend the relation between undiluted justice and undiluted injustice in respect of the happiness and misery of their possessors. As before, we will examine the commonwealths first, and afterwards the individuals.*

543 A **ff.** The description of the philosopher and the philosophic city is at last complete, and the argument returns to the point at which the 'digression' began, viz. V 449 A: see note ad loc. Plato has already said repeatedly, and reminds us yet again in 544 A, that the aim of our whole investigation was to decide εἰ ὁ ἄριστος εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ὁ κάκιστος ἀθλιώτατος, ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοι (cf. II 368 E, 369 A *nn.*). With the character of the perfect man we are now familiar, but we have still to discover and describe τὸν κάκιστον, in order that we may institute our comparison and pronounce our verdict. This is the task to which Plato addresses himself in VIII and IX (down to 576 B). The method which he follows resembles that adopted in II 369 B ff.—IV. In the first place, he retains throughout the former analogy between the Soul and the City, and his account of the imperfect man is in every instance preceded by an account of the imperfect State. Secondly, instead of going straight to the mark and giving us a single ready-made sketch of total and complete depravity, Plato draws an elaborate and quasi-historical picture of the gradual descent of the perfect State and the perfect Man through successive phases of ever-growing degeneration down to the lowest depth of wickedness and crime. In the same way, as Nettleship observes (*Lect. and Rem.* II p. 295), "in describing a perfect state, or certain steps in the process of forming a perfect state," he sometimes wrote "as if one step of that process succeeded another in a historical order." See on II 369 B, 372 D, 373 D et al. The question has often been discussed whether the sequence of polities in VIII and IX was intended to be really historical or not: see for example Zeller[4] II pp. 923—925, Henkel *Studien zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre v. Staat* p. 56 and Krohn *Pl. St.* pp. 204 ff. Aristotle seems to have understood Plato's account as an attempt to describe the actual facts of Greek history, and severely criticizes it from his usual standpoint in *Pol.* E 12. 1316[a] 1—[b] 27; but Plato himself must of course have known as well as Aristotle that the historical development of Greek constitutions did not by any means always correspond with his scheme. See Whibley *Gk Olig.* pp. 62—88 and Greenidge *Gk Const. Hist.* pp. 12—35. The fact is that Aristotle altogether ignores the real object of Plato, which is, as we have seen, to arrive at the worst State and the worst man, and treats him as if he had undertaken to exhibit a full

ἄκρως οἰκεῖν πόλει κοινὰς μὲν γυναῖκας, κοινοὺς δὲ παῖδας εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν παιδείαν, ὡσαύτως δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα κοινὰ ἐν πολέμῳ τε καὶ εἰρήνῃ, βασιλέας δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον γεγονότας ἀρίστους. Ὁμολόγηται, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τάδε ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, ὡς ὅταν δὴ καταστῶσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, B ἄγοντες τοὺς στρατιώτας κατοικιοῦσιν εἰς οἰκήσεις οἵας προείπομεν, ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ἐχούσας, κοινὰς δὲ πᾶσι. πρὸς δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις οἰκήσεσι καὶ τὰς κτήσεις, εἰ μνημονεύεις, διωμολογησάμεθά που οἵαι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς. Ἀλλὰ μνημονεύω, ἔφη, ὅτι γε

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and complete genealogical tree of all the changes good or bad which had ever taken place in Greek constitutional history. But Plato does not here profess to describe political advance, but only political decay; and even his theory of political decay is itself based upon a theory of psychological degeneration which justly and deliberately ignores, as irrelevant for our present purpose, the undoubted power of human character to improve as well as to deteriorate. The question, as Nettleship says, which Plato puts before himself is this: "The human soul being as we have described it, and having in it a certain capacity for evil as well as for good, what would it come to, and through what stages would it pass, if its capacity for evil were realized gradually but without any abatement? In actual human experience there is always some abatement; there are always counteracting circumstances which prevent any one tendency working itself out in isolation and unhindered; but the philosopher may, as Plato here does, work out the result of a single tendency logically. These books therefore put before us an ideal history of evil, as the previous books put before us an ideal history of good" (l. c. p. 295). The different stages in the decline of the individual soul are each reflected in the decline of the *πολιτεία*, which is still, as in II—VII, not 'a lifeless instrument, or dead machine,' but in the words of Isocrates, simply the soul of the State (*ἔστι γὰρ ψυχὴ πόλεως οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ πολιτεία Areop.* 14). But although Plato treats the whole question from a psychological rather than a historical standpoint, it is none the less true that the materials of his picture are taken from Greek political and social life. In Books VIII and IX of the *Republic* we have an extraordinarily vivid and life-like embodiment of the results of Plato's observation and experience of the Greek character, both private and public, in all its different phases, Lacedaemonian, oligarchical, democratical or Athenian, and tyrannical; and the student of Greek history, whether political, economical or social, will obtain a clearer idea of the inner life and animating spirit of Greek constitutions from Plato's description than from any other ancient source whatever. For the rest, it should be noted that Plato has given us in this part of the *Republic* the earliest attempt at a Philosophy of History, and founded the psychological interpretation of the State. Every political movement is, according to him, the expression of some particular psychological impulse or impulses, and the Constitution inevitably assumes different forms, according as one or another element or 'part' of soul obtains the mastery in the individual citizen. See on this subject Krohn *Pl. St.* pp. 199 ff., and Bluntschli *Theory of the State* pp. 76 f.

543 A 1 **τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως κτλ.** Cf. *Laws* 739 C, D. The adverb *ἄκρως* is said by Herwerden (*Mn.* XIX p. 335) to be a *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον* in classical Greek. On the word *βασιλέας* Pfleiderer (*Zur Lösung* etc. p. 73) bases a chorizontic argument; but see on IV 445 D. Plato's rulers may well be called 'Kings,' for Plato holds that there is no difference of principle between Kingship and Aristocracy: cf. VII 520 B with V 473 C, IX 587 B, and Henkel *Stud. zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat* p. 57.

4 **αὐτῶν.** The genitive is partitive: 'and that those of their number are to be Kings who have shewn themselves best' etc. Jowett wrongly translates 'their kings.'

543 B 6 **ξυνεχωρήσαμεν.** III 415 D ff.

10 **οἵαι.** The reference is to III 416 D ff.

οὐδὲν οὐδένα ᾠόμεθα δεῖν κεκτῆσθαι ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὥσπερ δὲ
C ἀθλητάς τε πολέμου καὶ φύλακας, μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς | δεχο-
μένους εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν τὴν εἰς ταῦτα τροφὴν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτῶν
τε δεῖν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφην, λέγεις.
ἀλλά γ' ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ' ἀπετελέσαμεν, ἀναμνησθῶμεν πόθεν δεῦρο 15
ἐξετραπόμεθα, ἵνα πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἴωμεν. Οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη.
σχεδὸν γάρ, καθάπερ νῦν, ὡς διεληλυθὼς περὶ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς
λόγους ἐποιοῦ, λέγων, ὡς ἀγαθὴν μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην, οἵαν τότε
D διῆλθες, τιθείης πόλιν καὶ ἄνδρα | τὸν ἐκείνῃ ὅμοιον, καὶ ταῦτα, ὡς

Liebhold's conjecture *ὅτι κοιναί* is an undeserved reflection on Glauco's powers of memory.

11 **οἱ ἄλλοι.** *οἱ ἄνθρωποι*, which I once suggested (*Cl. Rev.* IV p. 357), would be more exact, and ΑΛΛΟΙ and ΑΝΟΙ are pretty easily confused in uncial MSS (Cobet *V.L.*² p. 432: cf. Heindorf on *Prot.* 354 B). Owing to *νῦν*, *οἱ ἄλλοι* can only mean 'the rest of mankind,' and the Guardians are therefore virtually spoken of as a section of living men. This kind of looseness is not uncommon, though here it has no stylistic effect. An alternative view might be to understand *οἱ ἄλλοι* of the rest of the citizens (*τῶν ἄλλων* below) and *νῦν* as 'in point of fact' or 'in our present discussion'; but this explanation is much less satisfactory. *ὡς*, which some inferior MSS write for *ὧν*, does not remove the inaccuracy in *οἱ ἄλλοι*: nor is *οἷον ἄλλοι* in IV 419 A precisely parallel, though it supports the view that *οἱ ἄλλοι* means 'the rest of mankind.'

12 **ἀθλητάς—πολέμου.** VII 521 D *n.*

543 C 13 **εἰς ἐνιαυτόν.** Nothing is to remain over at the end of the year (III 416 E).

εἰς ταῦτα: viz. *εἰς τὰ τῆς φυλακῆς* etc. For the use of the pronoun cf. VII 536 A and infra 558 E *nn.* Madvig's *εἰς τακτά* is unnecessary, and *ταξαμένους* in III 416 D means something quite different.

15 **ἀλλά γ' ἐπειδὴ κτλ.:** 'yes, but after we finished that subject, let us recall where we digressed to come here, that we may resume the old path.' "*γε* ad sequentia *ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ' ἀπετελέσαμεν* pertinet et priora recte quidem dicta a Glaucone, sed unum idque non leve reliquum esse significat, quod item sit in memoriam revocandum, ut relictam viam denuo capessere possint" (Schneider). The MSS fluctuate between *ἀλλά γ'* (the reading of A), *ἀλλ' ἄγ'* and *ἀλλ' ἄγε* (Π), the last of which readings is adopted by all editors except Schneider. *ἀλλά γε*, though rare, is, I believe, firmly established in Plato: see on I 331 B. It fits the situation in this passage exactly, whereas *ἀλλ' ἄγε* does not, if we translate *ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ' ἀπετελέσαμεν* correctly, and not (with D. and V., Jowett etc.) by 'now that we have concluded the subject.' *τοῦτο* is not Books V—VII, but the arrangements of the earlier city of II—IV, as described in 543 B, C: and *ἀπετελέσαμεν* is aorist, not perfect. *ἀναμνησθῶμεν* (as Schneider observes) is necessitated by *ἵνα —ἴωμεν*, otherwise Socrates might simply have said *ἀλλά γ' ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ' ἀπετελέσαμεν, πόθεν δεῦρο ἐξετραπόμεθα;* There is moreover no need for so vigorous an exhortation to exercise the memory as would be conveyed by *ἀλλ' ἄγε ἀναμνησθῶμεν*, especially as Glauco's recollection had left nothing to be desired in B and C above.

17 **καθάπερ νῦν.** *νῦν* refers to 541 B.

ὡς διεληλυθὼς—πόλεως: "quasi disputatione de civitate absoluta" (Stallbaum): cf. V 450 A. The MSS vary between this reading, and *ὡς διελήλυθας* or *διελήλυθας* alone: but A (with which Π² and several other MSS agree) is certainly right.

18 **λέγων κτλ.** V 449 A.

543 D 19 **καὶ ταῦτα κτλ.:** 'and that, too, though, as it seems, you could have told us of a still more beautiful city and man' viz. the city of the philosopher-king and the philosopher-king himself, afterwards described by Socrates in V 472 B—VII. The city of V—VII is spoken of as a different city from that of II—IV: see on *ἐν μὲν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκλογῇ* VII 536 C, II 372 D *n.*, and Hirzel

ἔοικας, καλλίω ἔτι ἔχων εἰπεῖν πόλιν τε καὶ ἄνδρα. ἀλλ' | οὖν 544
δὴ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμαρτημένας ἔλεγες, εἰ αὖτη ὀρθή. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν
πολιτειῶν ἔφησθα, ὡς μνημονεύω, τέτταρα εἴδη εἶναι, ὧν καὶ πέρι
λόγον ἄξιον εἴη ἔχειν καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τοὺς
ἐκείναις αὖ ὁμοίους, ἵνα πάντας αὐτοὺς ἰδόντες καὶ ὁμολογησάμενοι
τὸν ἄριστον καὶ τὸν κάκιστον ἄνδρα ἐπισκεψαίμεθα, εἰ ὁ ἄριστος
εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ὁ κάκιστος ἀθλιώτατος ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοι· καὶ
ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου, τίνας λέγοις τὰς τέτταρας πολιτείας, | ἐν τούτῳ B
ὑπέλαβε Πολέμαρχός τε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ σὺ ἀνα-
λαβὼν τὸν λόγον δεῦρ' ἀφῖξαι. Ὀρθότατα, εἶπον, ἐμνημόνευσας.
Πάλιν τοίνυν, ὥσπερ παλαιστής, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε, καὶ τὸ
αὐτὸ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἅπερ τότε ἔμελλες λέγειν.
Ἐάνπερ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύνωμαι. Καὶ μήν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐπιθυμῶ καὶ αὐτὸς
ἀκοῦσαι, τίνας ἔλεγες τὰς τέτταρας πολιτείας. | Οὐ χαλεπῶς, ἦν C
δ' ἐγώ, ἀκούσει. εἰσὶ γὰρ ἃς λέγω, αἵπερ καὶ ὀνόματα ἔχουσιν, ἥ
τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαινουμένη, ἡ Κρητική τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ

Der Dialog pp. 235 ff. Jowett's translation "although, as now appears, you had more excellent things to relate both of State and man" is a defensible construction, but unnatural, and certainly not what Plato meant. The passage has been curiously misunderstood by some critics, through inattention to the force of the imperfect participle ἔχων. Herwerden, for example, actually proposes to insert <οὐ> before καλλίω. Schneider and Stallbaum translate the sentence correctly.

544 A 3 **ἔφησθα κτλ.** IV 445 C. On the pronouns ὧν—αὐτῶν see II 357 B *n.* Plato is very careful to make it clear that he does not profess, like Aristotle, to give a complete account of faulty States. From his watch-tower he can descry infinite varieties, but only four on which he need expatiate. We may take it that these are, in Plato's view, the four most conspicuous landmarks in the history of political degeneration, as well as the most important and clearly-outlined varieties of existing States. Cf. IV 445 C and infra 544 D ἥτις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινι κεῖται.

5 **ἵνα πάντας κτλ.** reminds us of the thread which is the clue to the labyrinthine reasoning of the *Republic*: cf. 545 A, 548 D and II 368 E *n.*

7 **ἔχοι.** The optative, for which Ast and Stallbaum needlessly read ἔχει with Ξq and some other inferior MSS, is due to the *oratio obliqua*: cf. VII 515 D *n.*

8 **ἐρομένου.** V 449 A.

544 B 11 **ὥσπερ παλαιστής.** The Scholiast remarks ἔθος γὰρ τούτοις, ὅταν πέσωσιν ὁμοῦ—πάλιν ἐγερθέντας ἐφ' ὁμοίῳ συμπλακῆναι σχήματι, ὅπερ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶπε λάβην. Plato, as Stallbaum points out, uses the same figure in *Phaedr.* 236 B: cf. *Phil.* 13 D, *Laws* 682 E and ἀντιλαμβανόμενος VI 505 A *n.*

13 **ἐπιθυμῶ—ἀκοῦσαι:** 'I am desirous also on my own account to hear' sc. apart from the half-polemical motive suggested by the figure. Herwerden remarks "locus vix sanus," but it is sound enough, although the English translators ("I shall particularly wish" etc. Jowett) miss the meaning.

544 C 15 **ἥ τε—ἐπαινουμένη.** The Spartan constitution in its palmy days was widely praised for εὐνομία and discipline (pseudo-Archytas in Mullach *Frag. Philos. Gr.* I p. 560, Xen. *Mem.* III 5. 15 f., IV 4. 15, Plato *Hipp. Mai.* 283 E, 285 B, *Laws* 692 C and elsewhere), and became on this ground a sort of political ideal in the eyes of many Greeks: see for example Isocr. *Panath.* 108 ff. 200 ff. 216 ff. and the fragments of Critias' Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτεία in Müller *Frag. Hist. Gr.* II pp. 68 f. Cf. Nohle *Statslehre Plat.* pp. 108 ff. and Whibley *Gk Olig.* pp. 57 ff.

αὕτη· καὶ δευτέρα καὶ δευτέρως ἐπαινουμένη, καλουμένη δ' ὀλιγαρχία, συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία· ἥ τε ταύτῃ διάφορος καὶ ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη δημοκρατία, καὶ ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννὶς καὶ πασῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα, τέταρτόν τε καὶ ἔσχατον πόλεως
D *νόσημα. ἢ τίνα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν | πολιτείας, ἥτις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινι κεῖται; δυναστεῖαι γὰρ καὶ ὠνηταὶ βασιλεῖαι καὶ*

19. *καὶ πασῶν* Π: *καὶ ἡ πασῶν* A. 20. *διαφέρουσα* Ξ: *διαφεύγουσα* AΠ*q*.

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17 **αὕτη**: *ista* 'that of yours,' 'your Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitution.' On their connexion see Arist. *Pol.* B 10. 1271^{b} 22 ff. with Susemihl and Hicks's notes. It is, I think, fanciful to see in *αὕτη* an allusion to Glauco's sympathies for Sparta, in spite of 548 D below.

καὶ δευτέρως. Hermann prints his own conjecture *ἡ δευτέρως*, but the common confusion of *καί* and *ἡ* (Bast *Comm. Pal.* p. 815) is, I believe, later than the date of Paris A, and the text is free from objection: 'and second in order as in esteem, a constitution fraught with many evils, bearing the name of oligarchy.' *δευτέρα* agrees with *πολιτεία*, not with *ὀλιγαρχία*.

18 **διάφορος**: not of course 'different' (as Jowett), but 'antagonistic,' *adversaria* (Stallbaum). *διάφορος* 'different' gives a poor sense, and would take the genitive, which Ast erroneously proposed to read. Greek history furnished only too many proofs of the natural feud between democracy and oligarchy: see Greenidge *Gk Const. Hist.* pp. 208 ff. and Gilbert *Gr. Staatsalt.* II p. 285 *n.* 2.

19 **ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη**. From this and other indications it would appear on a first perusal that the sequence of commonwealths in VIII and IX is intended by Plato to be not merely logical, but historical also; but there is no question that the political evolution of Greek constitutions was far more complex than would appear from Plato's description. See on 543 A. We must above all things remember that it is in order to furnish a picture of the worst city and the worst man that the whole of this enquiry is undertaken, and Plato is at liberty to adopt whatever mode of presentation is best adapted for the object which he has in view. The form which he does in point of fact select is that of a historical narrative (see on 543 A, 548 D), but the real order of the development which he describes is a 'logical order,' and is primarily determined by psychological, and not by historical considerations. Although there are many points of contact between the development of Greek constitutional history and Plato's arrangement, Plato here employs narration primarily and chiefly as a vehicle or instrument for expressing the results of psychological analysis, and not because he believes that political development always and inevitably follows the same lines. See also on 543 A and infra 544 D.

20 **διαφέρουσα κτλ**. The reading of Ξ—see *cr. n.*—is confirmed by *v* and two other MSS, as well as by Stobaeus (*Flor.* 43. 115) and Ficinus (*ab his omnibus differens*). All other MSS appear to have *διαφεύγουσα*. "Errori—occasionem pronuntiatio non absimilis dedisse videtur" (Schneider). The word does not mean 'differs' (as Jowett) but 'excels' (ironically, of course, like *ἡ γενναία δή*). Father Rickaby has suggested to me that we should read *καὶ ἡ πασῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα, ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννίς, τέταρτον κτλ*. The conjecture is an attractive one, both on other grounds and also because it enables us to retain the article which appears before *πασῶν* (see *cr. n.*) in A: but it is perhaps safer to follow Ξ.

21 **νόσημα**. Greek political theory regards tyrants as *νοσήματα τῶν πόλεων* (Isocr. *Hel.* 34: cf. Henkel l. c. p. 156).

ἢ τίνα. Ast and others write *ἥ τινα* (with slight MS support), but *τίνα* is perfectly good: cf. IX 573 A.

ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινι. See on 544 A.

544 D 22 **δυναστεῖαι**. *δυναστεία* is that form of polity in which the son succeeds the father *καὶ ἄρχῃ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἄρχοντες* (Arist. *Pol.* Δ 5. 1292^{b} 5 ff.: cf. *Laws* 680 A, B). Such a *πολιτεία* might be good, but was of course generally bad: see Susemihl and Hicks on Arist. *Pol.* B 10. 1272^{b} 3. Examples are pro-

τοιαῦταί τινες πολιτεῖαι μεταξύ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν, εὕροι δ' ἄν τις αὐτὰς οὐκ ἐλάττους περὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἢ τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Πολλαὶ γοῦν καὶ ἄτοποι, ἔφη, λέγονται.

II. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἴδη τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι, ὅσαπερ καὶ πολιτειῶν; ἢ οἴει ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ' ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα τἆλλα ἐφελκύσηται; E Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐντεῦθεν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πέντε, καὶ αἱ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε ἂν εἶεν. Τί μήν; Τὸν μὲν δὴ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ὅμοιον διεληλύθαμεν ἤδη, ὃν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον ὀρθῶς φαμὲν εἶναι. | Διεληλύθαμεν. 545 Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διιτέον τοὺς χείρους, τὸν φιλόνικόν τε καὶ φιλότιμον, κατὰ τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἑστῶτα πολιτείαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὸν

28. ἠθῶν τῶν $A^2\Pi$: ἠθῶν A^1. 33. ἤδη $A^2\Pi$: δὴ A^1.

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vided by Thessaly (Thuc. IV 78. 3) and (about 480 B.C.) Thebes (Thuc. III 62. 3: cf. Gilbert *Griech. Staatsalt.* II pp. 10, 46). See Whibley *Gk Olig.* pp. 124—126.

ὧνηται βασιλεῖαι: like Carthage (Arist. l.c. 11. 1273^a 36 with Susemihl and Hicks p. 349). Herwerden sins through ignorance when he proposes *αἱρεταί* for *ὧνηταί*.

23 τοιαῦταί τινες: such as, for example, *αἰσυμνητεία*, and the other specific varieties (as Aristotle reckons them) of Plato's typical *πολιτεῖαι*: see *Pol.* Γ, Δ, Ζ *passim*.

εὕροι δ' ἄν κτλ.: whereas Plato confines himself to *Greek* history throughout VIII and IX.

26 καὶ ἀνθρώπων κτλ. Cf. IV 445 C, and on the principle here laid down see IV 435 E *n.* The present passage is a clear and emphatic statement of the psychological basis on which Plato's philosophy of History rests. Political *ἀδικία*, like political *δικαιοσύνη* (IV 443 B *n.*), is after all no more than *εἴδωλόν τι*: injustice in the truest sense is *στάσις* within the individual soul (IV 444 B), and social and political wrong-doing is but its outward manifestation. The double genitive, which is easy enough (cf. E below and V 449 A *n.*), has led to the corruption *τρόπον τινά* in several MSS. Liebhold also suggests *καὶ τρόπων* instead of *τρόπων*. The expression *εἴδη τρόπων* ('specific characters') is treated as a single word, and should be repeated with *πολιτειῶν*: cf. IV 445 C *ὅσοι πολιτειῶν τρόποι εἰσὶν εἴδη ἔχοντες, τοσοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσι καὶ ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι* (a passage which proves, I think, that Schneider and Stallbaum are wrong in supplying only *εἴδη* with *ὅσαπερ κτλ*).

27 ἐκ δρυὸς κτλ. Hom. *Od.* XIX 162 f. *ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς μοι εἰπὲ τεὸν γένος, ὁππόθεν ἐσσί· | οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός ἐσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης*, i.e. you have a *γένος* (cf. *Ap.* 34 D) and are not miraculously sprung *ἀγενεαλογήτως* out of tree or stone, like the fabled men of old (see Preller-Robert *Gr. Myth.* p. 79 *n.* 4). In Plato the saying is used much like the German 'es ist doch nicht aus der Luft gefallen' (Schück *de scholiis* p. 32, where the proverb is illustrated).

544 E 29 ἃ ἂν κτλ. *οἷ ἄν* was read till Schneider on the authority of Ξ; but *ἃ ἄν* (AΠ and a large majority of MSS) is quite satisfactory. "Reipublicae formae eos dicuntur sequi mores, qui in quavis civitate veluti pondere praegravantes ad se suamque regionem attraxerint reliqua" (Schneider, comparing for *ῥέψαντα* Hdt. VII 139). The word *ῥεύσαντα* (Ξ and some other MSS) is unattic (Lobeck *Phryn.* p. 738): Plato's form is *ῥυέντα* e.g. VI 495 B.

33 ὀρθῶς is more naturally taken with *φαμέν* (Jowett etc.) than with the adjectives (as Schneider). We rightly call him 'good' etc., because he is *ὅμοιος ἀριστο-κρατίᾳ*.

αὖ καὶ δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τὸν τυραννικόν, ἵνα τὸν ἀδικώτατον ἰδόντες ἀντιθῶμεν τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ καὶ ἡμῖν τελέα ἡ σκέψις ᾖ, πῶς ποτὲ ἡ ἄκρατος δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν τὴν ἄκρατον ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας τε πέρι τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἀθλιότητος, ἵνα ἢ Θρασυμάχῳ πειθόμενοι
B διώκωμεν | ἀδικίαν ἢ τῷ νῦν προφαινομένῳ λόγῳ δικαιοσύνην; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιητέον. Ἆρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ ἠρξάμεθα ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις πρότερον σκοπεῖν τὰ ἤθη ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἰδιώταις, ὡς ἐναργέστερον ὄν, καὶ νῦν οὕτω πρῶτον μὲν τὴν φιλότιμον σκεπτέον πολιτείαν· ὄνομα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον ἄλλο· ἢ τιμοκρατίαν ἢ τιμαρχίαν αὐτὴν κλητέον· πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὸν
C τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα σκεψόμεθα, ἔπειτα ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ | ἄνδρα ὀλιγαρχικόν, αὖθις δὲ εἰς δημοκρατίαν ἀποβλέψαντες θεασόμεθα

13. ταύτην A¹Π: ταύτῃ A².

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545 A 4 **ἵνα κτλ.** See 544 A *n.*

545 B 9 **ἠρξάμεθα.** II 368 E *n.*

12 **ὄνομα γὰρ κτλ.**: 'for I have no other name in our language for it: we must call it either "timarchy" or "timocracy"' ("Ehrenherrschaft oder Ehrenobmacht" Schneider). Plato called the constitution in question *φιλότιμος πολιτεία*, which may be cumbrous, but is certainly Greek. If we want a single name, we must, he says, invent: and either *τιμαρχία* or *τιμοκρατία* will do. The Oxford editors erroneously suggest that *ἢ—κλητέον* is interrogative: nor is there any reason to suspect the text, as W. H. Thompson did. Both of Plato's coinages survived, but they never became popular, and were used in another sense from Plato's—*τιμοκρατία* with the meaning of the *vox nihili τιμηματοκρατία* or *ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων ἀρχή* (Arist. *Eth. Nic.* VIII 12. 1160ª 36) and *τιμαρχία* for the Roman censorship (Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s.v.).

13 **πρὸς—ταύτην**='ad hanc': cf. IX 577 B and *Tim.* 24 A *τοὺς μὲν οὖν νόμους σκόπει πρὸς τοὺς τῇδε* (Schneider).

545 C—**547** C *How does Timarchy arise out of Aristocracy? We may lay it down as a universal rule that constitutional change is originated by dissension within the governing class. Socrates invokes the Muses to tell 'how first sedition entered.' Like everything else, our perfect city is subject to Nature's universal law, that whatever is created perishes. Out of the elements of the number which expresses the shortest period of gestation in the human kind, Socrates builds up a 'geometrical number,' which he calls 'the lord of better and worse births.' When, through ignorance of these, couples are united inopportunely, as one day they will be, a degenerate race of offspring arises. The best of these in due course become rulers; but the mixture of races—golden, silver, copper, iron—waxes greater, and sedition is the result. The contending parties finally, by means of a compromise, effect the transition to Timarchy—a form of commonwealth standing midway between Aristocracy and Oligarchy.*

545 C **ff.** I have discussed the famous 'Number of Plato' at length in Appendix I, and must refer the reader to that Appendix for a fuller justification of views which considerations of space preclude me from defending *totis viribus* throughout the notes. The connexion of the episode with the argument of the *Republic* may be expressed as follows. In accordance with the form of a historical narrative which he employs throughout these two books, Plato invites us to conceive of his perfect city as having actually existed long ago, just as in the *Timaeus* (23 C ff.) and *Critias* (109 B ff.) the Platonic Utopia appears as prehistoric Athens. In making this demand upon the imagination of his countrymen, Plato could count upon the support to be derived from the prevalence of the view that mankind had degenerated from an age of innocence and bliss in the far-distant past: see the references in my

ἄνδρα δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τέταρτον εἰς τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἐλθόντες καὶ ἰδόντες, πάλιν εἰς τυραννικὴν ψυχὴν βλέποντες, πειρασόμεθα περὶ ὧν προὐθέμεθα ἱκανοὶ κριταὶ γενέσθαι; Κατὰ λόγον γέ τοι ἄν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνοιτο ἥ τε θέα καὶ ἡ κρίσις.

20 III. Φέρε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πειρώμεθα λέγειν, τίνα τρόπον

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edition of the *Protagoras* p. xxiii and Rohde *Griech. Roman* pp. 216 ff. What, then, was the originating cause of degeneration? Plato finds the cause, not in anything peculiar to the Ideal city, but in a law which prevails throughout the whole of Nature—the law that *everything created is doomed to decay*. There cannot be any ἴδιος μεταβολή (to quote the phrase of Aristotle *Pol.* E 12. 1316ᵃ 12) of a perfect City; for a city which carries *within itself* the seeds of decay is not perfect, but imperfect. In the sequel Plato first describes the manner in which degeneration begins to take effect (*οὐ μόνον —δέον* 546 A, B), and afterwards proceeds to construct a Number which is the expression of that law of inevitable degeneration to which the Universe and all its parts are subject. The substance of what he has to say on the first head is that a psychologically inferior offspring gradually makes its appearance because children are sometimes begotten inopportunely. It is noteworthy that here, as everywhere in Books VIII and IX, the decline of the constitution or soul of the State (543 A *n.*) is traced to the decline of the soul of the individual. In the words *ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ—τριάδος* (546 B, C), Plato, copying the method of the Pythagoreans, and closely following their calculations, at all events in the first part of the reckoning, attempts to give an arithmetical expression to the Law of Change in that which he calls the *γεωμετρικὸς ἀριθμός*. According to the view which I have endeavoured to establish in Appendix I, the arithmetic, in which each of the factors and processes involved was full of significance to ancient speculators on the theory of numbers, may be thus expressed in modern arithmetical notation:

(1) $3^3+4^3+5^3=216$.

(2) $(3\times4\times5)^4=12{,}960{,}000$
$=3600^2=4800\times2700$.

The first number, 216, is the shortest period of gestation in the human race expressed in days. In the second equation, the number 12,960,000 expresses, also in days, the duration of a Great Year in the life of the Universe. Expressed in years, the number is 36,000, if we count, as Plato here does, 360 days in the year. The two 'harmonies,' 3600^2 and 4800×2700, are the two cycles described in the *Politicus*, each of which is a Great Year. In the first *ὁμοιότης* prevails, in the second *ἀνομοιότης*: the World 'waxes' in the first, and 'wanes' in the second, without, however, suffering dissolution. In what sense the whole number 36,000 years, which astronomers sometimes called the *Platonicus annus* in the middle ages, is at once the numerical Cause of Change, and the 'lord of better and worse births,' is pointed out in App. I, Pt ii § 7, and also in the notes on 546 C. How far Plato attached a serious value to his Number and the calculations from which he derives it, I have briefly discussed at the end of App. I, Pt ii. Here it must suffice to say that the episode, like many other passages in Plato, is half-serious, and half-playful. The setting of the whole is mythical, for it is only for literary and artistic purposes that Plato pictures his ideal city as historically true: and the meaning of the latter part of the Number is deciphered by the aid of one of Plato's myths. Moreover, the style of the whole passage, though extraordinarily rhythmical and highly-wrought, acquires a touch of fantastic humour from the bewildering parade of mathematical terms, at some of which even Plato's own contemporaries would probably have smiled. On its serious side, the Number affords an interesting example of the application of Number and Mathematics to explain the life of the Universe and Man; and, as I have said in the Appendix, finds its fittest apology in the saying *θεὸς ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖ*. It is of some importance in the history of philosophy because of its connexion with Pythagorean embryology and physics, and its employment by the Neoplatonists to justify the wildest astrological vagaries. The extreme difficulty of the Greek has made the Platonic

D τιμοκρατία γένοιτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας. ἦ τόδε μὲν ἁπλοῦν, ὅτι
πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν
ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται· ὁμονοοῦντος δέ, κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγον
ᾖ, ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι; Ἔστι γὰρ οὕτω. Πῶς οὖν δή, εἶπον, ὦ
Γλαύκων, ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν κινηθήσεται, καὶ πῇ στασιάσουσιν οἱ ἐπί- 25
κουροι καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτούς; ἦ
βούλει, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος, εὐχώμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν, ὅπως
E δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔμπεσε, καὶ φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς, ὡς
πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδῇ
546 λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν; Πῶς; Ὧδέ πως. | χαλεπὸν 30
μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν οὕτω ξυστᾶσαν· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ γενομένῳ παντὶ
φθορά ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ τοιαύτη ξύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα μενεῖ χρόνον,
ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται. λύσις δὲ ἥδε· οὐ μόνον φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις, ἀλλὰ

Number a favourite hunting-ground of successive generations of scholars, and the works which have been written on the subject, a few of which are mentioned in the Appendix, are very numerous.

545 D **21 ἁπλοῦν.** See on I 351 A. For the statement itself cf. *Laws* 683 E ff. Aristotle, whose standpoint is historical rather than psychological, enumerates many and diverse causes of revolutionary change (*Pol.* E passim).

24 κινηθῆναι: an ominous word, used here, as constantly throughout Greek literature, of constitutional changes for the worse.

27 ὅπως δὴ κτλ. An imitation of Hom. *Il.* XVI 112 f. *ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, μοῦσαι —ὅππως δὴ πρῶτον πῦρ ἔμπεσε νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν.* Homer appeals to the Muses at the turning-point of his narrative (see Leaf ad loc.); and Plato, like Milton ("Of man's first disobedience and the fruit Of that forbidden tree, sing heavenly Muse"), fitly invokes them at the commencement of his Epic of the Fall of Man. Cf. *Tim.* 27 C.

28 καὶ φῶμεν κτλ.: 'and shall we say that they speak in the lofty tragic vein, as if it were all earnest, whereas it is only the banter of the Muses playing with us as if we were little children?' Instead of *φῶμεν*, I once suggested *θῶμεν* (cf. *Laws* 654 A and 677 C), but *φῶμεν*, which is in all MSS, though less picturesque, may stand. Herwerden's excision of *παιζούσας καί* obliterates a tender touch; for there is of course a play on *παῖδας* (cf. VII 536 E *n.*). The remarks of Proclus *in Tim.* 300 C ff. on the style of this and similar passages deserve to be quoted: *ὁ δὲ χαρακτὴρ τῶν λόγων ἐστὶν ἐνθουσιαστικός, διαλάμπων ταῖς νοεραῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, καθαρός τε καὶ σεμνός—ἐξηλλαγμένος τε καὶ ὑπερέχων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐννοιῶν, ἀβρός τε ὁμοῦ καὶ καταπληκτικὸς καὶ χαρίτων ἀνάμεστος κάλλους τε πλήρης καὶ σύντομος ἅμα καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένος.* 'The Muses playing' warns us that there is an element of the mythical and fantastic in what follows, but by no means implies that it is fooling and nothing more. See on 545 C and App. I, Pt ii ad fin.

546 A **2 γενομένῳ κτλ.** This is a universally recognised principle of ancient philosophy, alluded to again by Plato in *Tim.* 41 A. Cf. Arist. *de cael.* I 12. 282^b 8 *τὸ γὰρ γενητὸν καὶ τὸ φθαρτὸν ἀκολουθοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις* and ib. 10. 279^b 20 *ἅπαντα γὰρ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται.* That *τὸ ἀγένητον* is *ἄφθαρτον* and *τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀγένητον* was also held (cf. *Phaedr.* 245 D, Arist. l. c. 282^a 30 ff., al.): hence Plato always regards the pre-existence and immortality of the soul as involving one another. *γένεσις* is here, as usual, *σύγκρισις*, and *φθορὰ διάκρισις.* The point of *ἐπεὶ—ἐστιν* is that the cause of decay is not contained in the ideal city itself—the city would be less than ideal if it were—but springs from a universal law of Nature, to which the city, like everything else, is necessarily subject: see on 545 C and App. I, Pt iii.

4 λύσις δὲ ἥδε κτλ. Here begins Plato's description of the mode of dissolution. *οὐ μόνον—ἐναντίας*, literally trans-

καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζῴοις φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνονται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἑκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς συνάπτωσι, βραχυβίοις μὲν βραχυπόρους, ἐναντίοις δὲ ἐναντίας· γένους δὲ ὑμετέρου εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ | ὄντες σοφοὶ οὓς ἡγε- B
μόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λογισμῷ μετ' αἰσθήσεως τεύξονται, ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοὺς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε οὐ δέον. ἔστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδος, ἣν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε

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lated, is 'Not only to plants within the ground, but also among animals above the ground, there cometh production or non-production of souls and bodies, as



Fig. 1.

often as turnings-round join for each species' (of animals, plants etc.) 'circumferences of circles faring a short way for the short-lived, and the reverse for the reverse.' See Fig. 1. Suppose the revolution starts at the fixed point A. The circumference is joined as soon as the revolving wheel reaches A again, and at that point there is *φορὰ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος*, if the seed was sown at A and has come safely to maturity. If the seed was not sown, or, though sown, did not take root or miscarried on the way, there is *ἀφορία*. The phrase is only a fantastic way of saying *ὅταν περίοδοι ἑκάστοις ἀποτελεσθῶσιν*. The *περιφορά* of a short-lived species is *βραχύπορος* and conversely, because short-lived creatures have short periods of gestation, and long-lived creatures long (Arist. *de gen. an.* IV 10. 777ª 31 ff., al. See App. I, Pt ii § 2). Soul, viewed merely as the vital principle, is one and the same in every organic creature: hence the singular *ψυχή* (App. l. c.). This explanation, so far as I know, is new, the *περίοδος* being generally supposed to be 'Umlaufszeit.' Cf. App. l. c.

546 A, B **7 γένους δὲ κτλ.** The literal translation is: 'Now of *your* kind' (i.e. mankind: it is the Muses who are speaking), 'clever though the leaders of the city be whom you educated' (the middle of personal interest IV 421 E *n.*), 'none the more will they by calculation together with perception obtain' (lit. hit the obtaining of) 'good offspring and no offspring, but it will escape them, and the time will come when they will beget children wrongly or inopportunely' (cf. *παρὰ καιρὸν* 546 D). In arranging matters connected with marriages and the treatment of children etc., the rulers of our city employ both *λογισμός* and *αἴσθησις*. *αἴσθησις* helps them to decide what couples should be joined, what children should be reared etc.: by *λογισμός* they calculate what number of marriages they should permit *ἵνα ὡς μάλιστα διασῴζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν* (V 460 A) etc.: see App. I, Pt ii § 2. But however well they use these instruments, the time will come when children are begotten *οὐ δέον*. The fault lies not with the rulers, but with the inevitable law of Change, which is beginning to affect our city together with the rest of the Universe. *ἀφορίας* is said, because the rulers must if possible make illicit unions unproductive (V 461 C). Possibly the *εὖ* of *εὐγονίας* may affect *ἀφορίας* also: cf. 555 A *n.* See also App. l. c.

11 ἔστι δὲ—τέλειος. 'For a divine creature, there is a period comprehended by a number which is final.' The 'divine creature' is the World: it is *θεῖον*, because it is a God, *γεννητόν*, because it is created (i.e. has been brought out of chaos into order). Cf. *Tim.* 30 A and Proclus *in Tim.* 89 D. With *περιλαμβάνει* cf. *Theaet.* 148 A. The *ἀριθμὸς τέλειος* is the period expressing the gestation of the Universe, i.e. the time which its creation occupies. For the metaphor cf. the Orphic verses cited by Proclus *in Tim.* 94 B and 95 E. The number is a final or consummating number because it

καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι, ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων,

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τελειοῖ τὴν γένεσιν: cf. *Theol. Ar.* p. 58 ed. Ast. Plato wisely leaves *this* number shrouded in silence and obscurity. See App. I, Pt ii § 3 for a full discussion of the sentence.

12 **ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ—ἀπέφηναν** gives us the *περίοδος* or period of gestation for the human creature: 'and for a human creature the number is the first in which root-and-square increases, comprehending three distances and four limits, of elements that make like and unlike and wax and wane, render all things conversable and rational with one another.' The construction is *ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ <γεννητῷ ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς> ἐν ᾧ κτλ.*, and that is itself short for *ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ <γεννητῷ ἔστι περίοδος ἣν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει> ἐν ᾧ κτλ.* The 'first' number is of course the first number after unity. *αὐξήσεις* 'increases' may in itself mean either 'additions' or 'multiplications.' *δυνάμεναι* refers to 'roots' (cf. Eucl. X *def.* 11), *δυναστευόμεναι* to 'squares' (Procl. *in remp. comm.* ed. Kroll II p. 36. 9—12 et al.), and 'root-and-square increases' means either 'additions of roots to squares' or 'multiplications of roots by squares.' *τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις* etc. shew that *multiplications* and not additions are meant. The three distances are *μῆκος*, *πλάτος* and *βάθος*, and the four *ὅροι* their attendant limits. Thus in Fig. 2 AB,



Fig. 2.

BC, CD are the three *ἀποστάσεις*, AB *μῆκος*, BC *πλάτος*, CD *βάθος*, and A, B, C, D the four *ὅροι*. Cf. Nic. *Introd. Ar.* p. 116 Ast *εἴ τι γὰρ στερεόν ἐστιν, τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις*—they are called *ἀποστάσεις* in *Theol. Ar.* p. 23—*πάντως ἔχει, μῆκος, πλάτος καὶ βάθος· καὶ ἔμπαλιν εἴ τι ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ἐκεῖνο πάντως στερεόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδέν*: also Iambl. *in Nic. Introd. Ar.* p. 93 Pistelli *στερεὸς δέ ἐστιν ἀριθμὸς ὁ τρίτον διάστημα παρὰ τὰ ἐν ἐπιπέδοις δύο προσειληφώς, δηλονότι τετάρτου ὅρου προσγενομένου· ἐν γὰρ τέσσαρσιν ὅροις τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν*, Arist. *Top.* Z 5. 142^{b} 24f. and many other passages quoted in App. I, Pt i § 1. Consequently the arithmetical meaning of *αὐξήσεις—λαβοῦσαι* is merely 'root-and-square multiplications' i.e. 'multiplications of root by square,' in other words cubings (thus $w \times w^2 = w^3$, $x \times x^2 = x^3$, $y \times y^2 = y^3$), or *κυβικαὶ αὐξήσεις*, a phrase which itself might well have been employed by Plato, except that he has an object in drawing attention to the different stages in the process of augmentation (see App. I, Pt ii § 4); and partly also he wants the Muses to preserve their character as *ὑψηλολογούμεναι*. The period of human gestation is therefore the first number, in which 'cubings make everything *ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα*'—but cubings of what? The answer is 'of elements which make like and unlike and wax and wane.' These elements are the numbers 3, 4 and 5, which measure the three sides of the Pythagorean *ζῳογονικὸν τρίγωνον* (Procl. *in remp.* II p. 43. 10), the triangle which,



Fig. 3.

The Pythagorean triangle.

as we are informed by many authorities—Aristotle, Plutarch, Aristides Quintilianus, Proclus and others—Plato made use of in his Number. The antecedent of *ὧν* in *ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς* is *ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων*, and as *ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν* means 'of which 4, 3,' Plato himself tells us two of the numbers, and the third is also readily suggested by *πεμπάδι*. 3, 4 and 5 are said to 'make like,' because, as we shall see, in the latter part of the Number, where the triangle fulfils its office as a *κοσμικὸν τρίγωνον* (Proclus l.c. II p. 45. 23), they produce the 'harmony' 3600^2, and square numbers are *ὅμοιοι* (Iambl. l.c. p. 82): they 'make unlike' because they produce

15 *πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν· ὧν ἐπίτριτος* C

the 'harmony' 4800 × 2700, and oblong numbers are *ἀνόμοιοι* (ib.): they are said to wax and wane in a figurative sense—to wax in the first harmony, which represents in a certain sense the waxing of the Universe, and to wane in the second, which represents its wane. As the elements out of which the Universe is formed, they may be said to grow with its growth, and decline with its decline. The words have also a further meaning as a description of 3, 4, 5 regarded as the *ἀρχαί* of everything which exists: see App. I, Pt ii § 5. Now the first number in which cubings of 3, 4 and 5 are present is $3^3+4^3+5^3=216$, and Aristides Quintilianus, in the passage where he refers to Plato's number, speaking of the Pythagorean triangle, remarks *ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τῶν πλευρῶν ἑκάστην κατὰ βάθος αὐξήσαιμεν (βάθος γὰρ ἡ σώματος φύσις) ποιήσαιμεν ἂν τὸν διακόσια δεκαέξ, ἰσάριθμον σύνεγγυς τῷ τῶν ἑπταμήνων* (p. 151 Meibom). Aristotle also in *Pol.* E 12. 1316^a 5—8, according to Schneider's interpretation of his words, which I believe to be right, informs us that the whole number of this section is 216: see App. I, Pt iii. On *πάντα—ἄλληλα* see next note. In App. I, Pt ii § 4 I have fully treated of the meaning of all these calculations. The different mathematical terms are discussed in detail ib. Pt i § 1. My explanation of this passage is, as far as I can discover, new, except as regards *αὐξήσεις—δυναστευόμεναι*. Some other views are mentioned in App. I, Pt i § 1 ad fin. *nn.*

15 **πάντα προσήγορα κτλ.** Cf. Philol. *Fr.* 13 Mullach *πάντα γνωστὰ καὶ ποτάγορα ἀλλήλοις—ἀπεργάζεται*. The Pythagoreans asserted that the embryo develops according to the proportions of the *ἁρμονία* or musical scale. The first stage is complete in 6 days, the second in 8, and 8 : 6 is 'the fourth' (*διὰ τεσσάρων*). The third stage (making flesh) takes 9 days, and 9 : 6 is 'the fifth' (*διὰ πέντε*). In the next 12 days the body is formed: and 12 : 6 is the octave (*διὰ πασῶν*). Total 6+8+9+12=35, and 35 is a *ἁρμονία* (Plut. *de anim. gen. in Tim.* 1017 F). Now 216=(6 × 35)+6, so that 216 contains 6 *ἁρμονίαι* together with 6 times *ἡ πάντων ἀρχή* i.e. the unit (*Excerpt. ex Nicom.* in v. Jan's *Mus. Script. Gr.* p. 279), or if you like together with the marriage number 6. For the evidence and further details see App. I, Pt ii § 4.

546 C **ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν κτλ.** In *ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ—ἀπέφηναν* the Pythagorean triangle was employed to construct the period of gestation for the microcosm or man: here it is used to construct two periods in the lifetime of the macrocosm or Universe, for that is what Plato means by the two 'harmonies.' The translation is: 'of which, 4, 3 married with 5, yields two harmonies when thrice increased, the one equal an equal number of times, so many times 100, the other of equal length one way, but oblong:—on the one side, of 100 squares of rational diameters of five diminished by one each, or if of irrational diameters, by two: on the other of one hundred cubes of three.' The antecedent of *ὧν* is *ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων*, which I have already interpreted as the numbers 3, 4, 5. Of these numbers (*ὧν*) the *ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν* i.e. 3, 4 (cf. Theo Smyrn. p. 80 ed. Hiller, Proclus l. c. II p. 37 *ὁ ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν γ' καὶ δ'*), is 'married' or 'coupled' with 5. That is to say, 3, 4, and 5 are multiplied together: whence we get 3 × 4 × 5 = 60. 'Thrice increased' is 'three times multiplied by itself'; and 60 thrice increased is therefore 60 × 60 × 60 × 60. This sum, which is 12,960,000, yields two harmonies. One of the two harmonies is 'equal an equal number of times, viz. *so* many times 100,' in other words, it is a square (cf. *Theaet.* 147 E) each of whose sides is a certain number of times 100 (for *τοσαυτάκις* cf. *τοσοῦτον* in *Alc.* I 108 E), viz. of course 36 times 100, for 60 × 60 × 60 × 60 = 3600^2. See Fig. 4.



Fig. 4.

The other harmony which 60 × 60 × 60 × 60 yields is a rectangle (with *προμήκη* cf.

πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται τρὶς αὐξηθείς,

Theaet. 148 A), one of whose sides is one hundred cubes of 3, i.e. 2700, and the other the number which Plato describes in *ἑκατὸν μὲν—δυοῖν*. What is that number? *ἀριθμοὶ ἀπό* means (numerical) 'squares of' (cf. Procl. l. c. II p. 38. 9 et al.): the side in question is therefore '100 squares of'—what? Of the rational diameter of 5 etc. Now the 'rational diameter of 5' is the nearest rational number to the real diameter of a square whose side is 5 (Theo l. c. pp. 43 ff. and other authorities). The real diameter



Fig. 5.

of a square whose side is 5 is $\sqrt{50}$. See Fig. 5. $AC^2=5^2+5^2=50$ (by Pythagoras' famous *εὕρημα* Eucl. I 47): $\therefore AC=\sqrt{50}$. And the nearest rational number to $\sqrt{50}$ is 7: for $\sqrt{49}=7$. Consequently 7 is 'the rational diameter' of 5. And 100 squares of $7=100\times49=4900$. But we are told to diminish the 100 squares by 1 each. Do so: $4900-(1\times100)=4800$. This side is therefore 4800. The words *ἀρρήτων δὲ δυοῖν* give us an alternative way of reaching the number 4800. The construction is *<ἀπὸ> ἀρρήτων δὲ <διαμέτρων δεομένων> δυοῖν <ἑκάστων>* = (or of 100) 'squares of *irrational* diameters of 5, wanting 2 each.' Now the *irrational* diameter of 5 is $\sqrt{50}$. Square this and it becomes 50. 100 squares of $50=5000$. Subtract 2 from each square and you have $5000-(2\times100)=4800$. The two sides of the oblong are therefore



Fig. 6.

4800 and 2700 ('one hundred cubes of three'). The area is $4800\times2700=12{,}960{,}000$ which is $60\times60\times60\times60$. See Fig. 6. Thus the arithmetical meaning of this part of Plato's Number may be expressed by us as follows:

$$(3\times4\times5)^4=3600^2=4800\times2700.$$

In this explanation, which is defended at length in App. I, Pt i § 2, the most important novelty is my view of *τρὶς αὐξηθείς*. Most, but not quite all, of the other expressions have been explained in the above way at one time or another, though never, as far as I have noticed, by any single critic. The meaning of *ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν* was perfectly well known to ancient mathematicians: and Proclus fully understood the 'rational' and 'irrational' diameters of 5. The full explanation of *ἑκατὸν μὲν—τριάδος* is due to Barozzi, except that he did not multiply the sides. As regards *τρὶς αὐξηθείς*, I believe that I have proved my view in App. I, Pt i § 2 and Pt iii. Here I will only say that just as in the increasing series 1, 60, 3600, 216000 the number 216000 or 60^3 is the '*third* increase' (*τρίτη αὔξη*) of unity, so in the increasing series 60, 3600, 216000, 12960000, the number 12960000 or (as *we* express it, but as Plato, to whom 'power' means either 'square' or 'root,' never did or could express it, 60^4) is the third increase of 60.

16 **συζυγείς.** The metaphor is from marriage, and marriage, among the Pythagoreans, was usually expressed by multiplication. Thus 6, which is the product of the first male number 3 and the first female number 2, was called by them marriage. *συζυγεῖσα* also means 'multiplied with' in Proclus l. c. II p. 544 (App. I, Pt i § 2).

δύο ἁρμονίας. The square and oblong may be regarded as *ἁρμονίαι* because in them, as in the number 216 above, all things are *προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα*. Thus $12{,}960{,}000=(35+1)\times360{,}000$, so that, as 35 is a *ἁρμονία*, 12,960,000 contains the portentous number of 360,000 *ἁρμονίαι plus* $(1\times360{,}000=)$ 360,000, each *ἁρμονία* thus having added to it, as before, the unit which is *ἡ πάντων ἀρχή*. The analogy between the Microcosm and the Macrocosm is thus preserved: see on *πάντα—ῥητά* 546 B

τὴν μὲν ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις, τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δέ, ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομένων ἑνὸς ἑκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυοῖν, ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος. ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος, ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός, τοιούτου κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων, ἃς ὅταν ἀγνοήσαντες ὑμῖν | οἱ φύλακες D
συνοικίζωσιν νύμφας νυμφίοις παρὰ καιρόν, οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ' εὐ-

17. ἑκατὸν $A^2\Xi$: ἕκαστον $A^1\Pi q$. 18. ἑκατὸν $A^2\Pi$: ἕκαστον A^1.

above. So much for the arithmetical meaning of the term *ἁρμονίας*. In App. I, Pt ii § 5 I have given my reasons for connecting the two *ἁρμονίαι* with the myth of the *Politicus*. In that myth we are told how two cycles of equal and vast duration invariably succeed one another in the life of the Universe, a progressive and a retrogressive cycle. These two cycles are two Great Years, in the first of which *ὁμοιότης* prevails and the Universe is fresh and strong, while in the second, in which we are living now, *ἀνομοιότης* begins to assert itself and the Universe flags and wanes. Cf. 547 A *n.* Here the first *ἁρμονία*, which is a square and therefore *ὅμοιον*, represents the progressive cycle, the cycle of *ὁμοιότης*, and the second *ἁρμονία*, which is an oblong, and therefore *ἀνόμοιον* (see above on 546 B line 12), stands for the retrogressive cycle, the cycle of *ἀνομοιότης*. If this identification is, as I believe, correct, each *ἁρμονία* represents a Great Year. The area or number of each harmony, according to Plato, is 12,960,000, and as Plato elsewhere says that the Great Year is measured *τῷ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἰόντος κύκλῳ* (*Tim.* 39 D), i.e. by the diurnal revolutions of the heavens, we may take this number as denoting days. Converted into years, on the astronomical calculation of 360 days to the year, followed by Plato here and elsewhere, the number becomes 36,000 years, which was known in Ptolemaic astronomy as the *magnus Platonicus annus*. For the evidence on all these points, see App. I, Pt ii §§ 5, 6.

20 ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος κτλ. 'This whole number, a number *measuring the earth*, is lord of better and worse births.' On its arithmetical side, *γεωμετρικός* means only that the number is reached by means of *γεωμετρία* and expressed in geometrical figures: but I have no doubt that Plato meant the word to bear another and profounder meaning, suitable to the real import of the two harmonies whereof this is the number. The number is *τῷ ὄντι γεωμετρικός*, for it measures an aeon of the Universe, of which the Earth is part (cf. 555 A *n.* and VI 511 B *n.*): and indeed it is artistically right that the meaning of the two harmonies should be summed up at the climax of the whole in a single pregnant word. How do good and bad births depend upon this number? Because in the early days of our era, when God had but lately left the world, and *ἀνομοιότης* and *ἀνωμαλία* were young, Nature produced better children than *οἷοι νῦν βροτοί εἰσιν*. Plato in fact invites us to think of his city as having existed soon after the change to the aeon in which we now live, just as throughout Book VIII and part of IX the Ideal City is figured in the past. For more on this subject see App. I, Pt ii §§ 5—7. I know not what others will think, but to me it seems that the extraordinary range and elevation of its central ideas make the Platonic number worthy even of a writer who is full of 'thoughts that wander through eternity.' The connexion between the Human Child and the Divine, the Microcosm and the Macrocosm, has played no small part in the history of human thought, and the story of a Great Year, with the hope which it affords of the *ἀποκατάστασις* of all things (*Acts* 3. 21), has been and is, in its religious setting, the solace and support of many a 'human child.'

546 D 22 παρὰ καιρόν: 'inopportunely,' 'improperly': cf. *Pol.* 277 A and *οὐ δέον* 546 B. The phrase does not, as I once thought, imply that Nature has appointed certain periodic times or seasons in the life of men and women when their union will produce good offspring, but refers to unions of wrong couples, superabundance of marriages, and the like: cf. V 459 E ff. The notion that the number of the Great Year is to be

τυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται· ὧν καταστήσονται μὲν τοὺς ἀρίστους οἱ πρότεροι, ὅμως δὲ ὄντες ἀνάξιοι, εἰς τὰς τῶν πατέρων αὖ δυνάμεις ἐλθόντες, ἡμῶν πρῶτον ἄρξονται ἀμελεῖν φύλακες ὄντες, παρ' ἔλαττον τοῦ δέοντος ἡγησάμενοι τὰ μουσικῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς· ὅθεν ἀμουσότεροι γενήσονται ἡμῖν οἱ νέοι. ἐκ δὲ
E *τούτων ἄρχοντες οὐ πάνυ φυλακικοὶ καταστήσονται | πρὸς τὸ*
547 *δοκιμάζειν τὰ Ἡσιόδου | τε καὶ τὰ παρ' ὑμῖν γένη, χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν καὶ σιδηροῦν· ὁμοῦ δὲ μιγέντος σιδήρου ἀργύρῳ καὶ χαλκοῦ χρυσῷ ἀνομοιότης ἐγγενήσεται καὶ ἀνωμαλία*

2. *σιδήρου ἀργύρῳ* Π : *σιδηροῦ ἀργυρῷ* A.

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used by the rulers as a means of determining at what time unions should take place, derives no support from the Greek, and ought not to be entertained. In point of fact, the number is not a nuptial but a secular number, being *γεωμετρικὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς*. The expression 'nuptial number' is not applied to it either by Plato or by Aristotle, and it is only in later writers that we meet with *ὁ τοῦ λεγομένου γάμου τόπος* (Nicom. *Introd. Ar.* p. 144 Ast), *γαμήλιον διάγραμμα* (Plut. *de Is. et Os.* 373 F) and *γαμικὸς ἀριθμός* (Iambl. *in Nic. Ar.* p. 82. 21 Pistelli).

23 **καταστήσονται.** The active *καταστήσουσι*, found in *v* and two other MSS of little moment, is read by Hermann. Some may prefer it because *καταστήσονται* is passive just below: but Plato is careless about matters of this kind, and it is better to follow the best MSS.

25 **ἡμῶν κτλ.** : 'us they will first begin to neglect when they are Guardians' (i.e. after they have come *εἰς τὰς τῶν πατέρων δυνάμεις*), 'setting too little store by music first, and second by gymnastic.' Political decay is constantly associated by Plato with neglect of 'Music': see on IV 424 C. In place of *δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς*, which is in all MSS, Baiter adopts Madvig's conjecture *δεύτερά τε γυμναστικῆς*. At first sight *ὅθεν ἀμουσότεροι—νέοι* would seem to favour such an alteration, as well as the fact that in the city which comes next in order Gymnastic is more esteemed than Music (548 C). But *πρῶτον* after *ἡμῶν* supports the MS tradition, and the decline of the ideal city, which, as we have seen, arises from inevitable organic deterioration, shews itself in a general lowering of vital energy, rather than in the exaltation of any one pursuit at the expense of another. In the Spartan city Gymnastic ranks higher than Music, because Music has fallen from the high position which she formerly occupied, and not because Gymnastic stands higher than before.

27 **ὅθεν—νέοι**: 'and so our children will forget us.' The Muses are speaking, and the children of Plato's Muse may well be called the Muses' children. This is the force of *ἡμῖν*, which is the reading of A, Ξ and some other MSS: Π and others have *ὑμῖν*. Schneider says "*Μούσαις—ἄμουσον γίγνεσθαι* nullo modo tolerabile est." That is true, only *ἡμῖν* does not go with *ἀμουσότεροι*, but is an ethic dative, and seems to me at least to be full of a strange beauty and pathos. As true Gymnastic educates the soul and not the body (III 410 C ff.), the neglect of Gymnastic in the ideal city itself contributes to *ἀμουσία*.

547 A 1 **τὰ παρ' ὑμῖν γένη.** See III 415 A ff.

3 **ἀνομοιότης καὶ ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος.** We have already seen that as the second scroll of the World's life unfolds itself, *ἀνομοιότης*, *ἀνωμαλία*, and *ἀναρμοστία*, with their attendant retinue of sedition, strife and war, make their appearance and wax more and more aggressive, until at last, in the words of the *Politicus*, careful lest the world *χειμασθεὶς ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθεὶς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα τόπον δύῃ*, God takes the helm again and *κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἐπανορθῶν ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγήρων ἀπεργάζεται* (*Pol.* 273 D f.). See on 546 C and App. I, Pt ii § 5. The same insidious enemies, not from any fault of the rulers, but because the part must neces-

ἀνάρμοστος, ἃ γενόμενα, οὗ ἂν ἐγγένηται, ἀεὶ τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν. ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς χρὴ φάναι εἶναι στάσιν, ὅπου ἂν γίγνηται ἀεί. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, αὐτὰς ἀποκρίνεσθαι φήσομεν. Καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη Μούσας γε οὔσας. Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο | λέγουσιν αἱ Μοῦσαι; Στάσεως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γενομένης B εἰλκέτην ἄρα ἑκατέρω τὼ γένει, τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ γῆς κτῆσιν καὶ οἰκίας χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου, τὼ δ' αὖ, τὸ χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν, ἅτε οὐ πενομένω, ἀλλὰ φύσει ὄντε πλουσίω τὰς ψυχάς, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν ἠγέτην· βιαζομένων δὲ καὶ ἀντιτεινόντων ἀλλήλοις, εἰς μέσον ὡμολόγησαν γῆν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας κατανειμαμένους ἰδιώ-

δ. *φήσομεν* $A^1\Pi$: *φήσωμεν* A^2. 9. *τὼ γένει* Π: *τῷ γένει* A^1: *τὼ γένεε* A^2. 10. *χρυσοῦ* $A^2\Xi$: *χρυσίου* $A^1\Pi q$. 11. *τὼ δ' αὖ, τὸ* Schneider: *τὼ δ' αὖ τὸ* (*τὸ* erasum) M: *τὸ δ' αὐτὸ* $A\Xi^1$: *τὸ δ' αὖ τὸ* Π: *τὸ δ' αὖ* $\Xi^2 q$. 11. *ἀργυροῦν* Ξ: *ἀργύρεον* $A^1 q$: *ἀργύρουν ὂν* corr. A^2: *ἀργύριον* Π. 11, 12. *πενομένω—πλουσίω* $A^2\Pi$: *πενομένων—πλουσίων* A^1.

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sarily suffer with the whole, fasten both on the perfect individual and on the perfect State, and the fall of men and cities, which Plato describes in VIII and IX, is one long record of the triumphal progress of *ἀνομοιότης*, until at last she sits enthroned in the soul and city of the tyrant. The Platonic number is thus the setting in which Plato's 'Philosophy of History' is framed.

5 **ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς.** From Homer *Il.* VI 211 al. *ταύτης τοι γενεῆς τε καὶ αἵματος εὔχομαι εἶναι.* Plato means of course 'Such, as we must say, is the pedigree of Sedition, wheresoever she arises.' D. and V. are wholly wrong when they translate: "so that we may positively assert that the rise of such a generation will invariably be marked by divisions."

547 B 9 **εἰλκέτην κτλ.** The logical object of *εἰλκέτην* and *ἠγέτην* (in line 13) is *τὴν πολιτείαν.* For the omission of the object with ἕλκω and ἄγω cf. 560 B, X 604 A, 604 D et al. It is only another way of expressing oneself to say that the verbs are practically intransitive. The sedition which arises is not between rulers and ruled, but between the rulers among themselves, as is clear from 545 D and elsewhere: hence *τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν* does not refer to the farmers and artisans, who probably possessed *οἰκίαι* from the first (III 417 A *n.*), but to the section of the rulers who have become *σιδηροῦν* and *χαλκοῦν* by the intermixture of different breeds. Cf. the oracle foretelling the destruction of the city *ὅταν αὐτὴν ὁ σίδηρος ἢ ὁ χαλκὸς φυλάξῃ* (III 415 C). *γῆς κτῆσιν κτλ.* means 'the possession of land and a private dwelling-place as well as of gold and silver,' all of which were forbidden to Plato's rulers. *ἔγκτησις γῆς καὶ οἰκίας* was a familiar expression to the Greeks, and one of the well-recognised privileges of *μέτοικοι* at Athens (Gilbert *Gr. Staatsalt.* II p. 295). On the reading *χρυσοῦ* see *cr. n.* It is usual to read *χρυσίου,* but *ἀργύρου* immediately following favours *χρυσοῦ,* whose authority is not much inferior to that of *χρυσίου.* Cf. *χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον* 548 A. Herwerden, retaining *χρυσίου,* would write *ἀργυρίου* instead of *ἀργύρου* with some MSS of little value: but the reading printed above has much more MS support. His further proposal *ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν χρυσίου τε καὶ ἀργυρίου καὶ γῆς κτῆσιν καὶ οἰκίας* will not find favour among scholars.

12 **φύσει—ψυχάς.** They are not rich in worldly possessions, but they have the true riches—the riches of the soul. Cf. the prayer of Socrates in *Phaedr.* 279 C *πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν,* and see also on III 416 E. The usual view, which makes *τὰς ψυχάς* depend on *ἠγέτην* (Schneider, J. and C., D. and V., etc.) is surely wrong. Jowett from his translation appears to have caught the meaning.

14 **εἰς μέσον ὡμολόγησαν κτλ.** The

C σασθαι, | τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὡς ἐλευθέρους, φίλους τε καὶ τροφέας, δουλωσάμενοι τότε, περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἔχοντες, αὐτοὶ πολέμου τε καὶ φυλακῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, αὕτη ἡ μετάβασις ἐντεῦθεν γίγνεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν μέσῳ τις ἂν εἴη ἀριστοκρατίας τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

IV. Μεταβήσεται μὲν δὴ οὕτω· μεταβᾶσα δὲ πῶς οἰκήσει; D ἢ φανερὸν ὅτι | τὰ μὲν μιμήσεται τὴν προτέραν πολιτείαν, τὰ δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἅτ' ἐν μέσῳ οὖσα, τὸ δέ τι καὶ αὐτῆς ἕξει ἴδιον; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν τιμᾶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ γεωργιῶν ἀπέχεσθαι τὸ προπολεμοῦν αὐτῆς καὶ χειροτεχνιῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου χρηματισμοῦ, ξυσσίτια δὲ κατεσκευάσθαι καὶ γυμναστικῆς τε καὶ

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change is effected, as in the case of the corresponding man (550 B), by a peaceful compromise. In the later stages of political decay, when ἀνομοιότης has gathered strength, revolution is attended by civil war (557 A), and the tyrant wades through bloodshed to his throne (565 E ff.).

16 **περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας.** We meet with *περίοικοι* not only in Sparta, of which city Plato is chiefly thinking, but also in Crete, Thessaly and Argos: see Gilbert *Gr. Staatsalt.* II pp. 16, 74, 220. In each of these States there was also an inferior grade, in Sparta the Helots, in Crete the *ϝοικέες* of the Gortynian inscription, sometimes also spoken of as *οἰκέται*, in Thessaly the *πενέσται*, and in Argos the *γυμνῆτες* or *γυμνήσιοι* (Gilbert l.c.). It is clear, I think, that in *οἰκέτας* Plato is thinking of this lowest order. The Spartan Helots had to perform the duties of domestic servants, as appears from Plut. *Lyc. et Num. comp.* 2. 4 ἦν ἡ περὶ τὰ χρήματα κατασκευὴ δεδομένη δούλοις καὶ Εἵλωσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ περὶ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ ὄψον διακονία.

17 **φυλακῆς αὐτῶν:** the duty of watching and guarding—*sensu inimico*—the *περίοικοι* and *οἰκέται*. The institutions and history of Sparta are a sufficient commentary on the phrase.

19 **οὐκοῦν—πολιτεία.** Cf. 547 C *n.*

547 C—548 D *So much for the origin of Timarchy. In character, it will resemble Aristocracy on the one hand, and Oligarchy on the other; partly also it will have peculiarities of its own. The aristocratical features of Timarchy are respect for the ruling class and so forth; its own distinctive peculiarity is the love of war and warlike matters; in cupidity and avarice it is like Oligarchy. On the whole Timarchy is a mixture of good and evil; but the one conspicuous feature of this polity is the love of victory and honour.*

547 C Plato's description of 'timocracy' is, as he says himself, a sketch (548 D), but one in which hardly any feature of first-rate importance is wholly ignored. He regards 'timocracy' as primarily and essentially the political embodiment of *θυμοειδές* (548 C), and consequently a sort of half-way house between aristocracy and oligarchy, as *θυμοειδές* is between *λογιστικόν* and *φιλοχρήματον*. It is, however, at the same time a 'mixed' constitution (548 C *n.*), and partakes in the characteristics of both its neighbours. The portrait of timocracy is drawn in the main from Sparta, as the notes will shew, but it represents the Sparta of the fifth rather than of the fourth century, during which the oligarchical element in the Spartan constitution began to acquire an undue predominance, owing to the temptations of empire and other causes: cf. Isocr. *de Pace* 95—103. Plato's sketch may be filled in from the sources enumerated in Hermann-Thumser *Gr. Staatsalt.* pp. 176—191, 251—260. The student of Greek history and political science should read Aristotle's account of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan polities (*Pol.* B 9, 10) in connexion with Plato's description of the timarchical constitution and the timarchical man. See also Schoemann-Lipsius *Griech. Alterthümer* pp. 196—323.

547 D 24 **γεωργιῶν—χρηματισμοῦ:**

τῆς τοῦ πολέμου ἀγωνίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται; Ναί. Τῷ δέ γε φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς | σοφοὺς E
ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγειν, ἅτε οὐκέτι κεκτημένη ἁπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀτενεῖς
30 τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μεικτούς, ἐπὶ δὲ θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ ἁπλουστέρους ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς πόλεμον μᾶλλον πεφυκότας ἢ πρὸς εἰρήνην, | καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα δόλους τε καὶ μηχανὰς 548
ἐντίμως ἔχειν, καὶ πολεμοῦσα τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διάγειν, αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς αὖ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἴδια ἕξει; Ναί. Ἐπιθυμηταὶ δέ γε,

29. κεκτημένη Bekker, fortasse secundum *v*: κεκτημένην A cum ceteris.

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as in Sparta: see Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 7. 1—2 and other authorities in Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 182 *nn.*

26 **ξυσσίτια.** Cf. Hermann-Thumser l.c. pp. 185—191. In Crete, the *ξυσσίτια* were maintained at the expense of the State; in Sparta, by the contributions of the *ξύσσιτοι*. The former arrangement of course prevailed in the ideal city (III 416 E), and as timarchy copies the ideal city in regard to *ξυσσίτια* (*τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται* below), we may suppose that in the timarchical polity, as conceived by Plato, the Cretan method was observed. Cf. Arist. *Pol.* B 9. 1271ª 28 ff. and see also on 551 A, B.

28 **τῷ δέ γε φοβεῖσθαι κτλ.** The Spartans were notorious for their dislike and distrust of knowledge and intellectual cultivation: see *Hipp. Mai.* 285 B ff. and Arist. *Pol.* B 9. 1271ᵇ 1 ff., with Susemihl and Hicks' notes. For the anacoluthon *τῷ δέ γε—τὰ πολλά—ἕξει* (548 A) cf. (with Schneider) *Laws* 931 C, 949 A.

547 E 29 **κεκτημένη.** See *cr. n.* Bekker's silence is often untrustworthy, and as he omitted A and Ξ as well as *v* in the list of MSS which read *κεκτημένην*, it is doubtful if even *v* has the nominative here. *κεκτημένην* is however very awkward from its position between *τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται* and *πολεμοῦσα*, and the error is so easy and common that I agree with Bekker and others in rejecting the accusative. See *Introd.* § 5. In illustration of what Plato says we may contrast Pausanias for example and Lysander with Brasidas and Callicratidas. The former were *σοφοί* but far from *ἁπλοῖ*: the latter *θυμοειδεῖς* and *ἁπλούστεροι*.

30 **τοὺς τοιούτους**: i.q. *τοὺς σοφούς*. With *μεικτούς* cf. 547 A.

31 **ἁπλουστέρους** = 'more single-minded.' Since they distrust *σοφοί* because their *σοφοί* are not *ἁπλοῖ*, it is natural enough that they should seek *ἁπλούστεροι*, and find them in *θυμοειδεῖς*, whose single all-engrossing idea is war (548 A) and *φιλονικίαι* (548 C). The text would hardly have been suspected if critics had grasped the meaning of *ἁπλοῦς* (see on I 351 A, II 370 B and IV 434 C). As it is, there is a host of superfluous conjectures: *ἀλλοκωτέρους*, *αὐστηρούς*, *αὐθαδεστέρους*, *ποικιλωτέρους* (Ast), *πολλαπλουστέρους* (Stallbaum), *ἀγχινουστέρους* (Müller), *ὑποαμουσοτέρους* (Herwerden), *ἀμουσοτέρους* (Herwerden, Apelt, Richards). It should be remembered that the Spartans prided themselves upon *τὸ ἁπλοῦν* in the ordinary sense of the term.

548 A 2 **ἐντίμως ἔχειν.** See VII 528 B *n.* For the statement itself cf. for example *Laws* 630 D, 666 E *στρατοπέδου—πολιτείαν ἔχετε* and elsewhere, with Isocr. *Archid.* 81 and Arist. *Pol.* H 14. 1333ᵇ 12 ff.

καὶ πολεμοῦσα κτλ. Isocrates says much the same of Sparta in *Paneg.* 128 and *Philipp.* 51: cf. also *Laws* 686 B. The description up to this point recalls to some extent the city of Books II—IV, *minus* the *ἄρχοντες* proper and some parts of the 'musical' education, and Plato may well have looked on the constitution of Lycurgus, from which he borrowed several features, as in some respects a kind of imperfect edition of his earlier *καλλίπολις*. See on this subject K. F. Hermann *Die historischen Elemente d. plat. Staatsideals*, in his *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, pp. 132—159. Cf. also *Laws* 692 C, where the Lacedaemonian polity is called a *παράδειγμα γεγονός*. In what follows the strictly oligarchical features of the Spartan polity are described.

3 **ἐπιθυμηταὶ δέ γε κτλ.** Spartan avarice was the theme of universal com-

ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρημάτων οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, καὶ τιμῶντες ἀγρίως ὑπὸ σκότου χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον, ἅτε κεκτημένοι ταμιεῖα καὶ οἰκείους θησαυρούς, οἳ θέμενοι ἂν αὐτὰ κρύψειαν, καὶ αὖ περιβόλους οἰκήσεων, ἀτεχνῶς νεοττιὰς ἰδίας, ἐν
B αἷς | ἀναλίσκοντες γυναιξί τε καὶ οἷς ἐθέλοιεν ἄλλοις πολλὰ ἂν δαπανῷντο. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φειδωλοὶ χρημάτων, ἅτε τιμῶντες καὶ οὐ φανερῶς κτώμενοι, φιλαναλωταὶ δὲ ἀλλοτρίων δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ λάθρᾳ τὰς ἡδονὰς καρπούμενοι, ὥσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες, οὐχ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ
C βίας πεπαιδευμένοι διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης, τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας, ἠμεληκέναι | καὶ πρεσβυτέρως γυμναστικὴν μουσικῆς τετιμηκέναι. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, λέγεις μεμιγμένην πολι-

10. οὐ Π: erasum est in A.

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ment: see the references collected by Susemihl and Hicks on Arist. *Pol.* B 9. 1271^{b} 16 with Eur. *Andr.* 451, Ar. *Peace* 622 ff. and Isocr. *Bus.* 20.

5 **τιμῶντες ἀγρίως**: 'passionately adoring.' The adverb was unnecessarily suspected by Herwerden.

6 **ταμιεῖα κτλ.** In spite of the formal prohibition of gold and silver (Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 7. 6, Plut. *Lyc.* 9. 2, *Lys.* 17. 6), an immense amount of gold and silver money was accumulated in private hands throughout Laconia: cf. *Alcib.* I 122 E *χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσιν Ἕλλησιν ὅσον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἰδίᾳ· πολλὰς γὰρ ἤδη γενεὰς εἰσέρχεται μὲν αὐτόσε ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων, ἐξέρχεται δὲ οὐδαμόσε* κτλ. and other authorities quoted in Hermann-Thumser p. 252 *nn.* or Gilbert *Gk Const. Ant.* E. T. pp. 12, 13.

οἰκείους—κρύψειαν refers specifically to the hoarding of specie as practised by Spartan citizens. It may be doubted whether the Thucydidean Pericles was justified even at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war in telling the Athenians that the Spartans possessed *οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματα* (I 141. 3), in spite of Xenophon *Rep. Lac.* 7. 6.

7 **περιβόλους οἰκήσεων κτλ.**: not 'walled houses' (D. and V.) but 'dwellings to encompass them withal, veritable private nests': cf. *Theaet.* 174 E *σηκὸν ἐν ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον* and *Crat.* 400 C. The phrase has a poetical sound and may be taken from the drama, but is more likely to be one of Plato's own poetical flourishes. A Spartan husband could occasionally escape from the rigid discipline of camp-life and take shelter—this is the force of *περιβόλους*—in his domestic nest: see Plut. *Lyc.* 15. 4—7. Plato seems to imply that this arrangement encouraged habits of extravagance and luxuriousness in the wives as well as in the husbands: cf. Arist. *Pol.* B 9. 1269^{b} 22 *ζῶσι γὰρ* (the Spartan wives) *ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τρυφερῶς*. Aristotle's remark is amply borne out by other evidence: see Hermann-Thumser l. c. p. 180 *n.* 5 and Newman on Arist. l.c.

548 B 8 **οἷς ἐθέλοιεν ἄλλοις**: masculine, not (as D. and V. translate), neuter. The reference is probably intended to include *παιδικά* as well as others. The Spartan's domestic nest was doubtless occasionally a nest of vice.

12 **τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες**. The expression is borrowed by Aristotle *Pol.* B 9. 1270^{b} 34, where see Newman's note.

13 **τῆς ἀληθινῆς—φιλοσοφίας**. Cf. the famous saying *φιλοσοφία μεγίστη μουσική* in *Phaed.* 61 A.

548 C 15 **μεμιγμένην** and *μέμικται* sound half-technical, and it is clear from *Laws* 712 D ff., 691 E, 693 D, Isocr. *Nicocles* 24 (with *Areop.* 61) and Arist. *Pol.* Δ 9. 1294^{b} 18 ff. that Greek political theorists were in the habit of viewing the Spartan constitution as a 'mixed polity,' although they did not always analyse the *μῖξις* in the same way: cf. Henkel *Studien zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre v. Staat* p. 62 *nn.* 35, 36, and Whibley *Gk Olig.* pp. 14, 19. The

τείαν ἐκ κακοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ. Μέμικται γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· διαφανέστατον δ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἕν τι μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κρατοῦντος, φιλονικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι. Σφόδρα γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη μὲν ἡ πολιτεία οὕτω γεγουνῖα καὶ τοιαύτη ἄν τις εἴη, ὡς
20 λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας | ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι D διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, ἀμήχανον δὲ μήκει ἔργον εἶναι πάσας μὲν πολιτείας, πάντα δὲ ἤθη μηδὲν παραλιπόντα διελθεῖν. Καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

25 V. Τίς οὖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν ἀνήρ; πῶς τε γενόμενος ποῖός τέ τις ὤν; Οἶμαι μέν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ἐγγύς τι

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analysis which is attributed to Archytas may serve as a specimen: *δεῖ δὴ τὸν νόμον τὸν κάρρονα καὶ τὰν πόλιν ἐκ πασᾶν σύνθετον ἦμεν τᾶν ἄλλαν πολιτειᾶν, καὶ ἔχεν τι δαμοκρατίας, ἔχεν τι ὀλιγαρχίας, ἔχεν τι βασιλήας καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τᾷ Λακεδαίμονι. τοὶ μὲν γὰρ βασιλέες τᾶς μοναρχίας, τοὶ δὲ γέροντες τᾶς ἀριστοκρατίας, τοὶ δὲ ἔφοροι τᾶς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἱππαγρέται δὲ καὶ κόροι τᾶς δαμοκρατίας* (Stobaeus *Flor.* 43. 134). On mixed polities in ancient political science see Henkel l.c. pp. 85 ff., 102, 106 ff., 112, 115 and Greenidge *Gr. Const. Hist.* pp. 74—121.

17 **ἕν τι μόνον.** For *τι μόνον* Apelt conjectures *τιμώμενον*: but Plato expresses himself emphatically in case the oligarchical features of the Spartan polity should make us forget that after all it is and must be essentially *θυμο-κρατία*—the expression of *θυμοειδές* and not *φιλοχρήματον* (547 C *n.*).

18 **φιλονικίαι κτλ.** Cf. Plut. *Ages.* 5. 4. Plato is not thinking of 'divisions in Sparta between the partisans of the ephors and kings' (as J. and C. suppose), but of the passion *ὑπείροχον ἐμμέναι ἄλλων*: for this and not 'quarrelsomeness' is the *distinctive* feature of timarchy. We are in danger of misconceiving the whole position of 'timarchy' and the 'timarchical' man if *φιλόνικος* (or *φιλόνεικος*) is connected with *νεῖκος* instead of with *νίκη*. On the spelling and derivation of the word see IX 581 B *n.*

548 D 21 **διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν κτλ.** See 544 A *n.* With *ἀμήχανον δὲ κτλ.* cf. IV 443 D, E *n.*

548 D—**550** C *The character of the timarchical man is now described in close analogy with that of the timarchical State* (548 D—549 B). *In origin* (*continues Socrates*) *he was the son of a good father living in an ill-regulated city and abstaining from public life. Drawn by his father's precepts and example towards the higher life, and by maternal and other influences towards the lower, he finally surrendered himself to the dominion of the intermediate principle in the soul, and thus became timarchical.*

25 **πῶς τε γενόμενος:** 'how did he arise?' Richards proposes *γιγνόμενος*: but the past tense is in harmony with *ἔμπεσε* 545 D, with *εἱλκέτην, ἠγέτην, ὡμολόγησαν* 547 B, and indeed with the whole of Plato's exposition, which is deliberately arrayed in the vesture of a historical narrative or epic poem: see on 543 A, 544 C. It appears to be the custom to translate most of the aorists of this kind in Books VIII and IX by the present, but in some cases the effect is much more realistic and picturesque if we make them past, and I think that Plato intended some of these aorists to be understood in that way. The instances in point are 550 B *ἦλθε, παρέδωκε, ἐγένετο*, 550 E *ἀπειργάσαντο*, 551 B *κατεστήσαντο*, 555 D *ἠνάγκασαν*, 560 A—C *ὑπεχώρησε, διεφθάρησαν, ἐξέπεσον, κατεκοσμήθη, ἐγένοντο, εἵλκυσαν, ἐνέτεκον, κατέλαβον, κατέσχον*, 565 B *ἔσχον*, 566 E *ἠλευθέρωσε, διένειμε*. Except in 550 E, 551 B, 555 D, 565 B, and 566 E, in which the aorists are no doubt the so-called gnomic aorists "used in animated language to express general truths" (Goodwin *MT.* p. 53), each of these tenses is in my opinion correctly translated by a past in English. Plato of course repeatedly employs the

E αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος τουτουὶ τείνειν ἕνεκά γε φιλονικίας. | Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε· ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ τάδε οὐ κατὰ τοῦτον πεφυκέναι. Τὰ ποῖα; Αὐθαδέστερόν τε δεῖ αὐτόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναι καὶ ὑποαμουσότερον, φιλόμουσον δέ, καὶ φιλήκοον μέν, ῥητορικὸν δ' οὐδα- 30
549 μῶς. καὶ δούλοις | μέν τις ἂν ἄγριος εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος, οὐ καταφρονῶν δούλων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένος, ἐλευθέροις δὲ ἥμερος, ἀρχόντων δὲ σφόδρα ὑπήκοος, φίλαρχος δὲ καὶ φιλότιμος, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ἀξιῶν ἄρχειν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοιούτου οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἔργων τῶν τε πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, φιλογυμναστής τέ 5
τις ὢν καὶ φιλόθηρος. Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο τὸ ἦθος ἐκείνης τῆς πολιτείας. Οὐκοῦν καὶ χρημάτων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ τοιοῦτος νέος
B μὲν | ὢν καταφρονοῖ ἄν, ὅσῳ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γίγνοιτο, μᾶλλον ἀεὶ

1. τις ἂν ν: τισιν ΠΞq et fortasse A^1: τις A^2.

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present also, not only where he is painting a scene (e.g. 549 B ff., 553 A ff., 555 C ff.), but also when he is describing the actual genesis of a particular sort of commonwealth or individual (e.g. 550 D, 551 A, B al. and many instances of *γίγνεται*), and in such cases the appearance of historical narration is not preserved, for it would be pedantic to view all these presents as merely examples of the *praesens historicum*. See also on 549 C.

27 **φιλονικίας**: 'desire to excel.' The translations 'party-spirit' (D. and V.), 'spirit of contention' (Jowett) are misleading: see 548 C *n.* On Glauco's *φιλονικία* see *Introd.* § 2.

548 E 29 **ὑποαμουσότερον**. It is unnecessary (with Herwerden) to add *<μέν>*, although *ὑποαμουσότερον* is contrasted with *φιλόμουσον*: see on I 340 D.

30 **φιλόμουσον**. The 'timocratical' man has neglected *τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας* (548 B), but he is nevertheless *φιλόμουσος*, though somewhat less so than Glauco, whom Socrates calls *μουσικός* in III 398 E. On the Spartan love of music cf. Plut. *Lyc.* 21 and other evidence in Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 178 *nn.* 5, 6.

φιλήκοον κτλ. This characteristic of the Spartans is well illustrated by J. and C. from *Hipp. Mai.* 285 D ff.: *Ἀλλὰ τί μήν ἐστιν ἃ ἡδέως σου ἀκροῶνται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν* (sc. *οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι*);—*Περὶ τῶν γενῶν—τῶν τε ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τῶν κατοικίσεων, ὡς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκτίσθησαν αἱ πόλεις, καὶ συλλήβδην πάσης τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας ἥδιστα ἀκροῶνται.* Schneider is mistaken in taking *οὐδαμῶς* with all three adjectives: it belongs only to *ῥητορικόν*. The carefully qualified expression *ὑποαμουσότερον* would be inconsistent with calling the Spartan *οὐδαμῶς φιλόμουσον*: and *φιλήκοον* is not used as in VII 535 D, but rather as the antithesis to *ῥητορικόν*.

549 A 1 **ἄγριος κτλ.**: like the Spartans towards slaves and Helots: cf. *Laws* 777 A ff. and Gilbert *Gk Const. Ant.* E. T. pp. 32 ff.

οὐ καταφρονῶν κτλ. is a subtle psychological touch. Those who have no moral or intellectual right to 'despise' inferiors are apt to treat them harshly, in the vain effort to convince themselves of their own superiority. *ὁ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένος* uses those below him "as creatures of another place" (*All's well that ends well* I 2. 41). Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* IV 8. 1124^b 5. 20 and (for *καταφρονῶν*) Thuc. II 62. 4 *αὔχημα μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀμαθίας εὐτυχοῦς καὶ δειλῷ τινι ἐγγίγνεται, καταφρόνησις δὲ ὃς ἂν καὶ γνώμῃ πιστεύῃ τῶν ἐναντίων προέχειν.*

3 **οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν κτλ.** Cf. *Prot.* 342 E ff. The Spartans were men of deeds, not words.

5 **φιλογυμναστής—φιλόθηρος**: as in Sparta: see Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 182 *nn.* 1, 2.

549 B 8 **ὅσῳ δὲ πρεσβύτερος κτλ.** The life of the timocratical man is an epitome of that of the State, in which,

ἀσπάζοιτο ἂν τῷ τε μετέχειν τῆς τοῦ φιλοχρημάτου φύσεως καὶ
10 μὴ εἶναι εἰλικρινὴς πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τὸ ἀπολειφθῆναι τοῦ ἀρίστου
φύλακος; Τίνος; ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Ἀδείμαντος. Λόγου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
μουσικῇ κεκραμένου· ὃς μόνος ἐγγενόμενος σωτὴρ ἀρετῆς διὰ βίου
ἐνοικεῖ τῷ ἔχοντι. Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Καὶ ἔστι μέν γ', ἦν δ'
ἐγώ, τοιοῦτος ὁ τιμοκρατικὸς νεανίας, τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐοικώς.
15 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Γίγνεται δέ γ', εἶπον, ὁ οὗτος ὧδέ πως. ἐνίοτε C
πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὢν νέος ὑὸς ἐν πόλει οἰκοῦντος οὐκ εὖ πολιτευομένῃ,
φεύγοντος τάς τε τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δίκας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην
πᾶσαν φιλοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐθέλοντος ἐλαττοῦσθαι, ὥστε πράγ-
ματα μὴ ἔχειν—Πῇ δή, ἔφη, γίγνεται; Ὅταν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον

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as actually happened at Sparta, the oligarchical element grows more and more powerful as time goes on (547 C *n.*).

11 **λόγου—κεκραμένου** recalls the ἀληθινὴ Μοῦσα of 548 B.

12 **σωτὴρ ἀρετῆς.** Virtue is never secure unless it rests on knowledge, and can render a λόγος of itself: cf. VI 497 C and VII 531 E *nn.*

549 C 15 **ἐνίοτε κτλ.** Krohn finds a difficulty in *οὐκ εὖ πολιτευομένῃ*, for timarchy is a degeneration of the perfect city (*Pl. St.* pp. 208 ff., insufficiently refuted by Grimmelt *de reip. Pl. comp. et unit.* p. 71). But Plato is here speaking of the origin of the 'timarchical' *man*, not of the 'timarchical' *State*, and the ἀριστοκρατικός whose son becomes τιμοκρατικός may be found in any one of the degenerate commonwealths, although he will not rule except 'in his *own* city,' i.e. aristocracy. We must beware of supposing that there is no remnant of good men in depraved States (cf. VI 492 E ff., 496 C ff., IX 591 E ff.). If Plato had here preserved the fiction of a historical narrative and made the τιμοκρατικὸς νεανίας the son of an ἀριστοκρατικός in his own ideal city, he could only have attributed his fall to the same law of natural degeneration which subverted the καλλίπολις (546 A ff.). As it is, the description is drawn from facts of daily experience and observation, and Plato, as is suggested by the Oxford editors, may well be thinking of some 'Laconizing youth of Athens,' perhaps of some member of the Socratic circle. We have already seen that Plato frequently deserts the epic or narrative form of exposition which he has chosen to express his views: see above on 548 D. I formerly printed a comma after *πως* and a full stop after *ἔχειν*, but now revert to Stallbaum's punctuation, because (1) the contrast with *καὶ ἔστι μέν γε* κτλ. seems to require a fuller pause after *πως*, (2) *ἐνίοτε —ἔχειν* does not explain the *γένεσις* of the τιμοκρατικός, as it ought to do, if *γίγνεται—ἔχειν* is all one sentence, (3) Adimantus' interruption *πῇ δή—γίγνεται*, which calls attention in a lively manner to the point which Plato wishes to emphasise, is most easily accounted for on the supposition that *ἐνίοτε* κτλ. begins a separate sentence: cf. 567 E *n.* and Soph. *O. C.* 644 f., with Jebb's note. *νέος ὑός* is resumed in *νέος* (550 A), and has no other predicate except *ἦλθε* etc. in 550 B.

17 **φεύγοντος κτλ.** Cf. VI 496 C ff. and *Theaet.* 173 C ff. *φυγαρχία* (if the word may be allowed) on the part of the best men was a growing evil in Athenian politics: see Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 749 *n.* 4. In a bad State, according to Aristotle (*Pol.* Γ 4), the good man is apt to be a bad citizen.

549 C, D 19 **ὅταν κτλ.**: 'whenever, I continued, he listens in the first instance to his mother, who is annoyed because her husband has no place in the government and is on that account belittled among the other wives, and who also sees' etc. *πρῶτον μέν* has nothing to do with *ἔπειτα*, but prepares us for *καὶ οἱ οἰκέται* κτλ. in 549 E. See also on 549 D. Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 198) thinks the present sentence inconsistent with the position assigned to women in V; but actual wives *ἐν πόλει οὐκ εὖ πολιτευομένῃ* may be allowed to differ from the perfect products of an

D μὲν τῆς μητρὸς ἀκούῃ, ἀχθομένης ὅτι οὐ τῶν ἀρχόντων ¹ αὐτῇ ὁ ἀνήρ ἐστιν, καὶ ἐλαττουμένης διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις γυναιξίν, ἔπειτα ὁρώσης μὴ σφόδρα περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζοντα μηδὲ μαχόμενον καὶ λοιδορούμενον ἰδίᾳ τε ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ῥᾳθύμως πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα φέροντα, καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα ἀεὶ αἰσθάνηται, ἑαυτὴν δὲ μήτε πάνυ τιμῶντα μήτε ἀτιμάζοντα, ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων ἀχθομένης τε καὶ λεγούσης, ὡς ἄνανδρός τε αὐτῷ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ ὅσα καὶ
E οἷα φιλοῦσιν ¹ αἱ γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμνεῖν—Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, πολλά τε καὶ ὅμοια ἑαυταῖς. Οἶσθα οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ οἱ οἰκέται τῶν τοιούτων ἐνίοτε λάθρᾳ πρὸς τοὺς υἱεῖς τοιαῦτα λέγουσιν, οἱ δοκοῦντες εὖνοι εἶναι, καὶ ἐάν τινα ἴδωσιν ἢ ὀφείλοντα χρήματα, ᾧ μὴ ἐπεξέρχεται ὁ πατήρ, ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀδικοῦντα, διακελεύονται, ὅπως ἐπειδὰν ἀνὴρ γένηται, τιμωρήσεται

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ideal city. Plato's description is as realistic as anything could well be: he speaks as though *ξυνῳκηκὼς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ παραγεγονὼς ἐν ταῖς κατ' οἰκίαν πράξεσιν* (IX 577 A). Socrates and his relations with Xanthippe possibly furnished some details of the picture (so also Müller on p. 749 of his Translation).

549 D 23 **λοιδορούμενον** is certainly middle, not passive, as Ast imagined: cf. VI 500 B.

ἐν δικαστηρίοις. The opposition between *ἴδιαι* and *δημόσιαι δίκαι* (cf. *Laws* 957 A) is not to the point here, as Vermehren remarks (*Plat. Stud.* p. 107), but we should not, with that critic, expunge *ἐν δικαστηρίοις*. The expression *ἰδίᾳ ἐν δικαστηρίοις* refers to *ἴδιαι δίκαι*: and *δημοσίᾳ* to other public gatherings, as e.g. the assembly: cf. *Theaet.* 174 C *ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἤ που ἀλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ* κτλ.

24 **ῥᾳθύμως κτλ.**: 'indifferent to everything of the sort': cf. Xen. *Mem.* II 9. 1, *Theaet.* 173 C, D and (for the vague use of *τὰ τοιαῦτα*) VII 536 A.

25 **αἰσθάνηται** is usually explained as by anacoluthon for *αἰσθανομένης*: but no parallels have been cited, nor are the anacolutha by which Engelhardt (*Anac. Pl. Spec.* III p. 42) illustrates the sentence in any degree comparable. The sense compels us to regard the subject of *αἰσθάνηται* as the mother, but grammatically it can only, as with *ἀκούῃ*, be the son. I formerly placed *αἰσθάνηται* after *ἀχθομένης τε*: Richards excises it altogether. Neither solution is perfectly satisfactory; and it is possible that the sentence by some accident or other was imperfectly revised by Plato. The grammatical structure of this chapter from *ἐνίοτε πατρός* down to *ἐπαινουμένους* (550 A) is considerably freer than is usual even with Plato, and there are other passages in Book VIII which seem to stand in need of revision: cf. 558 A *n.* Nothing is easier than to 'emend' them all in accordance with our grammatical rules, but such emendations involve so great a departure from the MSS that they lack every element of probability, and as it is possible that the fault is Plato's, it is safer for us to adhere to the MSS. Nearly all the greatest writers occasionally offend against the rules by which we seek to bind them. See the excellent remarks of Longinus on the subject of correctness *versus* fire in composition (*περὶ ὕψους* 33—36).

27 **ἄνανδρος—καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος** rings poetical. The rhythm may be intentional, to suit *ὑμνεῖν*: or Plato may have taken the words from a tragedian. Such a line as *ἄνανδρός ἐστι καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος* might well have been applied by Zethus to Amphion in Euripides' *Antiope*, which was in effect a comparison between the *πρακτικός* and the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*: see *Gorg.* 485 E ff. and Eur. *Frag.* 187 Dind. Cf. also VI 494 D *n.*

πάντας τοὺς | τοιούτους καὶ ἀνὴρ μᾶλλον ἔσται τοῦ πατρός. καὶ 550
ἐξιὼν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούει καὶ ὁρᾷ, τοὺς μὲν τὰ αὑτῶν πράττοντας
ἐν τῇ πόλει ἠλιθίους τε καλουμένους καὶ ἐν σμικρῷ λόγῳ ὄντας,
τοὺς δὲ μὴ τὰ αὑτῶν τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐπαινουμένους. τότε δὴ ὁ
5 νέος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκούων τε καὶ ὁρῶν, καὶ αὖ τοὺς τοῦ πατρὸς
λόγους ἀκούων τε καὶ ὁρῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἐγγύθεν παρὰ
τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἑλκόμενος ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς
αὐτοῦ | τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄρδοντός τε καὶ αὔξοντος, τῶν δὲ B
ἄλλων τό τε ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς
10 εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ὁμιλίαις δὲ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων κακαῖς κεχρῆσθαι, εἰς
τὸ μέσον ἑλκόμενος ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἦλθε, καὶ τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ
ἀρχὴν παρέδωκε τῷ μέσῳ τε καὶ φιλονίκῳ καὶ θυμοειδεῖ, καὶ
ἐγένετο ὑψηλόφρων τε καὶ φιλότιμος ἀνήρ. Κομιδῇ μοι, ἔφη,
δοκεῖς τὴν τούτου γένεσιν διεληλυθέναι. Ἔχομεν ἄρα, ἦν | δ' ἐγώ, C
15 τήν τε δευτέραν πολιτείαν καὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἄνδρα. Ἔχομεν, ἔφη.

VI. Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου, λέγωμεν ἄλλον

2. ἀκούει Ξ: ἀκούῃ ΑΠ *q*. 5. αὖ τοὺς Ξ: αὐτοὺς A^1Π: αὐτοὺς τοὺς A^2: αὖ *q*.

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550 A **2 ἀκούει.** See *cr. n.* If we retain *ἀκούῃ, ὅταν* must be carried on from 549 C, in spite of the intervening sentences in 549 E. In that case we should regard Socrates' description (549 C —550 B) as virtually a single sentence *ἐνίοτε—ἔχειν, ὅταν—ὑμνεῖν, καὶ ἐξιὼν—ἐπαινουμένους, τότε δὴ—ἀνήρ,* and ignore Adimantus' replies, as well as *οἶσθα οὖν —πατρός* (549 E). But although *ὅταν* sometimes extends its influence in this way (VII 540 D—541 A), the interposition of 549 E makes it very difficult to retain the subjunctive here, and I therefore agree with other editors in holding the sentence to be independent. Cf. 553 B *n.*

6 **παρὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων.** Others know his father *πόρρωθεν*: the son sees him near at hand, comparing his ways of life with those of other men—and consequently understands and appreciates his father more. J. and C. wrongly translate "having a nearer view of his father's ways than of the ways of others."

7 **ἑλκόμενος κτλ.** describes the *στάσις* in the soul. Cf. 545 C, D.

550 B 8 **ἄρδοντος.** The metaphor is common: cf. X 606 D and *Euthyph.* 2 D with my note ad loc. So also in Cor. I 3. 6 *ἐγὼ ἐφύτευσα, Ἀπόλλως ἐπότισεν.*

9 **διὰ τὸ κτλ.**: 'because he is not naturally a bad man,' lit. 'his nature is not that of a bad man': not 'because he is by birth the son of no bad man.'

10 **εἰς τὸ μέσον—ἦλθε κτλ.** A compromise is effected, reminding us of the compromise which converted the aristocratical State into *τιμαρχία*: cf. 547 B *εἰς μέσον ὡμολόγησαν κτλ.* The aorists *ἦλθε, παρέδωκε* etc. are past, and should be so translated: see on 548 D.

14 **ἔχομεν ἄρα κτλ.** Richards thinks this sentence interrogative; but *ἄρα* rather points the other way.

550 C—**551** C *Next in order comes Oligarchy or Plutocracy. The change originates in the growth of avarice and cupidity within the timarchical State; it is completed as soon as a property qualification for the holding of office has been established by law.*

550 C 16 **οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο κτλ.** As *θυμοειδές* in Timarchy superseded *λογιστικόν*, so in Oligarchy *φιλοχρήματον* supersedes *θυμοειδές*. The lower 'parts' of soul assert the mastery in turn, as the scale of commonwealth descends (cf. 553 D and 547 C *n.*); and the continuity is unbroken, for the element of *φιλοχρήματον* already displayed an ominous activity in the Spartan State, although it had not yet attained the

ἄλλῃ πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον, μᾶλλον δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν προτέραν τὴν πόλιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Εἴη δέ γ' ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ὀλιγαρχία ἡ μετὰ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. Λέγεις δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὴν ποίαν κατάστασιν ὀλιγαρχίαν; Τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτείαν, ἐν ᾗ οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι ἄρχουσιν, πένητι | δὲ οὐ μέτεστιν ἀρχῆς. Μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν ὡς μεταβαίνει πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς τιμαρχίας εἰς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ῥητέον; Ναί. Καὶ μήν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τυφλῷ γε δῆλον, ὡς μεταβαίνει. Πῶς; Τὸ ταμιεῖον, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἑκεῖνο ἑκάστῳ χρυσίου πληρούμενον ἀπόλλυσι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δαπάνας αὐτοῖς ἐξευρίσκουσιν, καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐπὶ τοῦτο παράγουσιν, ἀπειθοῦντες | αὐτοί τε καὶ γυναῖκες αὐτῶν. Εἰκός, ἔφη. Ἔπειτά γε, οἶμαι, ἄλλος ἄλλον ὁρῶν καὶ εἰς ζῆλον ἰὼν τὸ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν ἀπειργάσαντο.

19. τοιαύτην Π et in marg. A^2: om. A^1. 28. αὐτῶν Π: αὐτῷ A.

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sovereign place. Plato's description of Greek oligarchies, if we judge it by the facts of history, probably lays rather too much emphasis on τὸ φιλοχρήματον: but it is certainly true that the pursuit of riches was the characteristic feature of ancient oligarchy. See on the whole subject Whibley *Greek Oligarchies*, and Newman *The Politics of Aristotle* IV pp. xxi—xxxvi, and compare the account which Aristotle gives of the causes producing revolution in what he calls 'aristocracies' (*Pol.* E 7).

τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου. The line is a playful adaptation from *Sept.* 451 λέγ' ἄλλον ἄλλαις ἐν πύλαις εἰληχότα and 570 Ὁμολωίσιν δὲ πρὸς πύλαις τεταγμένος. There is no good reason for holding (with Herwerden) that Plato is quoting from one of Aeschylus' lost plays.

17 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. See 545 B ff.

20 την ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. By Herodotus (III 81) ὀλιγαρχίη is used in its strictly etymological sense; and Socrates' own name for that which Plato calls 'oligarchy' was πλουτοκρατία (*Mem.* IV 6. 12). The establishment of a property qualification for full citizenship was the central feature in the programme of the Athenian oligarchical party from 412 B.C. onwards: see (for 411) Thuc. VIII 65. 3, 97. 1 and (for 404) Xen. *Hell.* II 3. 48, with Hermann-Thumser l.c. pp. 724—734. It is therefore natural enough that Plato should define oligarchy as he does, especially as in his younger days, both personally and through his friends, he was himself connected with the Athenian oligarchical faction (Grote VIII p. 30). The term 'oligarchy' retained its Platonic sense after Plato (cf. e.g. Arist. *Pol.* Γ 8. 1280ᵃ 1 f. ἀναγκαῖον μέν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον ἄν τ' ἐλάττους ἄν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν κτλ.), though Aristotle recognises also the wider meaning, e.g. in *Pol.* Z 2. 1317ᵇ 39 ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται. See especially Whibley *Gk Olig.* pp. 15—22.

550 D 22 ὡς μεταβαίνει. The leading features in Plato's narrative are probably taken from the history of Sparta, which had degenerated during his lifetime from a 'timarchy' to what was virtually an oligarchical polity: cf. Nohle *die Statslehre Pl.* p. 106 and Hermann-Thumser l.c. p. 258. Others have referred to the Solonian constitution and the oligarchical revolutions at Athens in 411 and 404. In neither of these instances was the previous government timarchical, for the rule of the Eupatrids had become an oppressive oligarchy by the time of Solon (Holm *Gk Hist.* E. T. I p. 389); but it is likely enough that Plato was thinking of these among other oligarchies and oligarchical movements in some parts of his descriptions: see 551 B *n.*

24 τὸ ταμιεῖον—ἑκεῖνο. 548 A *nn.* The oracle spoke truly ἀ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ὀλεῖ, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν (Tyrtaeus 3. 1).

28 γυναῖκες. See on 548 A.

550 E 29 ἀπειργάσαντο. On the

Εἰκός. Τοὐντεῦθεν τοίνυν, εἶπον, προϊόντες εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, ὅσῳ ἂν τοῦτο τιμιώτερον ἡγῶνται, τοσούτῳ ἀρετὴν ἀτιμοτέραν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν, ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ κειμένου ἑκατέρου ἀεὶ τοὐναντίον ῥέποντε; Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Τιμωμένου δὴ | πλούτου ἐν πόλει καὶ τῶν πλουσίων 551
ἀτιμοτέρα ἀρετή τε καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί. Δῆλον. Ἀσκεῖται δὴ τὸ ἀεὶ τιμώμενον, ἀμελεῖται δὲ τὸ ἀτιμαζόμενον. Οὕτω. Ἀντὶ δὴ φιλονίκων καὶ φιλοτίμων ἀνδρῶν φιλοχρηματισταὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι τελευτῶντες ἐγένοντο, καὶ τὸν μὲν πλούσιον ἐπαινοῦσίν τε καὶ θαυμάζουσι καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγουσι, τὸν δὲ πένητα ἀτιμάζουσι. Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν τότε δὴ νόμον τίθενται ὅρον πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικῆς, | ταξάμενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων, οὗ μὲν μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχία B
πλέον, οὗ δ' ἧττον, ἔλαττον, προειπόντες ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχειν, ᾧ ἂν

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tense see 548 D *n.* A few MSS read *ἀπειργάσατο*: but *ἄλλος ἄλλον* is in partitive apposition to the plural subject, according to the regular idiom: cf. II 369 B, C, IX 581 C *n.*

32 **ἢ οὐχ κτλ.** Cf. 555 C and especially *Laws* 743 A ff. *ἀγαθὸν δὲ ὄντα διαφερόντως καὶ πλούσιον εἶναι διαφερόντως ἀδύνατον* ('how hardly shall a rich man' etc.). Other parallels are quoted by Spiess *Logos Spermatikos* p. 74. Cf. also III 416 E *n.*

ὥσπερ κτλ.: 'as it were inclining always in opposite directions when each is placed in the scale of a balance.' As the scale containing virtue rises, that containing riches falls, and *vice versa*. Cf. Hom. *Il.* XXII 209 ff. Madvig's *κείμενον ἑκάτερον*, though adopted even by J. and C., is questionable Greek, and certainly no improvement. *ὥσπερ* should be taken with *ῥέποντε* "quasi non *πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν*, sed *πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετὴ διεστήκατον* praecessisset" (Schneider). There is a kindred figure in 544 E above: *ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα τἆλλα ἐφελκύσηται.* Ξ and some other inferior MSS have the obvious 'correction' *ῥέποντος*. Other conjectures are *ῥέπουσα* (Liebhold) and *ἂν ῥέπουσα* (Price), but neither could ever have been changed to *ῥέποντε*.

551 A 4 **φιλοχρηματισταὶ κτλ.** Although Aristotle (*Pol.* E 12. 1316ª 39 ff.) pronounces it *ἄτοπον* to think that oligarchy arises *ὅτι φιλοχρήματοι καὶ χρηματισταὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς*, there is no doubt that the special oligarchy which Plato probably has in view, viz. Sparta in the fourth century B.C., became to all intents and purposes an oligarchy chiefly from this cause, as in fact Aristotle himself recognises ib. 7. 1307ª 34 ff.: cf. also B 9. 1270ª 14 ff. It should also be remembered that Plato's selection of the *αἰτία τῆς φθορᾶς* is primarily determined by his psychological standpoint: see on 543 A.

5 **ἐγένοντο.** See 548 D *n.*

7 **νόμον τίθενται κτλ.** In Sparta, apparently, matters never went so far as this, although those who were unable to make the statutory contribution to the public mess forfeited their citizenship, according to the laws of Lycurgus, and later abuses swelled the ranks of the *ὑπομείονες* from this cause: see Arist. *Pol.* B 9. 1271ª 34 and Hermann-Thumser l.c. pp. 258—260 *nn.* 'The minimum amount of property qualifying for privilege in an oligarchy' was of course different in different oligarchical States: cf. Whibley *Gk Olig.* p. 22.

551 B 8 **οὗ μὲν μᾶλλον κτλ.** See again Whibley l.c. pp. 126—132. As an example of a moderate oligarchy (in the Platonic sense) we may take the Solonian constitution, which was, broadly speaking, the ideal of the moderate oligarchs at Athens towards the end of the fifth century (Beloch *Att. Pol.* p. 74: cf. Thuc. VIII 97. 2), and is commended by Plato in *Laws* 698 B ff.

μὴ ἧ οὐσία εἰς τὸ ταχθὲν τίμημα, ταῦτα δὲ ἢ βίᾳ μεθ' ὅπλων διαπράττονται, ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτου φοβήσαντες κατεστήσαντο τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Οὕτω μὲν οὖν. Ἡ μὲν δὴ κατάστασις, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, αὕτη. Ναί, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ ὁ τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας; καὶ ποιά ἐστιν ἃ ἔφαμεν αὐτὴν ἁμαρτήματα C | ἔχειν;

VII. Πρῶτον μέν, ἔφην, τοῦτο αὐτό, ὅρος αὐτῆς οἷός ἐστιν. ἄθρει γάρ, εἰ νεῶν οὕτω τις ποιοῖτο κυβερνήτας, ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τῷ δὲ πένητι, εἰ καὶ κυβερνητικώτερος εἴη, μὴ ἐπιτρέποι. Πονηράν,

10. ἧ Π: ἡ Α.

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10 **ἢ βίᾳ κτλ.** "To an Athenian, as to ourselves, this would naturally suggest a revolution against a democratic system such as took place at the establishment of the Four Hundred in 411 B.C., or of the Thirty in 404 B.C., and constantly throughout Greece during the Peloponnesian war" (Bosanquet). The remark applies with equal force to *πρὸ τούτου φοβήσαντες* (cf. Thuc. VIII 66. 2), and it can scarcely be doubted that the familiar struggles of oligarchy against democracy in his own as well as other times supplied Plato with this detail of the picture. But the employment of force would be equally necessary in order to transform a timarchy into an oligarchy, owing to the opposition to be apprehended from the impoverished and relatively poorer sections of the timarchs, who would under an oligarchy be formally and for ever excluded from office. The conspiracy of Cinadon partly illustrates Plato's point; for it was supported by *ὑπομείονες*, and suppressed by force (Xen. *Hell.* III 3. 4—11 with Grote IX pp. 70 ff.). Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 211) asserts that Plato has already forgotten 545 C, D, where constitutional change was said to originate from *στάσις* in the ruling class. But the struggle between those timarchs who have, and those who have not, the proposed *τίμημα*, is in reality *στάσις* between the rulers, for until timarchy is abrogated by law, the poor, if otherwise qualified, are *de iure* rulers as well as the rich. In Sparta it would be otherwise, because those who failed to pay their contributions to the *ξυσσίτια* ceased *ipso facto* to be rulers; only Plato's timarchy is not in this particular a copy of Sparta, but rather resembles Crete (547 D, 551 A *nn.*). See also on 545 C.

11 **κατεστήσαντο κτλ.** For the aorist cf. 548 D *n.* *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* is illustrated on I 341 B. *ἔφαμεν* refers to 544 C.

551 C—553 A *There are many grievous faults in the oligarchical city. It makes wealth instead of knowledge the qualification for ruling, is divided against itself, incapable, in all probability, of waging war, and false to our principle of 'one man, one work.' Worst of all, Oligarchy is the first constitution which permits a man to dispose of all his property by sale. From this cause springs up a large impoverished class resembling drones, some stingless and others stinging. The former are only poor, but the latter are criminals who have to be repressed by force.*

551 C 16 πρῶτον μέν: sc. *ἁμάρτημά (ἐστιν).*

ὅρος—ἐστιν: 'terminus eius qualis sit.' *ὅρος* is the limit or defining mark which separates it from all the other *πολιτεῖαι*: cf. I 331 D. Few will approve of Badham's conjecture *τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὁρᾷς αὐτῆς οἷόν ἐστιν*, especially as *ὅρος* echoes *ὅρον* in 551 A. *οἷός ἐστιν, ἄθρει· εἰ γὰρ νεῶν κτλ.* (Liebhold) is scarcely less unhappy. The text is above suspicion.

17 **εἰ νεῶν κτλ.** The illustration is a favourite one both with Socrates and Plato: cf. Xen. *Mem.* III 9. 11 and supra VI 488 A ff. *nn.* There is probably no aposiopesis after *ἐπιτρέποι*: we should translate 'Just consider if one were to choose pilots on the census principle and refuse to let a poor man steer though better qualified!'

18 **πονηρὰν κτλ.** "Adimantus quasi non videre, sed quid videat renuntiare iussus, *πονηράν*, inquit, *τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοὺς ναυτίλλεσθαι* sc. *ὁρῶ*" (Schneider). Cf. VII 535 C *n.* This explanation is, I think, easier than that of Stallbaum, who prints *ἄθρει γάρ· εἰ νεῶν κτλ.*, understand-

ἢ δ' ὅς, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοὺς ναυτίλλεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ
20 ἄλλου οὕτως ὁτουοῦν ἀρχῆς; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Πλὴν πόλεως; ἦν δ'
ἐγώ, ἢ καὶ πόλεως πέρι; Πολύ γ', ἔφη, μάλιστα, ὅσῳ χαλεπωτάτη
καὶ μεγίστη ἡ ἀρχή. Ἓν μὲν δὴ | τοῦτο τοσοῦτον ὀλιγαρχία ἂν D
ἔχοι ἁμάρτημα. Φαίνεται. Τί δέ; τόδε ἆρά τι τούτου ἔλαττον;
Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ μὴ μίαν ἀλλὰ δύο ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν,
25 τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκοῦντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀεὶ
ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἀλλήλοις. Οὐδὲν μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ἔλαττον. Ἀλλὰ
μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε καλόν, τὸ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι ἴσως πολεμόν τινα πολε-
μεῖν διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἢ χρωμένους τῷ πλήθει ὡπλισμένῳ
δεδιέναι μᾶλλον ἢ | τοὺς πολεμίους, ἢ μὴ χρωμένους ὡς ἀληθῶς E
30 ὀλιγαρχικοὺς φανῆναι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μάχεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα χρήματα μὴ

19. ναυτιλίαν $A^2\Xi g$: ναυτηλίαν (*sic*) $A^1\Pi$. 20. ὁτουοῦν vertit Ficinus: ὁτουοῦν ἤ τινος $A\Pi\Xi g$. 24. ἀνάγκη Ast: ἀνάγκη codd. 27. Ita Π: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ A^1: καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε A^2.

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ing (after ἐπιτρέποι) *τί λέγοις ἂν περὶ τούτου;* or the like, and *λέγοιμι ἄν* to govern the accusative with infinitive. J. and C.'s solution is in principle the same as Stallbaum's. The text may be corrupt, but no convincing emendation has hitherto been offered. The different proposals are *εἰκός* (Ast, Richards) and *ἂν εἴη δέος* (Liebhold) for *ἤ δ' ὅς*: <*φαίην ἄν*> added after *ἤ δ' ὅς* (Stephanus): *πονηρὰ εἴη ἂν ναυτιλία αὐτοῖς ναυτίλλεσθαι* (Ast): *πονηρὰν* <*ἀνάγκη*> κτλ. Richards—but it would surely be better to add the word after *ναυτιλίαν*. I have sometimes fancied that Plato wrote *πονηράν, ἤ δ' ὅς, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοῖς ναυτίλλεσθαι*, taking the accusative as in apposition to the previous sentence (cf. in some respects *Hipp. Mai.* 291 E and infra 567 C); but, for a reason to be mentioned presently on 551 D, perhaps *ναυτιλίαν* <*ἀνάγκη*> is right.

19 περὶ ἄλλου κτλ. See *cr. n.* *ἤ τινος* is retained by Schneider, who takes it as neuter, and *ὁτουοῦν* as masculine. The words can hardly be anything except a gloss or variant on *ὁτουοῦν*: the corrections *ἤστινος* or *ἠστινοσοῦν* (Ast) are much less easy and probable. *περὶ* governs *ἀρχῆς*, on which *ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν*, which is neuter, depends. Cobet's *περὶ ἄλλης οὕτως ὁτουοῦν ἀρχῆς* ('about any other *ἀρχή* whatsoever') does not suit with *πλὴν πόλεως* (i.e. *ἄλλου*—not *ἄλλης*—*ὁτουοῦν πλὴν πόλεως*).

551 D 24 μὴ μίαν κτλ. Aristotle (*Pol.* E 12. 1316^b 6 ff.) urges that this is equally true of all States where inequality of property prevails: but Plato would not allow that it is true of his ideal city, or even of timarchy except in so far as timarchy is itself oligarchical (548 A).

ἀνάγκη. See *cr. n.* The word could be dispensed with here, and, as all those MSS which are in the habit of writing the iota subscript at all regularly appear to have the nominative and not the dative, it is possible, and even perhaps probable, that this is the *ἀνάγκη* which Richards desiderated in 551 C: see note ad loc.

27 τὸ ἀδυνάτους κτλ. The sense of course is 'to be—probably—unable' i.e. 'that they are in all probability unable.' Richard says *ἴσως* is 'feeble': to me it seems exactly the right word in the right place. The conjectures *σῶς* (Badham) and *ἰσχυρῶς* (Richards) are each of them for different reasons very unpleasing, and even if the passage were corrupt *ἰσχυρῶς* is far too violent a change to deserve consideration.

28 χρωμένους κτλ. In illustration the Oxford editors cite Thuc. III 27. The Spartans in particular had regularly to arm and employ the *πλῆθος*, both Perioeci and Helots, in their wars (see e.g. Thuc. VII 19. 3), and were consequently sometimes exposed to grave dangers (Thuc. IV 80).

551 E 29 ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικούς: 'literally olig-archical or masters of few'

ἐθέλειν εἰσφέρειν, ἅτε φιλοχρημάτους. Οὐ καλόν. Τί δέ; ὃ πάλαι ἐλοιδοροῦμεν, τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν γεωργοῦντας καὶ χρηματιζο-
552 μένους | καὶ πολεμοῦντας ἅμα τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἣ δοκεῖ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν; Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. Ὅρα δή, τούτων πάντων τῶν κακῶν εἰ τόδε μέγιστον αὖτη πρώτη παραδέχεται. Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ ἐξεῖναι πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ κτήσασθαι τὰ τούτου, καὶ ἀποδόμενον οἰκεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει μηδὲν ὄντα τῶν τῆς 5
πόλεως μερῶν, μήτε χρηματιστὴν μήτε δημιουργὸν μήτε ἱππέα
B μήτε ὁπλίτην, ἀλλὰ πένητα καὶ ἄπορον κεκλημένον. | Πρώτη, ἔφη. οὔκουν διακωλύεταί γε ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις τὸ τοιοῦτον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἱ μὲν ὑπέρπλουτοι ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ παντάπασι πένητες. Ὀρθῶς. τόδε δὲ ἄθρει· ἆρα ὅτε πλούσιος ὢν ἀνήλισκεν ὁ τοιοῦτος, μᾶλλόν 10
τι τότ' ἦν ὄφελος τῇ πόλει εἰς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; ἢ ἐδόκει μὲν τῶν ἀρχόντων εἶναι, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ οὔτε ἄρχων οὔτε ὑπηρέτης ἦν αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἑτοίμων ἀναλωτής; Οὕτως, ἔφη· ἐδόκει, ἦν δὲ οὐδὲν
C | ἄλλο ἢ ἀναλωτής. Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶμεν αὐτόν, ὡς

(*Herren von wenigen*, Schneider). Cf. ὀλιγαρχικῶς 555 A *n.* and (for ὡς ἀληθῶς) VI 511 B *n.* Jowett's translation "few to fight as they are few to rule" does not bring out the peculiar force of ὀλιγαρχικούς here.

31 **φιλοχρημάτους**: with emphasis on φιλο- (Schneider, who compares 568 B for ἅτε without the copula). The sentiment is illustrated by Bosanquet from Arist. *Pol.* B 9. 1271[b] 13 εἰσφέρουσί τε κακῶς (of the Spartans): cf. also infra 554 E f. and Theophr. *Char.* 26, where the ὀλιγαρχικὸς cries πότε παυσόμεθα ὑπὸ λειτουργιῶν καὶ τριηραρχιῶν ἀπολλύμενοι; and more in Hermann-Thumser l. c. p. 685 *n.* 1.

πάλαι. IV 434 A ff.

552 A 4 **τὸ ἐξεῖναι κτλ.** According to some ancient authorities (cited in Hermann-Thumser l. c. pp. 186 f.), the constitution of Lycurgus absolutely forbade the alienation of a certain minimum of the original κλῆρος, called the ἀρχαία μοῖρα. The evidence of Plato does not go far, but so far as it does go, it supports this view; for he says that oligarchy is the *first* polity which permits a citizen πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀποδίδοσθαι: cf. also *Laws* 744 D. Aristotle says nothing of the ἀρχαία μοῖρα, and states that a Spartan might legally part with his estate by gift or bequest, although to sell it was οὐ καλόν (*Pol.* B 9. 1270[a] 19 ff.). The conflict of evidence is discussed by Newman and Susemihl on Arist. l.c.: see also on the other side Hermann-Thumser l. c. pp. 259 f. In many Greek States besides Sparta it was either illegal, or at least dishonourable, to dispose of the 'ancient lot': see Whibley *Gk Olig.* pp. 113—115.

552 B 8 **οὔκουν κτλ.** Schneider was the first to give this sentence to Adimantus, and ὀρθῶς to Socrates, "qui quum paucorum gubernationem *primam* illud vitium recipere persuasum haberet eamque sententiam verbis ὅρα δή etc. aperte demonstrasset, suffragante Adimanto rursus in dubium sine causa rem vocare non debebat." Cf. 554 B. Baiter and others ought not to have reverted to the old arrangement. For οὔκουν—γε see Neil's edition of the *Knights* of Aristophanes p. 195.

11 **εἰς ἅ**: i.e. for χρηματισμός, δημιουργία and the other purposes specified in 552 A.

13 **ἐδόκει**: sc. ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀναλωτής (Schneider). This explanation, which is, I think, neater and more pointed than to supply τῶν ἀρχόντων, makes ἦν—ἀναλωτής indispensable. Herwerden was wrong in any case when he bracketed these words.

ἐν κηρίῳ κηφὴν ἐγγίγνεται, σμήνους νόσημα, οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν οἰκίᾳ κηφῆνα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, νόσημα πόλεως; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, τοὺς μὲν πτηνοὺς κηφῆνας πάντας ἀκέντρους ὁ θεὸς πεποίηκεν, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς τούτους ἐνίους μὲν αὐτῶν ἀκέντρους, ἐνίους δὲ δεινὰ κέντρα ἔχοντας; καὶ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀκέντρων πτωχοὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας τελευτῶσιν, | ἐκ δὲ τῶν D κεκεντρωμένων πάντες ὅσοι κέκληνται κακοῦργοι; Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Δῆλον ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν πόλει, οὗ ἂν ἴδῃς πτωχούς, ὅτι εἰσί που ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἀποκεκρυμμένοι κλέπται τε καὶ βαλλαντιοτόμοι καὶ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν δημιουργοί. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις πόλεσι πτωχοὺς οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἐνόντας; Ὀλίγου γ', ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἐκτὸς τῶν ἀρχόντων. Μὴ οὖν οἰώμεθα, ἔφην | ἐγώ, καὶ κακούργους πολλοὺς ἐν E αὐταῖς εἶναι κέντρα ἔχοντας, οὓς ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ κατέχουσιν αἱ

25. δῆλον, ἔφη Π: om. A. 27. οἰώμεθα $A^2\Xi$: οἰόμεθα $A^1\Pi q$.

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552 C 15 **ἐν κηρίῳ**: not 'in the hive' (as D. and V.), but 'in a cell.' The drone-cell in which the drone is produced stands to the whole hive as the *οἰκία* to the *πόλις*. For *κηρίον* in this sense, see Bonitz *Ind. Arist.* s.v.

τὸν τοιοῦτον — κηφῆνα. The comparison is frequent in Greek literature from Hesiod onwards (*OD.* 304 ff.): see Ruhnken on Tim. *Lex.* s.v. *κηφήνεσσι κοθούροισι* and Blaydes on Ar. *Wasps* 1114. "We would purge the land of the drones, that rob the bee of her honey" (*Pericles Prince of Tyre* II 1. 50).

20 **τελευτῶσιν**: i.q. *τελευτῶντές εἰσιν*. 'To the stingless belong those who die paupers in their old age.' *πρὸς τὸ γῆρας* is adverbial as in VI 498 A. Stallbaum and others understand *τελευτῶσιν* as only 'tandem fiunt'; but the other view—Schneider's—is better and more natural: cf. II 372 D *γηραιοὶ τελευτῶντες* and *Symp.* 179 E.

552 D 21 **πάντες**: sc. *εἰσίν* (understood from *τελευτῶσιν*) rather than *γίγνονται* (as J. and C. explain).

22 **ἐν πόλει κτλ.** Compare the melancholy picture of Athens in Isocrates *Areop.* 83 *τότε μὲν οὐδεὶς ἦν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνδεὴς τῶν ἀναγκαίων, οὐδὲ προσαιτῶν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τὴν πόλιν κατήσχυνε, νῦν δὲ πλείους εἰσὶν οἱ σπανίζοντες τῶν ἐχόντων· οἷς ἄξιόν ἐστι πολλὴν συγγνώμην ἔχειν, εἰ μηδὲν τῶν κοινῶν φροντίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο σκοποῦσιν, ὁπόθεν τὴν ἀεὶ παροῦσαν ἡμέραν διάξουσιν.* The *Areopagiticus* was published about 354 B.C.

26 **ὀλίγου γε—ἀρχόντων.** Plato's description may be illustrated from the state of Athens just before Solon's legislation: see Solon *Fr.* 36 ed. Bergk = Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 12. 4. The words *χρησμὸν λέγοντας* (in line 9 of the fragment) are certainly not, as some have thought, a corruption of *χρείους φυγόντας* (as in Aristotle's text), but point to a different recension. *χρησμὸν λέγοντας* 'gathering alms' has been suggested (cf. *χρήζω, χρησμοσύνη*), and may I think be the original from which the first of the two variants comes.

27 **μὴ οὖν οἰώμεθα**: 'are we, then, not to suppose?' *μή* is not 'num,' but the negative and goes with *οἰώμεθα*: cf. I 337 B *μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προεῖπες μηδέν*; and infra 554 B with other examples cited by Stallbaum: see also Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 187. The positive counterpart of this idiom is *οἰώμεθα* or *βούλει οἰώμεθα*: and the negative is due to the jussive idea on which the subjunctive logically depends. *οἰόμεθα* (see *cr. n.*) is retained by Schneider and others, *μή* being construed as 'num.' But 'we do not, then, suppose, do we,' overdoes the irony, and Stallbaum's explanation is better in every way. On the interchange of *o* and *ω* in Paris A see *Introd.* § 5.

552 E 28 **ἐπιμελείᾳ** = 'deliberately,' 'consulto,' is a rare but well-established adverb: see Xen. *Cyr.* V 3. 47, *Mag. Eq.*

ἀρχαί; Οἰώμεθα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν καὶ κακὴν τροφὴν καὶ κατάστασιν τῆς πολιτείας φήσομεν τοὺς τοιού- 30
τους αὐτόθι ἐγγίγνεσθαι; Φήσομεν. Ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ τοιαύτη γέ τις ἂν εἴη ἡ ὀλιγαρχουμένη πόλις καὶ τοσαῦτα κακὰ ἔχουσα, ἴσως δὲ
553 καὶ πλείω. Σχεδόν τι, ἔφη. Ἀπειρ|γάσθω δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ αὕτη, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ πολιτεία, ἣν ὀλιγαρχίαν καλοῦσιν, ἐκ τιμημάτων ἔχουσα τοὺς ἄρχοντας· τὸν δὲ ταύτῃ ὅμοιον μετὰ ταῦτα σκοπῶμεν, ὥς τε γίγνεται οἷός τε γενόμενος ἔστιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

VIII. Ἆρ' οὖν ὧδε μάλιστα εἰς ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρα- 5
τικοῦ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλει; Πῶς; Ὅταν αὐτοῦ παῖς γενόμενος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ζηλοῖ τε τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου ἴχνη διώκῃ,
B ἔπειτα αὐτὸν ἴδῃ ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα | ὥσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι πρὸς τῇ

29. οἰώμεθα A^2: οἰόμεθα $A^1\Pi\Xi g$. 5. εἰς $A^2\Pi$: om. A^1.

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7. 9 and cf. κατ' ἐπιμέλειαν in *Hell.* IV 4. 8. The magistrates resign themselves to the presence of these κακοῦργοι, and instead of removing the cause—ἀπαιδευσία καὶ κακὴ τροφὴ καὶ κατάστασις τῆς πολιτείας—as they *should* do, they 'deliberately hold them down by force.' Plato emphatically believed that 'force is no remedy.' Cf. the corresponding account of the oligarchical man in 554 C, D κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνούσας, οὐ πείθων ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδ' ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκῃ καὶ φόβῳ κτλ. Schneider's translation 'carefully' (sorgfältig) is inaccurate; but he was right in holding that ἐπιμελείᾳ and not βίᾳ (as J. and C. suppose) is the adverb. We certainly cannot understand ἐπιμελείᾳ as = ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας in spite of 554 C. The suggestions καὶ βίᾳ (Stephanus) and [ἐπιμελείᾳ] βίᾳ (J. J. Hartman) are superfluous.

29 **ἀπαιδευσίαν.** ἀπαιδευσία is a feature of the oligarchical State and man: cf. 554 B, 559 D.

553 A—553 E *The oligarchical man is the son of a timarchical father, whose fortunes have been shipwrecked by an unjust condemnation. Profiting by his father's example, the son deposes the love of honour from its sovereign place, and enthrones desire and avarice within his heart. The amassing of wealth is henceforward his one consuming passion.*

553 A 6 ὅταν κτλ. Plato (as suggested by Hermann *Gesch. Abhandl.* pp. 155 ff.) may have in view some of the generation of Athenian oligarchs who succeeded to the political party of Cimon; for Cimon was τιμοκρατικός rather than ὀλιγαρχικός (cf. V 470 C *n.*). The description of the progress of individual degeneration from the aristocrat down to the tyrant constantly reflects Plato's own experience of Athenian society and domestic life: cf. 549 C, D *nn.* Abundant materials for the picture were doubtless ready at hand in the παντοδαποὶ ἄνθρωποι (557 C) of the 'bazaar of polities' (557 D). For the construction of this sentence cf. 549 C—550 A *n.* We ought not to understand μεταβάλλει before ὅταν, for the μεταβολή does not take place until 553 C, and ἆρ' οὐκ—παραζωννύντα is the only apodosis which Plato thinks it necessary to provide.

8 **πταίσαντα κτλ.** For the figure cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 1006 and *Eum.* 554—565.

553 B ὥσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι κτλ. In some other examples of this idiom (III 414 E, VII 520 E, supra 545 E, IX 573 E et al.) only the first preposition is expressed; but in *Euthyph.* 2 C, *Phaedr.* 255 D and *Phaed.* 67 D (according to Ven. T) we find as here both prepositions. Cobet is not justified in excising the second preposition either here or elsewhere (*V. L.*^{2} pp. 54, 164 ff., 532); for while ὥσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει (for example) is only a similitude, in ὥσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι τῇ πόλει the connexion is much closer, amounting almost to identification: see my note on *Euthyph.* l. c. and cf. Braun *de Hyperb. Plat.* II p. 9.

πόλει, καὶ ἐκχέαντα τά τε αὑτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτόν, ἢ στρατηγήσαντα ἤ
10 τιν' ἄλλην μεγάλην ἀρχὴν ἄρξαντα, εἶτα, εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα,
βλαπτόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμω-
θέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν ἀποβαλόντα—Εἰκός γ', ἔφη. Ἰδὼν
δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, ταῦτα καὶ παθὼν καὶ ἀπολέσας τὰ ὄντα δείσας,
οἶμαι, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ
15 ψυχῇ | φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ταπεινωθεὶς ὑπὸ C
πενίας πρὸς χρηματισμὸν τραπόμενος γλίσχρως καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν
φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος χρήματα ξυλλέγεται. ἆρ' οὐκ οἴει τὸν
τοιοῦτον τότε εἰς μὲν τὸν θρόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ
φιλοχρήματον ἐγκαθίζειν καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ,
20 τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτοὺς καὶ ἀκινάκας παραζωννύντα; Ἔγωγ',
ἔφη. Τὸ δέ γε, οἶμαι, λογιστικόν τε καὶ θυμοειδὲς | χαμαὶ ἔνθεν D
καὶ ἔνθεν παρακαθίσας ὑπ' ἐκείνῳ καὶ καταδουλωσάμενος, τὸ μὲν
οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐᾷ λογίζεσθαι οὐδὲ σκοπεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ ὁπόθεν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων

9. ἤ τιν' Ξq: ἤ τὴν ΑΠ.
18. τὸ Ξq: τὸν ΑΠ.
17. ξυλλέγεται Ξq²: ξυλλέγηται ΑΠq¹.

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9 ἢ στρατηγήσαντα κτλ. The words *ἢ στρατηγήσαντα—ἀποβαλόντα* interpret the figure in *ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα—ἑαυτόν*: 'having either been a Strategus or held some other high office, and then, when brought to trial, been either put to death, or banished, or disfranchised and deprived of all his property, by the damaging evidence of lying informers.' *βλαπτόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν* might be taken as subordinate to *ἐμπεσόντα*, but *πρὸς πόλει πταίσαντα* seems rather to imply that the prosecution is not wholly vexatious, although the evidence turns out to be so. Some misfortune, such as happened for example at the battle of Arginusae (Xen. *Hell.* I 6. 33 ff., 7. 4 ff., with Grote VII pp. 411 ff.), arouses a great wave of popular feeling, in consequence of which the general is put upon his trial, and *συκοφάνται* manage to secure his condemnation (cf. Xen. l.c. I 7. 11). Badham and Cobet ignominiously expel *βλαπτόμενον*, apparently for no better reason than that *ἐμπεσόντα* can be followed by *ὑπό* of the agent (Cobet *N. L.* p. 752, *V. L.*² p. 54). If the passage is taken as I take it, *βλαπτόμενον* cannot be cancelled without grave inconvenience; and even if *βλαπτόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν* be construed with *ἐμπεσόντα*, its excision is unnecessary. On the mischief wrought by *συκοφάνται* in Athens see Hermann-Thumser *Gr. Staatsalt.* p. 686 *nn.* 2—4.

553 C 17 ξυλλέγεται. See *cr. n.* and 550 A, 553 A *nn.* *ξυλλέγηται* is impossible after *ὠθεῖ*, and *ὠθῇ* would be very awkward.

20 τιάρας κτλ.: symbols of Oriental sovereignty—note *μέγαν βασιλέα*—and distinction: see *Dict. Ant.* s.vv. and Schück *de Scholiis* p. 32.

553 D 21 χαμαὶ—παρακαθίσας. Plato makes them squat like servile Oriental courtiers. The picture expresses with admirable clearness the psychological basis of Plato's sequence of polities: see on 547 C and 550 C, and compare the lines of Milton *Paradise Lost* IX 1127 ff. "Understanding ruled not, and the will Heard not her lore; both in subjection now To sensual appetite, who from beneath Usurping, over sovran reason claimed Superior sway." The poet Gray's note, though not, I think, correct, is worthy of quotation: "An allusion to those statues or bas-reliefs where some king, or conqueror, is represented with captive nations in chains sitting at his feet; as in that erected to the honour of Justinian, in the Hippodrome at Constantinople."

22 καὶ καταδουλωσάμενος is excised by J. J. Hartmann: but see V 451 B *n.*

χρημάτων πλείω ἔσται, τὸ δὲ αὖ θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πλοῦτόν τε καὶ πλουσίους, καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι μηδ' ἐφ' ἑνὶ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ ἐάν τι ἄλλο εἰς τοῦτο φέρῃ. Οὐκ ἔστ' ἄλλη, ἔφη, μεταβολὴ οὕτω ταχεῖά τε καὶ ἰσχυρὰ ἐκ φιλοτίμου νέου
E εἰς φιλοχρήματον. | Ἆρ' οὖν οὗτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὀλιγαρχικός ἐστιν; Ἡ γοῦν μεταβολὴ αὐτοῦ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἀνδρός ἐστι τῇ πολιτείᾳ, ἐξ ἧς
554 ἡ ὀλιγαρχία μετέστη. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ εἰ ὅμοιος ἂν εἴη. | Σκοπῶμεν.

IX. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν τῷ χρήματα περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι ὅμοιος ἂν εἴη; Πῶς δ' οὔ; Καὶ μὴν τῷ γε φειδωλὸς εἶναι καὶ ἐργάτης, τὰς ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας μόνον τῶν παρ' αὑτῷ ἀποπιμπλάς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀναλώματα μὴ παρεχόμενος, ἀλλὰ δουλούμενος τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ὡς ματαίους. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Αὐχμηρός γέ τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὢν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς περιουσίαν ποιούμενος, θησαυρο-
B ποιὸς ἀνήρ· οὗς δὴ | καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος. ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ ὅμοιος; Ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἔφη, δοκεῖ· χρήματα γοῦν μάλιστα ἔντιμα τῇ τε πόλει καὶ παρὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παιδείᾳ ὁ τοιοῦτος προσέσχηκεν. Οὐ δοκῶ, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τυφλὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ χοροῦ ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα.

12. Ita Schneider. ἐστήσατο. Καὶ ἔτι μάλιστα εὖ A.

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24 **μηδέν** is written rather than οὐδέν owing to the infinitives θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν.

27 **ἄλλη**: i.e. other than you have just described. Jowett's translation "Of all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one" is quite wrong.

553 E 30 **εἴη**. Stallbaum and some others place a mark of interrogation after εἴη: "quod ego non penitus ineptum, sed inter proxime praecedentem et proxime sequentem interrogationem minus aptum existimo" (Schneider). Cf. 550 C.

554 A—**555** B *In character, the oligarchical man resembles the oligarchical State. He gratifies his 'necessary' desires and no others. He is avaricious, niggardly, sordid, and the blind god of wealth is leader of the chorus of his soul. From time to time, as opportunity offers, the drone-like desires within him assert themselves, but for the most part he forcibly represses them through fear of consequences. Thus, although his soul is a prey to sedition, his better desires generally prevail over those which are worse. In public competitions he is usually content to be beaten and save his money.*

554 A 4 **ἐργάτης**: not simply 'hard-working' (D. and V.), but with reference to *illiberalis labor*.

ἀναγκαίους. This form of the feminine recurs in IV 425 D, supra 558 D, 559 A, 561 A (ter) and IX 572 C; but in 558 D we have ἀναγκαῖαι, and ἀναγκαία in 559 B, C. See Schneider on IV 425 D. There is no justification for making ἀναγκαίους consistently an adjective of either two or three terminations (as suggested by Richards). The full meaning of ἀναγκαῖοι ἐπιθυμίαι is explained in 558 D ff.

5 **τὰ ἄλλα ἀναλώματα** "sunt pecuniae in cetera impendendae, quas hic negatur παρέχεσθαι, de suis praebere" (Schneider). With ἄλλα cf. ἄλλης 554 C, and with παρεχόμενος IV 421 D *n*. The translation 'not affording or allowing himself' (J. and C.) is inaccurate. παραδεχόμενος, which was read, with slight MS authority, before Bekker, has been rightly discarded by later editors.

8 **οὗς δή**. For the plural cf. (with Stallbaum) *Laws* 908 D and Eur. *Hel.* 440 Ἕλλην πεφυκώς, οἷσιν οὐκ ἐπιστροφαί. See also on I 347 A.

554 B 12 **τυφλὸν κτλ.** τὸν Πλοῦτον,

Εὖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τόδε δὲ σκόπει. κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίας ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἀπαιδευσίαν μὴ φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι, τὰς μὲν πτωχικάς, | τὰς C
δὲ κακούργους, κατεχομένας βίᾳ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας; Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Οἶσθα οὖν, εἶπον, οἳ ἀποβλέψας κατόψει αὐτῶν τὰς κακουργίας; Ποῖ; ἔφη. Εἰς τὰς τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἐπιτροπεύσεις καὶ εἴ πού τι αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτον ξυμβαίνει, ὥστε πολλῆς ἐξουσίας λαβέσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. Ἀληθῆ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τούτῳ δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐπιεικεῖ τινι ἑαυτοῦ βίᾳ κατέχει ἄλλας | κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνούσας, D
οὐ πείθων, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδ' ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκῃ καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τρέμων; Καὶ πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Καὶ νὴ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, τοῖς πολλοῖς γε αὐτῶν εὑρήσεις, ὅταν δέῃ τἀλλότρια ἀναλίσκειν, τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος ξυγγενεῖς ἐνούσας

24. εὑρήσεις $A^1\Pi$: ἐνευρήσεις A^2.

οἶμαι, φησίν says a Scholiast in the margin of A. See Blaydes on Ar. *Plut.* 90. Hirmer (*Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Pol.* p. 658 *n.*) doubts whether the god of Wealth is represented as blind earlier than Aristophanes; but a *σκόλιον* of Timocreon began *ὤφελέν σ' ὦ τυφλὲ Πλοῦτε* (Schol. on Ar. *Ach.* 532). With the figure in *τοῦ χοροῦ* cf. VI 490 C and infra 560 E.

ἐτίμα μάλιστα. See *cr. n.* Schneider's admirable emendation is now universally accepted: cf. *μάλιστα ἔντιμα* above and *τιμᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πλοῦτον* 553 D. On the corruption see *Introd.* § 5.

13 **κηφηνώδεις κτλ.** As oligarchy has 'drones' (552 C), so the oligarchical man has 'drone desires.' The parallel is worked out with unusual completeness, even for Plato: see on 555 A.

14 **μὴ φῶμεν.** 552 D *n.*

554 C 15 **κατεχομένας κτλ.** Cf. 552 E. *ἄλλης=περὶ τὰ ἄλλα*: cf. *ἄλλα* in 554 A. The translation 'his general habit of carefulness' (J. and C.) is scarcely right: cf. *περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τρέμων* in D below.

16 **αὐτῶν**: not *κηφηνωδῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν*, but the plural masculine, in spite of *αὐτῷ* above (I 347 A *n.*).

18 **ὥστε πολλῆς κτλ.** See II 359 B ff. Socrates would say that the picture which Glauco there draws is only too true of the oligarchical man.

19 **τούτῳ δῆλον**: 'clear by this,' 'clear from this,' as in Eur. *Hipp.* 627 *τούτῳ δὲ δῆλον* and Ar. *Plut.* 587 (*τούτῳ δηλοῖ*). Stallbaum reads *τοῦτο* with Ξ and a majority of the inferior MSS; but there is no reason for deserting A and Π. The antecedent to *τούτῳ* is contained in *οἶσθ' οὖν—ἀδικεῖν*. From the fact that such a person *κακουργεῖ* when he gets the chance, it is clear (says Socrates) that when he *εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι*, he achieves this result only by doing violence to himself.

21 **ἐπιεικεῖ κτλ.**: 'by a sort of virtuous self-constraint' not (as Campbell) 'by some virtuous element in himself he forcibly restrains.' *βίᾳ* is a verbal noun as in *βίᾳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν* (566 A) and the like. *τινι* qualifies *ἐπιεικεῖ*: there is no real *ἐπιείκεια* in this sort of thing: cf. *Phaed.* 69 A ff.

554 D 24 **εὑρήσεις**: see *cr. n.* The addition of *ἐν* above the line by A^2 is hardly sufficient to justify *ἐνευρήσεις*, especially as *εὑρήσεις* has much more support from the other MSS. *ἐνευρίσκω* has not yet been proved classical (see Jebb on Soph. *Aj.* 1144), and Schneider afterwards (*Addit.* p. 65) retracted his defence of it here. The distance of *τοῖς πολλοῖς* from *ἐνούσας ἐπιθυμίας* is no real difficulty, especially after *ἐπιθυμίας ἐνούσας* just above.

25 **τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος ξυγγενεῖς κτλ.** Cf. VII 519 B, C *n.* For *ἀστασίαστος* see on 545 C. *διπλοῦς*: like the oligarchical State, which is 'not one, but two' (551 D).

ἐπιθυμίας. Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ἀστασίαστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἷς ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ
E ἐπιθυμιῶν ὡς τὸ | πολὺ κρατούσας ἂν ἔχοι βελτίους χειρόνων. Ἔστιν οὕτω. Διὰ ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι, εὐσχημονέστερος ἂν πολλῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἴη· ὁμονοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθὴς 30
ἀρετὴ πόρρω ποι ἐκφεύγοι ἂν αὐτόν. Δοκεῖ μοι. Καὶ μὴν ἀντα-
555 γωνιστής γε ἰδίᾳ ἐν πόλει ὁ φειδωλὸς | φαῦλος ἢ τινος νίκης ἢ ἄλλης φιλοτιμίας τῶν καλῶν, χρήματά τε οὐκ ἐθέλων εὐδοξίας ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγώνων ἀναλίσκειν, δεδιὼς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἀναλωτικὰς ἐγείρειν καὶ ξυμπαρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ ξυμμαχίαν τε καὶ φιλονικίαν, ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἑαυτοῦ πολεμῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶς τὰ πολλὰ 5
ἡττᾶται καὶ πλουτεῖ. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ἔτι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπιστοῦμεν, μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχουμένην πόλιν ὁμοιότητι τὸν
B φειδωλόν τε καὶ χρηματιστὴν | τετάχθαι; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.

7. μὴ $A^2\Pi$: om. A^1.

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554 E 30 **ἡρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς.** Richards would omit *τῆς*, but the article (which is in all MSS), implies, I think, that such a soul exists and has already been described, as it has in *ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον* IV 443 D, E.

31 **ἀνταγωνιστής γε κτλ.** See on 551 E. Susemihl *Gen. Entw.* II p. 232 reminds us of the disinclination on the part of rich Athenians to undertake *λειτουργίαι*: see Hermann-Thumser l.c. pp. 687 ff.

555 A 2 **τῶν καλῶν**: sc. *φιλοτιμιῶν*. In *χρήματά τε* the *τε* connects its own with the preceding clause, and does not here mean 'both.' *τοιούτων*: i.e. *εὐδόξων*. This interpretation is more idiomatic and forcible than to refer *τοιούτων* to *φιλοτιμίας κτλ.*

5 **φιλονικίαν κτλ.** The *ὀλιγαρχικός*, when competing for *νίκη*, is a *φαῦλος ἀνταγωνιστής*, because he is afraid to summon his *ἀναλωτικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι* 'to fight and strive for victory along with him,' precisely as the oligarchical city was afraid to arm the *πλῆθος* (551 D *n.*). And just as the oligarchs found themselves *ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγ-αρχικοὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μάχεσθαι* (551 E), so the *ὀλιγαρχικὸς ἀνήρ*, 'true to his name of olig-arch' (*ὀλιγαρχικῶς*), 'employs but few of his forces in the war, and is usually beaten and keeps his money' ('loses the prize and saves his money' Jowett). The force of *ξυμ-* in *ξυμμαχίαν* may perhaps extend to *φιλονικίαν* (cf. 546 A *n.*), which must not be translated 'rivalry' (with D. and V.): see on IX 581 B. *ἡττᾶται καὶ πλουτεῖ* has an epigrammatic effect somewhat like Juvenal's "probitas laudatur et alget."

7 **ὁμοιότητι** = 'in virtue of similarity': cf. IX 576 C. Baiter and others would expunge the word in both places as an 'inutile glossema,' and it is true that the meaning could be apprehended without *ὁμοιότητι*, as in 561 E—562 A. There are, however, many principles (e.g. *ἀνομοιότης* etc.) on which things can be *τεταγμένα κατ' ἄλληλα* 'ranged over against one another,' and it is right that in summing up, Plato should emphasise the principle which has determined the form of his exposition from *σκοπῶμεν δὴ εἰ ὅμοιος ἂν εἴη* (554 A) onwards: see 554 B, D, E *nn.* For the dative cf. IX 575 C *n.*

555 B—**557** A *Oligarchy is succeeded by Democracy. As dissipated young men in an oligarchical government are permitted and even encouraged to squander their property, a large impoverished class of 'stinging drones' makes its appearance in the city. The rulers take no steps to remedy an evil which increases their own fortunes, and become luxurious and effeminate. In seasons of stress and common danger, the poor discover their own*

Χ. Δημοκρατίαν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, τίνα τε γίγνεται τρόπον γενομένη τε ποῖόν τινα ἔχει, ἵν' αὖ τὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρὸς τρόπον γνόντες παραστησώμεθ' αὐτὸν εἰς κρίσιν. Ὁμοίως γοῦν ἄν, ἔφη, ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πορευοίμεθα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβάλλει μὲν τρόπον τινὰ τοιόνδε ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν, δι' ἀπληστίαν τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ὡς πλουσιώτατον δεῖν γίγνεσθαι; Πῶς δή; Ἄτε, οἶμαι, ἄρχοντες ἐν αὐτῇ οἱ ἄρχοντες C διὰ τὸ πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν εἴργειν νόμῳ τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἂν ἀκόλαστοι γίγνωνται, μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἀναλίσκειν τε καὶ ἀπολλύναι τὰ αὑτῶν, ἵνα ὠνούμενοι τὰ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ εἰσδανείζοντες ἔτι πλουσιώτεροι καὶ ἐντιμότεροι γίγνωνται. Παντός γε μᾶλλον. Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ἤδη τοῦτο ἐν πόλει, ὅτι πλοῦτον τιμᾶν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἅμα ἱκανῶς κτᾶσθαι ἐν τοῖς πολίταις ἀδύνατον, | ἀλλ' D ἀνάγκη ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀμελεῖν ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου; Ἐπιεικῶς, ἔφη, δῆλον. Παραμελοῦντες δὴ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ἐφιέντες ἀκολασταίνειν οὐκ ἀγεννεῖς ἐνίοτε ἀνθρώπους πένητας ἠνάγκασαν γενέσθαι.

18. εἰσδανείζοντες $A^1\Pi$: δανείζοντες A^2.

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strength and the weakness of the rich, and thereafter it needs but a little impulse to overthrow the rotten fabric. Democracy is established as soon as the introduction of the lot affirms the principle of equality.

555 B 9 **δημοκρατίαν δή κτλ.** We have seen that the dominant feature in the oligarchical State is *τὸ φιλοχρήματον*, and the present chapter describes how in process of time the polity itself is inevitably overthrown by that very principle. The incidents which prove the immediate cause of revolution are such as may frequently have happened in Greek history: see 556 C, D, E and 557 A *nn.* It is instructive to compare with this chapter Aristotle's *a posteriori* analysis of the causes of revolution in oligarchical cities (*Pol.* E 6). On the psychological basis of democracy see 557 A *n.*

11 **παραστησώμεθα κτλ.** For the use of *παραστήσασθαι* Schneider refers to II 360 E, 361 B and Lucian *Icarom.* 17, *ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις παραστήσαμενος πολλοὺς χορευτὰς—ἔπειτα προστάξειε κτλ.*

ὁμοίως κτλ. See 543 A *n.* *μεταβάλλει*='it changes,' viz. the *πολιτεία*. The verb is scarcely impersonal, as the English translators appear to suppose.

14 **προκειμένου κτλ.** *προκειμένου* is not 'publicly acknowledged' (D. and V.), but 'propositus,' as in *τὸ τέλος τὸ προκείμενον*. *δεῖν* (wrongly rejected by J. J. Hartman) 'resumes the notion of *προκειμένου*' (J. and C.). Similar pleonasms occur in *Crit.* 44 C, *Gorg.* 500 C and elsewhere: cf. also *ἐξεῖναι* in C below and VII 535 A *n.*

555 C 15 **ἄτε—ἄρχοντες κτλ.** As in timarchy (550 D ff.), so in oligarchy, it is the love of money which sows the seeds of party strife and political degeneration. Cf. generally 552 A *n.* and Aristotle *Pol.* E 6. 1305^b 39 ff., with his criticism of Plato ibid. 12. 1316^b 15 ff.

18 **εἰσδανείζοντες**: i.e. 'lending money on-the-security-of' (*εἰς*). The *τὰ τῶν τοιούτων* should be taken with the *εἰς* of *εἰσδανείζοντες* as well as with *ὠνούμενοι*: cf. Arist. *Pol.* Z 4. 1319^a 13 *δανείζειν εἴς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἑκάστῳ γῆς* and Dem. *in Aphob.* I 28. The word *εἰσδανείζω* is a *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον*, but we certainly ought not to substitute *ἐκδανείζοντες* (suggested by Stephanus) or *προσδανείζοντες* (with Richards).

20 **δῆλον ἤδη τοῦτο κτλ.** See 550 E *n.*

555 D 24 **οὐκ ἀγεννεῖς κτλ.**='of no common stamp' etc. (*von nicht gemeiner Art*, Schneider), not simply 'of noble birth' (as D. and V.). Catiline would

Μάλα γε. Κάθηνται δή, οἶμαι, οὗτοι ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκεντρωμένοι τε καὶ ἐξωπλισμένοι, οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες χρέα, οἱ δὲ ἄτιμοι γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισοῦντές τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς κτησαμένοις
E τὰ αὑτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες. | Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οἱ δὲ δὴ χρηματισταὶ ἐγκύψαντες οὐδὲ δοκοῦντες τούτους ὁρᾶν, τῶν λοιπῶν τὸν ἀεὶ ὑπείκοντα ἐνιέντες ἀργύριον τιτρώσκοντες καὶ
556 τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκγόνους τόκους πολλαπλασίους κομιζόμενοι | πολὺν τὸν κηφῆνα καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι τῇ πόλει. Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, οὐ πολύν; Οὔτε γ' ἐκείνῃ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἐκκαόμενον ἐθέλουσιν ἀποσβεννύναι, εἴργοντες τὰ αὑτοῦ ὅπῃ τις βούλεται τρέπειν, οὔτε τῇδε, ᾗ αὖ κατὰ ἕτερον νόμον τὰ τοιαῦτα λύεται.
Κατὰ δὴ τίνα; Ὃς μετ' ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι δεύτερος καὶ ἀναγκάζων ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτοῦ κινδύνῳ
B τὰ πολλά τις τῶν ἑκουσίων ξυμβολαίων | προστάττῃ ξυμβάλλειν, χρηματίζοιντο μὲν ἂν ἧττον ἀναιδῶς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐλάττω δ' ἐν αὐτῇ φύοιτο τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, οἷων νῦν δὴ εἴπομεν. Καὶ πολύ

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have seemed to Plato a case in point (cf. Sallust *Cat.* 5), and the Catilinarian conspiracy illustrates not inaptly the description which follows (555 D, E). The aorist *ἠνάγκασαν* is gnomic, as appears from the plural *ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις*.

25 **κεκεντρωμένοι κτλ.** See 552 C, D *nn.* *ἐξωπλισμένοι* does little more than explain the metaphor, *more Platonico*: see on V 451 B and cf. *καὶ πτωχόν* (wrongly discarded by J. J. Hartman) in 556 A below.

555 E 29 ἐγκύψαντες. *τοιαῦτα γὰρ τὰ τῶν ἄγαν φροντιζόντων καὶ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐχόντων σχήματα* (Schol. on Ar. *Clouds* 191). A comparison with IX 586 A *κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν* suggests that the stoop of the *χρηματιστής* in reality betrays the inherent earthliness of his soul: see on VII 519 A, B and cf. Dante *Purg.* 19. 70—72.

31 **τοῦ πατρὸς κτλ.** Cf. VI 507 A *n.* *τόκους* is bracketed by Herwerden, but *τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἔκγονον* (l.c.) supports it.

556 A 3 οὔτε γε κτλ. *καί* appears before *οὔτε* in ΠΞ *q* and a majority of MSS, but the reading of A is, I now think, right. We should translate 'At all events, said I, they are unwilling to extinguish this kind of mischief when it is beginning to break into a flame, either by preventing' etc. If they quenched it in its earlier stages, then the *πτωχοί* would not be *πολλοί*: and *πολύν* bears the emphasis in both the previous sentences. For this use of *γε* see 559 B *n.*, and cf. IX 581 C and (with Schneider) Isocr. *Paneg.* 153. With *ἐκκαόμενον* cf. Ar. *Peace* 1132. D. and V. understand the word of 'cauterizing,' wrongly, as *ἀποσβεννύναι* shews.

4 **ὅπῃ.** I formerly, with two inferior MSS, Bekker and Ast, read *ὅποι*, which is certainly more exact: see the examples cited by Blaydes on Ar. *Clouds* 858 *τὰς δ' ἐμβάδας ποῖ τέτροφας;* The verb *βούλεται* is however treated as more than a mere auxiliary, and the relative accommodated to it by a species of attraction, even at the cost of sacrificing something of the peculiar force of *τρέπειν*. Translate 'to dispose of one's property as one likes.'

5 **ἕτερον νόμον.** Plato's language here and in *ὃς μετ' ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι δεύτερος* seems to imply that such a law would not be altogether a novelty in Greece. According to Theophrastus (*Frag.* 97. 5 Wimmer = Stob. *Flor.* 44. 22), it found a place among the laws of Charondas: *ἐὰν δέ τις πιστεύσῃ, μὴ εἶναι δίκην· αὐτὸν γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς ἀδικίας*. Plato makes a similar provision in *Laws* 742 C, 849 E, 915 E.

γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς μὲν δὴ ἀρχομένους οὕτω διατιθέασιν ἐν τῇ πόλει οἱ ἄρχοντες· σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὑτῶν ἆρ' οὐ τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους καὶ ἀπόνους καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ καρτερεῖν | πρὸς ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀργούς; Τί μήν; Αὐτοὺς C δὲ πλὴν χρηματισμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμεληκότας, καὶ οὐδὲν πλείω ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιημένους ἀρετῆς ἢ τοὺς πένητας; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν ἀλλήλοις οἵ τε ἄρχοντες καὶ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι ἢ ἐν ὁδῶν πορείαις ἢ ἐν ἄλλαις τισὶ κοινωνίαις, ἢ κατὰ θεωρίας ἢ κατὰ στρατείας, ἢ ξύμπλοι γιγνόμενοι ἢ συστρατιῶται, ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνοις | ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι D μηδαμῇ ταύτῃ καταφρονῶνται οἱ πένητες ὑπὸ τῶν πλουσίων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἰσχνὸς ἀνὴρ πένης, ἡλιωμένος, παραταχθεὶς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίῳ ἐσκιατροφηκότι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας, ἴδῃ

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556 B 11 **τοὺς μὲν δὴ κτλ.** *μέν* balances *δέ* after *σφᾶς*, and should not be taken with *δή* in the ordinary sense of the collocation *μὲν δή*: so that there is no reason to omit *δή* (with Ξ and two other MSS) on the ground that *μὲν δή* comes too late in the sentence. *δή* "priori membro dilatando inservit et vinculi per *μέν* iniecti nexum relaxans alterum membrum ut nova interrogatione instructum minus miremur efficit" (Schneider, comparing *Laws* 751 E).

13 **ἆρ' οὐ τρυφῶντας κτλ.** Note the usual Platonic chiasmus.

556 C, D 18 **παραβάλλωσιν:** 'come alongside,' originally perhaps a nautical expression (J. and C.), as in Arist. *de gen. anim.* III 11. 763ª 31. The usage occurs again in *Lys.* 203 B, and tolerably often in Aristotle.

21 **ἢ καὶ κτλ.** *ὅταν* extends its influence to *καταφρονῶνται* and *ἴδῃ*. On *θεώμενοι κτλ.* Schneider remarks "post verba *ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι* exspectabatur *μηδαμῇ ὡς πρότερον περὶ ἀλλήλων διανοῶνται*, vel tale quid, quod ad utrosque se invicem conspicientes pertineret; cuius loco statim divisione facta quid iam de pauperibus divites, de divitibus pauperes sentiant, infertur. Cuius non inconsequentiae, sed breviloquentiae significandae causa supra post *θεώμενοι* comma—sustuli." The effect is analogous to that produced by so-called partitive apposition (IV 431 A *n.*), of which idiom a somewhat similar extension occurs in V 465 C, where see note. Richards suspects corruption, proposing to read either (1) *θεωμένων* and perhaps also *ἢ κἂν* or *ἢ καὶ <ἐάν>* instead of *ἢ καί*, or (2) simply to insert *καί* before *μηδαμῇ*. The second proposal is neat and scholarly; but *καί* was unlikely to disappear, and Plato's rapidity of thought and style renders him particularly liable to grammatical and other irregularities in his more spirited and dramatic passages: cf. VI 488 C, D, VII 531 A, and infra 558 A. See also on 549 D above.

556 D 22 **ταύτῃ** is emphatic, implying that it is otherwise when danger does not threaten.

24 **πολλὰς κτλ.:** 'with quantities of alien fat about him' (*viel fremdes Fleisch an sich habend*, Schneider), 'cumbered with much fat.' *παχεῖς* 'bloated' was, it may be remembered, a nickname for oligarchs: see Gilbert *Gr. Staatsalt.* II p. 275 *n.* 2 and Neil's edition of Ar. *Knights* App. II p. 209. *ἀλλοτρίας* is 'not his own,' i.e. no real part of him, and hence useless, superfluous. As Graser points out (*Spec. advers. in serm. Pl.* p. 91), it is Homer's *γναθμοῖσιν ἀλλοτρίοισι* (*Od.* XX 347) which is the source of this and other kindred uses of *ἀλλότριος*, e.g. Thuc. I 70. 6 and Isocr. *Paneg.* 86. Hermann thinks the meaning is that he has grown fat at the expense of others, like the drone. This explanation is less pointed, and the drone represents not the rich oligarch, but the *πτωχός* (555 E). With the feeling of this passage cf. Plut. *Apoph.*

ἄσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν, ἆρ' οἴει αὐτὸν οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι κακίᾳ 25
τῇ σφετέρᾳ πλουτεῖν τοὺς τοιούτους, καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλῳ παραγγέλλειν,
E ὅταν ἰδίᾳ ξυγγίγνωνται, ὅτι ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι· | εἰσὶ γὰρ οὐδέν; Εὖ
οἶδα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὕτω ποιοῦσιν. Οὐκοῦν ὥσπερ σῶμα
νοσῶδες μικρᾶς ῥοπῆς ἔξωθεν δεῖται προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάμνειν,
ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ 30
κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ διακειμένη πόλις ἀπὸ σμικρᾶς προφάσεως,
ἔξωθεν ἐπαγομένων ἢ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐξ ὀλιγαρχουμένης πόλεως συμ-
μαχίαν ἢ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐκ δημοκρατουμένης, νοσεῖ τε καὶ αὐτὴ αὑτῇ
557 μάχεται, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει; | Καὶ σφόδρα γε.
Δημοκρατία δή, οἶμαι, γίγνεται, ὅταν οἱ πένητες νικήσαντες τοὺς
μὲν ἀποκτείνωσι τῶν ἑτέρων, τοὺς δὲ ἐκβάλωσι, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐξ
ἴσου μεταδῶσι πολιτείας τε καὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ κλήρων

32. ἐπαγομένων—συμμαχίαν Π et in marg. A^2: om. A^1. 33. νοσεῖ A^2Π: νοήσει A^1.

Reg. et Imp. 192 D τοῖς πολυσάρκοις ἐπολέμει (Ἐπαμεινώνδας) καί τινα τοιοῦτον ἀπήλασε τῆς στρατιᾶς, εἰπὼν ὅτι μόλις αὐτοῦ σκέπουσι τὴν γαστέρα ἀσπίδες τρεῖς ἢ τέσσαρες.

27 **ἄνδρες—οὐδέν.** 'We have them at our mercy: for they're good for nothing.' ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι is virtually an exhortation to rise in revolt: hence παραγγέλλειν. The omission of the article heightens the dramatic effect: cf. X 617 D. ἡμέτεροι has a colloquial ring ('they are ours'). A kindred meaning, but without any colloquial touch, appears in Xen. *Cyr.* II 3. 2 (quoted by Schneider *Addit.* p. 65) ἦν μὲν ἡμεῖς νικῶμεν—δῆλον ὅτι οἵ τε πολέμιοι ἡμέτεροι καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἀγαθὰ πάντα: cf. also VII 5. 73. This interpretation, which Schneider finally suggested, has the support of A, Π and other MSS. Baiter's ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶ παρ' οὐδέν has found considerable favour, and gives a fair sense, but παρ' οὐδέν (for which see Jebb on Soph. *Ant.* 466) appears to me unpleasantly weak. ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶν οὐδέν (ρ and others) is intrinsically better (cf. 562 D), and may be right, but the intrusion of γάρ in the best MSS remains a difficulty, and παραγγέλλειν (as in Baiter's reading) is shorn perhaps of its full force. It is on the whole easier, I think, to understand ἡμέτεροι as I do than to explain the insertion of γάρ in our two oldest and best MSS.

556 E 28 **οὐκοῦν ὥσπερ κτλ.** Cf. Soph. *O. T.* 961 σμικρὰ παλαιὰ σώματ' εὐνάζει ῥοπή. The Platonic simile is imitated by Arist. *Pol.* Z 6. 1320^b 33 ff. and may also, as Stallbaum thinks, have been in Demosthenes' mind when he wrote *Ol.* II 21.

32 **ἔξωθεν ἐπαγομένων κτλ.** A familiar feature in the history of Greek revolutions: cf. Whibley *Gk Olig.* p. 52 and (for examples) Gilbert *Gr. Staatsalt.* II *passim.*

557 A 4 **καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ κτλ.**: 'and the magistracies in the city are for the most part given by lot.' These words, which depend, of course, on ὅταν, explain ἐξ ἴσου—ἀρχῶν, and should be taken in close connexion with that clause, as Ast long ago pointed out. The difference in tense (μεταδῶσι but γίγνωνται), no less than the meaning, clearly indicates that the two clauses do not express two separate and distinct acts. It is by means of the lot that ἰσότης is secured; and hence democracy is not established until offices are assigned thereby: cf. Hdt. III 80 πάλῳ μὲν ἀρχὰς ἄρχει and Arist. *Rhet.* I 8. 1365^b 32 δημοκρατία μὲν πολιτεία ἐν ᾗ κλήρῳ διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, with Whibley *Gk Olig.* p. 35 and Greenidge *Gk Const. Hist.* pp. 139 ff. The clause was, strangely enough, condemned by Hermann. Plato was not likely to omit all mention of the most characteristic and necessary factor in the establishment of a democracy, especially as he

αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν αὐτῇ γίγνωνται. Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, αὕτη ἡ κατάστασις δημοκρατίας, ἐάν τε καὶ δι' ὅπλων γένηται ἐάν τε καὶ διὰ φόβον ὑπεξελθόντων τῶν ἑτέρων.

XI. Τίνα δὴ οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτοι τρόπον οἰκοῦσι; καὶ ποία τις ἡ τοιαύτη | αὖ πολιτεία; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ B δημοκρατικός τις ἀναφανήσεται. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ παρρησίας

6. φόβον $A^2\Xi q$: φόβων $A^1\Pi$.

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introduces the same feature in describing the democratical man (561 B ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ). J. and C., with Schneider and others, read γίγνονται, for which there is very little MS support, remarking that 'the subjunctive is inexact, because any words dependent on ὅταν should describe a characteristic of the origin of democracy, not merely a characteristic of democracy.' The fact is that the words do explain the origin of democracy by explaining ἐξ ἴσου μεταδῶσι κτλ., where the aorist is rightly used of the act by which democracy is established; whereas if we read γίγνονται the clause must be taken by itself, and then it can only express a characteristic of democracy after that constitution is in force, so that its proper place would be in the next chapter. It should be observed that in no ancient democracy that we know of was the lot employed in electing to *all* magistracies: see Gilbert l.c. II p. 318. For this reason Plato writes ὡς τὸ πολύ.

557 A—**558** C *The peculiar characteristics of Democracy are liberty and licence. It is of all governments the most manifold and many-coloured, resembling a bazaar of constitutions rather than a single polity. In a democratic city the individual is free to adopt his own policy independently of the State. Little trouble is taken to execute judicial sentences. The people are indulgent to educational defects in their leaders and require nothing beyond a profession of loyalty to the masses. Truly a delightful constitution, full of anarchy and colour, distributing a species of equality to equal and unequal alike!*

557 A 8 **τίνα δὴ οὖν κτλ.** The psychological principle of Democracy, as well as of Oligarchy, is τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. But whereas in Oligarchy everything was subjected to the dominion of one particular desire, viz. the desire of wealth (550 C *n.*), Democracy, on the other hand, is the political embodiment of absolute freedom and equality among all desires, unnecessary as well as necessary: see on 558 C ff. The materials for Plato's picture of democracy are of course taken from Athens more than any other single city. It is an extraordinarily vivid sketch; and indeed Plato's whole account of democracy and the democratical man (557 A—565 C), in spite of manifest exaggerations, brings Athens nearer to us than almost any monument of ancient literature, Aristophanes alone excepted. We can see that Plato was fully alive to the wonderful variety and colour of Athenian life; but even on this ground democracy did not appear to him worthy of praise. Multiplicity and variety are the offspring of that fatal ἀνομοιότης which works ruin alike in the city and the soul (547 A *n.*). In other respects, Plato represents democracy as a land of Hedonism, peopled by Anarchy and Waywardness, and darkened by the shadow of the Tyranny to which it must at last succumb. Nearly all the greatest writers of Greek antiquity were on the whole unfavourable to democracy, except of course the Orators: and least of all in Plato could democracy expect a champion. For the other side of the picture, we should of course take Pericles' speech in Thuc. II 35 ff. See Neil's *Knights of Aristophanes* pp. vii ff.

557 B 9 **δῆλον γὰρ κτλ.** It is the ἀνήρ rather than the πολιτεία which is the ultimate object of our search; but as the ἀνήρ in a democracy will be δημοκρατικός τις, we cannot understand him until we understand δημοκρατία. Hence the question ποία τις—πολιτεία. Cf. 545 B, C.

11 **ἐλευθερίας.** ἐλευθερία was the fundamental ὑπόθεσις of ancient democracy: ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία, says Aristotle *Pol.* Z 2. 1317^a 40. Cf. 562 B. It involves, according to Aristotle l.c., two ideas, viz. (1) τὸ ἐν

γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅ τί τις βούλεται; Λέγεταί γε δή, ἔφη. Ὅπου δέ γε ἐξουσία, δῆλον ὅτι ἰδίαν ἕκαστος ἂν κατασκευὴν τοῦ αὑτοῦ βίου κατασκευάζοιτο ἐν αὐτῇ, ἥτις ἕκαστον
C ἀρέσκοι. Δῆλον. Παντοδαποὶ δὴ ἄν, οἶμαι, ἐν ταύτῃ | τῇ πολιτείᾳ μάλιστ' ἐγγίγνοιντο ἄνθρωποι. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Κινδυνεύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι· ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν πεποικιλμένη καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο. καὶ ἴσως μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταύτην, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδές τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ ποικίλα θεώ-
D μενοι, καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαν. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Καὶ ἔστιν γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἦν | δ' ἐγώ, ἐπιτήδειον ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ πολιτείαν. Τί δή; Ὅτι πάντα γένη πολιτειῶν ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ κινδυνεύει τῷ βουλομένῳ πόλιν κατασκευάζειν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐποιοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς δημοκρατουμένην
E ἐλθόντι πόλιν, ὡς ἂν αὐτὸν ἀρέσκῃ τρόπος, τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι, ὥσπερ εἰς παντοπώλιον ἀφικομένῳ πολιτειῶν, καὶ ἐκλεξαμένῳ οὕτω κατοικίζειν. Ἴσως γοῦν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἂν ἀποροῖ | παραδειγμά-

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μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, (2) *τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεταί τις* (ib. 1317^b 11). Throughout this chapter Plato illustrates the second of these characteristics. Cf. Whibley *Gk Olig.* pp. 33—35.

παρρησία and **ἐξουσία** are democratical watchwords; see e.g. *Gorg.* 461 E, Eur. *Hipp.* 422, *Ion* 671 ff., and Thuc. VII 69 (*τῆς—ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας*) with II 37. 2 and infra 557 D, 563 E, Arist. *Pol.* Z 4. 1318^b 39 al.

557 C 17 **ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον κτλ.** For the asyndeton cf. VI 497 B *n.* *ποικίλον* = 'many-coloured' is cancelled by Herwerden and J. J. Hartman. The word is in every MS and thoroughly harmonises with Plato's characteristic fulness of style: 'like a many-coloured garment, diversified with every shade of colour.' In itself it is the antithesis of *ἁπλοῦς*, and symbolical of kaleidoscopic diversity and changefulness, just as in recent years we have heard the expression 'Joseph's coat of many colours' applied to a versatile and distinguished statesman. See also on 561 E. *ἄνθεσι* is not 'flowers' (as seems to be generally supposed), but 'dyes,' 'colours' (IV 429 D *n.*): nor need *πεποικιλμένη* be understood of embroidery: for *ποικίλλειν* means no more than 'to diversify with colours' and implies nothing whatever as to the process: cf. II 378 C. On the verbal play in *ἄνθεσι—ἤθεσι* see III 406 B *n.* For *ἦν δ' ἐγώ* repeated cf. VII 522 A *n.*

557 D 23 **πάντα γένη κτλ.** Cf. *Laws* 681 D *πολιτείας σχῆμα—ἐν ᾧ δὴ πάντα εἴδη καὶ παθήματα πολιτειῶν καὶ ἅμα πόλεων ξυμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι.* On *ἐξουσίαν* see 557 B *n.*

26 **τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι κτλ.** Pericles (Thuc. II 37. 1) regarded the Athenian constitution as a *παράδειγμα*: Plato humorously describes it as a motley aggregate of *παραδείγματα*. Democracy is *πόλεις παμποίκιλαι, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις*, the different varieties of individuals living in it representing so many different constitutions. In view of 561 C we may even go farther, and say that every democratical individual is himself a kaleidoscopic succession of polities—*χαμαιλέων τις καὶ σαθρῶς ἱδρυμένος* (ap. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* I 11. 1100^b 6). Hence, as Plato would hold, the waywardness and instability of democratic policy, constantly reversing to-morrow what it decrees to-day. See Thuc. I 44, II 65, III 36 ff., IV 28 and VIII 1. Democracy in fact, from Plato's point of view, is the political expression of monochronous Hedonism: cf. 558 A and 561 C *nn.*

των. Τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην, εἶπον, εἶναι ἄρχειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ
30 *πόλει, μηδ' ἂν ᾖς ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν, μηδὲ αὖ ἄρχεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ βούλῃ, μηδὲ πολεμεῖν πολεμούντων, μηδὲ εἰρήνην ἄγειν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγόντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιθυμῇς εἰρήνης, μηδὲ αὖ, ἐάν τις ἄρχειν νόμος σε διακωλύῃ ἢ δικάζειν, μηδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν, ἐὰν αὐτῷ σοι ἐπίῃ, | ἆρ' οὐ θεσπεσία καὶ ἡδεῖα ἡ τοιαύτη διαγωγὴ ἐν* 558
τῷ παραυτίκα; Ἴσως, ἔφη, ἔν γε τούτῳ. Τί δέ; ἡ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἢ οὕπω εἶδες ἐν τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς, οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτῶν

32. *ἐπιθυμῇς q*: ἐπιθυμῇ ΑΠΞ[1]: *ἐπιθυμεῖ* Ξ[2]. 33. *ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν* Ξ *q*: *ἀρχῆς καὶ δικάζῃς* A[1]Π[2]: *ἄρχῃς καὶ δικάζῃς* A[2]: *ἀρχὴς* (*sic*) *καὶ δικάζεις* Π[1]. 1. *τοιαύτη* Π: *αὐτὴ* A.

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557 E 29 **ἀνάγκην.** The Athenians gloried in their *ἀνειμένη δίαιτα*. See Thuc. II 39. 1 and *Laws* 642 C *μόνοι γὰρ ἄνευ ἀνάγκης, αὐτοφυῶς, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ, ἀληθῶς καὶ οὔ τι πλαστῶς εἰσιν ἀγαθοί*.

32 **μηδὲ αὖ—δικάζειν**: 'nor again, if any law prevents you from being a magistrate or judge—actually to be both magistrate and judge in spite of the law, if you take it into your own head to be so.' The grammatical construction would naturally be *μηδὲ αὖ* (*ἀνάγκην εἶναι*)—*μηδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν* κτλ. This could only mean 'nor any necessity compelling you to act as magistrate or judge if a law forbids you,' etc. i.e. 'you are not even compelled to follow your own inclination when it goes *against* the law.' The sentiment is intelligible, but too extravagant and subtle a piece of satire even for so highly coloured a passage as the present. As it is, Plato starts as if he would write 'nor again—to *refrain* from being a magistrate or judge,' but by a dramatic anacoluthon expresses the last part of his sentence in a positive form. *μηδὲν ἧττον* and the emphatic *καὶ–καί* make it easy to catch the meaning. The corruptions in A Π (see *cr. n.*) and some other MSS are probably due to assimilation.

558 A 1 **θεσπεσία καὶ ἡδεῖα** is almost a hendiadys: cf. IV 429 E *n.* Democracy is political hedonism: see on 561 C. Hermann's *θεσπεσία ὡς ἡδεῖα* is inelegant and even questionable Greek: nor does *θεσπεσία καὶ θεία* (Stallbaum) merit praise.

2 **τί δέ; ἡ πραότης** κτλ.: 'And is not the perfect good temper of some who have been tried exquisite? or have you never seen in such a State, when people have been condemned to death or exile, how none the less they remain and roam about in public, and the culprit saunters round as though unheeded and unseen like some spirit from another world?' They bear the State no malice, and shew their good temper by stopping where they are—for the sentence remains unexecuted. See also App. II.

3 **δικασθέντων** has been thought to be neuter (Weil *Rev. d. Phil.* VIII pp. 171 ff.); but although the usage of the word in other passages of Plato (*Critias* 120 C, *Laws* 867 E, infra X 614 D, *Crit.* 50 B, *Gorg.* 523 C and elsewhere) favours this view, it yields no satisfactory sense, and *πραότης* is an attribute of persons rather than of things. The perfect passive—it is not the middle—of *δικάζω* is similarly used of persons in Lysias 21. 18 *αἰσχρὰς δίκας δεδίκασμαι*. The circumstances of Socrates' own imprisonment after his condemnation illustrate, though only imperfectly, what is said here, for the Athenians were not careful to prevent him from escaping: see *Crit. passim* and my Introduction to that dialogue pp. ix f.

4 **ἀνθρώπων** κτλ. The construction is extremely irregular. Perhaps the simplest and least unsatisfactory solution is to make *καταψηφισθέντων* a genitive absolute and regard *μενόντων* etc. as attracted by *ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων* (so also J. and C.). See App. II.

θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς κτλ. For the genitive Kühner (*Gr. Gr.* II p. 332) compares *θανάτου κρίνεσθαι, ὑπάγεσθαι* and the like, in which *δίκην* is probably understood. The genitive of the penalty seems not to occur elsewhere with *καταψηφι-*

μενόντων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφομένων ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς οὔτε φροντίζοντος 5
οὔτε ὁρῶντος οὐδενὸς περινοστεῖ ὥσπερ ἥρως; Καὶ πολλούς γ',
B ἔφη. Ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη καὶ οὐδ' | ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία αὐτῆς,
ἀλλὰ καταφρόνησις ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν σεμνύνοντες, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν
ᾠκίζομεν, ὡς εἰ μή τις ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔχοι, οὔποτ' ἂν
γένοιτο ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὢν εὐθὺς παίζοι ἐν καλοῖς καὶ 10
ἐπιτηδεύοι τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς καταπατήσας
ἅπαντα ταῦτα οὐδὲν φροντίζει, ἐξ ὁποίων ἄν τις ἐπιτηδευμάτων
ἐπὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ ἰὼν πράττῃ, ἀλλὰ τιμᾷ, ἐὰν φῇ μόνον εὔνους εἶναι

11. καταπατήσας' q^2: καταπατήσας ΑΠΞq^1. 12. ταῦτα Π: αὐτὰ A.

ζεσθαι, and we should perhaps read θάνατον ἢ φυγήν. The pronoun αὐτῶν is half pleonastic: cf. IV 428 A *n.*

5 **καὶ ὡς κτλ.** The change from plural to singular (cf. I 347 A *n.*) "rem magis insignem et imaginem evidentiorem reddit" (Schneider). The same effect is produced by making the clause independent—a common transition, for examples of which see Engelhardt *Anac. Pl. Spec.* III pp. 41—43.

6 **περινοστεῖ κτλ.**: i.e. ἀπὸ τόπου εἰς τόπον μεταβαίνει κτλ. (Schol. on Ar. *Plut.* 121). The word has a contemptuous ring—a rolling stone gathers no moss—and suggests a vagrant or loafer. Cf. Ar. l.c. and ib. 494 ἦν γὰρ ὁ Πλοῦτος νυνὶ βλέψῃ καὶ μὴ τυφλὸς ὢν περινοστῇ, with Lucian *Tim.* 24 ἄνω καὶ κάτω πλανῶμαι περινοστῶν. The comparison ὥσπερ ἥρως is suggested by ὁρῶντος οὐδενός. They excite no more notice and remark than an invisible ἥρως or circumambient spirit of one who has joined the happy or unhappy dead: see Rohde *Psyche*[2] I pp. 146 ff. and especially p. 182 *nn.*, or Roscher *Lex. d. Myth.* s.v. Heros. Weil (*Rev. d. Phil.* VIII pp. 171 ff.) seems to think there is a specific reference to such an invisible hero as sometimes rendered service in battle (cf. Paus. III 19. 12 with Frazer's note, and Hdt. VIII 64); but Plato's language is quite general. The meaning cannot be 'parades like a hero' (as Jowett translates), for ἥρως is not thus used in Greek, and a parading hero always excites popular attention. J. and C. think 'there is an implied allusion to the νόστοι. "He is welcomed wherever he goes like one of the heroes returning from the siege of Troy".' But what of οὔτε φροντίζοντος οὔτε ὁρῶντος οὐδενός? It may be noted that the superstition of which Plato here avails himself was widely prevalent in Greece as elsewhere. Hence some of the Pythagoreans asserted ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα (Arist. *de An.* I 2. 404[a] 18), and commanded τὰ πίπτοντα ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης μὴ ἀναιρεῖσθαι (Mullach *Fr. Phil. Gr.* I p. 507)—a precept on which Diogenes Laertius remarks Ἀριστοφάνης δὲ τῶν ἡρώων φησὶν εἶναι τὰ πίπτοντα (VIII 34). The famous passage in *Cor.* I 11. 10 looks like a relic of some similar idea. Cf. also *Phaed.* 81 C, Zeller[5] I p. 452 *nn.*, Rohde *Psyche*[2] II pp. 320 *n.* 1, 346 ff. *nn.*, 361 *nn.*, and Dieterich *Nekyia* pp. 88 f. *nn.* For other views on the whole of this difficult sentence see App. II.

καὶ πολλούς γε. The reply differs somewhat in form from the question: cf. V 465 E *n.* It is difficult not to believe that Plato is exaggerating, although the frequency of the δίκη ἐξούλης in Athens shews that in civil cases at all events it was often far from easy to enforce the verdict.

7 **συγγνώμη**: 'considerateness,' viz. in making allowance for want of education in their demagogues, as the rest of the sentence shews. The irony is of the truly Platonic kind. Jowett's "forgiving spirit" misses the point.

558 B **σμικρολογία κτλ.**: 'haggling about trifles' etc., like education, forsooth! ἐλέγομεν refers to IV 424 E ff. and VI 492 E.

11 **καταπατήσασα κτλ.** Cf. *Gorg.* 484 A. The reading αὐτά for ταῦτα—see *cr. n.*—is intrinsically weak, and has no MS support except A. On ἐξ ὁποίων κτλ. see VI 488 B *n.*

τῷ | πλήθει. Πάνυ γ', ἔφη, γενναία. Ταῦτά τε δή, ἔφην, ἔχοι ἂν C
καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφὰ δημοκρατία, καὶ εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡδεῖα
πολιτεία καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ποικίλη, ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε
καὶ ἀνίσοις διανέμουσα. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, γνώριμα λέγεις.

XII. Ἆθρει δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίς ὁ τοιοῦτος ἰδίᾳ. ἢ πρῶτον
σκεπτέον, ὥσπερ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐσκεψάμεθα, τίνα τρόπον γίγνεται;
Ναί, ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ὧδε; τοῦ φειδωλοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ὀλι- D
γαρχικοῦ | γένοιτ' ἄν, οἶμαι, υἱὸς ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος ἐν τοῖς
ἐκείνου ἤθεσι. Τί γὰρ οὔ; Βίᾳ δὴ καὶ οὗτος ἄρχων τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ
ἡδονῶν, ὅσαι ἀναλωτικαὶ μέν, χρηματιστικαὶ δὲ μή· αἳ δὴ οὐκ
ἀναγκαῖαι κέκληνται. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ
σκοτεινῶς διαλεγώμεθα, πρῶτον ὁρισώμεθα τάς τε ἀναγκαίους
ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τὰς μή; Βούλομαι, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν ἅς τε οὐκ
ἂν οἷοί τ' εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι, δικαίως ἂν ἀναγκαῖαι καλοῖντο, καὶ
ὅσαι | ἀποτελούμεναι ὠφελοῦσιν ἡμᾶς; τούτων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων E

14. γενναία Ξ q^2: γενναῖα Α Π q^1. ταῦτά Π: ταὐτατά (*sic*) Α. 25. ὁρισώμεθα A^2Π: ὁρισόμεθα A^1. 27. ἂν ἀναγκαῖαι M Vind. E: ἀναγκαῖαι ΑΠΞ q.

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558 C 14 **γενναία.** γενναῖα—see *cr. n.*—is much less elegant, in spite of the exclamatory anacoluthon ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς κτλ. See on V 465 E. Apelt strangely suggests ἔφη. Γενναῖα ταῦτά τε κτλ. (*Fleck. Jb.* for 1893, p. 556).

15 **ἄλλα ἀδελφά.** It is remarkable that Plato says nothing of ψηφίσματα, which were regarded as an essential feature of advanced democracy: see Arist. *Pol.* Δ 4. 1292ª 19 and Gilbert *Beitr. zur innern Gesch. Ath.* etc. pp. 79 ff.

ἡδεῖα κτλ. True political equality, according to Plato, is γεωμετρικὴ ἰσότης, which τῷ μὲν—μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δ' ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει (*Laws* 757 C and *Gorg.* 508 A): ἀριθμητικὴ ἰσότης, which is the democratic principle, is a spurious kind of equality, not κατὰ φύσιν: τοῖς γὰρ ἀνίσοις τὰ ἴσα ἄνισα γίγνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου (*Laws* 757 A). Cf. Isocr. *Nicocles* 14 and Arist. *Pol.* Γ 9. 1280ª 11 ff., with other passages cited by Henkel *Gr. Lehre vom Staat* p. 154 *n.* 63.

558 C—**559** D *We cannot describe the origin of the democratical man, until we explain what we mean by 'necessary' and 'unnecessary' desires. Desires which cannot be eradicated, and desires which we gratify with advantage to ourselves, are called 'necessary': those of the opposite kind are 'unnecessary.' The oligarchical man is ruled by the former; the latter sway the drone.*

558 D 22 **βίᾳ δὴ κτλ.** The description is interrupted by the digression on Desire: hence the anacoluthon.

23 **οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι.** See 554 A *n.*

24 **ἵνα μὴ σκοτεινῶς κτλ.** It becomes important at this stage to investigate the subject of the Desires, because τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν in the widest sense is the psychological basis of the democratical as well as of the oligarchical character. Plato's complete classification distinguishes between (1) necessary desires, (2) not-necessary, (3) not-necessary and παράνομοι (IX 571 B). The ὀλιγαρχικός is the embodiment of (1): the δημοκρατικός of (1) and (2) equally (561 A ff.): the τυραννικός of (3). Cf. IX 571 A *n.* If we translate παράνομοι by 'unnatural' (as in view of IX 571 C ff. we are justified in doing: cf. IX 571 B *n.*), Plato's account becomes almost identical with that of Epicurus, who classified Desires as (1) natural and necessary, (2) natural and not-necessary, (3) neither natural nor necessary. For the authorities see Usener *Epicurea* pp. 78, 294. Cf. also Athen. XII 511 E.

27 **ἄν.** See *cr. n.*, and for the loss of ἄν before ἀναγκαῖαι IV 437 B *n.*

28 **ὅσαι—ἡμᾶς.** As Aristotle would say, those also are ἀναγκαῖαι ὧν ἄνευ

ἐφίεσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη. ἢ οὔ; Καὶ μάλα. Δικαίως
559 δὴ | τοῦτο ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἐροῦμεν, τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Δικαίως. Τί δέ; 30
ἄς γέ τις ἀπαλλάξειεν ἄν, εἰ μελετῷ ἐκ νέου, καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν
ἀγαθὸν ἐνοῦσαι δρῶσιν, αἱ δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον, πάσας ταύτας εἰ μὴ
ἀναγκαίους φαῖμεν εἶναι, ἆρ' οὐ καλῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Καλῶς μὲν
οὖν. Προελώμεθα δή τι παράδειγμα ἑκατέρων, αἵ εἰσιν, ἵνα τύπῳ 5
λάβωμεν αὐτάς; Οὐκοῦν χρή. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἡ τοῦ φαγεῖν μέχρι
B ὑγιείας τε καὶ εὐεξίας καὶ αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ ὄψου ἀναγκαῖος | ἂν
εἴη; Οἶμαι. Ἡ μέν γέ που τοῦ σίτου κατ' ἀμφότερα ἀναγκαία,
ᾗ τε ὠφέλιμος ᾗ τε παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή. Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ὄψου, εἴ
πῃ τινα ὠφελίαν πρὸς εὐεξίαν παρέχεται. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; 10
ἡ πέρα τούτων καὶ ἀλλοίων ἐδεσμάτων ἢ τοιούτων ἐπιθυμία, δυνατὴ
δὲ κολαζομένη ἐκ νέων καὶ παιδευομένη ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπαλλάτ-
τεσθαι, καὶ βλαβερὰ μὲν σώματι, βλαβερὰ δὲ ψυχῇ πρός τε
C φρόνησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν, | ἆρά γε ὀρθῶς οὐκ ἀναγκαία ἂν
καλοῖτο; Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀναλωτικὰς φῶμεν 15

11. ἢ Π: ἡ A.

τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι (*Met.* Δ 5. 1015ª 22).

558 E **τούτων—ἀνάγκη** justifies the appellation *ἀναγκαῖαι*. The pronoun *τούτων* is used somewhat vaguely, and denotes not the desires themselves, but their objects. Cf. 543 C *n.*

29 **τῇ φύσει.** It follows that no desires which are necessary can be unnatural: see Epicurus referred to on 558 D.

559 A **2 καὶ πρός**: 'and which moreover' ("idem est quod *καὶ προσέτι*, ac praeterea, atque insuper" Stallbaum). Two kinds of *necessary* desires were distinguished viz. (1) *ἃς—ἀποτρέψαι*, (2) *ὅσαι—ἡμᾶς*. Corresponding to this, which is not of course a mutually exclusive, division, Plato emphasises two distinct features of unnecessary desires: so that *καὶ πρός* ('and which moreover,' or according to the Greek idiom, 'and these moreover': see on II 357 B) is altogether appropriate. Cf. (with Stallbaum) *Euthyd.* 298 D and Blaydes on Ar. *Knights* 578. Schneider takes *πρὸς οὐδέν* together ("nullius rei habita ratione"), but *οὐδὲν* cannot easily be separated from *ἀγαθόν*, unless we read <*οὐδὲν*> *πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν*, as I formerly suggested. I have no longer any doubt that Stallbaum's view is right. Ast's conjecture *πρὸς οὐδέν'* is refuted by Schneider.

7 **αὐτοῦ σίτου**: 'merely of food,' as opposed to e.g. *pleasant* food, *sweet* food (*τῶν τοιῶν δε σιτίων* in Epicurus: Usener *Epic.* p. 295). See in particular IV 437 D—439 A *nn.*

559 B **8 ἡ μέν γε κτλ.** On *γε* see 556 A *n.* and Neil's *Appendix* on *γε* in his edition of Ar. *Knights* p. 192. The words *ᾗ τε—δυνατή* should be explained as follows. Hunger, which is the desire of *σίτος*, 'is capable of putting an end to life': i.e. it must be gratified (*οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ' εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι* 558 D), or else we die. On this ground, and also because it is *ὠφέλιμος* (i.e. *ἀποτελουμένη ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς* 558 E), we pronounce it an *ἀναγκαία ἐπιθυμία*. The Greek is terse but not obscure. With *παῦσαι ζῶντα* cf. *Gorg.* 523 C, D and *Menex.* 241 B. Jowett thinks the expression 'very strange' for *ἀποκτιννύναι*. It is strictly accurate: the sword kills, but hunger *παύει ζῶντα*: we merely 'cease to live.' Other views on this passage are discussed in App. III.

11 **ἀλλοίων—ἢ τοιούτων**: "alius generis—quam quales modo diximus" (Stallbaum).

εἶναι ταύτας, ἐκείνας δὲ χρηματιστικὰς διὰ τὸ χρησίμους πρὸς τὰ ἔργα εἶναι; Τί μήν; Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φήσομεν. Οὕτω. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ὃν νῦν δὴ κηφῆνα ὠνομάζομεν, τοῦτον ἐλέγομεν τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων φειδωλόν | τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν; Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; D

XIII. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγωμεν, ὡς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ δημοκρατικὸς γίγνεται. φαίνεται δέ μοι τά γε πολλὰ ὧδε γίγνεσθαι. Πῶς; Ὅταν νέος τεθραμμένος ὡς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀπαιδεύτως τε καὶ φειδωλῶς, γεύσηται κηφήνων μέλιτος καὶ ξυγγένηται αἴθωσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς, παντοδαπὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἐχούσας δυναμένοις σκευάζειν, ἐνταῦθά που οἴου εἶναι

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559 C 16 **χρηματιστικὰς—χρησίμους:** 'money-making or productive, because useful in production.' Plato *more suo* σοφίζεται *περὶ τὸ ὄνομα* (VI 509 D *n.*).

17 **οὕτω δή:** they also are *ἀναλωτικαί*. Epicurus l.c. describes *ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμία* as *φυσικὴ μέν, οὐκ ἀναγκαία δέ*.

18 **νῦν δή.** 552 C ff., 555 E ff.

559 D—**562** A *Let us now return and explain the genesis of the democratical man. An oligarchical father has a son, whom he brings up on narrow and parsimonious principles. The young man tastes the 'honey of drones,' and sedition is engendered within his soul. A struggle ensues, and after perhaps a temporary check the unnecessary desires prevail; but with the help of fortune and advancing years a sort of equality of all desires is finally established; and the man becomes an impartial devotee of pleasure in all its forms—a beautiful and many-coloured creature, 'everything by starts and nothing long.'*

22 **πάλιν τοίνυν κτλ.** Plato's description of the genesis of the democratical man is one of the most royal and magnificent pieces of writing in the whole range of literature, whether ancient or modern. Throughout most of this chapter, in the words of Longinus, the style *πλουσιώτατα καθάπερ τι πέλαγος εἰς ἀναπεπταμένον κέχυται—μέγεθος* (*περὶ ὕψους* 12. 2), and no better example will ever be discovered of that full tide of lofty thoughts and images and words—a tide 'too full for sound and foam'—in which the author of the treatise *On the Sublime* places the essence of *ὕψος*. We owe to Longinus what is by far the best appreciation of Plato's hierophantic vein: see especially cc. 33—36, where we can hear more than a mere echo of that sublimity which is itself, according to Longinus, the 'echo of high-mindedness' (*ὕψος μεγαλοφροσύνης ἀπήχημα* ib. 9. 2). For a very different estimate the student may be referred to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*ad Cn. Pomp. Gem.* 753—765 Reiske), whose pedantic criticisms make it tolerably plain that a study of the Attic orators does not qualify a man to sit in judgment upon Plato. The present episode is hardly less remarkable for psychological insight than for elevation of style, and the description of the democratic man as the chameleon of human society paints him for all time (561 C ff.). As a representation of actual fact, the picture is doubtless somewhat exaggerated, as usual; but it is extraordinarily vivid and powerful, and shews that the Platonic analogy between the individual and the State may prove in the hands of a master an admirable clue whereby to unravel the workings of the human soul in the individual as well as in the State.

559 D 24 **νῦν δὴ κτλ.** See 558 C, D. With *ἀπαιδεύτως* cf. 552 E *n.*

25 **κηφήνων κτλ.** It is clear from the summary of this passage in IX 572 C *συγγενόμενος δὲ κομψοτέροις ἀνδράσι καὶ μεστοῖς ὧν ἄρτι διήλθομεν ἐπιθυμιῶν* that *κηφήνων* and *αἴθωσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς* refer to *human* drones, and not to the *κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίαι* in the young man's heart. *αἴθωσι* 'furious,' 'wild' (Jebb on Soph. *Ajax* 221) shews that the drones are of the 'stinging' order (552 C ff., 555 D ff.).

Ε ἀρχὴν αὐτῷ μεταβολῆς | ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰς δημοκρατίαν.
Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν ὥσπερ ἡ πόλις μετέβαλλε βοηθη-
σάσης τῷ ἑτέρῳ μέρει ξυμμαχίας ἔξωθεν, ὁμοίας ὁμοίῳ, οὕτω καὶ
ὁ νεανίας μεταβάλλει βοηθοῦντος αὖ εἴδους ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔξωθεν τῷ
ἑτέρῳ τῶν παρ' ἐκείνῳ, ξυγγενοῦς τε καὶ ὁμοίου; Παντάπασιν
μὲν οὖν. Καὶ ἐὰν μέν, οἶμαι, ἀντιβοηθήσῃ τις τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὀλι-
γαρχικῷ ξυμμαχίᾳ, ἤ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
560 οἰκείων, | νουθετούντων τε καὶ κακιζόντων, στάσις δὴ καὶ ἀντί-
στασις καὶ μάχη ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν τότε γίγνεται. Τί μήν;
Καὶ ποτὲ μέν, οἶμαι, τὸ δημοκρατικὸν ὑπεχώρησε τῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ,
καί τινες τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν διεφθάρησαν, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξέπεσον,
αἰδοῦς τινὸς ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ, καὶ κατεκοσμήθη
πάλιν. Γίγνεται γὰρ ἐνίοτε, ἔφη. Αὖθις δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν ἐκπεσου-

28. ὀλιγαρχίας—δημοκρατίαν nos: ὀλιγαρχικῆς—δημοκρατικήν codd. 29. ἔφη Π et in marg. A^2: om. A^1. μετέβαλλε A^1Π: μεταβάλλει corr. A^2.

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559 Ε 28 **ὀλιγαρχίας—δημοκρατίαν.** See *cr. n.* Schneider defends the MSS by explaining *μεταβολὴ ὀλιγαρχική* as "ea quae ad *ὀλιγαρχίαν* pertinet eamque efficit," and referring *τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ* "ad ipsam *ὀλιγαρχίαν* in adjectivo latentem." *δημοκρατικήν* he thinks is written for *δημοκρατίαν* by a sort of attraction. This explanation is much too difficult and obscure. Nor can *ὀλιγαρχικῆς* by itself stand for *ὀλιγαρχικῆς πολιτείας*, at all events in this connexion. The MS reading can only mean 'of the oligarchical change within himself into a democratical,' an expression which bears no sense. I formerly wrote *ὀλιγαρχικοῦ τοῦ—δημοκρατικόν*, comparing 559 E, 560 A; but it may fairly be objected that the 'oligarchical *element*' within the man does not change into a democratical: it is the *government* that changes. For this reason I now prefer my old suggestion (*Cl. Rev.* IV p. 357), although the corruption of *ὀλιγαρχικοῦ — δημοκρατικόν* is perhaps somewhat easier to explain. For the combination of genitives cf. V 449 A *n.* An alternative solution would be to insert *πολιτείας* after *ἑαυτῷ*. This gives excellent sense, but it is difficult to assign a plausible reason for the loss of *πολιτείας* in all our MSS. I am unable to resist the conclusion that the text is corrupt, otherwise I should not venture to make any alteration. If Plato did not write the passage as it is printed above, there can be little doubt that *πολιτείας* has accidentally disappeared.

29 **μετέβαλλε κτλ.** See 556 E. *τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν* means of course *τῷ ἑτέρῳ εἴδει τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.*

33 **τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ:** 'the oligarchical element within one.' *ἑαυτῷ* is 'oneself': cf. III 407 C *μελέτας πρὸς ἑαυτόν. ἐν αὐτῷ*, which Ast adopted (after Stephanus), would be easier; but I think Plato means to suggest that the oligarchical element present in this *νεανίας* is a universal feature of the human race. J. and C. think *ἐκείνῳ* and *ἑαυτῷ* may have changed places—a conjecture which is surely too bold. Schneider, taking *ἑαυτῷ* as 'himself' and not 'oneself,' compares *ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν* below and *αὐτῷ—ἐν ἑαυτῷ* in 559 D, E; but here there is nothing corresponding to the *αὐτῷ* in each of these passages, and *ἑαυτῷ* cannot therefore be translated in Schneider's way.

560 A 1 **στάσις κτλ.** Cf. 556 E, 557 A. On the tense of *ὑπεχώρησε* and the other aorists throughout this passage see 548 D *n.*

4 **τινες—αἱ μὲν κτλ.** Cf. IV 431 A *n.* The words *διεφθάρησαν—ἐξέπεσον* correspond to *ἀποκτείνωσι—ἐκβάλωσι* in 557 A. Madvig's *διετράπησαν* is an unlucky venture.

σῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄλλαι ὑποτρεφόμεναι ξυγγενεῖς δι' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην | τροφῆς πατρὸς πολλαί τε καὶ ἰσχυραὶ ἐγένοντο. Φιλεῖ B
γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν εἵλκυσάν τε πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς
10 ὁμιλίας, καὶ λάθρᾳ ξυγγιγνόμεναι πλῆθος ἐνέτεκον. Τί μήν;
Τελευτῶσαι δή, οἶμαι, κατέλαβον τὴν τοῦ νέου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρό-
πολιν, αἰσθόμεναι κενὴν μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν
καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν, οἳ δὴ ἄριστοι φρουροί τε καὶ φύλακες ἐν
ἀνδρῶν | θεοφιλῶν εἰσι διανοίαις. Καὶ πολύ γ', ἔφη. Ψευδεῖς δὴ C
15 καὶ ἀλαζόνες, οἶμαι, λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι ἀντ' ἐκείνων ἀναδραμόντες
κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοιούτου. Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. Ἆρ'
οὖν οὐ πάλιν τε εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς Λωτοφάγους ἐλθὼν φανερῶς
κατοικεῖ, καὶ ἐὰν παρ' οἰκείων τις βοήθεια τῷ φειδωλῷ αὐτοῦ τῆς
ψυχῆς ἀφικνῆται, κλήσαντες οἱ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι ἐκεῖνοι τὰς τοῦ
20 βασιλικοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας οὔτε αὐτὴν τὴν ξυμμαχίαν |
παριᾶσιν οὔτε πρέσβεις πρεσβυτέρων λόγους ἰδιωτῶν εἰσδέχονται, D

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7 **ἀνεπιστημοσύνην — πατρός**: the father is himself *ἀπαίδευτος* (552 E *n.*), and the *ἀπαίδευτος* cannot *παιδεύειν*. On the genitives see V 449 A *n.*

560 B 9 **τὰς αὐτὰς ὁμιλίας κτλ.** The reference in *τὰς αὐτάς* is to *ξυγγένηται—δεινοῖς* 559 D. Ast's conjecture *τὰς αὐταῖς ὁμιλίας* is wrong in point of sense. *λάθρᾳ ξυγγιγνόμεναι*: viz. with the desires of the 'drones': see 559 D.

13 **ἐν ἀνδρῶν κτλ.** The stately cadence is worthy of the theme: cf. *τὴν—τέλεσι* 560 E, and see the remarks of Longinus on rhythm and the arrangement of words as an element of *ὕψος* (*περὶ ὕψους* 39 ff.).

560 C 15 **ἀναδραμόντες κατέσχον**: 'ran up and seized.' *ἀναδραμόντες* preserves the metaphor in *ἀκρόπολιν* (560 B).

17 **εἰς—Λωτοφάγους**: 'to those Lotos-eaters' land.' *ἐκείνους* refers to *κηφήνων* 559 D. The figure is strikingly appropriate, for the lotos-flower of sensual indulgence makes man, who is an *οὐράνιον φυτόν* (Clem. Alex. *Cohort. ad Gent.* 96 A ed. Migne, following Plato *Tim.* 90 A), forget 'the imperial palace whence he came.' Cf. VII 519 A, B *nn.*, and (for Λωτοφάγοι) Luc. *Salt.* 2–4, Anth. Pal. XV 12. 8 *μισῶ Λωτοφάγων γλυκερὴν λιπόπατριν ἐδωδήν* (with reference to Epicureanism).

φανερῶς κατοικεῖ: no longer *λάθρᾳ* (560 B). He glories in his shame. Herwerden's *κατοικεῖ* < *ἐκεῖ* > in place of *κατοικεῖ* is wholly unnecessary and spoils the rhythm.

19 **τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους**: i.e. the wall enclosing the *ἀκρόπολις* (560 B), where the soul's king or ruling power inhabits.

560 D 21 **οὔτε πρέσβεις κτλ.**: 'nor admit an embassy of wise words spoken by private persons of maturer years.' The contrast is between the *ξυμμαχία* itself, consisting of the *λόγοι* of *οἰκεῖοι*, and 'ambassador-words' of *ἰδιῶται*, i.e. men who take no part in public or official life. Their representations would serve as ambassadors to those of the *οἰκεῖοι*, whether the *οἰκεῖοι* inspire them or not. It has often been pointed out that Plato is thinking of Alcibiades in various parts of this description (see e.g. Steinhart *Einleitung* pp. 239, 698 *n.* 238), Susemihl *Gen. Entw.* II p. 233 and Herwerden *Mnem.* XIX p. 337); and here, I believe, he has in mind the efforts of Socrates to reclaim him. Cf. VI 494 D *n.* and especially *Symp.* 215 D ff. For *πρεσβύτερος* with reference to Socrates see *ἀγαθοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτέροις* III 409 C *n.*; and for *ἰδιώτης* as applied to him, *Apol.* 32 E—33 B. The order and rhythm, as in *ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν εἰσι διανοίαις* above, is in keeping with the stately and sonorous eloquence of the whole passage: cf. IX 573 D. On Badham's conjecture *δι' ὥτων* for *ἰδιωτῶν* see App. IV.

αὐτοί τε κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ ἠλιθιότητα ὀνομάζοντες ὠθοῦσιν ἔξω ἀτίμως φυγάδα, σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές τε καὶ προπηλακίζοντες ἐκβάλλουσι, μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὖσαν πείθοντες ὑπερορίζουσι μετα πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν; Σφόδρα γε. Τούτων δέ γέ που κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ κατεχο-
E μένου[1] τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχὴν μεγάλοισι τέλεσι, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη ὕβριν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀναίδειαν λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατάγουσιν ἐστεφανωμένας, ἐγκωμιά-
ζοντες καὶ ὑποκοριζόμενοι, ὕβριν μὲν εὐπαιδευσίαν καλοῦντες, ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν, ἀναίδειαν δὲ
561 ἀνδρείαν. | ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτω πως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νέος ὢν μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίοις ἐπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου τὴν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλευθέρωσίν τε καὶ ἄνεσιν; Καὶ μάλα γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐναργῶς. Ζῇ δή, οἶμαι, μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἡδονὰς ἀναλίσκων καὶ
χρήματα καὶ πόνους καὶ διατριβάς· ἀλλ' ἐὰν εὐτυχὴς ᾖ καὶ μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχευθῇ, ἀλλά τι καὶ πρεσβύτερος γενόμενος τοῦ πολλοῦ

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22 **μαχόμενοι**: viz. with *τὸ φειδωλόν* (560 C).

αἰδῶ. See 560 A. With what follows cf. Thuc. III 82. 4 ff. and Isocr. *Areop.* 20, *Panath.* 131 (Dümmler's *Chron. Beiträge* pp. 15 ff.).

23 **σωφροσύνην κτλ.** Thuc. l.c. *τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα.* Cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 509 *ἀνανδρία γὰρ τὸ πλέον ὅστις ἀπολέσας | τοὔλασσον ἔλαβε.* It is probable that Plato had Thucydides in his mind: see Susemihl *Gen. Entw.* II p. 234.

26 **μετά**: 'with the aid of' (*in Vereinigung mit*, Schneider).

27 **καθήραντες κτλ.** The imagery is borrowed from the Eleusinian rites. On the first day of the Greater Mysteries, which was called *ἅλαδε μύσται*, took place the cleansing of the *μύσται* in the sea: cf. Mommsen *Feste d. Stadt Ath.* p. 207 *n.* 2. *κατεχομένου* is used as in *Men.* 99 D *κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ.*

560 E 28 **μεγάλοισι τέλεσι κτλ.** The archaic termination in *μεγάλοισι* adds solemnity: see on I 330 B. *λαμπράς* = 'in a blaze of light.' Plato's language would suggest to an Athenian the brilliant scene on the evening of the Iacchus-day, when the 'procession following the figure of Iacchus transformed itself into a *λαμπαδηφορία*' (Mommsen l.c. p. 229): cf. Ar. *Frogs* 340 ff. *ἔγειρε φλογέας λαμπάδας ἐν χερσὶ τινάσσων Ἴακχ', ὦ Ἴακχε.* The exiled *ὕβρις* etc. are conducted home like Iacchus to Eleusis. In *χοροῦ* there is an allusion to the *χορὸς μυστῶν.*

32 **μεγαλοπρέπειαν.** See on VI 486 A.

561 A 2 **τοῦ—τρεφομένου.** Masculine, not neuter.

τὴν—ἄνεσιν. I formerly read *εἰς τὴν* (with ΠΞ and many other MSS) instead of *τήν*, but now believe that A is right. "Non est idem, *εἰς δημοκρατικὸν μεταβάλλειν*, et *τὴν—ἐλευθέρωσιν μεταβάλλειν.* Hoc prius, illud posterius, haec via, ille finis est" (Schneider). If Plato had written *εἰς*, it should have been followed by an accusative masculine, contrasting with *ἐκ τοῦ—τρεφομένου*, as in 553 A *εἰς ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλει.* For the use of *μεταβάλλει* cf. (with Schneider) IV 424 C et al. With the force of *ἄνεσιν* cf. IX 575 A (*ἀνεθέντα*) and 590 A.

6 **εὐτυχὴς ᾖ** = 'if he is fortunate' is much better than *εὐτυχήσῃ* (Cobet), which would mean 'if he becomes fortunate.' Cf. IX 578 C *n.*

7 **ἀλλά τι κτλ.**: 'but, owing also in some measure to the influence of years,

θορύβου παρελθόντος μέρη τε καταδέξηται τῶν ἐκπεσόντων καὶ B
τοῖς ἐπεισελθοῦσι μὴ ὅλον ἑαυτὸν ἐνδῷ, εἰς ἴσον δή τι καταστήσας
τὰς ἡδονὰς διάγει, τῇ παραπιπτούσῃ ἀεὶ ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ
ἀρχὴν παραδιδούς, ἕως ἂν πληρωθῇ, καὶ αὖθις ἄλλῃ, οὐδεμίαν
ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου τρέφων. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Καὶ λόγον γε,
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ οὐ προσδεχόμενος οὐδὲ παριεὶς εἰς τὸ φρούριον,
ἐάν τις λέγῃ, ὡς αἱ μέν εἰσι τῶν ⁞ καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν C
ἡδοναί, αἱ δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ τιμᾶν,
τὰς δὲ κολάζειν τε καὶ δουλοῦσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀνανεύει
τε καὶ ὁμοίας φησὶν ἁπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητέας ἐξ ἴσου. Σφόδρα
γάρ, ἔφη, οὕτω διακείμενος τοῦτο δρᾷ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ
διαζῇ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν οὕτω χαριζόμενος τῇ προσπιπτούσῃ ἐπι-
θυμίᾳ, τοτὲ μὲν μεθύων καὶ καταυλούμενος, αὖθις δὲ ὑδροποτῶν καὶ
κατισχναινόμενος, ⁞ τοτὲ δ' αὖ γυμναζόμενος, ἔστιν δ' ὅτε ἀργῶν D
καὶ πάντων ἀμελῶν, τοτὲ δ' ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβων· πολλάκις
δὲ πολιτεύεται, καὶ ἀναπηδῶν ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει·
κἄν ποτέ τινας πολεμικοὺς ζηλώσῃ, ταύτῃ φέρεται, ἢ χρηματι-
στικούς, ἐπὶ τοῦτ' αὖ. καὶ οὔτε τις τάξις οὔτε ἀνάγκη ἔπεστιν
αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλ' ἡδύν τε δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν
τὸν βίον τοῦτον χρῆται αὐτῷ διὰ παντός. Παντάπασιν, ⁞ ἦ δ' ὅς, E
διελήλυθας βίον ἰσονομικοῦ τινὸς ἀνδρός. Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

9. ἑαυτὸν Ξq: ἑαυτῷ ΑΠ. 20. τοτὲ Π: τὸ Α.

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when the tumult of the soul has mostly passed' etc. Cf. I 329 C. Plato means that good fortune does something, and growing age the rest.

561 B 9 **εἰς ἴσον κτλ.** Pleasures are regarded by the *δημοκρατικὸς ἀνήρ* as individual men are regarded by the *δημοκρατικὴ πολιτεία* (557 A, 558 C *nn.*): they are all equal. For *ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ* see on 557 A. *ἕως ἂν πληρωθῇ* means 'till he' (not 'it,' as D. and V. etc.) 'is filled.' Sensual pleasures *πληροῦσι* because they are *πληρώσεις*: cf. *Phil.* 35 D ff. This is the *χαραδριοῦ βίος* so powerfully described in *Gorg.* 493 A—494 D.

13 **τὸ φρούριον κτλ.** The *φρούριον* is the *ἀκρόπολις* of 560 B. With *ἐάν τις λέγῃ κτλ.* cf. *Gorg.* 495 A ff.

561 C 19 **διαζῇ κτλ.** The *δημοκρατικός*, like the State of which he is the counterpart, is a living example of the Cyrenaic cult of *μονόχρονος ἡδονή*: see 557 A, D, *nn.* and RP.[7] 207 B, 211. Steinhart (*Einleitung* p. 698 *n.* 239) with much probability thinks that the portrait is drawn from Alcibiades, whose *ἤθος* (says Plut. *Alc.* 2. 1) *πολλὰς—ἀνομοιότητας καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ μεταβολὰς ἐπεδείξατο.* Cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 1115—1117 *ῥᾴδια δ' ἤθεα τὸν αὔριον ⁞μεταβαλλομένα χρόνον ἀεὶ⁞ βίον ξυνευτυχοίην*, and (with Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II p. 311 *n.*) the striking parallel in Dryden's *Absalom and Achitophel* 545 ff. On *ἀνομοιότης* as marking decay in men and cities see 547 A, 557 A *nn.*

561 D 25 **οὔτε τις τάξις κτλ.** "The absence of principle, he, like the democratic state, makes into a principle" (Nettleship l.c. II p. 310). On *οὔτε ἀνάγκη* see 557 E *n.*, and on *ἡδύν* 561 C *n.*

561 E 28 **ἰσονομικοῦ**: 'to whom all laws are equal.' 'Equal laws' (*ἰσονομία*) was the proud claim of democracy (Hdt. III 80, Bergk *Poet. Lyr. Gr.*[4] III Scol. 12). The *δημοκρατικός* practises what he preaches *ὡς ἀληθῶς*—by impartially ignor-

καὶ παντοδαπόν τε καὶ πλείστων ἠθῶν μεστόν, καὶ τὸν καλόν τε καὶ ποικίλον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, ὃν πολλοὶ ἂν καὶ πολλαὶ ζηλώσειαν τοῦ βίου, παραδείγματα πολιτειῶν τε καὶ τρόπων πλεῖστα ἐν αὑτῷ ἔχοντα. Οὕτος γάρ, ἔφη, ἔστιν. Τί οὖν; τετάχθω ἡμῖν κατὰ | δημοκρατίαν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ, ὡς δημοκρατικὸς ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορευόμενος; Τετάχθω, ἔφη.

XIV. Ἡ καλλίστη δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτεία τε καὶ ὁ κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ λοιπὰ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴη διελθεῖν, τυραννίς τε καὶ τύραννος. Κομιδῇ γ', ἔφη. Φέρε δή, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, γίγνεται; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας μεταβάλλει, σχεδὸν δῆλον. Δῆλον.

32. οὗτος A^2q^1: οὕτος (*sic*) Π: οὕτω vel οὕτως Ξq^2 et fortasse A^1.

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ing every law! For the etymological figure cf. II 376 B *n.*

29 παντοδαπόν τε καὶ — μεστόν. Richards proposes to write the genitive, remarking "surely the words are parallel to *ἰσονομικοῦ*." Logically they are, but grammatically they need not be, for the life of an *ἰσονομικὸς ἀνήρ* is of course *ἰσονομικός*. With *πλείστων ἠθῶν* cf. *πᾶσιν ἤθεσι πεποικιλμένη* 557 C.

καὶ τὸν καλόν τε κτλ. lit.: 'and that this man is the beautiful and many-coloured man, as the city described above' (was the beautiful and many-coloured city). "Sunt diversa hominum et civitatum genera, unum simplex ac rectum, alterum duplex, aliud multiplex et varium. Qui primo accensendus est, *ὁ ἁπλοῦς*, qui alteri, *ὁ διπλοῦς*, hic vero *ὁ καλός τε καὶ ποικίλος* audit" (Schneider). Thus understood the article is strictly to the point, and there is no reason for writing *τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ποικίλων* with Vind. B and W. H. Thompson. On *ποικίλον* see 557 C *n.* It is worthy of remark that Clement interprets Joseph's 'coat of many colours' in the Old Testament as symbolical of desire: *εἴη δ' ἂν ἐπιθυμία ποικίλον ἔνδυμα* (*Strom.* V 8. 84 C ed. Migne).

30 ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν. See 557 C, with which and 557 D the words *ὃν πολλοὶ κτλ.* are also in close correspondence.

562 A—563 E *It remains to describe tyranny and the tyrannical man. As oligarchy was overthrown by the insatiate pursuit of wealth, so democracy begins to change to tyranny, when evil cupbearers provide the wine of Freedom in excessive draughts. Anarchy under the name of Freedom infects every department of life—political, domestic, educational, and social: the very dogs and beasts of burden become tainted with the prevailing vice. In the final stage no regard whatever is paid to laws, whether written or unwritten.*

562 A ff. 3 ἡ καλλίστη κτλ. As Oligarchy fell a victim to the excessive pursuit of its ideal, viz. Wealth, so also the extravagant devotion to liberty and equality subverts in course of time the democratic State. In 562 A—565 D Plato puts before us the different stages in the fall of democracy: cf. Arist. *Pol.* Δ 4 1291^b 30—1292^a 38, where the various *εἴδη τῆς δημοκρατίας* are distinguished, and Newman *The Politics of Aristotle* IV pp. xxxvi—lxi. Plato's description, as usual, can be illustrated in many places from Greek and especially Athenian political and social life: see 562 D, E, 563 B, C, D al. *nn.*

562 A 5 γίγνεται = 'prodit,' 'quaerentibus se offert' (Schneider). Cf. III 412 C *οἱ δὲ γεωργῶν ἄριστοι ἆρ' οὐ γεωργικώτατοι γίγνονται*, *Euthyd.* 298 E *ὥστε σὸς πατὴρ γίγνεται ὁ κὼν καὶ σὺ κυναρίων ἀδελφός*, infra 566 A, IX 576 B and *Prot.* 325 B with my note ad loc. 'What,' asks Socrates, 'do we find to be the *character* of tyranny? As for its *origin*, it is pretty obvious that tyranny comes from democracy.' For the order of questions cf. 558 C. The words *ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κτλ.*, when taken in connexion with the preceding question, seem at first sight to suggest that the *μεταβολή* will not be described: but cf. V 466 D, where *μὲν γὰρ* is used in exactly the same way, and followed by a full account of the topic to which its clause refers. See also App. V.

Ἆρ' οὖν τρόπον τινὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔκ τε ὀλιγαρχίας δημοκρατία γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ δημοκρατίας | τυραννίς; Πῶς; Ὃ προὔθεντο, B
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀγαθόν, καὶ δι' ὃ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καθίστατο—τοῦτο δ' ἦν
10 πλοῦτος· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Ἡ πλούτου τοίνυν ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια διὰ χρηματισμὸν αὐτὴν ἀπώλλυ. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ὃ δημοκρατία ὁρίζεται ἀγαθόν, ἡ τούτου ἀπληστία καὶ ταύτην καταλύει; Λέγεις δ' αὐτὴν τί ὁρίζεσθαι; Τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, εἶπον. τοῦτο γάρ που ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ πόλει ἀκούσαις | ἂν ὡς C
15 ἔχει τε κάλλιστον καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ ταύτῃ ἄξιον οἰκεῖν ὅστις φύσει ἐλεύθερος. Λέγεται γὰρ δή, ἔφη, καὶ πολὺ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἦα νῦν δὴ ἐρῶν, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια καὶ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν μεθίστησίν τε καὶ παρασκευάζει τυραννίδος δεηθῆναι; Πῶς; ἔφη. Ὅταν, οἶμαι,
20 δημοκρατουμένη πόλις ἐλευθερίας διψήσασα κακῶν οἰνοχόων προστατούντων τύχῃ, | καὶ πορρωτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἀκράτου αὐτῆς D
μεθυσθῇ, τοὺς ἄρχοντας δή, ἂν μὴ πάνυ πρᾶοι ὦσι καὶ πολλὴν

9. ὃ nos: οὗ codd. ἡ Π: om. A. 10. πλοῦτος unus omnium codicum Vind. F: ὑπέρπλουτος ΑΠ *q*: γίνεσθαι ὑπέρπλουτος Ξ. 11. χρηματισμὸν A^1Π: χρηματισμῶν corr. A^2.

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7 ἆρ' οὖν κτλ. begins a long description of the *τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως*: the *τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας* is not described till 566 D ff. Here again the situation in V 466 D is nearly, though not quite, analogous: see note ad loc. For other views on this passage consult App. V.

562 B **8 προὔθεντο**: sc. the citizens of the oligarchical State. Stallbaum reads *προὔθετο*, on inferior MS authority; but the plural is easy enough: cf. 550 D.

9 καὶ δι' ὃ κτλ. explains and amplifies ὃ—*ἀγαθόν*. Wealth is the cause of oligarchy, that 'on account of' which it was established: cf. 550 D ff., 551 C, 555 B (*τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ*). The reading *δι' οὗ* (see *cr. n.*) would make wealth the *means* or *instrument* in producing the result, and this it was not, except in the loose sense in which the *προκείμενον ἀγαθόν* is also a means. I formerly conjectured *δι' ὃ αὖ* (*Cl. Rev.* IV p. 357), but *αὖ* is unsuitable. For the corruption in the MSS see note on *διὰ τοῦτο* X 610 D. Jowett wrongly translates *καθίστατο* by 'was maintained.'

10 πλοῦτος. See *cr. n.* The majority of editors reject *ὑπέρπλουτος*: rightly, for the word is not used except as an adjective. A host of emendations has been suggested, *ὁ πέρα πλοῦτος* (Richter *Fleck. Jb.* 1867 p. 146), *ὑπέρπλουτος <πλοῦτος>* (Stallbaum), *ὑπὲρ πλούτου* (Madvig—but the use of *ὑπέρ* is not above suspicion), *που πλοῦτος* (Campbell), *ὑπερπλουτεῖν* (apud J. and C.), *εἴπερ τι, πλοῦτος* (Apelt *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1895 p. 968). Stephanus' conjecture *γίγνεσθαι ὑπέρπλουτον* was adopted by Ast. The expression *ὑπέρπλουτος πλοῦτος* occurs in Joan. Damasc. III 733 A ed. Migne, but in a highly rhetorical passage and without any reference to Plato. It is probably best to read *πλοῦτος*, with Schneider and Hermann. *ὑπέρπλουτος* may have originally been a marginal note intended to recall *ὑπέρπλουτοι* in 552 B.

11 ἀπώλλυ. 555 C—557 A.

13 ἐλευθερίαν. See 557 B *n.*

562 C **14 ἀκούσαις—ἐλεύθερος** rings like an echo from some of the panegyrists of Athens: cf. Eur. *Ion* 669—675 with *Menex.* 239 A ff. and Thuc. II 37. 2.

15 ἔχει—κάλλιστον (sc. *ἡ δημοκρατουμένη πόλις*) = 'is its fairest possession,' not 'it has this in the highest perfection' (as suggested in J. and C.).

20 προστατούντων. See on 565 C.

562 D **22 ἂν μὴ—ὀλιγαρχικούς.** For a striking example see the account

παρέχωσι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κολάζει αἰτιωμένη ὡς μιαρούς τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικούς. Δρῶσιν γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο. Τοὺς δέ γε, εἶπον, τῶν ἀρχόντων κατηκόους προπηλακίζει ὡς ἐθελοδούλους τε καὶ οὐδὲν 25
ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀρχομένοις, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἄρχουσιν ὁμοίους ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἐπαινεῖ τε καὶ τιμᾷ. ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη
E ἐν τοιαύτῃ | πόλει ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἰέναι; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Καὶ καταδύεσθαί γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, εἴς τε τὰς ἰδίας οἰκίας καὶ τελευτᾶν μέχρι τῶν θηρίων τὴν ἀναρχίαν ἐμφυομένην. Πῶς, ἦ δ' 30
ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν; Οἷον, ἔφην, πατέρα μὲν ἐθίζεσθαι παιδὶ ὅμοιον γίγνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς υἱεῖς, ὑὸν δὲ πατρί, καὶ μήτε
563 | αἰσχύνεσθαι μήτε δεδιέναι τοὺς γονέας, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖ· μέτοικον δὲ ἀστῷ καὶ ἀστὸν μετοίκῳ ἐξισοῦσθαι, καὶ ξένον ὡσαύτως. Γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη. Ταῦτά τε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ σμικρὰ τοιάδε ἄλλα γίγνεται· διδάσκαλός τε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ φοιτητὰς φοβεῖται καὶ θωπεύει, φοιτηταί τε διδασκάλων ὀλιγωροῦσιν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγῶν· καὶ ὅλως οἱ μὲν νέοι πρεσβυτέροις ἀπεικάζονται καὶ 5
διαμιλλῶνται καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις, οἱ δὲ γέροντες ξυγκαθιέν-
B τες τοῖς νέοις εὐτραπελίας τε καὶ χαριεντισμοῦ | ἐμπίμπλανται, μιμούμενοι τοὺς νέους, ἵνα δὴ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀηδεῖς εἶναι μηδὲ δεσποτικοί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τὸ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔσχατον, ὦ φίλε, τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ πλήθους, ὅσον γίγνεται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ 10
πόλει, ὅταν δὴ οἱ ἐωνημένοι καὶ αἱ ἐωνημέναι μηδὲν ἧττον ἐλεύθεροι ὦσι τῶν πριαμένων. ἐν γυναιξὶ δὲ πρὸς ἄνδρας καὶ ἀνδράσι πρὸς

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of the proceedings after Arginusae in Xen. *Hell.* I 7. 12—15.

562 E 30 **μέχρι τῶν θηρίων.** See on 563 C, D.

31 **πατέρα μὲν κτλ.** Cf. *Laws* 701 B, [Xen.] *Rep. Ath.* I 8—12 and *Mem.* III 5. 15, 16 (Hermann *Gesch. u. System d. Pl. Phil.* p. 91).

563 A 6 **ξυγκαθιέντες.** V 467 B *n.*

563 B 9 **τὸ δέ γε κτλ.** 'But the extremest amount of freedom which appears in such a city is when' etc.: lit. 'the extreme of the amount of freedom' etc. *τὸ—ἔσχατον* is the subject to something like *ἐστιν* or *γίγνεται* understood: cf. such idioms as *οὗ τοι ἕνεκα ἠρόμην—ὅτι κτλ.* I 330 B, where see note. The sentence is not exclamatory, as some have supposed. With *πλήθους ἐλευθερίας* cf. *πολλὴν—τὴν ἐλευθερίαν* 562 D, and (for *πλῆθος*) IX 591 E (*πλῆθος οὐσίας*), *Laws* XI 913 D, *Theaet.* 158 D (*πλῆθος χρόνου*) and Dem. *Phil.* IV 2. This explanation is that of Schneider, and indubitably right. The English editors and translators make *τοῦ πλήθους* depend on *ἐλευθερίας*: but "servi servaeque non sunt pars *τοῦ πλήθους*," and *ὅσον—πόλει* is not easily either separated from *πλήθους* or connected with *ἔσχατον*.

11 **ὅταν—πριαμένων.** Cf. [Xen.] *Rep. Ath.* I. 10 ff. *τῶν δούλων δ' αὖ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων πλείστη ἐστὶν Ἀθήνησιν ἀκολασία, καὶ οὔτε πατάξαι ἔξεστιν αὐτόθι, οὔτε ὑπεκστήσεταί σοι ὁ δοῦλος κτλ.* In Arist. *Pol.* E 11. 1313^{b} 35 *δούλων ἄνεσις* is said to be a symptom of extreme democracy.

12 **ἐν γυναιξὶ κτλ.** Arist. l.c. goes farther and speaks of a *γυναικοκρατία περὶ τὰς οἰκίας*. A German critic characteristically sees an 'admirable' illustration of Plato's remarks in the social life "jenes transatlantischen Staatvereins" (Steinhart *Einleitung* p. 243). Some have accused

γυναῖκας ὅση ἡ ἰσονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία γίγνεται, ὀλίγου ἐπελαθόμεθ' εἰπεῖν. Οὐκοῦν κατ' Αἰσχύλον, ἔφη, | ἐροῦμεν ὅ τι νῦν ἦλθ' C
ἐπὶ στόμα; Πάνυ γε, εἶπον. καὶ ἔγωγε οὕτω λέγω. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν θηρίων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὅσῳ ἐλευθερώτερά ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ, οὐκ ἄν τις πείθοιτο ἄπειρος. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ αἵ τε κύνες κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν οἷαιπερ αἱ δέσποιναι, γίγνονταί τε δὴ καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὄνοι πάνυ ἐλευθέρως καὶ σεμνῶς εἰθισμένοι πορεύεσθαι, κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐμβάλλοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἀπαντῶντι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξίσ-

Plato of already forgetting the liberalism of Book V (Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 214): but an ideal city is one thing, and a lawless democracy another; and *corruptio optimi*, in the relations between the sexes, as in other cases, may well be *pessima*.

563 C 14 **ὅ τι νῦν—στόμα**: "'what rose to our lips just now, whatever it be,' as Aeschylus observes." See Aesch. *Frag.* 337 Dindorf=334 Nauck. The reference in *νῦν*, which here as in some other places (III 414 B *n.*) has the meaning of 'just now,' is to 562 E *καὶ τελευτᾶν μέχρι τῶν θηρίων τὴν ἀναρχίαν ἐμφυομένην*. Nauck restores the fragment of Aeschylus in the form *ὅτι νυν ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα*: but the enclitic is unpleasing, and as *ὅτι* is absent from the other two places where the quotation occurs (Plut. *Amat.* 763 B, Them. *Or.* IV 52 B) Aeschylus probably wrote *νῦν γὰρ ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα* ('just come to my lips') or something of the sort. With the general sense cf. III 394 D. Similar expressions in Greek literature are collected by Schaefer on Dion. Hal. *de comp. verb.* pp. 12, 13. Jackson ingeniously proposes to connect the present passage with Arist. *Eth. Nic.* III 2. 1111ª 9 ff., where he conjectures *οἷον λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ* (for *ἢ*) *οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά* (*Proceedings of the Camb. Phil. Soc.* XIII 8 and *Journal of Philology* XXVII p. 159 f.). "Is it possible" he asks "that the phrase *ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα* is a proverbial survival of the plea urged by Aeschylus in plain prose on the occasion referred to in the *Ethics*?" I think an Athenian speaking in plain prose would have said *ἦλθεν ἐπὶ στόμα* or *ἐπὶ τὸ στόμα*, not *ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα*. The elision is tragic.

15 **οὕτω**: i.e. in the spirit of the Aeschylean phrase: the idea occurred to me, and it shall out, though never so extravagant and absurd!

16 **ἐλευθερώτερα**. For the concord cf. *Phil.* 45 E and *Laws* 657 D (Ast).

18 **τὴν παροιμίαν**. The proverb was *οἷαπερ ἡ δέσποινα, τοῖα χὰ κύων* (Schol.), and meant *ὅτι ὁποία δέσποινα, τοιαύτη καὶ ἡ θεραπαινίς* 'like mistress, like maid.' Plato takes *κύων* literally: hence *ἀτεχνῶς*. See Leutsch und Schneidewin *Paroem. Gr.* II p. 44. The traveller in modern Greece will remember the 'democratic dogs' of Peloponnesian villages.

γίγνονταί τε δὴ κτλ.: 'aye, and there arise both horses and asses' etc. This explanation—Jowett's—catches the mock-heroic humour of the passage and is at the same time easier grammatically than to supply, with Schneider, *οἷοίπερ οἱ δεσπόται* or, with Campbell, *ἐλεύθεροι* or the like. There is no ground for suspecting the text as some have done. Plato's humorous description brings vividly before us the anarchical condition of the Athenian streets. Foot-passengers have a poor time of it where the very beasts of burden forsooth are tainted with the spirit of democracy! "The regulation of traffic," remarks Bosanquet, perhaps a little sententiously, "is in some degree a real test of social order." No doubt this is what Plato means.

20 **ἐμβάλλοντες κτλ.** See the amusing and characteristic anecdote about Alcibiades' childhood in Plut. *Alc.* 2. 4 *μικρὸς ὢν ἔπαιζεν ἀστραγάλοις ἐν τῷ στενωπῷ, τῆς δὲ βολῆς καθηκούσης εἰς αὐτὸν ἅμαξα φορτίων ἐπήει. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐκέλευε περιμεῖναι τὸν ἄγοντα τὸ ζεῦγος· ὑπέπιπτε γὰρ ἡ βολὴ τῇ παρόδῳ τῆς ἁμάξης· μὴ πειθομένου δὲ δι' ἀγροικίαν, ἀλλ' ἐπάγοντος, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι παῖδες διέσχον, ὁ δ' Ἀλκιβιάδης καταβαλὼν ἐπὶ στόμα πρὸ τοῦ ζεύγους καὶ παρατείνας ἑαυτὸν ἐκέλευεν οὕτως, εἰ βούλεται, διεξελθεῖν, ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον ἀνακροῦσαι τὸ ζεῦγος ὀπίσω δείσαντα, τοὺς δ' ἰδόντας ἐκπλαγῆναι καὶ μετὰ βοῆς συνδραμεῖν πρὸς αὐτον.*

D τηται· καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως | μεστὰ ἐλευθερίας γίγνεται. Τὸ ἐμόν γ', ἔφη, ἐμοὶ λέγεις ὄναρ· αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰς ἀγρὸν πορευόμενος θαμὰ αὐτὸ πάσχω. Τὸ δὲ δὴ κεφάλαιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντων τούτων ξυνηθροισμένων ἐννοεῖς, ὡς ἁπαλὴν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν πολιτῶν ποιεῖ, ὥστε κἂν ὁτιοῦν δουλείας τις προσφέρηται, ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ μὴ 25
ἀνέχεσθαι; τελευτῶντες γάρ που οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν νόμων φρον-
E τίζουσιν γεγραμμένων ἢ ἀγράφων, ἵνα δὴ μηδαμῇ μηδεὶς αὐτοῖς | ᾖ δεσπότης. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, οἶδα.

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563 D 21 **τὸ ἐμόν γ'—ὄναρ** is manifestly proverbial (Schneider). For *ὄναρ* cf. *Charm.* 173 A *ἄκουε δὴ—τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ* and *Theaet.* 201 E.

22 **αὐτὸς γὰρ κτλ.** 'I frequently experience what you describe when I am on my way to the country,' sc. through the congested streets of Athens. Jowett's 'when I take a country walk' is hardly accurate. The present *πορευόμενος* should be taken in its full force.

25 **κἂν ὁτιοῦν κτλ.** If the middle is to be pressed, we must translate: 'if any man applies to himself the very least degree of slavery' etc. That is to say, they are so sensitive that they cannot bear to see any one making himself even a *willing* slave. In the sacred name of Freedom, Democracy, which is now on the verge of Tyranny, puts freedom down. The sentiment is perhaps a little exaggerated, but otherwise suitable enough; only we should rather have expected Plato to express this meaning by *αὐτὸς αὑτῷ προσφέρῃ*. If there were any well-authenticated examples of the middle of *προσφέρειν* used for the active, it would be better to construe *προσφέρηται* as if it were *προσφέρῃ*, and suppose that the slavery is applied to others: but the instances of *προσφέρεσθαι* = *προσφέρειν* in Stephanus-Hase s. v. are either dubious or from late authors. The syllable *-ται* at the end of a line is sometimes abbreviated in uncial MSS (see Bond and Thompson *Public. of the Pal. Soc.* I Plate 106), and this fact lends additional plausibility to W. H. Thompson's conjecture, that we should write *προσφέρῃ* for *προσφέρηται*. I once proposed *τισί*, and the proposal is approved by a critic in *Hermathena* XXIV p. 252. The citizens become so sensitive that the least degree of pressure applied to any section of them rouses them all. Meantime, as neither of these conjectures is quite convincing, I have retained the MS reading *pro tempore*, although I think Thompson's conjecture represents what Plato meant to say.

26 **τελευτῶντες γὰρ κτλ.** There is steady deterioration; and the last stage of democracy is the worst. Aristotle holds the same opinion: see *Pol.* Δ 6. 1293^{a} 1 *ἡ τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη* along with 1291^{b} 30 —1292^{a} 37.

οὐδὲ τῶν νόμων κτλ. Cf. *Laws* 701 B and Xen. *Hell.* I 7. 12 ff. Such a democracy works by means of *ψηφίσματα* rather than laws, and is *ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ τυραννίδι* (Arist. l.c. Cf. also Gilbert *Beiträge zur inn. Gesch. Athens* pp. 79 ff.).

563 E—**566** D *Such is the seed which developes into Tyranny, excessive freedom generating excessive servitude, in accordance with a common law. The drones wax more numerous and violent, and ruin the democracy in course of time as once they ruined oligarchy. A democratical State contains three classes of citizens* (1) *the drones, stinging as well as stingless,* (2) *the rich who serve as drones' provender,* (3) *the Demos, with whom the sovereignty lies. The most active members of the drone-fraternity become leaders of the Demos against the rich. By dint of extortion and calumny the propertied classes are at last compelled in self-defence to form an oligarchical party. Hence arise impeachments etc., and the people range themselves under a single Champion. As in the fable he who tasted human flesh became a wolf, so this Champion of the People, as soon as he spills the blood of fellow-citizens, is doomed to become a tyrant. Civil war begins; the Champion is either driven from the city, and returns a full-fledged tyrant, or receives a body-guard to protect him from secret assaults, and thus achieves his end.*

XV. *Αὕτη μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἡ ἀρχὴ οὕτωσὶ καλὴ καὶ νεανική, ὅθεν τυραννὶς φύεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. Νεανικὴ δῆτα, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; Ταὐτόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ νόσημα ἐγγενόμενον ἀπώλεσεν αὐτήν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλέον τε καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἐκ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐγγενόμενον καταδουλοῦται δημοκρατίαν. καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην φιλεῖ εἰς τοὐναντίον μεταβολὴν ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἐν ὥραις τε καὶ ἐν | φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασιν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ* 564 *ἥκιστα. Εἰκός, ἔφη. Ἡ γὰρ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἢ εἰς ἄγαν δουλείαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ πόλει. Εἰκὸς γάρ. Εἰκότως τοίνυν, εἶπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης πολιτείας τυραννὶς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας, ἐξ οἶμαι τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας δουλεία πλείστη τε καὶ ἀγριωτάτη. Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἠρώτας, ἀλλὰ ποῖον νόσημα ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ*

1. *καὶ δὴ καὶ* Π: *καὶ* A.

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563 E ff. 29 **αὕτη μὲν τοίνυν κτλ.** In his account of the genesis of tyranny, as in his description of the tyrant himself, Plato has borrowed several features from the career of the most conspicuous tyrant of his own age, Dionysius I of Syracuse. See on 564 A, and for other historical references 566 B al.

καλὴ καὶ νεανική: 'fair and proud.' For *νεανική* cf. IV 425 C.

32 **νόσημα**: viz. the drones, as explained in 564 B (*ἐκεῖνο τοίνυν κτλ.*).

33 **ἐξουσίας κτλ.** See on 557 B. For *τῷ ὄντι* cf. VI 497 D *n.*

564 A 1 **καὶ δὴ καὶ κτλ.** See *cr. n.* The omission of *καὶ δή* was a natural slip, and a majority of MSS agree with Π. For *καὶ δὴ καί* with *οὐχ ἥκιστα* following cf. (with Schneider) *Soph.* 216 B. The present passage brings out very clearly Plato's conception of the State as a living organism and no mere 'dead machine.' See on this subject Bluntschli *Theory of the State* E. T. pp. 18—24 and cf. 543 A *n.*

3 **ἄγαν δουλείαν.** For the omission of the article cf. IV 434 C *n.* We certainly should not read, with Schaefer, *τὴν ἄγαν*, or delete *ἄγαν* with Cobet.

4 **οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης κτλ.** In early times, according to Aristotle (*Pol.* E 5. 1305^{a} 7 ff.) democracies used to give rise to tyrannies. The tyranny of Dionysius I of Syracuse is a notorious illustration from later history (see Grote c. 81). But tyranny had other origins as well: it constantly appeared for example during the transition from Aristocracy to an oligarchical form of government (Whibley *Gk Olig.* pp. 72—83). Plato deliberately selects that particular origin which accords with his psychological standpoint. In the decline of an individual soul, 'lawless' or unnatural (*παράνομοι*) desires succeed the *ἰσονομία* in which all desires are treated as equal. Hence tyranny, which is only the political expression of unnatural desire, succeeds democracy in the fall of a State. Granted that Plato thought Athens was still degenerating, he must certainly have expected her, unless the process of decay should be arrested, to end in a tyranny. See also on IX 576 B. With the position of *οἶμαι* cf. 568 C and other examples in Braun *de hyperb. Plat.* II p. 12.

5 **ἀκροτάτης.** Herwerden (with Flor. T) conjectures *ἀκρατοτάτης*: but *ἄκρατος* does not easily admit the superlative, and the word is less suitable here than in the elaborate similitude about the wine of freedom 562 D. For the superlative of *ἄκρος* cf. V 459 E al.

7 **ἠρώτας**: 'you were asking about' (*doch wohl nicht danach fragtest du*, Schneider), viz. when you said *τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;* (563 E). Cf. *Crat.* 407 C *τὸν Ἄρη ἐρώτα* ('ask about Ares'). *καὶ τῷ ὄντι—ἀγριωτάτη* (563 E—564 A) is a digression, and Adimantus' question is

B τε φυόμενον ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δουλοῦται αὐτήν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἐκεῖνο τοίνυν, ἔφην, ἔλεγον τὸ τῶν ἀργῶν τε καὶ δαπανηρῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος, τὸ μὲν ἀνδρειότατον ἡγούμενον αὐτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀνανδρότερον ἑπόμενον· οὓς δὴ ἀφωμοιοῦμεν κηφῆσι, τοὺς μὲν κέντρα ἔχουσι, τοὺς δὲ ἀκέντροις. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη. Τούτω τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταράττετον ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐγγιγνομένω, οἷον C περὶ σῶμα φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή· ὦ δὴ καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἰατρόν τε καὶ νομοθέτην πόλεως μὴ ἧττον ἢ σοφὸν μελιττουργὸν πόρρωθεν εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἐγγενήσεσθον, ἂν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, ὅπως ὅ τι τάχιστα ξὺν αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κηρίοις ἐκτετμήσεσθον. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, παντάπασί γε. Ὧδε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λάβωμεν, ἵν' εὐκρινέστερον ἴδωμεν ὃ βουλόμεθα. Πῶς; Τριχῇ διαστησώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ δημοκρατουμένην πόλιν, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἔχει. ἓν μὲν γάρ που τὸ τοιοῦτον D γένος ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμφύεται δι' ἐξουσίαν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχουμένῃ. Ἔστιν οὕτω. Πολὺ δέ γε δριμύτερον ἐν ταύτῃ ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῃ. Πῶς; Ἐκεῖ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔντιμον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπελαύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀγύμναστον καὶ οὐκ

11. ἀφωμοιοῦμεν Ξq²: ἀφομοιοῦμεν ΑΠq¹. 15. μελιττουργὸν A²Π: μελιτουργόν A¹. 17. ἐκτετμήσεσθον A² cum v aliisque: ἐκτετμῆσθον A¹ΠΞq.

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not answered until Socrates specifies what particular *νόσημα* was meant by the allusion in 563 E. J. and C. erroneously refer *ἠρώτας* to *πῶς—τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν;* (562 E).

564 B 9 **ἐκεῖνο κτλ.** 'Well then,' said I, 'I was referring to yon class' etc. *ἐκεῖνο* = 'already-mentioned' (in 552 C and later). On *τὸ μὲν—ἑπόμενον* see 564 D *n.*

11 **ἀφωμοιοῦμεν.** See *cr. n.* The present is less suitable, especially with *δή* (=*ut scis*, Schneider). For the error see *Introd.* § 5.

13 **ταράττετον κτλ.** *ταράττετον* is used absolutely as in *Hipp. Min.* 373 B *Σωκράτης—ἀεὶ ταράττει ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.* On *φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή* the Oxford editors refer to Arist. *Probl.* I 29. 862ᵇ 27 *τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡ χολὴ μέν ἐστι θερμόν, τὸ δὲ φλέγμα ψυχρόν*, and rightly hold that 'the hot humour answers to the stinging, the cold to the stingless drones.' Cf. *Tim.* 85 D ff.

564 C 15 **μελιττουργόν** is the reading of Ξ *q* M as well as Π (see *cr. n.*), and is elsewhere better attested than *μελιτουργόν*, which "api magis quam homini convenit" (Schneider).

17 **ξύν** has been suspected by W. H. Thompson and Herwerden; but the preposition is occasionally found with this idiom both in poetry and prose (Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 356 and Lina *de praep. usu Plat.* p. 33). The half-poetic *ξύν* (see on IV 424 E and VII 518 C) suits well with the archaic form *αὐτοῖσι* (I 330 B *n.*).

19 **τριχῇ διαστησώμεθα.** With what follows cf. Eur. *Suppl.* 238—245 *τρεῖς γὰρ πολιτῶν μερίδες· οἱ μὲν ὄλβιοι | ἀνωφελεῖς τε πλειόνων τ' ἐρῶσ' ἀεί· | οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ σπανίζοντες βίου | δεινοί, νέμοντες τῷ φθόνῳ πλέον μέρος, | ἐς τοὺς ἔχοντας κέντρ' ἀφιᾶσιν κακά, | γλώσσαις πονηρῶν προστατῶν φηλούμενοι· | τριῶν δὲ μοιρῶν ἡ 'ν μέσῳ σῴζει πόλεις | κόσμον φυλάσσουσ' ὄντιν' ἂν τάξῃ πόλις.* Plato is thinking primarily of course of Athens. See also Arist. *Pol.* Δ 11. 1295ᵇ 1 ff. and (on the whole subject) Whibley *Pol. Parties in Athens* pp. 35 ff. and Beloch *Att. Pol.* pp. 1—19.

21 **τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος**: viz. the drones.

564 D **ἐξουσίαν.** See on 557 B.

ἐρρωμένον γίγνεται, ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δὲ τοῦτό που τὸ προεστὸς αὐτῆς ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει, τὸ δ' ἄλλο περὶ τὰ βήματα προσίζον βομβεῖ τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα | λέγοντος, ὥστε πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου διοικεῖται ἐν E τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ χωρίς τινων ὀλίγων. Μάλα γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἄλλο τοίνυν τοιόνδε ἀεὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους. Τὸ ποῖον; Χρηματιζομένων που πάντων οἱ κοσμιώτατοι φύσει ὡς τὸ πολὺ πλουσιώτατοι γίγνονται. Εἰκός. Πλεῖστον δή, οἶμαι, τοῖς κηφῆσι μέλι, καὶ εὐπορώτατον ἐντεῦθεν βλίττειν. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, παρά

25. προεστὸς Π et nisi fallor A^1: προεστὼς A^2. 33. βλίττειν nos: βλίττει $A\Pi^1$: βλύττει $\Pi^2\Xi q$.

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25 **προεστός** refers not only to the εἷς προστάτης τοῦ δήμου (565 C *n.*), but to δημαγωγοί in general and all who lead the people whether as orators or as officers (λέγει τε καὶ πράττει).

26 **ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων.** The leaders in a democracy, says Plato, belong to the class of drones—with a few exceptions. Pericles, for example, was an illustrious exception (Thuc. II 65. 8, 9 and Xen. *Symp.* 8. 39); and so, according even to Plato himself, was Aristides (*Gorg.* 526 B). Plato's general attitude towards Athenian demagogues has often been censured; but nearly all the greatest writers of antiquity, except the orators, pronounce the same verdict.

τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον—βομβεῖ. Cf. Dem. *Ol.* II 29 πολιτεύεσθε κατὰ συμμορίας. ῥήτωρ ἡγέμων ἑκατέρων, καὶ στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τούτῳ, καὶ οἱ βοησόμενοι τριακόσιοι. οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι προσνενέμησθε οἱ μὲν ὡς τούτους, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐκείνους. προσίζον (used of a bee alighting in Arist. *Hist. An.* VIII 11. 596^b 15) and βομβεῖ keep up the figure.

28 **τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος.** Vermehren proposes του, comparing V 479 A οὐδαμῇ ἀνεχόμενος ἄν τις—φῇ and IX 579 A. If Plato had wished to say 'any one,' he would, I think, have written οὑδενός: του is too weak. The article is generic.

564 E 28 **τοῦ τοιούτου**: the class of drones in general, not simply τὸ δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ. Cf. τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος in C above.

29 **χωρὶς τινων ὀλίγων** is neuter and should be taken with πάντα. The different liturgies etc. would scarcely be performed by the drones; and some departments of civic administration might be in the hands of the few exceptions noted above (ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων D).

30 **τοίνυν** is 'also': see I 339 E *n.*

31 **χρηματιζομένων κτλ.**: 'if all are engaged in making money' etc. πάντων is the whole of which οἱ κοσμιώτατοι form a part; not 'all the citizens of a democracy,' for the aim of democracy is not πλοῦτος but ἐλευθερία, and the drones at least are not engaged in money-making.

32 **πλεῖστον δὴ κτλ.**: 'thus, I imagine, there is plenty of honey for the drones, and it is most easy to squeeze honey from this source.' My correction βλίττειν for βλίττει (see *cr. n.*) is regarded as certain by a reviewer of my *Text of the Republic* in *Hermathena* XXIV p. 252. βλίττει is retained by J. and C.; but there is no authority for the intransitive use of the verb, and βλίσειεν in the very next sentence is active. Schneider reads βλύττει, which would be a ἅπαξ εἰρημένον. Ruhnken's βλίττεται is unexceptionable in point of sense, and has found much favour. The author of this emendation claims (in his note on Tim. *Lex.* s.v. βλίττειν) that it is confirmed "cum Scholiastae, tum Codicis Parisini auctoritate." But the Paris MSS have all either βλίττει or βλύττει; and Bekker's collation of the Scholium is βλίττει· ἀφαιρεῖ (*not* ἀφαιρεῖται) τὸ μέλι ἀπὸ τῶν κηρίων. Moreover, although the syllable ται was sometimes abbreviated in uncial MSS (see on 563 D), it is easier to suppose that the horizontal stroke for final ν was here accidentally omitted, as constantly in the *Republic*: see *Introd.* § 5. For the sense cf. I 343 A *n.* and on the word βλίττειν (i.e. *μ(β)λίττειν from μέλι) Blaydes on Ar. *Knights* 794.

γε τῶν σμικρὰ ἐχόντων τις βλίσειεν; Πλούσιοι δή, οἶμαι, οἱ τοιοῦτοι καλοῦνται, κηφήνων βοτάνη. Σχεδόν τι, ἔφη.

565 XVI. Δῆμος δ' ἂν εἴη | τρίτον γένος, ὅσοι αὐτουργοί τε καὶ ἀπράγμονες, οὐ πάνυ πολλὰ κεκτημένοι· ὃ δὴ πλεῖστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, ὅταν περ ἀθροισθῇ. Ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλ' οὐ θαμὰ ἐθέλει ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ μέλιτός τι μεταλαμβάνῃ. Οὐκοῦν μεταλαμβάνει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀεί, καθ' ὅσον δύνανται οἱ προεστῶτες, τοὺς ἔχοντας τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιρούμενοι, διανέμοντες τῷ δήμῳ
B τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοὶ ἔχειν. Μεταλαμβάνει γὰρ | οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως. Ἀναγκάζονται δή, οἶμαι, ἀμύνεσθαι, λέγοντές τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ πράττοντες ὅπῃ δύνανται, οὗτοι ὢν ἀφαιροῦνται. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Αἰτίαν δὴ ἔσχον ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων, κἂν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι νεωτερίζειν, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύουσι τῷ δήμῳ καί εἰσιν ὀλιγαρχικοί. Τί μήν; Οὐκοῦν καὶ τελευτῶντες, ἐπειδὰν ὁρῶσι τὸν δῆμον οὐχ ἑκόντα ἀλλ'

34. βλίσειε (*sic*) m: βλίσσειεν A: βλύσειε Ξ *q*: βλίσσειν ut videtur Π^1: βλύσσειεν Π^2.

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34 πλούσιοι—καλοῦνται. The oligarchs were frequently called *πλούσιοι, κτηματικοί* and the like: see Whibley *Pol. Part. in Ath.* p. 48 and Beloch *Att. Pol.* p. 2.

35 κηφήνων βοτάνη has a proverbial ring: cf. the proverb *κηφῆνες μόχθους ἄλλων κατέδονται* (Leutsch u. Schneidewin *Paroem. Gr.* II p. 179). The same expression, as Schneider points out *Addit.* p. 69, is used by Plut. *Mor.* 42 A with a different meaning.

565 A 3 κυριώτατον. In a democracy the sovereignty lies with the *δῆμος* in its assemblies.

4 οὐ θαμὰ κτλ. Under the earliest and best form of democratical government, according to Aristotle, the *δῆμος* consists chiefly of farmers, and *ἐκκλησίαι* are infrequent, for *διὰ τὸ ἐσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν οὔτ' ἀπαντῶσιν οὔθ' ὁμοίως δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταύτης* (*Pol.* Z 4. 1319^a 30 ff., 3. 1318^b 11, and Δ 5. 1292^b 27). It is a later and degenerate phase when assemblies are multiplied by the payment of *ἐκκλησιαστικὸς μισθός* and other forms of 'honey' (ib. Δ 6. 1293^a 1 ff.). Plato in this passage contributes some hints towards a historical analysis of the evolution of Greek democracy such as we find in Aristotle.

ἐὰν μὴ—μεταλαμβάνῃ. Cf. Ar. *Peace* 632—643. There is little doubt that the compulsory migration of Athenian farmers into Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war had a decisive effect on the course of Athenian democracy: cf. Thuc. II 14 and 16 and Gilbert *Beiträge* etc. pp. 98 ff.

6 τοὺς ἔχοντας κτλ. On the oppression of the rich in Athens see Hermann-Thumser *Gr. Staatsalt.* pp. 688 ff., 747.

διανέμοντες κτλ.: 'while dividing it among the people to retain the lion's share themselves.' The epigram is spoiled if (with Cobet) we read <ὀλίγα> *διανέμοντες*. For the sentiment cf. Dem. *Ol.* III 31, Ar. *Peace* l.c., *Knights* 46 ff., 792 ff., 1218 ff. and (with J. and C.) *Wasps* 655—679.

565 B 7 οὕτως: emphatic, 'with that proviso' (D. and V.).

9 πράττοντες is quite satisfactory: cf. *λέγει τε καὶ πράττει* 564 D. Richter should not have proposed *παράττοντες*.

ὅπῃ δύνανται κτλ.: 'in any way they can.' Their opportunities of public action in self-defence are limited; hence they form e.g. secret associations and the like. On the tense of *ἔσχον* see 548 D *n.*, and for the statement itself (*αἰτίαν—ὀλιγαρχικοί*) many passages in Aristophanes, e.g. *Wasps* 488 ff. and others quoted by Whibley *Pol. Part. in Athens* p. 65 *n.* 3.

ἀγνοήσαντά τε καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν διαβαλλόντων ἐπιχειροῦντα | σφᾶς ἀδικεῖν, τότ' ἤδη, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή, ὡς ἀληθῶς C
ὀλιγαρχικοὶ γίγνονται, οὐχ ἑκόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κακὸν ἐκεῖνος ὁ κηφὴν ἐντίκτει κεντῶν αὐτούς. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Εἰσαγγελίαι δὴ καὶ κρίσεις καὶ ἀγῶνες περὶ ἀλλήλων γίγνονται. Καὶ μάλα. Οὐκοῦν ἕνα τινὰ ἀεὶ δῆμος εἴωθεν διαφερόντως προΐστασθαι ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦτον τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν; Εἴωθε γάρ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, | δῆλον, ὅτι, ὅταν περ φύηται τύραννος, ἐκ D
προστατικῆς ῥίζης καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἐκβλαστάνει. Καὶ μάλα δῆλον. Τίς ἀρχὴ οὖν μεταβολῆς ἐκ προστάτου ἐπὶ τύραννον; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν ἄρξηται δρᾶν ὁ προστάτης τῷ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, ὃς περὶ τὸ ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερὸν λέγε-

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565 C 14 **τότ' ἤδη—οὐχ ἑκόντες.** Isocrates makes a similar complaint (*Antid.* 318): *οὗ τοὺς μὲν ἐνδοξοτάτους τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ μάλιστα δυναμένους ποιῆσαί τι τὴν πόλιν ἀγαθόν, ὀλιγαρχίαν ὀνειδίζοντες καὶ λακωνισμόν, οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσαντο* (sc. *οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν*) *πρὶν ἠνάγκασαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις ταῖς λεγομέναις περὶ αὐτῶν;* Cf. also Arist. *Pol.* E 5. 1304^{b} 21 ff. Observe how Plato now begins to insist on the inevitable *necessity* which dogs the footsteps of political decay: see on 566 A and 567 C.

16 **εἰσαγγελίαι:** 'impeachments,' as e.g. for *κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου*. On eisangelia in Attic legal procedure see Hager *Dict. Ant.* s.v. and Meier u. Schömann *Att. Proc.* I pp. 312—335.

17 **ἀγῶνες περὶ ἀλλήλων:** 'trials of one another' (Jowett): lit. 'trials about one another,' i.e. trials in which the individuals chiefly concerned, viz. the defendants, belong to one or other of the two parties in the State. *ἀλλήλων* by itself would be better suited to the words *εἰσαγγελίαι καὶ κρίσεις*, but *ἀγῶνες ἀλλήλων* is too harsh an expression, and that, I think, is why Plato writes *ἀγῶνες περὶ ἀλλήλων*. This explanation is in my opinion better than to translate "Processe um Leben und Tod" (Schneider: cf. *ἀγῶνας—περὶ σφέων αὐτῶν* Hdt. VIII 102). Some may think that *ἀλλήλους* should replace *ἀλλήλων*: but *περί* with the accusative would not express a close enough connexion in this passage.

18 **οὐκοῦν κτλ.** So in Ar. *Knights* 1127 Demos says *βούλομαι τρέφειν ἕνα προστάτην*. The *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου* in Athens was simply "the leading demagogue, who acted as guardian and representative of the demos, as the ordinary *προστάτης* did of the metoecs" (Whibley *Pol. Part. in Ath.* p. 51). He was not a magistrate, although his position was recognised and much sought after. Pericles was certainly *προστάτης*, and, among his successors, apparently Cleon and others. For the authorities see Whibley l.c. and Gilbert *Beiträge* etc. pp. 78 ff. For *ἕνα τινά* Cobet substitutes *ἕνα γέ τινα*, without sufficient reason: cf. VI 494 D *n.* To my mind the emphasis on *ἕνα* is much stronger without *γε*: and Plato clearly intends to emphasise that word, for it is by the rise of a *single* champion that tyranny is caused.

565 D 20 **ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥίζης κτλ.** Arist. *Pol.* E 10. 1310^{b} 14 ff. *σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους*. This was especially true of earlier times, when the orator also held military command (ib. 5. 1305^{a} 7 ff.). See Gilbert *Gr. Staatsalt.* II pp. 280 ff.

21 **καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν.** If we treat this sentence as a statement of historical fact, Plato expresses himself too strongly; for tyranny sometimes arose in other ways. See however on 564 A and 543 A, 544 C *nn.*

23 **τῷ μύθῳ.** See [Hecat.] *Frag.* 375 in Müller *Frag. Hist. Gr.* I p. 31 and Paus. VIII 2. 6. In his note on the latter passage, Frazer collects the ancient legends about werewolves. For the later history of the superstition consult M^{c}Lennan's

ται; Τίς; ἔφη. Ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχ- 25
νου, ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἑνὸς ἐγκατατετμημένου, ἀνάγκη δὴ
E τούτῳ | λύκῳ γενέσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας τὸν λόγον; Ἔγωγε. Ἆρ'
οὖν οὕτω καὶ ὃς ἂν δήμου προεστὼς, λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον
ὄχλον, μὴ ἀπόσχηται ἐμφυλίου αἵματος, ἀλλ' ἀδίκως ἐπαιτιώμενος,
οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν, εἰς δικαστήρια ἄγων μιαιφονῇ, βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανί- 30
ζων, γλώττῃ τε καὶ στόματι ἀνοσίῳ γευόμενος φόνου ξυγγενοῦς, καὶ
566 ἀνδρηλατῇ καὶ ἀποκτιννύῃ | καὶ ὑποσημαίνῃ χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς
καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν, ἆρα τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ
εἵμαρται ἢ ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ ἐξ
ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Οὗτος δή, ἔφην, ὁ

28. προεστὼς Ξq: προσεστὼς A: προσετὼς (*sic*) Π.

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article *Lycanthropy* in Enc. Brit. ed. 9, and for parallels in non-classical mythologies Tylor *Prim. Culture*[2] I pp. 308—315.

26 **ἑνός** is bracketed by Herwerden; but τοῦ in τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου proves it genuine. But for ἑνός Plato must have written τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου <τοῦ> ἐν ἄλλοις κτλ. The werewolf superstition was similarly associated with cannibalism in some of its later European forms (M[c]Lennan l.c.).

ἀνάγκη δὴ κτλ. The anacoluthon is illustrated by Engelhardt *Spec. Anac. Pl.* III p. 40.

565 E 29 **ἐμφυλίου αἵματος.** Cf. Pind. *Pyth.* II 32 ἐμφύλιον αἷμα πρώτιστος οὐκ ἄτερ τέχνας ἐπέμιξε θνατοῖς. The style rises into poetry as usual in passages of solemn import and sustained emotion; cf. 560 B, D *nn.*

30 **ἀνδρός** is poetic for ἀνθρώπου: cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 1020 f. ἀνδρὸς μέλαν αἷμα τίς ἂν πάλιν | ἀγκαλέσαιτ' ἐπαείδων; and often in Pindar (*Ol.* I 35, 66 etc.).

31 **γλώττῃ τε καὶ—ξυγγενοῦς.** The blood of fellow-citizens is kindred blood: for all are sons of the same fatherland. 'The unholy tongue and lips' is an eloquent amplification of γευόμενος, in harmony with the story to which Plato has referred in D above. J. and C. seem to me to mar the effect of Plato's eloquence by remarking that "the tongue and lips which make the slanderous accusation are vividly imagined as actually tasting blood."

32 **ἀνδρηλατῇ κτλ.** Cf. *Gorg.* 466 C τί δέ; οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι ἀποκτιννύασί τε (sc. οἱ ῥήτορες) ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; Νὴ τὸν κύνα. The unscrupulous mob-orator is a budding tyrant.

566 A 1 **ὑποσημαίνῃ:** 'hints at.'

χρεῶν—ἀναδασμόν: phrases ominous of revolution to a Greek ear: see *Laws* 684 E, [Dem.] 24. 149 ψηφιοῦμαι—οὐδὲ τῶν χρεῶν τῶν ἰδίων ἀποκοπὰς οὐδὲ γῆς ἀναδασμὸν τῆς Ἀθηναίων οὐδ' οἰκιῶν (in the Heliastic oath), Isocr. *Panath.* 259, Arist. *Pol.* E 5. 1305[a] 5 al. and Sandys on *Ath. Pol.* 6. 1. Cf. also Gilbert *Gr. Staatsalt.* II p. 279.

2 **ἀνάγκη—καὶ εἵμαρται κτλ.** Once more Necessity rings her knell (565 C *n.*): the instinct of self-preservation makes the final stage inevitable. For the same reason Xenophon remarks (*Hier.* 7. 12, 13) that a tyrant never dare lay down his power: cf. also Periander in D. L. I 97 and the pathetic saying καλὸν μὲν εἶναι τὴν τυραννίδα χωρίον, οὐκ ἔχειν δὲ ἀπόβασιν (Plut. *Sol.* 14. 10). See also on 545 C and 547 A.

4 **οὗτος κτλ.** 'This then,' said I, 'is the man who is guilty of sedition against the holders of property.' γίγνεται is not 'becomes' ("the leader of the faction against the rich becomes that person" J. and C.), but 'turns out to be,' 'is' sc. in our argument or picture: cf. 562 A *n.* οὗτος γίγνεται is similarly used at the end of the picture of the tyrannical man in IX 576 B. Schneider seems to suppose that στασιάζων refers to civil *war* ("vim et arma civilia") such as is described in what follows, but the incidents just enumerated

στασιάζων γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας τὰς οὐσίας. Οὗτος. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐκπεσὼν μὲν καὶ κατελθὼν βίᾳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τύραννος ἀπειργασμένος κατέρχεται; Δῆλον. Ἐὰν δὲ ἀδύνατοι ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὸν ὦσιν ἢ | ἀποκτεῖναι διαβάλλοντες τῇ πόλει, βιαίῳ δὴ θανάτῳ B
ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἀποκτιννύναι λάθρᾳ. Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι. Τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον ἐπὶ τούτῳ πάντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο προβεβηκότες ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ᾖ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Διδόασι δή, οἶμαι, δείσαντες μὲν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου, θαρρήσαντες δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν. Καὶ | μάλα. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ὅταν C
ἴδῃ ἀνὴρ χρήματα ἔχων καὶ μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων αἰτίαν μισόδημος εἶναι, τότε δὴ οὗτος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατὰ τὸν Κροίσῳ γενόμενον χρησμὸν

πολυψήφιδα παρ' Ἕρμον
φεύγει, οὐδὲ μένει, οὐδ' αἰδεῖται κακὸς εἶναι.

Οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, δεύτερον αὖθις αἰδεσθείη. Ὁ δέ γε, οἶμαι, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καταληφθεὶς θανάτῳ δίδοται. Ἀνάγκη. Ὁ δὲ δὴ προστάτης ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς δῆλον δὴ ὅτι μέγας μεγαλωστὶ | οὐ κεῖται, ἀλλὰ D
καταβαλὼν ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἕστηκεν ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ τῆς πόλεως,

23. καταβαλὼν $A^2\Pi$: καβαλὼν (*sic*) A^1.

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would certainly be called *στάσις* by a Greek, and *οὗτος δὴ—γίγνεται* points backward rather than forward, as is clear both from *δή* and from Adimantus' reply.

6 ἐκπεσὼν κτλ. He is transformed into a full and finished tyrant in one of two ways: either by being expelled (in course of the *στάσις*) and returning *βίᾳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν*, or else in the way described in *ἐὰν δὲ—ἀποτετελεσμένος* (D). Pisistratus is not a perfect example to illustrate *ἐκπεσών* etc., for he had made himself a tyrant before he was expelled (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 14. 3).

566 B 8 διαβάλλοντες τῇ πόλει: 'by setting the citizens against him' (J. and C.) rather than 'by accusing him to the State' (D. and V.). Cf. VI 498 C and *Phaed.* 67 E.

βιαίῳ—λάθρᾳ. Cf. Thuc. VIII 65. 2.

10 αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον: as in the case of Theagenes of Megara, Pisistratus, and Dionysius of Syracuse: see Arist. *Rhet.* I 2. 1357^b 30—33 with Cope ad loc., and (for Dionysius) Grote X pp. 202 ff. and Freeman's *Sicily* III p. 558. Gilbert (*Gr. Staatsalt.* II p. 281 *n.* 1) remarks that the body-guard plays a part in the genesis of nearly every Tyrannis.

566 C, D 14 θαρρήσαντες—ἑαυτῶν. Cf. Solon *Frag.* 11. 5—8 Bergk.

16 τὸν Κροίσῳ κτλ. See Hdt. I 55.

20 αἰδεσθείη κτλ. Liebhold's conjecture *οἰκισθείη* is of course absurd. The expression *θανάτῳ διδόναι* is *paullo exquisitius dictum*, resembling our phrase 'is done to death': cf. (with Stallbaum) IX 571 E, 574 C and *Phaedr.* 254 E (*ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν*, imitated from Homer *Od.* XVII 567).

22 μέγας μεγαλωστί. *Il.* XVI 776.

23 ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ κτλ. The figure—a common one—is of course suggested by the Homeric allusion. Cebriones *ἀρνευτῆρι ἐοικὼς | κάππεσ' ἀπ' εὐεργέος δίφροιο* (ib. 743). Not so the *προστάτης*: he fells others, but himself (*αὐτὸς*) *ἕστηκεν ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ τῆς πόλεως.*

566 D—569 C *The tyrant begins his reign with popular measures, but as soon as his position is secure, he impoverishes and oppresses the citizens by a continual*

τύραννος ἀντὶ προστάτου ἀποτετελεσμένος. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη.

XVII. Διέλθωμεν δὴ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς πόλεως, ἐν ᾗ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος βροτὸς ἐγγένηται; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, διέλθωμεν. Ἆρ' οὖν, εἶπον, οὐ ταῖς μὲν πρώταις ἡμέραις τε καὶ χρόνῳ προσγελᾷ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται πάντας, ᾧ ἂν
E περιτυγχάνῃ, καὶ οὔτε τύραννός | φησιν εἶναι ὑπισχνεῖταί τε πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, χρεῶν τε ἠλευθέρωσε καὶ γῆν διένειμεν δήμῳ τε καὶ τοῖς περὶ ἑαυτόν, καὶ πᾶσιν ἵλεώς τε καὶ πρᾶος εἶναι προσποιεῖται; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Ὅταν δέ γε, οἶμαι, πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς μὲν καταλλαγῇ, τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ, καὶ ἡσυχία ἐκείνων γένηται, πρῶτον μὲν πολέμους τινὰς ἀεὶ κινεῖ, ἵν' ἐν χρείᾳ

24. μέλλει A¹Π: μέλει A².

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succession of wars. All who expostulate, he 'removes': it is a sad necessity of his situation that he should purge the city of wealth and virtue. To provide against his growing unpopularity, he must increase his standing army by enlisting foreign mercenaries and the slaves of private citizens. These are his 'new citizens' forsooth! Euripides and other tragedians praise tyranny and its retinue: that is why we exclude them from our city. The higher they climb the hill of commonwealths, the more the honour paid to poets flags. As for the tyrant, after exhausting the property of temples and the proscribed, he will compel the Demos that begat him to support his rabble rout. All remonstrance is in vain. The Demos now learns what slavery means—slavery in its most cruel form, where slaves are masters.

566 D ff. 26 **διέλθωμεν δὴ κτλ.** Throughout the whole of this picture, it is tolerably clear that Plato has Dionysius the first of Syracuse in his mind: see on 566 E, 567 B, E, 568 A, D. The reader should compare Aristotle's brief account of the three kinds of Tyranny in *Pol.* Δ 10. 1295ᵃ 1—24. That which Plato describes is of course the worst variety *ἥτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ βελτιόνων πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων* (ib. 20—22).

27 **βροτός**: 'creature' (Jowett). The tyrant is something less than human.

29 **πάντας ᾧ ἂν κτλ.** For the grammatical concord cf. IV 426 C *n.* The sense is well illustrated by Stallbaum from Eur. *I. A.* 337—342, where Menelaus says to Agamemnon: *οἶσθ' ὅτ' ἐσπούδαζες ἄρχειν Δαναΐδαις πρὸς Ἴλιον | —ὡς ταπεινὸς ἦσθα, πάσης δεξιᾶς προσθιγγάνων, | καὶ θύρας ἔχων ἀκλήστους τῷ θέλοντι δημοτῶν, | καὶ διδοὺς πρόσρησιν ἐξῆς πᾶσι, κεἰ μήτις θέλοι, | τοῖς τρόποις ζητῶν πρίασθαι τὸ φιλότιμον ἐκ μέσου;* On οὔτε followed by τε (neque—et) where the stress falls on the affirmative clause (non modo non—sed etiam) see IV 430 B *n.*

566 E 31 **ἠλευθέρωσε—διένειμεν**: fulfilling the hopes held out by him as *προστάτης* (566 A *n.*). A redistribution of landed property was one of Dionysius' earliest measures after he had established himself in the tyranny (Grote X pp. 221 ff.). As Mr Giles points out, such a step would tend to keep up the enthusiasm of the *πλῆθος*, especially when the tyrant succeeded to an oligarchy which had added field to field by lending on mortgage to the small farmers and selling them up after a bad year. It would be easy enough to carry out, because the tyrant's opponents would have fled the country: cf. 566 C. For the aorists see 548 D *n.*

33 **πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς κτλ.**: 'in his relations to foreign enemies' etc. With the construction of *τοῖς μὲν κτλ.* cf. IX 591 E—592 A *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τιμάς γε—τῶν μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται ἐκών, ἃς ἂν ἡγῆται ἀμείνω αὐτὸν ποιήσειν, ἃς δ' ἂν λύσειν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἕξιν, φεύξεται ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.* In both cases the idiom resembles so-called partitive apposition, for which see IV 431 A *n.*

35 **πολέμους τινὰς κτλ.** Cf. Arist. *Pol.*

ἡγεμόνος ὁ δῆμος ᾖ. Εἰκός γε. | Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἵνα χρήματα εἰσφέ- 567
ροντες πένητες γιγνόμενοι πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζωνται εἶναι καὶ ἧττον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύωσι; Δῆλον. Καὶ ἄν γέ τινας, οἶμαι, ὑποπτεύῃ ἐλεύθερα φρονήματα ἔχοντας μὴ ἐπιτρέψειν αὐτῷ ἄρχειν, ὅπως ἂν τούτους μετὰ προφάσεως ἀπολλύῃ ἐνδοὺς τοῖς πολεμίοις; τούτων πάντων ἕνεκα τυράννῳ ἀεὶ ἀνάγκη πόλεμον ταράττειν; Ἀνάγκη. Ταῦτα δὴ ποιοῦντα ἕτοιμον μᾶλλον ἀπεχθάνεσθαι | τοῖς B
πολίταις; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν καί τινας τῶν ξυγκαταστησάντων καὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐπιπλήττοντας τοῖς γιγνομένοις, οἳ ἂν τυγχάνωσιν ἀνδρικώτατοι ὄντες; Εἰκός γε. Ὑπεξαιρεῖν δὴ τούτους πάντας δεῖ τὸν τύραννον, εἰ μέλλει ἄρξειν, ἕως ἂν μήτε φίλων μήτ' ἐχθρῶν λίπῃ μηδένα ὅτου τι ὄφελος. Δῆλον. Ὀξέως ἄρα δεῖ ὁρᾶν αὐτόν, τίς ἀνδρεῖος, τίς μεγαλόφρων, | τίς φρόνιμος, τίς πλούσιος· καὶ C
οὕτως εὐδαίμων ἐστίν, ὥστε τούτοις ἅπασιν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, εἴτε βούλεται εἴτε μή, πολεμίῳ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύειν, ἕως ἂν καθήρῃ τὴν πόλιν. Καλόν γε, ἔφη, καθαρμόν. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ σώματα· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ χείριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπουσι τὸ βέλτιστον, ὁ δὲ τοὐναντίον. Ὡς ἔοικε γάρ, αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἄρξει.

2. τῷ Ξq: τὸ A¹Π: τὼ (*sic*) A².
11. ὑπεξαιρεῖν Π: ὑπεξαιρειν A.
13. αὐτόν A¹Π: ἀστόν A².

E 11. 1313ᵇ 28 ff. ἔστι δὲ καὶ πολεμοποιὸς ὁ τύραννος, ὅπως δὴ ἄσχολοί τε ὦσι καὶ ἡγεμόνος ἐν χρείᾳ διατελῶσιν ὄντες. The history of Dionysius the elder is again in point: see Grote X pp. 224—331.

567 A 1 **οὐκοῦν καὶ κτλ.** Arist. *Pol.* l.c. 1313ᵇ 18 ff. καὶ τὸ πένητας ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους τυραννικὸν ὅπως—πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ὄντες ἄσχολοι ὦσιν ἐπιβουλεύειν—καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν, οἷον ἐν Συρακούσαις· ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν εἰσενηνοχέναι συνέβαινεν. Cf. Grote l.c. p. 223.

2 **πρὸς τῷ.** A majority of MSS have πρὸς τό, which is also the older reading (see *cr. n.*); but εἰμι πρός τι in this sense lacks authority, and is inherently improbable. Cf. *Phaedr.* 249 D and IX 585 A, X 604 C, D *n.*

5 **ὅπως — πολεμίοις:** sc. πολέμους τινὰς ἀεὶ κινεῖ as before. ἕτοιμον in line 7 is impersonal—a rare usage, for which cf. *Epp.* 7. 333 A and Eur. *H. F.* 86.

567 B 11 **ὑπεξαιρεῖν.** For the corruption ὑπεξαίρειν (*cr. n.*) cf. Xen. *Hiero* 5. 2 ὅταν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους—ὑπεξαιρῶνται (J. G. Schneider's conjecture for ὑπεξαίρωνται of the MSS). On this passage the poet Gray remarks: "Compare this description with the Hiero of Xenophon: it is in almost every step a picture of the politicks and way of life of the elder Dionysius."

12 **ἕως ἂν μήτε φίλων κτλ.** There is no solitude or desolation like the tyrant's: for he is the enemy of the whole human race. See the passages quoted by Nägelsbach *Nachhom. Theol.* p. 304.

567 C 17 **καλόν γε—καθαρμόν.** Cf. VII 540 E *n.* The famous anecdote of Thrasybulus and Periander (Hdt. V 92: cf. Arist. *Pol.* Γ 13. 1284ᵃ 26 ff., E 10. 1311ᵃ 20 ff., also Eur. *Suppl.* 445—449, where the poet borrows his imagery from the same story) is one instance out of many in Greek history: see Greenidge *Gk Const. H.* pp. 31 ff.

20 **ἀνάγκη:** sc. ἐστιν. J. and C. strangely say that "ἀνάγκη is the subject

D XVIII. Ἐν μακαρίᾳ ἄρα, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκῃ δέδεται, | ἣ προστάττει αὐτῷ ἢ μετὰ φαύλων τῶν πολλῶν οἰκεῖν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μισούμενον ἢ μὴ ζῆν. Ἐν τοιαύτῃ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τοῖς πολίταις ἀπεχθάνηται ταῦτα δρῶν, τοσούτῳ πλειόνων καὶ πιστοτέρων δορυφόρων δεήσεται; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τίνες οὖν οἱ πιστοί, καὶ πόθεν αὐτοὺς μεταπέμψεται; Αὐτόματοι, ἔφη, πολλοὶ ἥξουσι πετόμενοι, ἐὰν τὸν μισθὸν διδῷ. Κηφῆνας, E ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νὴ τὸν κύνα, δοκεῖς αὖ τινάς μοι λέγειν | ξενικούς τε καὶ παντοδαπούς. Ἀληθῆ γάρ, ἔφη, δοκῶ σοι. Τί δέ; αὐτόθεν ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθελήσειεν—Πῶς; Τοὺς δούλους ἀφελόμενος τοὺς πολίτας, ἐλευθερώσας, τῶν περὶ ἑαυτὸν δορυφόρων ποιήσασθαι; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη· ἐπεί τοι καὶ πιστότατοι αὐτῷ οὗτοί εἰσιν. Ἡ μακάριον, 568 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις τυράννου χρῆμα, εἰ τοιούτοις φίλοις τε καὶ | πιστοῖς ἀνδράσι χρῆται τοὺς προτέρους ἐκείνους ἀπολέσας. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, τοιούτοις γε χρῆται. Καὶ θαυμάζουσι δή, εἶπον, οὗτοι οἱ ἑταῖροι αὐτόν, καὶ ξύνεισιν οἱ νέοι πολῖται, οἱ δ' ἐπιεικεῖς μισοῦσί

21. μακαρίᾳ $A^2\Pi$: μακαρία A^1. ἀνάγκῃ Π: ἀνάγκη A. 29. τί δὲ (nullo interrogationis signo) *q*: τίς δὲ ΑΠΞ.

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of ἔοικε." For αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη cf. 568 E and IX 579 A. On the force of ἀνάγκη here and just below see 565 C, 566 A *nn.*

567 D 27 **ἥξουσι πετόμενοι**: 'will wing their way.' πετόμενοι leads up to κηφῆνας.

τὸν μισθόν: 'the pay,' i.e. 'the necessary pay' (J. and C.). W. H. Thompson would omit τόν or replace it by μόνον: but *insufficient* pay would not attract mercenaries.

567 E 28 **ξενικούς — παντοδαπούς.** The body-guard of foreign mercenaries was a familiar feature in Greek tyrannies: see Xen. *Hiero* 5. 3 and (for Dionysius in particular) Grote X p. 221.

29 **τί δέ;—ποιήσασθαι**; The words from αὐτόθεν to ποιήσασθαι form a single sentence, πῶς being neglected: cf. πῇ δὴ—γίγνεται in 549 C, where see note and Jebb quoted ad loc. αὐτόθεν by its emphatic position already suggests what Socrates is about to say; and Adimantus' interruption, besides its stylistic effect, expresses the anxiety and horror with which the bare idea of such a proceeding would inspire a Greek. "Slaves were normally of non-Greek race; so this is what enlisting a band of negroes would be in the United States to-day" (Bosanquet). The best MSS read τίς δὲ αὐτόθεν κτλ., but τίς is indefensible, and retained by no editor. Schneider's τοὺς δὲ αὐτόθεν (with several MSS of inferior authority) seems to me grammatically awkward, as well as lifeless and dull. In Richards' proposal τί δέ; αὐτόθεν ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθελήσειέ πως τοὺς δούλους etc., the enclitic πως is singularly weak. J. and C., who print, with Hermann and Stallbaum, τί δέ; αὐτόθεν—ἐθελήσειε; and a full-stop after ποιήσασθαι, supply "some general notion such as λαβεῖν or ποιήσασθαι" with ἐθελήσειεν "from μεταπέμψεται in the previous sentence"—surely an impossible solution. The punctuation in the text removes, I think, all difficulty, if the words are taken as I take them.

30 **τοὺς δούλους κτλ.** As Dionysius, for example, did (Grote X p. 221 and Freeman's *Sicily* IV p. 13).

568 A 4 **οἱ νέοι πολῖται**: 'the new citizens,' viz. these quondam slaves etc., not (as D. and V.) 'the young citizens.' It is, in view, for example, of νέους ἑταίρους 'new friends' IX 575 D, quite unnecessary to read οἱ νεοπολῖται (apparently with Pollux III 56: cf. also id. IX 26), although according to Diodorus XIV 7 Dionysius called his body-guard of emancipated slaves νεοπολῖται. See Freeman's *Sicily* l.c.

τε καὶ φεύγουσι; Τί δ' οὐ μέλλουσιν; Οὐκ ἐτός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥ τε τραγῳδία ὅλως σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ. Τί δή; Ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο πυκνῆς διανοίας ἐχόμενον ἐφθέγξατο, ὡς ἄρα σοφοὶ τύραννοι | εἰσι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ. καὶ B ἔλεγε δῆλον ὅτι τούτους εἶναι τοὺς σοφούς, οἷς ξύνεστιν. Καὶ ὡς ἰσόθεόν γ', ἔφη, τὴν τυραννίδα ἐγκωμιάζει, καὶ ἕτερα πολλά, καὶ οὗτος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. Τοιγάρτοι, ἔφην, ἅτε σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιηταὶ συγγιγνώσκουσιν ἡμῖν τε καὶ ἐκείνοις, ὅσοι ἡμῶν ἐγγὺς πολιτεύονται, ὅτι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ παραδεξόμεθα ἅτε τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς. Οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ξυγγιγνώσκου- C σιν ὅσοιπέρ γε | αὐτῶν κομψοί. Εἰς δέ γε, οἶμαι, τὰς ἄλλας περι-

15. περιόντες $A^2\Xi g$: περιόντες $A^1\Pi$.

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5 **οὐκ ἐτὸς κτλ.** A highly ironical and sarcastic sentence. It is not without reason that tragedy 'in general' (*ὅλως* is not 'on the whole' as D. and V. render) is thought *σοφόν*, and Euripides a master-tragedian (Euripides was notoriously '*σοφός*'—see Blaydes on Ar. *Clouds* 1378): for he gave utterance *inter alia* to this sapient remark (for *ἐφθέγξατο* of an oracular, would-be-profound observation, see on VI 505 C): *σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ*, in which by '*τῶν σοφῶν*' he meant of course *οἷς ξύνεστιν* (*ὁ τύραννος*), the associates of the tyrant, i.e., as we have seen, a rabble of emancipated slaves and foreign mercenaries. In *τραγῳδία—σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι* Plato is also perhaps scoffing at the constant use of *σοφός* in tragedy, especially by Euripides: *σοφός* is, no doubt, that *σοφόν* says! None but a *σοφός* could have written *σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ*. The poet of course really meant that tyrants gain wisdom from the wise men who throng the 'rich man's courts' (VI 489 B *n.*); but Plato maliciously twists the words into a compliment to tyrants and their rabble rout, and makes them a reason for tabooing tragic poets as *τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς* (B). Cobet would omit *τούς* before *σοφούς*: but the article is necessary because *τοὺς σοφούς* represents *τῶν σοφῶν* of the quotation. As regards the verse itself, it was Sophocles (in his *Αἴας ὁ Λοκρός*), and not Euripides, who was the author: see the references in Schneider, with Blaydes on Ar. *Thesm.* 21, *Frag.* 311 and Dindorf on Soph. *Frag.* 12 = Nauck *Frag.* 13. Plato's error is repeated in *Theag.* 125 B, and the Scholiast on Ar. *Thesm.* l.c. remarks that Aristophanes and Antisthenes made the same mistake, suggesting that either Aristophanes misled the others (so also Hirmer *Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol.* p. 658 *n.* 2), or that the two tragedians wrote the same line independently (so Schneider also thinks). The latter supposition is unlikely. Perhaps the reduplication of the cant Euripidean *σοφός* is responsible for a kind of error which was easier in antiquity than it would be now. There is little to be said in favour of Dümmler's conjecture (*Akadem.* p. 16), that Antisthenes had quoted the line as from Euripides in an attack on Plato for associating with tyrants (Dionysius I and II), and that Plato, in his hurry to reply, forgets to rectify his assailant's error. Still less should we suppose that Plato's perverse exegesis is meant to caricature Antisthenes' way of expounding poetry.

568 B 10 **ἰσόθεόν γε κτλ.** Eur. *Troad.* 1169 *τῆς ἰσοθέου τυραννίδος*. Isocrates *ad Nic.* 5 appears to allude to the same verse (Dümmler *Chronol. Beiträge* p. 32).

ἕτερα πολλά: e.g. *Phoen.* 524 f., *Fragg.* 252, 336 Dindorf. In point of fact, however, Euripides blames tyranny at least as often as he praises it: see e.g. *Ion* 621 ff., *Suppl.* 429 ff., *Fragg.* 277, 288, 608 and other passages in Stob. *Flor.* 49. The elder Dionysius himself had the effrontery or candour to write the line *ἡ γὰρ τυραννὶς ἀδικίας μήτηρ ἔφυ* (Stob. *Flor.* 49. 9, quoted in Freeman's *Sicily* IV p. 7 *n.* 1).

13 **παραδεξόμεθα**: not *παραδεχόμεθα* (as Stephanus suggested), in spite of the present *συγγιγνώσκουσιν*, for "civitas ipsa

ιόντες πόλεις, ξυλλέγοντες τοὺς ὄχλους καλὰς φωνὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ πιθανὰς μισθωσάμενοι, εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας ἕλκουσι τὰς πολιτείας. Μάλα γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ προσέτι τούτων μισθοὺς λαμβάνουσι καὶ τιμῶνται, μάλιστα μέν, ὥσπερ τὸ εἰκός, ὑπὸ τυράννων, δεύτερον δὲ ὑπὸ δημοκρατίας· ὅσῳ δ' ἂν ἀνωτέρω 20
D ἴωσιν πρὸς τὸ ἄναντες τῶν πολιτειῶν, μᾶλλον ἀπαγορευεῖ | αὐτῶν ἡ τιμή, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ἄσθματος ἀδυνατοῦσα πορεύεσθαι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

XIX. Ἀλλὰ δή, εἶπον, ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἐξέβημεν· λέγωμεν δὲ πάλιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατόπεδον, τὸ καλόν τε καὶ πολὺ 25 καὶ ποικίλον καὶ οὐδέποτε ταὐτόν, πόθεν θρέψεται. Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, ἐάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα ᾖ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα ἀναλώσει, ὅποι ποτὲ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐξαρκῇ, <καὶ> τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων, ἐλάττους εἰσφορὰς

22. ὥσπερ Π: ἡ ὥσπερ A. 28. <καὶ> Baiter: om. codd. ἀπολομένων *q* et corr. A^2: ἀποδομένων A^1ΠΞ.

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nondum exstitit, sed veniam iam nunc sibi dari sperat Socrates" (Schneider).

568 C 16 **καλὰς φωνὰς κτλ.** *τὰς τῶν ὑποκριτῶν* (Schol.). With this whole sentence should be compared *Laws* 817 C, where Plato addresses tragic poets in these words: *μὴ δὴ δόξητε ἡμᾶς ῥᾳδίως γε οὕτως ὑμᾶς ποτε παρ' ἡμῖν ἐάσειν σκηνάς τε πήξαντας κατ' ἀγορὰν καὶ καλλιφώνους ὑποκριτὰς εἰσαγαγομένους, μεῖζον φθεγγομένους ἡμῶν, ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμῖν δημηγορεῖν πρὸς παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὸν πολὺν ὄχλον* κτλ.

17 **τυραννίδας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας.** Democracy is next door to tyranny: in fact, *ἡ δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία τυραννὶς ἐστιν* (Arist. *Pol.* E 10. 1312^{b}5). Attic tragedy, of course, praises Democracy more often than Tyranny. On the political influence of poetry see *Laws* 817 C ff., *Gorg.* 501 E ff. and other passages in Reber *Platon u. die Poesie* pp. 55—59.

19 **μισθοὺς κτλ.** We may recall Pindar's *ἀργυρωθεῖσαι πρόσωπα μαλθακόφωνοι ἀοιδαί* (*Isthm.* 2. 8).

τιμῶνται κτλ. "For good and evil," says Bosanquet, "Plato's assertion is true on the whole." But as far as concerns Greece, at any rate, we may doubt whether tragic poets were not more honoured in the democracy of Athens than in imperial courts.

20 **ὑπὸ τυράννων:** e.g. Hiero, Archelaus, and such like patrons of poetry and the drama.

ὅσῳ δ' ἂν κτλ. The honour paid to Poetry varies inversely with the merit of the constitution. This is perhaps the severest thing which Plato has yet said against Poetry. The striking metaphor in *ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ἄσθματος κτλ.* is curiously like Dante, as Bosanquet points out.

568 D 26 **θρέψεται.** Is the verb middle or passive? It is passive in E below, but that does not decide the question: see on 546 D. If we confine our attention to the single sentence *λέγωμεν—θρέψεται*, the verb is most readily understood as passive; but *ἀναλώσει* in the next sentence favours the view that it is middle. On the whole, I prefer the passive. It is easy to supply the subject of *ἀναλώσει* from *τοῦ τυράννου*.

27 **ἐάν τε ἱερὰ κτλ.** The elder Dionysius in particular greatly shocked the conscience of Hellas by plundering temples: see Grote X pp. 300, 302 *n.* 3.

28 **<καὶ> τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων:** 'and the property of his victims': cf. *ἀπολλύῃ* 567 A, *ἀπολέσας* 568 A, as well as the *καθαρμός* of 567 B, C. *ἀπολομένων* is itself so used in *Laws* 628 B. In the indictment of Dionysius I by the Syracusan knight Theodorus (Diodor. XIV 65) occur the words *οὗτος δὲ τὰ μὲν ἱερὰ συλήσας, τοὺς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν πλούτους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν κεκτημένων ψυχαῖς ἀφελόμενος τοὺς οἰκέτας μισθοδοτεῖ κατὰ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν δουλείας.* The sentence exactly illustrates what Plato here says. On the text and other views of this passage see App. VI.

ἀναγκάζων τὸν δῆμον εἰσφέρειν. | Τί δ' ὅταν δὴ ταῦτα ἐπιλίπῃ; E
Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πατρῴων θρέψεται αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ συμπόται τε καὶ ἑταῖροι καὶ ἑταῖραι. Μανθάνω, ἔφην ἐγώ· ὅτι ὁ δῆμος, ὁ γεννήσας τὸν τύραννον, θρέψει αὐτόν τε καὶ ἑταίρους. Πολλὴ αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη. Πῶς δὲ λέγεις, εἶπον, ἐάν τι ἀγανακτῇ τε καὶ λέγῃ ὁ δῆμος, ὅτι οὔτε δίκαιον τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ πατρὸς ὑὸν ἡβῶντα, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ υἱέος πατέρα, οὔτε τούτου αὐτὸν ἕνεκα | ἐγέννησέν τε καὶ κατέστησεν, ἵνα, ἐπειδὴ μέγας γένοιτο, τότε 569
αὐτὸς δουλεύων τοῖς αὑτοῦ δούλοις τρέφοι ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τοὺς δούλους μετὰ ξυγκλύδων ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλευθερωθείη ἐκείνου προστάντος, καὶ νῦν κελεύει ἀπιέναι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὥσπερ πατὴρ ὑὸν ἐξ οἰκίας μετὰ ὀχληρῶν συμποτῶν ἐξελαύνων; Γνώσεταί γε, νὴ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, τότ' ἤδη ὁ δῆμος, | οἷος B
οἷον θρέμμα γεννῶν ἠσπάζετό τε καὶ ηὔξεν, καὶ ὅτι ἀσθενέστερος ὢν ἰσχυροτέρους ἐξελαύνει. Πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις; τολμήσει τὸν πατέρα βιάζεσθαι, κἂν μὴ πείθηται, τύπτειν ὁ τύραννος; Ναί,

λῖ

29. ἐπιλίπῃ Ξ *q*: ἐπιλείπῃ ΑΠ. 30. συμπόται Π: συμπο.ται (*sic*) A. 31. ἔφην ἐγώ nos: ἔφην δ' ἐγώ A^1Π: ἔφην ἦν δ' ἐγώ *q*. 32. ἑταίρους Π: ἑτέρους A. 33. ἐάν τι *q*: ἐάν τε ΑΠΞ. 3. ἀπὸ *q*: ὑπὸ ΑΠΞ.

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568 E 29 **δή**. Badham suggests *ἤδη*, needlessly: cf. IX 573 E and 574 C (Baiter).

ἐπιλίπῃ κτλ. *ἐπιλείπῃ* (see *cr. n.*) is retained by Hermann, but the aorist, which nearly all the MSS read, is no less necessary here than in I 340 E, IX 573 E and X 601 B. Cf. Heller *Curae Criticae* pp. 3 ff. On *τῶν πατρῴων* see IX 574 A *n.*

31 **μανθάνω—ὅτι**. A comparison with 584 A line 8 and with 496 A line 8 (see *cr. nn.* ad loc.) shews that *ἔφην ἐγώ*, and not *ἦν δ' ἐγώ* is in all probability the right reading in this place. *ὅτι*=(you say so) 'because,' not 'that': see on I 332 A.

33 **πῶς δὲ λέγεις κτλ.** 'And how say you,' quoth I, 'if the Demos be somewhat wroth,' etc. I formerly read *πῶς λέγεις* with Ξ and some other inferior MSS, but now revert to the best supported reading, except that, with *q*, I print *ἐάν τι* for *ἐάν τε* (see *cr. n.*). If we read *πῶς λέγεις*, we must take the words as referring to *πολλὴ αὐτῷ—ἀνάγκη*: if *πῶς δὲ λέγεις*, the reference will be to the words which follow *εἶπον*, and *πῶς δὲ λέγεις* will then invite the reply which Adimantus gives below, viz. *γνώσεταί γε—ἐξελαύνει*. It seems to me better in every way to make the question refer to the new point which is about to be raised by Socrates; for the statement that the Demos will have to support the tyrant is already complete, and needs neither further elucidation nor any expression of surprise. A majority of editors read *ἐὰν δέ* for *ἐάν τε*. I think that *τε* must be wrong in any case, unless (with Schneider) we postulate an awkward anacoluthon, as though Socrates meant to add *ἐάν τε μή*. The reading of *τι* for *τε* enables us to retain *πῶς δὲ λέγεις*, and refer the question to what follows: for which reasons I now follow *q*.

569 A 3 **ἀπὸ** is read by Flor. U and V as well as *q*. Schneider alone retains *ὑπό*, but *ἐλευθεροῦσθαι ὑπὸ* means only 'be freed by.' It is better to write *ἀπό* than (with Baiter) to excise the preposition. For the corruption see Bast *Comment. Pal.* p. 794.

4 **καλῶν κἀγαθῶν**. See on VI 489 E.

5 **κελεύει**. Baiter's conjecture *κελεύῃ* is a curious error. *κελεύει* depends of course on *ὅτι*: in *oratio recta* the *δῆμος* would say *κελεύω σε ἀπιέναι*. Cf. *διακελεύοιντο* in X 614 D and note ad loc.

ἔφη, ἀφελόμενός γε τὰ ὅπλα. Πατραλοίαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις τύραννον καὶ χαλεπὸν γηροτρόφον, καὶ ὡς ἔοικε τοῦτο δὴ ὁμολογουμένη
ἂν ἤδη τυραννὶς εἴη, καί, τὸ λεγόμενον, ὁ δῆμος φεύγων ἂν καπνὸν
C δουλείας ἐλευθέρων εἰς πῦρ | δούλων δεσποτείας ἂν ἐμπεπτωκὼς εἴη,
ἀντὶ τῆς πολλῆς ἐκείνης καὶ ἀκαίρου ἐλευθερίας τὴν χαλεπωτάτην 15
τε καὶ πικροτάτην δούλων δουλείαν μεταμπισχόμενος. Καὶ μάλα,
ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτω γίγνεται. Τί οὖν; εἶπον· οὐκ ἐμμελῶς ἡμῖν
εἰρήσεται, ἐὰν φῶμεν ἱκανῶς διεληλυθέναι, ὡς μεταβαίνει τυραννὶς
ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη τε οἵα ἐστίν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.

ΤΕΛΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Η'.

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569 B 13 **τὸ λεγόμενον.** *τὸν καπνὸν φεύγων εἰς τὸ πῦρ ἐνέπεσον. ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ μικρὰ τῶν δεινῶν φευγόντων, καὶ εἰς μείζονα δεινὰ ἐμπιπτόντων.* (Diogen. VIII 45 in Leutsch u. Schneidewin *Paroem. Gr.* I p. 314, where the other authorities are also cited.)

φεύγων κτλ.: 'in trying to escape the smoke of servitude to free men will have fallen into the fire of the masterdom of slaves.' Herwerden proposes to excise *ἐλευθέρων* and *δούλων* (both here and in C below). It is difficult to believe that he had read 567 E and 569 A (*δουλεύων τοῖς αὐτοῦ δούλοις*) before making this audacious suggestion. The chiasmus *δουλείας ἐλευθέρων—δούλων δεσποτείας* is in Plato's finest style.

569 C 15 **ἀκαίρου.** *ἀκράτου* (Herwerden: cf. 562 D) would be grossly incongruous with *μεταμπισχόμενος*, and is otherwise less suitable here than *ἀκαίρου*.

16 **δούλων** is emphatic: 'the most galling form of slavery' is slavery to slaves (J. and C.). Cf. 567 E *n.*

APPENDICES TO BOOK VIII.

I.

THE NUMBER.

The famous Number of Plato is notoriously the most difficult passage in his writings. The difficulty lies in the Greek, and not in the calculations, which are, as will be seen, extraordinarily simple, and can be understood by any one who has a rudimentary acquaintance with the multiplication table, and is willing to believe a single proposition of Euclid, viz. I 47. I have explained my conception of the passage as a whole in the note on 545 C: and in this Appendix I propose to investigate and illustrate the entire section in detail with a view to justifying the explanations which I have given throughout the notes.

The literature of the subject is immense. Many of the passages relating to the Number in ancient authors have been collected by Schneider, who has also made a digest of the leading publications on the subject from the revival of learning down to 1830 (*Platonis Opera Graece* III pp. i—lxxxviii). For more information on the literature between 1830 and 1881 reference may be made to Dupuis *Le nombre géométrique de Platon*, Paris 1881. In addition to the commentators on the *Republic* and on Aristotle *Pol.* E 12. 1316^a 4 ff., to Proclus in Kroll's *Procli in Pl. remp. comm.* II pp. 1—80, and to the summary of earlier opinions contained in Schneider's edition, I have found some of the following discussions interesting and occasionally suggestive: Monro, *Journal of Philology* VIII pp. 275—289, and *Classical Review* VI pp. 152—156, 242—244: Gow, *Journal of Philology* XII pp. 91 ff., and *Academy* no. 522: Hultsch, *Zeitschrift für Mathematik und Physik* XXVII, Historisch-literarische Abtheilung, pp. 41—60, *de numero Platonis a Proclo enarrato disputatio* in Schoell's *Procli commentariorum in remp. Platonis partes ineditae* pp. 140—148, and *Exkurs zu* Μέλισσα $\overline{\text{ΑΕ}}$ in Kroll's *Procli in Pl. remp. commentarii* II pp. 400—415: Rettig, *Proleg. in remp.* pp. 315 ff.: Donaldson in the *Proceedings of the Philological Society* I pp. 81 ff.: Martin in the *Revue Archéologique* XIII pp. 257 ff.: Dupuis *Le Nombre Géométrique de Platon*, *Interprétation Nouvelle*, Paris 1881, *Seconde Interprétation*, Paris 1882, and *Mémoire Définitif* in his edition of Theo Smyrnaeus pp. 365—400: Tannery in the *Revue Philosophique* I pp. 170 ff., XIII pp. 210 ff., XV pp. 567 ff.: Demme in the *Zeitschrift für Math. und Phys.* XXXII,

Historisch-literarische Abth. pp. 81—99 and 121—132: Albert *Die Platonische Zahl und Einige Conjecturen zu Platon* etc.: Jowett in *The Republic of Plato translated*, 1888, pp. cxxx ff., and Zeller[4] II 1, pp. 857—860 *n.*

It should be mentioned that this Appendix is in a few passages identical with the treatise on *The Number of Plato* which I published in 1891. During the eleven years which have elapsed since my earlier publication, my views have been considerably modified, especially as regards the interpretation of the words *τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις—φθινόντων* and the philosophical significance of the latter part of the Number; and the explanations contained in this Appendix are those which I now believe to be right. I may perhaps be allowed to express my obligations to those scholars who have supplied me with criticisms, whether written or printed, on my former work. The Provost of Oriel's discussions on my *Number of Plato* in the *Classical Review* have been constantly before me while engaged upon this subject. Some of his objections to my earlier theory were sound: others, and these the most important, I believe that I have refuted in the course of the present discussion. I am wholly unable to acquiesce in the *praeiudicata opinio* that "there is no complete solution because there was no consistent meaning in Plato's mind" (*J. of Ph.* VIII p. 285), but my revised explanation owes something to Mr Monro's resolute and sturdy application of the 'negative arm of the elenchus,' and I am not less grateful to him for the opportunity which he has given me of shewing (in Parts ii and iii of this Appendix) that the incomplete solution which he himself suggests is one which cannot be attributed either to Plato or Aristotle, without infringing, as it seems to me, the laws alike of logic, arithmetic and Greek[1].

It will be convenient to quote the passage in full and also, for the sake of facilitating reference, to divide the words with which we are more immediately concerned into five sections, A, B, C, D, E.

[1] Mr Archer-Hind's criticisms in the *Cambridge Review* for Jan. 28, 1892, have also affected my view on the meaning of the two *ἁρμονίαι*: and I now also agree with him in his suggestion that *συζυγείς* in *ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς* invites us to multiply together the three numbers 3, 4 and 5. The review by Hultsch in *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1892 pp. 1256 ff. may also be mentioned. Hultsch agrees with me in making the two numbers 216 and 12,960,000: he was also the first, so far as I know, to see that the sides of the *ἁρμονίαι* should be multiplied and not added, and that the rectangle is equal to the square: but in other respects his proposed solution is almost entirely different from mine. It is due to Hultsch and to the reader, that I should give the two solutions side by side, and I now do so.

A. *Hultsch's Solution.*

(1) $2^3 \times 3^3 = 216$ (so also Schneider)

(2) $(3+4+5)\ 3 = 36$,

and 36 by somehow or other developing out of itself a square number multiplied by 100, becomes 3600^2, which is the first harmony. The second is the rectangle whose sides are

(1) $100 \times 7\sqrt{7-\frac{1}{7}}$

and (2) $100 \times 3^3\sqrt{7-\frac{1}{7}}$.

For further information the reader should consult Hultsch's article in *Zeitschrift f. Math.* etc. l.c.

B. *The solution now proposed.*

(1) $3^3+4^3+5^3 = 216$,

(2) $(3 \times 4 \times 5)^4 = 3600^2 = 4800 \times 2700$.

In the interpretation of Plato's Greek I am seldom if ever able to agree with Hultsch.

Φέρε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πειρώμεθα λέγειν, τίνα τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ' 545 C
ἂν ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας. ἢ τόδε μέν | ἁπλοῦν, ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει 545 D
ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται· ὁμο-
νοοῦντος δέ, κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγον ᾖ, ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι; Ἔστι γὰρ οὕτω. Πῶς
οὖν δή, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν κινηθήσεται, καὶ πῇ στασιάσουσιν οἱ
ἐπίκουροι καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτούς, ἢ βούλει,
ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος, εὐχώμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν, ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις
ἔμπεσε, καὶ φῶμεν αὐτὰς | τραγικῶς, ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ 545 E
ἐρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδῇ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν; Πῶς; Ὧδέ
πως. | χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν οὕτω ξυστᾶσαν· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ γενομένῳ 546 A
παντὶ φθορά ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ τοιαύτη ξύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα μενεῖ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ
λυθήσεται. λύσις δὲ ἥδε· οὐ μόνον φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις
ζῴοις φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνονται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ
ἑκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς συνάπτωσι, βραχυβίοις μὲν βραχυπόρους, ἐναν-
τίοις δὲ ἐναντίας· γένους δὲ ὑμετέρου εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ | ὄντες 546 B
σοφοὶ οὓς ἡγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λογισμῷ μετ' αἰσ-
θήσεως τεύξονται, ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοὺς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε οὐ
A *δέον. | ἔστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδος, ἣν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, |*
B *ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, τρεῖς*
ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι, ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ
αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, πάντα προσήγορα καὶ | ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέ- 546 C
C *φηναν· | ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται τρὶς*
D, E *αὐξηθείς, | τὴν μὲν ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις, | τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ,*
προμήκη δέ, ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομένων
ἑνὸς ἑκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυοῖν, ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος. | ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος,
ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός, τοιούτου κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων,
ἃς ὅταν ἀγνοήσαντες ὑμῖν | οἱ φύλακες συνοικίζωσιν νύμφας νυμφίοις παρὰ 546 D
καιρόν, οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ' εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται.

For the sake of clearness I will endeavour as far as possible to confine myself in the first instance to the elucidation of the numbers and numerical processes, reserving the question of the philosophical significance of the Platonic Number for separate treatment in Part ii of this Appendix. But as it is impossible thoroughly to grasp the numbers apart from their meaning, or their meaning apart from the numbers, I may perhaps be allowed to suggest that the student, after he has read a section in Part i, before going on to the succeeding section, should glance at the corresponding division of Part ii. I have added a third Part by way of epilogue, in which Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic Number is fully discussed.

Before we embark on our task, it is desirable to allude to the evidence which there is for believing that Plato made use of the Pythagorean triangle in his Number. The triangle in question, as is well known[1], is the right-angled triangle whose sides are 3 and 4, whose hypotenuse[2] is consequently 5, and whose area[3] is $\frac{4 \times 3}{2} = 6$. See Fig. 1.

[1] See Gow, *History of Greek Mathematics*, p. 155.

[2] By Euclid I 47—a proposition which is said to have been discovered by Pythagoras, and which was certainly familiar to Plato: see *Tim.* 54 B.

[3] *ABC*, the right-angled triangle in which $AC=3$, and $AB=4$, is half the

It will be shewn in Part iii that Aristotle regards the Pythagorean triangle as the basis of the number in the section which I have called B. Besides Aristotle we have the testimony of at least three authors (cited by Schneider[1]), viz. Plutarch (*de Is. et Os.* 373 F), where he says *τῶν τριγώνων τὸ κάλλιστον—ᾧ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δοκεῖ προσκεχρῆσθαι, τὸ γαμήλιον διάγραμμα συντάττων. ἔχει δὲ ἐκεῖνο τὸ τρίγωνον τριῶν τὴν πρὸς ὀρθάς, καὶ τεττάρων τὴν βάσιν καὶ πέντε τὴν ὑποτείνουσαν ἴσον ταῖς περιεχούσαις δυναμένην*: Proclus (*in Euclid.* p. 428, ed. Friedlein) in these words: *τὸ ἐν πολιτείᾳ τρίγωνον, οὗ τὴν ὀρθὴν περιέχουσιν ὅ τε τρία* (sc. *ἀριθμός*) *καὶ ὁ τέσσαρα*: and Aristides Quintilianus, who (*De Musica*, ed. Meibom p. 152 = Jahn p. 90) remarks: *αἱ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν περιέχουσαι δηλοῦσι τὸν ἐπίτριτον. τοῦτο δὴ καὶ Πλάτων φησὶν ἐπίτριτον πυθμένα πεμπάδι συζυγέντα.* To this testimony may now be added Proclus and the authorities whom he quotes in his commentary on the Platonic Number (ed. Kroll II pp. 1 ff.), in the course of which constant reference is made to the wonderful properties of this *κοσμικὸν τρίγωνον*, as it was sometimes called (ib. 45. 23).



FIG. 1. The Pythagorean Triangle.

PART i.

THE ARITHMETICAL SOLUTION[2].

I will take the four divisions B, C, D, E in the order in which they occur. The division which I call A involves no arithmetical calculations, and will be better discussed in Part ii.

§ 1.

ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ—ἀπέφηναν.

It may be well to give at the outset a translation of this passage. 'But the number of a human creature is the first number in which root and square increases, having received three distances and four limits, of elements that make both like and unlike and wax and wane, render all things conversable and rational with one another.'

The construction of the words *ἀνθρωπείῳ—πρώτῳ* is *ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ <γεννητῷ ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς> ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ*, which is itself an abbreviated expression for *ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ <γεννητῷ ἔστι περίοδος ἣν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει> ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ*, as a glance at the preceding clause will shew.

The meaning is: 'while the number of a human creature is the first

rectangle *ABDC*, i.e. it is $\frac{4\times 3}{2}=6$. Cf. *Theol. Ar.* p. 39 ed. Ast, where in a description of the Pythagorean triangle it is expressly pointed out that the area is 6. So also in Proclus *in remp.* II p. 42 ed. Kroll.

[1] l.c. p. xxxii. Cf. also Iamblichus, *Vit. Pythag.* § 131.

[2] A brief summary of the results of Part i has already been published by me in *Cl. Rev.* XVI pp. 17—23.

number in which,' and 'the first number' signifies of course the first number which satisfies the conditions about to be described. In the notes on 546 A f., as well as in Pt ii § 3, I have shewn that by 'period' Plato means 'period of gestation': so that the 'number of a human creature' must be a number which measures the time during which the human creature is in the womb. It will be well to bear this in mind throughout the calculations which follow.

I proceed to explain *αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι.*

The word *αὐξήσεις* means 'increases,' and in its arithmetical signification must denote either 'additions' or 'multiplications'[1]. Which of these two meanings the word bears here, Plato himself, as we shall presently see, informs us by means of the clause *τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι.*

What is the meaning of *δυνάμεναι*? It is clear from more than one passage in Plato that the mathematical sense of *δύνασθαι* 'be equal when squared to,' i.e. 'be the square root of,' was not yet fully and firmly established in his day. In *Theaetetus* 147 E—*τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν· τὸν μὲν δυνάμενον ἴσον ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσόπλευρον προσείπομεν*—it is a *square* number which is said to be *δυνάμενος* (viz. *ἴσος ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι*), while in 148 B—*ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, μῆκος ὡρισάμεθα, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις*[2]*, ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται*—it is the *roots* which are *δυνάμενα* (sc. to produce squares), as in Euclid x *def.* 11 *καὶ αἱ δυνάμεναι αὐτὰ ἄλογοι.* But on comparing these two passages from Plato, we note that, while *δυνάμενον* is not used absolutely in the sense of a square, but requires to be further explained (viz. by the words *ἴσος ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι*), *δύνανται*, where it is used absolutely, means 'are the roots of.' We infer that *δυνάμεναι* in our passage refers to roots and not to squares. Our inference will be confirmed as we proceed.

We have next to deal with the word *δυναστευόμεναι.* It is fortunate that Proclus[3] should have expressly alluded to this part of Plato's Number. At the outset of his commentary on the first book of Euclid he endeavours to shew that the *ἀρχαί* of the Universe of things—*τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων*—are also the *ἀρχαί* of Mathematics. One of his examples, that from *δυνάμεις*, is as follows[4]: *καὶ ὅσα κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀναφαίνεται πᾶσιν ὁμοίως προσήκει τοῖς μαθήμασι, τῶν μὲν δυναμένων, τῶν δὲ δυναστευομένων. ἃ δὴ καὶ ὁ ἐν πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης ταῖς μούσαις ὑψηλολογουμέναις ἀνέθηκεν, τὰ κοινὰ πάντων τῶν μαθηματικῶν λόγων ἐν πέρασιν ὡρισμένοις περιλαβὼν καὶ προστησάμενος ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις*

[1] For the meaning 'multiplications' cf *Theol. Ar.* p. 39 Ast *ὁ λε' ἑξάδι αὐξηθὲν ἑπτάμηνον χρόνον ἀποτελεῖ τὸν τῶν σί ἡμερῶν* and Nicom. *Introd. Ar.* p. 127 Ast.

[2] The word *δυνάμεις* is here confined to *irrational* roots, but this is a limitation introduced by Theaetetus. Theaetetus in fact proposes to confine the word *δυνάμεις* to surds, and to use *μῆκος* for the rational roots. The usual meaning of *δύναμις* in Plato's mathematics is 'second increase': cf. Gow *Gk Math.* p. 78 *n.* 1.

[3] *In Euclidem* ed. Friedlein, p. 8.

[4] *In Eucl.* l.c.

ἀριθμοῖς, ἀφ' ὧν δὴ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῆς τε εὐγονίας καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας πρὸς ταύτην ἀγονίας καταφαίνεται. The first sentence means that 'powers' play a part in every department of Mathematics as well as in Nature and in Life—'some having power, while others are subject to power.' For example 3 is *δυνάμενος*, because it has power (viz. over 9—to *make* 9): 9 is *δυναστευόμενος*, because it is subject to power (viz. of 3—to be *made* by 3). It will not be denied that *δυναστεύομαι* is intended by Proclus as the passive of *δύναμαι*[1]. Now *δύναται*, said of a root, means *δύναται τετράγωνον ποιεῖν*. The passive of this, said of a square number, is *δύναται τετράγωνος γίγνεσθαι* (*δύναται ἴσος ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι* in *Theaet.* 147 E). In the case of the *active*, it was found possible to drop *τετράγωνον ποιεῖν*: but if, in the *passive*, *τετράγωνος γίγνεσθαι* is discarded, at least the passivity must not be. For this reason *δύναται* becomes *δυναστεύεται*.

We may therefore take it that *δυναστευόμεναι* in our passage refers to squares. But before interpreting the expression as a whole, it is necessary to discuss a passage of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, which has not unnaturally been quoted[2] in connexion with section B, since it seems to be the only other passage besides those already quoted in which *δυναστεύεται* occurs in mathematical surroundings. The words are[3]: *ἀνικίαν δέ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων λέγεσθαι τὴν πεντάδα, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι τῶν ὀρθογωνίων τριγώνων τῶν ἐχόντων ῥητὰς τὰς πλευρὰς πρῶτόν ἐστι τῶν περιεχουσῶν ὀρθὴν γωνίαν πλευρῶν ἡ μὲν τριῶν ἡ δὲ τεττάρων, ἡ δὲ ὑποτείνουσα πέντε. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἡ ὑποτείνουσα ἴσον δύναται ἀμφοτέραις ἅμα, διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μὲν δυναμένη καλεῖται, αἱ δὲ δυναστευόμεναι, καὶ ἔστι πέντε. τὴν τε πεντάδα ἀνικίαν ἔλεγον ὡς μὴ νικωμένην ἀλλ' ἀήττητον καὶ κρατοῦσαν.*

The general drift of the passage is that the Pythagoreans called the number 5 'Invincibility,' because it is the hypotenuse of the first right-angled triangle with rational sides—the one 3, the other 4. As the hypotenuse is *equally powerful*[4] with both the other sides, it is called *δυναμένη*, the others *δυναστευόμεναι*. It is *ἀνικία*, because it remains unconquered and prevails.

δυναμένη here means 'powerful,' 'prevailing': *δυναστευόμεναι* 'subject to power,' 'prevailed against.' Our sympathies being with the hypotenuse, because the odds are against him, we call him conqueror even although the battle is a drawn one. The only bearing of the passage on our text is this: it uses *δυναστευομένη* as a passive of *δυναμένη*. But whereas, in Proclus, *δυναστευόμενα* includes 'what can be produced by roots' (i.e. squares), and *δυνάμενα* 'what can produce squares' (i.e. roots), here *δυναμένη* means 'equal, or rather greater in power' (viz. the hypotenuse), and *δυναστευόμεναι* 'prevailed against' (viz. the sides). It is evident that the words are used by Alexander

[1] Cf. also Proclus *in remp.* II p. 36 *τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον πᾶν πρὸς τὸ δυναστευόμενον ἀποδίδοται*, and ib. p. 5 *δύνανται μὲν γὰρ οἱ πλευρικοί* (sc. *ἀριθμοί*), *δυναστεύονται δὲ οἱ ἐκ τούτων*. The use of the passive is like that in *τιμοκρατεῖσθαι, δημοκρατεῖσθαι, regnor* and the like.

[2] See e.g. Zeller[4] II 1, p. 858 *n.*, Zeller[5] I p. 400 *n.* 1, and Susemihl *Aristoteles' Politik* II p. 374.

[3] *In Arist. Met.* A 8. 990[a] 23.

[4] Being equal when squared to the sum of the squares of the other two sides.

less in a technical, than in a metaphorical sense, and with no reference to their occurrence in the Platonic Number—to which indeed he makes no reference at all. The interpretation of *δυναστευόμεναι* in Plato should be deduced not from Alexander, but from an examination of the passage of Proclus in the light of *Theaet.* 147 E ff.

We are now in a position to interpret the highly elaborate and fantastic expression *αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι.* The literal translation is 'root and square increases' or 'increasings,' and the correlation of meaning between the words *δυνάμεναι* and *δυναστευόμεναι*—*τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον πᾶν πρὸς τὸ δυναστευόμενον ἀποδίδοται*[2]—requires us to suppose that in a 'root and square increase' the 'root' in question is the root of the 'square' in question, and the 'square' in question the square of the 'root' in question. When for example x is the 'root,' the 'square' will be x^2, and where the 'square' is x^2, the 'root' will be x. What then is the meaning of a 'root and square increase'? If *αὔξησις* means 'addition' it will be $x + x^2$, if 'multiplication,' $x \times x^2$. And the plural 'root and square increases' will refer to more than one instance of the same process, i.e. for example either (1) to $x + x^2$, $y + y^2$, $z + z^2$ or (2) to $x \times x^2$, $y \times y^2$, $z \times z^2$. Whether the *αὐξήσεις* mean processes of addition or processes of multiplication will presently be seen: meantime it should be noted that the awkwardness of the English expression 'root and square increases' is escaped by the Greek idiom, because *δυνάμεναι* and *δυναστευόμεναι* are participial adjectives[3].

I come now to *τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι.* The literal translation is 'having received three distances, and four limits,' and the meaning will appear from a glance at the following passages.

In Nicomachus *Introd. Ar.* pp. 143 f. ed. Ast we read *τὰ μὲν στερεὰ*

[1] I have treated the words of Alexander seriously, because there is no *a priori* reason why the Pythagoreans should not have called 5 *ἀνικία*, or indeed almost anything else in heaven or earth, as readers of the *Theologumena Arithmetica* and other similar treatises will readily admit. But so much confusion has elsewhere arisen from the similarity of vowel in *νεικ-* and *νικ-* (see on IX 581 B) that I should not be surprised if *ἀνεικία* and not *ἀνικία* was in reality the original form: see *Theol. Ar.* p. 26 ed. Ast: *καὶ ἀνεικίαν προσηγόρευον τὴν πεμπάδα, οὐ μόνον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ πέμπτον καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τεταγμένον στοιχεῖον, ὁ αἰθήρ, κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχων διατελεῖ, νείκους καὶ μεταβολῆς ἐν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸν ὑπαρχόντων ἀπὸ σελήνης μέχρι γῆς, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰ πρώτιστα διαφέροντα καὶ οὐχ ὅμοια τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δύο εἴδη, ἄρτιον καὶ περιττόν, αὐτὸς ὡσανεὶ ἐφιλίωσε καὶ συνήρτησε κτλ.* Megillus is quoted to the same effect a few lines lower down, and Ast in his note adds further references. Zeller[5] I p. 400 *n.* 1 regards *ἀνικία* as more original than *ἀνεικία.*

[2] Proclus *in remp.* II p. 36.

[3] As it will shortly be found that *αὐξήσεις* refers to multiplications, I may remark here that Schneider and Donaldson so far agree with me in explaining *αὔξησις δυναμένη τε καὶ δυναστευομένη* as "incrementum per multiplicationem radicis seu lateris et quadrati mutuam factum" (Schneider l.c. III p. xx). But Schneider is mistaken when he makes the whole expression *αὐξήσεις—δυναστευόμεναι* equivalent to actual or concrete *cubes*: "hoc loco numeros per eiusmodi *αὐξήσεις* effectos *αὐξήσεις obscurius* dici intelligitur: ii vero cubi sunt." The Greek word *αὔξησις* means 'actio ipsa augendi,' as Schneider himself remarks, and, as will presently appear, there is no occasion to interpret it as anything else. It is of course obvious that the words *αὐξήσεις—δυναστευόμεναι* are to some extent deliberately and intentionally fantastic: the Muses, we remember, *ὑψηλολογοῦνται*: but there is also a touch of serious import in the structure of the phrase. See Part ii § 4.

διαστήματα λέγεται τριχῇ διαστατά, τὰ δὲ ἐπίπεδα διχῇ...ταῦτα δὲ τῆς οἰκείας σαφηνείας ἐπιλήψεται ἐν τῇ Πλατωνικῇ συναναγνώσει κατὰ τὸν τοῦ λεγομένου γάμου τόπον ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ ἀπὸ προσώπου τῶν Μουσῶν παρεισαγομένου[1]. There are many other statements to the same effect not only in Nicomachus, but also in the *Theologumena Arithmetica*, in Theo of Smyrna, and in Iamblichus' commentary on the work of Nicomachus. The distances are sometimes called διαστήματα, sometimes διαστάσεις, and in at least one passage ἀποστάσεις, as in Plato. The fullest explanation of the matter is in the *Introd. Ar.* p. 116: πρῶτον δὲ διάστημα γραμμὴ λέγεται· γραμμὴ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐφ' ἓν διαστατόν· δύο δὲ διαστήματα ἐπιφάνεια· ἐπιφάνεια γάρ ἐστι τὸ διχῇ διαστατόν· τρία δὲ διαστήματα στερεόν· στερεὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδαμῶς ἐπινοεῖν στερεόν, ὃ πλειόνων τέτευχε διαστημάτων ἢ τριῶν, μήκους, πλάτους καὶ βάθους...εἴ τι γὰρ στερεόν ἐστιν, τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις πάντως ἔχει, μῆκος, πλάτος καὶ βάθος· καὶ ἔμπαλιν εἴ τι ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ἐκεῖνο πάντως στερεόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδέν. Compare also pp. 117, 123, 128, and *Theol. Ar.* p. 38, in each of which places διαστάσεις is used with this meaning, Theo pp. 24 f. ed. Hiller τῶν δὲ συνθέτων (sc. ἀριθμῶν) τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ δύο ἀριθμῶν περιεχομένους καλοῦσιν ἐπιπέδους, ὡς κατὰ δύο διαστάσεις θεωρουμένους καὶ οἷον ὑπὸ μήκους καὶ πλάτους περιεχομένους, τοὺς δὲ ὑπὸ τριῶν στερεούς, ὡς καὶ τὴν τρίτην διάστασιν προσειληφότας, *Theol. Ar.* p. 48, Nicomachus l.c. p. 136 οἱ κύβοι τριχῇ διαστατοὶ ὄντες and Iamblichus l.c. p. 58. In *Theol. Ar.* p. 23, the author, in speaking of the number 4, which according to the Pythagoreans πρώτη ἔδειξε τὴν τοῦ στερεοῦ φύσιν· σημεῖον γάρ, εἶτα γραμμή, εἶτα ἐπιφάνεια, εἶτα στερεόν, εἶτα σῶμα, remarks τὰς—πάσας ἀποστάσεις ἤτοι τὰς τρεῖς ἀπέστη, ὧν περαιτέρω οὐκέτι εἰσίν. Finally, we may refer to Simplicius *in physica* IV 1, p. 531. 9 ed. Diels σῶμα—τὸ τὰς τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις and ibid. p. 634. 11 ff., to Aristotle *Top.* Z 5. 142[b] 24 ὁ τοῦ σώματος ὁρισμός, τὸ ἔχον τρεῖς διαστάσεις, *Phys.* IV 1. 209[a] 4 ff. διαστήματα μὲν οὖν ἔχει (sc. ὁ τόπος) τρία, μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος, οἷς ὁρίζεται σῶμα πᾶν and other passages cited by Bonitz in the *Index Arist.* s.v. διαστάσεις, and also to Plato himself, who in *Laws* 894 A has the following sentence: γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις, ἡνίκα ἂν τί πάθος ᾖ; δῆλον ὡς ὅταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὔξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθῃ μετάβασιν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αἴσθησιν σχῇ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις.

From these passages it is clear that the three ἀποστάσεις of which Plato speaks are μῆκος, πλάτος and βάθος. What then ought we to understand by the four ὅροι? In *Theol. Ar.* p. 16 Ast we find the words τὸ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους αἰσθητόν, ὅ ἐστιν ἀποτέλεσμα τριχῇ διαστατόν, ἐν τέτταρσιν ὅροις ἐστίν, and in Iambl. *in Nic.* p. 93 Pistelli στερεὸς δέ ἐστιν ἀριθμὸς ὁ τρίτον διάστημα παρὰ τὰ ἐν ἐπιπέδοις δύο προσειληφώς, δηλονότι τετάρτου ὅρου προσγενομένου· ἐν γὰρ τέσσαρσιν

[1] The reader will observe that Nicomachus had the Platonic number in his mind when he wrote these words. Cf. Mr Monro in *J. of Ph.* VIII p. 276 "The Pythagorean writer Nicomachus says (*Introd. Arithm.* p. 143) that solid figures are called τριχῇ διαστατά, plane figures διχῇ διαστατά, and that this receives full light from the *Republic* of Plato, κατὰ τὸν τοῦ λεγομένου γάμου τόπον."

ὅροις τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν. The meaning will be easily apprehended from the accompanying figure of a στερεὸς ἀριθμός (Fig. 2), which I borrow from Theo p. 42 ed. Hiller. *AB* is the μῆκος, *BC* the πλάτος, *CD* the βάθος (or ὕψος or πάχος, as it was sometimes called: see Nicom. l.c. p. 123), and the points *A*, *B*, *C*, *D* are the four ὅροι (αἱ στιγμαὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν ὅροι Arist. *Met.* N 5. 1092ᵇ 9): ἐν γὰρ τεσσαρσιν ὅροις τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν, as Iamblichus observes.



FIG. 2.

From these and other passages to the same effect, I conclude that the three ἀποστάσεις and four ὅροι are μῆκος, πλάτος, and βάθος, with their attendant limits, that consequently αὐξήσεις refers to multiplications and not to additions, and that the whole expression αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι i.e. 'root and square increases comprehending[1] three distances and four limits' means cubings and nothing more.

The περίοδος of the ἀνθρώπειον γεννητόν is accordingly the first number in which cubings make everything conversable and rational with itself: but what are the numbers to be cubed?

Let us examine the phrase ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων.

In point of construction the genitives might depend, so far as the Greek is concerned, either on (1) ὅρους, or (2) on ἀποστάσεις and ὅρους combined, or (3) upon αὐξήσεις. Other possibility there is none. As far as concerns the sense, we observe that whereas the meaning of ἀποστάσεις and ὅρους is complete—for μῆκος, πλάτος and βάθος, with their four ὅροι, demand no further specification—that of αὐξήσεις is incomplete, because 'increasings' necessarily imply something to be increased. Now we have not yet been informed what we are invited to increase: and we are therefore compelled to suppose that the information is contained or concealed in ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων. I therefore believe that the genitives depend on αὐξήσεις.

In point of grammatical gender the genitives can only be neuter. ὁμοιούντων, for example, is the genitive of ὁμοιοῦντα i.q. τὰ ὁμοιοῦντα, the article being dispensed with in accordance with Plato's frequent practice in passages of real or affected elevation[2]. But as Plato is trying to reach a certain number ('the first *number* in which' etc.), the

[1] λαβοῦσαι is literally 'having received.' The completed process ἔχει τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, 'has three distances' or as we should say 'dimensions': and as each successive ἀπόστασις is acquired, the process itself is said λαμβάνειν ἀπόστασιν. The usage is like that of (προσ)ειληφώς in Iambl. *in Nic.* p. 93 (quoted above): cf. also Theo p. 24 and Nicom. l.c. pp. 123, 127.

[2] It is the Muses who are speaking, and the article was rarer in their language, as the usage of poetry attests. The intransitive use of αὔξω—tolerably common in Aristotle and later Greek, after poetical words and idioms began to be freely admitted into prose—has a similar stylistic effect. We are bound to suppose that αὐξόντων and φθινόντων are opposed to one another no less than ὁμοιούντων and ἀνομοιούντων, and therefore as φθινόντων is intransitive, αὐξόντων must be intransitive too.

objects which are subjected to the processes of cubing cannot themselves be anything but numbers: so that for practical purposes we may regard ὁμοιούντων etc. as ὁμοιούντων ἀριθμῶν etc.

It is clear, therefore, that ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων stands for the numbers which we have to cube. What then are the numbers that 'make like and unlike, wax and wane'? The Muses are evidently teasing, and we must be patient with them till they choose to tell us.

Let us look a little farther on. The next half of this sentence begins with ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν, and ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν, as will presently be shewn (§ 2), means the numbers 4, 3. Now if we take the expression 'of which, 4, 3' in its simplest and most natural signification, it means 'of which numbers, the numbers 4, 3,' so that the antecedent to ὧν will be *some numbers, two of which are the numbers* 4 and 3.

Now what is the grammatical antecedent to ὧν? The possibilities—I use the word in a generous sense—are (1) αὐξήσεις—δυναστευόμεναι, (2) τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις and τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους, either or both, (3) πάντα, (4) ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων.

It will be agreed that (2) is scarcely possible, and also, I think, that (3) is unlikely. On grounds of sense neither the first nor the second alternative is suitable. The antecedent to ὧν, on the most natural and simple translation of ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν, must be, as I have said, 'some numbers, two of which are the numbers 4 and 3.' Now αὐξήσεις are not 'numbers,' but (as Schneider remarks) 'actiones augendi,' and the three ἀποστάσεις and four ὅροι are only μῆκος, πλάτος and βάθος with their limits. As for πάντα, so comprehensive a word might certainly include numbers, and numbers, too, in which 4 and 3 are present: but it will be shewn in Part ii § 4 that πάντα has not in point of fact the meaning required, but another and very different meaning.

We conclude therefore that the grammatical antecedent to ων is ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, and I think no one will deny that the relative is most obviously and naturally connected with these words. It follows that ὁμοιούντων—φθινόντων are 'some numbers, two of which are the numbers 4 and 3.' We have thus obtained two of the numbers which are to be cubed, viz. 4 and 3. It is however clear from the partitive genitive ὧν that 4 and 3 are not the only numbers: there must be at least one more. What the missing number is, Plato does not tell us, but as the numbers 4 and 3 are 'married with 5' (πεμπάδι συζυγείς) in the second half of this sentence, and as we are so frequently warned by the ancients of the presence of the Pythagorean triangle throughout this passage, we may fairly suppose that the number we are looking for is the number of the hypotenuse, viz. 5. That this supposition is right, the sequel will shew.

There remains the question 'Why are the numbers 3, 4, and 5 said to make like and unlike, wax and wane?' The full explanation of these words belongs to Part ii, and will be given there. But ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων has also an arithmetical meaning in the Platonic number, in addition to its real or philosophical significance, and that meaning should here be explained. The numbers 3, 4, and 5 are said to 'make like

and unlike' both for other reasons, as will afterwards be pointed out, and also in view of the use which is presently made of them to construct the two harmonies in the latter half of the number. It will be shewn in § 2 that these harmonies are built up out of the numbers 3, 4, and 5, by multiplying them together, and then multiplying the product three times by itself. Nothing is contained in either of the two harmonies except what 3, 4, and 5 supply. It is, in short, the numbers 3, 4, and 5 that *make* the two harmonies. Now the first harmony, as we shall see, is the square of 3600, and square numbers, according to the ancients, were ὅμοιοι. The second harmony is 4800 × 2700, and oblong numbers were considered ἀνόμοιοι. See Iambl. *in Nic. Intr. Ar.* p. 82 Pistelli οἱ δὲ παλαιοὶ ταὐτοὺς τε καὶ ὁμοίους αὐτοὺς (i.e. τοὺς τετραγώνους) ἐκάλουν διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰς πλευράς τε καὶ γωνίας ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἰσότητα, ἀνομοίους δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ θατέρους τοὺς ἑτερομήκεις, and Nicomachus himself *Intr. Ar.* pp. 132 ff. Ast[1]. The numbers 3, 4, and 5 are therefore called ὁμοιοῦντές τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦντες in connexion with the arithmetical side of the Platonic Number, because they produce the square and the oblong which express the γεωμετρικὸς ἀριθμός in its twofold aspect, first as ὅμοιος and afterwards as ἀνόμοιος. This is the arithmetical significance of ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων in this passage: but the words have an even wider significance as a description of the Pythagorean 'cosmic triangle' (Proclus in *remp.* II pp. 45. 23 Kroll): see Part ii § 5. To the same section of Part ii I defer my account of αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, because these words have no technical arithmetical meaning, but merely describe the sides of the Pythagorean triangle in its cosmic and creative aspects.

I accordingly believe that the περίοδος of the ἀνθρώπειον γεννητόν was obtained by Plato, following of course the Pythagoreans, by adding together the cubes of the three sides of the 'zoogonic triangle': $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$. The justification for adding the cubes together is that the numbers are said to be *contained* in the total (ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ κτλ.).

The result which we have reached is supported by the evidence of Aristotle, who gives us to understand that the total number of this section is 216: see Part iii of this Appendix. It is also in exact correspondence with Aristides Quintilianus, who informs us, in a passage where he alludes expressly to the Platonic Number, that the number 216 is nearly equivalent to 'the number of the seven months' child,' and can be reached by adding together the cubes of the sides of the Pythagorean triangle, precisely as Plato does here: ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τῶν πλευρῶν ἑκάστην κατὰ βάθος αὐξήσαιμεν (βάθος γὰρ ἡ σώματος φύσις) ποιήσαιμεν ἂν τὸν διακόσια δεκαέξ, ἰσάριθμον ὄντα σύνεγγυς τῷ τῶν ἑπταμήνων (*de mus.* III p. 151 Meibom, 89 Jahn).

The words πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν can be

[1] That the habit of calling square numbers ὅμοιοι and oblong numbers ἀνόμοιοι was not merely a later development of Pythagoreanism, is expressly stated by Iamblichus (οἱ παλαιοί), and the same inference may be drawn from the Pythagorean συστοιχία (Arist. *Met.* A 5. 986ᵃ 22 ff.), in which τετράγωνον appears on the same side as πέρας, ἀγαθόν etc., and ἑτερόμηκες along with ἄπειρον, κακόν etc.

abundantly illustrated from Pythagorean writings, and will be more conveniently discussed in Part ii.

I conclude[1] that the arithmetical meaning of section B is

$$3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216.$$

[1] In my former treatise on the Number, I explained section B in a different way (*The Number of Plato*, pp. 33—35), taking the three ἀποστάσεις as denoting 3, 4, and 5. Except as regards αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, the explanation which I now offer is new, so far as I know. That the ἀποστάσεις are length, breadth, and thickness, and not what I formerly supposed them to be, nor anything else except length, breadth, and thickness, seems to me proved by the evidence of Aristotle as well as the other authorities quoted above, and is in harmony with the passage cited from *Laws* 894 A. Other attempts at solving the Number have usually supposed that the ὅροι denote terms in a numerical progression, and ἀποστάσεις the intervals between them. The words ὅροι and ἀποστάσεις could of course bear such an interpretation: but what can the ὅροι be? According to Proclus and Hermann, they are 27, 36, 48 and 64; according to Schneider, 8, 12, 18, 27. I cannot see that Plato furnishes any hints to justify us in selecting either of these progressions, and nothing can be made of them without having recourse to arbitrary calculations for which there is no authority in Plato's language; whereas it is clear from ὧν ἑπίτριτος πυθμὴν κτλ. that 3 and 4, and at least one other number, which πεμπάδι συζυγείς suggests is 5, are present in section B. With regard to ὁμοιούντων κτλ., it is to be noted that Proclus makes ὁμοιοῦντες = square or cubic numbers, viz. in this case 27 and 64, αὐξοντες = ἰσάκις ἴσοι μειζονάκις, in this case $3 \times 3 \times 4 = 36$, and φθίνοντες = ἰσάκις ἴσοι ἐλασσονάκις viz. $4 \times 4 \times 3 = 48$. I think it is clear that this explanation is devised by Proclus (or those whom he is here following) to suit his hypothesis about the ὅροι: at all events I have found no trace of any such explanation in Theo, Nicomachus, Iamblichus, the *Theologumena Arithmetica*, or any other ancient writings. Cf. Hultsch in Kroll l.c. p. 402. According to Schneider and Donaldson, ὁμοιοῦντες is equivalent to ὅμοιοι, and means numbers "whose factors are in the same ratio...i.e. as length to length, so breadth to breadth" (Donaldson l.c.), e.g. 8 and 27, ἀνομοιοῦντες equivalent to ἀνόμοιοι or numbers whose factors are not in the same ratio, e.g. 12 and 18; while αὔξοντες is equivalent to ὑπερτελεῖς, i.e. numbers whose 'parts' or measuring numbers make up a sum exceeding the numbers themselves (see Nicom. *Introd. Ar.* pp. 87 ff. Ast), e.g. 12 and 18, and φθίνοντες to ἐλλιπεῖς, i.e. numbers which are larger than the sum of their 'parts,' e.g. 8 and 27. But the identification is purely speculative, and no proof of it is offered. It has also been suggested that since ὅμοιοι and ἀνόμοιοι were sometimes used for 'square' and 'oblong' numbers (Iambl. *in Nic.* p. 82 ed. Pistelli), ὁμοιοῦντες and ἀνομοιοῦντες may be odd and even numbers, because according to the Pythagoreans "the odd numbers produce the series of squares, and the even numbers the series of oblongs," and further that αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων may be "only another way of describing the antithesis odd and even" (Mr Monro in *J. of Ph.* VIII p. 278). This too is the merest conjecture. There are other suggestions no less speculative: but these will suffice. It should be mentioned, in conclusion, that 216 is the number at which Schneider, Donaldson (who follows Schneider closely) and Hultsch have also arrived, although they reach it by multiplying 2^3 and 3^3, and not by adding 3^3, 4^3, and 5^3. Those who wish to study the explanations of these writers will find them in the works referred to at the beginning of this Appendix. Hultsch is more interested in the mathematics than in the Greek; but Schneider, here as always, studies the language carefully, although he himself recognises that in order to reach his conclusion he has to strain the meaning of some words, and introduce conjectural steps for which the language gives us no sanction or authority.

§ 2.

ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν—ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος.

As before, I begin by giving a literal translation. 'Of which the numbers 4, 3, married with 5, furnish two harmonies when thrice increased, the one equal an equal number of times, so many times 100, the other of equal length one way, but oblong—on the one side of 100 squares rising from rational diameters of five diminished by one each, or if from irrational diameters, by two; on the other, of 100 cubes of 3.'

Let us now examine the individual words, beginning with *ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν*.

What is *ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν*? About the meaning of this phrase there can no longer be any doubt, if we put any faith in the repeated statements of ancient writers on arithmetic and mathematics. The words denote, as Mr Monro expresses it (*Cl. Rev.* l.c.) "the ratio 4 : 3 in its lowest terms (the actual numbers 4 and 3)." See Theo Smyrnaeus *Expos. rerum math. ad legendum Platonem utilium* pp. 80 f. ed. Hiller *πάντων δὲ τῶν κατ' εἶδος εἰρημένων λόγων οἱ ἐν ἐλαχίστοις καὶ πρώτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀριθμοῖς ὄντες καθ' ἕκαστον πρῶτοι λέγονται τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐχόντων καὶ πυθμένες τῶν ὁμοειδῶν· οἷον διπλασίων μὲν λόγων πρῶτος καὶ πυθμὴν ὁ τῶν β′ πρὸς ἕν· μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτον ἐν μείζοσι καὶ συνθέτοις ἀριθμοῖς λόγοι εἰσὶ διπλάσιοι, ὁ τῶν δ′ πρὸς τὰ β′ καὶ τῶν ς′ πρὸς τὰ γ′ καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπ' ἄπειρον. τριπλασίων δὲ λόγων πρῶτος καὶ πυθμὴν ὁ τῶν γ′ πρὸς τὸ ἕν· οἱ δὲ ἀεὶ ἐν μείζοσι καὶ συνθέτοις ἀριθμοῖς ἐπ' ἄπειρον προάγουσιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλαπλασίων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιμορίοις. ἡμιολίων μὲν λόγων πρῶτος καὶ πυθμὴν ὁ τῶν γ′ πρὸς τὰ β′, ἐπιτρίτων δὲ ὁ τῶν δ′ πρὸς γ′, καὶ ἐπιτετάρτων ὁ τῶν ε′ πρὸς δ′· οἱ δὲ ἐν μείζοσιν ὅροις καὶ συνθέτοις πάλιν ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ θεωρεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.* Thus for example 4 : 3 is the *πυθμήν* of 8 : 6, 12 : 9, 16 : 12, and so on: and Plato calls it the *ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν* because it is the *πυθμήν*[1] of all *ἐπίτριτοι λόγοι*: cf. the expression *ὁ ἐπόγδοος πυθμήν* in Theo p. 70. With Theo's evidence Nicomachus *Introd. Ar.* II p. 134 is in exact correspondence, as Mr Monro has shewn (*Cl. Rev.* VI pp. 243 f.); and Proclus takes the same view: see his commentary II p. 37 [*ἔστιν οὖν οὗτος*] *ὁ ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν γ′ καὶ δ′*. We may therefore take it as certain that the *ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν* is the numbers 4 and 3, forming two of the three sides of the Pythagorean triangle. *ὧν*, as we have seen, has for its antecedent *ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων*, which we have already identified with the numbers 3, 4, 5.

Of these three numbers, viz. 3, 4, 5, Plato bids us take 3, 4, and 'couple' or 'marry' them with 5. So far as I can discover, the word *συζεύγνυμι* had not either in Plato's time, or later, any fixed and stereotyped mathematical meaning, and *συζυγείς* in this passage is obviously

[1] For *πυθμήν* cf. also Iambl. *in Nic. Ar.* ed. Pistelli pp. 38 ff., 42 f., 47 f., 64, 66 (*πυθμὴν δὲ ἐπιτρίτων ὁ δ′ πρὸς γ′ ἐστίν*), 67 et al. The other explanations which I originally offered of *ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν* need not be mentioned. They have been shewn by Mr Monro, among others, to be untenable: see *Cl. Rev.* VI pp. 153, 243.

in the first instance a metaphor from marriage, not inappropriate in connexion with a number which is 'lord of better and worse births': cf. Nicolaus ap. Proclus *in remp.* II p. 26 Kroll ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς αἱ ποῖαι συζεύξεις ὁμοίους ἢ ἀνομοίους ἀποτελοῦσιν τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς βίοις. But how is the metaphor to be interpreted? If συζυγείς has no arithmetical meaning in this passage, the numbers 3, 4, 5 will stand side by side like lonely celibates throughout all time, and the riddle can never be solved. If it has an arithmetical meaning, the reference must be either to addition or to multiplication. We may fairly say that the process of multiplication is at least as readily suggested by Plato's metaphor as the process of addition, and in point of fact the Pythagoreans frequently denoted marriage by the number 6, because, among other reasons, 6 is produced by multiplying together the first male number, i.e. 3, and the first female number[1], i.e. 2. It is therefore permissible to hold (with Schneider and others) that συζυγείς refers to multiplication, and as it has been asserted that "there is no parallel to lead us to take συζυγείς to mean multiplied" (*Cl. Rev.* l.c. p. 154), I may mention that Proclus uses the word with this meaning[2].

On this view ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς cannot mean anything except $4 \times 3 \times 5 = 60$. Every other possibility is excluded. We cannot interpret the phrase as $(4 + 3) \times 5$, for ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν is not 4 *plus* 3, but only 4, 3, and there is nothing in the Greek to justify the addition, nor yet as $(4 \times 5) + (3 \times 5)$, for here again we introduce a *plus* without any warrant from the language. If on the other hand we refuse to connect the numbers in any way whatever, and hold that if ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν means 4, 3, ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς means 9, 8 or 20, 15 and nothing more, the marriage is either altogether sterile, or else it produces, not a number, but only a ratio: whereas Plato himself expressly describes the issue of his calculations not as a ratio, but as a number (ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος, ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός 546C). Those who, like Hultsch, suppose that συζυγείς denotes addition, and make the whole clause equivalent to $3 + 4 + 5$, justly extend the arithmetical process to the two numbers of the ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν: and if multiplication is intended, we are equally justified in multiplying all three numbers together. The 'coupling' of 3, 4, 5 is simply $3 \times 4 \times 5$.

The words ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς therefore mean that 3, 4 and 5 are to be multiplied together. $3 \times 4 \times 5 = 60$.

[1] See Iambl. *in Nic. Ar.* p. 34. 20 Pistelli, Aristid. Quint. I 151 Meibom, Clem. Alex. *Strom.* V 14. 137B, VI 16. 365A Migne, and the *Theolog. Ar.* p. 33 Ast, et al. No doubt the number 5 could also bear the same meaning (see Zeller[5] I p. 390 *n.*), but I have found many more examples of 6 than of 5.

[2] See *in remp.* II p. 54. 2 ff. ed. Kroll, ἡ δ' οὖν ἑκατοντὰς τῷ ἐλλείποντι ἀριθμῷ πρὸς αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πεμπάδος ἀριθμὸν συζυγεῖσα ποιεῖ τὴν ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπὶ γένεσιν περιοδον, i.e. 100 coupled with the number which falls short of it by 5^2 makes the cycle from birth to birth. That cycle, according to Proclus, is 7500 (ib. p. 38); and $100 \times (100 - 25 =) 75 = 7500$. It is right to state that this passage had not been fully published when Mr Monro wrote the words quoted above. Cf. also Demetrius ap. Proclus ib. p. 23. 14 ff. The constant employment of οἱ γενόμενοι ἐξ in Euclid (e.g. VII 16 ff.) to denote numbers produced by multiplication out of other numbers involves the same idea as συζυγείς here.

Let us now proceed to τρὶς αὐξηθείς. The literal translation is 'thrice increased,' and, as far as concerns the Greek, the words might refer either to three additions, or to three multiplications, and the addenda, or multipliers, might be either the number which has to be increased, that is, 60, or any other number or numbers whatsoever[1]. But as we have seen that αὐξήσεις in section B refers to multiplications and not additions, it is the most natural and obvious course to give αὐξηθείς the same meaning here, and as Plato does not specify any multiplier, the simplest inference from his silence is that the multiplier is the same as the multiplicand, that is to say, 60. And 60 × 60 × 60 × 60 = 12,960,000.

At this stage it becomes necessary to discuss the arguments which have been advanced in favour of a different explanation of τρὶς αὐξηθείς, and against the explanation which was first proposed in my *Number of Plato* pp. 25—28. The discussion will bring to light several points which will, I hope, convince the reader, as they have completely convinced me, that τρὶς αὐξηθείς means 'three times multiplied by itself,' and cannot possibly mean anything else in the context where it occurs.

By every writer whom I have read, the words are taken as meaning cubed, or else the multiplication of some three factors: Weber, however, as I learn from Mr Monro[2], saw this much—that the words denote three separate processes of multiplication. I may be permitted to take Mr Monro and Dr Gow as types. The former observes[3]: "The phrase τρὶς αὐξηθείς may be translated 'raised to the third dimension,' since it may imply either 'solid' numbers (products of three factors) in general, or the cube, which is the solid number *par excellence*. For the former use, see *Rep.* 528 B; for the latter, *Rep.* 587 D. Aristotle paraphrases τρὶς αὐξηθείς by the words ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός." In Dr Gow's article[4] we read: "στερεός" (sc. in the passage quoted from Aristotle in Part iii of this Appendix) "seems to be equivalent to and explanatory of τρὶς αὐξηθείς (cf. Plato *Rep.* VII 528 B)." That is, they would regard 60 τρὶς αὐξηθείς—granted that ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς means 60—as equivalent to 60 multiplied *twice*, and not *thrice*, by itself. I say '*would* regard,' because Dr Gow *does* take τρὶς αὐξηθείς as meaning merely the multiplication of *three* numbers, which in this case, he thinks, are different from one another (viz. 15, 20, 25), but Mr Monro admits[5], and Dr Gow would not deny, that the three factors *may* be identical. The fact is αὐξηθείς means simply 'multiplied,' and, if the multiplier is not otherwise stated, it can only be the multiplicand.

In support of their explanation these two scholars quote, in the first place, the well-known passage in which Aristotle refers to Plato's

[1] The phrase cannot however bear Hultsch's interpretation 'multiplied by three,' for a number which is multiplied by 3 does not receive three increases, but only one, or, if we suppose that the increase means addition, two. Thus 60 × 3 (one increase of 60) = 180 = 60 + 60 + 60 (two increases of 60). The Greek for 'multiplied by 3,' if we choose the verb αὐξάνω, would be τριάδι αὐξηθείς: cf. τριάδι αὐξηθῇ Nicom. *Intr. Ar.* p. 127 Ast and ἑξάδι αὐξηθείς *Theol. Ar.* p. 39.

[2] *J. of Ph.* VIII p. 284.

[3] l.c. p. 280.

[4] *J. of Ph.* XII p. 93.

[5] l.c. p. 280.

Number (*Pol.* E 12. 1316[a] 4 ff.). This passage of the *Politics* is so important for the correct understanding of the whole of Plato's Number that I have found it necessary to devote a separate division of this Appendix to its explanation. In Part iii I have, as I believe, shewn that the words quoted by Mr Monro do not paraphrase *τρὶς αὐξηθείς* at all, but tell us what Aristotle believed to be the number of the section which I have called B. I will therefore ask the reader to defer his judgment on the Aristotelian passage till he has read Part iii.

In the second place, the above-named writers refer to *Republic* VII 528 B and IX 587 D. I cite these two passages in full. The first is as follows: *μετὰ ἐπίπεδον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν περιφορᾷ ὂν ἤδη στερεὸν λαβόντες, πρὶν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ λαβεῖν· ὀρθῶς δὲ ἔχει ἑξῆς μετὰ δευτέραν αὔξην τρίτην λαμβάνειν. ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο περὶ τὴν τῶν κύβων αὔξην καὶ τὸ βάθους μετέχον* (528 B). The second runs thus: *κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην δῆλον δὴ ἀπόστασιν ὅσην ἀφεστηκὼς γίγνεται* (587 D).

I have fully commented on these passages where they occur, but it may be convenient once more to recapitulate my explanation of *τρίτη αὔξη* in each of these places. The first passage is where Plato says that the study of solids by themselves should precede the study of solids *ἐν περιφορᾷ*, i.e. astronomy: after the second 'increase,' says Plato, we ought to take the third. What does this mean? A point (= unity) has no 'increase': a line (say 3) has one: a rectangle (say 3×4) has two (*δευτέρα αὔξη*): a solid figure (say $3 \times 4 \times 5$) has three. A solid figure is therefore rightly said to be or have *τρίτη αὔξη*, because your reckoning begins from the point, which has no increase. The second passage deals with a case, not of solids in general, but of cubes. The number in question is 9—which is (says Plato) the distance separating the tyrant from *ἀληθὴς ἡδονή*, measured *ἀριθμῷ* or *κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμόν*, i.e. "numero seu secundum longitudinem, numerus enim omnis quatenus monadibus constat, lineae instar habendus" (Schneider III p. lxxxxv): 'and how far removed the tyrant is *according to the square and the third increase*, is manifest.' But the third increase of what? Not of 9 (though belonging to 9), for 9 is itself already one increase, viz. of unity—but the third increase of unity in that special case where 9 is its first increase. 'The first increase (viz. of the unit or point) was *ὁ τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμός*, i.e. in this case $(1 \times 9 =) 9$: by the second-and-third increases on the same scale we obtain 9×9 (second increase or *δύναμις*) $\times 9$ (third increase) $= 729$' (*n.* ad loc.). Both in 528 B and 587 D it is *unity* or the *point* which suffers a third increase: in Plato's number it is not unity, but 60, and that makes all the difference. Cf. Pt iii.

Let us consider for a moment what is the meaning of the Greek word *αὔξη* or *αὔξησις*. Aristotle[1] distinguishes *γένεσις* from *αὔξησις* in these words: *φανερὸν δὴ—ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὔξησις μεταβολὴ ἐκ δυνάμει μεγέθους, ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἔχοντος μέγεθος...ἔτι δὲ ἥ γε τοιαύτη μεταβολὴ οὐκ αὐξήσεως ἴδιος ἀλλὰ γενέσεως· ἡ γὰρ αὔξησίς ἐστι τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος μεγέθους ἐπίδοσις, ἡ δὲ φθίσις μείωσις.* Compare with this another passage of the same treatise[2]: *ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ γίγνεσθαί τι*

[1] *De Gen. et Corr.* A 5. 320[b] 25 ff. [2] *ib.* 321[a] 22 ff.

ἁπλῶς ἢ φθείρεσθαι οὐχ ὑπομένει, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἢ αὐξάνεσθαι ἢ φθίνειν ὑπομένει τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ αὐξανόμενον ἢ ἀλλοιούμενον· ἀλλ' ἔνθα μὲν τὸ πάθος, ἔνθα δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ αὐτὸ οὐ μένει. In other words, the process which calls a thing into being out of nothing is ἁπλῆ γένεσις, not αὔξησις: in αὔξησις the original size is not lost, but increased. Now apply this to the number 60. Increased once, what does it become? Certainly not 60, which it already is: else what of the words τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος ἐπίδοσις, and ὑπομένει τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ αὐξανόμενον,... ἔνθα δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ αὐτὸ οὐ μένει? Does the process of αὔξησις, when applied to a number, begin by putting it to flight, and afterwards lure it back again? 60 once 'increased' (i.e. in this particular passage, as we have seen, multiplied by itself) is 60 × 60; twice 'increased' it is 60 × 60 × 60; thrice 'increased' it is 60 × 60 × 60 × 60. Apply the reverse process to 60^3, and the illogical nature of the traditional interpretation will at once appear. If 60^3 is 60 *three* times 'increased,' then 60^2 is 60 *twice* 'increased,' 60 is 60 *once* increased, and nothing—or rather, unity, which is the point[1],—is 60. When Aristotle says, in the passage referred to by Mr Monro, ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός he means[2] that 6, which has already one increase, by getting *two* more becomes 216. The number 216 we may then call either an ἀριθμὸς τρὶς ηὐξημένος (cf. *Epin.* 990 D), i.e. a number which is thrice increased (sc. from unity, by means of 6), or we may call it ὁ ἓξ ἀριθμὸς δὶς ηὐξημένος, because ἓξ δὶς αὐξηθείς produces it.

For my own part, I am unable to see any way of escape from these arguments, but Mr Monro complains of "the want of any evidence" that αὔξη in the phrase τρίτη αὔξη originally referred to the increase of the unit or point[3]. To this criticism I would make the following reply.

The expression τρίτη αὔξη is extremely rare, occurring only twice in Plato, and not at all, I believe, in Aristotle. I have not found it in later Greek writers on mathematics. But Plato uses also δευτέρα αὔξη of plane surfaces, and if we compare 528 B ὀρθῶς δὲ ἔχει ἑξῆς μετὰ δευτέραν αὔξην τρίτην λαμβάνειν with 526 C δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου σκεψώμεθα ἆρά τι προσήκει ἡμῖν, it is clear that he also regarded numbers or lines as the πρώτη αὔξη. Now there can be no question that the word αὔξη in each of these phrases bears some meaning, and the obvious and natural meaning is 'increase.' But 'increase' must be increase of something, and we are surely bound to ask 'What is that something which is increased first to a line, second to a plane, and thirdly to a solid?' The *non possumus* attitude should not be adopted till we have tried and failed. The only possible and at the same time perfectly satisfactory answer is 'the unit or point,' for number on the one hand is a σύστημα μονάδων (VII 525 A *n.*), and the Pythagoreans, to whom the expression τρίτη αὔξη is surely due, 'built up the line out of points, the plane out of lines, and the solid out of planes' (see App. II to Book VII, where the evidence is cited, and cf. also Part ii § 4). The origin which I

[1] The Greeks did not regard 'nought' as a number and had no symbol for it: see Cantor *Vorlesungen zur Gesch. der Mathem.* p. 144.

[2] It will be shewn in Pt iii that ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου is 6.

[3] *Cl. Rev.* l.c. pp. 154, 242.

suggest for the phrase is therefore in harmony both with Greek linguistic usage and with the theories of the school to which above all others Plato confesses his obligations in the domain of mathematics (see on VII 530D, E and cf. also App. II to Book VII), and no rival interpretation is offered either by Mr Monro, or, so far as I am aware, by any other critic.

Finally, my interpretation of τρὶς αὐξηθείς has been admitted to be "logical, but it is not" says Mr Monro (*Cl. Rev.* l.c. p. 154) "in accordance with the *usus loquendi*, which in this and many similar cases follows the inclusive method of reckoning." In support of this allegation Mr Monro quotes a passage from Euclid IX 8 ἐὰν ἀπὸ μονάδος ὁποσοιοῦν ἀριθμοὶ ἐξῆς ἀνάλογον ὦσιν, ὁ μὲν τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς μονάδος τετράγωνος ἔσται κτλ., and refers to a similar passage in Archimedes, quoted by Nesselmann, *Alg. d. Griechen* p. 124 *n.* 16. "On the latter of these" continues Mr Monro "Nesselmann remarks: 'Es ist bei diesem Satze nur zu bedenken, dass die Griechen bei Angaben von Abständen beide Grenzen mitzählen' (*Algebra d. Griechen* p. 125, cp. p. 161)." I have no fault to find with Nesselmann, whose remarks are perfectly true and relevant in both the places cited by Mr Monro, and in the fullest harmony, so far as they go, with my explanation of τρὶς αὐξηθείς. My only objection is to the inference which Mr Monro on his own account draws from this and similar passages in Greek. That inference will claim our attention presently: but first it is necessary to explain what Euclid means[1].

The meaning is as follows. If, for example, we take the series

1, 60, 3600, 216000 etc.,

in which 1 : 60 :: 60 : 3600 :: 3600 : 216000 etc.[2], then the *third number* —it will be admitted that ἀριθμός is understood with τρίτος—*from* 1 will be a square. (Here it is of course 60^2.) The expression 'third number from 1' is doubtless, as Mr Monro thinks, somewhat illogical, for one cannot be the first number from itself: and it is perfectly true that 'this is only one of many examples of the *usus loquendi*' of the Greek language.

But what inference does Mr Monro draw from the usage in question? Because the third *number* from one is a square, he seems to infer that the third *increase* is also a square. This is the only way in which I can interpret the words: "*We may feel sure, I think, that the 'third increase' would naturally mean the third term in the increasing series rather than the fourth.*" (The italics are mine.) Well, the increasing series is 1, 60, 60^2, and the third term in the series is 60^2, so that according to Mr Monro's view 60^2 is a τρίτη αὔξη. This no one believes. 'It is not in accordance with the *usus loquendi*,' not to speak of logic.

My reviewer's inference from the idiom to which he calls attention is therefore unwarranted and fallacious. The fact is, of course, that the

[1] The passage of Archimedes is, as Mr Monro remarks, similar to that from Euclid; and what I say of the one applies equally to the other.

[2] That Euclid regards the increasing series as beginning with unity, and not with the second number, is clear from the words with which he begins his demonstration: ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ἡ μονὰς πρὸς τὸν A, οὕτως ὁ A πρὸς τὸν B κτλ.

'third increase' meant to the Greeks, as it means to us, the *fourth* term in the increasing series, and *not* the third. Thus in the increasing series 1, 60, 3600, 216000, the fourth term, viz. 216000 or 60 × 60 × 60, is the 'third increase,' and in the increasing series which is involved in the words ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς τρὶς αὐξηθείς, that is to say,

60, 3600, 216000, 12,960,000,

the 'third increase' is also the fourth term viz. 12,960,000 or 60 × 60 × 60 × 60 i.e. 60 τρὶς αὐξηθείς. So far am I from interpreting τρὶς αὐξηθείς differently from τρίτη αὔξη, as has been asserted by Mr Monro (l.c. p. 154)[1].

Our conclusion therefore is that ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς τρὶς αὐξηθείς means

60 × 60 × 60 × 60 = 12,960,000.

This number, according to Plato, 'furnishes two harmonies' (δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται). What does Plato mean by 'furnishes'? Does he mean 'furnishes of itself,' or 'furnishes after it has been submitted to various arithmetical operations'? παρέχεσθαι elsewhere bears the meaning 'de suo praebere' (IV 421 D *n.*), and we are not justified in supplying any new arithmetical processes out of our own imaginations, in the absence of any hint contained in the Greek[2]. No such hint is given: so that παρέχεται can only mean 'furnishes of itself.' Now in what sense can a number be said to furnish of itself a square and an oblong? The natural and obvious answer is 'When it can be resolved both into a square and into an oblong'[3].

[1] The reason why τρὶς αὐξηθείς has been misunderstood so long is due in part to our habit of expressing Plato's mathematics in the technical language of a later generation. Mr Monro for example calls it a paradox to hold "that τρὶς αὐξηθείς means 'raised to the fourth power,' while τρίτη αὔξη denotes the third power" (*Cl. Rev.* l.c. p. 242). The 'paradox' becomes a truism if we say 'τρὶς αὐξηθείς means thrice increased, and τρίτη αὔξη denotes the third increase.' And this is in fact the only admissible way of stating the case. The mathematical terms 'fourth power' and 'third power' were unknown to Plato. 'Power' or δύναμις alone was sometimes used by him with the meaning which we express by 'second power' (*Rep.* IX 587 D), but he also employs δευτέρα αὔξη to convey that meaning (ib. VII 528 B), and δύναμις itself actually means 'root' in *Theaet.* 148 A. See Allman *Gk Geom.* p. 208 *n.* In the course of my commentary on the *Republic* I have had occasion to point out some instances in which the interpretation of Plato's philosophy has suffered by the employment of later philosophical formulae and phrases, and it is interesting and instructive to find so conspicuous an example of the same tendency in connexion with his mathematics.

[2] It is at this point where all the previous attempts to solve the Number with which I am acquainted have broken down. In order to make their conjectures about the ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς τρὶς αὐξηθείς yield the two harmonies, the different writers on the subject have been compelled to interpret παρέχεται κτλ. as 'furnishes two harmonies *after it has been submitted to other arithmetical processes*,' and as no such processes are indicated by Plato, they have supplied the missing links by a variety of purely imaginative conjectures according to their different interpretations of the ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν etc. and of the harmonies which it provides.

[3] A less natural but still possible answer would be 'When it is produced by the sum of a square and an oblong.' But the sequel shews that this alternative is not intended here.

Let us now examine the words in which Plato describes the first harmony. It is, he tells us, 'equal an equal number of times, so many times 100.' But *how* many times 100? This time the Muses are only pretending to tease: for the answer is already in our hands. 12, 960,000 furnishes (i.e., as we have seen, can be resolved into) 3600^2 (Fig. 3), and 3600^2 is 'equal an equal number of times, viz. *thirty-six* times 100,' so that τοσαυτάκις means 36 times. It should be added that ἴσος ἰσάκις is regularly used of a square number by Greek writers on arithmetic[1], and bears the same meaning in *Theaet.* 147 E.



FIG. 3.

Why does Plato add the words ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις when the square could be just as easily discovered without them? He wishes to call our attention to the fact that each of the sides of the square is a multiple of 100, just as each of the sides of the oblong is also a multiple of 100 (ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν—ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος). We are thus encouraged to look for some special significance in his employment of that number. What the significance is will be explained in Part ii § 5. The number 36 had also a profound significance and value in Pythagorean embryology, theory of music, and physics (Part ii § 4), and Plato calls our attention to it all the more pointedly because he represents it as if it were an unknown quantity. In reality it is not unknown, for the antecedent of τοσαυτάκις is easily discovered from the equation which Plato himself has already given us, viz. 12,960,000 = a square[2].

[1] Euclid VII *def.* 11 τετράγωνος ἀριθμός ἐστιν ὁ ἰσάκις ἴσος.

[2] In my *Number of Plato* p. 21 I explained τοσαυτάκις in substantially the same way. It was urged against my explanation that τοσαυτάκις ought not to refer to a number "discovered by an algebraic process *from a subsequent statement*" (*Cl. Rev.* l.c. p. 153. The italics are mine). The words in italics do not apply to the present solution, in which the Number is investigated in the order of the Greek, and not, as on the previous occasion, from the end upwards. I now interpret τοσαυτάκις not by what follows, but by what precedes it, but I still regard the pronominal adverb as meaning 'so many times' i.e. 'a certain number of times.' The usage is just as natural in Greek as in English, and resembles the use of τοσοῦτον in βέλτιον τόδε τοῦδε καὶ νῦν καὶ τοσοῦτον *Alc.* I 108 E, τόσῳ καὶ τόσῳ in *Laws* 721 D and τοσόσδε in Arist. *Pol.* Γ 12. 1283^a 8 τοσόνδε γὰρ μέγεθος εἰ κρεῖττον τοσοῦδε, τοσόνδε δῆλον ὡς ἴσον. In *Cl. Rev.* l.c. p. 241 I suggested that the whole phrase might be equivalent to ἴσην ἰσάκις ἑκατοντάκις, the word τοσαυτάκις having for its antecedent the square number which ἴσην ἰσάκις denotes, and I find that Schneider, Donaldson and apparently also Hultsch (ll.cc.) understand the expression in this way. In that case the first harmony will be $360^2 \times 100$ instead of 3600^2, and the total result remains the same. But the symmetry of the passage is impaired if we take this view: for just as in the case of the oblong it is not the area, but the sides which are multiplied by 100 (ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν—ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος), so also here the number 100 should multiply the sides, and not the area, of the square. Mr Monro thinks that "the ordinary interpretation of ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις—'a hundred taken *that* number of times viz. 100 times' —is unassailable" (l.c. p. 153). This view of the word is as old as Proclus (l.c. II p. 37), but is far from universally held, as I have just pointed out. I am by no means sure that Plato would have expressed the area of his square in this way: certainly in *Men.* 83 C he writes τεττάρων γὰρ (not τέτταρα) τετράκις ἐστὶν ἑκκαίδεκα (cf. ib. 82 C, 83 E), describing the

The first 'harmony' is therefore 3600^2; what is the second?

Plato describes it in the words *τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δέ, ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομένων ἑνὸς ἑκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυοῖν, ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος*, 'the other of equal length one way, but oblong; on the one side, of 100 squares of rational diameters of 5, diminished by one each, or if of irrational diameters, by two; on the other, of 100 cubes of 3.'

Let us examine the words one by one. It is clear that *τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δέ* means that the 'harmony' is expressed by means of a rectangle. "When the sides of the rectangle were expressed in numbers," says Allman[1], "*προμήκης* was the general term for an oblong," and *προμήκης* is the term employed here. Compare the Platonic definition of an oblong number in *Theaet.* 148A *πλείων ἐλαττονάκις ἢ ἐλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει.* The sense would have been complete if Plato had merely said *τὴν δὲ προμήκη*, but the addition of *ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ* has a stylistic effect: the rectangle, like the square, is also *ἰσομήκης*, though only in one direction[2].

We have now to interpret *ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομένων ἑνὸς ἑκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυοῖν*[3]. These words express the first of the two sides of the rectangle: cf. *Critias* 118A *πρόμηκες δὲ*

square as 'of' its sides, just as he usually describes an oblong (cf. *Critias* 118A *πρόμηκες δὲ πᾶν, ἐπὶ μὲν θάτερα τρισχιλίων σταδίων, κατὰ δὲ μέσον ἀπὸ θαλάττης ἄνω δισχιλίων*). If he had wished to say that the first harmony was 100 × 100, we should have expected *ἑκατὸν μονάδων τοσαυτάκις*, so as to balance *ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν* κτλ. below: or rather *ἑκατὸν μονάδων ἑκατοντάκις*, for Plato never uses *τρία τοσαυτάκις, τέτταρα τοσαυτάκις*, etc., but always *τρία τρίς, τέτταρα τετράκις* etc. It is incredible that a nation which had a word for 10,000 times had no word to express 100 times, although Mr Monro suggests that because *ἑκατοντάκις* does not appear to occur in classical literature, therefore it was unknown in Plato's day (*Cl. Rev.* l.c. p. 153). Over and above all these considerations, there is the indisputable fact that the harmony which Plato describes in the words *ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις* must be one which can be 'furnished' or 'yielded' by the *ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς τρὶς αὐξηθείς*: and no theory about the area of that harmony has the smallest claim to be even considered unless it complies with this condition. Mr Monro himself makes no attempt to shew that the number 10,000 can be derived from the subject of *παρέχεται*, and every writer who has attempted this impossible task has been compelled to resort to purely conjectural and arbitrary processes for which there is not a shadow of justification in Plato's language.

[1] *Gk Geom.* p. 210 *n.*

[2] Hultsch (*Zeitschrift f. Math.* etc. l.c. p. 46), who agrees that the words denote a rectangle, changes *τῇ* into *πῃ*, but *πῃ* is not sufficiently precise. The order is of course intended to throw emphasis on *τῇ*, and at the same time to bring *ἰσομήκη* as near as possible to *ἴσην ἰσάκις*. *τῇ* is demonstrative as in *τῇ μέν, τῇ δέ* (*Theaet.* 158E et al.), and the position of *μέν* is as in X 614D *ἓκ μὲν τοῦ ἀνιέναι—ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου* and elsewhere. The usual theory seems to make *τῇ* mean the square: 'equal to the former in one dimension' (J. and C.). If Plato had intended such a meaning, he would certainly have written *ἐκείνῃ* and not *τῇ*. There should be no question that *τῇ* is adverbial.

[3] The full explanation of this passage is due to Barozzi (see Schneider l.c. p. xxv), but Proclus (l.c. II p. 38) understood 'the rational' and 'irrational diameters of five.' Barozzi's only error was that he added, instead of multiplying, the two sides of the oblong. I think Hultsch was the first to see that multiplication is intended, although he interprets the sides of the rectangle wrongly.

πᾶν, ἐπὶ μὲν θάτερα τρισχιλίων σταδίων, κατὰ δὲ μέσον ἀπὸ θαλάττης ἄνω δισχιλίων.

In the language of Greek arithmetic ἀριθμὸς ἀπό means 'square of': see for example Euclid VII 20 ἐὰν τρεῖς ἀριθμοὶ ἀνάλογον ὦσιν, ὁ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄκρων ἴσος ἔσται τῷ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου, i.e. for example, in the proportion 2 : 4 :: 4 : 8, the product of 8 and 2 = 4^2. The same use of ἀπό is found in Plato, e.g. *Men.* 85 B ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος, γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον.

Consequently ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπό is simply 'of one hundred squares of.'

What are διάμετροι ῥηταὶ πεμπάδος? The rational diameter of 5 is the nearest rational number to the real diameter of a square whose side is five[1], i.e. to $\sqrt{50}$ by Euclid I 47 (see Fig. 4). Now the nearest rational number to $\sqrt{50}$ is $7 = \sqrt{49}$. Therefore ῥηταὶ διάμετροι πεμπάδος = 'sevens.' Thus the entire clause ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος means 'of one hundred squares of 7,' i.e.

$$100 \times 49 = 4900.$$



FIG. 4.

It remains to explain δεομένων ἑνὸς ἑκάστων and ἀῤῥήτων δὲ δυοῖν.

δεομένων ἑνὸς ἑκάστων means 'wanting one each,' i.e. each ἀριθμὸς ἀπό or square being diminished by 1. The normal expression would be δεομένων ἑνὸς ἑκάστου 'wanting, each of them, 1,' but Plato allows ἑκάστου to assimilate itself to ἀριθμῶν.

We can now interpret the whole expression ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομένων ἑνὸς ἑκάστων. It is equivalent to

$$(7^2 \times 100) - (1 \times 100) = 4900 - 100 = 4800.$$

The words ἀῤῥήτων δὲ δυοῖν merely give another way of arriving at 4800. The translation is: 'or, if you take *irrational* diameters of 5,

[1] For evidence of this see Theo Smyrnaeus, pp. 43 ff. Cf. also Proclus *in remp.* II p. 38, Gow, *Gk Math.* p. 96 and Cantor *Gesch. d. Math.* p. 191. This is the only passage in Plato where 'rational diameters' are mentioned. In *Theaet.* 147 D ff. he merely distinguishes rational from irrational *roots* or surds: while a careful study of *Polit.* 266 A shews that the passage is in no way parallel to ours except in the use of διάμετρος. But there is nothing harsh or difficult, from the Greek point of view, in the expression 'rational diameter.' The geometrical construction is very simple. See Fig. 5. Let $AB = \sqrt{50}$, i.e. the *irrational* diameter of 5, and consequently $ABDE$ = the square of (ἀπό) $AB = 50$; we have only to insert in $ABDE$ the largest square of a rational number which it will contain, say $AFHG$, and AF will be the *rational* diameter of 5, i.e. *that part of the diameter of 5 which is rational.*



FIG. 5.

wanting 2 each.' The construction is <ἀπὸ> ἀρρήτων δὲ <διαμέτρων δεομένων> δυοῖν <ἑκάστων>. The meaning, expressed in figures, is: 'or, if you prefer it, of $(\sqrt{50})^2 \times 100 - (2 \times 100) = 5000 - 200 = 4800$.' δέ gives an alternative, as in μᾶλλον δέ = vel potius.



Fig. 6.

Consequently one of the two sides of the second harmony is 4800.

The words ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος 'on the other hand of 100 cubes of three' give us the second side, viz. $100 \times 3^3 = 2700$.

The second harmony is therefore

$$4800 \times 2700 \text{ (Fig. 6)} = 12{,}960{,}000.$$

And this harmony, like the first, is furnished by $60 \times 60 \times 60 \times 60$, for $60 \times 60 \times 60 \times 60 = 12{,}960{,}000$.

The reason why the square and the rectangle are each called 'harmonies' will be explained in Part ii § 5.

The arithmetical solution of the Platonic Number is therefore

(1) $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$.
(2) $(3 \times 4 \times 5)^4 = 3600^2 = 4800 \times 2700$.

PART ii.

The meaning of the Platonic Number.

I will now discuss the whole passage from beginning to end, and elucidate the meaning step by step.

§ 1. *The point of view.*

Our city, says Plato, will be moved, when στάσις appears in the two higher classes. The Muses shall tell us how στάσις entered first. The *cause* of our city's being moved, they say, is that everything created is liable to destruction. The *process* of destruction (λύσις) is when the leaders of the city γένους ὑμετέρου εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας—οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τεύξονται, ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοὺς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε οὐ δέον. Whenever, in ignorance of 'better and worse births,' οἱ φύλακες συνοικίζωσι νύμφας νυμφίοις παρὰ καιρόν, οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ' εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται (546 D). In the next generation the dissolution has already gone so far that iron breeds with silver, and copper with gold.

Accordingly the λύσις of the ideal State is *the begetting of children when children ought not to be begotten*, or briefly, *the begetting of children out of season*, or *inopportunely*.

This is quite in harmony with the stringent rules laid down by Plato in Book v on the subject of marriage and the procreation of children. Thus in 458 D the male and female archons are not allowed ἀτάκτως

μίγνυσθαι, but marriages are to be celebrated ἱεροὶ εἰς δύναμιν ὅ τι μάλιστα. In 459 E it is said: οὐκοῦν δὴ ἑορταί τινες νομοθετητέαι, ἐν αἷς ξυνάξομεν τάς τε νύμφας καὶ τοὺς νυμφίους, καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ὕμνοι ποιητέοι τοῖς ἡμετέροις ποιηταῖς πρέποντες τοῖς γιγνομένοις γάμοις. And at 461 A it is reckoned a sin against God and man to produce a child for the State οὐχ ὑπὸ θυσιῶν οὐδ' ὑπ' εὐχῶν φὺς ἃς ἐφ' ἑκάστοις τοῖς γάμοις εὔξονται καὶ ἱέρειαι καὶ ἱερεῖς καὶ ξύμπασα ἡ πόλις κτλ.

§ 2. *The meaning of the words from* χαλεπὸν μέν *to* γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε οὐ δέον.

We have thus obtained the point of view from which the whole passage is to be interpreted. While the *cause* of change from the best to the second-best commonwealth lies in the perishability of everything which is created, the *process* which leads to change is the begetting of children inopportunely.

Plato deals first with the process leading to change (λύσις). To plants and animals, he says, cometh production or non-production (a bearing or no bearing) of soul and bodies, whenever revolutions join for each the circumferences of their circles, these circumferences faring a short way for the short-lived, but the reverse for the reverse. That is to say, plants and animals have fixed periods of gestation, which may be represented by circles whose circumferences revolve (Fig. 7). Every time that the fixed point A is reached, there is φορὰ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων, if the seed was sown on the last occasion when the same point of the circle was at A, and if it has come, without accident, to maturity: if however the seed was not then sown, or, though sown, has not come to maturity, there is ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων. The singular ψυχή is used because soul, viewed merely as the principle of life, is one in all plants, in all animals, and in both[1]. Why are the circumferences long in the case of long-lived animals, and short in the case of short-lived? Because animals that live long have long periods of gestation, and conversely. Aristotle also takes note of the same general rule: see *Probl.* X 9. 891^{b} 25 ff., διὰ τί τὰ μὲν ταχυτόκα τῶν ζῴων ἐστί, τῶν δὲ πολυχρόνιος ἡ κύησις; ἢ ὅτι τὰ μακροβιώτερα βραδύτερον πέφυκε τελειοῦσθαι; ἔστι δὲ βραδυτόκα τὰ μακρόβια and *de gener. anim.* IV 10. 777^{a} 31 ff., where the elephant is cited as a well-known case in point.



FIG. 7.

The meaning of the words from λύσις δὲ ἥδε to ἐναντίας may therefore be summed up in the sentence: In all plants and animals the period of gestation is fixed by nature. Now as man is the animal with whom in the ideal State we are concerned, we are prepared by this exordium for the mention of the period of gestation in the human race. It will come in due time.

[1] Cf. *Tim.* 77 B.

Plato proceeds to narrow the case down to man: 'Now as touching your kind (i.e. mankind), clever though the leaders of the city be whom you educated, none the more will they by calculation together with perception obtain' (literally, *hit the obtaining of*) 'good offspring and no offspring, but it will escape them, and the day will come when they will beget children when they ought not.' Several points in this require to be explained. First: in place of repeating φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία Plato writes εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, because it is not enough for the prosperity of the ideal State merely to produce children—the children must be good in quality. The word ἀφορίας is full of meaning; it is the duty of the rulers to render, if possible, illicit unions unproductive, πάντα διακελευσάμενοι προθυμεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύημα μηδέ γ' ἔν, ἐὰν γένηται, ἐὰν δέ τι βιάσηται, οὕτω τιθέναι, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ (v 461 c). Second: what is the meaning of λογισμὸς μετ' αἰσθήσεως? Nothing very recondite. Both calculation and perception by the senses must be employed by the rulers in arranging the details connected with marriage and the bringing up of children: perception for example in settling what couples are to be brought together (v 459 a ff.), which children should be reared, and which exposed (460 c al.), and calculation in order to determine what number of marriages are needed to keep the population nearly uniform (460 a), what couples may marry by reason of age (460 e ff.), and other things too trivial to mention. Plato means that however well the rulers employ the means at their disposal, that is, λογισμός and αἴσθησις, yet the time will come when mistakes *must* happen. We are not to blame the rulers of our perfect city, nor yet αἴσθησις (with Amelius ap. Procl. l.c. p. 29 and Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II p. 302): for the real *fons et origo mali*, as we shall shortly discover, is the Universe, the failure of whose energies is beginning to affect the ideal city, as well as every other portion of the whole. See §§ 5 and 7.

§ 3. *The* περίοδος *of the* θεῖον γεννητόν.

We come now to the words ἔστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδος ἣν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος. Plato has stated that all ζῷα have a fixed period of gestation: he now proceeds to deal with the periods of (1) the θεῖον γεννητόν and (2) the ἀνθρώπειον, beginning with the θεῖον, on the principle ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα.

Four expressions require to be discussed before we can arrive at Plato's meaning—viz.: περίοδος, περιλαμβάνει, ἀριθμὸς τέλειος, and θεῖον γεννητόν.

The word περίοδος means nothing more than 'way round.' One complete revolution of any circle is a περίοδος: two or more of the same circle, or one (or more) of one circle and one (or more) of another or others, are περίοδοι. This will not be denied by any one who will take the trouble to study side by side the examples quoted in Ast's Lexicon of the use of περίοδος in Plato. In the present passage the 'way round' is that described above in the words ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἑκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς ξυνάπτωσι: the περίοδος of a θεῖον γεννητόν is therefore

fulfilled ὅταν περιτροπὴ θείῳ γεννητῷ κύκλου περιφορὰν ξυνάπτῃ. Now it has already been shewn that the words from ὅταν περιτροπαί to ἐναντίοις refer to periods of gestation, so that the περίοδος of a θεῖον γεννητόν is the period of gestation which ends in the birth of a divine creature[1]. This is the only possible interpretation of the Greek, nor is the meaning otherwise than appropriate, as will appear when we apprehend what the 'divine creature' is.

The word περιλαμβάνει means 'comprehends.' If a number is represented by a rectangle, its sides, or factors, are said to 'comprehend' it, as in *Theaet.* 148 A, where the number which μείζων καὶ ἐλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρὰ περιλαμβάνει is called a προμήκης ἀριθμός. In the present case, we are dealing, not with a number, but with a περίοδος which is comprehended by a number, and that number περιλαμβάνει περίοδον which gives the time that the revolution takes to accomplish. The period of gestation of a divine creature is therefore expressed by a 'final number.'

I will now discuss the words τέλειος ἀριθμός. It is well known that a 'perfect' number meant to Euclid[2] and Greek arithmeticians generally a number which is equal to the sum of its divisors, e.g. $6 = 1 + 2 + 3$; $28 = 1 + 2 + 4 + 7 + 14$. Although there is no trace of such a meaning in Plato, nor in the fragments of Philolaus[3], the usage may very well be old: but even among the Pythagoreans numbers are often called 'perfect,' although they are not equivalent to the sum of their factors[4]. The τέλειος ἀριθμός *par excellence* was 10 according to Philolaus: θεωρεῖν δεῖ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰν ἐσσίαν τῶ ἀριθμῶ καττὰν δύναμιν, ἅτις ἐστὶν ἐν τᾷ δεκάδι· μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελὴς καὶ παντοεργὸς καὶ θεῖα καὶ οὐρανίω βίω καὶ ἀνθρωπίνω ἀρχὰ καὶ ἀγεμὼν καὶ κοσμήτειρα ἁ δύναμις ἁ τᾶς δεκάδος[5]. But 10 was called by them παντελής or τέλειος simply because, as the basis of their system of calculation, which was a decimal one, it may be regarded as the 'consummating' or 'all-ending' number, the numbers above ten being considered merely repetitions of the first ten[6]. Plato was perfectly at liberty to call any other number τέλειος which 'ends' or 'brings a consummation[7],' and in point of fact he does so in the *Timaeus*. In 39 D of that dialogue we find the words: ἔστι δ' ὅμως οὐδὲν ἧττον κατανοῆσαι δυνατόν, ὡς ὅ γε τέλειος ἀριθμὸς χρόνου τὸν τέλειον ἐνιαυτὸν

[1] For περίοδος in the sense of 'period of gestation,' cf. Aristides Quint. *De Musica*, p. 143 Meib. ταῖς τῶν ἑπταμήνων περιόδοις. Many writers on the Number understand by περίοδος 'Umlaufszeit' (e.g. Zeller[4] II 1, p. 858 *n.*): but the word must of course be interpreted by what precedes and follows. I have shewn that 'period of gestation' is the only meaning which harmonises with ὅταν περιτροπαὶ κτλ. above, and it is the only meaning possible below, where the period of the human creature is described.

[2] VII *def.* 23 τέλειος ἀριθμός ἐστιν ὁ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσιν ἴσος ὤν.

[3] Some of Philolaus' fragments, whether genuine or not, are at all events, in my opinion, tolerably early.

[4] e.g. 3 and 9: see the *Theolog. Arithm.* pp. 13, 58 ed. Ast. The number 3 is on p. 13 said to be τέλειος ἰδιαίτερον τῶν ἄλλων, implying that other numbers may also be τέλειοι, though in a less specific sense. Cf. Demme (referred to above) pp. 84 f.

[5] *Frag.* 13 in Mullach II p. 4.

[6] See Zeller[5] I p. 398 *n.* 2, and Aristotle quoted there.

[7] Cantor in his *Vorlesungen zur Gesch. der Math.* p. 142 agrees in denying that 'perfect number' here means 'a number equal to the sum of its divisors.'

πληροῖ τότε, ὅταν ἁπασῶν τῶν ὀκτὼ περιόδων τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ξυμπερανθέντα τάχη σχῇ κεφαλὴν τῷ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἀναμετρηθέντα κύκλῳ. It is rightly held that we have here a reference to a Great Year—the period within which all the eight circles[1] revolving around the earth simultaneously reach the point from which they started at the commencement of our cycle. Now if Plato allowed himself to call the number which measures a cycle of the world's life a 'final' or 'ending' number, it is clear that he might with equal propriety apply the epithet τέλειος to the number which completes or fulfils (τελειοῖ)[2] the World's creation; for the θεῖον γεννητόν, as will presently be shewn, is the World and nothing more. What the particular number is, he does not say: and no one will blame him for his reticence[3].

There remain the words θείῳ γεννητῷ. The ancients[4] explained these words, with perfect justice, as referring to the Universe: οὐρανὸς ἢ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τί ποτε ὀνομαζόμενος μάλιστ' ἂν δέχοιτο, τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ὠνομάσθω (*Tim.* 28 B). In the *Timaeus* there is abundant evidence that Plato regarded the World as a divine creature: τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, he says, ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν[5], with which compare the words of Proclus (*in Tim.* 89 D): ὅταν δὲ ἔμψυχον αὐτὸ καὶ ἔννουν ἴδῃς, θεὸν αὐτὸ καλέσεις, ὅπερ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν Πολιτείᾳ μὲν θεῖον γεννητόν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ θεὸν εὐδαίμονα προσειπεῖν τὸν κόσμον ἠξίωσε. The Universe is θεῖον, because it is a God; γεννητόν, because it is created[6].

The θεῖον γεννητόν is therefore the World, and the words which we have been discussing mean that *the time during which the world is in the womb*[7] *is comprehended by a final or consummating number*, the size of which Plato prudently conceals.

[1] viz. the circle of the Fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Moon: see *Rep.* X 616 D ff. There is a good definition of the Great Year in Macrob. *Somn. Scip.* II 11. 10.

[2] By the 'World's creation' is meant, of course, the development of a κόσμος or ordered universe out of the primeval chaos. Cf. *Tim.* 30 A ff. and *Pol.* 273 B πολλῆς ἧν μετέχον ἀταξίας πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κόσμον ἀφικέσθαι. It ought to be mentioned here that I formerly thought the period of the θεῖον γεννητόν is actually specified by Plato in the sequel, and that it is identical with one of the two harmonies; but the identification cannot be sustained, and I now withdraw it.

[3] τελειοῖ is used with the same meaning in the *Theol. Arithm.* p. 58 Ast: καλεῖται δὲ αὐτὴ (sc. ἐννεάς) τελεσφόρος, τελειοῖ δὲ τὰ ἐννεάμηνα.

[4] See Plutarch περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας 10. 1017 C and the references in Schneider.

[5] 30 B: cf. 30 D, 32 D, 34 A, 34 B (εὐδαίμονα θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐγεννήσατο) and 37 C.

[6] *Tim.* 28 B γέγονεν· ὁρατὸς γὰρ ἁπτός τε ἔστι καὶ σῶμα ἔχων, πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰσθητά, τὰ δ' αἰσθητά, δόξῃ περιληπτὰ μετ' αἰσθήσεως, γιγνόμενα καὶ γεννητὰ ἐφάνη. Whether these words are to be taken in their literal meaning or not, it will be allowed that if Plato can call the world γεννητόν in the *Timaeus*, he may do so with equal justice in the *Republic*.

[7] In the Orphic verses this identical metaphor is found: see Procl. *in Tim.* 94 B πάντα γὰρ ἐν Ζηνὸς μεγάλου τάδε δώματι κεῖται καὶ Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σύν ῥα πεφύκει and 95 E τοὔνεκα σὺν τῷ παντὶ Διὸς πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη | αἰθέρος εὐρείης ἠδ' οὐρανοῦ ἀγλαὸν ὕψος κτλ. It is well known that there is a large element of Orphic belief embodied in Pythagoreanism; and if these verses are early or embody an early tradition, the figure which Plato here employs may itself be taken from Pythagorean sources.

§ 4. *The περίοδος of the ἀνθρώπειον γεννητόν.*

The general statement, with which we started, that every living thing has a fixed period of gestation, has now at last been narrowed down to man. The period of gestation for a human creature, says Plato, is the 'first number in which root and square increasings, comprehending three distances and four limits, of elements which make like and unlike and wax and wane, render all things conversable and rational towards one another.'

The arithmetical meaning of this sentence, as we have seen, is $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$, the numbers 3, 4, and 5 denoting the sides of the Pythagorean triangle. In order to apprehend its real significance, it will be necessary to say something about (1) the numbers 3, 4, and 5, (2) the expression *αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι*, and (3) the whole number 216 together with *πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν*.

As regards the numbers 3, 4, and 5, I have already alluded to the evidence which there is for holding that Plato made use of the Pythagorean triangle throughout the Number. The oldest testimony, as we shall see in Part iii, is that of Aristotle, and practically all the ancient commentators, as appears from Proclus (l.c. II pp. 22 ff.), made the figure in question the starting-point of nearly all their investigations on the subject. That the properties of this triangle were employed by the Pythagoreans to explain and enforce their embryological theories, is also attested from many sources, such as Aristides Quintilianus III 151 ff. Meibom = 89 ff. Jahn, Proclus l. c. p. 26 *ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ τριγώνου τούτου δείκνυσιν Πυθαγόρας τὰς τῶν ἑπταμήνων καὶ ἐννεαμήνων εὐγονίας καὶ τὰς τῶν ὀκταμήνων πηρώσεις*, Nicomachus *Excerpt. ex Nicom.* in von Jan's *Mus. Scr. Gr.* pp. 278 f., *Theol. Ar.* p. 40 Ast, and Censorinus *de die Nat.* 11 (redeo ad propositum, ut doceam quid Pythagoras de numero dierum ad partus pertinentium senserit etc. The authority followed by Censorinus throughout this chapter, and indeed throughout the whole of chapters 4—15, is Varro, as Diels has shewn *Dox. Gr.* pp. 186 ff.). Compare also Plut. *περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας* 12. 1018 B and Diog. Laert. VIII 29. The most exact parallel to the calculation adopted by Plato is found in the passage already quoted from Aristides l. c. p. 89 Jahn: *ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τῶν πλευρῶν ἑκάστην κατὰ βάθος αὐξήσαιμεν (βάθος γὰρ ἡ σώματος φύσις), ποιήσαιμεν ἂν τὸν διακόσια δεκαέξ, ἰσάριθμον ὄντα σύνεγγυς τῷ τῶν ἑπταμήνων*. We may therefore, I think, regard it as certain that Plato is closely following the Pythagoreans when he expresses the period of human gestation in terms of their favourite triangle. In what sense are the numbers 3, 4, 5 said 'to make like and unlike and wax and wane'? As the numbers in question produce not only the number 216, but also the *γεωμετρικὸς ἀριθμός* 12,960,000, we shall be in a better position for dealing with this question after we have interpreted the meaning of the larger as well as of the smaller number. This subject is accordingly reserved for § 5.

The phraseology of *αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, τρεῖς*

ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι is in all probability borrowed from Pythagorean sources. We have already seen that the use of the word 'increase' in this connexion agrees with Pythagorean principles (Part i § 2), and our authorities for the meaning of τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους were to a considerable extent writers with a Pythagorean bias (Part i § 1). See also Arist. *de caelo* A 1. 268ª 7 ff. μεγέθους δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐφ' ἓν γραμμή, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ δύο ἐπίπεδον, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τρία σῶμα—καθάπερ γάρ φασι καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶν ὥρισται. It is however impossible to believe that so long and cumbrous an expression was even in Plato's time a regular phrase for cubing. The word κυβικός occurs both in Plato (*Tim.* 55 C, D) and in Aristotle (*Probl.* XV 3. 910ᵇ 36), and although κύβων αὔξην in VII 528 B has a different meaning, we may reasonably suppose that αὐξήσεις κυβικαί would have conveyed the meaning of 'cubic increases' or 'cubings' to Plato's contemporaries as well as to a later generation (cf. κυβικὴν αὔξησιν *Excerpt. ex Nicom.* p. 279). Why then did not Plato employ that or some other equally simple phrase? The answer is that the words selected by Plato are intended to have a significance of their own, in addition to the arithmetical process of cubing which they describe. We are dealing with the formation of a human child, and, as Aristides reminds us, βάθος ἡ σώματος φύσις. By expressing the process involved as 'root and square increasings,' Plato intended to remind us that the human, like every other solid body, is built up from the line, which makes ἐπιφάνεια as ἐπιφάνεια makes σῶμα (Theo p. 83). The same desire to adumbrate a theory of the different stages in the growth of the ἀνθρώπειον γεννητόν is apparent also in τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους, wherein, as we have seen, the allusion is to μῆκος, πλάτος, and βάθος, with the four limits which they imply; and a similar tendency makes itself felt in a noteworthy passage of the *Laws*, where it is easy to detect Pythagorean inspiration: γίγνεται δὴ πάντων γένεσις, ἡνίκ' ἂν τί πάθος ᾖ; δῆλον ὡς ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὔξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθῃ μετάβασιν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αἰσθησιν σχῇ τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις (*Laws* 894 A)[1]. We may even go a step further, though Plato does not here invite us to do so, and say that the substance or οὐσία of which the three ἀποστάσεις viz. μῆκος, πλάτος, and βάθος consist, is τὸ ἄπειρον: and the ὅροι which limit and determine them belong to the category of πέρας[2]: so that the ἀνθρώπειον γεννητόν, like everything else in the universe[3], is a compound of πέρας and ἄπειρον[4].

[1] It should be mentioned that Proclus finds a further astrological meaning in δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, interpreting δυνάμεναι of the stars that prevail, and δυναστευόμεναι of the stars which are prevailed against, ἐν ταῖς σπορίμαις ὥραις (l.c. II p. 57). To ὁμοιούντων, ἀνομοιούντων, αὐξόντων and φθινόντων Proclus also attributes an astrological as well as an arithmetical connotation (ib. pp. 57 ff.), but it is most unlikely that these words meant anything of the sort in Plato's time. Cf. Thompson on *Phaedr.* 252 E and Pauly-Wissowa art. *Astrologie* pp. 1810 f.

[2] Arist. *Met.* N 3. 1091ª 15 ff. φανερῶς γὰρ λέγουσιν (sc. Πυθαγόρειοι) ὡς τοῦ ἑνὸς συσταθέντος — εὐθὺς τὰ ἐγγιστα τοῦ ἀπείρου ὅτι εἵλκετο καὶ ἐπεραίνετο ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος.

[3] Philol. *Fr.* 3 Mullach ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὅ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόχθη. Cf. Arist. *Met.* A 5. 986ª 15 ff.

[4] Cf. *Phil.* 27 B πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν

Let us now briefly discuss the number 216.

The number 216 is the first number (*ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ* κτλ.) in which the cubes of 3, 4, 5 occur, and was known to the Pythagoreans as the *ψυχογονικὸς κύβος* (Anatolius in *Theol. Ar.* p. 40), because it expresses the period of the seven months' child, counted in days. It is also the cube of the number 6, which the Pythagoreans called the marriage number[1], owing, as we are told, to the fact that 6 represents the union of the first male number 3 and the first female number 2 ($3 \times 2 = 6$). In other respects also the number 216 maintains its character as a matrimonial and generative force: for it is the cube of the area of the zoogonic triangle and the product of the cubes of the first male and female numbers ($(2^3 \times 3^3 = 216)$[2]. 216 can likewise be produced by multiplying together the marriage number 6 and 36, and 36 is not only the sum of the Pythagorean *τετρακτύς* (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8), but an *ἀριθμὸς τέλειος καὶ τοῦ ὀρθογωνίου ἔχων τὴν αὔξησιν*[3], and also peculiarly important in the growth of the embryo, as will presently be shewn, both on other grounds and because it is the number of the *δεκανοί*[4]. Any one who cares to examine the writings of later Pythagoreanism will discover many other virtues in the number 216: but enough has been said to shew that the number was suited to express the meaning which is here attached to it, that is to say the number of the seven months' child. I will only add, in conclusion, that the number of the *ἐννεάμηνον γεννητόν* was itself also connected with the smaller number by adding thereto the product of the sides of the triangle: *πάλιν δὲ τὰς τρεῖς ἐπ' ἀλλήλους κατὰ βάθος ποιήσαντες, καὶ τῷ προειρημένῳ προσθέντες, τὸν τῶν ἐννεαμήνων συντίθεμεν διακόσια ἑβδομήκοντα ἕξ* (Arist. Quint. p. 89 Jahn. $3 \times 4 \times 5 + 216 = 276$. As 210 and 270 were usually held to express the exact numbers of the two periods, Aristides adds *ἐν ἀμφοτέροις δὲ ὁ ἑξ περιττεύει, γαμικὸς ὢν δι' ἣν εἴπομεν αἰτίαν* viz. because *συντιθέμενος ἐκ πρώτου περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου*: see p. 73 ed. Jahn)[5].

We have still to discuss *πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν*. It is curious that these words find an echo in a fragment attributed to Philolaus[6] on the virtue of the number 10. The resemblance may be interpreted as an indication either of the spurious or of the genuine character of the fragments of Philolaus, but I am inclined to think that it is in favour of the authenticity, if not the genuineness, of

ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτην καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν and other passages to the same effect in that dialogue.

[1] Iambl. *in Nic. Introd. Ar.* p. 34. 19 ff. Pistelli, and many other passages, some of which have already been cited.

[2] Cf. Macrob. *Somn. Scip.* I 6. 15 f.

[3] *Excerpt. ex Nicom.* p. 279 von Jan.

[4] Proclus l.c. II pp. 44 f., 56 ff. et al. Cf. Aristid. Quint. p. 90 Jahn, Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* I § 470 ff., Sext. Emp. *adv. Astrolog.* pp. 728 ff. and August. *de civ. Dei* V cc. 1—7, and see also Cantor *Gesch. d. Math.* p. 86, and Sir G. C. Lewis *Ancient Astronomy* pp. 306 ff.

[5] Ancient authorities were not agreed "quoto post conceptionem mense infantes edi soleant" (Censor. *de die nat.* 7. 2). The different views are given by Censorinus l.c., following Varro: cf. also Gellius *Noct. Att.* III 16, Proclus l.c. II pp. 33 ff., and Diels *Dox. Gr.* pp. 427—429.

[6] Mullach II p. 4 *νῦν δὲ οὗτος* (sc. *ἀριθμός*) *ποτὰν ψυχὰν ἁρμόζων αἰσθήσει πάντα γνωστὰ καὶ ποτάγορα ἀλλήλοις κατὰ γνώμονος φύσιν ἀπεργάζεται.*

this particular fragment, for it is not unlikely that in a passage so full as this is of Pythagorean influence there should be some verbal indications of the source whence Plato drew something of his inspiration. However this may be, we are told by Censorinus[1], whose authority, as we have already seen, is Varro, that the Pythagoreans thought the development of the embryo proceeded according to the proportions of the harmony or octave: eos vero numeros, qui in uno quoque partu aliquid adferunt mutationis, dum aut semen in sanguinem aut sanguis in carnem aut caro in hominis figuram convertitur, inter se conlatos rationem habere eam quam voces habent quae in musica *σύμφωνοι* vocantur. How they worked the idea will appear from these words[2]: quorum prior ac minor (sc. partus, i.e. the seven months' child, to which they usually assigned a life of 210 days within the womb) senario maxime continetur numero. Nam quod ex semine conceptum est, sex, ut ait (sc. Pythagoras), primis diebus umor est lacteus, deinde proximis octo sanguineus: qui octo cum ad primos sex accesserunt, faciunt primam symphoniam *διὰ τεσσάρων*. (That is, the fourth, which is 8 : 6 or 4 : 3.) Tertio gradu novem dies accedunt iam carnem facientes: hi cum sex illis primis collati sescuplam faciunt rationem et secundam symphoniam *διὰ πέντε*. (That is, the fifth, which is 9 : 6 or 3 : 2.) Tum deinceps sequentibus duodecim diebus fit corpus iam formatum: horum quoque ad eosdem sex collatio tertiam *διὰ πασῶν* reddit symphoniam duplici rationi subiectam. (That is, the octave, which is 12 : 6 or 2 : 1.) Now $6+8+9+12=35$, and as 35 is a *ἁρμονία*[3], 210, which is 6×35, contains 6 *ἁρμονίαι*. Plato's number is not 210, but 216: but in 216 all these *ἁρμονίαι* are also present, together with the marriage number 6. The statements of Censorinus are confirmed by other authorities, among whom we may cite Plut. *περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ κτλ.* 12. 1017 F, Arist. Quint. p. 85 Jahn, Proclus l.c. II pp. 34 f. and Nicomachus *Excerpt. ex Nic.* p. 279 von Jan[4]. If we search the works of Plato to discover how he himself conceived of the 'harmony' in the development of the child, our quest will be in vain, but it is worthy of remark that the making of Soul in the *Timaeus* proceeds according to the proportions of the octave[5], and that the Universe is constituted, as Plato thought, in the

[1] l.c. 9 *ad fin.*

[2] l.c. 11.

[3] Plut. *περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας* 12. 1017 F.

[4] It should also be mentioned that Empedocles thought the *διάρθρωσις* began on the thirty-sixth day from conception. For the views of ancient philosophers on embryology in general see Diels *Dox. Gr.* pp. 417—433. I may here add that Aristides l.c. gives a few fresh points. He tells us that the sum of 1, 2, 3, 4 (in which are involved the *ἴσος*, *διπλασίων*, *ἡμιόλιος*, and *ἐπίτριτος* ratios) added to 35, yields 45, *καθ' ὃν φασι μορφοῦσθαι τὰ ἐννεάμηνα*: and $45\times6=270$, which is the number of a nine months' child. It is also important for our purpose when in speaking of the Pythagorean triangle he notices (p. 89) that the sum of the sides 3 and $4=7$ (the *περίοδος*, in months, of the *ἑπτάμηνος*), of 4 and $5=9$, of 3, 4, and $5=12$ (the number of signs in the zodiac), and that (as we have already noted) the sum of the cubes of the sides $=216$, and $216+(3\times4\times5)=276$, which is about the period of the nine months' child.

[5] *Tim.* 35 B. In the *Timaeus* 44 D ff. the creation of man's body by the created gods is described. It is reasonable to suppose that the embryo was thought by Plato to develop on the same lines as

same way[1]. There can be little doubt that if he speculated on the subject at all, he followed in the path already marked out by the Pythagoreans, framing the Microcosm, as his manner is, on the lines of the Macrocosm.

§ 5. *The meaning of the words from* ὧν ἐπίτριτος *to* κύβων τριάδος.

The chief question which requires to be discussed in this section is 'What does Plato mean by the two harmonies?' So far as I can see, he does not, in this passage, inform us, and we are therefore justified in trying to discover his meaning from other passages in his works.

From the *Republic* itself we obtain little assistance: but I think that the myth of the *Politicus* (*Pol.* 268 E—274 E) furnishes us with the right solution.

It will be advisable to begin by giving a succinct analysis of the story itself.

At one time, says Plato[2], God himself accompanies and helps to wheel the revolving world, at another, when the times are fulfilled, he lets it go, and the Universe begins to roll back again spontaneously, ζῷον ὂν καὶ φρόνησιν εἰληχὸς ἐκ τοῦ συναρμόσαντος κατ' ἀρχάς. The reason for the reversal of the world's motion is that the Universe, since it partakes in body, is not exempt from change, but being more nearly so than is aught else corporeal, τὴν ἀνακύκλησιν εἴληχεν, ὅ τι σμικροτάτην τῆς αὑτοῦ κινήσεως παράλλαξιν. Thus Plato declares that the Universe ποτὲ μὲν ὑπ' ἄλλης συμποδηγεῖσθαι θείας αἰτίας, τὸ ζῆν πάλιν ἐπικτώμενον καὶ λαμβάνοντα ἀθανασίαν ἐπισκευαστὴν παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, ποτὲ δ' ὅταν ἀνεθῇ, δι' ἑαυτοῦ αὐτὸν ἰέναι, ἀφεθέντα τοιοῦτον ὥστε ἀνάπαλιν πορεύεσθαι πολλὰς περιόδων μυριάδας[3]. At present the universe is *rolling back* (ἀνακύκλησις): in the reign of Cronus it *rolled forward*[4]. The end of the backward is the beginning of the forward movement, and when the forward ends, the backward begins. The change from either movement to the other, says Plato, ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ τῶν περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν γιγνομένων τροπῶν πασῶν εἶναι μεγίστην καὶ τελεωτάτην τροπήν, and this τελεωτάτη τροπή is marked by wide-spread destruction among animals and men.

When the backward movement ends, and the forward begins, a few men are left surviving, and these suffer change in sympathy with the whole. The old grow middle-aged and young again till at last they dwindle to a point and disappear: fresh generations are born, not from one another, but from the earth: for those that died in the former cycle and were buried within the earth now rise again from the dead and in

those on which the gods first made the human body, and a minute study of the *Timaeus* from this point of view might possibly yield one or two interesting results. In *Tim.* 91 D Plato sums up the development of the embryo in the words μέχρι περ ἂν—ὡς εἰς ἄρουραν τὴν μήτραν ἀόρατα ὑπὸ σμικρότητος καὶ ἀδιάπλαστα ζῷα κατασπείραντες καὶ πάλιν διακρίναντες μεγάλα ἐντὸς ἐκθρέψωνται καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς φῶς ἀγαγόντες ζῴων ἀποτελέσωσι γένεσιν.

[1] *Rep.* X 617.
[2] *Pol.* 269 C ff.
[3] 270 A.
[4] 271 D, 269 A.

their turn are born old, grow young, and vanish, ὅσους μὴ θεὸς αὐτῶν εἰς ἄλλην μοῖραν ἐκόμισεν. In those days, when God ruled the rolling world, and divine shepherds kept their flocks, no creature preyed on any other, nor was there any war or strife. God was himself the shepherd of the earth-born: they had no πολιτεῖαι nor κτήσεις γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων, being born by resurrection from the ground. The earth, their mother, fed them with abundant fruits, and they toiled not, neither did they spin. Whether they were happier than we depends entirely on whether they used their manifold advantages as means to help them to attain unto wisdom: tradition says they did not.

When the forward movement ended, and μεταβολὴν ἔδει γίγνεσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ γῆϊνον ἤδη πᾶν ἀνήλωτο γένος, πάσας ἑκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς γενέσεις ἀποδεδωκυίας, then the pilot of the Universe οἷον παιδαλίων οἴακος ἀφέμενος εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπὴν ἀπέστη. Thereupon began the backward movement. At first there was σεισμός within the world, attended by destruction among all kinds of living things. The few who survive, ceasing to become young, grow old, while those just born from the earth with hoary hair die and return to the earth from which they came. Fresh generations are no longer born from the earth, but even as the world is now left to itself, so also are all its parts, and each race breeds offspring from its kind[1]. After the shock of turning, προελθόντος ἱκανοῦ χρόνου, θορύβων τε καὶ ταραχῆς ἤδη παυόμενος καὶ τῶν σεισμῶν, γαλήνης ἐπιλαβόμενος εἰς τε τὸν εἰωθότα δρόμον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κατακοσμούμενος ἦει, ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ κράτος ἔχων αὐτὸς τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἀπομνημονεύων διδαχὴν εἰς δύναμιν[2]. Gradually the Universe became less and less accurate in its movements: τούτων δὲ αὖτῷ τὸ σωματοειδὲς τῆς συγκράσεως αἴτιον, τὸ τῆς πάλαι ποτὲ φύσεως ξύντροφον, ὅτι πολλῆς ἦν μετέχον ἀταξίας πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κόσμον ἀφικέσθαι[3]: it is ἡ ἔμπροσθεν ἕξις to which is due ὅσα χαλεπὰ καὶ ἄδικα ἐν οὐρανῷ γίγνεται. As time rolls on, the disorganization increases more and more until the world is at last in danger of perishing with all that it contains. Thereupon God, careful lest his Universe should vanish εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα τόπον, takes the helm again, and reversing the motion of the world, ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν καὶ ἀγήρων ἀπεργάζεται[4].

It would be an interesting enquiry to investigate the sources from which Plato drew the materials for this myth. That it embodies many echoes of the early cosmogonies, there can be no doubt. As I have elsewhere pointed out[5], an essential feature of the story is already involved in two lines of Hesiod, who, in speaking of the end of the fifth or iron age in which we live, observes

> Ζεὺς δ' ὀλέσει καὶ τοῦτο γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων,
> εὖτ' ἂν γεινόμενοι πολιοκρόταφοι τελέθωσιν[6].

[1] 273 E ff.
[2] 273 A—B.
[3] 273 B.
[4] 273 E.
[5] *Cl. Rev.* V p. 445.
[6] *Works and Days* 180 f. See also Heraclitus *Frag.* 78 Bywater φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος ταῦτ' εἶναι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός, καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα

Hesiod means that the iron age will end, and consequently a new, and presumably happier, era begin, when men are born grey-haired. We may perhaps regard the grey hairs as a sign that the time is at hand when human creatures, as in Plato's myth, will all be born with grey hairs (πολιὰ φύντα *Pol.* 273 E) and pass from age to infancy and fade away[1]. It is tolerably clear that there was a tradition according to which old or grey-haired children were considered to be a sign of the end: for in the Testament cited by James in his account of the Revelation of St Peter[2], we are warned that when the end is near there shall be 'children whose appearance shall be as of those advanced in years: for they that are born shall be white-haired[3].' But for our present purpose the details of the myth are of less importance and value than the underlying idea of the whole. That idea is that in the life of the Universe there are two recurrent cycles, in one of which peace and uniformity prevail, while in the other discord and dissimilarity gradually assert their sway[4]. It is also, I think, clear that the two cycles are of equal length, for the march of the Universe being regarded as progression and retrogression along one

ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κἀκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα. The last four words mean that τεθνηκός changes to ζῶν, καθεῦδον to ἐγρηγορός, and γηραιόν to νέον as well as reversely: so that the essence of Plato's story would seem to be present here also, if we are to understand the participle μεταπεσόντα in its full and proper sense. In the happy land of the Meropes, hard by the river of Pleasure, there are some fabled trees, of whose fruit he that tastes γίνεται κατὰ βραχὺ νεώτερος, τὸ μὲν γὰρ γῆρας ἀπορρίψας, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν ὑποστρέφει, εἶτα ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν μειρακίων ἡλικίαν ἀναχωρεῖ, εἶτα παῖς γίνεται, εἶτα βρέφος, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐξαναλώθη (Theopompus *Fr.* 76, Müller *F. H. G.* I p. 290). A careful study of Empedocles' cosmology will also discover some interesting analogies with the myth of the *Politicus*.

[1] In Hesiod's description of the golden age, the return of which he seems to hope for after the age of iron has passed away, there are some features which resemble the life of Plato's γηγενεῖς: see especially *Works and Days* 109 ff. The curious expression of Hesiod αἰεὶ δὲ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὁμοίοι perhaps receives some light from *Symp.* 189 E, and we should remember that ὁμοιότης is the dominant feature in the progressive cycle of the *Politicus*. It is worth while to compare the whole of the Aristophanic travesty in Plato's *Symposium* with the myth of the *Politicus*, and the latter with Hesiod l.c.

[2] p. 57.

[3] Professor Ridgeway (*Early Age of Greece* I p. 628) interprets πολιοκρόταφοι in Hesiod l.c. as 'fair-haired' and thinks the line εὖτ' ἂν γεινόμενοι πολιοκρόταφοι τελέθωσιν "some sort of oracular utterance referring to fair-haired invaders of some Teutonic stock," remarking that, according to Hesiod, the children of the Iron Age 'are born with white hair.' The exact translation is however 'when they are hoary-headed at their birth,' and it is quite clear from Ζεὺς δ' ὀλέσει καὶ τοῦτο γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων εὖτ' ἂν κτλ. that the white hairs foreshadow the *end* of the Iron Age: so that we should look for parallels to the Hesiodic conception in passages which, like the myth of the *Politicus*, describe the end of one epoch and the beginning of the next, and not to Diod. Sic. v 32. 2. Plato's πολιὰ φύντα (*Pol.* 273 E) is an exact parallel to γεινόμενοι πολιοκρόταφοι, and the rest of the Platonic myth shews us how we ought to interpret the words of Hesiod.

[4] The student of ancient philosophy will naturally recall the cosmological periods of Empedocles: but it would lead us too far to institute a comparison between them and Plato's story. I may say, however, that the myth appears to me to confirm the view of Burnet, who maintains that we are now living in the second of Empedocles' periods, that is, "in the period when strife is gradually gaining the upper hand" (*Early Gk Phil.* p. 249). The fundamental difference between Plato and Empedocles is that in Plato Strife never obtains the victory altogether, for as soon as the Universe is in serious danger, the Deity steps in.

and the same circle, the forward revolution has to traverse the same space as the reverse, and nothing is said of any difference in the speed of the two revolutions[1]. That the cycles occupy a long period of time may be inferred from πολλὰς περιόδων μυριάδας in 270 A.

Now what do these two cycles represent? If we are to believe Deuschle[2], one of them is 'the transcendent realm of Ideas,' the other 'the world of appearances,' and the myth is intended to shew us 'the relations existing between the world of Ideas and that of phenomena, and the dependence of the latter on the former.' It is surely unnecessary to refute a view which requires us to assign a metaphysical significance to the γηγενεῖς. Deuschle's interpretation belongs to a style of criticism which always makes Plato sing the same old strain, forgetting that his was a παναρμόνιος ψυχή[3]. To my mind it is quite clear that in the myth of the *Politicus*, we have before us an astronomical, and not a metaphysical conception. The prelude to the story indicates in what direction we should look for its significance: ἦν τοίνυν καὶ ἔτι ἔσται τῶν πάλαι λεχθέντων πολλά τε ἄλλα καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἀτρέως τε καὶ Θυέστου λεχθεῖσαν ἔριν φάσμα—τὸ περὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς δύσεώς τε καὶ ἀνατολῆς ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, ὡς ἄρα ὅθεν μὲν ἀνατέλλει νῦν, εἰς τοῦτον τότε τὸν τόπον ἐδύετο, ἀνέτελλε δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τότε δὲ δὴ μαρτυρήσας ἄρα ὁ θεὸς Ἀτρεῖ μετέβαλεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τὸ νῦν σχῆμα (268 E f.): and Plato himself tells us that the myth will explain this astronomical revolution as well as other stories of a far distant past (269 B)[4].

The only possible explanation of the two cycles is that each of them represents a Great Year. The τροπή which ends one cycle and begins another is said by Plato to be τροπῶν πασῶν—μεγίστη καὶ τελεωτάτη τροπή, and the number of the period which culminates in such a τελεωτάτη τροπή is a τέλειος ἀριθμός in precisely the same sense as the number of the Great Year (*Tim.* 39 D), that is to say, it is a 'final' or 'consummating' number, and ends an epoch in the life of the world. But we must beware of supposing, as I formerly did, that the Great Year which is symbolized by the forward movement expresses the period during which the world is made, or that the world is dissolved when the ἀνακύκλησις ends: for it is clear from 273 B, C that the creation of the world is prior to both movements, and 273 D shews that the κόσμος, though it may be storm-tossed (χειμασθείς), is never actually wrecked.

The next step in our argument is to connect the two 'harmonies' of the *Republic* with the two cycles of the *Politicus*.

[1] In 271 A we find περιφορά applied to the forward movement: and in 273 E περίοδος is said of the backward. The life of the Universe is thus pictured as the revolution of a single circle. The plural περίοδοι in 269 C and in 270 A refers to the revolutions of the world on its own axis, and not to the two cycles which Plato describes.

[2] *Der Plat. Politikos* pp. 6 ff.

[3] δύο γὰρ αὗται ψυχαὶ λέγονται γενέσθαι παναρμόνιοι Olymp. *Vit. Pl.* 6. The reference is to Homer and Plato.

[4] The legend about an ἀνακύκλησις of the sun in the time of Atreus is mentioned also by Euripides *Orest.* 1001 ff. and *El.* 726 ff.; and from the second of these passages we can see that the story was by some interpreted as the mythical expression of a permanent change in the movement of the heavens. Cf. also the well-known story of the Egyptian priests in Hdt. II 142 and see Sir G. C. Lewis *Ancient Astronomy* pp. 69, 133.

We note, in the first place, that the harmonies are equal to one another, and that they are of vast extent (12,960,000 days). In like manner, the two cycles in the myth are of the same duration and occupy πολλὰς περιόδων μυριάδας[1] (*Pol.* 270 A). Secondly, during the progressive movement which precedes our era, the dominant features are concord and harmony—in one word ὁμοιότης: during the second, under which we live, strife and discord, or in one word ἀνομοιότης, prevail (*Pol.* 273 A—D). Now the first of the two harmonies, which I take to represent the progressive cycle, is ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις, i.e. as we have seen 3600[2]; whereas the second is προμήκης or oblong, the product of two unequal numbers viz. 4800 × 2700: and the Pythagoreans were in the habit of calling square numbers ὅμοιοι, and oblong numbers ἀνόμοιοι: see Iambl. *in Nic.* p. 82 Pistelli οἱ δὲ παλαιοὶ ταὐτούς τε καὶ ὁμοίους (sc. τοὺς τετραγώνους) ἐκάλουν διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰς πλευράς τε καὶ γωνίας ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἰσότητα, ἀνομοίους δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ θατέρους τοὺς ἑτερομήκεις[2]. It may also be observed that the harmonies, viewed by themselves, in the connexion where they occur, clearly denote some vast periodic cycles, and none of the cycles recognized in antiquity is so large as 12,960,000 days except the Great Year. That Plato should pass from describing the period of gestation in the human race to an account of the Great Year is natural enough: and the arrangement is the same in Censorinus' *de die natali* (cc. 5—19), the whole of which, according to Diels[3], is taken from Varro. In conclusion I may note that Aristotle himself appears to have connected the Platonic number with the myth of the *Politicus*, and that at all events he regarded the Number as expressing a certain cycle, at the end of which there is a change: see Part iii. My conclusion therefore is that the harmony 3600[2] measures the cycle of Uniformity, and the harmony 4800 × 2700 the cycle of Dissimilarity described in the *Politicus*.

Let us now see how Plato builds up the two numbers. Each of the two numbers is constructed out of the sides of the Pythagorean triangle 3, 4, 5: for each of them is only $(3 \times 4 \times 5)^4$. We have already met with the triangle as a zoogonic agency, and here it establishes its claim to the title κοσμικόν, by which, as we are told by Proclus[4], it was known to

[1] In *Tim.* 39 D it is said that the Great Year is measured τῷ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἰόντος κύκλῳ, that is to say, 'by the number of days and nights' it contains, as Mr Archer-Hind points out. Now περιόδων here means the diurnal revolutions of the heavens, which make days and nights; and the 'harmonies' of the *Republic* are also expressed in days, so that both in the *Politicus* and in the *Republic* Plato employs the unit of measurement which the *Timaeus* prescribes in the formal definition of the Great Year.

[2] It should be mentioned that Proclus also observes the prevalence of τὸ ὅμοιον in the first harmony, and τὸ ἀνόμοιον in the second: see Kroll's edition l.c. II pp. 52 ff. But when he proceeds to talk of the first harmony as the ὁδός from νοητόν to νοητόν, connected with angels *et hoc genus omne*, and designates the second as the ὁδός from γένεσις to γένεσις, guarded by 'the Ephors of Descent' (οἱ τῶν καθόδων ἔφοροι), and when he further canonizes Prometheus as the προστάτης of both because he stole the fire from Heaven, we can only regret that Plato should ever have been made the vehicle of such vagaries.

[3] *Dox. Gr.* p. 188.

[4] l.c. II p. 45. 23 εἰκότως ἄρα κοσμικὸν τρίγωνον εἰώθασιν τοῦτο καλεῖν οἵ τε ἄλλοι σοφοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ Αἰγυπτίων ἱστοροῦντες κτλ. Proclus expounds the appellation by shewing in some detail how the heavenly

some ancient thinkers, ὡς πάντων τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχον καὶ περιέχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ. The force of the words ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων can now be more readily apprehended than before. It has been pointed out in Part i § 1 that the arithmetical application of ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων in the Platonic Number is to the making of the like and unlike harmonies, that is, the square and the oblong: what is their philosophical application in this passage? It is that they are the makers of the like and unlike cycles in the world's history, the era in which concord and uniformity prevail, and that in which discord and dissimilarity gradually assert their sway. It will be remembered that we were able to interpret ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων as the numbers 3, 4 and 5 by means of the second part of the Platonic Number, viz. ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν κτλ.; and it is by means of the second part of the Number that we are able also to understand the suitability of these words to describe 3, 4 and 5 in the context where they occur. The period of the 'human creature' is fitly constructed out of the elements which build up the cycles of the 'divine creature': for man is the μικρός, and the Universe the μέγας κόσμος[1]. The words αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων 'waxing and waning' have also a reference to the two cosmic periods. We may regard the first of the circles as representing the αὔξησις or growth of the Whole, and the second as representing its φθίσις or decline. And if we make the numbers 3, 4 and 5 the cosmic ἀρχαί, and follow the method of Pythagorean physics, the αὔξησις or growth of the Universe is only the 'waxing' of these numbers on a large scale, its φθίσις only their 'decline.' The Universe renews its energy and strength because its elemental forces expand and grow: and when they begin to flag and fail, ἐπὶ διαφθορᾶς κίνδυνον αὐτοῦ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ (*Pol.* 273 D).

Such is the special applicability of ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων in connexion with the Platonic Number. But these words would have a still more comprehensive meaning in Pythagorean theory, and while we recognize their special fitness as a description of 3, 4 and 5 in the Platonic number, we are bound, I think, to suppose that Plato was conscious of their wider significance, and intended us to think of it too. According to Philolaus *Fr.* 3 Mullach ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐόντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ περαίνοντα ἢ ἄπειρα, ἢ περαίνοντά τε καὶ ἄπειρα, ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον οὔ κα εἴη: and as ὁμοιότης belongs to the category of πέρας, and ἀνομοιότης, ἀνωμαλία, ἀναρμοστία etc. to that of ἄπειρον[2], we may express what he means in other words by saying that everything in the Universe is either like or unlike, or both like and unlike. Philolaus continues ἐπεὶ

bodies and everything connected with them conform to this triangle and its manifold properties. However extravagant and absurd the particular fancies of Proclus and his authorities may be, the idea which underlies them is Platonic, viz. that τὰ οὐράνια are the expression in time and space of mathematical shapes and numbers: see App. I to Book VII.

[1] Cf. Arist. *Phys.* VIII 2. 252[b] 24 ff. εἰ δ' ἐν ζῴῳ τοῦτο δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, τί κωλύει τὸ αὐτὸ συμβῆναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν; εἰ γὰρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ γίνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ, and Zeller[3] II 2 p. 488, III 2 p. 397 with Stein's excursus on *Mikro- und Makrokosmos der Stoa* in his *Psychologie d. Stoa* I pp. 205—214.

[2] Cf. *Phil.* 16 C ff., 23 C ff., and *Pol.* 273 D τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα τόπον.

τοίνυν φαίνεται οὔτ' ἐκ περαινόντων πάντων ἐόντα οὔτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δῆλόν τ' ἄρα ὅτι ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὅ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόχθη. Thus the sides of the Pythagorean triangle, regarded as the universal ἀρχαί, the ἀρχαί not only of the whole, but of each of its parts, including the ἀνθρώπειον γεννητόν, may well be called in the words of Plato ὁμοιοῦντά τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦντα 'makers of like and unlike': for 'like and unlike' sums up the κόσμος and all within it. They wax when things are made and wane when things are unmade, rising from lines into planes, and from planes into solids, and afterwards fading from solids into planes, and from planes into lines again. This is in perfect harmony with the method of Pythagorean physics, in which, as we have seen already, the plane is made up of lines, and the solid of planes[1].

So much for the meaning of ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων. If we now proceed to scrutinize the two harmonies in detail, we shall find that many of the factors are full of significance.

We know from the *Laws*[2] that Plato counted 360 'days' in the year: the Great Year, which is 3600^2 or $(360 \times 10)^2 = 360^2 \times 10^2$ days[3], is therefore the square of the number of days in the ordinary year multiplied by the square of the Pythagorean perfect number 10. We are now able to express the period in years: it is $\frac{12960000}{360} = 36000$ *years*. Further, 3600^2 is $360^2 \times 100$. Now we know from the *Republic*[4] that Plato reckoned the duration of human life as 100 years, i.e. $100 \times 360 = 36000$ *days*. It follows that a day in the life of the ἀνθρώπειον γεννητόν corresponds to a year in an aeon of the θεῖον γεννητόν. Further, in arriving at the first harmony, Plato is careful, as we have seen, to direct our attention especially to the number 36: each side, he tells us, is so many times 100, i.e. 36 times 100. We have seen on p. 293 that 36 is an exceedingly significant number in many ways: but its special significance here may be that it suggests to us the reason why the number 12,960,000 is called a harmony. We have already found that the number 35 is a ἁρμονία because it contains all the proportions of a

[1] Cf. also *Tim.* 53 C—56 C, 81 C, D, 89 C. It will be observed that it is the inroads of ἀνομοιότης which lead to decay and dissolution in *Tim.* 81 C, D ὅταν δ' ἡ ῥίζα τῶν τριγώνων χαλᾷ διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς πολλὰ ἠγωνίσθαι, τὰ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς εἰσιόντα οὐκέτι δύναται τέμνειν εἰς ὁμοιότητα ἑαυτοῖς, αὐτὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπεισιόντων εὐπετῶς διαιρεῖται· φθίνει δὴ πᾶν ζῷον ἐν τούτῳ κρατούμενον, γῆρᾳς τε ὀνομάζεται τὸ πάθος. τέλος δέ, ἐπειδὰν τῶν περὶ τὸν μυελὸν τριγώνων οἱ ξυναρμοσθέντες μηκέτι ἀντέχωσι δεσμοὶ τῷ πόνῳ διιστάμενοι, μεθιᾶσι τοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς αὖ δεσμούς, ἡ δὲ λυθεῖσα κατὰ φύσιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐξέπτατο.

[2] VI 758 B. The number of Senators in the *Laws* is 360: these are to be divided into 12 sections of 30 each, and each section is to administer the State for one month. The number 60 with its multiples and divisors is the dominant number throughout the *Laws*. 360 'days' is of course only an ideal division of the year: see § 6. Plato elsewhere recognises (with Philolaus) $364\frac{1}{4}$ days (*Rep.* IX 587 E, where see note).

[3] See note 1 on p. 299.

[4] X 615 B, where see note. Sir James Crichton-Browne in an address on old age (see the *Times* of Oct. 2, 1891), said that "he thought it a good working hypothesis that the natural life of man was 100, and that in so far as it fell short of that, it was 'curtailed of fair proportion.' He would especially exhort medical students to start with a resolution that they would not be content with a duration of life shorter than that either for themselves or for their patients."

ἁρμονία or scale. Now in 36 we have a harmony plus 1, which is ἡ πάντων ἀρχή (*Excerpt. ex Nicom.* p. 279 von Jan): so that the Number of the Great Year contains $\frac{12960000}{36} = 360{,}000$ ἁρμονίαι, plus 360,000 units, each harmony having the ἡ πάντων ἀρχή added to it. In like manner the number 216 contained 6 ἁρμονίαι together with 6 units: so that the larger number is called a harmony for the same reason as the smaller number 216 was said to render πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα. The analogy between the Microcosm and the Macrocosm could not be more faithfully observed. In the second harmony the number 100 is still predominant. It is 'of 100 squares of the rational diameter of 5, minus one each, and of 100 cubes of 3.' Now

$$4800 \times 2700 = (480 \times 10) \times (270 \times 10) = (480 \times 270) \times 10^2.$$

(Just so the first harmony is $360^2 \times 10^2$.) 270 is the Pythagorean period of gestation for a nine months' child, and 480, which = 210 + 270, is the sum of the usually recognised periods of gestation for children born after seven and after nine months[1]. The Great Year of the Universe may therefore be denoted by a rectangle whose sides are respectively the longer period and the sum of the longer and shorter periods of gestation in the race of man, after it has been multiplied by the square of the Pythagorean perfect number 10. As the Universe is a 'magnus homo,' and man a 'brevis mundus[2],' these and similar analogies may well have seemed significant to the Pythagoreans, whom Plato is certainly copying here.

§ 6. *The number* 36000.

We have thus seen that the harmonies represent two recurrent aeons in the life of the Universe, in which the World waxes and wanes alternately. Before we proceed to discuss ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός, τοιούτου κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων, let us briefly explain the system upon which Plato's reckoning is based.

The number 36000 rests upon the Babylonian sexagesimal system[3], which made 60 the unit, and multiplied it by the factors of itself. This mode of reckoning, which to the present day divides our hour into 60 minutes, and our minute into 60 seconds, was widely spread in very early times, and there are traces of it as far west as Italy. It survived in the Latin use of *sescenti* for an indefinitely large number, and in the period of 6000 years, which was the duration of a dynasty of Etruscan gods. Among the Greeks we find traces of the sexagesimal system as a measure of time as early as Hesiod[4]

[1] Arist. Quint. l.c. Cf. also *Theolog. Arith.*, p. 40 Ast, Cens. 11 and Macrob. *Somn. Scip.* 1 6. 15—16. Tannery (*Rev. Phil.* 1 p. 179 note) also supposes that in 2700 there is a reference to the nine months' gestation.

[2] Macrob. *Somn. Scip.* II 12. 11. The same expression is used by Philo: see Zeller[3] III 2, p. 397.

[3] Full information on this system will be found in Brandis, *Das Münz- Mass- und Gewichtswesen in Vorderasien*, pp. 7—21, and in Cantor, *Gesch. der Math.*, pp. 67—94.

[4] *Works and Days* 562, 764 et al. It is of course obvious that there must even in Hesiod's time have been some way of making this division correspond with the

and Cleobulus[1], and Herodotus expressly tells us that the Greeks borrowed from the Babylonians the division of the day into 12 parts[2]. It is therefore unnecessary to suppose that Plato borrowed his reckoning directly from the Babylonians, even although, if Berosus may be trusted, 36000 years was actually the duration of a Babylonian cycle[3]. What it is of importance to note is, that the sexagesimal system was very commonly used in calculating long periods of time, from the notion that the year could be divided into 360 equal parts corresponding to the 360 degrees of the circle yearly traversed by the sun[4]. Thus among the Indians 360 years was 'a year of the gods,' 3600 a 'cycle of Bṛihaspati,' 216000 a 'cycle of Prajapati,' 4,320,000 an 'age of the gods,' and the 'kalpa' 1000 'ages of the gods' or one 'day of Brahma,' while twice this number, or 8,640,000,000 years, was 'a day and a night of Brahma[5].'

Let us now see how the number 36000 is connected with other Greek cycles.

It does not appear that Anaximander, Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, or Anaxagoras defined the period during which the world endures, although they held the Universe to be *φθαρτός*[6].

According to Stobaeus[7] the Great Year of Heraclitus was 18000 years, that is, one half of Plato's. Schuster's conjecture[8], that the time from one *ἐκπύρωσις* to another was reckoned by Heraclitus at 36000 years, 18000 being the *ὁδὸς κάτω*, and 18000 the *ὁδὸς ἄνω*, is in harmony with the tone of Heraclitus' philosophy, and brings Heraclitus very near to Plato[9], although no *ἐκπύρωσις* marked the end of Plato's year.

The nearest approach to the doctrine of a Great Year in Empedocles is the theory that the wicked *δαίμονες* are condemned 'to wander away

solar year. See Ideler, *Handbuch der Chronologie* I p. 257 ff., for more evidence on the subject.

[1] If the epigram quoted by Stob. I 240 is genuine.

[2] Hdt. II 109. It would appear that for astronomical purposes the Babylonians divided the day into 60 parts: see Cantor l.c. p. 82.

[3] I take this from Brandis, *Das Münzetc.*, p. 11. Compare Sir G. C. Lewis's *Ancient Astronomy*, pp. 400 ff. The Greek and Egyptian cycle of 36525 years (*ibid.* pp. 282, 389) is reached by a similar calculation, viz. by multiplying the number of days in the year (taken as $365\frac{1}{4}$) by 100. Lewis's excellent and learned work is a mine of information (see pp. 256 ff.) on the part played by the numbers 60 and 360 in the astronomical reckonings of the ancients.

[4] Martin, *Rev. Archéol.* XIII pp. 287 ff.

[5] Martin, l.c. p. 286. Martin interprets the verses of Hesiod beginning *ἐννέα τοι χύσει γενεὰς λακέρυζα κορώνη | ἀνδρῶν ἡβώντων* (Plut. *de def. Or.* 415 C) by taking 400 years as the life of the *κορώνη*, and thus assigns 43,200 (=3600 × 12) years to the phoenix, whose appearance was generally supposed to herald some kind of new era, and 432,000 years to the nymphs. 432,000 years was according to the Chaldaeans the period from the creation to the deluge.

[6] Stob. I 417: cf. Zeller[5] I pp. 231, 251, 271.

[7] I 264. Cens. 18. 11 assigns 10800 (=30 × 360) years to Heraclitus' cycle.

[8] Zeller[4] I p. 640 note 2.

[9] The *ὁδὸς κάτω* leads to the formation of the world, and the *ὁδὸς ἄνω* to its dissolution. It is the same way, now up, now down. Just so in the *Politicus* the *περίοδος* is the same, now forward, and now backward. Burnet's attempt to shew that Heraclitus did not believe in a periodical *ἐκπύρωσις* is, as he himself confesses, "in direct contradiction with the statements of most writers, ancient and modern," and appears to me unsuccessful (*Early Gk Phil.* pp. 160 ff.).

from the blessed for thrice ten thousand seasons[1].' Zeller rightly observes that this in no way determines the duration of the world, since the δαίμονες must have lived before the beginning of their wanderings and will live after they are done.

A comparison with the Great Year of Philolaus will not yield any satisfactory result, because, as we know from Censorinus[2], he counted $364\frac{1}{2}$ days in the year. We can only say that had he counted 360 days in the year, then, according to the method of reckoning which he employs, his great year would have been $59 \times 360 = 21240$ years, which is $\frac{59}{100}$ of Plato's cycle—and Philolaus (as well as Oenopides) recognised a smaller cycle of 59 years[3].

Aristotle is hostile to the idea of a Great Year, and the only passage which could possibly be otherwise construed is in the first book of the *Meteorologica* 14 p. 352^a 28 ff.[4]; but the most that can be made out of his words is an assertion of the periodical recurrence of partial floods.

Of later authorities, it is enough to mention the Stoics, whose great year was 365×18000 years, i.e. $\frac{365}{2}$ times the great year of Plato, and the astronomer Ptolemy, whose great cycle, like Plato's, was 36000 years[5].

It will be seen that the Great Year contained in Plato's Number was arrived at in the same way as that of many of the other Greek philosophers.

In conclusion, I may now be permitted to draw attention to the fact that the period of 36000 years is sometimes actually called the 'great Platonic year' in early astronomical treatises. In Barocius' *Cosmographia* 1 p. 6 (Venetiis, 1598) I find these words said of the movement of the ninth heaven: "qui profecto motus complet unam perfectam revolutionem spatio 36000 annorum iuxta Ptolemaei opinionem; iuxta autem Albategnii, spatio 23760 annorum; iuxta vero Alphonsi, et quorundam aliorum sententiam, 49000 annorum; *quod utique*" (i.e. whatever its duration is) "*temporis spatium vocant magnum Platonicum annum.*" Even more precise is the *Sphaera* of Johannes de Sacro-Bosco (ed. Burgersdicius, 1639) p. 12: "orbis nonus centenis quibusque annis juxta Ptolemaeum unum gradum proprio motu conficit, totamque periodum peragit *annis* 36000 (*quod spatium magnus annus appellari solet, aut annus Platonicus*), subiectasque sphaeras una secum circumducit." The work from which this sentence is quoted was a regular text-book of Astronomy till the Copernican theory prevailed over the Ptolemaic: and 36000 years could hardly have come to be called the *annus Platonicus* in a text-book of Ptolemaic Astronomy unless Ptolemy or some of his predecessors or commentators had understood the Platonic Number, for there is no other passage in Plato which gives the duration of the Great Year. We can even perhaps trace the knowledge of the Number as far back as Hipparchus. The precession of the Equinoxes, which is

[1] Mullach 1 p. 1: cf. Zeller[4] 1 p. 706.

[2] Ch. 19. See also Tannery *Rev. Phil.* XIII pp. 213 ff.

[3] Cens. 18. 8: cf. Stob. 1 264.

[4] This explains the remark of Censorinus in 18. 11, as Usener has pointed out (*Rhein. Mus.* XXVIII pp. 392 ff.).

[5] See Hultsch *Zeitschrift f. Math.* etc. l.c. p. 57.

in reality caused by the movement of the axis of the Earth round the pole of the Ecliptic, was—so we are told—discovered by Hipparchus, and the period of time during which the equinoctial points make a complete revolution was maintained by that astronomer to be 36000 years (Hultsch in Pauly-Wissowa art. *Astronomie* p. 1851). It is difficult to believe that Hipparchus was uninfluenced by Plato's number, if indeed the whole theory of a Great Year is not—as I am sometimes inclined to suspect that it is—connected with some pre-Hipparchian notions about the equinoctial *περίοδος*, the real extent of which is not 36000, but about 26700 years.

§ 7. *ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος—γενέσεων.*

'This whole number, a number measuring the earth, is lord of better and worse births.' The number 12,960,000 may fairly be called *γεωμετρικός* in the ordinary sense of the term, for it is arrived at by mathematical calculations, and expressed in two mathematical figures, the one an oblong, and the other a square. But what Plato chiefly means, as I believe, is that the number in question, since it expresses the duration of an aeon of the World, is *τῷ ὄντι γεω-μετρικός* (cf. *Rep.* VI 511 B *n.*), and measures a period in the lifetime of the Earth. Plato loves to play on the etymological meaning of words, as for example in VIII 555 A *ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἑαυτοῦ πολεμῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶς τὰ πολλὰ ἡττᾶται καὶ πλουτεῖ*, and it is appropriate and right that in a passage where so many of the mathematical terms are symbolic, *γεωμετρικός*, coming at the climax of the whole, should be symbolic too[1].

In what sense is this number 'lord of better and worse births'? I think the simple and sufficient explanation of Plato's words is that in the early stages of our cycle of 36,000 years, before disintegration and dissimilarity have gone far, *γενέσεις* are for the most part *ἀμείνονες*, whereas later they are apt to be *χείρονες* because the Universe is growing *χείρων*. Good and bad births are consequently determined by this number[2]. See also § 2 above and Part iii, with the notes on 546 C. There is in Plato's theory a suggestion of the view expressed by Lucretius when he wrote:

> Tristis item vetulae vitis sator atque vietae
> temporis incusat momen caelumque fatigat:
> nec tenet omnia paulatim tabescere et ire
> ad capulum spatio aetatis defessa vetusto[3].

I have elsewhere[4] pointed out that Plato, in order to pave the way

[1] Cf. Proclus *in Tim.* 270 E, and 271 A, B. In speaking of the *ἀριθμὸς τέλειος* of the Great Year, Proclus says *ὁ χρόνος μετρεῖ τὴν ὅλην κίνησιν καὶ τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν· διὸ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐπονομάζεται καὶ τέλειος*, and again *μετρεῖ δ' οὖν ὁ ὅλος χρόνος ὁ ἐγκόσμιος τὴν μίαν ζωὴν τοῦ παντός*.

[2] Proclus, as we should expect, has resort to all manner of astrological explanations of *τοιούτου κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων*: see his *in remp. comm.* II pp. 70 ff. al. I have already said that I can see no justification for reading theories of this kind into Plato.

[3] II 1171—1174.

[4] VIII 543 A *n.*

for his 'philosophy of history' in Books VIII and IX, plants his ideal city—only of course θεωρίας καὶ διδασκαλίας χάριν—in the distant past, and in accordance with this fancy we may picture it as belonging to the early stages of our present era of 36,000 years[1].

Some may be disposed to ask the question: 'Did Plato think that these speculations have any serious value?' I am not sure that an editor is called upon to reply: but it is certain that his reply will convince no one who is not convinced already. According to Prof. Huxley (*Life* II p. 426) "Plato was the founder of all the vague and unsound thinking that has burdened philosophy, deserting facts for possibilities, and then, *after long and beautiful stories of what might be, telling you he doesn't quite believe them himself.*" The unconscious humour of the words in italics may be allowed to atone for the libel which precedes. Plato does not here tell us that 'he doesn't quite believe' the Number: but he warns us in advance that the Muses are jesting. But as there is often a touch of playfulness when Plato professes to be serious, so there is usually an undercurrent of serious meaning in the frolics of his Muse. *De iocis non est disputandum*: every reader, according to his nationality and nature, will find his appropriate food for laughter in these pleasant 'Babylonian numbers.' The only thing that I venture to assert is that the point of the jest cannot be that it is unintelligible. About the serious side of the episode there is less room for difference of opinion. Plato was profoundly convinced of the truth, which inspires and animates all these calculations, that the Universe and all within it are created and sustained by mathematical laws. The grand old saying, θεὸς ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖ, is the abiding lesson of the Platonic Number.

PART iii.

In this division of the Appendix I propose, by way of epilogue, fully to explain the passage in which Aristotle refers to and criticises the Platonic Number. The duty cannot be evaded, because it has been alleged that Aristotle explains τρὶς αὐξηθείς in a different way from that in which the phrase has been explained in Part i of this Appendix[2]. In

[1] If we understand τροπή in Arist. *Pol.* E 12. 1316ᵃ 17 to refer to the τροπή of the *Politicus*, and press the criticism of Aristotle for all that it is worth, it would seem that Aristotle thought Plato assigns his city to the previous era, before the μεγίστη καὶ τελεωτάτη τροπή took place. I do not believe that Aristotle seriously thought anything of the sort, but if he did, he was certainly mistaken. Plato's ideal city contains of course some features in common with ὁ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίος, such as the principle of 'No property in wives' (*Pol.* 271 E), but in other respects the life of the γηγενεῖς is ludicrously unlike the life of Plato's citizens, and in the *Republic* we do not hear of any τροπή ushering in the change from Aristocracy to the Spartan State.

[2] *Cl. Rev.* l.c. pp. 154, 243. Mr Monro's own explanation of Aristotle's criticism does not pretend to be exhaustive, and involves, as will presently be shewn, several grave mistakes, even if we treat it as a partial explanation and nothing more. That of Susemihl is more complete but hardly less erroneous: see his *Aristoteles' Politik* II pp. 369—378. Newman's treatment of the subject is confessedly tentative and incomplete (Vol. IV pp. 481—483).

point of fact, as we shall see, Aristotle's criticism, so far as it goes, is completely in harmony with the results of our investigations.

The words of Aristotle are as follows (*Pol.* E 12. 1316[a] 1—17):

ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν περὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μέντοι λέγεται καλῶς· τῆς τε γὰρ ἀρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης οὔσης οὐ λέγει τὴν μεταβολὴν ἰδίως. φησὶ γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι τὸ μὴ μένειν μηθὲν ἀλλ' ἔν τινι περιόδῳ μεταβάλλειν, ἀρχὴν δ' εἶναι τούτων ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται, λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός, ὡς τῆς φύσεώς ποτε φυούσης φαύλους καὶ κρείττους τῆς παιδείας, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ λέγων ἴσως οὐ κακῶς· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ εἶναί τινας οὓς παιδευθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι σπουδαίους ἄνδρας ἀδύνατον. ἀλλ' αὕτη τί ἂν ἴδιος εἴη μεταβολὴ τῆς ὑπ' ἐκείνου λεγομένης ἀρίστης πολιτείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων πάντων; καὶ διά γε τοῦ χρόνου, δι' ὃν λέγει πάντα μεταβάλλειν, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἅμα ἀρξάμενα γίνεσθαι ἅμα μεταβάλλει, οἷον εἰ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγένετο τῆς τροπῆς, ἅμα ἄρα μεταβάλλει[1].

The words from *φησί* to *πάντων* concern us first. They mean: 'for he says that the *cause* of change is the fact that nothing abides, but all things change in a certain cycle of time, and that the *beginning* of change comes from' (lit. 'is of') 'those' (sc. elements *or* numbers), 'whereof 4, 3, coupled with 5, furnish two harmonies, meaning, *when the number of this diagram is made solid*, the theory being that Nature sometimes produces inferior children and children who defy education. In this particular point, indeed, Socrates is probably right: for there may well be persons who cannot be educated and made into good men. But why should *this* be a change peculiar to the constitution which he calls the best more than to every other constitution and everything that comes into being?'

In this sentence Aristotle distinguishes between Plato's account of the *cause* of change and his account of the *beginning* of change. The *cause* of change, he tells us, is *τὸ μὴ μένειν μηθέν, ἀλλ' ἔν τινι περιόδῳ μεταβάλλειν*: and the *beginning* of change is 'when the number of this diagram is made solid.' In the words of Schneider[2], who was, I think, the first to apprehend the meaning of this passage: "*τούτων* ad *ὧν* pertinet et sensus verborum talis est: Principium mutationis positum esse in numeris—quorum sesquitertia radix etc. Deinde verba *λέγων ὅταν* declarant tempus, quo Plato initium mutationis posuerit." Now what is 'this diagram'? There can be no question—nor is the point disputed—after the evidence already adduced, that the diagram is the Pythagorean triangle, whether we suppose (with Schneider) that the antecedent of *τούτου* is contained in *ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν*, or, as appears to me most probable, that Aristotle inserted in his manuscript a diagram, to which he refers in *τοῦ διαγράμματος τούτου*. Now the number of a triangle is its size or area expressed in numbers[3], and the area of the

[1] Newman prints a mark of interrogation at the end of this sentence.

[2] Vol. III p. xxviiii.

[3] I have not found the precise expression 'the number of a diagram' in any other Greek writer, but we can easily divine the meaning. It was the custom of the Greeks to express numbers by means of geometrical figures, and the 'number of a diagram' must

Pythagorean triangle, as we have seen, is 6. Make this number solid, as Aristotle bids us do, that is, cube it, and the result is 216. Aristotle therefore informs us that change begins, according to Plato, with the number 216: or in other words, that the number 216 expresses the beginning of change.

Let us next enquire in what sense Aristotle interprets the view which he attributes to Plato, I mean the view that the number 216 is the beginning of change from aristocracy to *τιμαρχία*. Aristotle's own words leave us in no doubt upon this subject: for immediately after he has said that change begins with the number 216 (*λέγων—στερεός*), he adds the explanatory clause *ὡς τῆς φύσεώς ποτε φυούσης φαύλους καὶ κρείττους τῆς παιδείας*: 'the theory being that Nature sometimes produces inferior offspring' etc. That is to say, the number 216 is the *ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς* because it is in some way or other connected with the production of offspring. In what way is it so connected? Because of course the *περίοδος* of the *ἀνθρώπειον γεννητόν*, according to Plato, is 216 days, and, according to the same authority, change begins with the child in the womb: *ὅταν—ὑμῖν οἱ φύλακες συνοικίζωσι νύμφας νυμφίοις παρὰ καιρόν, οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ' εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται* (546 D). Thus it is clear that *ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός* is Aristotle's way of stating the period which Plato assigns to the *ἀνθρώπειον γεννητόν*, viz. 216 days, and Aristotle's evidence is therefore in harmony with the result at which we arrived in our investigation of the words *αὐξήσεις—φθινόντων*. If we look at the words of Aristotle a little more closely, we shall see, I think, that he construed the passage exactly as we have done. 'Plato says that the beginning of change comes from those elements'

of course be the number which the diagram expresses. Thus for example the number of the square whose side is 3 can only be 9: for 9 and no other number is expressed by that square. In Theo p. 39 ed. Hiller the number 9 is actually represented

α α α

by the diagram α α α, in which the sum

α α α

of the letters represents the area: and this method of representing the area of figures was earlier than Aristotle, as appears from *Met.* N 5. 1092^{b} 10 ff. *ὡς Εὔρυτος ἑκατονταετίς ἀριθμὸς τίνος, οἷον ὁδὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπου, ὁδὶ δὲ ἵππου, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἄγοντες εἰς τὰ σχήματα τρίγωνον καὶ τετράγωνον, οὕτως ἀφομοιῶν ταῖς ψήφοις τὰς μορφὰς τῶν φυτῶν*. Cf. also Theophr. *Fr.* 12. 11 ed. Wimmer. In the face of this evidence, which was first adduced by me in *Cl. Rev.* XVI p. 22, I cannot believe that Mr Monro will continue to deny that the 'number of a diagram' is its area. On a former occasion he remarked: "The 'number of this diagram'—to wit, the Pythagorean triangle—does not seem to me to mean the area, but the linear measurement of the several sides" (*Cl. Rev.* l.c. p. 154). If so, then we must suppose that the number of the square diagram which I have just taken from Theo is not 9, but 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 12: whereas the number 12 is oblong, and not a *τετράγωνος ἀριθμός* at all. After a reference to IX 587 D *κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμόν*, a phrase which has no bearing on this passage at all (see my note ad loc.), Mr Monro continues "*The fact that the three cubes of the sides are together equal to the cube of the next whole number* ($3^3+4^3+5^3=6^3$) *is surely a strong confirmation of this view.*" (The italics are mine.) I am unable to attach any relevant meaning to this sentence unless it means that we are to cube 3+4+5 by making it into $3^3+4^3+5^3$. Such a solution of the clause *ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός* would make it an exact reproduction not only of the whole number, but also of the arithmetical processes which I find in Plato's *αὐξήσεις—ὁμοιούντων*, but it is of course wholly illegitimate, for the cube of 3+4+5 is 12^3 and not $3^3+4^3+5^3$. I will revert to this point later.

(viz. the ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων i.e. 3, 4, 5) 'of which the numbers 4, 3, coupled with 5, furnish two harmonies —meaning (that change begins) when the number of this diagram is cubed.' In Plato the beginning of change does come from 3, 4, 5 because these three numbers are made by him to produce the number 216 ($3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$), which *is* the ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς, as Aristotle points out. The only difference between Aristotle's calculation and Plato's is that Aristotle reaches the number by cubing the area, and not by adding the cubes of the sides, of the Pythagorean triangle, and that is exactly the kind of difference which we should expect; for Aristotle likes to vary his predecessors' ways of expressing their results, and 6^3 was known among the Pythagoreans as the ψυχογονικὸς κύβος: see p. 293. That Aristotle was aware of the way in which Plato himself reached the number is clear enough from his reference in τούτων to the ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων.

Let us now consider Aristotle's further remarks on Plato's beginning of change. He proceeds to say that Plato is quite right in holding that Nature sometimes produces bad offspring; for there may well be persons who cannot be educated. But this mode of change, urges Aristotle, is not peculiar to the ideal city, for it is found in all the other cities, and in fact in everything which is created (ἀλλ' αὕτη—πάντων). The remark is perfectly true: Nature does sometimes produce φαῦλοι and φαῦλα in every sphere, among plants and lower animals as well as in every aggregate of human beings. But Plato would of course reply that he had no intention of assigning an ἴδιος μεταβολή to his ideal State: there cannot be any ἴδιος μεταβολή of a perfect city: for a city which carries within itself the germs of dissolution is for that very reason imperfect. If our city is to decay at all, it must do so from the operation of a law from which there is no escape just *because* the law is universal throughout the whole domain of Nature, and *not* peculiar to the city.

Hitherto Aristotle's criticisms have concerned themselves solely with Plato's ἀρχή of change, viz. the number 216, which Aristotle interpreted by the sentence ὡς τῆς φύσεώς ποτε φυούσης φαύλους καὶ κρείττους τῆς παιδείας. We have seen that he gives a qualified approval to Plato's account of this matter, his only objection being that deterioration in the breed of children is not confined to aristocracy and so cannot be an ἴδιος ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας εἰς τιμαρχίαν. In the next sentence Aristotle directs his remarks against Plato's conception of the *Cause* of change, viz. τὸ μὴ μένειν μηθέν, ἀλλ' ἔν τινι περιόδῳ μεταβάλλειν. 'And moreover through the time, by reason of which[1] he says that all

[1] I follow Bekker's text, except that (with Susemihl) I read γε for τε. It has been proposed to change τοῦ χρόνου into τὸν χρόνον or, as an alternative, δι' ὃν into δι' οὗ. Neither of these changes would affect my argument; but neither is necessary. "Instrumentalis ac modalis vis praep. διά c. genet. coniunctae interdum prope accedit ad causalem vim praep. διά c. acc., ut de eadem re utrumque usurpetur" (Bonitz *Ind. Arist.* s.v. διά, where many examples are given). In this case τοῦ χρόνου, like ὃν, denotes the cause, rather than the instrument. Susemihl translates: "und soll denn während desjenigen Zeitraumes, dessen Eintritt er als Ursache dieser Umwandlung bezeichnet, auch Dasjenige, welches gar nicht zugleich den Anfang seines Entstehens genommen hat, dennoch zugleich diese Umwandlung

things change, those things also which did not begin to come into being at the same time are changed at the same time, for example, if a thing was born *the day before the turning*, it consequently changes at the same time' (sc. as something born at a different time from it). We have seen that in Plato 'the time, by reason of which all things change,' is the γεωμετρικὸς ἀριθμός, viz. 36000 years. Aristotle's criticism then amounts to this. In that case, he says, 'a thing born the day before the end of the cycle changes at the same time as a thing born, let us say, 100 years before the cycle ends: but if you hold that the περίοδος of the whole is the *cause* of change, it should be fulfilled for each individual thing *before* it can cause that thing to be changed: so that if you call the περίοδος 36000 years, a thing born in the year 1 should be changed in the year 36000, while another born in the year 2 should be changed in 36001 and so on.' The τροπή in Aristotle is obviously one of the two secular τροπαί of which Plato speaks in the *Politicus*: see 270C, D, 271C, and we note by the way that Aristotle agrees with us in regarding the γεωμετρικὸς ἀριθμός as the measure of an aeon in the life of the World. See Part ii § 5. Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Cause of Change is perfectly intelligible, but exceedingly perverse and unfair, as is sometimes the case when he is dealing with Plato: for in the Platonic Number, 36000 is the Cause of Change from Aristocracy to Timarchy only in the sense that it measures a secular epoch, marked, as time goes on, by a gradual and ever-increasing deterioration of the Universe and all its parts. Cf. p. 305.

So much for Aristotle's criticism of Plato. But before I conclude, it is necessary to advert to the rival interpretation of φησὶ γὰρ—στερεός, which has been held by many writers, and which Mr Monro has advocated in *Cl. Rev.* l.c. pp. 154, 243, as well as in the *Journal of Philology* VIII p. 280. According to Mr Monro "Aristotle paraphrases τρὶς αὐξηθείς by the words ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός. By the 'number of this figure' he cannot well mean any single number; probably he uses ἀριθμός in the sense of 'linear measurement,' as opposed to surfaces or solids (cf. *Rep.* p. 587D, where κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμόν is opposed to κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην). Now the most natural way of raising the Pythagorean triangle to the third dimension is by cubing each of the sides; and this process leads us at once to the remarkable fact that $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216 = 6^3$. It is difficult to resist the impression that this is what was in the mind of Plato" (*J. of Ph.* l.c.). I have dealt with the phrase κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμόν in my note on IX 587D, and need not touch on it again. The other statements will now be discussed in order. The theory which underlies them is, as the reader will observe, that ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς—τρὶς αὐξηθείς in Plato means $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$.

"Aristotle paraphrases τρὶς αὐξηθείς by the words ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός." What proof is offered of this

erleiden?" There is nothing in the Greek to justify us in translating δι' ὅν by 'dessen *Eintritt*,' and I can see no reason for making διά in διὰ τοῦ χρόνου refer to time. I am glad to find that Newman also interprets διά of agency ("through the influence of time" l.c. p. 483).

statement? "I do not see," says Mr Monro[1], "what proof of this is needed beyond placing the two passages together. We have:—

Plato's sentence

ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται τρὶς αὐξηθείς.

Aristotle's quotation and comment

'ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται,' λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός."

Stated in this way, the view which Mr Monro supports is superficially engaging and attractive. But it is wholly illegitimate to institute a comparison of this kind between two *parts* of a sentence, each of which is incomplete in point of sense, and cannot possibly be otherwise than incomplete because they each begin with a relative pronoun—a pronoun, too, of which, so far as I can see, Mr Monro offers no explanation whatsoever. No fair-minded jury would ever accept as evidence of identification the scrap of incomplete and unintelligible testimony on which we are invited to identify τρὶς αὐξηθείς with Aristotle's γένηται στερεός. They would insist that the evidence should be intelligible in itself and as far as possible complete. Make the evidence in this case intelligible and complete by writing αὐξήσεις—ἀπέφηναν before Plato's ὧν, and φησὶ—ἀρχὴν δ' εἶναι τούτων before Aristotle's ὧν, and I think a jury of scholars will then pronounce that λέγων ὅταν—γένηται explains ἀρχήν and not τρὶς αὐξηθείς, a phrase which Aristotle does not even quote. If it does not explain ἀρχήν, but Plato's τρὶς αὐξηθείς, the participle λέγων is not only superfluous but misleading, for ὅταν—γένηται by itself would in that case be sufficient for Aristotle's purpose, and the addition of λέγων would suggest that what he is about to explain has already been named or referred to. Cf. *Pol.* Δ 2. 1289^{b} 21 ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας, λέγω δὲ δημοκρατίας κτλ., Ε 7. 1307^{a} 10 μάλιστα δὲ τὰ δύο· λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δῆμον καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, and other passages in the *Ind. Arist.* s.v. λέγω[2].

[1] *Cl. Rev.* l.c. p. 243.

[2] As it seems to have been suggested that my reason for interpreting the passage in Aristotle as I do is because the other interpretation would be fatal to my view that τρὶς αὐξηθείς means 'thrice increased' (see *Cl. Rev.* l.c. p. 154), it is fair to remind the reader that it was Schneider, and not the writer of this Appendix, who first interpreted λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός as explaining the number arrived at in αὐξήσεις—ἀπέφηναν, and Schneider was not exposed to the same temptation as myself, for he makes τρὶς αὐξηθείς mean 'cubed,' like most other writers on the Number. Another objection raised was that my explanation makes "Aristotle's comment refer to words which are not only not quoted by him but are in the sentence preceding the words quoted" (*Cl. Rev.* l.c. p. 243). In point of fact, I now make Aristotle's comment refer to ἀρχήν, which is in the text of Aristotle: the other view makes them refer to τρὶς αὐξηθείς, which is *not*. A somewhat parallel sentence in English would be 'Mr Disraeli says that the root of the mischief is a man "whose egotistical imagination can at all times supply an interminable series of arguments to malign his opponent"—meaning *Mr Gladstone*.' Why then does Aristotle trouble to quote the words ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται at all? Because these words, as we have seen, give us Plato's *cause*—and not merely his ἀρχή—of change, and in the sequel Aristotle is going to criticise the Platonic *Cause* (καὶ διά γε—ἅμα ἄρα μεταβάλλει), as well as the Platonic *beginning*, of deterioration. In effect Aristotle says: Plato says the *Cause* of change

"By the 'number of this figure,'" continues Mr Monro, Aristotle "cannot well mean any single number; probably he uses ἀριθμός in the sense of 'linear measurement' as opposed to surfaces or solids....Now the most natural way of raising the Pythagorean triangle to the third dimension is by cubing each of the sides; and this process leads us at once to the remarkable fact that $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216 = 6^3$."

Mr Monro supposes that the ἀριθμός of the Pythagorean triangle is $3 + 4 + 5$. I have already, as I think, proved that the ἀριθμός of a figure is its area, and not the sum of its sides: and here it need only be remarked that ἀριθμός cannot possibly stand for ἀριθμοί, but must denote a single number. By Mr Monro it is interpreted as *three separate numbers*, which he proceeds to add together—here again, as it appears to me, without the shadow of a hint from Aristotle himself.

Mr Monro says that "the most natural way of raising the Pythagorean triangle to the third dimension is by cubing each of its sides." I should have thought that a more natural way of effecting this result would be to cube the area: but in point of fact it is *not* the Pythagorean triangle which Aristotle invites us to make solid: it is the *number* of the Pythagorean triangle. And if the number of the Pythagorean triangle is, as Mr Monro supposes, $3 + 4 + 5$, surely the most natural way of making that number solid is by cubing 12, since $3 + 4 + 5 = 12$. Or are we to suppose that Plato was so ignorant of arithmetic as to believe the cube of $3 + 4 + 5$ to be $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3$?

Finally, Mr Monro remarks, "It is difficult to resist the impression that this is what was in the mind of Plato." I hope there are other students of Plato besides myself who find it easy to resist an impression which attributes so many inconsequences both to Plato and to Aristotle. I should find it difficult to believe that this was in Plato's mind even if Aristotle categorically assured us that it was: but Aristotle does nothing of the sort, and Schneider's explanation of the words ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός will now, I hope, be at last admitted to be right.

II.

VIII 558 A. τί δέ; ἡ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἢ οὔπω εἶδες ἐν τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς, οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτῶν μενόντων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφομένων ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς οὔτε φροντίζοντος οὔτε ὁρῶντος οὐδενὸς περινοστεῖ ὥσπερ ἥρως;

This sentence has been much discussed. I will take the different points in order.

is that everything changes in a certain period of time (i.e. as we found, the Great Year), and that the *beginning* of change comes from the numbers (3, 4, 5), out of which he also builds up the numerical expression of the *Cause* of change etc. This 'beginning of change' is the number 216: it comes from 3, 4, 5 because $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3 = 216$: and the only difference between Aristotle and Plato is that Aristotle, who is interested only in the result, and not in the process, expresses 216 as 6^3 and not as $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3$. See p. 309.

Is *ἐνίων* κτλ. (*a*) objective or (*b*) subjective genitive? Does Plato mean *lenitas erga damnatos* or *lenitas damnatorum*? Schneider and others hold the former view; the Oxford editors (apparently with Ficinus, Schleiermacher etc.) prefer the latter. In favour of (*a*), we might refer to VI 500 A, where allusion is made to the proverbial *πραότης* of the *δῆμος*. Schneider also remarks, quite justly, that throughout this section it is the characteristics of democracy which Plato is describing, so that the behaviour of criminals would seem to be irrelevant. But surely the description of the placid criminal is only an artistic and highly ironical way of ridiculing the *ἀναρχία* of the constitution; and it is in the highest degree forced and unnatural on grammatical grounds to explain *ἐνίων* as an objective genitive. Neither *ξυνθήκας αὐτῶν* in II 359 A nor *βέλη αὐτοῦ* in *Laws* 717 A is an exact parallel, and even if they were, the construction would still remain ambiguous and obscure. The proposal to insert a preposition (*κατά* Herwerden after Stephanus, *περί* Richards) is the refuge of despair.

I once inclined to believe (with Weil) that *δικασθέντων* is neuter. But apart from the difficulty mentioned in the notes, the *sentence* cannot be described as *πρᾶον*, if the culprit is condemned to death or exile.

On these grounds we must accept the interpretation *mansuetudo damnatorum quorundam*, as Ficinus translates. A new set of difficulties begins with *ἢ οὔπω εἴδες*. The words *καταψηφισθέντων θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς* have often been doubted. Hermann (*Ges. Abh.* p. 175) makes the plural agree with both substantives taken together; but this solution is inadmissible, because the alternative penalties are mutually exclusive (Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 72). Madvig's *καταψηφισθέντος* appears to me to let too much stress fall upon *ἀνθρώπων*. I formerly printed *θάνατον ἢ φυγήν*, but the MSS have no variant and the text may be sound.

The syntax of *ἀνθρώπων—ἀναστρεφομένων* is certainly difficult. It is impossible to supply *ἐκείνην τὴν πραότητα* to govern the genitive (with Reisig, quoted in Schneider's note). Few scholars will agree with Schneider in holding that *εἶδον αὐτῶν μενόντων* could mean *vidi eos manere* because *οἶδα θνητὸς ὤν* is *scio me mortalem esse*. Kühner (l.c. II p. 311) makes the words equivalent to *ἢ οὔπω εἶδες—ἀνθρώπων* ('in men condemned' etc.)—*ὅτι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔμενόν τε καὶ ἀνεστρέφοντο* κτλ., comparing Xen. *Mem.* I 1. 11 *οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβὲς οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουσεν*, but the direct object of *εἶδεν* in Xenophon is the accusative *οὐδέν*, and there is no such accusative here.

On a general review, it must be admitted that in spite of its picturesqueness the sentence is unusually disjointed even for Plato. As in some other cases, for example 549 D, so here, we seem to miss the finishing touch. The alternative is to suppose that the text was seriously corrupted at an early date. There is no MS variant of any consequence, except *περινοστεῖ ὁ καταψηφισθείς* instead of *περινοστεῖ* in $\Xi^2 v$, and that is obviously a gloss. Schneider's conjecture, *αὐτοῦ* for *αὐτῶν*, is hardly necessary and does not attempt to remedy the graver faults. Herwerden formerly proposed *ἢ πραότης <κατ'> ἐνίων—ἦσθου* (for *εἶδες*)*—καταψηφισθέντος*: on a later occasion he made the following changes only:

καταψηφισθέντος—[καὶ] ὡς—ὁρᾶν δοκοῦντος (for ὁρῶντος)—περινοστοῦσιν ὥσπερ ἥρως. Richards would read the accusative singular (ἄνθρωπον καταψηφισθέντα etc.) or plural consistently throughout. Such drastic treatment is altogether inadmissible in dealing with the text of Plato. In 1867 Richter suggested ἧττον ὄντα τῶν μενόντων in place of ἧττον αὐτῶν μενόντων (*Fleck. Jb.* for 1867 p. 146). On the same lines is Weil's correction (*Rev. d. Phil.* VIII pp. 171 ff.): ἢ οὔπω εἶδες—ἄνθρωπον <τῶν> καταψηφισθέντων—οὐδὲν ἧττον αὖ τῶν—ἐν μέσῳ [καὶ] ὡς κτλ. 'have you never seen how a man who is condemned—saunters about just as freely as those who remain' etc. This emendation deserves to be considered by those who think the text corrupt, although αὐτῶν <τῶν> would perhaps be easier and more natural than αὖ τῶν: but for my own part, I think it much safer and wiser to leave the text alone.

III.

VIII 559 B. ἡ μέν γέ που τοῦ σίτου κατ' ἀμφότερα ἀναγκαία, ἥ τε ὠφέλιμος ἥ τε παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή.

My interpretation of this passage agrees with that of Schneider and Stallbaum.

Hermann (*Rhein. Mus.* 1846 p. 442) proposed ἀδυνάτη, and afterwards, when it was pointed out that ἀδυνάτη is not Greek, οὐ δυνατή, which he prints in his text. A similar conjecture (μὴ δυνατή) has forced its way into the text of *q* and Flor. U. Hermann's conjecture ('and because it cannot be stopped during life') is amply refuted by Schneider (*Addit.* pp. 66, 67), who observes that although ἀδύνατος παῦσαι in the sense of 'impossible to stop' is perfectly good Greek, ἀδύνατος παῦσαι ζῶντα in the sense of 'impossible for a living man to stop' is incorrect. The words could only mean 'unable to put a stop to life.' It is, I suppose, for this reason that Baiter proposes παῦσαι ζῶντα ἀδύνατον and Richards ζῶντι—οὐ δυνατή, the latter comparing Xen. *Anab.* IV 1. 24 αὐτὸς δ' ἔφη ἡγήσεσθαι δυνατὴν καὶ ὑποζυγίοις πορεύεσθαι ὁδόν. Both these emendations are unexceptionable in point of grammar; but there are more serious difficulties, as will presently appear.

Campbell, reading μὴ δυνατή (with *q*), remarks that "negation is expressed through μή rather than οὐ—which Coraes suggested—because the sentence states a condition. The complete expression would be ἀναγκαία (ἂν εἴη) ἥ μὴ (ἐστὶ) δυνατή (τινι) παῦσαι ζῶντα." To me the sentence appears as categorical a statement as it is possible to make, even if we understand ἂν εἴη after ἀναγκαία, and, in spite of ἀναγκαῖος ἂν εἴη above, ἐστί is much more naturally supplied. Campbell explains the accusative ζῶντα by quoting IV 422 B, C to illustrate "the transition from the dative to the accusative with an infinitive," but there is no 'transition,' where the dative (apparently τινι) is only understood.

The reading of A, Π and a vast majority of MSS would never have been suspected except from a desire to find a *verbal* correspondence between παῦσαι ζῶντα on the one hand, and οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ' εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι (558 D), ἅς γέ τις ἀπαλλάξειεν ἄν (559 A) and δυνατὴ—ἀπαλλάττεσθαι

(559 B) on the other. But in point of fact, the correspondence, on Hermann's view, is not even verbal; for παῦσαι ἐπιθυμίαν and ἀπαλλάξαι ἐπιθυμίαν are different. The way 'to stop a desire' is to gratify it; the way 'to get rid of a desire' is never to gratify it at all. On the other hand, if we adopt the authoritative text, the correspondence, though not verbal, is real. A desire which is 'capable of putting a stop to life' is precisely one which we cannot ἀποτρέψαι or ἀπαλλάξαι, i.e. turn aside, get rid of finally, and for this very reason it is 'necessary,' and we must gratify it. πεινῶντα, which Ast reads (cf. Ath. XII 511 E) is of course absurd. Hunger is not cured by homœopathy.

IV.

VIII 560 C, D. κλήσαντες οἱ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι ἐκεῖνοι τὰς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας οὔτε αὐτὴν τὴν ξυμμαχίαν παριᾶσιν οὔτε πρέσβεις πρεσβυτέρων λόγους ἰδιωτῶν εἰσδέχονται.

Badham's δι' ὤτων in place of ἰδιωτῶν (Preface to *Phaedrus* p. x) is adopted by Baiter and has won much applause. See for example Cobet *Var. Lect.*[2] pp. 219, 533, Madvig *Adv. Cr.* I p. 431, Heller *Cur. Crit. in Pl. de Rep. lib.* p. 2 and Apelt *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1895 p. 967.

Neither Badham, nor any other of these scholars except Heller, attempts to shew that ἰδιωτῶν is corrupt. Heller's criticism is as follows: "praeterquam quod ἰδιωτῶν vox inusitatam conlocationem occupavit, quid orationes hominum privatorum, qui" (*sic*) "tamen legati mittuntur, sibi volunt? An putas πρεσβυτέρων λόγους ἰδιωτῶν ratione habita τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους memorari? Credat Judaeus Apella: ego ἰδιωτῶν depravatum esse censens Britanni mutationem et facilem et sententiae aptissimam amplector" (l.c.). The suggestion contained in 'An putas' etc. is due to Stallbaum. No one else, so far as I know, has adopted it; and it is certainly wrong. But the erroneous interpretation of a single commentator is poor evidence on which to condemn the text.

The explanation in the notes appears to me to solve the two difficulties felt by Heller. Some may be disposed to regard ἰδιωτῶν as contrasting with αὐτὴν τὴν ξυμμαχίαν ('nor admit the ambassador-words of elderly men who are not members of the alliance'). But the word ἰδιώτης has in itself a wider connotation; and the antithesis would not be strictly accurate, because it is the λόγοι of οἰκεῖοι, and not οἰκεῖοι themselves, who form the alliance. The word ἰδιωτῶν should be taken in its full signification; for οὔτε πρέσβεις provides a sufficient antithesis to οὔτε αὐτὴν τὴν ξυμμαχίαν. Schneider translates "noch nehmen die Reden an, die von einzelnen älteren abgesandt werden," but ἰδιωτῶν is more than 'einzelnen.'

To δι' ὤτων there are the following positive objections. (1) All the MSS have ἰδιωτῶν. (2) The ἀλαζόνες λόγοι are personified throughout; and εἰσδέχομαι δι' ὤτων means 'I admit through my own ears.' Surely the spectacle of ἀλαζόνες λόγοι admitting other λόγοι through their ears is ludicrous and unmeaning. (3) The words δι' ὤτων—supposing they

could be referred to the young man's ears—are not only in themselves superfluous—for by what other avenue could the λόγοι be admitted?—but also a blot on what is otherwise one of Plato's finest and most artistic similitudes. They compel us to identify the 'gates of the king's wall' with the man's ears. Apart from questions of literary and artistic propriety, it is enough to point out that the identification is false. We have before us a simile of the soul, and just as the gates of a city's acropolis are in the city, so the gates of the soul's acropolis are in the soul. The false λόγοι, who are themselves in possession of the fortress, shut its gates and keep the key of the situation in their own hands; but it does not follow that the young man may not hear the good message with his ears. It is because the wise words are not admitted to the soul's *citadel* (λόγον ἀληθῆ—οὐ προσδεχόμενος οὐδὲ παριεὶς εἰς τὸ φρούριον κτλ. 561 B) that their purpose fails.

To me these arguments appear to prove conclusively that Badham's emendation gravely disfigures one of the most finished and melodious passages that Plato ever wrote. If any still think differently, I hope they will admit that it is at least unnecessary and unwise to exercise the art of emendation until the text has been proved to be corrupt.

V.

VIII 562 A. Φέρε δή, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, γίγνεται; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας μεταβάλλει, σχεδὸν δῆλον. Δῆλον. Ἆρ' οὖν τρόπον τινὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔκ τε ὀλιγαρχίας δημοκρατία γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τυραννίς; Πῶς;

The explanation which I have given of this passage is due to Schneider. So far as the language is concerned, it is, I think, invulnerable; but we must allow that ἆρ' οὖν—τυραννίς would be easier and more natural if the original question referred to the τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως and not to the τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας.

Jowett and Campbell boldly construe τίς—γίγνεται as 'τίς τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ' (*sic*); 'what is the nature of the process in the case of tyranny?' They cite no parallels, and it is surely inadmissible to do violence to the Greek in this way.

Others have resorted to emendation. Stallbaum thinks of τίνα τρόπον—τυραννὶς γίγνεται or (with pardonable hesitation) τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος ᾧ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, γίγνεται; Other suggestions are τίς ἀρχὴ τυραννίδος γίγνεται, or γενέσεως for γίγνεται (Richards). I once conjectured τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος—<καὶ τίνα τρόπον> γίγνεται in view of 555 B. If we adopt any of these readings, ὅτι μὲν γάρ etc. means 'as for the *fact* that tyranny comes from democracy, that is pretty clear: so that we need only describe the τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως.'

The sense is excellent, but none of the emendations carries conviction, and it is at least doubtful whether the text has suffered corruption. I agree with Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 214) and previous editors in adhering to the reading of the MSS.

VI.

VIII 568 D. *Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, ἐάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα ᾖ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα ἀναλώσει, ὅποι ποτὲ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐξαρκῇ, <καὶ> τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων, ἐλάττους εἰσφορὰς ἀναγκάζων τὸν δῆμον εἰσφέρειν.*

The reading of the best MSS—*ὅποι ποτὲ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐξαρκῇ τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων, ἐλάττους* κτλ.—is retained by Schneider and Stallbaum. The Oxford editors print *ἀποδομένων*, but pronounce it wrong. Schneider remarks "quidni *τοὺς ἀποδομένους* sacerdotes et sacrorum antistites intelligamus, quos tyrannus sacra vendere eamque pecuniam ad se deferre cogat?" and Stallbaum understands the passage in much the same way.

The arguments against this view have been well put by Vermehren. "Abgesehen davon dass es eine ganz unnöthige und *Platon*fremde Ausführlichkeit wäre, wenn für das an sich völlig klare und ausreichende *ἀναλίσκειν τὰ ἱερὰ χρήματα* noch die Art und Weise der Ausführung dieser Maasregel angegeben würde, begreift sich schwer, wie jener Gedanke aus den Worten hergeleitet werden soll" (*Plat. Stud.* pp. 108—110). *τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων* cannot mean 'the proceeds of sales' but only 'the property of those who sold,' and it is inaccurate or strained to describe the tyrant as spending the sellers' property.

To meet the linguistic difficulty the following emendations have been proposed: (1) *τὰ τῶν ἀποδιδομένων* or *τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀποδιδομένων* (Stephanus): (2) *τὸ τῶν ἀποδομένων* (Hermann, who compares *τὸ τῶν παιζόντων* and the like): (3) *τὰ τῶν ἀποδεδομένων* (Stallbaum): (4) *τὰ τῶν πωλουμένων* (Campbell). The first and third are wrong in point of language, for *ἀποδίδοσθαι* is not *vendi* but *vendere* (see Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s.v. The disputed reading *ἀπέδοσαν* in Thuc. VI 62. 4 will scarcely be considered evidence). Hermann's eccentric conjecture hardly needs refutation. *πωλουμένων* deserves the praise of ingenuity, but *τὰ τῶν πωλουμένων* cannot surely mean 'the *proceeds* of what is thus exposed for sale.' *ἐκ* is needed before *τῶν*.

Even if these suggestions were linguistically sound, which is not, I think, the case, Vermehren's first objection still holds good. Why should Plato have troubled to explain so simple a process as *ἱερὰ χρήματα ἀναλῶσαι*?

The kind of solution which I have adopted was first suggested by Vermehren. Dübner (Schneider *Addit.* p. 70) asserts that the λ over the δ of *ἀποδομένων* in A is by the first hand. Possibly; but I think it doubtful. *ἀπολομένων* is however read by Flor. U as well as by *q*. The correction in A is certainly old, and ought to carry weight; but in any case the intrinsic merit of *ἀπολομένων* is very great. *τε* in *ἐάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα* suggests that some other kind of *χρήματα* will presently be specified, and it would be strange if Plato had ignored so obvious a source of revenue as the goods of the proscribed (Vermehren l.c. p. 109), in view especially of 567 B, C, as well as the history of tyranny in general

and Dionysius' tyranny in particular (see note). The change from Λ to Δ is easy in uncial MSS. After ἀπολομένων was corrupted to ἀποδομένων, it was natural to omit καί, and make τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων (probably mistaken for passive) subject to ἐξαρκῇ. Nothing short of this would give even a semblance of meaning to the passage. The editor of *q*, who was certainly an intelligent, if too facile, emendator, added καί before ὅποι. I formerly accepted his view: Vermehren adds τε after τά: but Baiter's insertion of καί before τά is not more difficult, and intrinsically, I think, better.

Θ.

571 I. Αὐτὸς δὴ λοιπός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ τυραννικὸς ἀνὴρ σκέψασθαι, πῶς τε μεθίσταται ἐκ δημοκρατικοῦ γενόμενός τε ποῖός τίς ἐστιν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζῇ, ἄθλιον ἢ μακάριον. Λοιπὸς γὰρ οὖν ἔτι οὗτος, ἔφη. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ ποθῶ ἔτι; Τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οἵαί τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰσίν, οὗ μοι δοκοῦμεν ἱκανῶς διῃρῆσθαι. τούτου δὴ 5
B ἐνδεῶς ἔχοντος, | ἀσαφεστέρα ἔσται ἡ ζήτησις οὗ ζητοῦμεν. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτ' ἐν καλῷ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ σκόπει γε ὃ ἐν αὐταῖς βούλομαι ἰδεῖν. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε. τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν δοκοῦσί τινές μοι εἶναι παράνομοι, αἳ κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ἐγγίγνεσθαι παντί, κολαζόμεναι δὲ ὑπό τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν 10

7. ἔτ' (vel ἔτι) ἐν καλῷ Ξ *q*: ἔτ' (vel ἔτι) ἐγκαλῶ ΑΠ.

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571 A—**572** B *There remains the tyrannical man. Before beginning to describe his origin and character, we must complete our analysis of desire. Among the unnecessary desires, there is a special class which we call lawless or unnatural. It is these which are apt to be aroused in sleep, after over-indulgence in eating or drinking. But when we retire to rest with Desire and Anger in abeyance, and the rational element within us in full play, our dreams are innocent, and much is revealed to us in visions of the night.*

571 A 5 **οὐ—διῃρῆσθαι.** The psychological foundation of Tyranny, as well as of Oligarchy and Democracy, is Desire; but there are three varieties of Desire, and it is the lowest of these, viz. the Unnecessary and *παράνομοι*, which Tyranny represents. See VIII 558 D *n.*, and cf. Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II pp. 310—314.

571 B 7 **ἔτ' ἐν καλῷ.** See *cr. n.* *ἐν καλῷ* might well be written *ἐγκαλῶ* in early Greek script: see Meisterhans *Gr. d. Att. Inschr.*[3] pp. 106—108. It is strange that Apelt (*Berl. Philol. Woch.* for 1895 p. 965) should defend *ἔτ' ἐγκαλῶ*: "soll ich (das Fehlende) noch einklagen" gives a poor sense. For *ἐν καλῷ* see Jebb on Soph. *El.* 384 *νῦν γὰρ ἐν καλῷ* (i.q. *εὔκαιρον*) *φρονεῖν*.

9 **παράνομοι** is more like our 'unnatural' than 'lawless': cf. *Phaed.* 113 E, *Phaedr.* 254 A, Eur. *Med.* 1121 *ὦ δεινὸν ἔργον παράνομόν τ' εἰργασμένη* (addressed to Medea after she has slain her children), and the author of the Διαλέξεις ἠθικαί in Mullach *Frag. Phil. Gr.* I p. 546 *τοὶ δὲ Πέρσαι—καλὸν νομίζοντι καὶ τᾷ θυγατρὶ καὶ τᾷ μητρὶ καὶ τᾷ ἀδελφᾷ συνίμεν· τοὶ δὲ Ἕλλανες καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ παράνομα.* The phrase *οὐ κατὰ νόμον* in Hdt. I 61 has the same connotation. Compare the 'bestial' states—*θηριώδεις* like *θηριῶδες* below in 571 C—described in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* VII 6. 1148[b] 16 ff.

10 **ἐγγίγνεσθαι παντί**: 'are born in,' 'form an original part of every one' (D. and V.), not simply 'arise in' (as Bosan-

βελτιόνων ἐπιθυμιῶν μετὰ λόγου ἐνίων μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἢ παντάπασιν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἢ ὀλίγαι λείπεσθαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, τῶν δὲ ἰσχυρότεραι καὶ [1] πλείους. Λέγεις δὲ καὶ τίνας, ἔφη, ταύτας; C
Τὰς περὶ τὸν ὕπνον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐγειρομένας, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄλλο τῆς
15 ψυχῆς εὕδῃ, ὅσον λογιστικὸν καὶ ἥμερον καὶ ἄρχον ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ θηριῶδές τε καὶ ἄγριον ἢ σίτων ἢ μέθης πλησθέν, σκιρτᾷ τε καὶ ἀπωσάμενον τὸν ὕπνον ζητῇ ἰέναι καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι τὰ αὐτοῦ ἤθη. οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τολμᾷ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἀπὸ πάσης λελυμένον τε καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένον αἰσχύνης καὶ φρονήσεως. μητρί
20 τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖν [1] μίγνυσθαι, ὡς οἴεται, οὐδὲν ὀκνεῖ ἄλλῳ τε ὁτῳοῦν D
ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν καὶ θηρίων, μιαιφονεῖν τε ὁτιοῦν, βρώματός τε ἀπέχεσθαι μηδενός· καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ οὔτε ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει οὔτ' ἀναισχυντίας. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ὅταν δέ γε, οἶμαι, ὑγιεινῶς τις ἔχῃ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ εἰς τὸν ὕπνον
25 ἴῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν μὲν ἐγείρας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἑστιάσας λόγων καλῶν

22. ἑνὶ λόγῳ $A^2\Pi$: fortasse ἐν ὀλίγῳ A^1.

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quet suggests, ignoring or forgetting ἀπαλλάττεσθαι and λείπεσθαι). Cf. ἐγγίγνεται in 572 A and ἑκάστῳ ἔνεστι 572 B. There is something of 'the ape and tiger' in every human being: see infra 588 C ff. These παράνομοι ἐπιθυμίαι doubtless represent "der verbrecherische Hang der menschlichen Natur" (Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 216), but we ought not to compare Plato's conception with the doctrine of 'original sin,' as Schleiermacher (*Platons Staat* p. 601) and Susemihl (*Gen. Entw.* II p. 238) appear to do. According to Plato, Man is an οὐράνιον φυτόν, οὐκ ἔγγειον.

571 C 13 **λέγεις δὲ καὶ κτλ.** 'And pray what *are* these desires?' lit. 'and you mean by these desires, pray, which?' καί "significat accessionem aliquam pro interrogantis voluntate necessariam vel maiorem in modum expetitam" (Schneider, who compares *Polit.* 291 A τίνας αὐτοὺς καὶ λέγεις; *Euthyd.* 271 A and Heindorf ad loc.).

14 **τὰς περὶ τὸν ὕπνον κτλ.** "The cursed thoughts that Nature Gives way to in repose" (*Macbeth* II 1. 8) We must however beware of supposing that Plato regards sleep as the time when the lowest part of soul normally and naturally asserts its sway. It is only in the vicious, and after acts of self-indulgence, that the beast within us pollutes our slumber: cf. Cic. *de div.* I 115 and II 119. To translate ὅταν by 'when' (D. and V.) is therefore misleading: it means 'as often as.' See 571 D *n.*

17 **ἰέναι** "vix sanum videtur," says Herwerden. The text is perfectly sound. Although the man is, as we say, sleeping, his θηριῶδες 'has shaken off sleep' and 'seeks to go and gratify its instincts.' The theory is that in dreams the part of the soul concerned is not asleep, but awake, and goes out to seek the object of its desire. Cf. 572 A *n.*

19 **μητρί τε κτλ.** Cf. Soph. *O. T.* 981 f. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη κἀν ὀνείρασιν βροτῶν | μητρὶ ξυνηυνάσθησαν, with Jebb ad loc.

571 D 20 **ὡς οἴεται** goes closely with μίγνυσθαι ('intercourse, as it supposes, with' etc.). ὡς Οἰδίπους (suggested by Förster *Rhein. Mus.* for 1885 p. 631) is a tasteless conjecture, which confuses reality and dreamland.

21 **μιαιφονεῖν τε ὁτιοῦν**: such as parricide and other unnatural murders (φόνοι παράνομοι *Phaed.* 113 E).

βρώματός τε κτλ. Cannibalism, etc.: cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* VII 6. 1148^b 20—25.

24 **αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ.** The genitive depends on ὑγιεινῶς ἔχῃ as in ἡδέως ἔχων ἐμαυτοῦ Alexis ap. Athen. X 419 C and other examples quoted by Blaydes on Ar. *Lys.* 1125 and *Wasps* 357.

25 **ἑστιάσας κτλ.** For the metaphor

καὶ σκέψεων, εἰς σύννοιαν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀφικόμενος, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν
E δὲ | μήτε ἐνδεία δοὺς μήτε πλησμονῇ, ὅπως ἂν κοιμηθῇ καὶ μὴ
572 παρέχῃ θόρυβον τῷ | βελτίστῳ χαῖρον ἢ λυπούμενον, ἀλλ' ἐᾷ
αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μόνον καθαρὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ ὀρέγεσθαί του καὶ

2. του και A²Ξ : τοῦ Π *q* : om. A¹.

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in ἐστιάσας see I 354 A *n.* The general meaning of this passage is best illustrated from *Tim.* 45 E—46 A γενομένης δὲ πολλῆς μὲν ἡσυχίας βραχυόνειρος ὕπνος ἐμπίπτει, καταλειφθεισῶν δέ τινων κινήσεων μειζόνων, οἷαι καὶ ἐν οἷοις ἂν τόποις λείπωνται, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα παρέσχοντο ἀφομοιωθέντα ἐντὸς—φαντάσματα, with which Aristotle's theory closely agrees: see *Eth. Nic.* I 13. 1102ᵇ 7 ff. and Stewart's note. In like manner Zeno recommended his followers to gauge their moral 'progress' (προκοπή) by the nature of their dreams (*Frag.* 160 ed. Pearson). See also on 572 A.

26 **τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κτλ.** In Cic. *de div.* II 119 the Pythagorean veto on beans is attributed to this motive. Plato's psychology in this passage recalls the myth of the *Phaedrus*: cf. especially 253 C—256 E of that dialogue.

572 A 1 ἀλλ' ἐᾷ κτλ. The bearing of this remarkable chapter on the theory of divination did not escape Cicero, who has translated, or rather paraphrased, from ὅταν 571 C to ἅπτεται 572 A: see his *de div.* I 60, 61. In *Tim.* 71 D—72 B it is not, as here, the best part of soul which is said to perceive 'past, present, or future' in dreams, but ἡ περὶ τὸ ἧπαρ ψυχῆς μοῖρα κατῳκισμένη, the function of λογισμός being to interpret the visions seen by the ἐπιθυμητικόν in divination (whether ὄναρ or ὕπαρ), ὅπῃ τι σημαίνει καὶ ὅτῳ μέλλοντος ἢ παρελθόντος ἢ παρόντος κακοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ (*ib.* 72 A). In the present passage Plato appeals to the widespread popular view that the soul during sleep is freed from the trammels of the body, foresees the future, and has access to a region of truth denied, with few exceptions, to the waking mind: "viget enim animus in somnis, liberque est sensibus et omni impeditione curarum, iacente et mortuo paene corpore" (Cic. *de div.* I 115): see Pind. *Frag.* 131 3–5 Bergk τὸ γὰρ ἐστὶ μόνον | ἐκ θεῶν· εὕδει δὲ πρασσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὐδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς ὀνείροις | δείκνυσι τερπνῶν ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν, Aesch. *Ag.* 179 ff. (στάζει δ' ἔν θ' ὕπνῳ κτλ.), *Eum.* 104 εὕδουσα γὰρ φρὴν ὄμμασιν λαμπρύνεται and Xen. *Cyr.* VIII 7. 21, and cf. generally Rohde *Psyche*² I pp. 6 ff., II pp. 309 *n.* 2 and 414. On this view the Stoic theory of divination by dreams was based (see Cic. l.c. I 110 ff.), and the same idea appears also in Aristotle *Frag.* 12 ὅταν—ἐν τῷ ὑπνοῦν καθ' ἑαυτὴν γένηται ἡ ψυχή, τότε τὴν ἰδίαν ἀπολαβοῦσα φύσιν προμαντεύεταί τε καὶ προαγορεύει τὰ μέλλοντα. We may compare the lines of Wordsworth:

> "that serene and blessed mood
> In which the affections gently lead us on
> Until, the breath of this corporeal frame
> And even the motion of our human blood
> Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
> In body, and become a living soul:
> While with an eye made quiet by the power
> Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
> We see into the life of things."

2 **ὀρέγεσθαί του.** Schneider and Stallbaum read ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι with Π (see *cr. n.*) and a majority of MSS; but such an expression would be heavy and unpleasing. Jowett and Campbell think "καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι should perhaps be struck out and the accent restored to του," while Burnet omits καί, reading ὀρέγεσθαί του αἰσθάνεσθαι. The text, I believe, is sound, but cannot mean 'to aspire further (καί) to perceive something which it knows not' (J. and C.). We may translate 'to yearn after it knows not what and perceive what it knoweth not.' Just as in evil dreams the baser part of soul reaches out after the object of its desires (571 C), so also the βέλτιστον, in these happier visions of the night, has longings which are all its own. ὀρέγεσθαι expresses the instinctive and unconscious turning of the soul towards the fountain of her being, and the waking counterpart of these visions of the night are just

> "those shadowy recollections,
> Which, be they what they may,
> Are yet the fountain light of all our day,
> Are yet a master light of all our seeing."

With the use of ὀρέγεσθαι cf. *Phaed.* 65 C ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος κτλ., a passage which throws light on Plato's meaning here in more ways than one.

αἰσθάνεσθαι ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἤ τι τῶν γεγονότων ἢ ὄντων ἢ καὶ μελλόντων, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς πραΰνας καὶ μή τισιν εἰς ὀργὰς ἐλθὼν κεκινημένῳ τῷ θυμῷ καθεύδῃ, ἀλλ' ἡσυχάσας μὲν τὼ δύο εἴδη, τὸ τρίτον δὲ κινήσας, ἐν ᾧ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐγγίγνεται, οὕτω ἀναπαύηται, οἶσθ' ὅτι τῆς τ' ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ μάλιστα ἅπτεται καὶ ἥκιστα παράνομοι | τότε αἱ ὄψεις φαντάζονται τῶν B ἐννυπνίων. Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οἶμαι οὕτω. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐξήχθημεν εἰπεῖν· ὃ δὲ βουλόμεθα γνῶναι, τόδ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἄρα δεινόν τι καὶ ἄγριον καὶ ἄνομον ἐπιθυμιῶν εἶδος ἑκάστῳ ἔνεστι, καὶ πάνυ δοκοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἐνίοις μετρίοις εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γίγνεται ἔνδηλον. εἰ οὖν τι δοκῶ λέγειν καὶ συγχωρεῖς, ἄθρει. Ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ.

II. Τὸν τοίνυν δημοτικὸν ἀναμνήσθητι οἷον ἔφαμεν εἶναι. ἦν δέ | που γεγονὼς ἐκ νέου ὑπὸ φειδωλῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος, τὰς C χρηματιστικὰς ἐπιθυμίας τιμῶντι μόνας, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίους

5. ἐλθὼν Π: ἐλθὸν A. τὼ A^1Π: τῷ A^2.

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5 **ἡσυχάσας.** *ἡσυχάζω* is used transitively only in the aorist: cf. Solon ap. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 5. 3. Schleiermacher (*Platons Staat* p. 601) thinks that Plato recognises here, and in *ἐγείρας, ἐστιάσας, πραΰνας, κινήσας* etc., a fourth principle or 'part' of soul, that viz. which is able to excite or calm the others. Krohn on the other hand sees in this passage a sort of implicit recognition of the 'ego' as a separate and distinct entity (*Pl. St.* p. 217). The latter view is nearer the truth (cf. V 462 C, D *nn.*); but we ought not to press the words too much: cf. *ἐπιεικεῖ τινι ἑαυτοῦ βίᾳ κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας* VIII 554 C, and III 411 B *n.*

6 **εἴδη.** Other examples of this rare form of the dual in Plato are cited by Roeper *de dual. usu Plat.* p. 12.

7 **μάλιστα:** i.e. more than when he retires to sleep in any other condition. It is better, in view especially of the second half of this clause, to understand *μάλιστα* in this way, than to take the word generally, as if divination by dreams were the best way of grasping truth. Plato would hardly say this, nor indeed would the average Greek. See especially *Tim.* 71 D ff.

8 **παράνομοι.** 571 B *n.*

572 B—**573** C *The origin of the tyrannical man is as follows. A democratical father has a son, who is led away by evil associates into every form of lawlessness. When his family come to the rescue, these tyrant-breeders implant in him a master-passion to act as champion of his drone-desires. The history of the corresponding State repeats itself in the young man's soul, and the champion Lust becomes a tyrant in due course. We look on Lust, Drink, Madness as tyrants; and the tyrannical man arises when these three tyrants establish their dominion over the soul.*

572 B 10 **βουλόμεθα.** W. H. Thompson's *ἐβουλόμεθα* is unnecessary and even awkward with the present *ἐστίν* just following. The Greek means simply 'but what we want to notice is this' etc.

12 **καὶ πάνυ** belongs to *μετρίοις* (Schneider) rather than to *δοκοῦσιν* (J. and C.): 'however virtuous we may some of us appear to be.'

15 **οἷον ἔφαμεν εἶναι.** VIII 561 A—562 A.

ἦν δέ που κτλ.: 'he had been, you remember, produced, by having been brought up from early years' etc. Socrates recalls the genesis of the democratical man (described in 558 C, 559 D ff.) before recalling his nature (in D below). Ast suggested *γεγονὼς <καὶ>* or *γεγονώς <τε καὶ>*, taking *γεγονώς* of birth. The correct interpretation was pointed out by Schneider.

ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἕνεκα γιγνομένας ἀτιμάζοντι. ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Συγγενόμενος δὲ κομψοτέροις ἀνδράσι καὶ μεστοῖς ὧν ἄρτι διήλθομεν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὁρμήσας εἰς ὕβριν τε πᾶσαν καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων εἶδος μίσει τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φειδωλίας, φύσιν δὲ τῶν
D διαφθειρόντων βελτίω ἔχων, ἀγόμενος ἀμφοτέρωσε | κατέστη εἰς μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν τρόποιν καὶ μετρίως δή, ὡς ᾤετο, ἑκάστων ἀπολαύων οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον οὔτε παράνομον βίον ζῇ, δημοτικὸς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ γεγονώς. Ἦν γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ δόξα περὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον. Θὲς τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν τοῦ τοιούτου ἤδη πρεσβυτέρου γεγονότος νέον υἱὸν ἐν τοῖς τούτου αὖ ἤθεσιν τεθραμ-
E μένον. Τίθημι. Τίθει τοίνυν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα περὶ αὐτὸν γιγνόμενα, ἅπερ καὶ περὶ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ· ἀγόμενόν τε | εἰς πᾶσαν παρανομίαν, ὀνομαζομένην δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγόντων ἐλευθερίαν ἅπασαν, βοηθοῦντά τε ταῖς ἐν μέσῳ ταύταις ἐπιθυμίαις πατέρα τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους, τοὺς δ' αὖ παραβοηθοῦντας· ὅταν δ' ἐλπίσωσιν οἱ δεινοὶ μάγοι τε καὶ τυραννοποιοὶ οὗτοι μὴ ἄλλως τὸν νέον καθέξειν, ἔρωτά τινα αὐτῷ μηχανωμένους ἐμποιῆσαι
573 προστάτην τῶν ἀργῶν καὶ τὰ ἕτοιμα διανεμο|μένων ἐπιθυμιῶν,

23. ἑκάστων ἀπολαύων Π: ἑκάστων απολαβὼν A^1: ἕκαστον ἀπολαβὼν A^2. 28. αὐτὸν $A^2\Xi q$: αὐτῶν $A^1\Pi$.

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572 C 18 **παιδιᾶς — καλλωπισμοῦ.** Plato is less severe than in VIII 559 D—562 A. He has since discovered a yet lower depth than merely democratical desire, and the democratical man is almost virtue itself compared with the tyrannical.

19 **κομψοτέροις κτλ.** VIII 559 D *n.*

21 **τὸ ἐκείνων εἶδος:** 'their kind of conduct.' *εἶδος* is used almost like *τρόπον*, as in Thuc. II 41. 1, VI 77. 2 and VIII 56. 2. Ficinus has *mores*, but it does not follow that he read *ἦθος*, which is less suitable with *ὁρμήσας*.

572 D 22 **κατέστη κτλ.** VIII 561 A—562 A. The words *ὡς ᾤετο* qualify *μετρίως*: cf. 571 D.

24 **οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον κτλ.:** i.e. 'in the mean between *ὀλιγαρχία* and *ἀναρχία*' etc. (J. and C., comparing VIII 561 A and 561 E). *ἔζῃ* for *ζῇ* was conjectured by Ast, on account, no doubt, of *ᾤετο*. Schneider holds that *ᾤετο* refers to the time "quo primum ingrediens in istam vivendi rationem optimum factu statuebat omnibus pariter cupiditatibus obtemperare." It is difficult to understand *ᾤετο* otherwise than as the imperfect of recapitulation; and I prefer to think that Plato, in spite of the inconsistency, wrote *ζῇ* rather than *ἔζῃ* in order to bring the *δημοτικός* before us as a living reality, so as to prepare for *θὲς τοίνυν—τεθραμμένον*. There is no MS authority for *ἔζῃ*.

26 **περὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον:** "anlangend den so beschaffenen" (Schneider), "touching such a person" (D. and V.).

28 **τίθει κτλ.** The present echoes *τίθημι* (cf. I 339 D, VII 514 B, 519 B, 527 B, VIII 564 A al.), and is in itself more appropriate than *θές* to introduce a succession of pictures. *τοίνυν* means 'further' (I 339 D *n.*). The reference in *ἅπερ καὶ—πατέρα* is to VIII 559 E ff.

572 E 35 **προστάτην κτλ.** This overmastering passion becomes the champion of the drone-desires, exactly as the budding tyrant is the *προστάτης* of the proletariate: see VIII 564 D, 565 C ff. With *ἕτοιμα διανεμομένων* cf. *τῶν ἑτοίμων ἀναλωτής* VIII 552 B (J. and C.).

ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφῆνά τινα. ἢ τί ἄλλο οἴει εἶναι τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἔρωτα; Οὐδὲν ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦτο. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν περὶ αὐτὸν βομβοῦσαι αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, θυμιαμάτων τε γέμουσαι καὶ μύρων καὶ στεφάνων καὶ οἴνων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν ἀνειμένων, ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον αὔξουσαί τε καὶ τρέφουσαι πόθου κέντρον ἐμποιήσωσι τῷ κηφῆνι, τότε δὴ δορυφορεῖταί τε ὑπὸ μανίας καὶ οἰστρᾷ | οὗτος ὁ προστάτης τῆς B ψυχῆς, καὶ ἐάν τινας ἐν αὐτῷ δόξας ἢ ἐπιθυμίας λάβῃ ποιουμένας χρηστὰς καὶ ἔτι ἐπαισχυνομένας, ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ἔξω ὠθεῖ παρ' αὑτοῦ, ἕως ἂν καθήρῃ σωφροσύνης, μανίας δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ. Παντελῶς, ἔφη, τυραννικοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέγεις γένεσιν. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ πάλαι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον τύραννος ὁ Ἔρως λέγεται; Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλε, εἶπον, καὶ μεθυσθεὶς ἀνὴρ τυραννικόν τι φρόνημα | ἴσχει; Ἴσχει γάρ. Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε C μαινόμενος καὶ ὑποκεκινηκὼς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν

10. ἐπαισχυνομένας Π: ἐπαισχυνόμενος A. ἀποκτείνει—ὠθεῖ A^1Π: ἀποκτείνῃ —ὠθῇ A^2. 11. μανίας Π: καὶ μανίας A.

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573 A 2 **ὑπόπτερον** is doubly appropriate: for Ἔρως too has wings.

τῶν τοιούτων. Masculine, not neuter, as Stallbaum once supposed.

4 **ὅταν.** A large majority of MSS have *ὅταν δή*, which Schneider retains. *δή* is unsuitable after *οὐκοῦν*, and may possibly have arisen from the accidental reduplication of AN: see on V 450 C. I agree with most editors in accepting the text of A.

αὐτὸν κτλ. *αὐτόν* means *ἔρωτα*, the *μέγαν κηφῆνα*. On *βομβοῦσαι* see VIII 564 D *n.* The position of the participial adjective *ἀνειμένων* is illustrated on VII 532 C.

6 **αὔξουσαί τε καὶ τρέφουσαι.** The object is *τὸν κηφῆνα*, not of course *πόθου κέντρον*, as Jowett translates. This master-passion grows by what it feeds on, until it becomes acute, and ends in madness and frenzy. *πόθου κέντρον* (cf. *Phaedr.* 253 E *πόθου κέντρων*) is 'the sting of unsatisfied desire' (*Sehnsucht* Schneider): cf. the definition of *πόθος* in *Crat.* 420 A *πόθος—οὐ τοῦ παρόντος—ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀλλοθί που ὄντος καὶ ἀπόντος.* Ast conjectured *τρέφουσαι πόθον, κέντρον* κτλ., "namque *πόθος* s. *ἔρως* iam inest in fuco." But in point of fact the *ἔρως is* the drone, and the MS text is far more picturesque and expressive.

8 **δορυφορεῖται.** Cf. VIII 566 B ff.

573 B 9 **ἐν αὐτῷ.** The Oxford editors, with Herwerden, read *ἐν αὑτῷ*, "i.e. the man," remarking that "good opinions and desires could hardly be supposed to exist" in the drone. True; but *παρ' αὑτοῦ* shews that *αὐτῷ* is right, and *αὑτῷ* is unpleasing on aesthetic as well as on grammatical grounds. Plato speaks as if the master-passion were itself the soul. The inaccuracy is easily excused because the whole soul is rapidly falling under its sway.

ποιουμένας = 'accounted.' Hermann proposes *ποτωμένας*, Herwerden *ἐμποιουμένας*: but the text is sound. See VI 498 A *n.*

11 **καθήρῃ:** as in the *καθαρμός* of VIII 567 C.

μανίας δὲ κτλ. See *cr. n.* A few *deterioris notae* MSS agree with A, which is certainly in error here. Cf. IV 441 D. The epithet *ἐπακτοῦ* recalls the *ξενικοί* of VIII 567 D f.

14 **καὶ μεθυσθεὶς κτλ.** Ast compares Bacchyl. *Frag.* 27. 6 f. Bergk (on the effects of wine) *αὐτίχ' ὁ μὲν πόλεων κρήδεμνα λύει | πᾶσι δ' ἀνθρώποις μοναρχήσειν δοκεῖ.* But *τυραννικόν τι φρόνημα ἴσχει* has of course a wider meaning than this.

573 C 16 **ὑποκεκινηκώς** = 'deranged.'

ἐπιχειρεῖ τε καὶ ἐλπίζει δυνατὸς εἶναι ἄρχειν. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Τυραννικὸς δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀνὴρ ἀκριβῶς γίγνεται, ὅταν ἢ φύσει ἢ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις μεθυστικός τε καὶ ἐρωτικὸς καὶ μελαγχολικὸς γένηται. Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν. 20

III. Γίγνεται μέν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ· ζῇ δὲ
D δὴ πῶς; Τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, ἔφη, τοῦτο | σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς. Λέγω

(D. and V.). The litotes in *ὑπο-* is only euphemistic. *ὑποκεκινηκώς* with this meaning does not apparently occur elsewhere in classical Greek: see Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s.v., where the only parallel cited is from a scholium on Soph. *Aj.* 531 *ὑποκεκινηκότι μὴ πιστεύουσα.* W. H. Thompson (on *Phaedr.* 249 D) proposes *παρακεκινηκώς*, in view of Ar. *Frogs* 643, where he approves 'on MS authority' the reading *ἦν με παρακινήσαντ' ἴδῃς.* In point of fact, however, this reading will not scan, and the Ravenna with other MSS has *ἦν μ' ὑποκινήσαντ' ἴδῃς*, although *ὑποκινεῖν* is not used with the same sense as here.

οὐ μόνον κτλ. The madman also *τυραννικόν τι φρόνημα ἴσχει.* *ἐλπίζει* is not here 'expects' (D. and V.) but 'fancies,' 'imagines' (II 383 B *n.*).

18 **τυραννικὸς δὲ κτλ.** I formerly printed *δή* for *δέ* (with *q* and Vermehren *Plat. Stud.* p. 112), but now prefer the reading of the best MSS. Plato is testing his account of the origin of the tyrannical man by obvious and admitted facts: cf. (with Schneider) IV 442 E ff. Lust, Drink, and Madness are confessedly tyrants; and we hold that a *τυραννικὸς ἀνήρ* in the strictest sense of the term (for *ἀκριβῶς* cf. I 341 C) is produced when a man falls under the dominion of all three. So that our theory accords with everyday experience. *μελαγχολικός* is not of course 'passionate' (Jowett), but 'insane': cf. *ὅ γε μαινόμενος καὶ ὑποκεκινηκώς* above.

573 C—576 B *In respect of his character and mode of life, the tyrannical man plunges into every form of dissipation, and is hounded on by ever fresh desires. His income and property soon disappear; and in order to satisfy his clamorous lusts, he plunders his father's estate, not hesitating if need be to lay violent hands on father and mother. Then follow sacrilege and theft, and every variety of crime; for he has now become in living fact that which once he rarely was in dreams. Such men, if few in number, may go abroad and join a tyrant's bodyguard or remain to swell the ranks of petty criminals at home; but if they are numerous, they make the worst of all their crew into a tyrant over their fatherland. Tyranny is the goal and consummation of such a man's desires. Throughout his whole existence, both before and after he attains the crown of his ambition, the tyrannical man is a stranger to freedom and friendship, faithless and superlatively unrighteous—in one word, he is the living embodiment of the monstrous lusts we found in dreams, and the longer he rules, the worse he grows.*

573 C ff. Plato's *τυραννικός* is a monster without a single redeeming feature of any kind, the incarnation of unnatural desire, "bloody, Luxurious, avaricious, false, deceitful, Sudden, malicious"—"not in the legions Of horrid hell can come a devil more damned In evils" (*Macbeth* Act IV Sc. 3). It must be admitted that Plato takes a terrible revenge on Dionysius: see on 577 A.

21 **γίγνεται κτλ.** 'Such, apparently, is the origin also of the tyrannical man.' The stress of the voice falls on *τοιοῦτος* i.q. *τυραννικός* (*τυραννικὸς ἀνήρ* in Socrates' last sentence). *καί* is *etiam*: we have now described *his* origin as well as that of the others. J. and C. propose *ἀνήρ*, as if Plato meant *γίγνεται οὕτω, καὶ ἔστιν τοιοῦτος.* But the *character* of the man has still to be described (*ζῇ δὲ δὴ πῶς;*): hitherto we have been concerned only with his *genesis* (*γίγνεται μέν*). Schneider caught the meaning ("so nun entsteht auch dieser Mann"); but recent English translators are wrong. For *μέν* Richards conjectures *μὲν οὖν* (or *οὐκοῦν γίγνεται μέν* as an alternative). The asyndeton helps of course to accentuate the antithesis between *γίγνεται* and *ζῇ*.

22 **τὸ τῶν παιζόντων.** *παροιμία ἡνίκα τις ἐρωτηθείς τι ὑπὸ γινώσκοντος τὸ ἐρω-*

δή, ἔφην. οἶμαι γάρ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑορταὶ γίγνονται παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κῶμοι καὶ θαλίαι καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὧν ἂν Ἔρως τύραννος ἔνδον οἰκῶν διακυβερνᾷ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ πολλαὶ καὶ δειναὶ παραβλαστάνουσιν ἐπιθυμίαι ἡμέρας τε καὶ νυκτὸς ἑκάστης, πολλῶν δεόμεναι; Πολλαὶ μέντοι. Ταχὺ ἄρα ἀναλίσκονται, ἐάν τινες ὦσι πρόσοδοι. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο | δὴ δανεισμοὶ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας παραιρέσεις. **E**
Τί μήν; Ὅταν δὲ δὴ πάντ' ἐπιλίπῃ, ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὲν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας βοᾶν πυκνάς τε καὶ σφοδρὰς ἐννενεοττευμένας, τοὺς δ' ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κέντρων ἐλαυνομένους τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ διαφερόντως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔρωτος, πάσαις ταῖς ἄλλαις ὥσπερ δορυφόροις ἡγουμένου, οἰστρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν, τίς τι ἔχει, ὃν δυνατὸν ἀφελέσθαι ἀπατήσαντα ἢ | βιασάμενον; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. Ἀναγ- **574**
καῖον δὴ πανταχόθεν φέρειν, ἢ μεγάλαις ὠδῖσί τε καὶ ὀδύναις

24. θαλίαι Π: θάλειαι A. 30. ἐπιλίπῃ A^1Π: ἐπιλείπῃ A^2.

τηθέν, αὐτὸς ἀγνοῶν, οὕτως ἀποκρίνηται 'σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς' (Schol.). Cf. *Phil.* 25 B.

573 D 23 **αὐτοῖς**: the *τυραννικός* and his associates.

24 **θαλίαι**. See *cr. n.* *θάλεια* is either an adjective or the name of the Muse. Schneider (who was unaware that Π has *θαλίαι*) retains *θάλειαι*, but his note conclusively proves, I think, that the Attic writers as well as Homer invariably observed the distinction. Stallbaum alone of recent editors reads *θαλίαι*.

ἑταῖραι. "Nullus locus scortis est inter *ἑορτὰς* atque *κώμους καὶ θαλίας*" says Stallbaum. On this account he prefers *ἑταιρίαι* (a conjecture of G. W. Nitzsch), taking the word, strangely enough, for *lupanaria*. There is not the shadow of a difficulty: cf. II 373 A *n.* and *ἑταίρας* 574 B below.

ὧν κτλ.: 'in whoso's breast the tyrant Love indwelling steers all their soul.' The words are tinged with poetical colouring, as often in passages of this kind: cf. VIII 560 D, E al. J. and C. erroneously make *ὧν* neuter and dependent on *Ἔρως*. The pronoun is construed with *τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα* by Shorey (*A. J. Ph.* XVI p. 237), but in that case *οἷς* would have been more natural. The view I take agrees with Schneider's.

26 **παραβλαστάνουσιν**: 'shoot up beside' the master-passion. These desires correspond to *τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατόπεδον τὸ καλόν τε καὶ πολὺ καὶ ποικίλον καὶ οὐδέποτε ταὐτόν* in the *τυραννουμένη πόλις* (VIII 568 D).

28 **ἀναλίσκονται κτλ.** Cf. VIII 568 D.

573 E 29 **τῆς οὐσίας παραιρέσεις κτλ.**: 'encroachments on his capital' etc. (J. and C.), viz. to meet the money-lender's claims. See VIII 555 E. On *ἐπιλίπῃ* see VIII 568 E *n.*

30 **ἀνάγκη μὲν κτλ.** Bekker reads *ἀνάγκη τὰς μέν* with *g* and Flor. U: "recte, si cupiditates ipsis opponi statuimus. Sed nihil impedit, quo minus alteram necessitatem—quae postea hanc consequi particula *δή* significatur, iam hic scriptori obversatam atque hanc illi alteri oppositam putemus. Accedit quod si *τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας* scripsisset, non *τοὺς δέ*, sed *αὐτοὺς δὲ* dicturus fuisse videtur" (Schneider). We have no right to change *τούς* to *αὐτούς* as Stallbaum is fain to do.

31 **ἐννενεοττευμένας** is copied, as Ast observes, by Longinus *περὶ ὕψους* 44. 7.

32 **κέντρων**. The other desires (as well as the master Passion) are compared to goads. For the idiom *ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κέντρων τῶν κτλ.* cf. VIII 553 B *n.*

33 **αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔρωτος κτλ.** is not for *τῶν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔρωτος κτλ.*, as Stallbaum seems to hold; for the *ἔρως* is itself an *ἐπιθυμία*: see 572 E ff. With *δορυφόροις* cf. VIII 567 D.

ξυνέχεσθαι. Ἀναγκαῖον. Ἆρ' οὖν ὥσπερ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδοναὶ ἐπιγιγνόμεναι τῶν ἀρχαίων πλέον εἶχον καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων ἀφῃροῦντο, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἀξιώσει νεώτερος ὢν πατρός τε καὶ μητρὸς πλέον ἔχειν καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐὰν τὸ αὑτοῦ μέρος ἀναλώσῃ, ἀπονειμάμενος τῶν πατρῴων; Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἔφη. Ἂν δὲ δὴ αὐτῷ μὴ ἐπιτρέ-
B πωσιν, ἆρ' οὐ | τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπιχειροῖ ἂν κλέπτειν καὶ ἀπατᾶν τοὺς γονέας; Πάντως. Ὁπότε δὲ μὴ δύναιτο, ἁρπάζοι ἂν καὶ βιάζοιτο μετὰ τοῦτο; Οἶμαι, ἔφη. Ἀντεχομένων δὴ καὶ μαχομένων, ὦ θαυμάσιε, γέροντός τε καὶ γραὸς ἆρ' εὐλαβηθείη ἂν καὶ φείσαιτο μή τι δρᾶσαι τῶν τυραννικῶν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε θαρρῶ περὶ τῶν γονέων τοῦ τοιούτου. Ἀλλ', ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, πρὸς Διός, ἕνεκα νεωστὶ φίλης καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίας ἑταίρας γεγουνίας τὴν
C πάλαι φίλην | καὶ ἀναγκαίαν μητέρα, ἢ ἕνεκα ὡραίου νεωστὶ φίλου γεγονότος οὐκ ἀναγκαίου τὸν ἄωρόν τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον πρεσβύτην πατέρα καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀρχαιότατον δοκεῖ ἄν σοι ὁ τοιοῦτος πληγαῖς τε δοῦναι καὶ καταδουλώσασθαι ἂν αὐτοὺς ὑπ' ἐκείνοις, εἰ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν οἰκίαν ἀγάγοιτο; Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς. Σφόδρα γε μακάριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ τυραννικὸν ὑὸν τεκεῖν. Πανύ
D γ', ἔφη. Τί δ', ὅταν δὴ τὰ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς | ἐπιλείπῃ τὸν τοιοῦτον, πολὺ δὲ ἤδη ξυνειλεγμένον ἐν αὐτῷ ᾖ τὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν σμῆνος, οὐ πρῶτον μὲν οἰκίας τινὸς ἐφάψεται τοίχου ἤ τινος ὀψὲ νύκτωρ ἰόντος τοῦ ἱματίου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἱερόν τι νεωκορήσει;

21. τὰ $A^2\Pi$: om. A^1.

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574 A 1 **ἀναγκαῖον δὴ κτλ.** The civic parallel is in VIII 568 D ff. *φέρειν* = 'lift' (in the sinister sense of *ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν*: cf. *Laws* 762 A). On the position of *ἐπιγιγνόμεναι* see VII 532 C *n.* The words *ἀξιώσει νεώτερος ὢν κτλ.* correspond to VIII 568 E ff., and *ἐὰν—ἀναλώσῃ* is subordinate to *ἀπονειμάμενος τῶν πατρῴων* ('his father's property,' not, of course, 'his patrimony': cf. VIII 568 E).

574 B 10 **ἀντεχομένων.** The middle of *ἀντέχω* in the sense of 'resist' is extremely rare; but occurs in Arist. *H. A.* VII 3. 583^a 18, possibly in Xen. *de Ven.* 6. 6, and occasionally in later Greek: see Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s.v. The presence of *μαχομένων* makes it unlikely that *ἀντεχομένων* means 'cleaving to' sc. in the attitude of supplication.

14 **οὐκ ἀναγκαίας.** The adjective *ἀναγκαῖος* throughout this sentence combines the two senses of 'necessary')('superfluous,' and 'related by the ties of blood.' Bosanquet justly draws attention to the singular pathos and *pietas* of Plato's words: cf. V 470 D *n.* For the parallel in the State see VIII 569 B.

574 C 17 **πληγαῖς—δοῦναι.** See VIII 566 C *n.*

574 D 21 **ἐπιλείπῃ.** The present has better MS authority, and is intrinsically more appropriate than the aorist: "nam et ei quod sequitur *ξυνειλεγμένον ᾖ* magis respondet et eo ipso temporis puncto quo patrimonium deficere incipit filium istum ad latrocinia et sacrilegia abripi accuratius significat" (Heller *Cur. Crit.* p. 4). Contrast VIII 568 E *n.*

23 **ἐφάψεται:** 'put himself in touch with' (*sich in Berührung setzen* Schneider). The delicate euphemism is missed by the English translators.

24 **ἱερόν τι νεωκορήσει:** 'will sweep out a temple.' The euphemism may be

καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν, ἃς πάλαι εἶχεν δόξας ἐκ παιδὸς περὶ καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας, αἱ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυμέναι, δορυφοροῦσαι τὸν ἔρωτα, κρατήσουσι μετ' ἐκείνου, αἷ πρότερον μὲν ὄναρ ἐλύοντο ἐν ὕπνῳ, ὅτε ἦν | αὐτὸς ἔτι ὑπὸ E
νόμοις τε καὶ πατρὶ δημοκρατούμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ· τυραννευθεὶς δὲ
ὑπὸ ἔρωτος, οἷος ὀλιγάκις ἐγίγνετο ὄναρ, ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος ἀεὶ γενόμενος, οὔτε τινὸς φόνου δεινοῦ ἀφέξεται οὔτε βρώματος οὔτ' ἔργου, ἀλλὰ | τυραννικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ ἔρως ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ 575
ζῶν, ἅτε αὐτὸς ὢν μόναρχος, τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν ὥσπερ πόλιν
ἄξει ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τόλμαν, ὅθεν αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτὸν θόρυβον
θρέψει, τὸν μὲν ἔξωθεν εἰσεληλυθότα ἀπὸ κακῆς ὁμιλίας, τὸν δ'

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illustrated by Cicero's jest about Verres, "futurum ut omnia verreret" (Quint. VI 3. 55). Suidas has *νεωκορήσει. ἐνίοτε ἀντὶ τοῦ ἱεροσυλήσει· κορεῖν γὰρ λέγουσι τὸ καλλύνειν, τὸ σαροῦν* ('sweep') *καὶ ἐκκαλλύνειν.* The explanation of the Scholiast is less accurate. See also Shück *de Scholiis* p. 34 and Photius I p. 103 (ed. Porson) *ἱερόν τι νεωκορήσας· εὐφημότερον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἱεροσυλήσας* (as emended by Schneider). L. and S. say that *νεωκόρος* does not mean 'temple-sweeper' till Philo, but the present passage shews that this meaning is at least as old as Plato.

26 **δικαίας.** The letters *αια* are written over an erasure in A, so that the scribe may have originally written *δίκας*, which appears in all other MSS. The Scholiast read *δικαίας*, as appears from his paraphrase *τῶν δοξῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἃς πάλαι εἶχεν*, and no one, since Bekker, has adopted *δίκας* except Stallbaum. *τὰς δίκας ποιουμένας* is indefensible, and *χρηστάς* in 573 B, to which Plato here refers, proves *δικαίας* right.

ποιουμένας κτλ. *ποιουμένας* = 'accounted': see on VI 498 A. The words *ἐκ δουλείας λελυμέναι* correspond to VIII 567 E. *ὄναρ* is an adverbial accusative: cf. VII 520 C *n.* The expression *ἐν ὕπνῳ*, though excised by Cobet (*V. L.*[2] p. 525), is quite in keeping with Plato's *ubertas orationis.*

574 E 29 **ἐν ἑαυτῷ.** So also in 579 C. Herwerden calls for *ἐν ἑαυτοῦ*, which could, of course, only mean 'in his senses': see Blaydes on Ar. *Wasps* 642.

30 **γενόμενος κτλ.** *γιγνόμενος* (Richards in *Cl. Rev.* VIII p. 23, following Stephanus) is a groundless conjecture. The tyrannical man must have reached this stage *before* he sticks at nothing. On *βρώματος* see 571 D *n.*

575 A 2 **ἅτε αὐτὸς κτλ.**: 'being himself a monarch with sole sway will not only lead the man in whom he dwells as in a city unto every form of daring' etc. *τε* is used *ἀνακολούθως*: see on II 373 B. The words *ἅτε αὐτὸς ὢν μόναρχος* suggest as the proper supplement of the *τε* clause something like 'but will also make *him* a tyrant too'; and the sentiment appears in a somewhat different form in 575 C, D (where see *nn.*). So Hoefer (*de part. Pl.* p. 14) correctly explains the passage. Schneider understands *κυβερνῶν* or the like (to balance *ὤν*) after *πόλιν*—an impossible solution, which he himself abandoned afterwards in his translation. Others cancel *τε* (*q* and Stallbaum), or suggest *ἔχοντά τε καὶ τρέφοντα* (Richards). Neither proposal is either necessary or probable. The words *ὥσπερ πόλιν* have also caused difficulty; and Vind. E offers the ingenious emendation *πώλον* (*sic*). Should *ὥσπερ πόλιν* be connected with *τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτόν* or with *ἄξει*? The latter view has hitherto, I believe, been held; but the introduction of the parallel is very awkward, and, in point of fact, neither Ἔρως nor even the tyrant himself was said in Book VIII to lead the city into daring deeds (VIII 566 D ff., quoted by Stallbaum, is nothing to the point). On the other view *ὥσπερ πόλιν* is natural and easy: if *ὁ ἔρως* is a *μόναρχος*, *ὁ ἔχων τὸν ἔρωτα* is the *πόλις* where he rules. Cf. *ἕως ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει πολιτείαν καταστήσωμεν* 590 E.

ἔνδοθεν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνεθέντα καὶ ἐλευθερωθέντα· ἢ οὐχ οὕτος ὁ βίος τοῦ τοιούτου; Οὗτος μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Καὶ ἂν μέν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐν πόλει ὦσι | καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πλῆθος σωφρονῇ, ἐξελθόντες ἄλλον τινὰ δορυφοροῦσι τύραννον ἢ μισθοῦ ἐπικουροῦσιν, ἐάν που πόλεμος ᾖ· ἐὰν δ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ γένωνται, αὐτοῦ δὴ ἐν τῇ πόλει κακὰ δρῶσι σμικρὰ πολλά. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις; Οἷα κλέπτουσι, τοιχωρυχοῦσι, βαλλαντιοτομοῦσι, λωποδυτοῦσιν, ἱεροσυλοῦσιν, ἀνδραποδίζονται· ἔστι δ' ὅτε συκοφαντοῦσιν, ἐὰν δυνατοὶ ὦσι λέγειν, καὶ ψευδομαρτυροῦσι καὶ δωροδοκοῦσιν. Σμικρά γ', ἔφη, κακὰ λέγεις, | ἐὰν ὀλίγοι ὦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι. Τὰ γὰρ σμικρά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὰ μεγάλα σμικρά ἐστιν καὶ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πρὸς τύραννον πονηρίᾳ τε καὶ ἀθλιότητι πόλεως, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐδ' ἴκταρ βάλλει. ὅταν γὰρ δὴ πολλοὶ ἐν πόλει γένωνται οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ ξυνε-

17. ἴκταρ Π: ἴκταρ A.

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5 **ὑπὸ τῶν—ἑαυτοῦ** has been called 'nonsense' by Richards, who conjectures for *καὶ ἑαυτοῦ* either *ἑαυτῷ*, or *καὶ αὐτόν*: Herwerden contents himself with deleting *καί*. The text is assuredly sound; and although Stallbaum is here at fault, Vermehren correctly explained the passage as long ago as 1870 (*Pl. Stud.* pp. 112 ff.). *καί* is *quoque*, and we should translate 'by means of the same dispositions in himself also' ("durch dieselben Eigenschaften auch seiner selbst" Vermehren). *τῶν αὐτῶν* sc. as those of his evil associates. The history of the State furnishes an exact parallel in the contrast between the *foreign* mercenaries and the emancipated slaves (VIII 567 D, E). Jowett's translation is right, but in his edition he still takes *καί* as 'and.'

575 B 11 **κλέπτουσι κτλ.** recalls I 344 B (where see *n.*) and 348 D. From Xen. *Mem.* I 2. 62 and *Symp.* 4. 36 it would seem that these crimes were commonly cited as instances of *ἀδικία* in the Socratic school. Cf. also Ar. *Thesm.* 817 ff.

575 C 15 **ἐὰν—τοιοῦτοι** is bracketed by Herwerden. The words are certainly difficult, if *σμικρά γε κακά* be taken as ironical, for we have no right to render *ἐάν* by 'even if': "a small catalogue of evils—(even) if there are only a few such men!" J. and C. But there is no irony. The meaning is 'True, they *are* small evils, if such men are few in number.' 'Yes,' said I, 'for small is small in comparison with great.' Adimantus' *caveat* prepares us for *ὅταν γὰρ δὴ πολλοὶ κτλ.* below.

16 **πονηρίᾳ**: 'in respect of a city's wretchedness and misery.' For the datives cf. VI 509 D (*σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ*), VIII 555 A and infra 576 C. Its union with *ἀθλιότητι* seems to shew that *πονηρία* is here 'wretchedness' rather than 'vice,' although the Greeks did not clearly separate the two ideas (see on I 335 B), and in Plato wickedness *is* misery.

17 **οὐδ' ἴκταρ βάλλει**: 'are not within sight of.' The proverb means *οὐδὲ ἐγγύς ἐστιν* (Diogen. III 46. The other sources are given in Leutsch u. Schneidewin *Paroem. Gr.* II p. 43). Eustathius (*in Od.* II 292. 27, quoted by Schneider) argues for the rough breathing *ἵκταρ* (see *cr. n.*), on the ground that the word comes from *ἱκνοῦμαι*; but it is clear from his argument, as well as from the other authorities, that *ἴκταρ* was the regular pronunciation.

ὅταν γὰρ δὴ κτλ. The tyrannical man is like the philosopher in *one* respect. He does not attain to his full development except in a city meet for him. See VI 497 A and Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II p. 318. With *μετὰ δήμου ἀνοίας* cf. Solon *Frag.* 11 ed. Bergk.

πόμενοι αὐτοῖς καὶ αἴσθωνται ἑαυτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, τότε οὗτοί εἰσιν
οἱ τὸν τύραννον γεννῶντες μετὰ δήμου ἀνοίας, ἐκεῖνον, ὃς ἂν αὐτῶν
μάλιστα αὐτὸς ἐν αὑτῷ μέγιστον καὶ | πλεῖστον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ D
τύραννον ἔχῃ. Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη· τυραννικώτατος γὰρ ἂν εἴη.
Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὲν ἑκόντες ὑπείκωσιν· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπῃ ἡ πόλις,
ὥσπερ τότε μητέρα καὶ πατέρα ἐκόλαζεν, οὕτω πάλιν τὴν πατρίδα,
ἐὰν οἷός τ' ᾖ, κολάσεται ἐπεισαγόμενος νέους ἑταίρους, καὶ ὑπὸ
τούτοις δὴ δουλεύουσαν τὴν πάλαι φίλην μητρίδα τε, Κρῆτές φασι,
καὶ πατρίδα ἕξει τε καὶ θρέψει. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τέλος ἂν εἴη τῆς
ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρός. | Τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, παντάπασί γε. E
Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτοί γε τοιοίδε γίγνονται ἰδίᾳ καὶ πρὶν ἄρχειν;
πρῶτον μὲν οἷς ἂν ξυνῶσιν, ἢ κόλαξιν ἑαυτῶν ξυνόντες καὶ πᾶν
ἑτοίμοις ὑπηρετεῖν, ἢ ἐάν τού τι δέωνται, αὐ|τοὶ ὑποπεσόντες, πάντα 576
σχήματα τολμῶντες ποιεῖν ὡς οἰκεῖοι, διαπραξάμενοι δὲ ἀλλότριοι;
Καὶ σφόδρα γε. Ἐν παντὶ ἄρα τῷ βίῳ ζῶσι φίλοι μὲν οὐδέποτε
οὐδενί, ἀεὶ δέ του δεσπόζοντες ἢ δουλεύοντες ἄλλῳ, ἐλευθερίας δὲ
καὶ φιλίας ἀληθοῦς τυραννικὴ φύσις ἀεὶ ἄγευστος. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν τοὺς τοιούτους ἀπίστους καλοῖμεν; Πῶς
δ' οὔ; Καὶ μὴν ἀδίκους γε ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἐν
τοῖς πρόσθεν | ὡμολογήσαμεν περὶ δικαιοσύνης, οἷόν ἐστιν. Ἀλλὰ B
μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὀρθῶς γε. Κεφαλαιωσώμεθα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν
κάκιστον. ἔστιν δέ που, οἷον ὄναρ διήλθομεν, ὃς ἂν ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος

31. τού τι (vel του τί) Ξq: τουτὶ ΑΠ.

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575 D **21 πλεῖστον—τύραννον.** The *τύραννος* is *ἔρως*: see 575 A *τυραννικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἔρως—ζῶν* and 573 D. This explanation, with which Schneider agrees, is better than to make *τύραννος* equivalent merely to 'the tyrannical element' (cf. II 382 D *n.*) and so weaken the force of *τυραννικώτατος γὰρ ἂν εἴη*. Plato here ignores the fact that if a successful tyrant has strong passions he is usually not less strong in capacity and will. If he were entirely the slave of Passion, he would not prove successful.

23 **ἐὰν μὲν κτλ.** Cf. *Prot.* 325 D. The idiom, which begins with Homer, is illustrated at length by Herwerden *Mn.* XIX pp. 338 f. The reference in *ὥσπερ τότε* is to 574 C. *νέους* is 'new' (Schneider), not 'young': cf. VIII 568 A *n.*, and *νεωστὶ φίλης, νεωστὶ φίλου* 574 B, C. *μητρίδα* Photius (ed. Porson I p. 268) thus explains: *μητρίδα· τὴν πατρίδα. καὶ* Πλάτων *καὶ Φερεκράτης.* Cf. Synes. *Ep.* 93. 1460 A Migne *μητρίδος, ὡς ἂν Κρῆτες εἴποιεν.*

27 **ἕξει τε καὶ θρέψει:** 'will have and hold' ("haben und halten" Schneider). There is no sarcasm in *θρέψει* ("that is his way of supporting her!" J. and C.): nor does the word in this passage mean more than 'keep.'

29 **τοιοίδε γίγνονται.** *τοιοίδε* "ad sequentia spectat" (Schneider), and *γίγνονται* = 'prove themselves,' 'shew themselves,' as often.

576 A 2 **ἀλλότριοι:** sc. *γιγνόμενοι*, rather than *γίγνονται*, which Schneider supplies. The participles are all in explanatory apposition with *τοιοίδε*. Ast bids us repeat *ὡς*, wrongly: see Heindorf on *Theaet.* 167 E.

3 **φίλοι μὲν—οὐδενί.** Cf. Xen. *Hiero* 3 and VIII 567 B *n.*

576 B 10 **οἷον κτλ.:** "qui *vigilans*

ἦ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος γίγνεται ὃς ἂν τυραννικώτατος φύσει ὢν μοναρχήσῃ, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν πλείω χρόνον ἐν τυραννίδι βιῷ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τοιοῦτος. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη διαδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον ὁ Γλαύκων.

IV. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃς ἂν φαίνηται πονηρότατος, καὶ ἀθλιώτατος | φανήσεται; καὶ ὃς ἂν πλεῖστον χρόνον καὶ μάλιστα τυραννεύσῃ, μάλιστά τε καὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον τοιοῦτος γεγονὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ; τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πολλὰ καὶ δοκεῖ. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ταῦτα

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talis est, qualem finximus supra (571 C, D, E) *somniantem*" (Stallbaum). The Oxford editors, with D. and V., and apparently also Schneider, translate 'He is the man who in reality is such as we imagined him in our dream.' The Greek is perhaps a little simpler if we take this view, but I agree with Bosanquet in preferring Stallbaum's, partly because such a statement could scarcely be called a *κεφάλαιον*, and partly on account of 574 E *οἷος ὀλιγάκις ἐγίγνετο ὄναρ, ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος ἀεὶ γενόμενος*—a striking observation which would be at once recalled to Adimantus' mind, although the strong antithesis between *ὄναρ* and *ὕπαρ* is alone sufficient to suggest the meaning. We expect brevity and compression in a summary description of this kind. For the purposes of grammatical explanation we should supply *εἶναι* after *διήλθομεν* ('as we described a man to be in dreams'). The ellipse is easy because of *ἦ*: for *ὃς*—*ᾗ* is logically antecedent to *οἷον*—*διήλθομεν*.

11 **οὗτος γίγνεται.** *οὗτος* is in the predicate. For *γίγνεται* see on VIII 562 A.

13 **διαδεξάμενος κτλ.** We have now finished our account of depraved cities and individuals, and the change of interlocutors shews that we are about to enter on a new stage in the discussion: cf. VI 487 A, 506 D al. Aristotle blames Plato for not saying what is to follow tyranny (*Pol.* E 12. 1316^{a} 25 ff.). In reply, Plato would, I think, first point out that he is not required to touch on this subject either by the main thesis of the *Republic* or by the special aim which he has in view throughout Books VIII and IX (see VIII 543 A *n.*). He might afterwards observe that, since the best hope of founding the perfect city lies in imbuing an absolute ruler or one of his descendants with a love of genuine philosophy (VI 499 B—502 C), the deepest darkness perhaps contained a promise of the dawn. See especially the striking passage in *Laws* 709 E—712 A. Aristotle seems to have understood him to mean this (*ἐπεὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνον δεῖ εἰς τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνετο συνεχὲς καὶ κύκλος* l.c.), and criticises him accordingly from the facts of experience; but the succession of polities in the *Republic* is not intended to be in all respects, or even primarily and chiefly, historical (VIII 543 A *n.*).

576 B—**577** B *What shall we say then about the happiness or unhappiness of the individual who is most depraved? As is the city, so will the individual be in point of happiness as well as virtue. And the city in which a tyrant rules is of all cities the worst and most unhappy. What of the tyrannical man? He that has lived with a tyrant, and is himself moreover capable of judging, will best decide. Let us pretend, says Socrates, that we ourselves possess these qualifications.*

576 C ff. We have now discussed *ὁ κάκιστος*, and it only remains to compare him with *ὁ ἄριστος* in respect of happiness and misery. The present chapter is introductory to the triad of arguments by means of which Plato proves that the victory rests with *ὁ ἄριστος*. His description of the misery of the tyrant is based, as he virtually tells us, on the evidence of his own eyes (577 A, B *nn.*), but we should of course remember that in such cases we are apt to see what we wish to see, and Plato's description, regarded as a portrait of Dionysius I, though it doubtless possesses a certain historical value, may well be somewhat overdrawn.

576 C 18 **τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς κτλ.** = 'although the multitude are multitudinous also in their views' expresses the antithesis implied in the emphatic *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*

γοῦν οὕτως ἔχειν. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅ γε τυραννικὸς κατὰ
τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἂν εἴη ὁμοιότητι, δημοτικὸς δὲ κατὰ
δημοκρατουμένην, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὕτω; Τί μήν; Οὐκοῦν ὅ τι
πόλις πρὸς πόλιν ἀρετῇ καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, τοῦτο καὶ ἀνὴρ πρὸς
ἄνδρα; | Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τί οὖν ἀρετῇ τυραννουμένη πόλις πρὸς D
βασιλευομένην οἵαν τὸ πρῶτον διήλθομεν; Πᾶν τοὐναντίον, ἔφη·
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρίστη, ἡ δὲ κακίστη. Οὐκ ἐρήσομαι, εἶπον, ὁποτέραν
λέγεις· δῆλον γάρ. ἀλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύ-
τως ἢ ἄλλως κρίνεις; καὶ μὴ ἐκπληττώμεθα πρὸς τὸν τύραννον
ἕνα ὄντα βλέποντες, μηδ' εἴ τινες ὀλίγοι περὶ ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ' ὡς χρὴ
ὅλην τὴν πόλιν εἰσελθόντας θεάσασθαι, καταδύντες | εἰς ἅπασαν E
καὶ ἰδόντες, οὕτω δόξαν ἀποφαινώμεθα. Ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, προ-
καλεῖ· καὶ δῆλον παντί, ὅτι τυραννουμένης μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀθλιωτέρα,
βασιλευομένης δὲ οὐκ εὐδαιμονεστέρα. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ
περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλούμενος ὀρθῶς ἂν προ- 577
καλοίμην, ἀξιῶν κρίνειν περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνον, ὃς δύναται τῇ διανοίᾳ
εἰς ἀνδρὸς ἦθος ἐνδὺς διιδεῖν, καὶ μὴ καθάπερ παῖς ἔξωθεν ὁρῶν
ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυραννικῶν προστάσεως, ἣν πρὸς τοὺς
ἔξω σχηματίζονται, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς διορᾷ; εἰ οὖν οἰοίμην δεῖν ἐκείνου

23. ἀρετῇ γρ in marg. A²: ἆρα ἡ A¹: ἄρα ἡ ΠΞ *q*.

)(τῇ δόξῃ. Herwerden's conjecture *τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἄλλα δοκεῖ* is singularly feeble and inelegant. The Scholiast neatly remarks *πολλὰ δοκεῖ· ἀντὶ τοῦ ψευδῆ· τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος πολυχοῦν, 'ἁπλοῦς δ' ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας' ἔφη.'* On Plato's contempt of the many see VI 494 A *n.*

ταῦτα refers to the two questions, not to *τοῖς—δοκεῖ*. If otherwise, Plato would, I think, have written *τοῦτο* here.

20 **ὁμοιότητι**, though doubted by Ast, Cobet, Herwerden, and others, is sound enough: see on VIII 555 A.

576 D 23 **ἀρετῇ**. See *cr. n.* The correct reading was first restored by Schneider

26 **εὐδαιμονίας—ἀθλιότητος κτλ.** For the genitive see on V 470 A. *μὴ ἐκπληττώμεθα* = 'do not let us be dazzled' (D. and V.): cf. 577 A. Jowett's 'panic-stricken' suggests a wrong idea.

28 **ἀλλ' ὡς κτλ.**: 'but as it is necessary to go into and survey the entire city, do not let us give our opinion until we have crept into the whole of the interior and seen it.' It is best to make *ὡς* virtually causal, as it often is when dependent on imperatives or imperatival expressions (here *ἀποφαινώμεθα*): cf. I 336 D, IV 420 E, *Symp.* 189 B et al. With *εἰς ὅλην τὴν πόλιν κτλ.* cf. IV 421 B *ἢ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὅλην βλέποντας θεατέον κτλ. καταδῦναι* playfully suggests that we mean to elude the tyrant's eye (cf. infra 579 B, *Gorg.* 485 D). He shall not catch us if we can help it. For other views on this clause see App. I.

577 A 4 **τῆς—σχηματίζονται**: 'circumstance and pomp of majesty, which they put on to the world outside.' Cf. *προστήσασθαι* X 599 A *n.* and (with Schneider) II 365 C *πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα—περιγραπτέον. τῶν τυραννικῶν* seems to be usually taken as masculine, in which case it might have been omitted without any loss to the meaning. I think it is the genitive of *τὰ τυραννικά*: cf. B below *ἐν οἷς μάλιστα γυμνὸς ἂν ὀφθείη τῆς τραγικῆς σκευῆς.*

5 **εἰ οὖν οἰοίμην κτλ.** 'If then I should think it right for all of us to listen to the man who is both capable

πάντας ἡμᾶς ἀκούειν, τοῦ δυνατοῦ μὲν κρῖναι, ξυνῳκηκότος δὲ ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ παραγεγονότος ἔν τε ταῖς κατ' οἰκίαν πράξεσιν, ὡς
B πρὸς ἑκάστους τοὺς οἰκείους | ἔχει, ἐν οἷς μάλιστα γυμνὸς ἂν ὀφθείη
τῆς τραγικῆς σκευῆς, καὶ ἐν αὖ τοῖς δημοσίοις κινδύνοις, καὶ ταῦτα
πάντα ἰδόντα κελεύοιμεν ἐξαγγέλλειν, πῶς ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας καὶ 10
ἀθλιότητος ὁ τύραννος πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους; Ὀρθότατ' ἄν, ἔφη, καὶ
ταῦτα προκαλοῖο. Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, προσποιησώμεθα ἡμεῖς

8. ἂν ὀφθείη Π: ἀνοφθείη A. 12. προσποιησώμεθα A³Π: προσποιησόμεθα A².

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of judging' etc. The dialogue form is strained almost to breaking in this remarkable sentence. We are all to be silent and listen to Plato himself. Plato might fairly claim from his psychological studies and experience as a teacher, to be *δυνατὸς τῇ διανοίᾳ εἰς ἀνδρὸς ἤθος ἐνδὺς διιδεῖν* and so *δυνατὸς κρῖναι*, and he had lived under the same roof with Dionysius I of Syracuse. The poet Gray was one of the first to observe that Plato is here meant.

577 B 8 ἐν οἷς='among whom' is surely better and more natural than *ἐν αἷς*, which Richards has conjectured. The tyrant lays aside the mask in his own family.

9 **τραγικῆς σκευῆς**="theatrical garb" (D. and V.) again betrays "a feeling of the kinship between the shows of tyranny and those of tragedy" (Bosanquet: cf. VIII 568 A *n.*). Dionysius I was himself a writer of tragedies, and notoriously jealous—so we are told—of his poetical reputation (Grote X pp. 302 ff.): but it would be frigid to suppose that this was in Plato's mind when he wrote the word *τραγικῆς*.

αὖ τοῖς was first conjecturally restored by Heindorf (on *Soph.* 262 A), following Ficinus, instead of the vulgate *αὐτοῖς*. It has since been found to be the reading of most of the other MSS as well as A.

10 **κελεύοιμεν**. The singular *κελεύοιμι* (*q* Flor. U) is still read by Stallbaum. There is surely no reason why Socrates should not associate Glauco with himself in this hypothetical invitation.

11 **ὀρθότατ' ἄν—προκαλοῖο** forms the apodosis to what Socrates has said (cf. 582 E), but refers "ad initium potius quam ad exitum orationis Socraticae" (Schneider. Cf. V 465 E *n.*). Glauco admits most fully the claim that Plato has earned a right to speak with authority on this subject.

12 **προσποιησώμεθα κτλ.** Plato cannot appear *in propria persona*, so that it is necessary for Socrates and Glauco to pretend that they also belong to the number of those 'who would be able to judge' and have met with *τύραννοι* and *τυραννικοί*. The fiction is rendered necessary by the laws of dialogue as *ἵνα—ἐρωτῶμεν* frankly states. We must beware of supposing that it is *Plato* who 'pretends': Plato does not pretend, but *ἐς δυνατὸς μὲν κρῖναι, ξυνῳκηκὼς δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κτλ.* (577 A). Richards objects to *ἄν* with *δυνατῶν*, and it is certainly unusual to find *ἄν* with an adjective in this way. But as *δυνατῶν* can itself take an infinitive, it hardly differs from the participle *δυναμένων*, and the suggestions *δυνατῶν ὄντων*, or *δυνατῶν ἂν <ὄντων>*, are unattractive. I should add in conclusion that nearly all critics are now agreed in holding that Plato throughout the whole of this passage is referring to his own experience of Dionysius I: see for example Susemihl *Gen. Entw.* II pp. 240, 294 ff., Teichmüller *Lit. Fehd.* I p. 110, Hirmer *Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Pol.* pp. 667 ff., with Zeller⁴ II p. 413 *n.* 1. The date of Plato's first visit to the elder Dionysius was in or near 388 B.C. Compare *Epp.* VII 324 A—327 D. Whether this epistle be genuine or not, the visit is abundantly attested, as Zeller proves (l.c. pp. 413—415 *nn.*), and it is strange that J. and C. should still have doubts upon the subject. See also on V 473 D, VI 496 B, 499 B and infra 579 B *n.*

577 B—580 C *Like the city whose counterpart he is, the tyrannical man is in reality a slave, powerless to work his will, penniless and insatiate, full of fear and lamentation. A still greater depth of misery awaits him if he becomes a*

εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ἂν κρῖναι καὶ ἤδη ἐντυχόντων τοιούτοις, ἵνα ἔχωμεν ὅστις ἀποκρινεῖται ἃ ἐρωτῶμεν; Πάνυ γε.

V. Ἴθι δή μοι, ἔφην, ὧδε σκόπει. τὴν ὁμοιότητα ἀναμιμνη- C
σκόμενος τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός, οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει ἀθρῶν τὰ παθήματα ἑκατέρου λέγε. Τὰ ποῖα; ἔφη. Πρῶτον μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς πόλιν εἰπεῖν, ἐλευθέραν ἢ δούλην τὴν τυραννουμένην ἐρεῖς; Ὡς οἷόν τ', ἔφη, μάλιστα δούλην. Καὶ μὴν ὁρᾷς γε ἐν αὐτῇ δεσπότας καὶ ἐλευθέρους. Ὁρῶ, ἔφη, σμικρόν γέ τι τοῦτο· τὸ δὲ ὅλον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικέστατον ἀτίμως τε καὶ ἀθλίως δοῦλον. Εἰ οὖν, εἶπον, ὅμοιος ἀνὴρ τῇ D
πόλει, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἐνεῖναι, καὶ πολλῆς μὲν δουλείας τε καὶ ἀνελευθερίας γέμειν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ,

22. ἀνὴρ Campbell: *ἀνὴρ* codd.

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tyrant. Imagine the piteous plight of one who is suddenly transported into a solitary place where he is at the mercy of his own slaves, and surrounded by free neighbours who make common cause with them! Such is the position of the tyrant, a prisoner in his own palace, tormented by longings which he can never appease. To sum up, he is the supreme embodiment of vice and misery, and the longer he holds sway, the worse he becomes.

Let us now give judgment. In respect of virtue and happiness the different individuals stand as follows: (1) *Kingly,* (2) *Timocratical,* (3) *Oligarchical,* (4) *Democratical,* (5) *Tyrannical. He who is most kingly is best and happiest, he who is most a tyrant over himself and city, worst and most miserable,—whether their true character be hidden from men and gods, or not.*

577 C ff. The arguments by means of which Plato establishes his conclusion may be briefly described as the political argument, the psychological argument, and the metaphysical argument. The first (577 B—580 C) depends on the resemblance between the soul and the State, the second (580 C—583 A) on the threefold division of the soul into *λογιστικόν*, *θυμοειδές*, and *ἐπιθυμητικόν*, the third (583 B—587 B) on Plato's theory of Reality or Being. Now it is just these three methods of investigation, and these alone, which have been employed in the different parts of the dialogue, the political and psychological in II—IV and VIII—IX, the metaphysical in V—VII; and it is therefore altogether appropriate and right that Plato should bring them together now, and use their united forces 'in making up the last account.' The sequence of the three arguments follows the usual Platonic way of progression from the exoteric to the esoteric, and as the ideal city culminated in metaphysical idealism, so it is a metaphysical argument that crowns our citadel of proof.

577 C 16 **καθ' ἕκαστον κτλ.** *καθ' ἕκαστον*='point by point,' 'in detail,' not 'singly' (D. and V.), which would be *καθ' ἑκάτερον* here, since only two objects of comparison are involved. *ἀθρῶν*: sc. *ἑκάτερον*, viz. the city and the man (J. and C.). On *ὡς πόλιν εἰπεῖν* and *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* ('I might almost say') see I 341 B *n.*

577 D **22 ἀνήρ.** See *cr. n.* I have followed the advice of a reviewer of my *Text of the Republic* in *Hermath.* XXIV p. 256 and accepted Campbell's *ἀνήρ*. It is difficult to dispense with the article here: cf. *τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός* above.

24 **ἀνελευθερίας κτλ.** In *ἀνελευθερίας* there is here a strong suggestion of the etymological meaning ("Unfreiheit" Schneider). *μικρόν*, as J. and C. observe, is introduced to make the parallel between State and individual as complete as possible. From another point of view it might be held that the *μοχθηρότατον* in the tyrannical soul is not *σμικρόν* but *πολύ* (573 D—576 B).

καὶ ταῦτα αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη δουλεύειν, ἅπερ ἦν ἐπιεικέστατα, μικρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μοχθηρότατον καὶ μανικώτατον δεσπόζειν; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; δούλην ἢ ἐλευθέραν τὴν τοιαύτην φήσεις εἶναι ψυχήν; Δούλην δή που ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν ἥ γε αὖ δούλη καὶ τυραννουμένη πόλις ἥκιστα ποιεῖ ἃ βούλεται; Πολύ γε. Καὶ ἡ
E τυραννουμένη ἄρα | ψυχὴ ἥκιστα ποιήσει ἃ ἂν βουληθῇ, ὡς περὶ ὅλης εἰπεῖν ψυχῆς· ὑπὸ δὲ οἴστρου ἀεὶ ἐλκομένη βίᾳ ταραχῆς καὶ μεταμελείας μεστὴ ἔσται. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Πλουσίαν δὲ ἢ πενομένην ἀνάγκη τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν εἶναι; Πενομένην.
578 Καὶ ψυχὴν ἄρα τυραννικὴν | πενιχρὰν καὶ ἄπληστον ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι. Οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τί δέ; φόβου γέμειν ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη τήν τε τοιαύτην πόλιν τόν τε τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα; Πολλή γε. Ὀδυρμοὺς δὲ καὶ στεναγμοὺς καὶ θρήνους καὶ ἀλγηδόνας οἴει ἔν τινι ἄλλῃ πλείους εὑρήσειν; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἐν ἀνδρὶ δὲ ἡγεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ πλείω εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ μαινομένῳ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμιῶν τε καὶ
B ἐρώτων τούτῳ τῷ τυραννικῷ; Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη. Εἰς πάντα δή, οἶμαι, ταῦτά τε καὶ | ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας τήν γε πόλιν τῶν πόλεων ἀθλιωτάτην ἔκρινας. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς; ἔφη. Καὶ μάλα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αὖ τοῦ τυραννικοῦ τί λέγεις εἰς ταὐτὰ

3. τε τοιαύτην Ξ: γε τοιαύτην ΑΠ q. 4. δὲ Ξ: τε ΑΠ q. 8. γε Ξ q^2: τε ΑΠ q^1.

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577 D, E 29 **καὶ ἡ τυραννουμένη κτλ.** There is no *βούλησις*, in the true sense of that term, except *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*: cf. I 336 A with the *Gorgias* quoted ad loc. and *Men.* 77 C ff. Or in other words Virtue alone is free: cf. *ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον* X 617 E with note ad loc. See also Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II p. 317.

30 **ὡς—ψυχῆς.** The restriction (for which cf. 579 E) is necessary, for the *μοχθηρότατον* part of the *τυραννουμένη ψυχή* will have its way.

31 **ἑλκομένη κτλ.** Badham's *ἑλαυνομένη* would be less suitable with *βίᾳ* than *ἑλκομένη* (cf. VII 515 E), and is otherwise a gratuitous alteration. On *ταραχῆς* see VIII 547 A, 557A, 561 C *nn.* In the tyrannical soul the fatal principle of *ἀνομοιότης* attains its highest development. With *μεταμελείας* cf. *ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικός* (Arist. *Eth. Nic.* VII 9. 1150^b 30).

578 A 1 **ἄπληστον**: like the sieve in *Gorg.* 493 A—D (Nettleship). Nothing can 'fill up the cistern' of his lust.

2 **τήν τε—πόλιν.** I follow the Oxford editors in putting *τε* for *γε* (see *cr. n.*). *γε* is not indefensible; but the balance with *τόν τε τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα* is strongly in favour of *τε*: see the examples cited in Hoefer *de part. Plat.* p. 12.

3 **ὀδυρμοὺς δέ.** See *cr. n.* Jowett defended *τε*: Campbell and all the other editors do better in accepting the text of Ξ. A few MSS have *γε*: and Plato may have written *ὀδυρμοὺς δέ γε* as Schneider suggests.

5 **ἐν ἀνδρὶ κτλ.**: 'and in an individual,' viz. as contrasted with a *πόλις*, whence the emphatic position to which the words are assigned. In *ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ* the idiom is akin to 'partitive apposition': see IV 431 A *n.*

578 B 8 **τήν γε πόλιν.** *γε* is restrictive: our verdict on the *individual* has still to be pronounced. Cf. 582 B, C. J. and C. are the only editors who retain *τε* here (see *cr. n.*), but the anacoluthon would be too harsh, and *τὸν ἔχοντά τε* in 575 A is different: see note ad loc.

ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων; Μακρῷ, ἔφη, ἀθλιώτατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. Τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκέτ' ὀρθῶς λέγεις. Πῶς; ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὔπω, ἔφην, οἶμαι, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα. Ἀλλὰ τίς μήν; Ὅδε ἴσως σοι ἔτι δόξει εἶναι τούτου ἀθλιώτερος. Ποῖος; Ὃς ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυραννικὸς ὢν μὴ ἰδιώτην βίον καταβιῷ, ἀλλὰ C δυστυχὴς ᾖ καὶ αὐτῷ ὑπό τινος συμφορᾶς ἐκπορισθῇ ὥστε τυράννῳ γενέσθαι. Τεκμαίρομαί σε, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' οὐκ οἴεσθαι χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' εὖ μάλα τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ σκοπεῖν. περὶ γάρ τοι τοῦ μεγίστου ἡ σκέψις, ἀγαθοῦ τε βίου καὶ κακοῦ. Ὀρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς. Σκόπει δή, εἰ ἄρα τι λέγω. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι δεῖν ἐννοῆσαι ἐκ τῶνδε περὶ D αὐτοῦ σκοποῦντας. Ἐκ τίνων; Ἐξ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι πλούσιοι ἐν πόλεσιν ἀνδράποδα πολλὰ κέκτηνται. οὗτοι γὰρ

19. τῷ τοιούτῳ nos: τῷ τοιούτῳ ΑΠΞ *q*.

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13 **τοιοῦτος μάλιστα**: i.q. *ἄθλιος μάλιστα*. The subject is *οὗτος*, and *ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα* is in the predicate.

578 C 15 **τυραννικὸς ὤν**. "Have a care of inserting any negative particle here, as H. Stephanus would do, which would wholly destroy the sense" (Thomas Gray). Cf. 575 C, D and 579 C.

16 **δυστυχὴς ᾖ**. Cobet (*V. L.*² p. 534) revives Bekker's *δυστυχήσῃ*: but the MS reading is preferable: "significatur infelicitatem ei qui tyrannus factus sit, usque adesse perpetuoque eum comitari" (Schneider). Cf. VIII 561 A *n.* and *δυστυχεῖ εἶναι* 580 A.

18 **ἀλλ' εὖ μάλα κτλ.**: 'but carefully study by means of argument the two individuals in question.' *τῷ τοιούτῳ* is literally 'the two such people,' i.e. the two *τυραννικοί*, viz. the *τυραννικός* who lives an *ἰδιώτης βίος*, and the *τυραννικός* who becomes a *τύραννος*. It is the relative position of these two individuals in respect of misery which is the question before us now, and the rest of this chapter aims at answering it by argument: see 579 C, D, where the conclusion of the reasoning is given. No satisfactory explanation of the MS reading *τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ σκοπεῖν* (*cr. n.*) has yet been offered. Some hold that *τοιούτῳ* refers forward ("nach folgender Regel," Schleiermacher, Prantl), but *τῷ τοιούτῳ* cannot be thus used, although *τοιούτῳ* by itself might be. Others translate "by the help of such a process of reasoning as we now employ" (J. and C. etc.). I doubt whether this meaning, which does not, by the way, furnish a sufficiently pointed antithesis to *οἴεσθαι*, is easily conveyed by *τῷ τοιούτῳ*. The translations "bei einer solchen Untersuchung" (Schneider), "where the argument is of such a nature" (J. and C., comparing the altogether different *τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς* in 579 C), and 'in this high argument' are untenable on grammatical grounds; nor can we easily explain the dative as meaning 'in the interests of' ("videndum ne dativus eam rem significet, cuius gratia accurate quaerendum esse Socrates dicat" Schneider). The emendations proposed are (1) *τὸ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ* (Stephanus), (2) *τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγῳ* or *τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγῳ* (Ast), (3) fortasse *εὖ μάλ' ἐν κτλ.* (W. H. Thompson *J. Ph.* V p. 218). Did Stephanus mean by *τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ* something like the *δίκαιος* and *ἄδικος λόγος* of the *Clouds*? *τοιούτῳ* could not convey so much, but Stephanus was, I believe, on the right track when he restored *τῷ τοιούτῳ*. The corruption was all the easier, because the dual is constantly corrupted in the MSS of the *Republic*: thus in III 410 E all MSS have *ἀμφότερα*, in III 412 A *ἐπιτειναμένῳ* was written by A¹, in IV 422 E *πολέμια* is the reading of A, and in IV 442 D both A and Π give *τῷ ἀρχομένῳ* for *τὸ ἀρχομένῳ*. Cf. also III 395 A *n.*

578 D 23 **ὅσοι πλούσιοι**. We ought not, with J. and C., to understand *ὄντες*. The adjective logically belongs to *ἰδιωτῶν*, but is idiomatically placed in the relative clause: see Kuhner *Gr. Gr.* II pp. 924 ff.

τοῦτό γε προσόμοιον ἔχουσιν τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ πολλῶν ἄρχειν· διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἐκείνου πλῆθος. Διαφέρει γάρ. Οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι οὗτοι ἀδεῶς ἔχουσιν καὶ οὐ φοβοῦνται τοὺς οἰκέτας; Τί γὰρ ἂν φοβοῖντο; Οὐδέν, εἶπον· ἀλλὰ τὸ αἴτιον ἐννοεῖς; Ναί· ὅτι γε
E πᾶσα ἡ πόλις ἐνὶ ἑκάστῳ βοηθεῖ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. Καλῶς, | ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. τί δέ; εἴ τις θεῶν ἄνδρα ἕνα, ὅτῳ ἔστιν ἀνδράποδα πεντήκοντα ἢ πλείω, ἆρας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας θείη εἰς ἐρημίαν μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τε καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν, ὅπου αὐτῷ μηδεὶς τῶν ἐλευθέρων μέλλοι βοηθήσειν, ἐν ποίῳ ἄν τινι καὶ ὁπόσῳ φόβῳ οἴει γενέσθαι αὐτὸν περί τε αὑτοῦ καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικός, μὴ ἀπόλοιντο ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν; Ἐν παντί, ἦ δ'
579 ὅς, ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν | ἀναγκάζοιτο ἄν τινας ἤδη θωπεύειν αὐτῶν τῶν δούλων, καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι πολλὰ καὶ ἐλευθεροῦν οὐδὲν δεόμενος, καὶ κόλαξ αὐτὸς ἂν θεραπόντων ἀναφανείη; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ἢ ἀπολωλέναι. Τί δ', εἰ καὶ ἄλλους, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεὸς

30. ἆρας Π: ᾄρας Α.

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25 **ἐκείνου.** On the transition from plural to singular see I 347 A *n.*

26 **τί γὰρ κτλ.**. 'Why of course, what should they be afraid of?' sc. in their slaves. *τί* is not 'why,' but 'what,' as *οὐδέν* shews: cf. V 449 B *n.* Campbell, making *τί* 'why,' translates *οὐδέν* by 'Oh, for no reason,' and refers to *Prot.* 310 B; but there too *οὐδέν* is 'nothing': see my note ad loc.

578 E 29 **εἴ τις θεῶν κτλ.** It is a mistake to suppose from this passage that the treatment of slaves in Athens or Greece generally was exceptionally cruel or unkind. Granted the existence of slavery at all, what Plato here says would nearly always be found true, especially where, as in Athens, the slaves belonged for the most part to an alien and inferior race. See Gilbert *Gk Const. Ant.* E. T. pp. 170—174. Fifty slaves would of course be more than the average number belonging to a single citizen. In Athens, during the fourth century B.C., the slaves were probably little, if at all, more numerous than the free-born population and metoecs (Beloch *Die Bevölk. d. Gr.-Röm. Welt* p. 99).

33 **ὁπόσῳ.** On *ὁπόσῳ* following *ποίῳ* see I 348 B *n.*

579 A 1 **αὐτῶν τῶν δούλων.** "Quum ingenui desint, a quibus auxilium petat, nonnullis ex servorum ipsorum, quos timet, numero adulari cogitur" (Schneider). This explanation, which Vermehren also approves (*Pl. Stud.* p. 114), exactly meets the case, and there is no reason either to change *αὐτῶν* to *αὖ* (with Stephanus) or to delete *τῶν δούλων* (with Ast and Herwerden).

2 **οὐδὲν δεόμενος:** 'when he needn't.' He is under no obligation to set them free: why then should he make them a present of their freedom? The innuendo is in Plato's neatest style. For the language cf. (with Schneider) Plut. *Tib. Gracch.* 21. 2 *δείσασα περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἡ βουλὴ ψηφίζεται μηδὲν δεομένῃ πέμπειν αὐτὸν εἰς Ἀσίαν.* The conjecture *οὐδὲν δεομένους* (Groen v. Prinsterer *Prosop. Plat.* p. 211, Ast, and Herwerden, who appeals in vain to Plut. *Cato Maior* 12. 3, Dem. 11. 9, and Isocr. *Areop.* 25) is, as Schneider shews, inept; for if the slaves do not need to be set free, because they are practically free already, "ne ero quidem opus est ut ad eos coercendos illam aliamve ineat rationem."

4 **ἄλλους—γείτονας.** These free-born neighbours in Plato's simile represent surrounding independent States, who detest tyranny, and help the tyrant's subjects. See Newman's *Politics of Aristotle* II p. 315.

κύκλῳ κατοικίσειεν γείτονας πολλοὺς αὐτῷ, οἳ μὴ ἀνέχοιντο, εἴ τις ἄλλος ἄλλου δεσπόζειν ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ' εἴ πού τινα τοιοῦτον λαμβάνοιεν, ταῖς ἐσχάταις τιμωροῖντο τιμωρίαις; Ἔτι ἄν, ἔφη, οἶμαι, μᾶλλον ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ εἴη, κύκλῳ φρουρούμενος ὑπὸ πάντων B πολεμίων. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τοιούτῳ μὲν δεσμωτηρίῳ δέδεται ὁ τύραννος, φύσει ὢν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν φόβων καὶ ἐρώτων μεστός· λίχνῳ δὲ ὄντι αὐτῷ τὴν ψυχὴν μόνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε ἀποδημῆσαι ἔξεστιν οὐδαμόσε οὔτε θεωρῆσαι ὅσων δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυμηταί εἰσιν, καταδεδυκὼς δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γυνὴ ζῇ, φθονῶν | καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολί- C ταις, ἐάν τις ἔξω ἀποδημῇ καί τι ἀγαθὸν ὁρᾷ; Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

VI. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς πλείω καρποῦται ἀνὴρ ὃς ἂν κακῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ πολιτευόμενος, ὃν νῦν δὴ σὺ ἀθλιώτατον ἔκρινας, τὸν τυραννικόν, ὡς μὴ ἰδιώτης καταβιῷ, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκασθῇ

5. κατοικίσειε q^2: κατοικήσειεν vel κατοικήσειε ΑΠΞ q^1. 8. εἴη Ξ q: εἰ εἴη ΑΠ, sed *ei* puncto notavit A^2. 18. ἑαυτῷ A^2Π: ταυτῷ (*sic*) A^1.

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579 B 8 **ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων**: 'by none but enemies': cf. *πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις* in VI 496 D. The tyrant's splendid but awful isolation is admirably brought out by Plato: see also on VIII 567 B. In this respect Plato's similitude faithfully reflects the position of Dionysius I in Sicily and indeed, except for the support which Sparta lent him, in the whole Hellenic world. See Grote X p. 306 ff.

9 **ἐν τοιούτῳ κτλ.** The picture which follows is no doubt also drawn from Dionysius I: see Grote X pp. 244, 328 *nn.*

11 **λίχνῳ** "is the same with regard to the eye, that liquorishness is to the taste" (Thomas Gray).

12 **οὔτε ἀποδημῆσαι κτλ.** The parallel with Xen. *Hiero* I. 11 is singularly close. Plato speaks *con amore*, thinking doubtless of his own sojournings in foreign lands. See Zeller[4] II pp. 404—414. Neuman *de locis Aegypt. in oper. Plat.* (1874) discovers many allusions to Plato's 'Wanderjahre' throughout his works.

13 **ὅσων δὴ κτλ.** Such as the Olympian games etc.: cf. Xen. l.c. *τὰς κοινὰς πανηγύρεις ἔνθα τὰ ἀξιοθεατότατα δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀνθρώποις συναγείρεσθαι.* Dionysius was represented at Olympia by deputy, as Hermann reminds us (*Gesch. u. System* p. 116). Cf. Grote X p. 303. The phrase *τι ἀγαθὸν ὁρᾷ*, with which the sentence concludes, has a curiously modern sound.

17 **οὐκοῦν κτλ.**: 'greater then, by evils such as these, is the profit which is reaped by the individual who' etc. ("Um so grosse Übel reicher also ist der Mann" Schleiermacher). *τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς* is dative of amount of difference: cf. II 373 E *μείζονος—οὔτι σμικρῷ, ἀλλ' ὅλῳ στρατοπέδῳ*, VI 507 E *οὐ σμικρᾷ—ἰδέᾳ—τιμιωτέρῳ* and *Laws* 848 B (Schneider *Addit.* p. 72). The passage has been strangely misunderstood, Stephanus suggesting variously <*ἐπὶ*> or <*πρὸς*> *τοῖς τοιούτοις* or *τῶν τοιούτων*, and Ast <*ἐν*> *τοῖς τοιούτοις*. Stallbaum comes nearer to the truth in his "per huius modi mala," but the dative is exactly as in *τοσούτῳ πλείω*. The view that the dative is merely one of 'circumstance'—an alternative suggestion in J. and C.—cannot be upheld. See also on 578 C. The reference in *νῦν δή* is to 578 B.

19 **ὡς μὴ κτλ.** I have returned to the text of A, Π, and nearly all the MSS. Θ^1 with Stobaeus (*Flor.* 50. 50) has *μὴ ὡς*, and so Stallbaum and Baiter read. *μὴ ὡς* suits better with *ἀλλὰ ἀναγκασθῇ*, but the irregularity is slight, and, as Schneider observes, the sentence opens as if it were

ὑπό τινος τύχης τυραννεῦσαι, καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ὢν ἀκράτωρ ἄλλων ἐπιχειρήσῃ ἄρχειν· ὥσπερ εἴ τις κάμνοντι σώματι καὶ ἀκράτορι
D ἑαυτοῦ μὴ ἰδιωτεύων, ἀλλ' ἀγωνιζόμενος | πρὸς ἄλλα σώματα καὶ μαχόμενος ἀναγκάζοιτο διάγειν τὸν βίον. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ὁμοιότατά τε καὶ ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, παντελῶς τὸ πάθος ἄθλιον, καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ σοῦ κριθέντος χαλεπώτατα ζῆν χαλεπώτερον ἔτι ζῇ ὁ τυραννῶν; Κομιδῇ γ', ἔφη. Ἔστιν ἄρα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ, ὁ τῷ ὄντι τύραννος τῷ ὄντι δοῦλος τὰς μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας
E | καὶ κόλαξ τῶν πονηροτάτων, καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ἀποπιμπλάς, ἀλλὰ πλείστων ἐπιδεέστατος καὶ πένης τῇ ἀληθείᾳ φαίνεται, ἐάν τις ὅλην ψυχὴν ἐπίστηται θεάσασθαι, καὶ φόβου γέμων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου σφαδασμῶν τε καὶ ὀδυνῶν πλήρης, εἴπερ τῇ τῆς πόλεως διαθέσει ἧς ἄρχει ἔοικεν. ἔοικεν δέ· ἢ γάρ;
580 Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. | Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι ἀποδώσομεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἃ τὸ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν φθονερῷ, ἀπίστῳ, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίῳ καὶ πάσης κακίας πανδοκεῖ τε καὶ τροφεῖ,

27. δοκεῖ Lob.: δοκῇ A cum ceteris.

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meant to be positive and not negative, so that *ὡς μή* is suited to what precedes. We may add that *ὡς μὴ ἰδιώτης καταβιῷ* is a clearer echo of *μὴ ἰδιώτην βίον καταβιῷ* 578 C, which Plato wishes to recall.

579 D 27 **κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ κτλ.** Cf. V 473 A and (for *κἄν*) III 408 B *n.* The reading *δοκῇ* (see *cr. n.*) is retained by Schneider, but *ε* and *η* are easily confused, and, even if we allow sporadic instances of *εἰ* with the subjunctive in Attic, the analogy of V 473 A, as well as the sense, is in favour of *δοκεῖ*. There need not be a specific allusion in *τῳ*: for praises of tyranny and the tyrant's lot were common enough in Greece: cf. I 344 B, VIII 568 A *nn.* The phrase *τῷ ὄντι* invites us to understand *τύραννος* and *δοῦλος* in the fullest sense: cf. V 474 A *n.*

28 **δοῦλος κτλ.** I once too rashly placed *καὶ κόλαξ* after *δοῦλος*, in order to obtain a chiasmus, understanding *δουλείας τῶν πονηροτάτων* like *δούλων δουλείαν* in VIII 569 C. Two inferior MSS have *δουλείας καὶ θωπείας*: but the inversion is not difficult, because the two notions are so closely allied: cf. (with Schneider) *Euthyd.* 302 B *ἄπορόν τινα στροφὴν ἔφευγόν τε καὶ ἐστρεφόμην* (where Schanz's brackets 'nemini nocent').

579 E 29 **καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας κτλ.** Xenophon's *Hiero* is in effect a diluted commentary on this sentence: cf. also *Gorg.* 524 E ff., and especially Shakespeare's *Macbeth* IV 3. 50—99, V 3. 22—29.

32 **σφαδασμῶν** = 'convulsive movements' is a rare word. The spelling *σφαδᾳσμός* appears in no MS except A^1; but the iota is attested from other sources: see Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s. v. The verb *σφαδάζειν* (*μετὰ σπασμοῦ πηδᾶν* Hesych.) denotes any nervous, twitching, convulsive motion, outside one's own control, the result of excitement, fear, pain, disease etc. (Stephanus-Hase l. c.). For the sense of this passage cf. 577 E *n.*

580 A 2 **τὸ πρότερον κτλ.** The reference is to VIII 567 and supra 576 A, B. *ἢ πρότερον* might of course have been spared, and Herwerden *more suo* cuts it out; but the sentence gains in weight by the addition.

καὶ ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ δυστυχεῖ εἶναι, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς πλησίον αὐτῷ τοιούτους ἀπεργάζεσθαι. Οὐδείς σοι, ἔφη, τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων ἀντερεῖ. Ἴθι δή μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, νῦν ἤδη ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ | πάντων κριτὴς ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ σὺ οὕτω, τίς πρῶτος B

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580 A, B **7 νῦν ἤδη** ('nunc demum') is fully illustrated by Jecht *de usu part. ἤδη in Pl. dialog.* pp. 44 f.

8 ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων κτλ. The comparison is borrowed from the Athenian method of judging in musical or dramatic competitions. According to Petersen, who in his Dorpat program *über die Preisrichter der Grossen Dionysien zu Athen* (1878) has carefully investigated the whole subject, the mode of procedure was as follows. Some time before the festival a number of qualified persons were selected by the *βουλευταί* in cooperation with the *χορηγοί*, and their names deposited in 10 urns, one for each *φυλή*. On the day of the contest, one name was drawn from each urn, and the ten judges thereby constituted, after witnessing the performance, each wrote down in his *γραμματεῖον* the order in which he arranged the several competitors. Of these ten judges five were next selected by lot, and the final verdict was given in accordance with the votes already registered by these five. The most important piece of evidence in support of this theory is furnished by Lysias 4. 3 *ἐβουλόμην δ' ἂν μὴ ἀπολαχεῖν αὐτὸν κριτὴν Διονυσίοις, ἵν' ὑμῖν φανερὸς ἐγένετο ἐμοὶ διηλλαγμένος, κρίνας τὴν ἐμὴν φυλὴν νικᾶν· νῦν δὲ ἔγραψε μὲν ταῦτα εἰς τὸ γραμματεῖον, ἀπέλαχε δέ.* In none of the ancient authorities, which are fully cited by Petersen, do we find the expression *ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής*: but Petersen thinks the phrase may perhaps denote any one of the surviving five, *who had lasted through all the stages*, having been originally chosen by the Senate, and afterwards by lot on the two remaining opportunities. The singular number, according to Petersen, is generic, as in *Laws* 659 A, B and elsewhere. It is true of course that the matter could not always be brought to an immediate issue in this way; for, to take a single instance, in a case where there were, let us say, three competitors, the votes of the five judges might result in a tie between two competitors for each of the three prizes. Thus we might have:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1st Prize	A	B	C	A	B
2nd Prize	B	A	B	C	C
3rd Prize	C	C	A	B	A

In such a case we must, I suppose, believe either that one of the five judges, who will then be *ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής*, had a casting vote, or else—and this is the more reasonable view—that C was held to be disqualified for the first prize, and fresh scrutinies began. Petersen's explanation is accepted in the main by Müller (*Griech. Bühnenalt.* pp. 369—372), and, though to some extent conjectural, appears to me the best available, except in one point. *ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής* can hardly be separated from *ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγών*, a phrase which is quoted from Cratinus' *Panoptae* (*Fr.* 157 Kock), and explained as *ὁ ἔσχατος ἀγών* in Bekker's *Anecdota* p. 91. 10. The *διὰ πάντων κριτής* must surely mean the judge of the *διὰ πάντων ἀγών*, and if so, *διὰ πάντων* should be similarly interpreted in both phrases. In *διὰ πάντων ἀγών* it cannot mean "der durch alle Stadien oder besser durch alle Collegien hindurchgegangen war" (Petersen l. c. p. 24), but may possibly mean the last and greatest *ἀγών*, as *τὸ διὰ πασῶν* is the greatest interval in a scale of one octave. The expression is strangely reminiscent of the musical terms *διὰ πέντε*, *διὰ τεττάρων*, *διὰ πασῶν* etc., and in a competition between *χοροί*, it is natural enough that musical analogies should provide a name for the decisive struggle in which the claims of the competitors as it were contend with one another for the final victory. It will be seen that I understand *ἀγών* in the quotation from Cratinus as referring, not to the actual dramatic or musical representation, but to the final struggle in which the lot arbitrates between the rival claims, the earlier *ἀγών* being presumably that which is decided by the votes of the ten judges: so that the upshot of the whole matter will be that Socrates appeals to Glauco, as the Archon might to one of the five judges in what we may be forgiven for calling the 'grand finale,'

κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ τίς δεύτερος, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἑξῆς πέντε ὄντας κρῖνε, βασιλικόν, τιμοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικόν, δημοκρατικόν, τυραννικόν. Ἀλλὰ ῥᾳδία, ἔφη, ἡ κρίσις. καθάπερ γὰρ εἰσῆλθον, ἔγωγε ὥσπερ χοροὺς κρίνω, ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ. Μισθωσώμεθα οὖν κήρυκα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ αὐτὸς ἀνείπω, ὅτι ὁ Ἀρίστωνος ὑὸς τὸν ἄριστόν τε καὶ δικαιό-
C τατον | εὐδαιμονέστατον ἔκρινε, τοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν βασιλικώτατον καὶ βασιλεύοντα αὑτοῦ, τὸν δὲ κάκιστόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτατον ἀθλιώτατον, τοῦτον δὲ αὖ τυγχάνειν ὄντα ὃς ἂν τυραννικώτατος ὢν ἑαυτοῦ τε ὅ τι μάλιστα τυραννῇ καὶ τῆς πόλεως; Ἀνειρήσθω σοι, ἔφη. Ἦ οὖν προσαναγορεύω, εἶπον, ἐάν τε λανθάνωσιν τοιοῦτοι ὄντες ἐάν τε μὴ πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θεούς; Προσαναγόρευε, ἔφη.

VII. Εἶεν δή, εἶπον· αὕτη μὲν ἡμῖν ἡ ἀπόδειξις μία ἂν εἴη·
D | δευτέραν δὲ ἰδὲ τήνδε, ἐάν τι δόξῃ εἶναι. Τίς αὕτη; Ἐπειδή, ὥσπερ πόλις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διῄρηται κατὰ τρία εἴδη, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τριχῇ, δέξεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἑτέραν ἀπόδειξιν.

14. ὁ $A^2\Pi$: om. A^1. 22. δὲ ἰδὲ nos: δεῖ δὲ Απ: δὲ δεῖ vulgo cum Ξq. 24. δέξεται Ξ: τὸ (punctis notatum) λογιστικὸν δέξεται A: λογιστικὸν δέξεται Π: λογιστικὴν δέξεται q^1: λογιστικὴ δέξεται q^2.

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calling on him to pronounce τίς πρῶτος κτλ. The word ἀποφαίνεσθαι is probably formal: cf. *Laws* 659 B and Dio Chrys. quoted by Petersen l. c. p. 7. For a further discussion of this passage see App. II [where see Mr E. Meyrick's suggestion].

580 B 10 **πέντε ὄντας**: viz. in all.

12 **εἰσῆλθον κτλ.** "in scenam ingressi sunt" (Stallbaum). In dramatic and musical contests the victor's name was publicly proclaimed by a herald (see Müller l. c. p. 372 *n.* 2): hence μισθωσώμεθα κτλ. pursues the comparison introduced by ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων κτλ. Cf. also *Phil.* 66 A πάντῃ δὴ φήσεις—ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον κτλ. (the result arrived at in the dialogue). For the verbal play in Ἀρίστωνος—τὸν ἄριστον cf. II 368 A *n.*

19 **580** C **ἐάν τε λανθάνωσιν κτλ.** is said with reference to the challenge in II 367 E.

580 C—**583** A *A second proof may be founded on our psychological theory. Let us agree to call the three varieties of soul, knowledge-loving, honour-loving, and gain-loving respectively, and let us distinguish three corresponding varieties both of men and of pleasures. If you ask any three men who represent these different classes, which of the three lives is the most pleasurable, each will pronounce in favour of his own. Which of them is right? The necessary requisites for deciding this, like every other question, are experience, intelligence or wisdom* (φρόνησις), *and argument. Now the lover of knowledge is the only one among the three in whom any of these qualifications is present, and he possesses them all. We therefore accept his verdict, and arrange accordingly, placing love of knowledge first, love of honour second, and love of money last.*

580 D ff. 21 **εἶεν δή κτλ.** After the political follows the psychological argument: see 577 C *n.*

22 **δὲ ἰδέ.** My correction of δεῖ δέ (the reading of the best MSS: see *cr. n.*) has been generally accepted. The reading δὲ δεῖ is intrinsically unsatisfactory, and can only be an attempt to 'emend' δεῖ δέ. See *Cl. Rev.* XI p. 349.

24 **δέξεται κτλ.**: 'it will admit also of another demonstration.' The subject is simply 'our thesis,' as stated just before in the conclusion of the first argument

Τίνα ταύτην; Τήνδε. *τριῶν ὄντων τριτταὶ καὶ ἡδοναί μοι φαίνονται, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μία ἰδία, ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀρχαί.* Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Τὸ *μέν, φαμέν, ἧν ᾧ μανθάνει ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ ᾧ θυμοῦται· τὸ δὲ τρίτον διὰ πολυειδίαν ἐνὶ οὐκ ἔσχομεν ὀνόματι ¹ προσειπεῖν ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ὃ μέγιστον καὶ* E *ἰσχυρότατον εἶχεν ἐν αὑτῷ, τούτῳ ἐπωνομάσαμεν· ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεκλήκαμεν διὰ σφοδρότητα τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ πόσιν καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἀκόλουθα, καὶ φιλοχρήματον δή, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα ἀποτε|λοῦνται* 581 *αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπιθυμίαι.* Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλίαν εἰ φαῖμεν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους, μάλιστ' ἂν εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα τῷ λόγῳ, ὥστε τι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς

26. *ἰδία* Π: *ἰδίᾳ* A. 3. *φαῖμεν* $A^2\Xi$: *φαμὲν* $A^1\Pi$: *φῶμεν q.*

(580 C). Cf. (with Stallbaum) V 453 D *οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν* and *Phaed.* 69 E *τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει* (unjustly bracketed by Schanz), where the subject similarly 'latet in antegressis.' Idiomatic expressions like *δηλώσει* (VI 497 C *n.*), *δείξει* etc. belong to a somewhat different category. It is impossible to extract any satisfactory sense out of the passage if (with Schneider alone of all the editors) we retain *τὸ λογιστικόν* (see *cr. n.*) or *λογιστικόν*, the latter of which occurs before *δέξεται* in many MSS. The Oxford editors, with much probability, suggest that *λογιστικόν* is the relic of some such gloss on *τριχῇ* as we actually find in Par. K, viz. *λογιστικον. ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμικον* (*sic*).

25 **ἡδοναί κτλ.** Hitherto in the *Republic* the words Pleasure and Desire have, with few exceptions (e.g. I 328 D, VI 485 D, VIII 554 E al.), had an evil, or at least unmoral, connotation. The view now put forward, viz. that each 'part' of soul has its own pleasures and desires differing in point of virtue and vice (cf. VI 505 C) like the 'parts' to which they belong, is related not only to the theory of the *Philebus* but also to the Aristotelian analysis of pleasure in *Eth. Nic.* X cc. 3—5.

26 **ἰδία.** Paris A has *ἰδίᾳ*—see *cr. n.*—"multo minus concinne" (Schneider). Cf. *ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ* infra E.

27 **ἀρχαί κτλ.** Any one of the three may hold rule in the soul. The reference in *ἦν* is to IV 436 A ff.

580 E 29 **ὃ μέγιστον κτλ.**: viz. *ἐπιθυμία*. The words *τούτῳ ἐπωνομάσαμεν* mean 'we gave the name of *ἐπιθυμία* to this part,' when we called it *ἐπιθυμητικόν* (*ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ κτλ.*). Cf. (with Stallbaum) *Theaet.* 185 C *ᾧ τὸ ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις, Crat.* 420 B and elsewhere. J. and C. wrongly understand *τούτῳ* as instrumental. The variant *τοῦτο* has little authority and is much inferior: still worse is *τούτου* which Madvig (*Adv. Cr.* I p. 431) 'suspicatur fuisse.'

30 **ἐπιθυμητικὸν κτλ.** IV 439 D. The lowest part of soul was called *φιλοχρήματον* in IV 436 E et al.: see next note.

581 A 4 **εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον κτλ.** Plato recognised three varieties in *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*, corresponding respectively to the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical man (VIII 558 D *n.*). In the present chapter these varieties again recede into the background. This apparent 'Inconsequenz,' together with other reasons, led Krohn to suppose that the whole of this proof, as well as the next, was written at a different time from the rest of Books VIII and IX (*Pl. St.* pp. 221 ff. Cf. Pfleiderer *Zur Lösung* etc. p. 75. Krohn has since retracted his view: see his *Pl. Fr.* p. 104). But the unity of the *ἐπιθυμητικόν as such* has never been sacrificed, since each of its varieties are also expressions of desire; and Plato is therefore fully justified in setting it over against *φιλόσοφον* and *θυμοειδές*. To have compared each of its varieties separately with the two higher principles would have greatly lengthened and complicated Plato's proof; and he

δηλοῦν, ὁπότε τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος λέγοιμεν, καὶ καλοῦντες αὐτὸ φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδὲς ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν; Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν μέντοι
B φαμὲν καὶ νικᾶν καὶ εὐδοκιμεῖν ἀεὶ ὅλον ὡρμῆσθαι; | Καὶ μάλα. Εἰ οὖν φιλόνικον αὐτὸ καὶ φιλότιμον προσαγορεύοιμεν, ἢ ἐμμελῶς ἂν ἔχοι; Ἐμμελέστατα μὲν οὖν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ᾧ γε μανθάνομεν, παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὅπῃ ἔχει πᾶν ἀεὶ τέταται, καὶ χρημάτων τε καὶ δόξης ἥκιστα τούτων τούτῳ μέλει.
Πολύ γε. Φιλομαθὲς δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον καλοῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν καλοῖμεν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἄρχει
C ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς | τῶν μὲν τοῦτο, τῶν δὲ τὸ ἕτερον ἐκείνων, ὁπότερον ἂν τύχῃ; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν

6, 7. ἐμοὶ γοῦν A¹Π: ἔμοιγ' οὖν A². 16. λέγομεν Ξ q^2: λέγωμεν ΑΠ q^1.

reserves this point for another mode of treatment at a later opportunity (587 C *n.*). Why does he select the word *φιλοχρήματον* (s. *φιλοκερδές*) to denote the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* here? He wishes to find a *single* word to contrast with *φιλόσοφον* and *φιλόνικον* (s. *φιλότιμον*). The word *ἐπιθυμητικόν* itself is excluded, because we have agreed that the *φιλόσοφον* and *φιλόνικον* have also *ἐπιθυμίαι* of their own (580 D), and, as *φιλοχρήματον* made its appearance in each of the three forms of *ἐπιθυμία* (VIII 551 A, 553 C, 555 A, 558 D, 561 A, 568 D, IX 572 C, 573 D), it is the best summary description available. Plato himself claims no more for it, and that is why he says *μάλιστα ἂν εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα*. Cf. Grimmelt *de reip. Pl. comp. et unit.* pp. 73 ff.

7 **οὐ—μέντοι.** See on I 339 B.

581 B 9 **φιλόνικον.** For the spelling of this word see VIII 548 C *n.* and my note on *Prot.* 336 E. The present passage and also 586 C, D below conclusively prove that Plato connected the word with *νίκη* and not with *νεῖκος*, from which indeed it could not be derived without doing violence to the laws of the Greek language (cf. Schanz Vol. VI p. x). Now Plato certainly did not write *νείκη*, but *νίκη*: and it is therefore highly improbable that he wrote *φιλόνεικος*. *φιλόνικος* has also considerable support from the inferior MSS of the *Republic*. The substitution of *ει* for long *ι* became extremely common in imperial times, especially in proper names derived from *νίκη* (Meisterhans³ p. 49), and even *ἐνείκων* and the like are also found on late inscriptions (e.g. CIG 1585). In the case of *φιλόνεικος* the error was apparently established by Plutarch's time: see his *Ages.* 5. 4. The meaning 'lover of strife' is often unsuitable in Plato; where it suits, it is secondary and derivative, for the lover of victory must also love strife: *non sine pulvere palma*. For an exhaustive discussion of the question the student may be referred to Schmidt *Ethik d. alten Griechen* I pp. 386—391. While admitting that '*φιλόνικος* and its derivatives are far more frequent in Attic writers,' Schmidt is inclined to admit the existence of *φιλόνεικος* as a separate word, connected with *νείκη* as a byeform—so he thinks—of *νεῖκος*: but *νείκη*, at least in classical Greek, is only a conjecture on Aeschylus *Ag.* 1378 and *Eum.* 903: and in Plato, at all events, there is, I believe, no case in which *φιλόνικος* does not give the meaning required by the context.

12 **ἥκιστα τούτων**: 'less than any of them,' lit. 'least of these' three *εἴδη* of soul. There is no good reason for suspecting the text; for although strictly speaking the *φιλόσοφον* can only care for *σοφία*, the *φιλόσοφος*, who presently (581 C ff.) takes the place of the *φιλόσοφον*, is not wholly indifferent to either (582 B, C): he merely cares much less for them than the *φιλόνικος* and *φιλοχρήματος* do. *τούτων* is necessary to bring out the contrast: *ἥκιστα* alone, proposed by Baiter, or *ἥκιστα πάντων* (W. H. Thompson) would express too much.

581 C 16 **διὰ ταῦτα δὴ κτλ.** Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* I 3. 1095ᵇ 17 ff. *τρεῖς*

τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον, φιλόνικον, φιλοκερδές; Κομιδῇ γε. Καὶ ἡδονῶν δὴ τρία εἴδη, ὑποκείμενα ἓν ἑκάστῳ τούτων; Πάνυ γε. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι εἰ 'θέλοις τρεῖς τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον ἀνερωτᾶν, τίς τούτων τῶν βίων ἥδιστος, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος μάλιστα ἐγκωμιάσεται; ὅ γε χρηματιστικὸς πρὸς | τὸ κερδαίνειν τὴν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν D τοῦ μανθάνειν οὐδενὸς ἀξίαν φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Τί δὲ ὁ φιλότιμος; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἡδονὴν φορτικήν τινα ἡγεῖται, καὶ αὖ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνειν, ὅ τι μὴ μάθημα τιμὴν φέρει, καπνὸν καὶ φλυαρίαν; Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει. Τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί οἰώμεθα τὰς

18. ὑποκείμενα $A^2\Xi$: ὑποκείμενον $A^1\Pi q$. 21. γε Hermann cum M: τε A cum ceteris. 27. τί οἰώμεθα Graser: ποιώμεθα codd.

γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προὔχοντες (sc. βίοι), ὅ τε νῦν εἰρημένος (i.e. ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς) καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς (i.e. ὁ φιλότιμος here) καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός.

λέγομεν κτλ. 'And for this reason we say that the primary classes of men are also three in number' etc.? λέγομεν (see *cr. n.*) is the reading of all MSS except $A\Pi q^1$, and Schneider is right, I think, in retaining it, not only because these three γένη have been named before (IV 435 E), but still more because the classification was apparently a familiar one: see Stewart on Arist. l. c. For the orthographical error see *Introd.* § 5. I take τριττά as predicative: the hyperbaton is not, I think, a difficult one, because the stress of the voice falls on τριττά, and to my ear it sounds more idiomatic than τὰ πρῶτα γένη τριττὰ εἶναι would be. A possible alternative would be to take εἶναι with φιλόσοφον κτλ. ('that the three primary classes of men are lovers of wisdom' etc.), but this is somewhat less natural and satisfactory, in view especially of καὶ ἡδονῶν κτλ. The words τὰ πρῶτα mean 'the first' or 'original,' as in Aristotle's πρώτη ὕλη, the Stoic πρῶται ἀρεταί and the like: it would be possible to subdivide each of these primary classes into δεύτερα γένη, τρίτα γένη etc. Jowett, reading λέγωμεν, translates 'we may begin by assuming,' but it is harsh to separate τὰ πρῶτα from γένη, and the adverbial τὰ πρῶτα generally, if not always, refers *back* to something said or done 'at the beginning.' Cf. Shorey *A. J. Ph.* XIII p. 366.

18 ὑποκείμενα. The singular ὑποκείμενον (see *cr. n.*), retained by Schneider and all other editors except Baiter, is questionable Greek. In such cases the adjective, participle, or verb agrees with the whole and not with the part. ὑποκείμενα is little inferior to ὑποκείμενον in authority and the corruption was easy. Cf. VIII 550 E *n.*

21 τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κτλ. Cf. Pind. *Frag.* 215 Bergk ἄλλο δ' ἄλλοισιν νόμισμα, σφετέραν δ' αἰνεῖ δίκαν ἕκαστος and *Gorg.* 484 E ff.

ὅ γε. See *cr. n.* Hermann's conjecture is, I now think, right. We may perhaps explain τε as ἀνακόλουθον (cf. II 373 B *n.*) and taken up in τί δὲ ὁ φιλότιμος; κτλ., but γε is much livelier and better: 'the money-maker, at all events' etc. Cf. VIII 556 A *n.* If γε is right, we should not, as Hermann does, make the sentence interrogative.

581 D 23 ἀργύριον ποιεῖ: 'produces money.' πορίζει (Badham) is a neat conjecture; but the text is sound: cf. χρήματα ποιεῖν Arist. *Pol.* A 9. 1258ª 11.

26 καπνὸν καὶ φλυαρίαν. This contemptuous, half-proverbial, use of καπνός is illustrated by Blaydes on Ar. *Clouds* 320.

581 D, E 27 τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον κτλ. 'But the lover of knowledge, said I, what value shall we suppose that he assigns to the other pleasures compared with that of knowing how the truth stands and always enjoying a kindred sort of pleasure while he learns? Will he not think them very far away?' (viz. from ἡ τοῦ εἰδέναι

E ἄλλας ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι | ταὐληθὲς ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι μανθάνοντα τῆς ἡδονῆς; οὐ πάνυ πόρρω, καὶ καλεῖν τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαίας, ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων δέο- 30
μενον, εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν; Εὖ, ἔφη, δεῖ εἰδέναι.

VIII. Ὅτε δὴ οὖν, εἶπον, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἑκάστου τοῦ εἴδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ βίος, μὴ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἄμεινον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἥδιον καὶ
582 ἀλυπότερον, | πῶς ἂν εἰδεῖμεν, τίς αὐτῶν ἀληθέστατα λέγει; Οὐ 35
πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε ἔχω εἰπεῖν. Ἀλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. τίνι χρὴ κρίνεσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι; ἆρ' οὐκ ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; ἢ τούτων ἔχοι ἄν τις βέλτιον κριτήριον; Καὶ πῶς ἄν; ἔφη. Σκόπει δή. τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τίς ἐμπειρότατος 5
πασῶν ὧν εἴπομεν ἡδονῶν; πότερον ὁ φιλοκερδής, μανθάνων αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν οἷόν ἐστιν, ἐμπειρότερος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ
B | εἰδέναι ἡδονῆς, ἢ ὁ φιλόσοφος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν; Πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι τῶν ἑτέρων ἐκ παιδὸς

29. *τῆς ἡδονῆς* $A^1\Pi$ cum ceteris: punctis notavit A^2.

κτλ.). The *χρηματιστικός* considers the pleasures of honour and learning *οὐδενὸς ἀξίας*, compared with his own; the *φιλότιμος* similarly, *mutatis mutandis*; what then does the *φιλόσοφος* consider *his* pleasures to be compared with the others? What are his pleasures? Let us see. He either *knows* (i.e. has learnt) the truth in any given instance or is getting to know (i.e. is *learning*) it; his pleasures are therefore that of knowing and that of learning, i.e. *τοιοῦτόν τι τῆς ἡδονῆς*, for the pleasures of learning are akin to those of knowing. From each of these pleasures those of gain and fame are far removed. With the general sense, cf. *Phaed.* 64 D: for the use of *ἐν* IV 429 C, D: for *τοιούτῳ τινὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς* Xen. *An.* I 7. 5 *ἐν τοιούτῳ εἶναι τοῦ κινδύνου προσιόντος*: and for the position of *τῆς ἡδονῆς* Braun *de hyperb. Pl.* II p. 4, where many examples of similar hyperbata are quoted. The MSS read *ποιώμεθα* (see *cr. n.*), but Graser's emendation is in my opinion certainly right. I have taken *τῆς ἡδονῆς* with *τοιούτῳ τινί*: others wrongly, as I believe, join it to *οὐ πάνυ πόρρω*. See on the whole passage App. III.

581 E 29 **οὐ πάνυ πόρρω**: sc. *οἰώμεθα νομίζειν*; as before.

30 **ἀναγκαίας**: *necessarias*, quippe ceteris nihil indigentem nisi *necessitas* cogeret (after Stallbaum). Hence *τῷ ὄντι*: see on VI 511 B.

31 **δεῖ εἰδέναι**: we should not *suppose* (*οἴεσθαι*), but be sure of it. Badham's conjecture *διείλου* (*ad Euthyd.* p. 98) is wholly needless and inept.

32 **ἀμφισβητοῦνται**: 'are in dispute' (Jowett). For this somewhat irregular use of the passive cf. Cope's *Rhetoric of Aristotle* I p. 299. It is tempting to make the verb middle ('dispute with one another'), as in *Laws* 957 D, and suppose that the pleasures are personified, as the two lives are in Prodicus' apologue of Heracles at the cross-roads (Xen. *Mem.* II 1. 21 ff.). *αὐτῶν* in *τίς αὐτῶν* will then mean *τῶν ἡδονῶν*, and not *τῶν ἀνδρῶν*. But on such a theory, instead of *αὐτὸς ὁ βίος*, we should rather have had *αὐτοὶ οἱ βίοι*: and on the whole it is doubtless better to acquiesce in the ordinary interpretation, which is also more in harmony with *τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν κτλ.* below.

582 B 9 **τῶν ἑτέρων**. "Glauco simul *utrisque* philosophum praefert experientia, quoniam Socrates quis omnium experientissimus esset voluptatum rogaverat" (viz. in 582 A *τριῶν ὄντων κτλ.*) Schneider. The English translators take *τῶν ἑτέρων* as 'the other' (Jowett), viz. 'gain'; but that would be *τοῦ ἑτέρου*.

ἀρξαμένῳ· τῷ δὲ φιλοκερδεῖ, ὅπῃ πέφυκε τὰ ὄντα μανθάνοντι, τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύτης, ὡς γλυκεῖά ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι οὐδ' ἐμπείρῳ γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμουμένῳ οὐ ῥᾴδιον. Πολὺ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρει τοῦ γε φιλοκερδοῦς ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἡδονῶν. Πολὺ | μέντοι. Τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου; C
ἆρα μᾶλλον ἄπειρός ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν; Ἀλλὰ τιμὴ μέν, ἔφη, ἐάνπερ ἐξεργάζωνται ἐπὶ ὃ ἕκαστος ὥρμηκε, πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ἕπεται· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος ὑπὸ πολλῶν τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ὁ σοφός· ὥστε ἀπό γε τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οἷόν ἐστιν, πάντες τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔμπειροι· τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος θέας, οἵαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλῳ γεγεῦσθαι πλὴν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ. Ἐμπειρίας | μὲν ἄρα, εἶπον, ἕνεκα κάλλιστα τῶν ἀνδρῶν D
κρίνει οὗτος. Πολύ γε. Καὶ μὴν μετά γε φρονήσεως μόνος ἔμπειρος γεγονὼς ἔσται. Τί μήν; Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ δι' οὗ γε δεῖ

16. τιμὴ μὲν *v*: τί μὴν ΑΠΞ: τί μὴ *q*. 18. ὁ σοφός $A^2\Xi q$: σοφός $A^1\Pi$.
22. οὗτος Π: οὕτως Α. φρονήσεως $A^2\Xi q$: σωφρονήσεως Π et fortasse A^1.

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582 C 14 **τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου**; 'and how does he stand in relation to the lover of honour?' Supply *διαφέρει ὁ φιλόσοφος*, or rather a more general idea of comparison out of *διαφέρει*: cf. 585 D and X 597 D. We must beware of translating 'but what of the lover of honour?' (D. and V.), as if *τοῦ φιλοτίμου* were here equivalent to *περὶ τοῦ φιλοτίμου* (V 470 A *n.*). This error caused Groen v. Prinsterer (*Prosop. Pl.* p. 210) to suggest *ἆρα μᾶλλον ἐμπειρός ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἡδονῆς, ἢ ἐκεῖνος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι;* with which the translation of Davies and Vaughan also agrees. The subject of *ἄπειρός ἐστι* is of course *ὁ φιλόσοφος*, and *ἐκεῖνος* means *ὁ φιλότιμος*.

18 **ὁ ἀνδρεῖος** represents *ὁ φιλότιμος*: cf. *ἀνδρείᾳ* 582 E and *πολεμικοῦ* 583 A *n.*

19 **τοῦ ὄντος**. The presence of such metaphysical terms in this and the succeeding proof is what chiefly encourages Pfleiderer (*Zur Lösung* etc. pp. 74 ff.) and some others to maintain that §§ 580—587 were written at a later period than the rest of this Book, most of which they believe to be earlier than V 471 C—VII inclusive. See also on 581 A. Others with much more reason find in these expressions a strong argument in defence of the structural unity of the *Republic*; for it would seem that *τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας* and the like presuppose the discussions of Book VII. See Zeller[4] II p. 561 *n.*

582 D 22 **κρίνει**. Bekker's conjecture *κρινεῖ* is unnecessary.

μετά γε φρονήσεως corresponds to *φρονήσει* in 582 A. Plato is taking the three requisites in order. The *ἐμπειρία* of the *φιλόσοφος* is alone intelligent, and, without *φρόνησις*, *ἐμπειρία* is no more than a sort of *ἄτεχνος τριβή* (*Phaedr.* 260 E: cf. *Gorg.* 463 B). It is indeed quite true, as Nettleship reminds us (*Lect. and Rem.* II p. 322), that the higher kind of man learns more from the experience which he shares with the lower kind without having to go through nearly the same amount of it.

23 **ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ.** Bosanquet observes that "this is perhaps a good argument to prove that the man of culture is pre-eminently competent to appraise the value of different ideals of life, but it is not a good argument to prove that he is a good judge of degrees of agreeable feeling in lives fundamentally different from his own" (similarly Nettleship l. c. p. 321). True; but that is not the point. Plato is attempting to prove that the *φιλόσοφος* is the best judge, not of 'the degrees of agreeable feeling' experienced, in one particular kind of life, but of the relative pleasure of three *different* kinds of life, and his reasoning, granted that pleasures can be compared at all, is perfectly legitimate. Each of the three men pronounces his own life not merely

ὀργάνου κρίνεσθαι, οὐ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς τοῦτο ὄργανον οὐδὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου. Τὸ ποῖον; Διὰ λόγων που ἔφαμεν δεῖν κρίνεσθαι. ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Λόγοι δὲ τούτου μάλιστα ὄργανον. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν πλούτῳ καὶ κέρδει ἄριστα
E ἐκρίνετο τὰ κρινόμενα, ἃ ἐπῄνει | ὁ φιλοκερδὴς καὶ ἔψεγεν, ἀνάγκη ἂν ἦν ταῦτα ἀληθέστατα εἶναι. Πολλή γε. Εἰ δὲ τιμῇ τε καὶ νίκῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ, ἆρ' οὐχ ἃ ὁ φιλότιμός τε καὶ ὁ φιλόνικος; Δῆλον. Ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἃ ὁ φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ὁ φιλόλογος ἐπαινεῖ, ἀληθέστατα εἶναι.
583 Τριῶν ἄρ' οὐσῶν τῶν | ἡδονῶν ἡ τούτου τοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ μανθάνομεν, ἡδίστη ἂν εἴη, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἄρχει, ὁ τούτου βίος ἥδιστος; Πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη· κύριος γοῦν ἐπαινέτης ὢν ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον ὁ φρόνιμος. Τίνα δὲ δεύτερον, εἶπον, βίον καὶ τίνα δευτέραν ἡδονήν φησιν ὁ κριτὴς εἶναι; Δῆλον ὅτι τὴν τοῦ πολεμικοῦ τε καὶ φιλοτίμου· ἐγγυτέρω γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ ἡ τοῦ χρηματιστοῦ. Ὑστάτην δὴ τὴν τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς, ὡς ἔοικεν. Τί μήν; ἦ δ' ὅς.

3. ὧν $A^2Π$: ων ut videtur A^1.

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pleasant, but *pleasanter* than those of the other two: how then are we to decide? Nothing but argument will help us, and the *φιλόσοφος* is the only one of the triad who possesses that weapon. It should be observed that throughout this part of the discussion Plato takes it for granted that some kinds of pleasure are in point of fact more pleasant than others. At present his object is to discover what these are, but in the argument which is still to come (585 B ff.), he grapples with the metaphysical question—for to him it was a question, not of psychology, but of metaphysics—and attempts to shew that pleasures contain more or less of pleasure according as there is in them more or less of truth.

26 **ἔφαμεν κτλ.** The reference is to 582 A. *λόγοι* means 'rational arguments,' 'reasoning' (cf. VI 511 B *n.*), and *τούτου* is of course *τοῦ φιλοσόφου*, not *τοῦ κρίνειν*, as Stallbaum thinks.

582 E 29 **ἀληθέστατα** here and in *ἀληθέστατα εἶναι* below contains a hint of the theory which is afterwards developed in 585 B ff., where the various kinds of pleasure are shewn to be different in respect of reality and truth.

30 **φιλόνικος.** See on 581 B.

31 **ἀνάγκη, ἔφη κτλ.** supplies the apodosis to *ἐπειδή—λόγῳ*: cf. supra 577 B *n.*

583 A 5 **ὁ κριτὴς κτλ.** *ὁ κριτής* is the *φιλόσοφος*, as *αὐτοῦ* in the next sentence shews. There is therefore no reference to 580 B. For *πολεμικοῦ* Herwerden proposes *φιλονίκου*, very arbitrarily: see on 582 C. It is worth noting that the conclusion of this argument incidentally furnishes a further reply to the objection raised by Adimantus in IV 419 A ff., viz. that Plato's guardians cannot possibly be happy.

583 B—**585** A *Our third and crowning proof is as follows. All the pleasures except those of the wise (φρόνιμοι) are untrue and impure. We must recognise the existence of three distinct states, viz. Pleasure and Pain, which are positive and opposite, and the Neutral state, which is negative and intermediate. Men frequently identify the intermediate condition with Pleasure; but they are mistaken when they do so, for there are some pleasures, e.g. those of smell, which have a positive character of their own. Now bodily pleasures, so-called, together with the corresponding pleasures of anticipation, are for the most part merely ways of escape from pain, and belong to the neutral*

IX. Ταῦτα μὲν | τοίνυν οὕτω δύ' ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη καὶ δὶς νενι- B
10 κηκὼς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἄδικον· τὸ δὲ τρίτον Ὀλυμπικῶς τῷ σωτῆρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Διί, ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθής ἐστιν ἡ τῶν

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state. They are falsely judged pleasant through juxtaposition and contrast with positive Pain.

583 B ff. 9 **ταῦτα μὲν κτλ.** The political and psychological λόγοι have registered their votes, and it only remains for us to hear the verdict of the metaphysical, to which Plato characteristically assigns the greatest value (*καίτοι —πτωμάτων* below). See on 577 C. Plato's theory of true or pure and false or impure pleasures reappears in the *Philebus*. Both dialogues teach (1) that Pleasure consists in πλήρωσις, (2) that the majority of bodily pleasures are not pleasures at all, but only λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγαί, and (3) that there are other—true or pure—pleasures (e.g. smell) which are not preceded or followed by pain. The last generation of scholars mostly placed the *Republic* after the *Philebus*. I am inclined to agree with more recent critics in thinking it earlier (see on VI 506 B and Jackson in *Journal of Philology* XXV pp. 65—82), but the greater degree of elaboration which marks the treatment of this subject in the *Philebus* may be and has been accounted for on either hypothesis. Aristotle also touches on the question of Mixed and Unmixed Pleasures in *Eth. Nic.* VII 12. 1152^b ff., especially 1152^b 35—1153^a 7, ib. 15. 1154^a 22—^{b} 31 and again in X 2—5, especially 2. 1173^a 22—^{b} 20. The present section is further important in the history of ethics for its clear distinction between the *μέση κατάστασις* and the two extremes; a distinction already noted by the Cyrenaics (RP^7. § 208^b) and afterwards adopted by Epicurus (ib. § 380 ff.).

δύο and **δὶς** refer of course to the two preceding proofs 577 B—580 C and 580 C—583 A.

10 **τὸ δὲ τρίτον κτλ.** The libations at banquets (according to the Schol. on *Phil.* 66 D: cf. also Schol. on *Charm.* 167 A and on Pind. *Isthm.* 5. 7 with Hesych. s. v. *τρίτος κρατήρ* and Pollux VI 15, 100) were offered in the following sequence: (1) to Olympian Zeus and the Olympian gods, (2) to the heroes, (3) to Zeus Soter. Hence the proverb *τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι*, with which Plato sometimes introduces the third or culminating stage in an argument, demonstration, or the like (*Phil.* and *Charm.* ll. cc., *Laws* III 692 A, *Epp.* VII 340 A). In the present instance there is also an allusion to the Olympic games, as appears from Ὀλυμπικῶς ('Olympic-wise'). Stallbaum conjectures that competitors at Olympia were in the habit of making their third libation "non uni tantum Διὶ σωτῆρι, sed sicuti consentaneum fuit, *τῷ σωτῆρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Διί*": but there is no authority for this idea. Is Plato thinking of the *πένταθλον*, in which it was necessary to win in three (probably leaping, discus-throwing, javelin-throwing) out of the five events in order to obtain the prize (see P. Gardner in *J. of H. Studies* I p. 217, where the evidence is quoted)? Schneider takes this view: but the words *τῶν πτωμάτων* below make it clear that the reference is only to wrestling. The point manifestly is, that as in wrestling the third throw decided the contest between two athletes (Schol. on Aesch. *Eum.* 592 et al.), so here the *δίκαιος* wins after he has thrice defeated the *ἄδικος* (cf. also *Euthyd.* 277 C). I think Ὀλυμπικῶς is intended to suggest that the contest between justice and injustice is the greatest of all moral, as the Olympic was of all physical, *παλαίσματα*: the victors *ζήσουσι τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου ὃν οἱ ὀλυμπιονῖκαι ζῶσι μακαριώτερον* (V 465 D *n.*). Compare *Phaedr.* 256 B *τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν ἓν νενικήκασιν*. Plato adds the epithet *τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ de suo*: in an Olympic contest Zeus Soter is also in the truest sense Olympian too, although in banquets Zeus Olympius received only the first, and not also the third libation. With similar and even greater emphasis on the word Ὀλυμπίῳ Pindar prays for an *Olympic* victory for Phylacidas in the words *εἴη δὲ τρίτον | σωτῆρι πορσαίνοντας Ὀλυμπίῳ Αἴγιναν κάτα | σπένδειν μελιφθόγγοις ἀοιδαῖς* (*Isthm.* l.c.: see Donaldson ad loc.).

11 **οὐδὲ παναληθὴς — καθαρά.** In what sense is pleasure said by Plato to be pure and true? It is pure when unadulterated by pain, whether antecedent, present or consequent; and there is also perhaps in Plato's use of the epithet 'pure' a relic or hint of the old half-

ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς ἀκηκοέναι. καίτοι τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτωμάτων. Πολύ γε· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις; Ὧδ', εἶπον, ἐξευρήσω, σοῦ ἀπο- 15
C κρινομένου ζητῶν | ἅμα. Ἐρώτα δή, ἔφη. Λέγε δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἐναντίον φαμὲν λύπην ἡδονῇ; Καὶ μάλα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι εἶναί τι; Εἶναι μέντοι. Μεταξὺ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ ὄν, ἡσυχίαν τινὰ περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως αὐτὸ λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἆρ' οὐ μνημονεύεις, 20
ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους, οἷς λέγουσιν ὅταν κάμνωσιν; Ποίους; Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἥδιον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ
D σφᾶς | ἐλελήθει, πρὶν κάμνειν, ἥδιστον ὄν. Μέμνημαι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν περιωδυνίᾳ τινὶ ἐχομένων ἀκούεις λεγόντων, ὡς οὐδὲν ἥδιον τοῦ παύσασθαι ὀδυνώμενον; Ἀκούω. Καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις 25
γε, οἶμαι, πολλοῖς τοιούτοις αἰσθάνει γιγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους,

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ceremonial, half-religious idea of 'pure from taint': see App. III and Rohde *Psyche*[2] II pp. 281 ff. al. But in its deepest signification the truth or purity of Pleasure involves the ontological theory that soul and its sustenance (knowledge etc.) have more part in Being and Truth than Body and its food: the spiritual and not the material is the true. See also on 586 E and especially Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II pp. 322—327, where the farther bearings of Plato's theory are admirably traced.

12 **πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου.** Cf. *Phaed.* 69 B, C.

ἐσκιαγραφημένη. See on II 365 C. Bodily pleasure is *ἐσκιαγραφημένη* in the fullest sense of the word, because it depends on contrast and balance of pleasure with pleasure, and pleasure with pain (584 A), just as perspective produces its effect by the contrast of light and shade (586 B). Similarly in *Phaed.* 69 B Plato hints that the so-called virtue which consists in bartering one bodily pleasure for another is *σκιαγραφία τις—καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχουσα*, and ib. 81 B the soul is said to be *γεγοητευμένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ* (sc. *τοῦ σώματος*) *ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν*. Cf. also *Phil.* 44 C *αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς* (sc. *τῆς ἡδονῆς*) *ἐπαγωγὸν γοήτευμα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡδονὴν εἶναι*. In each of these passages there is probably a conscious reminiscence of Orphic doctrines: see next note and App. IV.

13 **τῶν σοφῶν** alludes, I believe, to Orphic or Pythagorean ascetics, who preached the doctrine *σῶμα σῆμα* and regarded bodily pleasure as essentially false and impure: see especially Rohde *Psyche*[2] II pp. 121—130, and 161—166. Evidence for this view is given in App. IV, where the other interpretations are also discussed.

14 **καίτοι** is hardly 'et vero' 'and surely' (as Kugler takes it *de part. τοῖ* etc. p. 18, comparing *Gorg.* 452 E, *Theaet.* 187 C al.), but rather 'quamquam' 'and yet' (sc. 'strong as were the other two proofs,' or the like): "und das wäre doch wohl" Schneider.

583 C 17 **τὸ μήτε χαίρειν κτλ.** This *τρίτη διάθεσις* is described in *Phil.* 32 E ff.: cf. ib. 42 E ff. and *Tim.* 64 C ff.

18 **μεταξὺ κτλ.**: 'something which is intermediate between these two, a sort of repose of the soul so far as these are concerned.' Herwerden is fain to cancel either *μεταξύ* or *ἐν μέσῳ*: but the fulness of expression is characteristic. See *Introd.* § 5.

19 **ἡσυχίαν**: whereas *λύπη* and *ἡδονή* are *κινήσεις* 583 E.

20 **ἆρ' οὐ.** Three inferior MSS have *ἆρ' οὖν*, which is easier; but *ἆρ' οὐ* is much more lively, and not more abrupt than e.g. *πολεμήσομεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαύκων*; II 373 E (quoted by Schneider). The stylistic effect is exactly like Lucretius' 'Nonne vides' etc.: e.g. II 263 al.

ἐν οἷς, ὅταν λυπῶνται, τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ τοιούτου ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὡς ἥδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν. Τοῦτο γάρ, ἔφη, τότε ἡδὺ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν γίγνεται, ἡσυχία. Καὶ ὅταν παύσηται | ἄρα, εἶπον, χαίρων τις, ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία λυπηρὸν E
ἔσται. Ἴσως, ἔφη. Ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτό ποτε ἀμφότερα ἔσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή. Ἔοικεν. Ἡ καὶ δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὂν ἀμφότερα γίγνεσθαι; Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κίνησίς τις ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν. ἦ οὔ; Ναί. | Τὸ δὲ μήτε 584
λυπηρὸν μήτε ἡδὺ οὐχὶ ἡσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τούτοιν ἐφάνη ἄρτι; Ἐφάνη γάρ. Πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν ἡδὺ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν ἀνιαρόν; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδὺ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὺ

27. τὸ $A^2\Pi$: om. A^1. 33. δυνατὸν $A^2\Pi$: fortasse ἀδύνατον A^1.

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583 D 28 **τοῦτο γὰρ κτλ.** The argument is as follows. While suffering pain, men are apt to look upon the *ἡσυχία* from pain as the highest pleasure. Perhaps (suggests Glauco) at such a time the neutral state is in point of fact found positively pleasant and welcome by them. Socrates proceeds to shew (by a *reductio ad absurdum* proof) that Glauco's suggestion is untenable. 'In that case,' he argues, '*ἡσυχία* from pleasure will in like manner be positively painful: and thus the neutral state, which we declared to be *between* the two extremes, will upon occasions be both, viz. both pleasure and pain.' Glauco allows that that which is neither cannot become both, and Socrates proceeds: In this instance the 'both' is a *κίνησις*, and the 'neither' a *ἡσυχία*, and lies, as we have seen, between the two: so that it is wrong to identify the absence of pain with pleasure or the absence of pleasure with pain. Hence your suggestion is erroneous: **οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται κτλ.** See below on 584 A. The argument is really complete when Glauco says *οὔ μοι δοκεῖ*, but the words *καὶ μὴν τό γε ἡδύ* introduce a new reason for refusing to identify *ἡσυχία* with pleasure or with pain, by explicitly stating for the first time that pleasure and pain are each of them a *κίνησις*. *ἡσυχία* and *κίνησις* are mutually exclusive notions. Cf. *Phil.* 43 D—44 B, where the reasoning follows nearly the same lines. See also next note.

583 E 32 **ἀμφότερα—ἡδονή.** Does Plato mean that the neutral state will sometimes be both painful and pleasant at one and the same time,—or only at *one* time painful and at *another* pleasant? According to *Gorg.* 497 C ff., in eating when hungry, drinking when thirsty etc., we cease from pain and pleasure simultaneously, so that in such a case the neutral state will appear to be both pleasant and painful. But the rest of the argument does not support this interpretation; and in the corresponding passage of the *Philebus* (43 D) we have *τὸ δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γένοιτ' ἄν.* The simpler view should therefore be adopted.

35 **κίνησις.** In Pleasure the *κίνησις* is *πλήρωσις*, in pain, *κένωσις*, as is afterwards pointed out (585 A *n.*).

584 A 2 **οὐχὶ—μέντοι κτλ.** See I 339 B *n.* It is safer to construe *ὀρθῶς* with *ἡγεῖσθαι* than with *ἔστι* (as D. and V. translate). Cf. *Euthyph.* 5 E *ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη οὕτω γιγνόμενα*, where *ὀρθῶς* belongs to *γιγνόμενα*, or to a *γιγνόμενα* understood.

4 **οὐκ ἔστιν κτλ.** contradicts Glauco's suggestion *τοῦτο γὰρ—ἡσυχία* 583 D. There is no *reality* about this (as *you* suggest): it is only a *φάντασμα*—the neutral state *appearing* pleasant by the side of pain, being, in fact, a sort of *σκιαγραφία*, as we said in 583 B. On *γοητεία* see 583 B *n.*

ἀλγεινὸν τότε, ἡ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων
πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις. Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη,
B σημαίνει. Ἰδὲ τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, | ἡδονάς, αἳ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν, ἵνα
μὴ πολλάκις οἰηθῇς ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτω τοῦτο πεφυκέναι, ἡδονὴν
μὲν παῦλαν λύπης εἶναι, λύπην δὲ ἡδονῆς. Ποῦ δή, ἔφη, καὶ ποίας 10
λέγεις; Πολλαὶ μέν, εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλαι, μάλιστα δ' εἰ 'θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι
τὰς περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἡδονάς. αὖται γὰρ οὐ προλυπηθέντι ἐξαίφνης
ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος γίγνονται παυσάμεναί τε λύπην οὐδεμίαν
C καταλείπουσιν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Μὴ ἄρα πειθώμεθα | καθαρὰν 15
ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὴν λύπης ἀπαλλαγήν, μηδὲ λύπην τὴν ἡδονῆς. Μὴ
γάρ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, αἵ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
τείνουσαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἡδοναὶ σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσταί τε καὶ μέγισται
τούτου τοῦ εἴδους εἰσί, λυπῶν τινὲς ἀπαλλαγαί. Εἰσὶ γάρ. Οὐκ-

8. ἔφην ἐγώ Θr: ἔφην δ' ἐγὼ ΑΠΞ (sed δ puncto notavit A^2): δ' ἐγὼ *q*.

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584 B 8 **αἱ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν κτλ.** are the so-called 'pure' pleasures of *Phil.* 51 B ff. *τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας, καθαρὰς λυπῶν, παραδίδωσιν.* They are never preceded by pain, but may, according to the *Philebus*, be preceded by *κένωσις* and *ἔνδεια*, so long as these are imperceptible; and they are caused by *πλήρωσις* no less than the pleasures which are called impure, although the *πλήρωσις* in the case of the pure pleasures is *ἀληθεστέρα*: cf. 585 B and *Tim.* 65 A.

ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις κτλ.: 'in case, perhaps, you should suppose in the *present* instance' etc. (sc. as you did in the other 583 D). *μὴ πολλάκις* is 'ne forte' (IV 422 C *n.*), and *ἐν τῷ παρόντι* refers to the example which Socrates is about to give. Glauco's *ποῦ δή* asks for an explanation of *ἐν τῷ παρόντι*, just as *ποίας* invites Socrates to specify the *ἡδονὰς αἳ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν*. The English translators are in error.

11 **πολλαὶ μὲν κτλ.** In spite of this passage and *Phil.* 51 B ff. Aristotle seems actually to insinuate that Plato made *all* pleasures conditional on release from pain: see Stewart on *Eth. Nic.* X 2. 1173^b 12 ff.

12 **ὀσμάς.** Has Heraclitus' curious fragment (38 Bywater) *αἱ ψυχαὶ ὀσμῶνται καθ' ᾅδην* any bearing on this doctrine of the 'purity' of smell? If the soul, after it is 'purified' from the body by death, still retains this sense, presumably *ὀσμὴ* is (in Orphic language) 'pure.' It is possible enough that Plato's whole theory of 'pure pleasures' was suggested by some such early theological notion, though he afterwards developed it in his own way. See however Rohde *Psyche*[2] II p. 152 *n.* Aristotle also looks upon smell as a painless pleasure: see *Eth. Nic.* X 2. 1173^b 18 ff. et al.

584 C 16 **αἵ γε—ἡδοναὶ κτλ.** The emphasis is on *διὰ τοῦ σώματος*. All pleasures belong of course to the soul (*Tim.* 64 B); but some come through the body, while others—the pleasures of knowledge, for example, according to Plato—do not (cf. *Theaet.* 184 E—185 E and generally *Phil.* 47 D ff.). Most of the former class—smell is an exception—and the greatest among them (*τὰφροδίσια Phil.* 65 C) are only *λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγαί* (cf. *Phaedr.* 258 E, *Phil.* 45 A—47 B and Arist. *Eth. Nic.* VII 13. 1153^a 33, 15. 1154^a 26 ff.), and so 'mixed' and unreal: compare the picture of the *χαραδριοῦ βίος* in *Gorg.* 494 B ff. The same is true of the purely spiritual pleasures and pains which come from the anticipation of these 'mixed' pleasures and pains. On the pleasures and pains of anticipation see *Phil.* 32 C ff.

οὖν καὶ αἱ πρὸ μελλόντων τούτων ἐκ προσδοκίας γιγνόμεναι προη-
σθήσεις τε καὶ προλυπήσεις κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσιν; Κατὰ ταὐτά.
Χ. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, οἷαί εἰσιν | καὶ ᾧ μάλιστα ἐοίκασιν; D
Τῷ; ἔφη. Νομίζεις τι, εἶπον, ἐν τῇ φύσει εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ
κάτω, τὸ δὲ μέσον; Ἔγωγε. Οἴει οὖν ἄν τινα ἐκ τοῦ κάτω
φερόμενον πρὸς μέσον ἄλλο τι οἴεσθαι ἢ ἄνω φέρεσθαι; καὶ ἐν
μέσῳ στάντα, ἀφορῶντα ὅθεν ἐνήνεκται, ἄλλοθί που ἂν ἡγεῖσθαι
εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄνω, μὴ ἑωρακότα τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ
ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ἄλλως οἶμαι οἰηθῆναι ἂν τὸν τοιοῦτον. Ἀλλ' εἰ πάλιν
γ', ἔφην, φέροιτο, | κάτω τ' ἂν οἴοιτο φέρεσθαι καὶ ἀληθῆ οἴοιτο; E
Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα πάσχοι ἂν πάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔμπειρος
εἶναι τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ἄνω τε ὄντος καὶ ἐν μέσῳ καὶ κάτω; Δῆλον
δή. Θαυμάζοις ἂν οὖν, εἰ καὶ ἄπειροι ἀληθείας περὶ πολλῶν τε
ἄλλων μὴ ὑγιεῖς δόξας ἔχουσιν πρός τε ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην καὶ τὸ
μεταξὺ τούτων οὕτω διάκεινται, ὥστε ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν
φέρωνται, ἀληθῆ τε | οἴονται καὶ τῷ ὄντι λυποῦνται, ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ 585
λύπης ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξύ, σφόδρα μὲν οἴονται πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ
ἡδονῇ γίγνεσθαι, ὥσπερ δὲ πρὸς μέλαν φαιὸν ἀποσκοποῦντες

27. ἄλλως Π: ἀλλ' ὡς A. 30. κάτω A^2Π: κάτα (*sic*) A^1. 3. δὲ *q*: om. AΠΞ.

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19 **προησθήσεις** is a Platonic coinage not found elsewhere. The reading *προαισθήσεις* (Ξ and Vind. B) held its ground till Bekker; but *προησθήσεις* had already been conjectured by Floyer Sydenham (Lupton in *Cl. Rev.* II p. 228).

20 **προλυπήσεις**: thus for example *τὸ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν* (sc. *ἐλπιζόμενον*) is *φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν* (*Phil.* l. c.). If bodily pleasure is 'mixed,' the same must be true of bodily pain: and so the *προλυπήσεις* as well as the *προησθήσεις* of anticipation are 'mixed' (*κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσιν*). Fear for example (which is *προσδοκία κακοῦ*) is a 'mixed' pain: see *Phil.* 47 E.

584 D 22 **νομίζεις κτλ.** This is the popular conception of 'above' and 'below' held also by most of the philosophers, e.g. Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras, the Atomists (RP^7. §§ 29, 68 A, 124 B *nn.*, 149 B *nn.*), and even Aristotle (*Phys.* IV 4. 212^a 24 ff.), and found also in the *Phaedo* (109 ff.). In the *Timaeus*, on the other hand, Plato takes a different and more scientific view: *φύσει γὰρ δή τινας τόπους δύο εἶναι διειληφότας διχῇ τὸ πᾶν ἐναντίους τὸν μὲν κάτω,—τὸν δ' ἄνω—οὐκ ὀρθὸν οὐδαμῇ νομίζειν κτλ.* (62 C ff.). It is possible (with Solomon *Cl. Rev.* III p. 418) to construe the divergence as "an incidental proof of the distance separating the *Republic* from the *Timaeus*," especially as the myth in Book X agrees with the view of Above and Below given here: but too much stress should not be laid on the present passage, which is intended only as an illustration and nothing more.

23 **οἴει οὖν ἄν τινα κτλ.** Cf. *Phaed.* 109 C.

584 E 31 **εἰ καὶ κτλ.**: 'if men also who are ignorant of truth' etc. *καί* sc. like *ὁ μὴ ἔμπειρος τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ἄνω τε ὄντος κτλ.* in our simile. Three *deteriores notae* MSS have *εἰ καὶ οἱ ἄπειροι*, and Hermann conjectures *οἱ* for *καί*: but cf. the use of *εἰ καί* in X 597 A. The article is not necessary, and ought not to be introduced without better MS authority.

585 A 2 **πληρώσει** prepares the way for the coming argument, in which Pleasure is viewed as *πλήρωσις*, Pain as *κένωσις* (cf. *Phil.* 31 E ff.). So far, we have been told only that they are *κινήσεις* (583 E).

3 **ὥσπερ δὲ κτλ.** The equations are of course Black = Pain, Grey = Absence

ἀπειρίᾳ λευκοῦ, καὶ τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω πρὸς λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀπειρίᾳ
ἡδονῆς ἀπατῶνται; Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἀλλὰ 5
πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει. Ὧδέ γ' οὖν, εἶπον, ἐννόει· οὐχὶ
B πεῖνα καὶ δίψα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κενώσεις τινές εἰσιν τῆς περὶ τὸ
σῶμα ἕξεως; Τί μήν; Ἄγνοια δὲ καὶ ἀφροσύνη ἆρ' οὐ κενότης
ἐστὶ τῆς περὶ ψυχὴν αὖ ἕξεως; Μάλα γε. Οὐκοῦν πληροῖτ' ἂν
ὅ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἴσχων; Πῶς δ' οὔ; Πλή- 10
ρωσις δὲ ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἧττον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος; Δῆλον, ὅτι
τοῦ μᾶλλον. Πότερα οὖν ἡγεῖ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας
μετέχειν, τὰ οἷον σίτου τε καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὄψου καὶ ξυμπάσης
C τροφῆς, ἢ τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ

4. τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω πρὸς λύπην Schleiermacher: πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην codd. 7. πεῖνα II et corr. A^2: πείνη A^1. 13. τὰ οἷον II: οἷον A^1: τὰ οἷα A^2.

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of Pain, White = Pleasure. Plato's simile is particularly appropriate, because Grey is a mixture of white and black (*Tim.* 68 C φαιὸν δὲ λευκοῦ τε καὶ μέλανος sc. κράσει γίγνεται), just as λυπῆς ἀπαλλαγή according to this discussion (584 C al.) may be regarded as a mixture of pleasure and pain (584 C, 586 B), or in other words only a 'mixed' pleasure. With the simile itself cf. Arist. *Phys.* V 1. 224^b 34 τὸ φαιὸν λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ μέλαν καὶ μέλαν πρὸς τὸ λευκόν and ib. 5. 229^b 16 ff. The best MSS omit δέ after ὥσπερ, and all the MSS have καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην instead of καὶ τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω πρὸς λύπην (see *cr. n.*), but it is impossible to believe that they are right. On the text and other views of this passage see App. V.

6 **ἔχει.** There is slight MS authority for **ἔχοι**, which Neukirch (*in Pl. Pol. quaest. phil.* I p. 47) and Richter (*Fleck. Jb.* 1867 p. 147) approve. ἔχει is sound enough: cf. *Prot.* 315 E οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ—τυγχάνει ὤν.

585 A—**586** C *Consider the question also in this way. Hunger, thirst etc. are modes of physical depletion; and Ignorance is a form of spiritual emptiness. He who partakes of food, and he who acquires Knowledge or Reason, are each 'filled'; but which of them is the more truly 'filled'? Knowledge and its kindred have more reality and truth than Food etc., Soul than Body: hence the acquisition of knowledge is a truer form of replenishment than the other. The resulting Pleasure will therefore be more true. Those who are strangers to wisdom and virtue know nothing of true delights, but fight with one another for delusive and unsatisfying joys.*

585 A 6 **ὧδέ γ' οὖν.** "In his γε vim acuit vocabuli ὧδε, sed οὖν inservit continuandae argumentationi. Ferri non potest γοῦν, quod ad universam sententiam pertineret, habens illud vim asseverandi cum restrictione quadam" (Stallbaum). Contrast I 335 E, VII 527 D *nn.* Here most of the MSS appear to have γε οὖν.

οὐχὶ πεῖνα καὶ δίψα κτλ. For the sense cf. *Phil.* 31 E and (in general) VII 519 A, B *nn.* The form πεῖνα (see *cr. n.*) is supported also by IV 437 D; but πείνη is in itself legitimate and occurs tolerably often in Plato, as Schneider shews.

585 B 8 **ἆρ' οὐ κενότης κτλ.** Ignorance, as well as hunger, is κενότης (cf. 584 B *n.*); but whereas we are *conscious* of physical depletion and therefore suffer pain, we are not—speaking generally—conscious of intellectual depletion, so that Ignorance is not, as a rule, painful; and thus the pleasures of Learning—the πλήρωσις of that whereof Ignorance is the κενότης—not being preceded by pain, are pure. This conclusion is worked out in *Phil.* 52 A, B, but not here, where the argument takes a different course. On ἴσχω 'acquire' 'get' see VI 511 D *n.*

14 **τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς κτλ.** So in *Phil.* 60 D μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος: cf. also ib. 19 D, 21 A, B, D. These objects are here conceived of as the τροφή of the soul, cf. *Phaed.* 84 B.

ξυλλήβδην αὖ πάσης ἀρετῆς; ὧδε δὲ κρῖνε· τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὂν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον μᾶλλον εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ, ἢ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτο καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον; Πολύ,

16. αὐτὸ Ξq: αὖ τὸ ΑΠ. 18. αὐτὸ Π: αὖ τὸ Α.

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585 C ff. 15 **ὧδε δὲ κρῖνε κτλ.** The following sentences are among the most perplexing in the whole of the *Republic*, or indeed in the whole of Plato's writings. That the reading of the MSS is corrupt has been admitted by the majority of critics, and will be proved in App. VI, to which I must refer for a full discussion on the text and interpretation of this difficult passage. Here it is possible only to set down what seems to me, after a review of all the conditions of the problem, the least unsatisfactory solution. The emendation in the text, which I printed in my *Text of the Republic*, has been approved by a critic in *Hermathena* XXIV p. 252. We have to discover whether food, drink etc. participate in pure Being more than true opinion, knowledge etc.; and the answer is arrived at by the following steps. (1) Which *is* more—that which is connected with the ever-like, the immortal and Truth, and which is itself of this nature, and found in something of this nature; or that which is connected with the never-like and mortal, and which is itself of this nature (never-like etc.) and found in something of this nature? That which is connected with the ever-like, says Glauco, *is* more. (2) Then does the Being of the *never*-like (ἀεὶ **ἀνομοίου**= μηδέποτε ὁμοίου) participate in Being at all more than the Being of Knowledge does? Certainly not (οὖν is strictly illative: if it is true that what is connected with the ever-like *is* more than what is connected with the never-like, then the Being of the never-like cannot *be* more than Knowledge is—for Knowledge of course ἔχεται τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου. Knowledge is in short taken as a type of that which ἔχεται τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου). (3) Or has the Being of the never-like more part in *Truth* than Knowledge has? To this also the answer is no: [for that which is connected with the ever-like—and Knowledge is so—is connected also with Truth: see above τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον—καὶ ἀληθείας]. (4) And if it has *less* part in truth [as it has], it must also have less part in Being. [This deduces from step (3) the conclusion already implied in (2), and also paves the way for οὐκοῦν ὅλως—μετέχει]. (5) Thus—since what is true of Knowledge is true of *all* the spiritual γένη, [and since food etc. are of course only particular examples of the ἀεὶ ἀνόμοιον or never-like], universally (ὅλως)—those γένη which are concerned with the care of the body have less part in Being and Truth than those which are concerned with the care of the soul. For a further discussion of this passage and other suggested solutions and emendations see App. VI.

τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου κτλ. The whole of this passage presupposes, as Grimmelt shews (*de reip. Pl. comp. et unit.* pp. 74 ff.), the metaphysical theory of V—VII. With τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου cf. V 479 A and VI 500 C: with ἀθανάτου VI 485 B (ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης): and with καὶ ἀληθείας VI 508 D. The last two words are rejected by Madvig and Baiter on the grounds that (1) we should expect an adjective, (2) καὶ ἀληθείας has no antithesis expressed, whereas ἀεὶ ὁμοίου and ἀθανάτου have: (3) the words unduly anticipate τί δ'; ἀληθείας; below. As I understand the passage, the mention of Truth is necessary—see above—just in view of τί δ'; ἀληθείας; and there is little weight in Madvig's first two arguments.

16 καὶ αὐτὸ κτλ. Is καί here and in καὶ αὐτό again below 'and' (Schneider) or 'both'? The first view is perhaps more likely: for it is more in keeping with the somewhat loose structure of the argument throughout this passage, and καί in D below (καὶ αὐτό) is most probably 'and.'

16, 18 ἐν τοιούτῳ (bis). The soul is of the nature of τὸ ἀεὶ ὅμοιον: see VI 490 B, 508 D, and especially *Phaed.* 79 A ff.: the body on the other hand is never constant, for like everything material πλανᾶται ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς (VI 485 B).

ἔφη, διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου. Ἡ οὖν ἀεὶ <ἀν>ομοίου οὐσία
οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ <ἡ> ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δ'; 20
ἀληθείας; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἧττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας;
D Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν | ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη
τῶν γενῶν αὖ τῶν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἧττον ἀληθείας
τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει; Πολύ γε. Σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ ψυχῆς οὐκ οἴει
οὕτως; Ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν τὸ τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων πληρούμενον καὶ 25
αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ὂν ὄντως μᾶλλον πληροῦται ἢ τὸ τῶν ἧττον ὄντων
καὶ αὐτὸ ἧττον ὄν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν
φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδύ ἐστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρού-
E μενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον | ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρειν ἂν ποιοῖ
ἡδονῇ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἧττον ὄντων μεταλαμβάνον ἧττόν τε ἂν 30
ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως πληροῖτο καὶ ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ
ἧττον ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι. Ἀναγκαιότατα, ἔφη. Οἱ ἄρα
586 φρονήσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἄπειροι, εὐω|χίαις δὲ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀεὶ
ξυνόντες, κάτω, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ φέρονταί
τε καὶ ταύτῃ πλανῶνται διὰ βίου, ὑπερβάντες δὲ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ
ἀληθῶς ἄνω οὔτε ἀνέβλεψαν πώποτε οὔτε ἠνέχθησαν, οὐδὲ τοῦ

19. ἀεὶ <ἀν>ομοίου nos: ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ΑΠΞ: ἡ δὲ τοῦ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου pro ἡ οὖν ἀεὶ ἀνομοίου *q*. In *v* et Flor. R legitur ἡ οὖν μὴ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου κτλ. 20. <ἡ> nos: om. codd. 24. ψυχῆς Π: τῆς ψυχῆς A, sed τῆς puncto notavit A^2.

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19 ἡ οὖν ἀεὶ ἀνομοίου κτλ. These words have already been discussed: but it should here be remarked that the insertion of *τοῦ* before the adjective (Ast, Madvig etc., both here and in *μηδέποτε ὁμοίου* above) is not necessary. On the connexion between *ἐπιστήμη*, *οὐσία* and *ἀλήθεια* see especially *Theaet.* 186 C, D.

585 D 24 σῶμα—οὕτως; 'And don't you think the same is true of the body itself as compared with the soul?' For the sense cf. *Phaed.* 80 B, and with the genitive *ψυχῆς* 582 C *n.* On this sentence Bosanquet remarks: "The only way to master this conception in its true light is to consider body and mind not as two things (*body* and *soul*) on a level or side by side, but, as daily experience really teaches us, under some such point of view as that of part and whole" (*Companion* p. 362). This point of view is suggestive, but it is scarcely that of the *Republic*, in spite of 584 C; and the student will best apprehend Plato's meaning both here and especially in X 608 D ff. if he carry his analysis no further than Plato himself does, and regard soul and body as two distinct and separate entities.

585 E 29 μᾶλλον μᾶλλον. The first *μᾶλλον* belongs both to *τῷ ὄντι* (=*ὄντως*) and to *τῶν ὄντων*: the second to *ὄντως*. After the stage of the argument reached in *οὐκοῦν—ἧττον ὄν*, it would have been enough to write here *τὸ τῷ ὄντι πληρούμενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντως —ἀληθεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἧττον ὄντως πληρούμενον ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν—μεταλαμβάνοι.* Plato characteristically amplifies his conclusion, even at the risk of obscuring the relation between it and the preceding step.

586 A 2 κάτω κτλ. refers to the illustration in 584 D ff. The meaning of *μέχρι πάλιν* is 'as far as back again' sc. to the intermediate point: cf. *μέχρι δεῦρο*, *μέχρι ἐνταῦθα*, and other instances of the same usage in Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s.v. *μέχρι* and Kühner-Blass *Gr. Gr.* II 1 p. 539 f.

3 **πλανῶνται.** They are like 'wanderers' who have lost the way: cf. the common use of *πλανᾶσθαι* in the New Testament; e.g. *Pet.* II 2. 15.

τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω refers to 584 D: but

ὄντος τῷ ὄντι ἐπληρώθησαν, οὐδὲ βεβαίου τε καὶ καθαρᾶς ἡδονῆς
ἐγεύσαντο, ἀλλὰ βοσκημάτων δίκην κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ
κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορταζόμενοι καὶ
ὀχεύοντες, καὶ ἕνεκα | τῆς τούτων πλεονεξίας λακτίζοντες καὶ B
κυρίττοντες ἀλλήλους σιδηροῖς κέρασί τε καὶ ὁπλαῖς ἀποκτιννύασι
διὰ ἀπληστίαν, ἅτε οὐχὶ τοῖς οὖσιν οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ στέγον ἑαυτῶν
πιμπλάντες. Παντελῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, τὸν τῶν πολλῶν, ὦ
Σώκρατες, χρησμῳδεῖς βίον. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡδοναῖς
ξυνεῖναι μεμιγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλοις τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ
ἐσκιαγραφημέναις, ὑπὸ τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλας θέσεως ἀποχραινομέναις,
| ὥστε σφοδροὺς ἑκατέρας φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἔρωτας ἑαυτῶν λυττῶντας C
τοῖς ἄφροσιν ἐντίκτειν καὶ περιμαχήτους εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς
Ἑλένης εἴδωλον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Τροίᾳ Στησίχορός φησι γενέσθαι

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the words are intended also to suggest the deeper Platonic use of 'the true Above,' where Truth and Pureness dwell: see *Phaed.* 109 B ff., with VII 514 A *n.*

6 **βοσκημάτων δίκην κτλ.** Cf. *Tim.* 91 E (the heads etc. of brute beasts are *εἰς γῆν ἐλκόμενα* in sympathy with their earthly souls) and VII 519 A, B *nn.* With *κεκυφότες εἰς τραπέζας* cf. the description of Syracusan gluttony in the seventh Platonic Epistle 326 B ff. *χορταζόμενοι* (cf. II 372 D) and *ὀχεύοντες* are properly used of brute beasts, and therefore suitable after *βοσκημάτων δίκην*. *ἕνεκα τῆς τούτων πλεονεξίας* is equivalent to *ὥστε τούτων πλέον* (sc. than others) *ἔχειν*.

586 B 9 σιδηροῖς κτλ. The epithet is significant and should be pronounced with emphasis. The horns and hoofs wherewith these human *βοσκήματα* 'kick and butt' are lethal weapons made of iron. Van Leeuwen's conjecture *σκληροῖς* for *σιδηροῖς* (*Mnem.* N. S. XXV Pt 4) only emasculates a fine comparison. J. and C. aptly cite in illustration Aesch. *Ag.* 1115 ff. *ὁπλαῖς* may be said "with a glance at *ὅπλοις*" (J. and C.). War springs from the insatiate desires of the flesh (II 373 E *n.*): hence *δι' ἀπληστίαν*.

10 ἅτε οὐχὶ—πιμπλάντες explains *ἀπληστίαν*. They cannot be 'filled' because that part of themselves which they fill is not the real, not the continent part, and that wherewith they fill it is not the real either. Bosanquet aptly compares "Whoso drinketh of this water shall thirst again." In *οὐδὲ τὸ στέγον* Plato doubtless has in mind the story of the Danaids, in which the *πίθος τετρημένος* was interpreted by certain 'wise men'—probably preachers of the Orphic-Pythagorean way of life: cf. App. IV—as the bottomless or incontinent part of soul: see *Gorg.* 493 A ff., especially the words *τῶν δ' ἀμυήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς, οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας* together with Rohde *Psyche*[2] I pp. 326—329. Schneider makes a curious error when he says "*τὸ στέγον* hic *corpus* quasi vas animi significare videtur."

12 **χρησμῳδεῖς** refers to the half-oracular style of Socrates' description: compare for instance *σιδηροῖς κέρασί τε καὶ ὁπλαῖς* with the famous *ξύλινον τεῖχος* in the oracle to the Athenians (Hdt. VII 141—144: see also id. I 55 al. for more examples).

14 **ἐσκιαγραφημέναις κτλ.** See on 583 B. The words *ὑπὸ τῆς—ἀποχραινομέναις* mean 'taking their colour from juxtaposition.' The word *ἀποχραίνειν* had also a more technical sense (*τὸ τὰ χρωσθέντα ἑνοποιεῖν* Tim. *lex. Pl.* s.v. *χραίνειν*), to which Plato alludes in *Laws* 769 A.

586 C 16 ὥσπερ κτλ. The many *σκιαμαχοῦσι* (VII 520 C) like the Trojans fighting for Helen's shadow in the fields of Troy.

17 **Στησίχορος κτλ.** See *Phaedr.* 243 A and Bergk *Poet. Lyr. Gr.*[4] III pp. 214 ff. There is no real ground for supposing (with Teichmüller *Lit. Fehd.* I pp. 113 ff.) that Plato intends an allusion to Isocrates' *Helena*, in spite of *περιμάχητος*

περιμάχητον ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτὸ εἶναι.

XI. Τί δέ; περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ὃς ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττηται, ἢ φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν
D ἢ βίᾳ διὰ φιλονικίαν ἢ θυμῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν, πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ; Τοιαῦτα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν, ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὸ φιλοκερδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόνικον ὅσαι ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσίν, αἷ μὲν ἂν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἑπόμεναι καὶ μετὰ τούτων

21. ἂν $A^2\Pi$: om. A^1. διαπράττηται $A^2\Pi$: διαπράττεται ut videtur A^1. 25. λέγωμεν $A^1\Pi$: λέγομεν A^2.

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in *Hel.* 40 and the reference to Stesichorus ib. 64. Instead of *τοῦ ἀληθοῦς* Floyer Sydenham conjectured *τῆς ἀληθοῦς* (see *Cl. Rev.* II p. 229). It is more like Plato's suggestiveness to say 'the truth' than 'the true Helen,' which would moreover (as Lupton points out l.c.) rather be *τῆς ἀληθινῆς*.

586 C—**588** A *The pleasures of anger, unless pursued in conformity with reason, are similarly unreal. We may even venture to say that it is only when obedient to knowledge that the desires of the two lower parts of soul can attain those pleasures which are in the highest sense their own and true—so far as it is possible for them to have true pleasures at all. Now the tyrannical desires are farthest from reason, so that the tyrant has least pleasure. By an elaborate calculation it is shewn that the king lives seven-hundred and twenty-nine times more pleasantly than the tyrant; and if the just man so far surpasses the unjust in respect of pleasure, how much greater will be his transcendence in beauty and virtue!*

586 C 20 **ἕτερα τοιαῦτα κτλ.** The satisfaction of *τὸ θυμοειδές* is also no true pleasure, but only *λύπης ἀπαλλαγή*. See *Phil.* 47 E. *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* means *τὸ τοῦ θυμοειδές*. The verb *διαπράττηται* is used as in IV 440 D *οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἢ διαπράξηται ἢ κτλ. φιλοτιμίαν, φιλονικίαν* and *δυσκολίαν* ('ill temper' cf. III 411 C) are particular forms of the principle which Plato calls *τὸ θυμοειδές*. Each of them is a *κενότης* and painful. The *κενότης* is filled, as the case may be, by *τιμή, νίκη*, or *θυμός* (indulgence in anger): hence *πλησμονὴν τιμῆς κτλ.* On the spelling *φιλονικίαν*, which the present passage, like others in Plato, clearly points to, see 581 B *n.*

586 D 23 **ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ** is emphatic, and prepares us for *θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν κτλ.*, where Plato concedes after all a certain measure of reality and truth to the pleasures of the two lower parts of soul, provided they act in obedience to reason. That the *φιλοκερδές* should in any degree whatsoever participate in true pleasure, has been judged inconsistent with the previous argument (Krohn *Pl. St.* pp. 227 ff.), but is not so, if we fully appreciate the restrictions which Plato makes (cf. Grimmelt *de reip. comp. et unit.* p. 76), and also remember that in the perfect city, which is the counterpart of the perfect soul, the lower orders found their truest pleasure in working for the common welfare under reason as embodied in the Guardians. The gist of the present passage is well expressed by Nettleship, who in his *Lectures and Remains* II p. 331 remarks "that in the most trivial satisfaction there may be a sense of serving something wider and higher than animal appetite: that this gives to the satisfaction of appetite a permanence and a satisfactoriness which by itself it cannot have." Appetite, in short, behaves like a loyal citizen of the *πολιτεία ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*. Cf. IV 443 D, E.

26 **αἷ μὲν κτλ.** The antithesis is supplied in a different form by *ὅταν δὲ κτλ.* 587 A. Instead of *ἑπομένων* in line 29 Stephanus read *ἑπόμεναι*, without MS authority: but cf. (with Schneider) *ὡς ἄμεινον ὂν παντὶ ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ κτλ.* 590 D. See note ad loc.

τὰς ἡδονὰς διώκουσαι, ἃς ἂν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγῆται, λαμβάνωσι, τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε λήψονται, ὡς οἷόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν, ἄτε ἀληθείᾳ ἑπομένων, καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν οἰκείας, | εἴπερ τὸ βέλτιστον E
30 ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον; Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, οἰκειότατόν γε. Τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἄρα ἑπομένης ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης ἑκάστῳ τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει εἴς τε τἆλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίῳ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς βελτίστας καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν | τὰς ἀληθεστάτας καρποῦσθαι. 587
Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Ὅταν δὲ ἄρα τῶν ἑτέρων τι κρατήσῃ, ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ μήτε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἡδονὴν ἐξευρίσκειν τά τε ἄλλ' ἀναγκάζειν ἀλλοτρίαν καὶ μὴ ἀληθῆ ἡδονὴν διώκειν. Οὕτως, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἃ
5 πλεῖστον φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ λόγου ἀφέστηκεν, μάλιστ' ἂν τοιαῦτα ἐξεργάζοιτο; Πολύ γε. Πλεῖστον δὲ λόγου ἀφίσταται οὐχ ὅπερ νόμου τε καὶ τάξεως; Δῆλον δή. Ἐφάνησαν δὲ πλεῖστον | ἀφεσ- B
τῶσαι οὐχ αἱ ἐρωτικαί τε καὶ τυραννικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι; Πολύ γε. Ἐλάχιστον δὲ αἱ βασιλικαί τε καὶ κόσμιαι; Ναί. Πλεῖστον δή,
10 οἶμαι, ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ οἰκείας ὁ τύραννος ἀφεστήξει, ὁ δὲ ὀλίγιστον. Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ ἀηδέστατα ἄρα, εἶπον, ὁ τύραννος βιώσεται, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἥδιστα. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσῳ ἀηδέστερον ζῇ τύραννος βασιλέως; Ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔφη.

27. ἐξηγῆται $A^2\Pi$: ἐξηγεῖται A^1. λαμβάνωσι $A^1\Pi$: λαμβάνουσι A^2.

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586 E 29 **τὸ βέλτιστον—οἰκειότατον.** Cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* X chapter 7 ad finem *δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο* (sc. *τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ*), *εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον κτλ.* The whole of the latter portion of that famous chapter, in which Aristotle comes nearer to the spirit of Plato than anywhere else throughout his writings, might be summed up in the pregnant saying *τὸ βέλτιστον ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον*—a saying which reaches to the very foundations of Plato's philosophy: for if that which is best for each thing, is also most its own—most truly akin to it, part of its very being,—it follows that each thing truly is just in proportion as it is good. In other words the cause of all existence is the Good; see on VI 505 D, 509 B.

31 **τῷ φιλοσόφῳ κτλ.** *τῷ φιλοσόφῳ* is of course neuter, and not masculine. With *μὴ στασιαζούσης κτλ.* cf. IV 441 D—444 A. Soul attains its true unity (so far as is possible in this life: see on X 611 B) when the two lower 'parts' obey the highest; only then does a man become *εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν* (IV 443 E *n.*). **δικαίῳ εἶναι:** i.e. according to the definition of Justice in Book IV l.c.

587 A 3 **μήτε—ἀναγκάζειν κτλ.:** as in the eloquent picture of the *λογιστικόν* and the *θυμοειδές*, seeking for pleasures to lay at the feet of the *φιλοχρήματον* VIII 553 C, D. Cf. also infra 590 B. For *μήτε—τε* see IV 430 B *n.*

587 B 10 **ὁ δέ:** viz. *ὁ βασιλεύς.* It is unnecessary to insert *βασιλεύς* in the text, as Baiter wishes to do: cf. I 349 D *n.*

13 **ὅσῳ ἀηδέστερον κτλ.** Plato loved to play with mathematics, and in the following passage he endeavours to give an arithmetical expression to the pleasures of justice and injustice. His motive in introducing this "hedonistic calculus," as Bosanquet calls it, has been much discussed. The following considerations deserve attention. (1) On artistic grounds, now that the argument has been concluded, it is not inappropriate that Justice and Injustice, represented by the

Τριῶν ἡδονῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐσῶν, μιᾶς μὲν γνησίας, δυοῖν δὲ νόθαιν,
C τῶν νόθων εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα | ὑπερβὰς ὁ τύραννος, φυγὼν νόμον τε 15
καὶ λόγον, δούλαις τισὶ δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς ξυνοικεῖ, καὶ ὁπόσῳ
ἐλαττοῦται οὐδὲ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν, πλὴν ἴσως ὧδε. Πῶς; ἔφη.
Ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ τρίτος που ὁ τύραννος ἀφειστήκει· ἐν μέσῳ
γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁ δημοτικὸς ἦν. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡδονῆς τρίτῳ εἰδώλῳ
πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀπ' ἐκείνου ξυνοικοῖ ἄν, εἰ τὰ πρόσθεν ἀληθῆ; 20
D Οὕτω. Ὁ δέ γε ὀλιγαρχικὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ αὖ τρίτος, | ἐὰν
εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν τιθῶμεν. Τρίτος γάρ.

14. *νόθαιν* Π: *νόθων* A¹: *νόθοιν* A². 19. *δημοτικὸς* A¹Π: *δημοκρατικὸς* corr. A².

King and the Tyrant, should as it were be weighed in the balance. The importance of *ἀριθμεῖν*, *μετρεῖν*, *ἱστάναι* is constantly present to Plato's mind. See on X 602 D. (2) The Pythagoreans were in the habit of expressing virtues and other immaterial ideas in terms of numbers (see Zeller[5] I pp. 389 ff.), and there is reason to suppose that the number 729 played a part in a Pythagorean calendar (588 A *n.*). Some of the terms employed by Plato, such as *τρίτη αὔξη*, are also in all probability of Pythagorean origin. See App. I to Book VIII pp. 279 ff. (3) The arithmetical method of calculation enables Plato to set forth in a very striking and dramatic way his own dissent from the popular estimate of the tyrant's happiness (Schneider). (4) When all is said we must allow that some of the steps are arbitrary, and that Plato's main object is to reach the significant number 729, so as to indicate that the king has more pleasure than the tyrant every day and every night of his life. There is of course an element of playfulness in the episode, and we need not suppose that Plato set any particular store by his calculations: but neither ought we on the other hand to dismiss the whole reckoning as a meaningless and foolish jest. See also on VIII 545 C.

14 **τριῶν ἡδονῶν κτλ.** The three pleasures are those of the king, the timocrat, and the oligarch. The first variety is genuine, the second and third spurious: but the tyrant has 'crossed the line into the region beyond the spurious,' i.e. his pleasures represent a still lower depth (see 571 B ff.), being in fact only *εἴδωλα* twice removed of the oligarch's spurious pleasures (587 C). Schleiermacher made *τῶν νόθων* depend partitively on *τὸ ἐπέκεινα* ("so ist der Tyrann auf die jenseitige der unächten hinübergestiegen"). This view is linguistically defensible (c. *Phaed.* 112 B), and even attractive at first sight; but *τῶν νόθων* must be interpreted by *δυοῖν νόθαιν*, and *δυοῖν νόθαιν* certainly does not include the tyrant's species of pleasure. The feminine dual ending *-αιν* (instead of the commoner *-οιν*) is "magis elatioris quam vulgaris sermonis" (Roeper *de dual. us. Pl.* p. 6). Cf. IV 422 E *n.*

587 C 16 **δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς.** These are described in 573 D ff.

17 **οὐδὲ** should not be taken with *εἰπεῖν*. The hyperbaton is too difficult, and the meaning ("not even to express it" J. and C.) weak. We should translate 'and it isn't very easy, either, to say' etc., taking *οὐδέ* as 'also not,' a usage illustrated by Riddell *Digest* § 141. See on *οὐδὲ θαμίζεις κτλ.* I 328 C.

18 **ὁ τύραννος.** We might expect *ὁ τυραννικός*, but throughout the whole of this comparison Plato is content to take the tyrant—who is, we remember, *τυραννικώτατος* 575 D—as the type of the tyrannical, and the king as the type of the kingly or aristocratic man. See above on 587 B and also below 587 E *n.*

19 **οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡδονῆς κτλ.** If the tyrant is third from the oligarch, his pleasure will also be, in respect of truth, third from the oligarch's, i.e. will be an image of an image (*τρίτῳ εἰδώλῳ* cf. X 597 E and 599 A, D) of the oligarch's pleasure.

587 D 21 **ἐὰν εἰς ταὐτὸν κτλ.** See on IV 445 D.

Τριπλασίου ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τριπλάσιον ἀριθμῷ ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς ἀφέστηκεν τύραννος. Φαίνεται. Ἐπίπεδον ἄρ', ἔφην, ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ εἴδωλον κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμὸν ἡδονῆς τυραννικῆς ἂν εἴη. Κομιδῇ γε. Κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην δῆλον δὴ ἀπόστασιν

23 **τριπλασίου ἄρα κτλ.** The distance of the tyrant from true pleasure is measured first *ἀριθμῷ*, i.e. "numero seu secundum longitudinem, numerus enim omnis quatenus monadibus constat, lineae instar habendus" (Schneider III p. LXXXXV. See also for *ἀριθμῷ* VII 526 C *n.* and cf. the expression *γραμμικὸς ἀριθμὸς* in Nicom. *Introd. Ar.* p. 117 Ast. Relatively to themselves, we reckoned the oligarch, democrat, and tyrant, as 1, 2, 3; but we have since found that the distance of the oligarch from true pleasure is in reality 3 times 1: hence that of the tyrant must be 3 times 3, as in the line AB. We should doubtless regard the intervening numbers (4, 5, and 7, 8) as indicating different stages in the gradual degeneration of the oligarch into the democrat (559 D ff.) and the democrat into the tyrant or tyrannical man (572 D ff.). It might seem more natural to make the distance of the tyrant from true pleasure 5 and not 9 (King 1, Timocrat 2, Oligarch 3, Democrat 4, Tyrant 5); but (as Schneider reminds us) the pleasures of the Democrat and Tyrant lie *beyond* the two spurious pleasures, so that the modulus of progression may reasonably be increased. Plato's chief object is however to reach the number 729, and he could not do so except by making a fresh departure with the oligarch.



24 **ἐπίπεδον ἄρα κτλ.** The number 9 is *ἐπίπεδος*, because = 3 × 3: *εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν οἱ μὲν ἐπίπεδοι, ὅσοι ὑπὸ δύο ἀριθμῶν πολλαπλασιάζονται, οἷον μήκους καὶ πλάτους· τούτων δὲ οἱ μὲν τρίγωνοι, οἱ δὲ τετράγωνοι κτλ.* (Theo. Smyrn. p. 31 Hiller. Cf. Gow *Gk Math.* p. 69 and Müller in *Hermes* 1870 p. 394 *n.* 1). This explanation, which so far agrees with that of the Scholiast, is adopted by the English translators and editors; but Schneider (l.c. and on p. 313 of his translation) holds that *ἐπίπεδον κτλ.* invites us to raise to the second power not 3, but 9—the number which we are presently expected to raise to the *third* power. The inferential *ἄρα* seems to me in favour of the Scholiast's view, as well as *κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμόν* (cf. *κατὰ τὸ μῆκος* in Theo p. 31 al.), an expression which corresponds to *ἀριθμῷ* in the previous sentence while at the same time preparing us for *κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην* in the next. The whole sentence is, I believe, only a way of saying that, if the tyrant is 3 × 3 degrees distant from true pleasure, his *εἴδωλον* of pleasure may be represented by 9. The use of the mathematical term *ἐπίπεδον* has a playful effect, both in itself and also because it sounds wilful and eccentric to express a number of *one* 'increase' (*τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμόν*) in terms of two. *δύναμις* = *δευτέρα αὔξη*: cf. *Tim* 54 B and Cantor *Gesch. d. Mathem.* p. 178. The first increase (viz. of the unit or point) was *ὁ τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμός*, i.e. in this case (1 × 9 =) 9: by the second-and-third increases (on the same scale) we obtain 9 × 9 (second increase or *δύναμις*) × 9 (third increase or *τρίτη αὔξη*) = 729. See App. I to Book VIII p. 279. Schneider's erroneous idea that the squaring of 9 has already been alluded to in *ἐπίπεδον—εἴη* leads him to take *δύναμιν* as merely 'power' and *τρίτην αὔξην* as "per epexegesin ad *δύναμιν* additum." What motive induced Plato to cube the distance? Was it something purely fanciful, e.g. "in order to gauge the *depth* of the tyrant's misery" (J. and C.), or because the king and the tyrant are themselves solid creatures (cf. Arist. Quint. *de Mus.* III p. 89. 35 Jahn)? I think not. He probably intended to suggest that "the degradation proceeds by increasingly wide intervals" (Bosanquet), but the actual calculations are inspired by a desire to reach the total 729. See on 588 A.

ὅσην ἀφεστηκὼς γίγνεται. Δῆλον, ἔφη, τῷ γε λογιστικῷ. Οὐκοῦν
E ἐάν τις μεταστρέψας ἀληθείᾳ ἡδονῆς τὸν | βασιλέα τοῦ τυράννου
ἀφεστηκότα λέγῃ ὅσον ἀφέστηκεν, ἐννεακαιεικοσικαιεπτακοσιο-
πλασιάκις ἥδιον αὐτὸν ζῶντα εὑρήσει τελειωθείσῃ τῇ πολλαπλα- 30
σιώσει, τὸν δὲ τύραννον ἀνιαρότερον τῇ αὐτῇ ταύτῃ ἀποστάσει.
Ἀμήχανον, ἔφη, λογισμὸν καταπεφόρηκας τῆς διαφορότητος τοῖν
588 ἀνδροῖν, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ | τοῦ ἀδίκου, πρὸς ἡδονήν τε καὶ λύπην.
Καὶ μέντοι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ προσήκοντά γε, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, βίοις ἀριθμόν,
εἴπερ αὐτοῖς προσήκουσιν ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες καὶ μῆνες καὶ ἐνιαυτοί.
Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, προσήκουσιν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τοσοῦτον ἡδονῇ νικᾷ
ὁ ἀγαθός τε καὶ δίκαιος τὸν κακόν τε καὶ ἄδικον, ἀμηχάνῳ δὴ 5

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28 **μεταστρέψας**: 'conversely' ("umgekehrt" Schneider).

587 E 32 **ἀμήχανον κτλ.** I do not think there can be any doubt that Schneider is right in retaining *καταπεφόρηκας*, which is found in all the best and also in a majority of the inferior MSS. The word has reference to the gigantic and tempestuous numeral *ἐννεακαιεικοσικαιεπτακοσιοπλασιάκις*, which Socrates has by a mighty effort of exspiration—*γιγγενεῖ φυσήματι*—hurled down upon his hearers' heads. Cf. generally *Theaet.* 180 A and Ar. *Frogs* 822—825. *καταφορεῖν* "contentionem vocis ad praelongum vocabulum numeri a Socrate prolati adhibendam significare potest; nec multum ab hoc abludit illa *καταφορά*, quam oratoribus esse inter accusandum longiorem spiritus productionem ex Hermogene refert vetus lexicon apud Stephanum *Thes.* T. IIII p. 109 C" (Schneider). See Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s.v., and also on *καταφορικός*, where the words *ἀδιόριστον τέθεικε τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα, ἵνα μετὰ ἀδικίας καταφορικῷ χρώμενος λόγῳ σφόδρα πλήξῃ τοὺς ἀκούοντας* are quoted from Chrysost. X p. 386 C. The reading *καταπεφώρακας* is much less dramatic and appropriate, and has very little MS authority (Ξ^2, *v* and two other MSS, in one of which it is only a correction).

33 **τοῦ τε δικαίου—ἀδίκου.** These words might have been dispensed with, and accordingly Herwerden brackets them. But the point at issue, as originally raised in Book II, was the relation between Justice and Injustice, not the relation between the King and the Tyrant: and before giving his final answer, Plato does well to remind us that the King and the Tyrant are only types of Justice and Injustice. Cf. *ὁ ἀγαθὸς—ἄδικον* just below.

588 A 2 **προσήκοντά γε κτλ.** 729 is twice $364\frac{1}{2}$, and Philolaus counted $364\frac{1}{2}$ days, and presumably therefore $364\frac{1}{2}$ nights in the year (Censor. *de die nat.* 19). This explains *ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες*. It is not so obvious in what way the number 729 is related to months. On this subject J. and C. remark "12 months in a year: $30+\frac{1}{3}$ days in a month: $12\times(30+\frac{1}{3})=364$: $2\times364\frac{1}{2}=729$." I can see no point in such a calculation. Susemihl on the other hand reminds us that Philolaus believed in a so-called great year of 729 months, and as Plato is following Philolaus in *ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες*, we may reasonably suppose that he does so in the rest of the passage, so that *καὶ μῆνες* will be a reference to Philolaus' great year. See Sus. *Gen. Entw.* II p. 244 *n.* 3, and on the subject of Philolaus' year of 729 months Zeller[5] I p. 428 *n.* 3. I have as yet found no evidence for supposing that Philolaus went a step farther and postulated a yet greater year of 729 ordinary years, but the words *καὶ ἐνιαυτοί* in Plato make it probable that he did so. On this supposition the full explanation of *προσήκοντα—ἐνιαυτοί* will be

729 days and nights = 1 year.
729 months = 1 great year.
729 years = 1 greatest year.

The general upshot is that the king is happier than the tyrant every day and every night of his life, rather than (as Bosanquet suggests) that "one day of the good life is worth a year of the bad"; "a day in thy courts is better than a thousand."

ὅσῳ πλέον νικήσει εὐσχημοσύνῃ τε βίου καὶ κάλλει καὶ ἀρετῇ; Ἀμηχάνῳ μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἔφη.

XII. Εἶεν δή, εἶπον· ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα λόγου γεγόναμεν, ἀνα- B
λάβωμεν τὰ πρῶτα λεχθέντα, δι' ἃ δεῦρ' ἤκομεν. ἦν δέ που
λεγόμενον λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν τῷ τελέως μὲν ἀδίκῳ, δοξαζομένῳ
δὲ δικαίῳ. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἐλέχθη; Οὕτω μὲν οὖν. Νῦν δή, ἔφην,
αὐτῷ διαλεγώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ διωμολογησάμεθα τό τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ
δίκαια πράττειν ἣν ἑκάτερον ἔχει δύναμιν. Πῶς; ἔφη. Εἰκόνα
πλάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς λόγῳ, ἵνα εἰδῇ ὁ ἐκεῖνα λέγων, οἷα ἔλεγεν.

6. πλέον nos (cf. Meisterhans[3] p. 152): πλείονι A^1: πλέονι *q*: πλεῖον $A^2\Pi\Xi$. 12. τό τε $A^2\Pi$: τε A^1.

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6 **πλέον.** See *cr. n.* πλέον and not πλεῖον is the classical form, though both πλέονι and πλείονι were admissible (Meisterhans[3] p. 152). The diphthong ει (in A^2 Π etc.) may therefore be held to favour the reading πλείονι, which I formerly adopted; but the dative is undeniably awkward, and it is better to acquiesce in πλέον: cf. τοσοῦτον ἡδονῇ νικᾷ above.

588 A—**589** B *We are now in a position to refute the thesis that Injustice combined with a reputation for Justice is profitable for him who is unjust. The soul may be likened to a composite creature —part bestial, part leonine, part human, —wearing the outward semblance of humanity. He who maintains that Injustice profits a man, holds that it is profitable to starve the human element and make strong the rest, and encourage strife and sedition within the soul. The advocate of Justice on the other hand asserts that the human element should have the mastery and bring the others into harmony with one another and itself.*

588 B 9 **ἦν δέ που λεγόμενον.** The reference is to II 361 A ff. For αὐτῷ C. Schmidt conjectured αὖ οὕτω, which I too hastily adopted in my edition of the text. Glauco and Adimantus are careful in Book II to disclaim the views which they expound; and after ἦν δέ που λεγόμενον it is easy to refer αὐτῷ to the hypothetical person (not necessarily Thrasymachus in particular: see II 358 C and 367 A) for whom they speak: cf. ὁ ἐκεῖνα λέγων presently and ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων (II 360 D), as well as φήσει λογιζόμενος (ib. 366 A). See also on 590 A.

13 **εἰκόνα πλάσαντες κτλ.** Cf. *Tim.* 69 D—70 E and the picture of the soul in *Phaedr.* 246 A, 253 D ff. We are told by Clement (*Strom.* II 20. 1058 C Migne) that Basilides compared man to a wooden horse, peopled by a host of different spirits. The underlying idea of Plato's similitude is that man is a compound of the mortal and the immortal, standing midway between corruptibility and incorruptibility: θνητῆς καὶ ἀθανάτου φύσεως μεθόριον (Philo *de mund. opif.* 46). In the noble lines of George Herbert:

"To this life things of sense
Make their pretence:
In th' other Angels have a right by birth:
Man ties them both alone,
And makes them one,
With th' one hand touching heav'n, with th' other earth.
In soul he mounts and flies,
In flesh he dies.
He wears a stuffe whose thread is coarse and round,
But trimm'd with curious lace,
And should take place
After the trimming, not the stuffe and ground."

Nettleship (*Lect. and Rem.* II p. 333) justly observes "that it was no mere figure of speech with Plato to represent these psychical tendencies in man as animals, for he clearly believed that there was continuity between the different forms in which life appears; that somehow or other souls rose and fell in the scale of being according as they behaved in each form in which they were embodied; and that there was a real identity between certain elements in man's soul and certain elements in other organic creatures." See X 618 B ff., *Phaed.* 81 E ff.

C Ποίαν τινά; ἦ δ' ὅς. Τῶν τοιούτων τινά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἷαι μυθο- 15
λογοῦνται παλαιαὶ γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἥ τε Χιμαίρας καὶ ἡ Σκύλλης
καὶ Κερβέρου, καὶ ἄλλαι τινὲς συχναὶ λέγονται ξυμπεφυκυῖαι
ἰδέαι πολλαὶ εἰς ἓν γενέσθαι. Λέγονται γάρ, ἔφη. Πλάττε
τοίνυν μίαν μὲν ἰδέαν θηρίου ποικίλου καὶ πολυκεφάλου, ἡμέρων
δὲ θηρίων ἔχοντος κεφαλὰς κύκλῳ καὶ ἀγρίων καὶ δυνατοῦ μετα- 20
βάλλειν καὶ φύειν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα. Δεινοῦ πλάστου, ἔφη,
D τὸ ἔργον· ὅμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ εὐπλαστότερον κηροῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων
λόγος, πεπλάσθω. Μίαν δὴ τοίνυν ἄλλην ἰδέαν λέοντος, μίαν δὲ
ἀνθρώπου· πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον ἔστω τὸ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον τὸ
δεύτερον. Ταῦτα, ἔφη, ῥᾴω· καὶ πέπλασται. Σύναπτε τοίνυν 25
αὐτὰ εἰς ἓν τρία ὄντα, ὥστε πῃ ξυμπεφυκέναι ἀλλήλοις. Συνῆπται,
ἔφη. Περίπλασον δὴ αὐτοῖς ἔξωθεν ἑνὸς εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
E που, ὥστε τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξω μόνον
ἕλυτρον ὁρῶντι ἓν ζῷον φαίνεσθαι, ἄνθρωπον. Περιπέπλασται,
ἔφη. Λέγωμεν δὴ τῷ λέγοντι, ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τούτῳ ἀδικεῖν τῷ 30
ἀνθρώπῳ, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν οὐ ξυμφέρει, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο φησὶν
ἢ λυσιτελεῖν αὐτῷ τὸ παντοδαπὸν θηρίον εὐωχοῦντι ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν
καὶ τὸν λέοντα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον λιμο-
589 κτονεῖν | καὶ ποιεῖν ἀσθενῆ, ὥστε ἕλκεσθαι ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκείνων ὁπότερον
ἄγῃ, καὶ μηδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ξυνεθίζειν μηδὲ φίλον ποιεῖν, ἀλλ'
ἐᾶν αὐτὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς δάκνεσθαί τε καὶ μαχόμενα ἐσθίειν ἄλληλα.
Παντάπασι γάρ, ἔφη, ταῦτ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐπαινῶν. Οὐκοῦν

1. ἐκείνων $A^2\Pi$: ἐκείνω A^1.

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588 C 16 Χιμαίρας κτλ. The Scholiast thus explains: *ἡ Χίμαιρα τὸ εἶδός ἐστι 'πρόσθε λέων, ὄπιθεν δὲ δράκων, μέσση δὲ Χίμαιρα'—Σκύλλα δὲ—πρόσωπον ἔχουσα καὶ στέρνα γυναικός, ἐκ λαγόνων δὲ κυνῶν κεφαλὰς ἓξ καὶ πόδας δώδεκα—εἶχε δὲ οὗτος* (Κέρβερος) *τρεῖς μὲν κυνῶν κεφαλάς, οὐρὰν δὲ δράκοντος, κατὰ νώτου δὲ παντοίων ὄφεων εἶχε κεφαλάς.*

17 **καὶ ἄλλαι τινὲς κτλ.**: e.g. Hippocentaurs, Gorgons, Pegasus (*Phaedr.* 229 D). The relatival is succeeded by an independent sentence, as often (II 357 B *n.*).

19 **θηρίου—πολυκεφάλου.** Cf. *Phaedr.* 230 A *θηρίον—Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον*, *Tim.* 70 E (the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* as a *θρέμμα ἄγριον*) and Arist. *Pol.* Γ 16. 1287^a 30 *ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον* (viz. *θηρίον*). For the epithet *ποικίλου* see VIII 557 C, 561 E and *πολυειδίαν* in 580 D.

ἡμέρων δέ. Madvig would write *ἡμέρων τε*: but *ἡμέρων—ἀγρίων* is loosely treated as a new point in the description, although it only elaborates and explains *πολυκεφάλου*, and *δέ* does not balance the preceding *μέν*. So also J. and C.

588 D 24 μέγιστον—τὸ πρῶτον. The *ἐπιθυμητικόν* is the largest part of soul: see IV 442 A and II 379 C *n.*

25 **σύναπτε τοίνυν κτλ.** Krohn finds fault with Plato for failing to preserve the essential unity of the individual throughout this comparison (*Pl. St.* p. 229). But, according to Plato, the true unity of the individual is realised only through the subjection of the two lower 'parts' of soul to the highest (586 E *n.*); and this subjection is described in 589 A, B.

αὖ ὁ τὰ δίκαια λέγων λυσιτελεῖν φαίη ἂν δεῖν ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ ταῦτα λέγειν, ὅθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ἐγκρατέστατος | καὶ τοῦ πολυκεφάλου θρέμματος ἐπιμελήσεται, ὥσπερ B γεωργὸς τὰ μὲν ἥμερα τρέφων καὶ τιθασεύων, τὰ δὲ ἄγρια ἀποκωλύων φύεσθαι, ξύμμαχον ποιησάμενος τὴν τοῦ λέοντος φύσιν, καὶ κοινῇ πάντων κηδόμενος, φίλα ποιησάμενος ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ αὑτῷ, οὕτω θρέψει; Κομιδῇ γὰρ αὖ λέγει ταῦτα ὁ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπαινῶν. Κατὰ πάντα τρόπον δὴ ὁ μὲν τὰ δίκαια ἐγκωμιάζων ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι, | ὁ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα ψεύδοιτο. πρός τε γὰρ ἡδονὴν C καὶ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν καὶ ὠφελίαν σκοπουμένῳ ὁ μὲν ἐπαινέτης τοῦ δικαίου ἀληθεύει, ὁ δὲ ψέκτης οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' εἰδὼς ψέγει ὅ τι ψέγει. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδαμῇ γε. Πείθωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὸν πράως, οὐ γὰρ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει, ἐρωτῶντες· ὦ μακάριε, οὐ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ νόμιμα διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἂν φαῖμεν γεγονέναι; τὰ μὲν καλὰ | τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ θείῳ D

13. ἀληθῆ ἂν Π: ἀλήθειαν A.

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589 A 6 **τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.** "The genitive," say the Oxford editors, "may be governed by *ἐγκρατέστατος* or may be taken partitively with *ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος*." The former is the correct view. Stephanus suggested *ἐγκρατέστερος*: but "quum tria sint quae de imperio contendant, superlativus recte habet" (Schneider). *ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος* has been compared with Paul's *ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* in *Rom.* 7. 22: cf. also *Eph.* 3. 16.

589 B 7 **ἐπιμελήσεται.** The subject is of course still *ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος*, and therefore no comma should be placed after *ἐγκρατέστατος*. Jowett's translation "He should watch over" etc. is very misleading.

ὥσπερ γεωργός clearly belongs to the following clause, not, as supposed by Stallbaum and the other editors except Schneider, to that which goes before. Cf. IV 419 A *n.* For the illustration cf. *Euthyph.* 2 D.

9 **ξύμμαχον κτλ.** The *θυμοειδές* is the natural ally of the *λογιστικόν*: see IV 440 E ff.

589 B—**591** A *The panegyrist of Justice is thus victorious on every count. His opponent will surrender when he understands that Virtue subjects the bestial to the human, nay rather to the element of God within us, while of Vice the opposite is true. Shall it profit a man to take gold unjustly and make his soul a slave? We may also define intemperance, self-will, discontent, cowardice, servility and meanness, and the vulgarity which we associate with mechanical pursuits, in terms of our comparison. The better must rule the worse—such is our principle, and it is in harmony with the aims both of law and of the government of children.*

589 C 15 **οὐδὲν ὑγιές.** We ought not to supply *λέγει*: for *οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ψέγει* is itself idiomatic for *οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ψέγων λέγει* (Schneider).

17 **οὐ γὰρ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει:** according to the usual Socratic view: see II 382 A *n.*

589 D 19 **μᾶλλον δὲ—θείῳ.** "Both Plato and Aristotle thought that there was in human nature a certain imperfect presence of God, and that it was this divine presence, however small, which made it specifically *human* nature" (Nettleship *Lect. and Remains* II p 334). Cf. VI 501 B *n.* with *Tim.* 90 A ff. (man is a *φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον, ἀλλ' οὐράνιον*) and Arist. *Eth. Nic.* X 7. 1177^{b} 30 ff. The doctrine of a *θεῖόν τι ἐν ἡμῖν* was by no means new to Greek philosophical and religious thought (see Rohde *Psyche*^{2} II pp. 121, 184 ff., 207 ff.), but Plato gave it a far deeper meaning than it ever had before.

τὰ θηριώδη ποιοῦντα τῆς φύσεως, αἰσχρὰ δὲ τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἀγρίῳ τὸ ἥμερον δουλούμενα; ξυμφήσει ἢ πῶς; Ἐάν μοι, ἔφη, πείθηται. Ἔστιν οὖν, εἶπον, ὅτῳ λυσιτελεῖ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου χρυσίον λαμβάνειν ἀδίκως, εἴπερ τοιόνδε τι γίγνεται, λαμβάνων τὸ χρυσίον ἅμα καταδουλοῦται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτοῦ τῷ μοχθηροτάτῳ; ἢ εἰ μὲν λαβὼν χρυσίον υἱὸν ἢ θυγατέρα ἐδουλοῦτο, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς ἀγρίων τε καὶ κακῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐλυσιτέλει οὐδ' ἂν πάμπολυ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λαμβάνειν, εἰ δὲ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ θειότατον ὑπὸ τῷ ἀθεωτάτῳ τε καὶ μιαρωτάτῳ δουλοῦται καὶ μηδὲν ἐλεεῖ, οὐκ ἄρα ἄθλιός ἐστι καὶ πολὺ ἐπὶ δεινοτέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ χρυσὸν δωροδοκεῖ ἢ Ἐριφύλη ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ψυχῇ τὸν ὅρμον δεξαμένη; Πολὺ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Γλαύκων· ἐγὼ γάρ σοι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἀποκρινοῦμαι.

XIII. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν οἴει διὰ τοιαῦτα πάλαι ψέγεσθαι, ὅτι ἀνίεται ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸ δεινόν, τὸ μέγα ἐκεῖνο καὶ πολυειδὲς θρέμμα πέρα τοῦ δέοντος; Δῆλον, ἔφη. Ἡ δ' αὐθαδία καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντῶδές τε καὶ ὀφεῶδες

1. ἢ A^2Π: ἡ A^1.

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21 δουλούμενα is bracketed by Herwerden, who suggests as an alternative the omission of *ὑπό* before *τῷ ἀγρίῳ*. Neither change should be adopted: cf. *ὑπὸ τῷ ἀθεωτάτῳ—δουλοῦται* 589 E.

ἐάν μοι—πείθηται. 'If he takes my advice, he will.' *ἐμοί*, which I once read (with Stobaeus *Flor.* 9. 65, W. H. Thompson, Baiter)—'if he takes *my* advice'—is certainly more pointed; but there is no real ground for deserting the MSS, and the unemphatic pronoun is quieter and, as it seems to me, more in keeping with the general spirit of this 'gentle exhortation' (*πείθωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὸν πράως* 589 C).

23 λαμβάνων τὸ χρυσίον κτλ. On the construction see I 351 B *n.* For the structure of the sentence beginning *εἰ μὲν λαβὼν κτλ.* cf. I 336 E *n.*

589 E 25 εἰς ἀγρίων—ἀνδρῶν: sc. *δουλείαν* or the like (supplied from *ἐδουλοῦτο*) rather than *οἰκίαν*, which J. and C. supply. Cf. IV 425 A *n.* and for the genitive VIII 569 C.

590 A 2 Ἐριφύλη. Hom. *Od.* XI 326 f. *Μαῖράν τε Κλυμένην τε ἴδον στυγερήν τ' Ἐριφύλην, | ἣ χρυσὸν φίλου ἀνδρὸς ἐδέξατο τιμήεντα.*

3 ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου. See 588 B *n.* Glauco will speak for the champions of Injustice in their surrender as well as in their attack.

6 τὸ δεινόν, τὸ μέγα κτλ. "Socrates quasi monstrum conspicatus, quod *τὸ δεινὸν θρέμμα* appellaturus erat, denuo descriptionem eius incipit et per asyndeton horridulam orationem facit" (Schneider). The asyndeton has a highly rhetorical effect: see the remarks of Longinus on rhetorical asyndeton combined with *ἀναφορά* and *διατύπωσις* ('vivid description') in his *περὶ ὕψους* 20. Jowett and Campbell understand *τὸ δεινόν* substantively ('the dangerous thing, viz. that great beast')—a most improbable view, as it appears to me. On the other hand, Stallbaum, writing *τὸ δεινὸν τὸ μέγα κτλ.* without any comma, compares *Crat.* 398 B *ἔν γε τῇ ἀρχαίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φωνῇ* and other passages, none of which is parallel except (in some respects) Soph. *O. R.* 806 *κἀγὼ τὸν ἐκτρέποντα, τὸν τροχηλάτην | παῖω δι' ὀργῆς*, and there a comma is required. We certainly should not (with Stephanus and Ast) read *τὸ δεινὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα κτλ.*

590 B 8 ὀφεῶδες. The serpentine element has not hitherto been mentioned, but (as Schleiermacher points out, *Platons*

αὔξηται καὶ συντείνηται ἀναρμόστως; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τρυφὴ δὲ καὶ μαλθακία οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ τούτου χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει ψέγεται, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ δειλίαν ἐμποιῇ; Τί μήν; Κολακεία δὲ καὶ ἀνελευθερία οὐχ ὅταν τις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ θυμοειδές, ὑπὸ τῷ ὀχλώδει θηρίῳ ποιῇ καὶ ἕνεκα χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀπληστίας προπηλακιζόμενον ἐθίζῃ ἐκ νέου ἀντὶ λέοντος πίθηκον γίγνεσθαι; | Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Βανανσία δὲ καὶ χειροτεχνία διὰ C τί, οἴει, ὄνειδος φέρει; ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι φήσομεν ἢ ὅταν τις ἀσθενὲς φύσει ἔχῃ τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θρεμμάτων, ἀλλὰ θεραπεύειν ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τὰ θωπεύματα αὐτῶν μόνον δύνηται μανθάνειν; Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ ὁμοίου ἄρχηται οἵουπερ ὁ βέλτιστος, δοῦλον αὐτόν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου | τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ D τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ᾤετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄμεινον ὂν παντὶ ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν

Staat p. 609) may well be included in *τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα* 588 E. It symbolizes some meaner forms of the *θυμοειδές* which cannot well be attributed to the king of beasts, e.g. *δυσκολία* (III 411 C), perfidiousness etc. Cf. Theogn. 601 f. *ἔρρε, θεοῖσίν τ' ἐχθρὲ καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἄπιστε | ψυχρὸν ὃς ἐν κόλπῳ ποικίλον εἶχες ὄφιν.* Clement (*Strom.* IV 3. 1225 B Migne) is thinking of the Old Testament when he says *ὄφις ὁ ἀπατεών*, but the idea is also Greek. It should also be remarked that expansions and amplifications like the addition of *ὀφεῶδες* in this passage are characteristic of the style of Plato: cf. for example *Theaet.* 147 A, B and 161 C. The emendation *ὀχλῶδες*, which Nettleship appears to favour (*Lect. and Remains* II p. 335), is excessively weak, and would moreover refer not to the *θυμοειδές*, but to the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* (cf. *τῷ ὀχλώδει θηρίῳ* below). It seems to me clear both from *λεοντῶδες* and from *αὐτοῦ τούτου* below that at present Plato is thinking only of the *θυμοειδές* and its degenerate kinds. We must therefore beware of referring *ὀφεῶδες* to *τοὺς φιληδόνους, τοὺς γαστρὶ καὶ αἰδοίοις δουλεύοντας* (Clement's interpretation of *Matt.* 3. 7: see *Strom.* IV 16. 1308 A).

9 **τρυφὴ δὲ καὶ μαλθακία κτλ.** Cf. III 411 A, B. On *πίθηκον* see X 620 C *n.*

590 C 15 **βανανσία.** See on VI 495 D.

19 **δύνηται** has been suspected by Stephanus, Ast, and Herwerden. The word could well be spared, but, as it is in all the MSS, was read by Stobaeus (*Flor.* 9. 67) and is not in itself an error, we are hardly justified in resorting to excision. The subjunctive depends of course on *ὅταν*, and *καί* connects *δύνηται* with *ἔχῃ*. By reading *τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ* (not *αὐτῷ*) *θρεμμάτων*, and making *τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἶδος* the subject to *δύνασθαι* and *θεραπεύειν*, Schneider makes it rather easier to refer *δύνηται* to *ὅταν τις*: but on the whole it is more natural to retain *αὐτῷ* and make the subject of *δύνασθαι* the same as that of *δύνηται*, viz. the individual himself. Even at the cost of a little awkwardness, Plato prefers to make the sentiment expressed by *καὶ τὰ θωπεύματα —μανθάνειν* co-ordinate with, rather than a consequence of, *ὅταν τις ἀσθενὲς* κτλ. For the imagery of the sentence cf. (with J. and C.) VI 493 A ff.

ἵνα καὶ κτλ. is Plato's justification for assigning the farmers and artisans to a dependent position in his city. For the syntax of *ὑπὸ ὁμοίου—οἵουπερ* see III 402 A *n.*

590 D 23 **ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ᾤετο.** See I 343 A ff.

24 **μάλιστα μὲν κτλ.** A profounder and truly Platonic form of Hesiod's famous

οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος, ἵνα εἰς δύναμιν πάντες ὅμοιοι ὦμεν καὶ φίλοι, τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι;
E Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη. Δηλοῖ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ νόμος, ὅτι τοιοῦτον βούλεται, πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει ξύμμαχος ὤν, καὶ ἡ τῶν παίδων ἀρχή, τὸ μὴ ἐᾶν ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, ἕως ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ
591 ἐν πόλει πολιτείαν καταστήσωμεν καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπεύ|σαντες τῷ παρ' ἡμῖν τοιούτῳ ἀντικαταστήσωμεν φύλακα ὅμοιον καὶ ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τότε δὴ ἐλεύθερον ἀφίεμεν. Δηλοῖ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Πῇ δὴ οὖν φήσομεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ κατὰ τίνα λόγον λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀκολασταίνειν ἤ τι αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν, ἐξ ὧν πονηρότερος

28. *βούλεται* Ξ² cum Stobaeo (*Flor.* 9. 67) : *βουλεύεται* ΑΠΞ¹ *q*.

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saying *οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ, | ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται* (*OD.* 293 f., as quoted by Arist. *Eth. Nic.* I 2. 1095ᵇ 10). Instead of *οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ* Madvig proposes to read *οἰκείου ἐνόντος ἐν αὐτῷ*. The emendation is neat and gets rid of the difficulty both in *ἔχοντος* and in *ἐφεστῶτος*: but *ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ* appropriately recalls *ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ* above, and the genitive absolute may be compared with *ἀποκριναμένου* VII 538 D, *ἑπομένων* 586 D and *δοκιμασθέντων Laws* 755 D. (Badham's *δοκιμασθέντας* is of course only a conjecture.) Cf. Riddell *Digest* § 274.

25 **ἐφεστῶτος** is another independent genitive absolute. The double peculiarity is certainly unusual. Stephanus obliterates first one, and then both by suggesting (1) *ἐφεστῶτα*, and (2) *ἔχοντι—ἐφεστώς* (intended, I suppose, as neuter, but the neuter should be *ἐφεστός*: see Schanz Vol. II p. XII). I believe the text is sound: there is hardly any limit—except that required by intelligibility—to Plato's rapid changes of construction, and they are especially common with participles. See VI 488 D *n.* with Engelhardt *Anac. Pl. Spec.* III p. 45.

590 E 28 **βούλεται κτλ.** See *cr. n.* The reading *βούλεται* is found also in *v*, Flor. R, Flor. T, Stobaeus (*Flor.* 9. 67) and Iamblichus (*Protrept.* 88 p. 33 Pistelli). *βουλεύεται*, which Schneider and Hermann, following the best MSS, still retain, is much less suitable, and the corruption is easy and tolerably frequent: cf. (with Schneider) *Phil.* 35 D and 50 E, "ubi *βουλεύεσθαι* et *βουλεύομαι* pro *βούλεσθαι* et *βούλομαι* in quibusdam scriptum est." Plato means that the purpose, intention or meaning of Law is that the better should rule the worse, and we may fairly appeal to the witness of Law on such a subject, for Law does not, as Thrasymachus argued (I 343 C), hold a brief for *ὁ κρείττων*, but is the ally of every class and individual in the city without exception, *πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει ξύμμαχος*. Law is "the ally of everybody in the community without distinction, because the ally of that which is best in him" (Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II p. 336).

591 A 2 **ἀντικαταστήσωμεν κτλ.**: sc. as a counterpart or substitute for our own *βέλτιστον* (*τῷ παρ' ἡμῖν τοιούτῳ*), by which he has hitherto been guided. Madvig's conjecture *ὄντι καταστήσωμεν* is both unnecessary and inelegant. On the singular *αὐτῷ* in spite of the plural *παίδων* see I 347 A *n.*

591 A—**592** B *It is also better for him who is guilty of Injustice to be detected and punished than to escape. The wise man will honour those studies which promote the welfare of his soul, and the same great object will be his guiding principle in all that appertains to the body and its state, as well as to the acquisition of riches and honours. Will he take part in political life? Perhaps not in the land of his birth, but in his own true city assuredly he will. It may be that the perfect city is an ensample laid up in Heaven for him who would plant a city in his soul.*

5 **ἀδικεῖν—ποιεῖν.** It is more natural and better in point of literary effect to make the infinitives coordinate (with the English translators) than to suppose (with Schneider) that *ἤ—ἤ* is 'either—or' and *ἀκολασταίνειν* and *τι αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν* intended as different species of the genus *ἀδικία*.

μὲν ἔσται, πλείω δὲ χρήματα ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ δύναμιν κεκτήσεται; Οὐδαμῇ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Πῇ δ' ἀδικοῦντα λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ διδόναι δίκην λυσιτελεῖν; ἢ οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν λανθάνων | ἔτι πονηρότερος γίγνεται, B
τοῦ δὲ μὴ λανθάνοντος καὶ κολαζομένου τὸ μὲν θηριῶδες κοιμίζεται
10 καὶ ἡμεροῦται, τὸ δὲ ἥμερον ἐλευθεροῦται, καὶ ὅλη ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τὴν βελτίστην φύσιν καθισταμένη τιμιωτέραν ἕξιν λαμβάνει, σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως κτωμένη, ἢ σῶμα ἰσχύν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ ὑγιείας λαμβάνον, τοσούτῳ ὅσῳπερ ψυχὴ σώματος τιμιωτέρα; Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν
15 ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων πάντα | τὰ αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ξυντείνας βιώσεται, C
πρῶτον μὲν τὰ μαθήματα τιμῶν, ἃ τοιαύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεργάσεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀτιμάζων; Δῆλον, ἔφη. Ἔπειτά γ', εἶπον, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν καὶ τροφὴν οὐχ ὅπως τῇ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέψας ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένος ζήσει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
20 πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων οὐδὲ τοῦτο πρεσβεύων, ὅπως ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ὑγιὴς ἢ καλὸς ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ σωφρονήσειν μέλλῃ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, | ἀλλ' D
ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἁρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα ξυμφωνίας

8. ἔτι πονηρότερος $A^2\Xi q$: ἐπιπονηρότερος $A^1\Pi$. 17. ἀπεργάσεται Π: ἀπεργάζεται A. 19. ζήσει Ξ: ζώσει A^1: ζώση (*sic*) Π: ζῴη $A^2 q$.

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7 **πῇ δ' ἀδικοῦντα κτλ.** It was maintained in II 361 A ff., 365 C ff. that Injustice could evade detection and punishment. So much the worse, says Socrates, for the sinner, who thereby forfeits his only chance of reformation, since Punishment is the appointed cure for Vice. It may be doubted whether so humane a view altogether corresponded to the actual administration of the Athenian or any other State; but to an idealist like Plato 'is' means 'should be,' and in so far as human laws fulfil their true function by reflecting the divine ordinances, we may truly say that punishment *is* remedial. See on the whole subject II 380 B *n.*

591 C 17 **ἀπεργάσεται κτλ.** Editors rightly abandon the present *ἀπεργάζεται* (see *cr. n.*) as indefensible. *ζήσει* is condemned by Cobet (*V. L.*² p. 610) as an interpolation, but some verb is needed, and Cobet himself allows that "*ζήσω* apud Atticos semel et iterum comparet" (e.g. V 465 D, Ar. *Plut.* 263 and *Fr.* 498 Dindorf). *ζώσει* (see *cr. n.*) can hardly be maintained in Plato, though not, apparently, unknown in Ionic: see Kühner-Blass *Gr. Gr.* I 2, p. 436. The erroneous *ζῴη* is clearly due to a misunderstanding of *οὐχ ὅπως* (non modo non).

591 D 21 **ἀλλ' ἀεὶ κτλ.** With the sentiments cf. III 410 A ff., VI 498 B *n.* On *φανεῖται* see *cr. n.* If we retain *φαίνηται*, as I formerly did, with J. and C., Schneider and the early editions, the conjunctive is parallel to the future *ἔσται*, both depending on *ὅπως*: cf. (with Schneider) *Tim.* 18 E *μηχανᾶσθαι κλήροις τισίν, ὅπως— ξυλλήξονται, καὶ μή τις αὐτοῖς ἔχθρα— γίγνηται.* A few additional examples are cited by Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 893 *n.* 5. In this instance, however, *φαίνηται* is particularly awkward, and may easily be a corruption of *φανεῖται*, under the influence of the preceding *ἐάν*. *q* has *φαίνοιτο*, which doubtless springs from the same misunderstanding which produced the corruption *ζῴη* for *ζήσει* in C. *φανεῖται* is adopted also by Ast, Stallbaum, and a reviewer of my *Text of the Republic* in *Hermathena* XXIV p. 256. We must understand the clause as still under the government of *ὅπως*, and not as independent; otherwise the verb becomes otiose, as it is in fact regarded by Hermann, Stallbaum and Baiter, all of whom bracket it.

ἁρμοττόμενος φανεῖται. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐάνπερ μέλλῃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μουσικὸς εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσει ξύνταξίν τε καὶ ξυμφωνίαν; καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ πλήθους οὐκ ἐκπληττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ ἄπειρον αὐξήσει, ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἔχων; Οὐκ οἶομαι, ἔφη. Ἀλλ' Ε ἀποβλέπων γε, εἶπον, [1] πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ πολιτείαν καὶ φυλάττων, μή τι παρακινῇ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ πλῆθος οὐσίας ἢ δι' ὀλιγότητα, οὕτως κυβερνῶν προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἷός τ' ᾖ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τιμάς γε, εἰς 592 ταὐτὸν ἀποβλέ|πων, τῶν μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται ἐκών, ἃς ἂν ἡγῆται ἀμείνω αὐτὸν ποιήσειν, ἃς δ' ἂν λύσειν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἕξιν, φεύξεται ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἔφη, τά γε πολιτικὰ ἐθελήσει πράττειν, ἐάνπερ τούτου κήδηται. Νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει καὶ μάλα, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως ἔν γε τῇ πατρίδι, ἐὰν μὴ θεία τις ξυμβῇ τύχη. Μανθάνω, ἔφη· ἐν ᾗ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένῃ· ἐπεὶ γῆς Β γε [1] οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι. Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως

23. φανεῖται Iamblichus (*Protrept.* 90): φαίνηται ΑΠΞ: φαίνοιτο *q*. 29. πλῆθος $A^2\Xi q$: πλήθους $A^1\Pi$.

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23 **ἐάνπερ—μουσικὸς εἶναι.** Cf. IV 432 A, 443 D, E.

24 **οὐκοῦν—ξυμφωνίαν;** sc. *τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα ξυμφωνίας ἁρμόσεται.*

25 **τοῦ πλήθους κτλ.:** i.e. *τοῦ πλήθους τῶν χρημάτων* κτλ.: cf. VIII 563 B *n.* **οὐκ** before **ἐκπληττόμενος** is not interrogative, but negatives **ἐκπληττόμενος—αὐξήσει.** The interrogative force of **οὐκοῦν** is carried on from the last sentence.

591 E 31 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τιμάς γε κτλ. See on VIII 566 E. The idiom has more in common with 'partitive apposition' than with such an *ἀνακόλουθον* accusative as in *Tim.* 37 D (quoted by Schneider) *ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅμα ἐκείνῳ ξυνισταμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται.*

592 A 4 νὴ τὸν κύνα. See III 399 E *n.*

5 **ἔν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει:** i.e. in the *πολιτεία προσήκουσα* of VI 497 A.

οὐ μέντοι—πατρίδι. We may compare the story about Anaxagoras in D. L. II 7: *τέλος ἀπέστη καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν θεωρίαν ἦν, οὐ φροντίζων τῶν πολιτικῶν. ὅτε καὶ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, Οὐδέν σοι μέλει τῆς πατρίδος; Εὐφήμει, ἔφη· ἐμοὶ γὰρ καὶ σφόδρα μέλει τῆς πατρίδος, δείξας τὸν οὐρανόν.* See also Antisthenes ap. D. L. VI 11. The question whether the wise man will take part in politics is raised by Aristotle in a somewhat different form (*Pol.* Γ 3. 1276^b 16 ff. al.), and afterwards became one of the stock questions of post-Aristotelian philosophy: see RP^7 § 384 C *n.* C.

6 **θεία—τύχη:** such as is contemplated in VI 499 B, where see note.

νῦν. The reading *νῦν δή* has very little authority, and it is certain that *νῦν* sometimes refers to the immediate past: see on VIII 563 C.

7 **τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένῃ:** 'the city which is founded in words.' It is truer and more perfect, aye and more lasting too, just *because* it *κεῖται ἐν λόγοις*: for *φύσιν ἔχει πρᾶξιν λέξεως ἧττον ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι* (V 473 A) and *ῥῆμα ἐργμάτων χρονιώτερον βιοτεύει* (Pind. *Nem.* 4. 6).

592 B 8 ἀλλ'—ἐν οὐρανῷ κτλ. 'But perhaps it is laid up in heaven as an ensample for him who desires to behold it and beholding found a city in himself.' If the philosopher is prevented from founding a city after the pattern in the Heavens, he can at all events 'found

παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν
10 κατοικίζειν. διαφέρει δὲ οὐδέν, εἴτε που ἔστιν εἴτε ἔσται· τὰ

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himself' ("sich selbst begründen" Schneider, and so also Bosanquet): cf. VI 496 C—497 A. ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν is a pregnant and powerful phrase, which involves not only the idea of the πόλις S. πολιτεία ἐν ἡμῖν (cf. 590 E, 591 E, X 605 B, 608 B), but also perhaps a hint that the παράδειγμα ἐν οὐρανῷ is as it were the μητρόπολις from which our souls should be colonised. Jowett and Campbell understand ἐκεῖ after ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν, while Richards thinks Plato may have written ἑαυτὸν <αὐτόσε> or <εἰς αὐτήν> κατοικίζειν: but the word παράδειγμα, as well as τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι, shews that the heavenly city is regarded as a model for the soul rather than as the place in which the soul should be planted. The conjectures αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ παράδειγμα) κατοικίζειν and ὁρῶντι πρὸς (s. εἰς) αὐτὸ κατοικίζειν (Herwerden) do not merit refutation. What does Plato mean by ἐν οὐρανῷ? It is surely something more than "harmlose populär-theologische Redeweise" (Pfleiderer *zur Lösung* etc. p. 33). The poet Gray (who aptly reminds us of Diogenes Laertius' epitaph on Plato πόλιν ἤλυθεν ἣν ποθ' ἑαυτῷ | ἔκτισε, καὶ δαπέδῳ Ζηνὸς ἐνιδρύσατο III 45) remarks "ἐν οὐρανῷ, that is, in the idea of the divinity: see the beginning of the following book." Apparently he understood the words of the Heaven of Ideas, a view which has, with various modifications and qualifications, found favour also with other critics (see Steinhart *Einleitung* p. 254 and cf. Susemihl *Gen. Entw.* II p. 248 ff. Proclus *in Tim.* 269 E seems to interpret the παράδειγμα as τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτείαν τῆς ψυχῆς, but Plato is manifestly speaking of the πολιτεία τῆς πόλεως). Others have taken ἐν οὐρανῷ of the 'Weltall' or Macrocosm, as if the Universe itself were one great ideal city, after whose pattern we should regulate the City of the Soul (see Steinhart l. c. and p. 270 with *Tim.* 47 B, 90 D); but, as Schneider points out, we can hardly reconcile such an interpretation with VII 529 C—530 C, and ἀνάκειται is also against it. The sentence may be compared with *Pol.* 297 C, *Laws* 713 B ff. and especially 739 D, E, where the polity of the *Republic* is thus described: ἡ μέν δὴ τοιαύτη πόλις, εἴτε που θεοὶ ἢ παῖδες θεῶν αὐτὴν οἰκοῦσι πλείους ἑνός, οὕτω διαζῶντες εὐφραινόμενοι κατοικοῦσι· διὸ δὴ παράδειγμά γε πολιτείας οὐκ ἄλλῃ χρὴ σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐχομένους ταύτης τὴν ὅ τι μάλιστα τοιαύτην ζητεῖν κατὰ δύναμιν. We might employ this passage to explain ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα, but its tone is less elevated and impressive, and in particular it does not help us to understand τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι. Plato's language is extraordinarily suggestive, and I confess that to me, as apparently to Susemihl (l. c. p. 249), these words suggest, not indeed the doctrine of Anamnesis in all its bearings, but something of the half-religious, half-poetical atmosphere with which Plato invests that doctrine in the *Phaedrus*. The mysterious and haunting phrase ἐν οὐρανῷ παράδειγμα recalls the 'imperial palace whence we came,' and the whole sentence reminds us once again of that profound and inspiring doctrine ἄνθρωπος οὐράνιον φυτόν, οὐκ ἔγγειον, which, as I have often pointed out, underlies so much of Platonism. The sister-doctrine of Immortality seems also to be implied, and from this point of view the Christian parallels are highly remarkable and significant: see for example *Philipp.* 3. 20 ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει, and many other passages in the New Testament, e.g. *Hebr.* 11. 16, 12. 23, 13. 14: 1 *Pet.* i. 4, 2. iii. 13. I do not venture to assert that Plato consciously and deliberately thought of Anamnesis and Immortality when he wrote ἐν οὐρανῷ etc., but the words are steeped in the fragrance of these beliefs; and to regard the reference to heaven "as a mere passing figure of speech" (Bosanquet) seems to me to do less than justice to the wonderful depth and fervour of this passage.

10 τὰ γὰρ ταύτης κτλ. See Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II p. 338 and *Theaet.* 173 C ff., quoted by him. Interpreted strictly and by themselves, the words of Plato would mean only that the philosopher will abstain from public and political life except when some 'divine chance' enables him to exercise his true vocation. But taken in connexion with ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν they mean more. In founding the city *within himself* after the likeness of the heavenly city the philosopher is in

γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἂν πράξειεν, ἄλλης δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

τέλος πολιτείας θ'.

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reality a true πολιτικός, because he is thereby faithful to the principles of the true and perfect State: even while he lives, he is already in a sense a citizen of Heaven, for the Kingdom of Heaven is reproduced within him. In existing cities the truest politicians are sometimes those who abstain from politics altogether, according to *Gorg.* 521 D ff. I agree with Steinhart (*Einleitung* p. 254) and Christ (*Gr. Literaturgesch.* p. 348 *n.* 6) that Plato now speaks much less hopefully than before of the prospects of realising his ideal city upon earth: see on V 470 E, VI 499 C and 502 C. It is possible to force some of the earlier allusions into a sort of harmony with the words of this passage (see for example Hirmer *Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Pol.* pp. 637 ff.); but we cannot help feeling that the tone and atmosphere are very different. Steinhart (l.c. p. 703 *n.* 264) traces the difference to Plato's disappointed hopes of the younger Dionysius. The conjecture is interesting, but even without this stimulus Plato may well have come to feel that his καλλίπολις is hardly of this world (cf. *Laws* 713 B), and that its true value lies in the religious, political, and moral ideals which it holds before mankind.

APPENDICES TO BOOK IX.

I.

IX 576 D, E. *ἀλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως κρίνεις; καὶ μὴ ἐκπληττώμεθα πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἕνα ὄντα βλέποντες, μηδ' εἴ τινες ὀλίγοι περὶ ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ' ὡς χρὴ ὅλην τὴν πόλιν εἰσελθόντας θεάσασθαι, καταδύντες εἰς ἅπασαν καὶ ἰδόντες, οὕτω δόξαν ἀποφαινώμεθα.*

The difficult clause *ὡς χρὴ—θεάσασθαι* has hardly received sufficient attention at the hands of editors. There is no variant of any consequence in the MSS.

The chief trouble lies in determining the precise force of *ὡς χρή*.

Is *ὡς* (1) 'sicut,' introducing an analogy, or (2) simply 'ut,' i.e. 'as,' or (3) a causal particle?

The first of these views is apparently held by Schleiermacher and Schneider. The former translates "sondern wie man sich eine Stadt ganz beschauen muss, wenn man hineinkommt, so lass uns überall herumsteigen und zusehn und dann unsere Meinung abgehen." Schneider's version is "sondern so wie man den gesammten Staat zu sehen in ihn hineingehen muss, in das innere des ganzen eindringen, und wenn wir ihn gesehen haben, unsere Meinung aussprechen." Schleiermacher seems to suppose that there is a comparison between what is necessary in order to see the sights of a town, and what is necessary in order to pronounce judgment on the *τυραννουμένη πόλις*: in either case we must get 'inside' the city. This explanation is attractive, and can be made very plausible; but (*a*) we should expect *ὥσπερ* in place of *ὡς*: (*b*) the present *χρή* suggests something which is our duty *here* and *now*, rather than what would be necessary in a hypothetical case: (*c*) the antithesis between seeing with the eye, and seeing with the mind, is not sufficiently brought out by merely setting *θεάσασθαι* over against *ἰδόντες*: and (*d*) it is not natural that the illustration should be confined to the tyrant's city, as it manifestly is by the words *ὅλην τὴν πόλιν*. For these reasons I cannot bring myself to agree with Schleiermacher, alluring as his view is.

The second explanation gives a thoroughly natural and easy meaning to *ὡς χρή*. But how are we to explain the remainder of the clause, *ὅλην—θεάσασθαι*? We cannot, surely, supply *θεασάμενοι* (with J. and C.) before *ὡς*, nor would the resulting sense be satisfactory if we could. Two explanations may be suggested. We may suppose, on the one hand, that *ὅλην—θεάσασθαι* is merely explanatory of *ὡς χρή* ('as is right,'

viz. that we should go into and see the whole city, 'let us' etc.). It is however, an objection to this theory that it makes ὅλην—θεάσασθαι almost entirely otiose, and Jowett, in point of fact, practically omits the words from his translation ("let us go as we ought into every corner of the city and look all about"). On the other hand, it may be argued that ὡς χρή, though in itself, strictly speaking, parenthetical, is allowed to affect the construction in much the same way as ὡς οἶμαι, ὡς ἔοικεν sometimes are (see for example Soph. *Trach.* 1238 ἀνὴρ ὅδ', ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ νεμεῖν ἐμοὶ κτλ. with note on 1 347 A). But there is apparently no other example of this kind of attraction on so extensive a scale, and ὅλην—θεάσασθαι is still nearly, if not quite, superfluous.

The view that ὡς is causal presents the fewest difficulties, and for that reason I have adopted it in the notes. It is held also by Ast and Davies and Vaughan. The text *may* be corrupt, but it has not, so far as I know, been hitherto suspected. If ἀλλά were read before καταδύντες and not before ὡς, all difficulty would disappear. 'Do not let us be dazzled by looking at the tyrant, who is but one man among many, or at a few persons in his retinue, for it is the entire city which we must go in and view; but let us' etc. The corruption, however, is not easy to explain, and it is safer and wiser to follow the MSS.

II.

IX 580 A, B. ἴθι δή μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, νῦν ἤδη ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτὴς ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ σὺ οὕτω, τίς πρῶτος κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ τίς δεύτερος, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἑξῆς πέντε ὄντας κρῖνε, βασιλικόν, τιμοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικόν, δημοκρατικόν, τυραννικόν.

The general meaning of this passage is clear, but it is difficult to determine the exact force of ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής. There is no reason to suspect the text, although the phrase is apparently not found elsewhere; nor would Orelli's conjecture διᾳσάντων deserve to be accepted, even if διὰ πάντων were corrupt.

In the program cited in the notes, Petersen has collected and discussed most of the available literary evidence on the Athenian method of judging in dramatic and musical contests. None of the passages quoted by him throw any direct light upon the words διὰ πάντων: but it is possible to construct from these passages a reasonable theory of the whole subject, in which ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής receives what is at least a plausible explanation. I have adopted the substance of Petersen's theory in the notes, but not his view of the particular phrase ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής.

The other *prima facie* evidence, which Petersen does not discuss, is as follows:

Antiatticistes in Bekk. *Anecd.* p. 91. 10: διὰ πάντων ἀγὼν λέγεται ὁ ἔσχατος. Κρατῖνος Πανόπταις (Crat. *Fr.* 157 Koch).

Hesychius: διὰ πάντων κριτής. Βοηθός φησι ἐν τοῖς περὶ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι ὁ νομοθέτης ἐκέλευσε τοῖς κρίνουσι γράφειν τὰ κεφάλαια ἕκαστον.

CIG 1585, 1586, 1719, 1720.

An inscription found at Nysa and published in *Bull. Hell.* IX 126 l. 55 τετειμῆσθαί τε αὐτὸν ἀναγορε[ύσει] χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἐν ταῖς τοῦ διὰ πάντων ἀγῶ[νος] ἱερουργίαις τε καὶ σπονδαῖς, and other inscriptions cited in Pauly-Wissowa *Real-Encyclopädie* etc. s.v. ἀγών.

The remark of Boethus preserved by Hesychius merely alludes to the regulation that the judges were to make use of a γραμματεῖον. This is abundantly attested from other sources (see Müller *Griech. Bühnenalt.* p. 371 *n.* 2), and does not, so far as I can see, help us to interpret διὰ πάντων. Cratinus' fragment, on the other hand, is important; for it shews that there was a διὰ πάντων ἀγών before the time of Plato.

The first of the inscriptions, CIG 1585, gives a list of victors in a musical contest at Thespiae, ending with διὰ πάντων (sc. ἐνίκα) Εὐμάρων Ἀλεξάνδρου Θεσπιεύς, who is also mentioned at the beginning as the author of the successful προσόδιον. The second inscription, found on Mt Helicon, is similar; and in CIG 1719 and 1720, both of which were discovered at Delphi, we meet with διὰ πάντων—though in 1719 πάντων has to be supplied by Boeckh—and ὁ διὰ πάντων, in the sense of ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγών (as in the inscription from Nysa). According to Boeckh on CIG 1585, ὁ διὰ πάντων (νικῶν) is "victor inter victores," the winner of the prize given for the one best production of all the successful pieces in the different kinds, like the prize for 'the best animal in the yard' at an agricultural show: and this interpretation is supported by the fact that the winner of the διὰ πάντων in that inscription has already secured the prize for the προσόδιον. A less probable theory understands τῶν ἀγωνισμάτων rather than τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν after διὰ πάντων, and takes ὁ διὰ πάντων νικῶν as "wer in mehreren Productionen zwar nicht den Sieg errungen hatte, aber doch ihm am nächsten gekommen war": such a person "verdiente seiner Vielseitigkeit wegen schon einen Preis" (Kayser quoted in Grasberger *Erziehung u. Unterricht* III p. 15). It will be observed that neither explanation makes the διὰ πάντων ἀγών a competition involving distinct and separate performances of its own.

As the διὰ πάντων ἀγών must necessarily have been decided last, and always, I think, comes at the end of the list of victories, the usage of the inscriptions is not inconsistent with the explanation of διὰ πάντων ἀγών as ὁ ἔσχατος, given in Bekker's *Anecdota* l.c. And, since it is obvious that if the Greeks could use the expressions ὁ διὰ πάντων νικῶν and ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγών, they may well have spoken of the judge in the διὰ πάντων as ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής, it may seem that a satisfactory explanation of the Platonic phrase is possible by the aid of the Inscriptions.

But neither Kayser's nor Boeckh's interpretation of the inscriptional use of διὰ πάντων is in the least degree suited to the situation in the *Republic*. Glauco is invited to arrange the competitors in order of merit, and not merely to decide which is first; nor are the βασιλικός, τιμοκρατικός, ὀλιγαρχικός etc. in any sense competitors in different departments, like the πυθαύλης, ῥαψῳδός etc. of the Inscriptions; they are all from beginning to end candidates in one and the same contest for one

and the same prize. The hypothesis proposed by Kayser is still less apposite: for Plato's *βασιλικός* is anything but 'many-sided,' and has never been beaten in any contest at all.

For these reasons I cannot see that the Inscriptions hitherto discovered give us any real assistance in attempting to elucidate the sentence of Plato, and it should be further remarked that they are all of them as late as the days of the Empire. There is nothing relevant to our purpose in the large collection of inscriptions contained in Reisch *de musicis Graecorum certaminibus* (1885).

It may be well to mention some of the different views which have been held by Platonic scholars on this difficult phrase. Ficinus translates "quemadmodum iudex omnia circumspiciens de singulis iudicat"; Schleiermacher "wie, wer in irgend einer Sache über alle durchweg richten soll, sein Urtheil abgiebt," confessing however (*Platons Staat* p. 603) that he finds the sentence obscure; Schneider "der Richter, der über alle entscheidet," i.e. "der welcher das Urtheil fällt, wenn Alle die in einem musikalischen Wettstreit um den Preis kämpfen, ihre Leistungen vollendet haben" (p. 312 of his Translation); Prantl "der Alles umfassende Richter"; Müller "der Richter, der das Ganze zusammenfassend sein Urtheil abgibt," i.e. "der verständige Richtende, der bei Abgabe seiner Stimme nicht einzelnes, sondern den ganzen Thatsbestand ins Auge fasst"; Jowett "as the general umpire in theatrical contests"; and Davies and Vaughan "the judge who passes sentence after going through the whole case." In most of these versions *διὰ πάντων* is construed as if it were not a technical expression at all, but merely equivalent to *διὰ πάντων διεξελθών* or the like (cf. VII 534 C). To me, on the other hand, it seems certain that *ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής* is an essential part of Plato's comparison, and would at once suggest to Plato's readers some particular judge or judges in musical or dramatic competitions. Jowett and Campbell think the words may mean: (1) the judge who decides the prizes of all the different kinds of contests; (2) or all the prizes, e.g. first, second, third in the same contest; (3) the judge who gave the final decision in some musical pentathlon. I have already given my grounds for rejecting the first suggestion; the second makes *διὰ πάντων* practically otiose, for it is obvious that all the prizes in the same contest must be awarded by the same authority; the third is more reasonable, although I cannot agree that "*πέντε ὄντας* conveys an allusion to the pentathlon." The words *πέντε ὄντας* refer of course to the competitors, *βασιλικόν* etc., and not to five different subjects of competition.

Sir Richard Jebb suggests another view, which appears to me deserving of consideration. He writes as follows:—

"A clue to the sense of *διὰ πάντων* here is given by those phrases in which *διά* with the genitive denotes the range of a comparison or a competition: *e.g.*, *Iliad* XII 104 *ἔπρεπε καὶ διὰ πάντων* ('among all'): Herod. I 25 *θέης ἄξιον διὰ πάντων τῶν ἀναθημάτων*: id. VI 63 *εὐδοκιμέοντι διὰ πάντων*. The phrase *ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγών* may be a terse expression ('the contest from among all,' = 'the contest of those selected from among all' or 'distinguished among all') for that contest in which the

competitors were οἱ διὰ πάντων εὐδοκιμήσαντες, those who had done best among all the competitors,—having vanquished their respective opponents in the preliminary contests. ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγών would thus be what the old interpreter calls it, ὁ ἔσχατος, the final contest. For example, in the dithyrambic ἀγών at Athens there were ten choruses, one for each tribe. We will suppose that these ten competed, to begin with, in pairs. Then ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγών would be the final contest between the five choruses left in after the preliminary contests. ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής would be any one of the (five) judges in ὁ διὰ πάντων ἀγών. It seems possible that the illustration from the final decision in the contest of dithyrambic choruses may have struck Plato as having a special fitness because *five* competitors are in question here."

III.

IX 581 D, E. τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί οἰώμεθα τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τἀληθὲς ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι μανθάνοντα τῆς ἡδονῆς; οὐ πάνυ πόρρω, καὶ καλεῖν τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαίας, ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν;

In this difficult passage all the MSS have ποιώμεθα instead of τί οἰώμεθα. In other respects the text which I have printed agrees with A and Π; nor is there any important variant in the inferior MSS, except νομίζειν οὐδέν (for νομίζειν) in Ξ and a few of its congeners.

ποιώμεθα was read by Schneider, whose translation is as follows:— "Von dem Wissenschaftliebenden aber, sagte ich, sollen wir nicht glauben dass er die andern Annehmlichkeiten in Vergleich mit der das Wahre wie es ist, zu erkennen und immer lernend auf solche Weise beschäftigt zu sein für sehr entfernt vom angenehmen hält und sie in der That nothwendige nennt, als der der andern nicht begehren würde, wenn es nicht nothwendig wäre?" Schleiermacher had already taken the passage in this way, except that he fell into error over οὐ πάνυ πόρρω. The objections to Schneider's view have been pointed out by Stallbaum and others. They are briefly these: (1) ποιεῖσθαι by itself cannot mean 'existimare,' 'statuere'; (2) ποιώμεθα τὰς ἄλλας νομίζειν—τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω is not equivalent to ἆρ' οὐ ποιώμεθα—τὰς ἄλλας νομίζειν—τῆς ἡδονῆς πάνυ πόρρω, which is that which Schneider translates. See also Graser *Spec. advers. in serm. Pl.* pp. 19—23. Jowett attempts to evade the second of these objections by translating "may we suppose that the philosopher regards the other pleasures in regard to the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that pursuit abiding always, not so very far from the Heaven of pleasure, and that he calls" etc., and making τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω slightly ironical, as if "intended to express that the philosopher has in knowledge the true pleasure." This explanation is, to say the least, obscure; if I understand it rightly, 'regards' means 'values,' and ποιεῖσθαί τι πρός τι surely cannot mean 'to value one thing in regard to another.'

In his published translation Jowett had acquiesced in Graser's τί

οἰώμεθα, which a large majority of critics have approved (Müller, Prantl, Hermann, Baiter, Madvig, Campbell). This emendation, which is easy enough, τί and π being nearly identical in uncials, removes all difficulty in the earlier part of the sentence, and is much neater than Stallbaum's μὴ οἰώμεθα. It is also an argument against μὴ οἰώμεθα that it requires us to read νομίζειν οὐδέν for νομίζειν: while, on the other hand, as soon as τί οἰώμεθα was corrupted into ποιώμεθα, the οὐδέν which we find in Ξ etc. may have been introduced into the text to go with πρός in the sense of 'nothing' (i.e. 'of no account') 'in comparison with' etc., exactly as in τί οἰώμεθα τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς of the original uncorrupted text.

Critics have also differed widely about the words μανθάνοντα—πόρρω. Does the sentence contain two questions or only one? Of those who accept the conjecture τί οἰώμεθα, Graser and Müller suppose that there is only a single question. The former (l.c.) bids us construe τῆς ἡδονῆς κτλ. as "quo in studio a voluptate tam prope abest, ut illas etiam revera necessarias appellet" etc., taking καὶ καλεῖν for ὥστε καὶ καλεῖν. The latter invites us to carry on the τοῦ of τοῦ εἰδέναι not only to εἶναι (to which of course it also belongs), but even to καλεῖν. Each of these explanations is equally unsatisfactory in point of meaning and of grammar.

Those who hold that there are two questions have hitherto made the first end with μανθάνοντα (Prantl, Hermann, Baiter, Campbell). According to their view, the meaning is 'And what, are we to suppose, is the philosopher's estimate of the other pleasures in comparison with that of knowing the truth as it is, and being evermore engaged in such an intellectual pursuit? Must we not think that he accounts them far removed from true pleasure?' etc. (Campbell). To this there are two objections. τῆς ἡδονῆς is not by itself commensurate with '*true* pleasure,' either here, or (as Shorey seems to hold *A. J. Ph.* XVI p. 230) in *Phil.* 44 c (γοήτευμα, οὐχ ἡδονήν): and in any case (though this consideration is less weighty) it should follow rather than precede οὐ πάνυ πόρρω. The first objection is met by Campbell's conjecture τῆς ἀληθινῆς, or by τῆς <ἀληθινῆς> ἡδονῆς. There is, however, no sign of corruption, except the three dots placed over τῆς ἡδονῆς by a later hand in A, and that is insufficient, although Baiter brackets the offending words. Madvig (*Adv. Crit.* I p. 431) would emend to τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον—τί οἰώμεθα—πρὸς τὴν—μανθάνοντα ἡδονήν, observing quite truly that "reliquae ἡδοναί non videntur philosopho τῆς ἡδονῆς (universae) πάνυ πόρρω, sed longe ab ea, quam ipse percipiat." The solution which I propose in the notes has some affinity in point of meaning with that of Madvig, but requires no alteration of the text. It seems to me to be free from all the difficulties which are inherent in the above explanations.

[In 1918, Mr E. Meyrick suggested the following interpretation: "An ordinary κριτής has to award, say, three prizes to ten competitors; he therefore selects the first, second, and third prizewinners, and leaves the rest undiscriminated. The διὰ πάντων κριτής goes right through all the competitors, placing all in order, down to the last, as in a school class, from first to tenth. This is exactly the meaning required by the context. In reading...I was struck by the felicitous expression of the Greek, and the absence of a correspondingly convenient phrase in English." A. M. Adam.]

IV.

IX 583 B. *ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθής ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς ἀκηκοέναι.*

Who are *τῶν σοφῶν*? Stallbaum's answer is "Verba *ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ—ἀκηκοέναι*, nisi fallor, ad *Philebum* ipsius Platonis referenda sunt." Apart altogether from the disputed question as to the priority of the *Philebus*, it is very unlikely that Plato should refer to himself as *τις τῶν σοφῶν*, and none of the other passages where such a phrase occurs lends any support to this explanation. Schleiermacher (*Platons Staat* p. 604), Susemihl (*Gen. Entw.* II p. 242), and Zeller[4] (II p. 548 *n.* 2), hold that the entire argument presupposes the *Philebus*, but do not discuss the words *τῶν σοφῶν τινός*. It is tolerably clear, as Schneider points out on p. 312 of his translation, that *τῶν σοφῶν τινός* is one of those who in *Phil.* 44 B ff. are said to consider the so-called pleasures of the body merely *λυπῶν ἀποφυγαί*. The passage in question is as follows:

Σω. *Ὄντως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβου τοῦδε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐ μανθάνεις.* Πρω. *Λέγεις δὲ αὐτοὺς τίνας;* Σω. *Καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οἳ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὔ φασιν εἶναι.* Πρω. *Τί μήν;* Σω. *Λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγάς, ἃς νῦν οἱ περὶ Φίληβον ἡδονὰς ἐπονομάζουσιν.* Πρω. *Τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι ξυμβουλεύεις, ἢ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες;* Σω. *Οὔκ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρῆσθαί τισι, μαντευομένοις οὐ τέχνῃ ἀλλά τινι δυσχερείᾳ φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς, λίαν μεμισηκότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νενομικότων οὐδὲν ὑγιές, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν γοήτευμα, οὐχ ἡδονὴν εἶναι* κτλ.

Schneider's identification, so far as it goes, has been generally accepted by recent critics; and the parallels are too close to admit of doubt: note in particular *γοήτευμα* as compared with *ἐσκιαγραφημένη*. But there is little agreement on the question who these haters of pleasure are, and they have been variously explained as: (1) Antisthenes and the Cynics (Urban *üb. die Erwähnungen d. Phil. d. Antisthenes in d. Pl. Schriften* p. 28 and Zeller[4] II p. 306 *n.* 6); (2) "probably Pythagorising friends" of Plato's, "who, adopting a ritual of extreme rigour, distinguished themselves by the violence of their antipathies towards *τὰς ἡδονὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων*" (Grote *Plato* II p. 610 *n.*, and to somewhat the same effect also Prantl in his Translation of the *Republic* p. 422 *n.* 311); (3) Democritus and his adherents (Hirzel *Unters. zu Cicero's philos. Schrift.* I pp. 141—152, and Natorp in *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil.* III pp. 522—528, and in *Die Ethika d. Demokritos* pp. 164—179). The respectful tone in which Plato, both in the *Philebus* and in the *Republic*, mentions the authors of these anti-hedonistic theories does not permit us to suppose that Antisthenes is intended. It is moreover inconsistent with the grossness which pervaded the Cynic philosophy to suppose that they looked upon the unseemly pleasures as delusive and false; nor was Antisthenes in any sense of the term *δεινὸς λεγόμενος τὰ περὶ φύσιν*.

These reasons, which are to my mind conclusive, are urged by Grote, and supplemented with great ability by Natorp.

I agree with von Arnim, who in his review of Natorp (*Gött. gel. Anz.* for 1894 p. 889) emphatically rejects the attempted identification of these pleasure-haters with Democritus and his followers. The founder of Hedonism could surely never have totally denied the existence of pleasure (*τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὔ φασιν εἶναι Phil.* l.c.); and Plato (in spite of Hirzel l.c. pp. 146 ff.) was not likely to treat the Arch-materialist with so much consideration and respect. Natorp's elaborate comparison of Democritus' ethical fragments with the writings of Plato involves many highly speculative combinations, and the two writers seldom if ever touch one another except in moral and political commonplaces and maxims for which parallels can readily be quoted from the other remains of pre-Socratic literature.

There are, I think, strong positive reasons for holding, in virtual agreement with Grote, that Plato has in view preachers of the Orphic-Pythagorean moral and religious school.

In the first place, we find other passages in which Plato alludes to this class of moralists as *σοφοί*. They were Plato's precursors in asserting the doctrine of individual immortality and transmigration; and in the *Meno* (81 A ff.) Plato refers to them in this connexion by the words *ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα πράγματα* κτλ. The famous passage of the *Gorgias* (492 E ff.) where the Orphic-Pythagorean view of the body as a tomb—*σῶμα σῆμα*—is expounded, begins *ὅπερ ἤδη του ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα* κτλ. It is even possible that *οἱ σοφοί* was a recognised way of describing—sometimes not without irony—the representatives of the Orphic brotherhood. Dieterich in his *Nekyia* (pp. 124, 133) cites in support of this contention Sophocles *El.* 62 *ἤδη γὰρ εἶδον πολλάκις καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς | λόγῳ μάτην θνῄσκοντας*, and Euripides *Hel.* 513 f. *λόγος γάρ ἐστιν οὐκ ἐμός, σοφῶν δ' ἔπος, | δεινῆς ἀνάγκης οὐδὲν ἰσχύειν πλέον.* The sages who reappeared after they were supposed to have died—Pythagoras, Zalmoxis, Aristeas etc.—are generally connected with the Orphic cult (Rohde *Psyche*[2] II pp. 28 ff. 90 ff.), and the power of *Ἀνάγκη* was a characteristic feature in the same creed (Dieterich l.c.). Another place in which *σοφοί* has the same reference, according to Dieterich, is Aesch. *P. V.* 936 *οἱ προσκυνοῦντες τὴν Ἀδράστειαν σοφοί.* The goddess Adrasteia plays a large part in the Orphic theology (cf. Thompson on Pl. *Phaedr.* 248 C), and Aeschylus' line certainly gains additional point if we agree with Dieterich, although in this particular instance I cannot regard the reference as proved. Miss Harrison has supplied me with two other passages to the same effect, one in Eur. *Ion* 1139 *ὡς λέγουσιν οἱ σοφοί*, where the allusion is to some numerical measurements according to which a ritual tent has to be built, and another in Eur. *Fr.* 938 Dindorf *καὶ γαῖα μῆτερ, Ἑστίαν δέ σ' οἱ σοφοὶ βροτῶν καλοῦσιν.* In the last of these instances *οἱ σοφοί* undoubtedly means the Pythagoreans; see Pl. *Phaedr.* 247 A and Thompson ad loc.

Secondly, the conception of the unreality and 'impurity' of bodily

pleasure has the closest affinity with the doctrine of the *Phaedo*. It is implied in the *Phaedo*, as it is here (οὐδὲ παναληθὴς), that the pleasures of sense are not, strictly speaking, pleasures at all (τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ, 60 B τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων καὶ ποτῶν κτλ. 64 D: cf. also 69 B and 81 B quoted in the notes); and just as sensual pleasure is here declared to be 'impure' (οὐδὲ καθαρά), so also the *Phaedo* constantly insists on the need of purification (κάθαρσις) from the body and its lusts (66 A—68 B, 69 B, C, 80 E ff., 82 D, 108 B, 114 C). Now it is precisely these and such-like views on sin, the relation of body and soul, etc., which formed the kernel of the Orphic-Pythagorean morality (Rohde l.c. II pp. 121—136, 160—170), and Plato himself does not desire to conceal the source from which he derived his inspiration (see *Crat.* 400 C and other evidence in Stallbaum-Wohlrab on *Phaed.* 62 B and Rohde l.c. II pp. 265—295). See also on IX 586 B.

The words δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν in the *Philebus* seem to shew that Plato is there thinking in particular of certain *pythagorising* Orphics. The Pythagoreans "might well be termed δεινοὶ περὶ φύσιν. They paid much attention to the interpretation of nature, though they did so according to a numerical and geometrical symbolism" (Grote l.c.). The expression 'symbolism' is however incorrect, if—as I think with Burnet *Early Greek Phil.* pp. 312 ff.—the Pythagorean numbers, at all events in the original form of the theory, were spatial, in which case δεινοὶ τὰ περὶ φύσιν is even more appropriate as a description of the Pythagoreans). In the present passage there is nothing (beyond the parallel with the *Philebus*) to indicate any special reference to Pythagoreans, although, as Rohde has shewn, the moral and religious teaching of Orphics and Pythagoreans was for all practical purposes the same.

V.

IX 584 E—585 A. In this difficult passage the reading of Paris A and all the best MSS is ὥσπερ πρὸς μέλαν φαιὸν ἀποσκοποῦντες ἀπειρίᾳ λευκοῦ, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀπειρίᾳ ἡδονῆς ἀπατῶνται;

In the text I have followed Schneider in reading, with *q* and Flor. U, ὥσπερ <δὲ> instead of ὥσπερ, and Schleiermacher in printing τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω πρὸς λύπην for πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην, which is in all the MSS.

I will deal first with ὥσπερ—ἀπειρίᾳ λευκοῦ. The structure of the clause proves that it is mainly intended to balance and illustrate καὶ—ἀπειρίᾳ ἡδονῆς. That being the case, is it possible to dispense with δέ after ὥσπερ, for which the authority is very slight?

In his *In Plat. Pol. quaest. philol.* I pp. 46 ff. Neukirch remarks "verba ὥσπερ πρὸς—λευκοῦ, descriptentia eos, quibuscum illi, de quibus in antecedentibus sermo est, comparantur, ita accedunt, quasi absolvant comparationem; quam ut magis perspicuam et perfectam exhibeat, addit praeterea scriptor καὶ πρὸς — ἀπατῶνται, nullam iam habens rationem eorum, quae ante ὥσπερ posita sunt," comparing (for the use

of ὥσπερ) III 413 D, IV 432 D, E, VIII 557 C, X 605 B, 611 C, D and *Phaed.* 60 E—61 A. Hermann also agrees with Neukirch in excluding δέ. It is certainly true that ὥσπερ *cum asyndeto* may be thus used (see on VI 497 B), but inasmuch as ἀπατῶνται furnishes the antithesis to σφόδρα μὲν οἴονται, we cannot here dispense with δέ. With Schneider and the other editors, I am therefore reluctantly obliged to desert the best MSS in this passage.

There is less unanimity among critics about καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην. As the words stand in the MSS, Painlessness is equated with Black, Pain with Grey, and Pleasure with White. In point of fact, however, Black should correspond to Pain, and Grey to Painlessness. The second hand in *q* tried to avoid the difficulty by advising the transposition of μέλαν and φαιόν, and so Jowett translates, "they, not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with grey instead of white" etc. But ἀπειρίᾳ λευκοῦ is not 'instead of white'; and, as Schneider observed, q^2 is certainly wrong, for however ignorant you are of white, you do not mistake black when contrasted with grey. Schneider himself, followed by Stallbaum and the other editors, is content to obey the MSS "quia per codices mutare non licet." His explanation, like that of Stallbaum ("res eodem redit, sive dolor iuxta doloris vacuitatem, sive doloris vacuitas iuxta dolorem spectari dicatur"), is fatal to the balance of the two clauses ὥσπερ—λευκοῦ and καὶ—ἡδονῆς: nor is it permissible, with the Oxford editors, to defend the MS reading by calling that a *chiasmus* which in reality involves an erroneous identification.

For these reasons, the MSS are, I believe, wrong. There is little to choose between Schleiermacher's two conjectures τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω πρὸς λύπην and πρὸς λύπην οὕτω τὸ ἄλυπον, the second of which was afterwards repeated by W. H. Thompson (*J. of Ph.* V p. 218). With Richards (*Cl. Rev.* VIII p. 294), I rather prefer the first, chiefly on account of the *chiasmus*.

VI.

IX 585 C. Ἡ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δ'; ἀληθείας; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἧττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας; Ἀνάγκη κτλ.

Such is the text of all the best MSS. There is nothing in any of the others to indicate the presence of corruption, for the variants μὴ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου (*v* Flor. R) and τοῦ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου (*q* and a Florentine MS) are obviously only attempts at emendation.

The traditional reading is maintained by Schneider and the Oxford editors. On grammatical grounds it is clear (1) that Τί δ'; ἀληθείας; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο stands for Τί δ'; <ἡ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία> ἀληθείας <τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει>; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο: also (2) that Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἧττον stands for Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἧττον <μετέχει ἡ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία>. We have no right (with Schneider) to explain Τί δ' ἀληθείας as Τί δ', <ἢ> ἀληθείας, or to understand only <μετέχει τι> after εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἧττον.

Jowett and Campbell do not explain the construction, but apparently regard the introduction of ἐπιστήμη as otiose and irrelevant. "For the sake of his" (Plato's) "argument it would have been sufficient to obtain the admission that truth and essence go together: that the pleasures of the body, being less true, are also less real." It appears to me quite clear that the mention of ἐπιστήμη plays an important part in the argument. Surely it must refer to, and be interpreted by, ἐπιστήμης already mentioned in τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης κτλ.

Is it possible to reconcile the grammatical construction of the MS text with such an interpretation of ἐπιστήμης? Let us try.

The Being of the ever-like, as appears from Glauco's πολὺ διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου taken in connexion with the previous sentence, has more Being and more Truth, than the Being of the never-like has. If therefore the Being of the ever-like has as much part in Knowledge as it has in Being and in Truth (ἦ οὖν—Οὐδὲ τοῦτο), we may infer (since μετοχή is reciprocal) that Knowledge also has more part in Being and in Truth than has the Being of the never-like. (The inference is just, but Plato does not draw it, and his way of expressing himself certainly does not invite us to do so. If we could make ἦ ἐπιστήμης = ἦ ἐπιστήμης οὐσία, which is barely possible, or if we read ἦ <ἡ> ἐπιστήμης sc. οὐσία, or ἐπιστήμη instead of ἐπιστήμης, this explanation becomes easier in itself, and the inference is also easier to draw.) But the words εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἧττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας; present an insuperable difficulty. They cannot be made to suit with this interpretation unless we make the subject of ἧττον <μετέχει> either (*a*) ἐπιστήμη (or ἡ ἐπιστήμης οὐσία), or else (*b*) τὸ μηδέποτε ὅμοιον (or τὰ οἷον σίτου κτλ.); and the only possible grammatical subject, so far as I can see, is ἡ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία.

For these and other reasons, some of which are urged by Vermehren *Plat. Stud.* pp. 114 ff., the text must, I fear, be pronounced corrupt.

The emendation which I have ventured to print supposes that the error lies in the subject of μετέχει. By reading ἀεὶ ἀνομοίου (= μηδέποτε ὁμοίου) instead of ἀεὶ ὁμοίου, and ἡ ἐπιστήμης sc. οὐσία instead of ἐπιστήμης, it is possible to introduce the necessary contrast in respect of Being and Truth between the never-like (to which such γένη as food etc. belong), and Knowledge, which belongs to the ever-like. R. G. Bury's emendation proceeds upon essentially the same principle. After an acute analysis of this passage (*Cl. Rev.* XIII pp. 289 ff.) he proposes to write: ἦ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου σιτία μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμη μετέχει; This suggestion regarded in itself is more attractive than that which I have adopted: for it contrasts the particular, instead of the general, with the particular, and thus makes ὅλως doubly appropriate. But on the one hand, throughout the whole of this argument Plato uses the word μετέχειν only in connexion with Being and Truth: whereas Bury connects it with the 'ever-like'; and on the other hand it is extremely unlikely that ἦ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου σιτία—ἐπιστήμη should ever have been corrupted into ἦ οὖν ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι—ἐπιστήμης. Bury's explanation of the error involves one dittography and four subsequent adaptations or 'corrections.' If we were dealing only with an emended MS like *q*, such a restoration might

be possible—probable it could not even then be called: but I doubt if there is a single instance in which it can be shewn that Paris A has suffered to this extent in this particular way. I should however be only too glad to accept a convincing emendation on the lines indicated by Bury, and I have spent no small amount of time in trying to devise one, without attaining any more satisfactory result than that which he has reached. Possibly *ἀεὶ ὁμοίου* has replaced a word denoting some particular kind of food.

Meantime the reading given in the text, though less pointed, appears to me less improbable. *ἀεὶ ἀνομοίου*, which gives the same sense as *q*'s *τοῦ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου*, might readily pass into *ἀεὶ ὁμοίου* under the influence of *ἀεὶ ὁμοίου* just before; and the addition of *<ἡ>* after *ἢ* is scarcely a change.

The other conjectures are these: (1) *ἦ οὖν ἀνομοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει;* (Hermann, followed by Müller): (2) *ἦ δὲ τοῦ ἀνομοίου κτλ.;* (Stallbaum, who adds "nolumus tamen in re incerta quidquam in oratione Platonis, qualem codd. plurimi optimique exhibent, immutare"): (3) *ἦ γοῦν ἀνόμοιος οὐσία ὁμοίας τι μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμης μετέχει;* "Hat denn zum Wenigsten das ungleiche Wesen einen grösseren Antheil am Wissen als das gleiche? Keineswegs. Und wie, an der Wahrheit? Auch das nicht. Wenn aber einen minderen an der Wahrheit, weil am Wissen, dann nicht auch am Sein? Nothwendig" (Vermehren l.c.). (4) Madvig (and after him Baiter) postulates an extensive lacuna. He first ejects *καὶ ἀληθείας* just before, and after writing with Ast *τὸ <τοῦ> μηδέποτε ὁμοίου*, continues as follows: *Ἡ οὖν <τοῦ> ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δ', ἀληθείας; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. <Ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀνομοίου οὐκ ἐπιστήμης ἧττον μετέχει ἢ ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Εἰ δ' ἐπιστήμης, καὶ ἀληθείας; Καὶ τοῦτο.>* The possibility of a lacuna must be allowed, as well as the counter-possibility that *ἦ οὖν—ἀνάγκη* is a clumsy attempt (modelled perhaps on *Theaet.* 186 C, D) on the part of some scribe to shew that Being and Truth go together, so that where there is less of the one, there is also less of the other; but neither solution is probable. It will be observed that all these attempts at correction agree in working in *ἀνόμοιον* (in some form or other) as the subject to *μετέχει*, although they are, I think, wrong in leaving *ἐπιστήμης* as it stands. It may be added that the brief account of Plato's third argument in Proclus *Comment.* II p. 82 ed. Kroll is of no use in trying to interpret or emend this difficult sentence.

I.

I. Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα περὶ αὐτῆς ἐννοῶ, 595
ὡς παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ᾠκίζομεν τὴν πόλιν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ

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595 A—**597** E *On a retrospect of our city, says Socrates, we can now see even more clearly than before that we did right in excluding imitative Poetry. What is Imitation? Examine it in the light of the Ideas, and you will find that it is the production of images or appearances which are third in order from Reality and Truth. There are, for example, three beds:* (1) *that which is in Nature, made, as we may say, by God:* (2) *that which the carpenter manufactures:* (3) *that which is the product of the painter's art. The first is, and must be, one: for there cannot be two Ideas of bed. We have thus two* makers *in connexion with the notion of bed:* (1) *a Nature-maker* (φυτουργός), *who is God;* (2) *a manufacturer* (δημιουργός), *viz. the carpenter. There is also* (3) *an imitator, i.e. the painter. Imitation is therefore concerned with a product third in sequence from Nature, and the tragic poet, among other imitators, is third from Royalty and Truth.*

595 A ff. Book X falls into two divisions, the first (595 A—608 B) dealing with Poetry, the second (608 C—621 D) with Immortality and the rewards of Justice both here and hereafter. The second half of the Book forms a welcome supplement to Plato's treatment of the main thesis of the *Republic* (see on 608 C); but the first division is of the nature of an episode, and might have been omitted without injury to the artistic unity of the dialogue (cf. Hirmer *Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol.* p. 623). It is in no sense, as supposed by Schleiermacher (*Einleitung* p. 55) and apparently also by Hirzel (*der Dialog* I p. 237 *n.*), a fulfilment of the promise held out in III 392 C; nor ought we to construe ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω ἔτι τούτων III 394 D as a hint that the subject of Poetry is to be resumed: see note ad loc. Why then is the episode introduced at all? The chorizontists (such as Siebeck *Unters. zur Phil. d. Griech.* pp. 142 ff., Pfleiderer *zur Lösung* etc. p. 34 and Brandt *zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehre d. Seelenteilen* p. 27), relying partly on the tone of the exordium, partly on ἀπολελογήσθω 607 B, assert that Plato is replying to certain comic poets (Pfleiderer), or to Antisthenes (Brandt), who had presumably fallen foul of Plato's treatment of Poetry in Books II and III. Cf. also Zeller[4] II p. 556 *n.* 2. But apart altogether from the question whether the *Republic* was issued *en bloc* or piecemeal, there is no actual evidence to support the presumption on which this theory rests (cf. 598 D, 607 B *nn.*). The Platonic dialogue, like actual conversation, is at liberty to recall, modify, and expand the results of a discussion apparently finished (cf. Hirzel l.c. pp. 228—230, 236); and we have already had an incidental recurrence to the subject of Poetry in VIII 568 A—D. Granted that Plato wished to justify his exclusion of the Muses by metaphysical and psychological as well as moral and paedagogic arguments, the beginning of Book X is his best, and indeed, as Hirmer shews (l.c. p. 625), his only opportunity: see on 595 B. He may well have wished to do so: for his dethronement of the great educator of Greece (606 E) would be sure to arouse wide-spread hostility, and Plato almost seems to feel that it needs further justification even to himself (595 B *n.*). Cf. Hirmer l.c. pp. 624—628 and see also on 598 D, 607 B.

The student will find an excellent and exhaustive account of Plato's theory of Aesthetics in Walter *Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Altertum* (1893) pp. 168—476. His attitude towards Poetry and Poets is

ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ ποιήσεως λέγω. Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. Τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική. παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐ
B παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ | δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ 5 χωρὶς ἕκαστα διῄρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδη. Πῶς λέγεις; Ὡς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι—οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μιμητικούς—λώβη ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα. Πῇ 10 δή, ἔφη, διανοούμενος λέγεις; Ῥητέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καίτοι φιλία γέ

5. παραδεκτέα $A^1\Pi$: παραδεκτέον corr. A^2.

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very fully discussed by Reber *Platon u. die Poesie* (1864), Heine *de rat. quae Platoni cum poet. Gr. intercedit*, etc. (1880), and more recently by Finsler *Platon u. die Arist. Poetik* (1900) and Stählin *Die Stellung d. Poesie in d. plat. Phil.* (1901). Following on the path marked out by Belger in his dissertation *de Arist. etiam in arte poetica Platonis discip.* (1872), Finsler has succeeded in shewing that Aristotle's debt to Plato in his Theory of Poetry is far greater than is commonly supposed: and although the treatment of Poetry in Book X of the *Republic* must be confessed to be inadequate and unjust, Plato himself, as Walter and Stählin have recognised, furnishes us elsewhere with the materials for constructing a truer and more generous theory. See also on 598 E. It may be added that a study of the *Poetics* of Aristotle side by side with 595 A—608 B will enable the student to understand both Plato and Aristotle better than if he confines himself to either alone. See also Butcher *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*^{2}, pp. 115 ff.

595 A 3 **ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ ποιήσεως.** II 377 B—III 403 C.

τὸ μηδαμῇ—μιμητική. See III 394 B—398 B. Plato speaks as if he had tabooed all mimetic poetry, but it is clear from III 396 E compared with 397 D, 398 B and 401 B—402 C that he did not condemn poetic and artistic imitation *as such*, but would have admitted it where the model imitated was good. See also on 595 C, 607 A, 608 A infra.

595 B 5 **ἐπειδὴ—εἴδη**: viz. in Book IV and also throughout VIII and IX. The psychological theory of these books is laid under contribution in 602 C ff.: see note ad loc. It may seem strange that Plato makes no reference to the metaphysical doctrine of V—VII, since he derives his first argument (596 A—601 B) from the theory of Ideas: but it was unnecessary for him to refer to it in this connexion, because the theory is itself expressly re-enunciated (*εἶδος γάρ που κτλ.* 596 A) before the argument begins.

6 **ὡς—εἰρῆσθαι**: 'between ourselves.' Cf. IV 430 E *n.*

10 **αὐτά**: viz. *πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*, tragedy and other forms of *μιμητικὴ ποίησις*: not (as Schleiermacher) "wie sich *die Dinge in der Wirklichkeit* verhalten." A knowledge of the *real* character of dramatic Poetry is the only antidote against its evil influence. On *τυγχάνει ὄντα* see I 337 B *n.*

11 **καίτοι φιλία γε—λέγειν.** Plato speaks with real feeling: no one who had so much of the poet in himself could be insensible to Homer's charm, and nearly every dialogue of Plato bears evidence of the affectionate admiration in which he held the 'first of tragic poets.' See Heine *de rat. quae Platoni cum poetis Graec. intercedit* pp. 8—15. The ancients classed Plato and Homer together: *δύο γὰρ αὗται ψυχαὶ λέγονται γενέσθαι παναρμόνιοι*, says Olympiodorus (*vit. Pl.* 6): and Longinus remarks that of all Greek writers Plato was *Ὁμηρικώτατος—ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὁμηρικοῦ κείνου νάματος εἰς αὐτὸν μυρίας ὅσας παρατροπὰς ἀποχετευσάμενος* (*περὶ ὕψους* 13. 3). See also the admirable remarks on Plato's imitation of Homer in James Geddes's essay *On the Composition and Manner of Writing of the Ancients* pp. 180—200, and Proclus' much less sound and instructive article *ὅτι διὰ πάσης τῆς ἑαυτοῦ συγγραφῆς Ὁμήρου ζηλωτής ἐστιν ὁ Πλάτων ταῖς τε λεκτικαῖς ἀρεταῖς καὶ ταῖς πραγματικαῖς* in his *in*

τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν. ἔοικε | μὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἁπάντων τούτων τῶν τραγικῶν πρῶτος C διδάσκαλός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν γενέσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ, ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, ῥητέον. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἄκουε δή, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποκρίνου. Ἐρώτα. Μίμησιν ὅλως ἔχοις ἄν μοι εἰπεῖν ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν; οὐδὲ γάρ τοι αὐτὸς πάνυ τι ξυννοῶ, τί βούλεται εἶναι. Ἦ που ἄρ', ἔφη, ἐγὼ συννοήσω. Οὐδέν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄτοπον, ἐπεὶ πολλά τοι ὀξύτερον βλεπόντων ἀμ|βλύ- 596

15. ἀλλ' ὃ $A^2\Pi$: fortasse ἀλλὰ A^1.

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remp. Kroll I pp. 163—177. There is a touch of something like filial love and piety in what Plato says of Homer in this passage, and we may well believe that he did not part company with the friend of his childhood without pain. From the way in which Plato here speaks, it looks as if he feared that his heart might after all get the better of his head (cf. infra 605 C, D, 606 B, 607 C ff.), and consequently tried by new and deeper arguments to provide an 'antidote' (*φάρμακον*, or *ἐπῳδή* 608 A) for himself as well as others (so also Hirmer l.c. p. 626).

595 C 13 **τῶν καλῶν κτλ.** *καλῶν* is of course ironical. For the sense cf. 598 D, 602 B, 607 A, *Theaet.* 152 E *οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος* and ib. 153 A, with Arist. *Poet.* 4. 1448^b 35 ff., 5. 1449^b 16 ff. It will be remembered that Aeschylus called his dramas *τεμάχη τῶν Ὁμήρου μεγάλων δείπνων* (Athen. VIII 347 E). Herwerden, quite without reason, so far as I can see, brackets *τῶν τραγικῶν*. It is unkind of Aristotle to purloin this sentiment in order to introduce his attack on Plato's theory of Ideas in *Eth. Nic.* I 4. 1096^a 11 ff., and Plato might well complain, in the words of Aeschylus, *τάδ' οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τοῖς αὐτῶν πτεροῖς*. To read *ἀνήρ* for *ἀνήρ*, as has been proposed, would make a general statement particular, and spoil the antithesis between *ἀνήρ* and *ἀληθείας*. The reference in *ὃ λέγω* is to *ῥητέον* in line 11 above: cf. VII 541 B.

16 **μίμησιν κτλ.** In III 392 C ff., *μίμησις*, in its application to Poetry, was regarded *primarily* as a form of style or *λέξις*, viz. the imitative or dramatic)(the narrative, and in this sense it included tragedy, comedy, and the strictly dramatic parts of epic and other poetry (394 C). But even in Book III *μίμησις* and its cognate notions have sometimes a wider application (e.g. 401 B—402 C). The following discussion tries to define the essential meaning of *μίμησις* in general by its relation to the Theory of Ideas. It should be noted that Poetry and Art were admitted to be *μιμήσεις* in Plato's day: cf. *Laws* 668 B *τοῦτό γε πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ περὶ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὅτι πάντα τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν ἐστι ποιήματα μίμησίς τε καὶ ἀπεικασία*, with Xen. *Mem.* III 10. 1—8, Plato *Crat.* 424 D, 430 B (*τὰ ζῳγραφήματα —μιμήματα—πραγμάτων τινῶν*, 434 A, *Soph.* 266 D), *Prot.* 312 D, *Critias* 107 B et al. See also on III 392 C and cf. Stählin *Poesie in d. plat. Phil.* p. 25. On the contrast between Plato's view of Imitation in Book X and that of Aristotle in his *Poetics*, see Butcher *Theory of Poetry*^{2} etc. pp. 115—152. Walter has justly remarked (*Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Altertum* p. 442) that *μίμησις*, with its question-begging connotation, was in many ways an unfortunate word by which to describe the essence of Art, though in view of what Aristotle made of it, I should not go so far as to say that 'Imitation is an unproductive principle, and dries up aesthetic life' (ib.). If Poetry, and not Painting and Statuary, had determined the Greek view of Art, we should probably hear more of Creation (*ποίησις*), and less of Imitation, in ancient discussions on aesthetics; and it is difficult not to regret that Plato did not select a new and more fruitful point of view. See also on 598 A, B.

19 **ἐπεὶ πολλὰ κτλ.** is neither arrogant nor rude, if we realise the situation: see on VII 532 E f.

τερον ὁρῶντες πρότεροι εἶδον. Ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτως· ἀλλὰ σοῦ παρόντος οὐδ' ἂν προθυμηθῆναι οἷός τε εἴην εἰπεῖν, εἴ τί μοι καταφαίνεται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὅρα. Βούλει οὖν ἐνθένδε ἀρξώμεθα ἐπισκοποῦντες, ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου; εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἓν ἕκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις; Μανθάνω. Θῶμεν δὴ καὶ νῦν ὅ τι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν. οἷον, εἰ 'θέλεις, πολλαί πού εἰσι

4. ἀρξώμεθα $A^2\Pi$: ἀρξόμεθα A^1.

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596 A 5 **ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου κτλ.** As in V 476 A (see note ad loc.), so here, Plato does not try to prove the Ideal Theory, but treats Glauco as already a loyal Platonist. The account which Plato here gives of his Ideas has been widely canvassed from many different points of view. Bosanquet (*Companion* pp. 381 ff.) appears to me to err by interpreting it throughout only in terms of modern life and thought. Others refuse to regard it as serious, in view of the inherent difficulties, and because of Aristotle's remark *διὸ δὴ οὐ κακῶς ὁ Πλάτων ἔφη ὅτι εἴδη ἔστιν ὁπόσα φύσει Met.* Λ 4. 1070^a 18: cf. also A 991^b 3 ff. with Bonitz's note. Others, again, like Krohn (*Pl. St.* pp. 242 ff.), hold that the Ideal Theory in Bk X is inconsistent with the theory expounded in V—VII, where we do not hear of Ideas corresponding to concrete and artificial objects, but only of Ideas of qualities (such as Justice) and the like. In reply to the last school of critics, we may point out that Plato is not bound to give an exhaustive account of the Ideal theory whenever he has occasion to make use of it. On the previous occasion he confined himself to Ideas of the virtues etc., because they only were relevant to his immediate purpose (see on V 476 A and cf. Grimmelt *de reip. Pl. comp. et unit.* pp. 81 ff., Hirmer l.c. pp. 646 ff. and Dümmler *zur Comp. d. Pl. St.* p. 14), and it is exactly the same reason which makes him cite Ideas of concrete and artificial objects in Book X. The view that Plato should not be taken seriously is as old as Proclus, who (*in Tim.* 104 F) observes *οὐ γὰρ κατά τινας ἰδέας ὁ τεχνίτης ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, εἰ καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν ὁ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ εἰρημένα παραδείγματος εἵρηται χάριν καὶ οὐ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν*, but, apart from other considerations, the recurrence of the same form of the theory in other dialogues (see on 596 B, C) justifies us in taking Plato here also at his word. The history of the controversy is ably reviewed by Dr Beckmann (*Num Plato artefactorum ideas statuerit*, Bonn 1889), with whom and with Zeller^4 II pp. 666, 701 al. I agree in believing this passage to be an authoritative exposition of the Ideal theory on one of its many sides.

εἶδος γάρ που κτλ.: 'for we are, as you know, in the habit of assuming a certain idea—always *one* idea—in connexion with each group of particulars to which we apply the same name': lit. 'an Idea, one each' i.e. each being one. There cannot be two or more Ideas of Bed for example: cf. 597 C. Unnecessary trouble has been raised about the translation of this sentence by Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 240), whose version "in Bezug auf jedes der vielen Dinge nehmen wir je eine Einheit als *εἶδός τι* an" is both strained and inaccurate. For the statement itself cf. V 476 A, 479 A, B, E, 480 A, VI 493 E and VII 507 B *n.* Plato *might* have written any of the foregoing passages without believing in Ideas of anything beyond qualities and attributes: but that he *did* believe in other Ideas also is evident not only from Book X, but also from *Phil.* 15 A, 16 C, D and many other places quoted by Zeller^4 II p. 701 *n.* 1.

8 **πολλαί πού εἰσι κλῖναι κτλ.** Why does Plato select examples of artificial objects, when the Painter can equally well paint the features of Nature, as is virtually allowed in C? One reason is that otherwise he could not have constructed the descending scale *θεός, κλινοποιός, ζωγράφος* 597 B ff. Had he selected e.g. mountains, it would be difficult to specify the middle term. Moreover in *Soph.* 266 B ff. we have a distinction drawn between *θεία* and *ἀνθρωπίνη εἰδωλοποική*, the first producing likenesses of natural objects by natural agencies, the

κλῖναι | καὶ τράπεζαι. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Ἀλλὰ ἰδέαι γέ που περὶ B
ταῦτα τὰ σκεύη δύο, μία μὲν κλίνης, μία δὲ τραπέζης. Ναί.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰώθαμεν λέγειν, ὅτι ὁ δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου τοῦ σκεύους
πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων οὕτω ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν τὰς κλίνας, ὁ δὲ τὰς
τραπέζας, αἷς ἡμεῖς χρώμεθα, καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ ταὐτά; οὐ γάρ που
τήν γε ἰδέαν αὐτὴν δημιουργεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν· | πῶς γάρ; C
Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόνδε τίνα καλεῖς τὸν δημιουργόν.
Τὸν ποῖον; Ὃς πάντα ποιεῖ, ὅσαπερ εἷς ἕκαστος τῶν χειροτεχνῶν.
Δεινόν τινα λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἄνδρα. Οὔπω γε, ἀλλὰ τάχα

15. τόνδε τίνα Π: τόν δέ τινα (*sic*) A. 17. τάχα $A^2\Xi$: ταῦτα Π *q* et fortasse A^1.

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second likenesses of artificial objects by artificial means, and Painting is there also classed under the second head: *τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἆρ' οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν, γραφικῇ δέ τιν' ἑτέραν, οἷον ὄναρ ἀνθρώπινον ἐγηγορόσιν ἀπειργασμένην;* (266 C). Inasmuch as *σκευαστά* are elsewhere credited with less reality than *φυτευτά* (see on VII 532 B, C *nn.*), the choice of these examples is also specially appropriate to Plato's main object, that is to say, the depreciation of imitative art.

596 B 9 **ἀλλὰ ἰδέαι κτλ.** For ideas of *σκευαστά* cf. especially *Crat.* 389 A—390 A, a passage which forms an admirable commentary on this. The anecdote about Plato and Diogenes in D. L. VI 53 (Πλάτωνος περὶ ἰδεῶν διαλεγομένου, καὶ ὀνομάζοντος τραπεζότητα καὶ κυαθότητα κτλ.) is pointless unless Plato believed in *εἴδη τῶν σκευαστῶν*.

11 **οὐκοῦν—κατὰ ταὐτά.** Cf. *Crat.* 389 A ff. *ποῖ βλέπων ὁ τέκτων τὴν κερκίδα ποιεῖ; ἆρ' οὐ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ὃ πέφυκε κερκίζειν;* Πάνυ γε. *Τί δέ; ἂν καταγῇ αὐτῷ ἡ κερκὶς ποιοῦντι, πότερον πάλιν ποιήσει ἄλλην πρὸς τὴν κατεαγυῖαν βλέπων, ἣ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, πρὸς ὅπερ καὶ ἣν κατέαξεν ἐποίει; Πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνο δικαιότατ' ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι κερκὶς καλέσαιμεν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.* The Idea is conceived as a *παράδειγμα*: cf. VI 500 E—501 C and see on V 476 D. Borrowing the ontology of the *Philebus*, we might say that the carpenter has an *ἄπειρον* of wood, into which he introduces *πέρας* after the model of the Idea of Bed or *αἰτία*, thereby manufacturing a *μικτόν* or material bed (Schmitt *die Verschiedenheit d. Ideenlehre in Pl. Rep. u. Phil.* p. 25 *n.* 68). We are not entitled (in view of 597 B and the phraseology of the present passage) to take *ἰδέαν* merely as the plan or form of bed in the mind of the carpenter: the Ideas of *σκευαστά* must be credited with the same attributes—transcendence, self-existence, etc.—as appertain to those of abstract qualities and *φυτευτά* (see on V 476 A), although the difficulties which such a view involves are undeniably greater in the one case than in the other. If we put ourselves in Plato's position—and Socrates is here speaking as one Platonist to another (*εἰώθαμεν λέγειν*)—it becomes correct to say that the carpenter is looking at the Idea rather than at his own *νόημα*, for the *νόημα* is nought apart from its object, the *νοητόν* (cf. V 476 E *n.*), i.e. the self-existent Idea of Bed, without which all the *νοήματα* in the world would be powerless to generate a bed because it is the *αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι κλίνη*, and no mere *νόημα*, which is the true and essential cause of all material *κλῖναι*. See also on 597 B.

596 C 15 **καὶ τόνδε—δημιουργόν**: i.e. *καὶ τόνδε τὸν δημιουργὸν τίνα καλεῖς*, sc. as well as the *δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου τοῦ σκεύους*. Baiter ought not to have printed Vermehren's pointless conjecture *καὶ τόνδε τινὰ καλεῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν* (*Pl. Stud.* p. 118): for Plato is leading up to 597 B *ζωγράφος δή, κλινοποιός, θεός, τρεῖς οὗτοι ἐπιστάται τρισὶν εἴδεσι κλινῶν*, and he again calls the painter a *δημιουργός* in D and E: so also *χειροτέχνης* just below.

16 **ὃς—χειροτεχνῶν.** Cf. *Soph.* 233 E—234 C, where the same conception is worked out in almost exactly the same way.

17 **τάχα** here means 'soon,' and not 'perhaps': cf. with Schneider *Crat.* 410 E.

μᾶλλον φήσεις. ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ οὗτος χειροτέχνης οὐ μόνον πάντα οἷός τε σκεύη ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα ἅπαντα ποιεῖ καὶ ζῷα πάντα ἐργάζεται, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἑαυτόν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ
D ἐν Ἅιδου ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργάζεται. Πάνυ θαυμαστόν, ἔφη, λέγεις σοφιστήν. Ἀπιστεῖς; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καί μοι εἰπέ, τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τοιοῦτος δημιουργός, ἢ τινὶ μὲν τρόπῳ γενέσθαι ἂν τούτων ἁπάντων ποιητής, τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἄν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει, ὅτι κἂν αὐτὸς οἷός τ' εἴης πάντα ταῦτα ποιῆσαι τρόπῳ γέ τινι; Καὶ τίς, ἔφη, ὁ τρόπος οὗτος; Οὐ χαλεπός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ πολλαχῇ καὶ ταχὺ δημιουργούμενος· τάχιστα δέ που, εἰ
E θέλεις λαβὼν κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν πανταχῇ· ταχὺ μὲν ἥλιον ποιήσεις καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ δὲ γῆν, ταχὺ δὲ σαυτόν τε καὶ ἄλλα ζῷα καὶ σκεύη καὶ φυτὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο. Ναί, ἔφη, φαινόμενα, οὐ μέντοι ὄντα γέ που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εἰς δέον ἔρχει τῷ λόγῳ. τῶν τοιούτων γάρ, οἶμαι, δημιουργῶν καὶ ὁ ζωγράφος ἐστίν. ἦ γάρ; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἀλλὰ

21. *πάντα* $A^1\Pi$: punctis notavit A^2.

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20 **καὶ ἑαυτόν** presents no difficulty: cf. *ταχὺ δὲ σαυτόν* in E below. It is difficult to imagine why Liebhold proposed *τὰ κατ' ἐνιαυτόν* (*Philolog.* for 1880 p. 168). Perhaps he thought the *δημιουργός* was *ὁ θεός*, an extraordinary error, which Peipers and others (see Zeller[4] II p. 711 *n.* 4) perpetrated, making God his own creator, and drawing some profound and far-reaching metaphysical lessons from their mistake.

καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κτλ. *Soph.* l.c. *καὶ πρός γε θαλάττης [καὶ γῆς] καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμπάντων.* The words in brackets occur only in Ξ, and were possibly introduced from this passage.

21 **πάντα** has two (not, as Baiter asserts, five) dots over it in A, but is in all the MSS and should not (with Baiter) be bracketed. It is important, in view of 598 C ff., to insist that there is *nothing* which the Painter and Poet cannot 'make': hence the emphasis.

22 **ἐν Ἅιδου** should also of course be kept, though cancelled by Herwerden. Polygnotus' famous picture of *τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου* at Delphi may serve as an illustration (Paus. X 28—31).

596 D 23 **σοφιστήν**: used as in *Symp.* 203 D *δεινὸς γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής.* Plato may also mean to hint that the Painter and Sophist are birds of a feather: for in *Soph.* 233 E ff. a definition of the Sophist in the ordinary sense of the term is evolved out of just such an account of painting as we find here.

25 **ποιητής.** The Greek idea of the Poet as a 'maker' lends additional flavour to *ποιεῖν* and *ποιητής* throughout this argument.

28 **δημιουργούμενος** is suggested of course by *δημιουργός* just before: cf. III 395 B. The combination of this verb with *τρόπος* has a playful mock-heroic air.

29 **κάτοπτρον κτλ.** On the view of Painting here involved see 598 A *n.* It is usual to compare Shakespeare's "hold the mirror up to nature," but (as Bosanquet points out) there is more in Shakespeare's saying than in Plato's.

596 E 33 **τῶν τοιούτων—ζωγράφος ἐστίν.** The Painter will copy with less accuracy than a mirror, so that according to Plato's way of reasoning in this passage Photography is superior in point of truth to Painting (Reber *Plato u. die Poesie* p. 23). See however on 598 A.

φήσεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, αὐτὸν ποιεῖν ἃ ποιεῖ. καίτοι τρόπῳ γέ τινι καὶ ὁ ζῳγράφος κλίνην ποιεῖ. ἢ οὔ; Ναί, ἔφη, φαινομένην γε καὶ οὗτος.

II. Τί δὲ ὁ κλινοποιός· οὐκ ἄρτι | μέντοι ἔλεγες, ὅτι οὐ τὸ 597
εἶδος ποιεῖ, ὃ δή φαμεν εἶναι ὃ ἔστι κλίνη, ἀλλὰ κλίνην τινά; Ἔλεγον γάρ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ὃ ἔστιν ποιεῖ, οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὂν ποιοῖ, ἀλλά τι τοιοῦτον, οἷον τὸ ὄν, ὂν δὲ οὔ; τελέως δὲ εἶναι ὂν τὸ τοῦ κλινουργοῦ ἔργον ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς χειροτέχνου εἴ τις φαίη, κινδυνεύει οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγειν; Οὔκουν, ἔφη, ὥς γ' ἂν δόξειεν τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τοιούσδε λόγους διατρίβουσιν. Μηδὲν ἄρα θαυμάζωμεν, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀμυδρόν τι τυγχάνει ὂν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. | Μὴ γάρ. B
Βούλει οὖν, ἔφην, ἐπ' αὐτῶν τούτων ζητήσωμεν τὸν μιμητὴν τοῦτον, τίς ποτ' ἐστίν; Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τριτταί τινες κλῖναι αὗται γίγνονται· μία μὲν ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα, ἣν φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι. ἢ τίν' ἄλλον; Οὐδένα, οἶμαι. Μία

37. γε $A^2\Pi$: om. A^1. 3. ποιεῖ $A^2\Xi q$: ποιῇ $A^1\Pi$. 11. ἐν Π: om. A.

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38 **οὐ—μέντοι.** I 339 B *n.* ἄρτι refers to 596 B.

597 A 7 **εἰ καὶ τοῦτο κτλ.**: sc. as well as the κλίνη made by the painter.

597 B 9 **ἐπ' αὐτῶν τούτων κτλ.** For ἐπί see on V 475 A. τοῦτον in τὸν μιμητὴν τοῦτον ("hunc, quem quaerimus" Schneider) was found by Dübner to be the reading of A as well as the rest of Bekker's MSS, and Schneider restores it in his *Addit.* p. 77.

10 **οὐκοῦν κτλ.** For γίγνονται see on VIII 562 A. With ἐν τῇ φύσει cf. infra 597 C, 598 A, *Phaed.* 103 B and *Parm.* 132 D τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει. Each of these passages brings ἡ φύσις into connexion with the Ideas: cf. also V 476 B, VI 501 B, *Crat.* 389 B ff. and infra 597 D, E. In the phrase ἐν τῇ φύσει, the expression ἡ φύσις means 'Nature' i.e. *rerum natura* (cf. R. G. Bury in *Cl. Rev.* VIII p. 299), but for Plato *rerum natura*, strictly interpreted, is the Ideal World. Plato's nomenclature is in harmony with the traditional usage of Greek philosophy, for "in Greek philosophical language, φύσις always means that which is primary, fundamental, and persistent, as opposed to that which is secondary, derivative, and transient" (Burnet *Early Greek Phil.* p. 11). Now in Platonism the primary, fundamental, persistent, is the εἶδος: and hence the φύσις or 'nature' of anything means its Idea (e.g. *Phaedr.* 254 B ἡ μνήμη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν ἠνέχθη), and the φύσις or nature of *all* things (*rerum natura*) becomes an expression for the World of Ideas ("regio idearum, ὁ νοητὸς τόπος" Schneider). Bosanquet would like to render φύσις by 'evolution,' "without understanding any definite theory of origins." Such a translation would be, in my judgment, not only gravely misleading, but linguistically wrong; for ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα cannot mean 'which evolution *has produced*': the force of ἐν must be local—figuratively so, of course—exactly as in ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει referred to above. So also J. B. Mayor in *Cl. Rev.* X p. 121. To Krohn, φύσις appears to be "die allgemeine Gesetzlichkeit des Universums, die dem δημιουργός die Musterbilder liefert" (*Pl. St.* p. 249). This is nearer the truth, but we must not surrender the self-existence of the Ideas. See also on 597 D.

11 **ἢν—θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι.** "Occurrit, ut videtur, quasi ex improviso Platoni, Deum Idearum auctorem appellare" says Pansch (*de deo Platonis* p. 45), truly enough, in the restricted sense that we ought to lay no stress on this passage *by*

δέ γε ἦν ὁ τέκτων. Ναί, ἔφη. Μία δὲ ἦν ὁ ζωγράφος. ἦ γάρ;
Ἔστω. Ζωγράφος δή, κλινοποιός, θεός, τρεῖς οὗτοι ἐπιστάται
C τρισὶν εἴδεσι κλινῶν. Ναὶ τρεῖς. Ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, εἴτε | οὐκ 15
ἐβούλετο, εἴτε τις ἀνάγκη ἐπῆν μὴ πλέον ἢ μίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει
ἀπεργάσασθαι αὐτὸν κλίνην, οὕτως ἐποίησεν μίαν μόνον αὐτὴν
ἐκείνην ὃ ἔστιν κλίνη· δύο δὲ τοιαῦται ἢ πλείους οὔτε ἐφυτεύθησαν
ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ οὔτε μὴ φυῶσιν. Πῶς δή; ἔφη. Ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ
δύο μόνας ποιήσειεν, πάλιν ἂν μία ἀναφανείη, ἧς ἐκεῖναι ἂν αὖ 20
ἀμφότεραι τὸ εἶδος ἔχοιεν, καὶ εἴη ἂν ὃ ἔστιν κλίνη ἐκείνη, ἀλλ'
οὐχ αἱ δύο. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι, εἰδὼς ὁ θεός, βουλό-
D μενος | εἶναι ὄντως κλίνης ποιητὴς ὄντως οὔσης, ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίνης
τινός, μηδὲ κλινοποιός τις, μίαν φύσει αὐτὴν ἔφυσεν. Ἔοικεν.

19. δὴ $A^2\Xi$: δὲ vel δ' $A^1\Pi q$.

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itself as evidence for the origin of the Ideas. But, if God and the Idea of Good are the same (see on VI 505 A ff.), Plato is merely saying in theological language what he formerly said in philosophical, when he derived the *οὐσία* of all other Ideas from the Idea of Good (VI 509 B). See Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 242, where the same explanation is given, and Zeller[4] II p. 666. It is not, I think, quite correct to dismiss *θεός* as merely "eine mythische Ausdrucksweise" (Hirmer *Entstehung u. Komp.* etc. p. 647), and Susemihl (*Einleitung* p. 262) is certainly wrong when he takes it to mean '*a* god.' The sentence has been much discussed in connexion with the theory that Plato's Ideas are 'thoughts of God': see for example Hermann *de loco Plat. de rep.* VI 505 sq. p. 5 with Bonitz's reply *Disput. Pl. duae* p. 33 and Hermann's rejoinder *Vindic. disp. de idea boni* pp. 39 ff., and cf. Zeller l. c. pp. 664—670. I have already said in App. III to Book VII that Plato himself says nothing to shew that he viewed his Ideas in this light; and it is only by reading into his words much more than they are naturally fitted to convey, that the present passage can be made to support the identification.

597 C 19 **εἰ δύο κτλ.**: not of course 'if God *had* made' etc. (D. and V.), but 'if he *should* make' etc., referring to the future, in harmony with *οὔτε μὴ φυῶσιν*. The words *δύο μόνας* mean 'no more than two,' "auch nur zwei" (Schneider). Even two (not to speak of more) would involve a fresh *ἰδέα*. Cf. *Tim.* 31 A *τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα ὁπόσα νοητὰ ζῷα, μεθ' ἑτέρου δεύτερον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη· πάλιν γὰρ ἂν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ περὶ ἐκείνω δέοι ζῷον, οὗ μέρος ἂν εἴτην ἐκείνω, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἐκείνοιν ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ τῷ περιέχοντι τόδ' ἂν ἀφωμοιωμένον λέγοιτο ὀρθότερον*. The *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* argument against the theory of Ideas rests on the same basis: see *Parm.* 132 E ff. with Arist. *Met.* A 9. 990[b] 17 and Bonitz ad loc.

597 D 24 **μίαν φύσει κτλ.**: 'created it, in its essential nature, one. So it appears. Shall we then call him the *Nature*-maker of bed, or something of the sort? It would at all events be fair to do so, since he has made both this and all besides in their essential nature.' Connected with the notion 'bed' (observe the neuter *τούτου*), there are *two* makers: (1) its *φυτ-ουργός*, who makes *ἡ φύσει κλίνη*, (2) its *δημι-ουργός*, who makes *κλίνη τις*, a particular material bed. The first is God—the *φυτουργός* not only of 'bed' but of all else: the second a carpenter. *φυτουργός* is used by Plato in the peculiar sense of *ὁ φύσει-τι ποιῶν*, the maker of e.g. the bed-by-nature, the table-by-nature, etc.; and the peculiar form of Glauco's answer (*δίκαιον γοῦν κτλ.*) shews that he was sensible of the linguistic experiment. Plato's meaning would have been easier for us to catch if (using substantives instead of pronouns), he had said *μίαν φύσει κλίνην ἔφυσεν* (created one bed-by-nature, cf. VI 501 B *τὸ φύσει δίκαιον*) and *ἐπειδήπερ καὶ φύσει-κλίνην καὶ φύσει-τἄλλα πάντα πεποίηκεν*, but what he does write is much

Βούλει οὖν τοῦτον μὲν φυτουργὸν τούτου προσαγορεύωμεν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον; Δίκαιον γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπειδήπερ φύσει γε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τἆλλα πάντα πεποίηκεν. Τί δὲ τὸν τέκτονα; ἆρ' οὐ δημιουργὸν κλίνης; Ναί. Ἦ καὶ τὸν ζωγράφον δημιουργὸν καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ τοιούτου; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλὰ τί αὐτὸν κλίνης φήσεις εἶναι; Τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ μετριώτατ' ἂν προσαγορεύεσθαι, μιμητὴς οὖ ἐκεῖνοι δημιουργοί. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὸν τοῦ τρίτου ἄρα γεννήματος ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως μιμητὴν καλεῖς; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τοῦτ' ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ τραγῳδοποιός, εἴπερ μιμητής ἐστι, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι

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more elegant. It seems to me certain that *φύσις* in this passage refers to the essential nature (i.e. the Idea) of the thing in question. Schleiermacher, Schneider, and Müller, to judge from their translations, held the same view. The English translators render the second *φύσει* 'by creation' (D. and V.) or 'by the natural process of creation' (Jowett), but apart from other objections, *φύσει* surely cannot bear a sense so very different from that which it has at the beginning of the argument: see 597 B *n.*, where reference is made also to Bosanquet's ingenious, but, as I believe, wholly mistaken view.

29 **τί αὐτὸν κλίνης κτλ.** ; For the genitive cf. IX 582 C, 585 D, infra 597 E and (with J. and C.) *Symp.* 204 D *τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως;*

597 E 30 **μιμητὴς οὖ ἐκεῖνοι δημιουργοί.** There is (1) the *φυτουργός*, (2) the *δημιουργός*, (3) the imitator of 'bed.' The two former are each of them (in the wider sense) *δημιουργοί* of 'bed.' It will be noticed that 'bed' is treated *pro tempore* (from *βούλει οὖν* to *ὡμολογήκαμεν*) as a single undifferentiated notion, because the contrast is shifted from the three beds to those who are concerned in their production. At 598 A *εἰπὲ δέ μοι κτλ.* Plato again differentiates the notion, in order to make it clear that the Painter imitates only the material, and not the Ideal, bed.

31 **τὸν τοῦ τρίτου κτλ.** The genitive is like *τί αὐτον κλίνης κτλ.* above. I do not think we ought (with J. and C.) to supply *δημιουργόν*.

33 **τοῦτ' ἄρα—μιμηταί.** Since the tragic poet is an imitator, he too will be *τοῦ τρίτου γεννήματος ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως*, or in other words, *τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως κτλ.* Baiter's text is misleading because he prints no comma after *μιμητής ἐστι*. That Tragedy is a branch of *μίμησις*, was universally allowed: see above on 595 C. Plato's procedure in reasoning from Painting to Poetry (cf. infra 598 C, 601 A, 603 B and 605 A) may be illustrated by Simonides' remark that 'Poetry is vocal Painting,' as 'Painting is silent Poetry' (*ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν μὲν ζωγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν* Plut. *de gloria Ath.* 346 F)—a saying which Lessing appropriately cites in the preface to his *Laocoon*.

τρίτος τις κτλ. : 'as it were third from King and Truth.' The metaphor is a genealogical one (cf. III 391 C *Πηλέως, σωφρονεστάτου τε καὶ τρίτου ἀπὸ Διός*), and the King corresponds of course to the *φυτουργός* or God. On the one hand we have (1) God, (2) the *τέκτων*, (3) the *μιμητής*: on the other (1) the *αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι κλίνη*, (2) a material *κλίνη*, (3) a picture of a material *κλίνη*: and just as the picture is *τὸ τρίτον γέννημα ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως*, so the imitator is 'third in descent' (*τρίτος — πεφυκώς*) and consequently two degrees removed from *ὁ θεός*. The propriety of the term *βασιλέως* will be seen if we translate Plato's theological phraseology into its philosophical equivalent. When he tells us that God constructs the Idea of Bed, he means that the Idea of Good is the source of that Idea (597 B *n.*), and the Idea of Good is *King* of the Ideal World: see VI 509 D. This is the application of the phrase: but it is possible enough that the expression itself was half-proverbial in Plato's time, and referred originally to the person who stood next but one in order of succession to the Persian throne. See App. I. The general sense is well illustrated by J. and C. from Dante *In-*

μιμηταί. Κινδυνεύει. Τὸν μὲν δὴ μιμητὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν· εἰπὲ 35
598 δέ μοι | περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου τόδε· πότερα ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἕκαστον δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιχειρεῖν μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα; Τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν, ἔφη. Ἆρα οἷα ἔστιν ἢ οἷα φαίνεται;

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ferno II. 105 Sì che vostr' arte a Dio quasi è nipote, i.e. Art is Nature's daughter, as Nature is God's: 'so that your art is as it were the grandchild of God.' It should be noticed that the drift of Plato's meaning can be expressed in terms of the simile of the line. The αὐτὸ δ ἔστι κλίνη, for example, belongs to *EB* (see Fig. 1 on p. 65), the material κλίνη to *DC*, and the picture of a Bed to the realm of εἰκόνες, that is to say *AD*. Similarly we may suppose that the state of mind of the carpenter is πίστις, and that of the Painter εἰκασία. See below on 601 E and cf. App. I to Book VII. Other views of the phrase τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως are discussed in App. I.

598 A—598 D *Moreover it is not the Idea which is copied by the Painter, but only the manufactured objects, and even of these he copies only one particular aspect or appearance. Hence Imitation is far removed indeed from the Truth; and only a simpleton will be beguiled by it.*

598 A 1 πότερα ἐκεῖνο—ἔφη. In holding that the Art of Painting imitates only τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα, Plato degrades it to the level of photography, and the painter himself to a mere mechanical copyist, whose intelligence does not rise above εἰκασία (in the sense of VI 511 E: see note ad loc. and App. I to Book VII). Yet the highest art has in every age claimed to portray, not the so-called actual, but the Ideal: see for example Arist. *Poet.* 25. 6 and 17: "It may be impossible that there should be men such as Zeuxis painted. 'Yes,' we say, 'but *the impossible is the higher thing; for the ideal type must surpass the reality*'" (Butcher's translation), and the recent development of this idea by W. J. Courthope, *Life in Poetry and Law in Taste* pp. 152, 165, 196 ff. and passim. In the present passage, Plato bases his unfavourable verdict on what must be admitted to be a narrow and scholastic interpretation of his own ontology, but in view of Books II and III as well as 605 C—607 A below, we can hardly doubt that his attitude was determined in the first instance by educational rather than by metaphysical considerations, and that throughout the whole of Book X he was thinking less of the inherent possibilities of Art, than of actual Greek Art and Poetry considered as the exponents of a moral and religious creed which Plato himself emphatically disowns. See also on 607 A. In any case, the objections which he here urges do not touch the real essence of any form of Art except pure and unadulterated realism. Elsewhere throughout the Platonic writings there are not wanting indications of a juster estimate of the artistic faculty and its possibilities (see for example III 401 B—403 C, and especially V 472 D, and cf. Walter *Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Altertum* pp. 441 ff., 459 ff. and Stählin *Stellung d. Poesie in d. Plat. Phil.* pp. 56—65), and the sympathetic student of Plato will find it easy to construct a nobler and more generous theory of Aesthetic Art out of the doctrine of Ideas together with its corollaries of ἀνάμνησις and pre-existence. It is also a historical fact that Plato's own conception of a transcendent self-existing Beauty, ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον, ἔπειτα οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ' αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δ' οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν (*Symp.* 211 A), has proved an inexhaustible fountain of inspiration to some of the greatest artists, notably, for instance, in connexion with the Platonic Academy at Florence in the days of Michel Angelo: see Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy* II pp. 205, 207, 247, 323 ff. Those who have caught the spirit of Plato's teaching will agree with me when I say that the famous lines of Wordsworth on King's College Chapel

"They dreamt not of a perishable home,
Who thus could build,"

are more truly and characteristically Platonic than Plato's attack upon poetry and painting in this passage.

3 ἆρα οἷα ἔστιν κτλ. The painter, as Bosanquet reminds us, operates in two dimensions, and so cannot copy the material bed "in its solid completeness, but

τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτι διόρισον. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Ὧδε. κλίνη, ἐάν τε ἐκ πλαγίου αὐτὴν θεᾷ ἐάν τε καταντικρὺ ἢ ὁπῃοῦν, μή τι διαφέρει αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς, ἢ διαφέρει μὲν οὐδέν, φαίνεται δὲ ἀλλοία; καὶ τἆλλα ὡσαύτως; Οὕτως, ἔφη· φαίνεται, διαφέρει δ' οὐδέν. Τοῦτο | δὴ B αὐτὸ σκόπει. πρὸς πότερον ἡ γραφικὴ πεποίηται περὶ ἕκαστον; πότερα πρὸς τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἔχει, μιμήσασθαι, ἢ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς φαίνεται, φαντάσματος ἢ ἀληθείας οὖσα μίμησις; Φαντάσματος, ἔφη. Πόρρω ἄρα που τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἡ μιμητικὴ ἐστιν καί, ὡς ἔοικεν, διὰ τοῦτο πάντα ἀπεργάζεται, ὅτι σμικρόν τι ἑκάστου ἐφάπτεται καὶ τοῦτο εἴδωλον. οἷον ὁ ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ζωγραφήσει ἡμῖν σκυτοτόμον, τέκτονα, τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, περὶ

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only his partial view of it" i.e. the bed as it *appears* to him from one point of view, a particular *φάντασμα* of bed. His work, in fact, is *σκιαγραφία* (II 365 C *n.*). It will follow that Painting is a stage lower than 'third from truth,' but Plato does not press the point, and in 599 A and D Poetry—the sister art to Painting—remains as before only *τρίτον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας*. See also on *μιμητική* in B below.

598 B 8 **πεποίηται** is passive, not middle, as J. and C. strangely imagine. Cf. 605 A *ὁ δὴ μιμητικὸς ποιητὴς—οὐ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκέ τε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν πέπηγεν*.

9 **τὸ ὄν**: not of course in the metaphysical sense, but in the sense in which e.g. the material bed 'is' as opposed to its *φάντασμα*, which only *φαίνεται*, and which is all that the painter copies. An apologist of Art might fairly reply to Plato that in another and profounder sense it is just because Art does 'imitate' the *φάντασμα* and not the material reality that her creations frequently possess a measure of ideality and truth beyond and above what Plato assigns to them here. Cf. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry* etc. pp. 127 ff., 157—162. For the construction see on III 407 B.

11 **ἡ μιμητική**. In this particular instance the inference from Painting to the whole of imitative art is hardly to be justified: for Sculpture, which is certainly, in the Greek way of thinking, a branch of *μιμητική*, cannot be said to copy only a *φάντασμα* of the material object to the same extent that Painting does. See however *Soph.* 235 E, 236 A.

12 **διὰ τοῦτο—εἴδωλον**: 'what enables it to manufacture all things is that it lays hold of but a little part of each, and even that is unsubstantial.' *πάντα ἀπεργάζεται* recalls 596 C—E, while preparing us at the same time for *πάσας ἐπισταμένῳ τὰς δημιουργίας* κτλ. below in C. In *σμικρόν τι ἑκάστου ἐφάπτεται* the construction is like *μεταλαμβάνουσι—τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο* (*Prot.* 329 E). For *εἴδωλον* Herwerden conjectures *εἰδώλου*: but the word refers to *φαντάσματος* above and must therefore be in apposition to the part and not the whole. The particular 'appearance' of a bed which a painter copies is properly regarded as only a little 'part' of it.

14 **περὶ οὐδενὸς—τῶν τεχνῶν**: 'although he does not understand about the arts of any one of them.' According to this explanation, which is that of Prantl, *περί* governs *τῶν τεχνῶν* and *τούτων* has for its antecedent *σκυτοτόμον, τέκτονα* κτλ. The plural *τῶν τεχνῶν* is a trifling irregularity, due to the introduction of *τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς*, in the absence of which Plato would doubtless have written *περὶ οὐδετέρου τούτων ἐπαΐων τῆς τέχνης*. For the distance between *περί* and its noun cf. VIII 551 C *περὶ ἄλλου οὕτως ὀτουοῦν ἀρχῆς, Prot.* 319 D *περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως* (if Sauppe is right in construing *περί* with *διοικήσεως*), *Laws* 859 A *οὕτω διανοώμεθα περὶ νόμων δεῖν γραφῆς γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, Tim.* 40 D *τὰ περὶ θεῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ γεννητῶν εἰρημένα φύσεως ἐχέτω τέλος*, and other examples in Lina *de praepos. usu Plat.* pp. 17 f. It is certainly wrong to translate the text by 'without knowing anything *about* these arts,' and we have no right to resort to such emendations as *οὐδὲν τούτων ἐπαΐων τῶν*

C | οὐδενὸς τούτων ἐπαΐων τῶν τεχνῶν· ἀλλ' ὅμως παῖδάς τε καὶ
ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους, εἰ ἀγαθὸς εἴη ζωγράφος, γράψας ἂν τέκτονα
καὶ πόρρωθεν ἐπιδεικνὺς ἐξαπατῷ ἂν τῷ δοκεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τέκτονα
εἶναι. Τί δ' οὔ; Ἀλλὰ γάρ, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, τόδε δεῖ περὶ πάντων
τῶν τοιούτων διανοεῖσθαι· ἐπειδάν τις ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλῃ περί του,
ὡς ἐνέτυχεν ἀνθρώπῳ πάσας ἐπισταμένῳ τὰς δημιουργίας καὶ
D τἆλλα πάντα, ὅσα εἷς ἕκαστος οἶδεν, οὐδὲν | ὅ τι οὐχὶ ἀκριβέστερον
ὁτουοῦν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅτι εὐήθης τις
ἄνθρωπος, καί, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐντυχὼν γόητί τινι καὶ μιμητῇ ἐξηπατήθη,
ὥστε ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ πάσσοφος | εἶναι, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς μὴ οἷός τ' εἶναι

24. πάσσοφος $A^1 q^1$: πᾶς σοφὸς $A^2 Π$: πάνσοφος $Ξ q^2$.

τεχνῶν (Ast) or οὐδὲν περὶ τούτων (or τούτων πέρι οὐδὲν) ἐπαΐων τῶν τεχνῶν (Richards). I now believe that Prantl's view, with which Stallbaum also agrees, is correct, and therefore withdraw my former conjecture τεχνιτῶν. That τεχνῶν is sound appears also from αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπαΐων περὶ σκυτοτομίας in 601 A.

598 C 16 **γράψας—τέκτονα εἶναι.** The same idea recurs in *Soph.* 234 B. The subject of δοκεῖν (*opinari*) is παῖδάς τε καὶ ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους (Schneider). This is better than to make δοκεῖν = *videri* and supply τὸ ἐζωγραφημένον (with J. and C.).

598 D 22 **ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ**: 'we must reply to'—(or 'retort upon') 'such a person': cf. (with J. B. Mayor in *Cl. Rev.* X p. 110) *Prot.* 320 C πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον κτλ. The antecedent of τῷ τοιούτῳ is τις. The words have been strangely misinterpreted by Schneider ("bei dem muss man annehmen" etc.), J. and C. ("we must understand by such a statement") and others, forgetful of the parallel expression in the *Protagoras*. Vermehren actually goes so far as to conjecture ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ (*Plat. Stud.* p. 119).

23 **γόητί τινι.** Cf. *Soph.* 234 C.

24 **διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς κτλ.** In agreement with Dümmler (*Antisth.* pp. 23 ff.), Stählin (*Stellung d. Poesie* etc. p. 26) takes this as a specific reference to Antisthenes. Antisthenes, in the first place, denied the Ideal theory and held that there could be no knowledge except of particulars: so that Plato might well insinuate that he was incapable of distinguishing knowledge from ignorance: cf. V 476 D *n.* In the second place, Antisthenes was a champion of Homer, and discovered a sort of moral philosophy in his works (see *Frag.* 24—28 in Winckelmann *Antisth. Frag.* and Zeller[4] II pp. 330 ff.). On the strength of these two facts Stählin has evolved the ingenious theory that Plato's motive throughout this part of the discussion is a purely polemical one, and that he did not seriously consider Poetry only 'third from Royalty and Truth.' Plato, thinks Stählin, says in effect: 'Antisthenes holds that poets have knowledge of and copy particulars; but there is no knowledge of particulars, and particulars are copies of Ideas, so that on Antisthenes's own shewing Poets are ignorant, and Poetry is thrice removed from Truth: whereas Antisthenes thinks Homer was omniscient.' The dagger is only lath: for Antisthenes was not an Idealist. Yet it is tolerably clear that Plato is refuting a view of poetry which found enthusiastic advocates in his own time, and Antisthenes may have been one of these, though the evidence falls far short of proof (see next note): but the purpose of this investigation is certainly not polemical and nothing more, and in spite of other passages in which Plato takes a more generous view of Poetry (see on 598 E), there is no good reason to suppose that his hostility is otherwise than serious here. See also on line 28.

598 D—**601** B *We hear it said that tragedians, including Homer, have knowledge of that whereof they write; but it is not so. No one would seriously give himself to the production of copies if he could make originals. If the poet possessed true knowledge of what he imitates, he would rather do great deeds than sing of them; and Homer rendered no services to his fellow men in the sphere of action,*

ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην καὶ μίμησιν ἐξετάσαι. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

III. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον τήν τε τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον, ἐπειδή τινων ἀκούομεν, ὅτι οὗτοι πάσας μὲν τέχνας | ἐπίστανται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια E
τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν καὶ τά γε θεῖα· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ καλῶς ποιήσειν, εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε εἶναι ποιεῖν. δεῖ δὴ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον

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invention, or even education, as the neglect he suffered in his own lifetime abundantly proves. The fact is that the Poet writes without knowledge. His productions are but images of images, and owe all their charm to their poetic setting.

598 D 28 **τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον κτλ.** See 595 C *n.* In *τινων* Dümmler and Stählin (ll. cc.) again recognise Antisthenes, but although Antisthenes seems to have believed in Homer, there is no evidence that he was a champion of Tragedy (note *ὅτι οὗτοι κτλ.*); and he was certainly not the only person in whose eyes Homer was regarded as at once a universal genius and the educator of the whole of Greece. It is not necessary to suppose that Plato has any individual person in his mind: there must have been many such apologists of Homer and dramatic poetry in Plato's day, and Plato as usual individualizes the type. See for instance the *Ion* of Plato and Ar. *Frogs* 1008 ff. It will, no doubt, help us to appreciate Plato's attitude towards Poetry if we remember that she was the *de facto* rival of Philosophy, and that (as Munk observes, *die nat. Ordnung d. Plat. Schr.* pp. 313 ff.) the *Republic* is in a certain sense a demand that Philosophy shall take the place which Poetry had hitherto filled in educational theory and practice: see especially the address to poets in *Laws* 817 A ff. *ὦ ἄριστοι—τῶν ξένων, ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν τραγῳδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δὴ φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην. ποιηταὶ μὲν οὖν ὑμεῖς, ποιητῇ δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὑμῖν ἀντίτεχνοί τε καὶ ἀνταγωνισταὶ τοῦ καλλίστου δράματος κτλ.* Cf. also infra 600 A *n.* But it is surely absurd to suppose that Plato was actuated by any feeling of personal jealousy towards Homer, and aspired to supplant him in the admiration of his countrymen: 'there is no envy in the choir divine' (*Phaedr.* 247 A). There is something almost pathetic in Dionysius' inability to understand and appreciate Plato when he assures us with monotonous and feeble iteration that 'there was, there really was in Plato's nature, with all its excellences, something of vainglory. He shewed this particularly in his jealousy of Homer, whom he expels from his imaginary commonwealth after crowning him with a garland and anointing him with myrrh' (*Letter to Pompeius* § 756, translated by Roberts).

598 E 30 **ἀνάγκη—ποιεῖν.** The saying is attributed by Wilamowitz (*Phil. Unters.* IV p. 285) to Sophocles himself, on what authority he does not say. Is he thinking of Athen. I 22 B *μεθύων δὲ ἐποίει τὰς τραγῳδίας Αἰσχύλος, ὥς φησι Χαμαιλέων. Σοφοκλῆς γοῦν ὠνείδιζεν αὐτῷ ὅτι εἰ καὶ τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδώς γε?* In any case the reference ought not to be thus limited, nor ought we to suppose (with Dümmler and Stählin, ll. cc.) that Antisthenes alone is intended, for Plato seems to be alluding to a tolerably widespread view and one which was freely represented in Apologies of Poetry. Understood in its full significance, the theory of Poetry which Plato is here combating requires us to believe that a poet who can represent a general, a pilot etc., knows the art of generalship, pilotage etc. (cf. 599 C ff.), and we are told that Sophocles was actually made *στρατηγός* because of his *Antigone* (see the Argument ascribed to Aristophanes the grammarian). If we realise the part which Poetry, and especially the poetry of Homer, played in Greek education, and remember that Aristophanes makes Homer the teacher of *τάξεις, ἀρετάς, ὁπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν*, it is by no means extra-

μιμηταῖς τούτοις οὗτοι ἐντυχόντες ἐξηπάτηνται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν
599 ὁρῶν|τες οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ῥᾴδια ποιεῖν
μὴ εἰδότι τὴν ἀλήθειαν· φαντάσματα γάρ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν·
ἤ τι καὶ λέγουσιν καὶ τῷ ὄντι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ ἴσασιν περὶ ὧν
δοκοῦσιν τοῖς πολλοῖς εὖ λέγειν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐξεταστέον.
Οἷει οὖν, εἴ τις ἀμφότερα δύναιτο ποιεῖν, τό τε μιμηθησόμενον καὶ 5
τὸ εἴδωλον, ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν εἰδώλων δημιουργίᾳ ἑαυτὸν ἀφεῖναι ἂν σπου-
Β δάζειν καὶ τοῦτο προστήσασθαι τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ βίου ὡς | βέλτιστον

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vagant to suppose that such views were actually maintained in Plato's time, though Pericles for example had a different criterion of strategic ability when he told Sophocles that he 'knew how to write poetry, but not how to command an army' (Περικλῆς ποιέειν μὲ ἔφη, στρατηγέειν δ' οὐκ ἐπίστασθαι Athen. XIII 604 D). Cf. *Ion* 540 B—542 B and Stählin *Stellung d. Poesie* etc. p. 23 *n.* 3. 'The public,' remarks Stählin, 'whose views Plato here combats. allowed the authority of the poets to extend even to the domain of the particular arts. It was Plato who broke through this magic circle which surrounded Poetry.' Aristotle followed in the same path, refusing to allow that a mistake in respect of some particular art is necessarily a flaw in the poetry: see *Poet.* 25. 1460^{b} 20 ff., 33 ff. Plato himself, of course, holds that poets are destitute of scientific knowledge, and compose their poems οὐ σοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες *Ap.* 22 C: cf. also *Phaedr.* 245 A, *Ion* 533 D ff., *Laws* 719 C and *Men.* 99 C. The true Poet, according to Plato, is a seer: knowledge he has none, but instead of it intuition, enthusiasm and inspiration: he is in short ἔνθεος, because ἐπίπνους ὢν καὶ κατεχόμενος ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ (*Men.* l.c.). This view of Poetry is of course earlier than Plato: we meet with something like it in a striking fragment of Democritus ap. Dio Chrys. LIII 274 (quoted by Stählin l.c. p. 12) Ὅμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτήνατο παντοίων, and Pindar likes to represent himself as the inspired mouthpiece of the Muses and Apollo. We cannot attain to a correct conception of Plato's aesthetic unless we are careful to remember that, although he refused to allow that the poet has knowledge, he did not deny him genius and inspiration. See also on 598 A supra.

32 **πότερον μιμηταῖς κτλ.**: 'whether these men whom they have met are imitators, by whom they have been deceived' etc. μιμηταῖς is of course predicative, and that is why τούτοις has no article. We certainly ought not (with Richards) to change τούτοις into τοιούτοις. Cf. IV 436 D *n.*

599 A 1 **τριττὰ—ὄντος**: 'are three stages removed from Truth.' One of Schneider's MSS has τριτὰ (*sic*), and Herwerden conjectures τρίτα, comparing τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας in D. Possibly Proclus also read τρίτα: see the critical note in Kroll's edition of the *in remp.* I p. 203. 22. If the numeral is an adjective agreeing with ἔργα, we must certainly read τρίτα, but it may be an accusative of extent, i. q. τρία ἀπέχοντα. I therefore think it safer to retain the MS reading, especially as τριττά was more likely to be corrupted into τρίτα than conversely.

2 **φαντάσματα—ποιοῦσιν.** 596 E.

3 **ἤ τι καὶ κτλ.**: 'or whether again there is something in what they say.' ἤ καί is sometimes thus used instead of ἤ, from a feeling that it introduces something additional, viz. an additional alternative. Cf. (with Schneider) Hom. *Il.* II 238 and Pl. *Laws* 744 A. The force of ἤ καί in *Ap.* 27 E, *Phaedr.* 269 A and infra 602 D, 605 D is nearly, but not quite, the same.

6 **ἐπὶ—δημιουργίᾳ** depends on σπουδάζειν, rather than on ἀφεῖναι. The word σπουδάζειν is emphatic: he might occasionally παίζειν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, but he would never make it the serious business of his life: cf. infra 602 B, VII 536 C *n.* and *Phaedr.* 276 C ff. The whole of this passage reminds us very strongly of the depreciatory estimate of written books in the *Phaedrus.* Cf. 599 B *n.*

7 **τοῦτο—ἔχοντα**: 'set this in the forefront of his life as his best possession,'

ἔχοντα; Οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἀλλ' εἴπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἐπιστήμων εἴη τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων πέρι, ἅπερ καὶ μιμεῖται, πολὺ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἂν σπουδάσειεν ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς μιμήμασι, καὶ πειρῷτο ἂν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἑαυτοῦ καταλιπεῖν μνημεῖα, καὶ εἶναι προθυμοῖτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ὁ ἐγκωμιαζόμενος ἢ ὁ ἐγκωμιάζων. Οἶμαι, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ἥ τε τιμὴ καὶ ἡ ὠφελία. Τῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων πέρι μὴ ἀπαιτῶμεν λόγον Ὁμηρον ἢ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐρωτῶντες, εἰ ἰατρικὸς ἦν τις αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ μὴ μιμητὴς μόνον C ἰατρικῶν λόγων, τίνας ὑγιεῖς ποιητής τις τῶν παλαιῶν ἢ τῶν νέων λέγεται πεποιηκέναι, ὥσπερ Ἀσκληπιός, ἢ τίνας μαθητὰς ἰατρικῆς κατελίπετο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς ἐκγόνους, μηδ' αὖ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας αὐτοὺς ἐρωτῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἐῶμεν· περὶ δὲ ὧν μεγίστων τε καὶ καλλίστων ἐπιχειρεῖ λέγειν Ὅμηρος, πολέμων τε πέρι καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ διοικήσεων πόλεων καὶ παιδείας πέρι ἀνθρώπου, D δίκαιόν που ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν πυνθανομένους· ὦ φίλε Ὅμηρε, εἴπερ μὴ τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εἶ ἀρετῆς πέρι, εἰδώλου δημιουργός, ὃν δὴ μιμητὴν ὡρισάμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερος, καὶ οἷός τε ἦσθα γιγνώσκειν, ποῖα ἐπιτηδεύματα βελτίους ἢ χείρους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, λέγε ἡμῖν, τίς τῶν πόλεων διὰ σὲ βέλτιον

15. μὴ $A^2\Pi$: nescio an omiserit A^1.

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in accordance with the maxim τὰ καλὰ τρέψαι ἔξω in Pind. *Pyth.* 3. 83. προστήσασθαι is used like πρόστασις IX 577 A, and προστησάμενοι in VII 531 B is not very different. Others (Schneider, Stallbaum, etc.) think προστήσασθαι κτλ. means 'to set before his life' as an aim or goal. In itself, this rendering is unexceptionable; but it does not suit with ὡς βέλτιστον ἔχοντα. The word ἔχοντα cannot be equivalent to ἡγούμενον 'considering' (in spite of the exceptional phrase ἐντίμως ἔχειν VII 528 B *n.*); nor is it easy to accept the version of Schneider "und dieses als das beste was er *könnte*." The emphasis requires us to take ἔχοντα in its full sense ("als das beste was er habe" Schleiermacher). Stallbaum conjectures ὡς βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχοντα, but the text is sound. For βέλτιστον instead of τὸ βέλτιστον cf. (with Schneider) μέγιστον ἀγαθόν in I 330 D.

599 B 9 **ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις.** ἐπί for ἐν is called for by Herwerden, but cf. *Laws* 834 B τὰς σπουδὰς—τάς τε ἐν τῇ τροφῇ καὶ τὰς περὶ ἀγωνίαν αὐτῶν. In ἔργοις there is combined the twofold sense of 'deeds' and 'originals')(μιμήματα: the originals of dramatic μίμησις are actions (603 C *n.*).

11 **καὶ εἶναι—ἐγκωμιάζων.** He would rather be Achilles than Homer. There is another side of the question, represented by Pindar's ῥῆμα δ' ἐργμάτων χρονιώτερον βιοτεύει (*Nem.* 4. 6), and by Plato himself very forcibly in *Symp.* 209 D, and it is certainly unfair to insinuate that no one would write good poems if he were capable of doing great deeds. Some of Plato's expressions in this passage almost suggest the tone of a man of letters pining for a life of action: cf. VI 496 D *nn.*

13 **ὠφελία:** not simply to the agent himself: cf. σφᾶς ὠφεληκέναι 599 E.

599 C 15 **ἐρωτῶντες κτλ.** Cf. *Ion* 537 C ff., *Ap.* 22 A—C. τοὺς ἐκγόνους are of course the Asclepiadae: see on III 405 D.

599 D 24 **ὡρισάμεθα κτλ.** See 597 E f. From ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερος we may infer that "the actual law-giver, in Plato's view, is second from reality" (Bosanquet).

26 **τίς τῶν πόλεων κτλ.** Contrast *Symp.* 209 C ff. where Homer and Hesiod

ᾤκησεν, ὥσπερ διὰ Λυκοῦργον Λακεδαίμων καὶ δι' ἄλλους πολλοὺς
E πολλαὶ μεγάλαι | τε καὶ σμικραί; σὲ δὲ τίς αἰτιᾶται πόλις νομο-
θέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι καὶ σφᾶς ὠφεληκέναι; Χαρώνδαν μὲν
γὰρ Ἰταλία καὶ Σικελία, καὶ ἡμεῖς Σόλωνα· σὲ δὲ τίς; ἔξει τινὰ 30
εἰπεῖν; Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· οὔκουν λέγεταί γε οὐδ' ὑπ'
600 αὐτῶν Ὁμηριδῶν. Ἀλλὰ δή τις πόλεμος ἐπὶ Ὁμήρου ὑπ' ἐκείνου
ἄρχοντος ἢ ξυμβουλεύοντος εὖ πολεμηθεὶς μνημονεύεται; Οὐδείς.
Ἀλλ' οἷα δὴ εἰς τὰ ἔργα σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς πολλαὶ ἐπίνοιαι καὶ εὐμή-
χανοι εἰς τέχνας ἤ τινας ἄλλας πράξεις λέγονται, ὥσπερ αὖ Θάλεώ
τε πέρι τοῦ Μιλησίου καὶ Ἀναχάρσιος τοῦ Σκύθου; Οὐδαμῶς 5
τοιοῦτον οὐδέν. Ἀλλὰ δὴ εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ τισὶν ἡγεμὼν παι-
δείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται Ὅμηρος γενέσθαι, οἳ ἐκεῖνον ἠγάπων ἐπὶ
B συνουσίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὑστέροις ὁδόν τινα | παρέδοσαν βίου Ὁμηρικήν,
ὥσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτός τε διαφερόντως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἠγαπήθη, καὶ

31. Ita Π: *οὔκουν—μνημονεύεται* Socrati tribuit A. 3. *εἰς* A^2Π: om. A^1.

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are linked with Lycurgus, Solon, *καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ ἐν βαρβάροις, πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἀποφηνάμενοι ἔργα, γεννήσαντες παντοίαν ἀρετήν.*

599 E 28 **σὲ δὲ τίς κτλ.** Yet it is a genuinely Greek sentiment that 'Poets are the unacknowledged'—a Greek would have said 'acknowledged'—'legislators of the world' (Shelley).

29 **Χαρώνδαν κτλ.** Charondas, of Catana in Sicily, the legislator of the Chalcidian colonies in Italy and Sicily, is not elsewhere mentioned by Plato, though frequently by Aristotle: see Susemihl and Hicks on Arist. *Pol.* A 2. 1252^b 14. The date of Charondas is probably the sixth century B.C.: see Niese in Pauly-Wissowa *art.* Charondas, where the authorities relating to this early legislator are cited and reviewed. It is worth noting, in view of Ἰταλία here and elsewhere in Plato (*Laws* 777 C, *Tim.* 20 A: cf. also *Laws* 659 B), that an argument against the genuineness of the seventh Platonic Epistle has been derived from the fact that it mentions Italy (326 B, 339 D): see Hermann, *Gesch. u. System* p. 591 *n.* 213.

32 **Ὁμηριδῶν**: 'votaries of Homer,' 'Homer's devotees.' So the word is rightly explained by Heine (*de rat. quae Pl. c. poet. Gr. intercedit* pp. 18—22), and also by Jebb (*Homer* p. 78). Cf. Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέταις 606 E and the use of Ὁμηρίδαι in *Ion* 530 E, *Phaedr.* 252 B. The original meaning of Ὁμηρίδαι is discussed by Jebb l.c.

ἀλλὰ δή like ἀλλὰ γάρ='at enim' (II 365 C *n.*).

600 A 3 **εἰς τὰ ἔργα** should be connected with *σοφοῦ*. The omission of *εἰς* in A^1 (see *cr. n.*) is apparently accidental, for it occurs in all other MSS.

4 **Θάλεώ τε—καὶ Ἀναχάρσιος.** Plato retains the Ionic genitive in the Ionic name: cf. Arist. *Pol.* A 11. 1259^a 6 Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου. On Thales' useful discoveries see Zeller[3] I p. 183 *n.* 2. Anacharsis was credited by some authorities with the invention of the anchor and the potter's wheel (D. L. I 105).

8 **ὁδόν τινα—βίου Ὁμηρικήν.** Yet in another and wider sense Homer *was* the founder of a 'way of life,' and the ὁδὸς Ὁμηρική, which Plato so strongly condemns in Books II and III, was in fact the ὁδὸς Ἑλληνική (Reber *Platon u. die Poesie* p. 25). From this point of view Plato's antagonism to Homer is only a symptom of his profound dissent from much that we are accustomed to regard as essentially characteristic of the Greek view of life. See on V 470 E and Bohne *Wie gelangt P. zur Aufstellung s. Staatsideals*, etc. p. 38.

οἱ ὕστεροι ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου διαφανεῖς πῃ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις; Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν λέγεται. ὁ γὰρ Κρεώφυλος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἴσως, ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἑταῖρος, τοῦ ὀνόματος ἂν γελοιότερος ἔτι πρὸς παιδείαν φανείη, εἰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀληθῆ. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς πολλή τις ἀμέλεια | περὶ αὐτὸν ἦν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, ὅτε ἔζη. C

IV. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλ' οἶει, ὦ Γλαύκων, εἰ τῷ ὄντι οἷός τ' ἦν παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ βελτίους ἀπεργάζεσθαι Ὅμηρος, ἅτε περὶ τούτων οὐ μιμεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ γιγνώσκειν δυνάμενος, οὐκ ἂρ' ἂν πολλοὺς ἑταίρους ἐποιήσατο καὶ ἐτιμᾶτο καὶ ἠγαπᾶτο ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος

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600 B 10 **Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον—τοῦ βίου.** The aim of the Πυθαγόρειος *βίος* was ἕπεσθαι θεῷ, and the rules of abstinence etc. by which its votaries sought to 'follow God' made them conspicuous (διαφανεῖς) and exceptional among the Greeks. See Rohde *Psyche*[2] II pp. 159—171.

12 **ὁ γὰρ Κρεώφυλος κτλ.** Κρεώφιλος was read before Ast on slight MS authority, and gives an excellent sense to τοῦ ὀνόματος—φανείη: but Κρεώφῡλος is confirmed by all the best MSS, as well as by Callimachus (*Epigr.* 6 ap. Strabo XIV 638 Κρεωφύλου πόνος εἰμὶ κτλ.) and others: see Pape-Benseler s.v. Plato speaks of him as Homer's friend or disciple (for ἑταῖρος has this meaning here: cf. ἑταίρους in C and *Soph.* 216 A ἑταῖρον—τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην κτλ. with Bonitz *Ind. Arist.* s.v.): others, including the Scholiast, say he was his son-in-law. The Epic poem Οἰχαλίας ἅλωσις was ascribed to Creophylus by Callimachus (l.c.): but according to another tradition, Creophylus received the poem from Homer himself in return for hospitality (Suidas s.v. Κρεώφυλος).

13 **τοῦ ὀνόματος—ἔζη.** Cf. Cic. *de repub.* III *Frag.* 38 Nobbe Sardanapalus ille vitio multo quam nomine ipso deformior (as if Σαρδανό-φαλλος). Κρεώφῡλος (from κρέας and φῦλον: 'Carnigena' 'Fleischgeburt,' suggests Schneider) is an ὄνομα γέλοιον πρὸς παιδείαν: for Beef suggests anything but culture. "I am a great eater of beef, and I believe that does harm to my wits" (*Twelfth Night* I 3. 90). The Greeks had the same feeling: cf. Plato's remarks on the effects of over-much feeding and athletics in III 411 C—E μισόλογος δή, οἶμαι, ὁ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται καὶ ἄμουσος, and Euripides *Frag.* 284 Dindorf, with the comic fragment παχεῖα γαστὴρ λεπτὸν οὐ τίκτει νόον. Plato means that the proof of the pudding is in the eating: Homer must have been a poor teacher if his disciples (including Creophylus) learnt so little. Had he taught them successfully they would have proved their παιδεία by treating their master more respectfully: cf. *Gorg.* 519 C, D, where we are told that if teachers of δικαιοσύνη do not get paid by their pupils, it only shews that they have failed to teach their subject and therefore deserve no fees. λέγεται—ἔζη means 'for it is said that he was much neglected even in his own age, when he was *alive*,' whereas it is precisely during his lifetime that he would have been most respected if he had taught to any purpose: witness the enthusiasm aroused by Protagoras, Prodicus and other teachers! Thus understood, ὅτε ἔζη has a strong rhetorical emphasis and ought not to be discarded (with Cobet, Baiter, and Herwerden). For ἐκείνου after αὐτοῦ referring to the same person cf. VII 538 B and Riddell *Digest of Platonic Idioms* p. 143 § 49. If we adopt Ast's conjecture and read ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, the passage gains a little in point, because αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου will then refer to Creophylus: but it is difficult to make the subject of ἔζη different from the antecedent of αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, and on the whole I no longer think there is any good reason for deserting the MSS.

600 C 16 **ἀλλ' οἶει κτλ.** For οἶει thus used cf. *Men.* 93 C with Heindorf on *Theaet.* 147 B.

20 **Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα κτλ.** With

ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοῖς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν παριστάναι
D ἰδίᾳ | ξυγγιγνόμενοι, ὡς οὔτε οἰκίαν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὑτῶν διοικεῖν
οἷοί τ' ἔσονται, ἐὰν μὴ σφεῖς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατήσωσιν τῆς παιδείας,
καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται, ὥστε μόνον οὐκ
ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἑταῖροι· Ὅμηρον δ' ἄρα 25
οἱ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ οἷός τ' ἦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὀνινάναι ἀνθρώπους,
ἢ Ἡσίοδον ῥαψῳδεῖν ἂν περιιόντας εἴων, καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἂν
αὐτῶν ἀντείχοντο ἢ τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἠνάγκαζον παρὰ σφίσιν οἴκοι
E εἶναι, | ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔπειθον, αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδαγώγουν ὅπῃ ἦσαν, ἕως
ἱκανῶς παιδείας μεταλάβοιεν; Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ 30
Σώκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Οὐκοῦν τιθῶμεν ἀπὸ Ὁμήρου ἀρξαμένους

21. Κεῖος A^2: Κίος vel Κῖος $A^1\Pi\Xi q$. 23. ἐπιστατήσωσιν vel ἐπιστατήσωσι $A^2\Pi$: ἐπιστατῶσιν ut videtur A^1. 26. ὀνινάναι Matthiaeus: ὀνεῖναι (*sic*) $A^1\Pi$: ὀνίναι (*sic*) $A^2 q$: ὀνῖναι Ξ. 27. περιιόντας $A^2\Xi$: περιόντας $A^1\Pi q$.

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the structure of the sentence cf. (with Stallbaum) *Crit.* 50 E and *Prot.* 325 B, C, where ἄρα occurs, as here, in both clauses. See also on I 336 E and App. IV to Book I. Prodicus survived to 399 at least, but Protagoras seems to have died about 411; so that if the date of action of the dialogue is 410, the reference to Protagoras as apparently still living may seem an anachronism. But the slip is a trifling one in any case; and Socrates might quite well have spoken as he does even if either or both of the persons had recently died. See *Introd.* § 3.

600 D 22 **οὔτε οἰκίαν—παιδείας.** Cf. *Prot.* 318 E ff. and *Men.* 91 A ff.

25 **ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν:** 'carry about shoulder-high' ("auf den Händen tragen" Schneider). Ast quotes Dio Chrys. *Or.* IX p. 141 A *ὑψηλὸν φερόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου*, and the imitation of this passage by Themistius *Or.* XXI p. 254 A *ὃν ἡμεῖς διὰ ταύτην τὴν φαντασίαν μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρομεν*. It is clear that the phrase has a honorific meaning, so that it cannot be, as Erasmus (quoted by Ast) imagined, "translatum—a matribus ac nutricibus, quae infantulos cunis impositos capite portant," whether children were thus carried in antiquity or no.

26 **ὀνινάναι.** See *cr. n.* I agree with Hermann, Baiter and the Oxford editors in preferring *ὀνινάναι* to *ὀνῆναι* (so Bekker and Schneider on slight MS authority) or *ὀνῆσαι* (Stallbaum, after one MS of Aristides II p. 432). *ὀνῆναι* is a very dubious formation, and the present gives a better meaning than the aorist. The error arose from lipography of *-να-*: and *ὀνεῖναι*, *ὀνῆναι* look like attempts to make the residue into an infinitive.

600 E 28 **παρὰ σφίσιν οἴκοι εἶναι:** 'to be with them in their homes.' *παρὰ σφίσιν οἰκεῖν*, which Cobet (*V. L.*² p. 534) and Herwerden desire to read, would not necessarily mean more than 'to dwell in their country.' With the sentiment cf. *Men.* 89 B (quoted below).

29 **αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδαγώγουν:** 'they would have made themselves their tutors and escorted them' etc. *παιδαγωγεῖν* is used in the same playful way in *Alc.* I 135 D *κινδυνεύσομεν μεταβαλεῖν τὸ σχῆμα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὲν σὸν ἐγώ, σὺ δὲ τοὐμόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐ παιδαγωγήσω σε ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, σὺ δ' ὑπ' ἐμοῦ παιδαγωγήσει.* The proverb *δὶς παῖδες οἱ γέροντες* perhaps lends an additional point to *ἐπαιδαγώγουν*, as in Soph. *Fr.* 623 Dindorf = Eur. *Bacch.* 193 *γέρων γέροντα παιδαγωγήσω σ' ἐγώ.*

30 **μεταλάβοιεν.** The regular sequence would be *μετέλαβον*, but cf. *Men.* 89 B *οὓς ἡμεῖς ἂν—ἐφυλάττομεν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατασημηνάμενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν* (*διαφθείρειεν* conj. Madvig), *ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοιντο ταῖς πόλεσιν.* The difference is the difference between 'should' and 'should have.'

πάντας τοὺς ποιητικοὺς μιμητὰς εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ποιοῦσιν, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας οὐχ ἅπτεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὁ ζωγράφος σκυτοτόμον ποιήσει δοκοῦντα
| εἶναι, αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπαΐων περὶ σκυτοτομίας καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπαΐου- 601
σιν, ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων δὲ καὶ σχημάτων θεωροῦσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὕτω δή, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν χρώματα ἄττα ἑκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν,
5 αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπαΐοντα ἀλλ' ἢ μιμεῖσθαι, ὥστε ἑτέροις τοιούτοις ἐκ τῶν λόγων θεωροῦσι δοκεῖν, ἐάν τε περὶ σκυτοτομίας τις λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, πάνυ εὖ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, ἐάν τε
| περὶ στρατηγίας ἐάν τε περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν· οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ B
ταῦτα μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα γε τῶν τῆς

5. αὐτὸν—ἑτέροις II et in marg. A^2 (ubi tamen ἀλλὰ pro ἀλλ' ἢ et ἐν τοῖς pro ἑτέροις): om. A^1. 6, 7. ἐν μέτρῳ—λέγεσθαι II et in marg. A^2: om. A^1.

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32 **πάντας τοὺς ποιητικούς**: see on 595 C.

μιμητὰς εἰδώλων: 'imitators of images.' The words can scarcely mean 'forgers of semblances,' 'imitative makers of shadows,' as suggested by J. and C., in spite of 599 D *εἰδώλου δημιουργός* and *τοῦ εἰδώλου ποιητής* in 601 B. The images which the poet manufactures are in fact images of images, according to both 598 B and 596 B ff.: cf. 602 B *n.*

34 **νῦν δή**. 598 B, C.

ὁ ζωγράφος κτλ.: 'the painter will make what seems to be a shoemaker, in the eyes of those who understand as little about shoemaking as he does himself, but judge by colour and form.' The dative is the dative of person judging, and does not directly depend on *δοκοῦντα εἶναι*, though doubtless affected by it. This explanation is better, I think, than to construe *τοῖς μὴ ἐπαΐουσιν* either directly with *δοκεῖν* (so Vermehren *Pl. St.* p. 120, comparing *ὥστε ἑτέροις—δοκεῖν* below), or with *ποιήσει* ("und für diejenigen, die auch nichts verstehen" Schneider).

601 A 4 **τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν**. The dative is instrumental.

6 **δοκεῖν—δοκεῖν**. The repetition "partim perspicuitatis studio, partim sermonis familiaris negligentiae cuidam tribuenda videtur" Schneider, who cites in illustration *Laws* 859 D, where there is a similar repetition of *εἶναι*. Other parallels will be found in Engelhardt *Anac. Pl. Spec.* III p. 44.

7 **ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ κτλ.** Rhythm and Pitch are the two elements of Music: see III 398 D *n.* The words *αὐτὰ ταῦτα* mean 'just these' and no more: viz. Metre and Music. For the sense cf. (with Ast) Isocrates *Evag.* 8—10.

601 B 9 **ἔχειν**. *ἔχει* was read till Bekker, apparently without any MS authority. The influence of *φήσομεν* is still felt.

ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα—φαίνεται. Cf. Isocr. l.c. 11 *ἦν γάρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλίπῃ, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδεέστερα τῆς δόξης ἧς νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν* and Pl. *Gorg.* 502 C, *Symp.* 205 C, *Phaedr.* 258 D *ἐν μέτρῳ ὡς ποιητής, ἢ ἄνευ μέτρου ὡς ἰδιώτης*. A cursory inspection of these passages of Plato might lead one to suppose that he defined poetry as no more than *λόγος ἔχων μέτρον*, but we can see from other passages in his writings that it was not the *μέτρον*, but the *μῦθος* which appeared to him to be the most essential part of poetry (e.g. *Phaed.* 61 B *ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους*: cf. Arist. *Poet.* 9. 1451^b 29 *τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων*. See also Walter *Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Alt.* pp. 460, 463). Whether Plato would have spoken of a prose romance as a poem, is another question, and the passages to which I have referred make it unlikely that he would have done so. Aristotle seems to attach less importance than

μουσικῆς χρωμάτων τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν, αὐτὰ ἐφ' αὑτῶν λεγόμενα, οἰμαί σε εἰδέναι οἷα φαίνεται. τεθέασαι γάρ που. Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικεν τοῖς τῶν ὡραίων προσώποις, καλῶν δὲ μή, οἷα γίγνεται ἰδεῖν, ὅταν αὐτὰ τὸ ἄνθος προλίπῃ; Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἴθι δή, τόδε ἄθρει· ὁ τοῦ εἰδώλου ποιητής, ὁ μιμητής, C φαμέν, τοῦ μὲν ὄντος οὐδὲν ἐπαΐει, τοῦ δὲ φαινομένου· | οὐχ οὕτως; Ναί. Μὴ τοίνυν ἡμίσεως αὐτὸ καταλίπωμεν ῥηθέν, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς ἴδωμεν. Λέγε, ἔφη. Ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ἡνίας τε γράψει καὶ χαλινόν; Ναί. Ποιήσει δέ γε σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεύς; Πάνυ

10. λεγόμενα $A^1\Pi$: γενόμενα corr. A^2. 16. ἡμίσεως $A^1\Pi$: ἡμίσεος A^2.

Plato to the metrical form: see *Poet.* 1. 1447^b 17 ff. οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον· διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητὴν κτλ. and ib. 9. 1451^b 2 ff.: but it is doubtful whether even Aristotle could have said with Sir Philip Sidney 'One may be a poet without versifying,' although he would certainly not quarrel with the converse statement that 'one may be a versifier without poetry.' See on the whole subject Butcher *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry*^{2} etc. pp. 143 ff. and Courthope *Life in Poetry* etc. pp. 68 ff.

11 **τεθέασαι γάρ που.** An example is afforded by III 393 B ff., but the reference is more general.

12 **ἔοικεν—προλίπῃ.** Aristotle cites this as an example of an εἰκών (*Rhet.* III 4. 1406^b 36 ff.).

601 B—**602** B *The condition of Imitative art in respect of knowledge may be apprehended in the following way. In connexion with every object we can distinguish three arts, that which uses, that which makes, and that which imitates it. The user alone has knowledge of the object; the maker, when the user instructs him, has correct opinion; but neither knowledge nor correct opinion can be attributed to the imitator. He merely copies what appears to be beautiful to the ignorant multitude.*

601 B 14 **ἴθι δή, τόδε ἄθρει κτλ.** Plato has already proved that Imitation is 'third from Truth' ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου (596 A), i.e. from the ontological standpoint provided by his own Ideal Theory. The following argument takes up a different standpoint, according to which knowledge is defined as ἐμπειρία or practical familiarity (601 C, D, 602 A). The attitude assumed throughout this section resembles in some respects that of the historical Socrates (601 D *n.*). Can the two points of view be reconciled? Bosanquet makes an interesting attempt to do so (pp. 379, 389 ff.), but his misconception (as it seems to me) of Plato's Ideas renders his conclusions less valuable than they might otherwise have been. Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 255) professes himself unable to effect a reconciliation. We must admit that Plato himself does not, as a matter of fact, endeavour in this passage to connect the two arguments. Had he chosen to make the effort, I think a careful study of *Euthyd.* 288 E—290 D and *Crat.* 390 B—E will shew on what lines he might have proceeded (see on ἐμπειρότατον in 601 D), but it is safer to suppose that he has shifted his ground, and is applying a new and less strictly scientific μέθοδος to shew that the Imitator is third from knowledge, as Imitation is from truth.

601 C 16 **ἡμίσεως—ῥηθέν.** See on 601 E. ἡμίσεως or ἡμισέως, in whichever way accented, is surely a full adverb, and not "the genitive used adverbially" (J. and C.) like ὀλίγου, πολλοῦ, etc., although there is good authority for the genitive in -εως from ἥμισυς (see Lobeck *Phryn.* p. 247). Stephanus preferred ἡμισέως: but the adverb follows the accent of the genitive plural (ἡμίσεων), and ἡμίσεως· ἐπίρρημα. Πλάτων Πολιτείας ἕκτῳ (Antiatt. in Bekk. *Anecd.* 98. 30)—a note which certainly refers to this passage: see *Introd.* § 4—supports the MS accentuation (Schneider). Liebhold's conjecture ἐπὶ μιμήσεως needs no refutation.

γε. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐπαΐει οἵας δεῖ τὰς ἡνίας εἶναι καὶ τὸν χαλινὸν ὁ γραφεύς; ἢ οὐδ' ὁ ποιήσας, ὅ τε χαλκεὺς καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος, ὅσπερ τούτοις ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι, μόνος ὁ ἱππικός; Ἀληθέστατα. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ πάντα οὕτω φήσομεν ἔχειν; Πῶς; Περὶ ἕκαστον ταύτας τινὰς τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι, χρησομένην, ποιήσουσαν, μιμησομένην; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἑκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζῴου καὶ πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν χρείαν ἐστίν, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ἕκαστον ᾖ πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός; Οὕτως. Πολλὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τὸν χρώμενον ἑκάστῳ ἐμπειρότατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἄγγελον γίγνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ, οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ

21. ὅσπερ A²Π: ὥσπερ A¹. 26. πρὸς ἣν Π: ἣν A.

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21 **ἐπίσταται.** See on *ἐμπειρότατον* in D below.

601 D 24 **οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ—πεφυκός.** The historical Socrates was in the habit of testing the beauty, excellence etc. of an object by the degree in which it fulfilled its function or purpose: see especially Xen. *Symp.* 5. 4 ff. together with other passages cited by Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 369. Plato himself adopts the same standard in I 352 E—353 E and elsewhere.

27 **ἐμπειρότατον.** Throughout the whole of this argument it is held that he who *uses*, e.g. an instrument, has *knowledge* of it (*ἐπίσταται* C, *εἰδώς* and *εἰδότι* E, *εἰδότος* and *ἐπιστήμην* etc. 602 A), and Plato says nothing to make us attach any metaphysical significance to the word 'knowledge,' which he often employs throughout his writings without any suggestion of the Ideas (e.g. II 374 D, IV 422 C). There is no doubt a certain sense in which —if we have regard to *Crat.* 390 B ff. and *Euthyd.* 288 E ff.—*ὁ χρώμενος* has, not indeed scientific knowledge of the Idea, but something analogous thereto. Dialectic, which is the scientific Knowledge of Ideas, is *κατ' ἐξοχήν* the *χρωμένη ἐπιστήμη*, the Science which alone knows in what respect each thing is good and *useful*, and *uses* things accordingly (cf. *Euthyd.* 290 C, *Crat.* 390 C), proving itself thereby the royal or kingly science (VI 505 A *n.*). Thus the man who uses a single instrument correctly occupies the same relative position in regard to that object which the dialectician occupies in regard to the totality of things, and is, in his own small way, a king compared with the maker and imitator of the instrument. Cf. Bosanquet p. 390. But if Plato had intended us to pursue this vein, he would, I think, have furnished us with some hints in the course of the argument itself. See also on 601 B.

28 **οἷα—χρῆται:** 'what are the good or bad points of the instrument he uses when he uses it,' lit. 'what good or bad things that which he uses does'—we cannot like the Greeks say 'makes'—'in use.' This interpretation, which is Schleiermacher's ("wie sich das was er gebraucht gut oder schlecht zeigt in Gebrauch"), seems to me the natural and obvious meaning of the Greek. In agreement, apparently, with Schneider's version, Campbell proposes "what specimens of that which he (the user) employs, the maker makes that are good or bad in actual use," remarking that "the correlation of singular and plural arises from the collocation of particular and universal. The instrument (sing.) is *good in some cases, but bad in others* (plur.)." Campbell's solution has the advantage of referring *ποιεῖ* to *ποιητής*, and corresponds more exactly with *χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν αὐλῶν* in E. The grammatical difficulty is however, I think, insuperable. If the subject to *ποιεῖ* must be *ποιητής*, it would even be easier to make *ᾧ χρῆται=τούτῳ ὃς χρῆται*—a rare form of attraction illustrated on V 465 D: but there is a certain elegance in applying *ποιεῖ* also to the instrument, which is in its way a 'maker too' and one by whose *ἔργα* the other maker must be guided. Herwerden remarks "expectabam potius *οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ* (sc. *ἐστι*) *ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ὧν* (i.e. *τῶν οἷς*) *κτλ.*" It is well that his expectations have been disappointed.

ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ᾧ χρῆται. οἷον αὐλητής που αὐλοποιῷ ἐξαγγέλλει
E περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν, οἳ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν | ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει 30
οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὁ δ' ὑπηρετήσει. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν
εἰδὼς ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν αὐλῶν, ὁ δὲ πιστεύων
ποιήσει; Ναί. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς πίστιν
ὀρθὴν ἕξει περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ πονηρίας, ξυνὼν τῷ εἰδότι καὶ
602 ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν | παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος, ὁ δὲ χρώμενος ἐπι- 35
στήμην. Πάνυ γε. Ὁ δὲ μιμητὴς πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι ἐπι-
στήμην ἕξει ὧν ἂν γράφῃ, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὀρθὰ εἴτε μή, ἢ δόξαν
ὀρθὴν διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεῖναι τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι οἷα
χρὴ γράφειν; Οὐδέτερα. Οὔτε ἄρα εἴσεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει 5
ὁ μιμητὴς περὶ ὧν ἂν μιμῆται πρὸς κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν. Οὐκ
ἔοικεν. Χαρίεις ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικὸς πρὸς σοφίαν

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29 **ἐξαγγέλλει.** Bekker and others write *ἐξαγγελεῖ* both here and in E below. The present echoes *ἄγγελον γίγνεσθαι*, and I agree with Schneider that change is needless, in spite of *ἐπιτάξει* and *ὑπηρετήσει*: cf. *κεῖσθαι—ἔσεσθαι* V 478 D. For the meaning cf. *Crat.* 390 B.

30 **οἳ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν κτλ.** I take this clause as a sort of parenthetical adjunct or characterisation of *αὐλοποιῷ*: 'thus the fluteplayer informs the flutemaker about his flutes—the persons who are his *servants* in the art of fluteplaying—and he will give orders how they should be made, and the flutemaker will *serve* him.' The liberty is great, but hardly greater than Plato allows himself elsewhere in the *Republic*: cf. III 411 C *ἀκράχολοι οὖν καὶ ὀργίλοι ἀντὶ θυμοειδοῦς γεγένηνται, δυσκολίας ἔμπλεοι*, IV 426 C *ὡς ἀποθανουμένους, ὃς ἂν τοῦτο δρᾷ*, VI 496 C, D, I 347 A *n.*: and the break afforded by the interposition of this clause makes the difference of tense between *ἐξαγγέλλει* and *ἐπιτάξει* seem easy and natural. To the ordinary interpretation, which makes *αὐλῶν* the antecedent to *οἳ ἄν*, it is a serious and I think fatal objection that the verb *ὑπηρετεῖν* is used immediately afterwards of the flutemaker in a way which seems to imply that it has been used of him before: and it is also very strange and unnatural to speak of flutes as *ὑπηρέται ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν*. Jowett's translation "which of his flutes is *satisfactory to* the performer," though Schleiermacher, Schneider and Prantl take much the same view, cannot be fairly extracted from *οἳ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν*. Many inferior MSS read *οἷα* for *οἳ*: and Richards conjectures *οἷα ποιοῦσιν* or *οἷα ἀποτελοῦσιν*, but the change is much too great. I once suggested *ὑπερέχωσιν* for *ὑπηρετῶσιν*, but now believe the foregoing interpretation to be right.

601 E 32 **ἐξαγγέλλει.** See on *ἐξαγγέλλει* in D above.

πιστεύων. In the language of the Line, his state of mind is *πίστις* (cf. *πίστιν ὀρθήν* below): see App. I to Book VII. In 596 B on the other hand the *δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπει*. Plato does not try to reconcile the two points of view (601 D *n.*): but he might say that the objective *reality* of that which guides the *δημιουργός* is always the Idea, whether he acts on his own initiative or under the direction of another. See on 596 B. It should be noted that Poetry and the other imitative arts are placed higher, and not lower, than *δημιουργία* in *Phaedr.* 248 E. Here, however, Plato's purpose is a narrower one, viz. by means of an illustration derived from the mechanical arts to complete the proof—hitherto only *ἡμίσεως ῥηθέν* 601 C—that the Imitator does not *εἰδὼς ποιεῖν*, as many assert (598 E), but is in reality third from knowledge.

602 A 3 **δόξαν ὀρθήν.** See IV 430 B *n.*

5 **οὔτε—πονηρίαν.** The word *εἰκασία*, though not here used, represents the Imitator's state of mind: see on VI 511 E and App. I to Book VII.

7 **ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικός.** Stallbaum remarks "cave unam poesim intelli-

περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ. Οὐ πάνυ. Ἀλλ' οὖν | δὴ ὅμως γε μιμήσεται, B
οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἑκάστου, ὅπῃ πονηρὸν ἢ χρηστόν· ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν,
οἷον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδὲν εἰδόσιν, τοῦτο
μιμήσεται. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο; Ταῦτα μὲν δή, ὥς γε φαίνεται, ἐπιεικῶς
ἡμῖν διωμολόγηται, τόν τε μιμητικὸν μηδὲν εἰδέναι ἄξιον λόγου
περὶ ὧν μιμεῖται, ἀλλ' εἶναι παιδιάν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν
μίμησιν, τούς τε τῆς τραγικῆς ποιήσεως ἅπτομένους ἐν ἰαμβείοις
καὶ ἐν ἔπεσι πάντας εἶναι μιμητικοὺς ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα. Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν.

V. | Πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτο οὐ περὶ C
τρίτον μέν τί ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας; ἢ γάρ; Ναί. Πρὸς δὲ

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gas": but *ποίησις* is certainly 'poetry' and nothing else, as Schneider shews, throughout the whole of this episode. It is *poetical μίμησις* with which the discussion is primarily and chiefly concerned: hence this passing exclamation—for it is nothing more: witness the asyndeton. With *χαρίεις* (ironical, of course) followed by *οὐ πάνυ*, in which the irony disappears, cf. IV 426 A, B (J. and C.). <*οὔκουν*> *χαρίεις* (Richards) is an unnecessary conjecture. The reading *μιμήσει* for *ποιήσει* (*q* and some other MSS) is tautological and absurd.

602 B 10 **οἷον φαίνεται—εἰδόσιν.** He will copy *τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων* (V 479 D).

τοῦτο μιμήσεται κτλ. *τοῦτο* is surely not "a cognate accusative" (J. and C.): see on *μιμητὰς εἰδώλων* 600 E. For *παιδιάν τινα* see on 599 A, and on *ἐν ἔπεσι* 595 C *n.*

602 C—**603** B *Consider, again, what is the part of our nature to which Imitation appeals. Painting depends for its effect on the optical delusions to which we are subject, and against which the arts of measurement, counting etc., are our only safeguard. The rational part of soul applies these arts, and proves itself the best by accepting their results. The opposing part is therefore one of the baser elements within us; and base will be the brood that springs from its union with imitative art, in Poetry as well as Painting.*

602 C ff. The reasoning from here to 607 A has been supposed to rest on a psychological theory irreconcileable with that of Book IV, to which the discussion expressly alludes (in 602 E). See for example Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 255 and Pfleiderer *Zur Lösung* etc., p. 38. It is true that Plato is here content, in view of his immediate purpose, with a twofold division of soul into (1) a rational and (2) an irrational, *ἀλόγιστον* (604 D, 605 B), or lower element. But the resemblance between the two theories is greater than the difference, for (*a*) the *λογιστικόν* is common to both, and (*b*) on its moral side the irrational element appears sometimes as the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* (606 D *καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων — καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν κτλ.*), sometimes as a degenerate form of the *θυμοειδές* (604 E, 606 A: cf. *θυμοῦ* 606 D). What is new is the assignment to the *ἀλόγιστον* of a certain quasi-intellectual power—viz. the power of forming false *opinions* (603 A, 605 C); but there was no occasion to raise this point in the earlier psychology, which was intended as a foundation for Plato's theory of the virtues. It becomes necessary to touch upon the question now, because imitative art aims at producing false opinions, and Plato accordingly assigns them to the *ἀλόγιστον*.

602 C 17 **πρὸς Διὸς κτλ.** The logical sequence is "iam vero haec imitatio non solum futilia efficit, sed etiam futilem animi nostri partem afficit" (Schneider). There is a certain awkwardness in making the transitional sentence interrogative in form, but the extreme animation carries it through. We cannot (with Stephanus) cancel *οὐ* and print a colon after *ἀληθείας*, for the interrogation is attested by *πρὸς Διός*.

18 **μέν τί.** *μέν* of course balances *δέ* in *πρὸς δὲ κτλ.*, and *μέντοι* (Stallbaum with some *deterioris notae* MSS) is not so good.

δὴ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχει; Τοῦ ποίου τινὸς πέρι λέγεις; Τοῦ τοιοῦδε. ταὐτόν που ἡμῖν μέγεθος ἐγγύθεν τε καὶ πόρρωθεν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως οὐκ ἴσον φαίνεται. Οὐ γάρ. Καὶ ταὐτὰ καμπύλα τε καὶ εὐθέα ἐν ὕδατί τε θεωμένοις καὶ ἔξω, καὶ κοῖλά τε δὴ καὶ ἐξέχοντα διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ χρώματα
D αὖ πλάνην τῆς ὄψεως, καὶ πᾶσά τις | ταραχὴ δήλη ἡμῖν ἐνοῦσα αὕτη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· ᾧ δὴ ἡμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει, καὶ ἡ θαυματοποιία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τοιαῦται μηχαναί. Ἀληθῆ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἱστάναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ πλέον ἢ βαρύτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογισάμενον καὶ μετρῆσαν ἢ καὶ
E στῆσαν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; | Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ ἔργον. Τούτου γὰρ οὖν. Τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μεῖζω ἄττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἑτέρων ἢ ἴσα τἀναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταὐτά. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν

19. Ita A^1: ab A^2 τω super ποῖον, τὸ pro τῶν scripta legimus. Pro τῶν, quod praebet etiam *q* sed omisit Ξ, legitur in Π τῷ. 25. αὕτη Π: αὐτὴ A.

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22 **καὶ ταὐτὰ καμπύλα τε κτλ.** Nettleship (*Lect. and Rem.* II p. 349 *n.* 2) reminds us that images in water were among Plato's examples of τὰ ἐφ' οἷς εἰκασία ἐστίν in Book VI 510 A: but, as Jackson points out, Plato is here thinking of refraction, and not of reflection.

24 **πᾶσά τις—ψυχῇ.** "πᾶσα cum αὕτη coniungendum et per attractionem pro πᾶν τοῦτο dictum videtur. τις nomini praepositum est ut *Gorg.* p. 522 D αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι" Schneider. For other examples of this sort of attraction see Riddell *Digest* p. 203 § 201. Conjecture is not necessary; but if it were, we could not acquiesce either in αὐτῇ for αὕτη (Richter *Fleck. Jb.* 1867 p. 147, with one MS), or even, I think, in πᾶσι for πᾶσα (Richards). B. D. Turner in his edition of Book X thinks we may translate "and this weakness (πάθημα, as it is afterwards specified) is manifested in our souls as every species of confusion." This solution gives an awkward sense, and is grammatically less easy than Schneider's.

602 D 26 **γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει:** 'leaves no magic art untried.'

27 **τὸ μετρεῖν—ἱστάναι.** Cf. *Euthyph.* 7 B, C, *Prot.* 356 B, *Phil.* 55 E, [περὶ δικαίου] 373 A and Xen. *Mem.* I 1. 9 ἃ ἔξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας ἢ μετρήσαντας ἢ στήσαντας εἰδέναι. See also on IX 587 B.

29 **ἐφάνησαν:** 'were discovered' 'were invented'=ηὑρέθησαν: cf. φανῆναι VII 528 D. The meaning is not 'were found by us to be' etc., as Liebhold supposes (*Fleck. Jb.* 1884 p. 522), and even Krohn, who actually thinks ἐφάνησαν may possibly contain a reference to some 'lost fragment' of the *Republic* (*Pl. St.* p. 252). Grimmelt, in his reply to Krohn, takes nearly the right view (*de comp. et unit.* etc. p. 90 *n.*).

τὸ φαινόμενον—βαρύτερον. 'The *apparently* larger' rules in us when we believe the nearer and smaller of two objects to be larger than a more distant object which measurement shews to be larger. Similarly in the other cases. There is no good reason for adding ἢ κουφότερον after βαρύτερον, as Madvig proposes to do: cf. IV 433 D *n.*

30 **τὸ λογισάμενον κτλ.:** 'that which has counted' etc. For ἢ καί='or if you like' see on 599 A.

602 E 31 **τοῦτό γε κτλ.:** sc. τὸ λογίσασθαι κτλ. In λογιστικοῦ there is a glance at the etymology of the word: cf. VII 525 B *n.*

32 **τούτῳ δὲ—ἅμα περὶ ταὐτά κτλ.**

ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι; Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ' ἔφαμεν. | Τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς 603
τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ μέτρῳ γε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεῦον βέλτιστον ἂν εἴη τῆς ψυχῆς. Τί μήν; Τὸ ἄρα τούτῳ ἐναντιούμενον τῶν φαύλων ἄν τι εἴη ἐν ἡμῖν. Ἀνάγκη. Τοῦτο τοίνυν διομολογήσασθαι βουλόμενος ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὅλως ἡ μιμητικὴ πόρρω μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας ὂν τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, πόρρω δ' αὖ φρονήσεως | ὄντι τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν B
προσομιλεῖ τε καὶ ἑταίρα καὶ φίλη ἐστὶν ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ οὐδ' ἀληθεῖ. Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς. Φαύλη ἄρα φαύλῳ ξυγγιγνομένη φαῦλα γεννᾷ ἡ μιμητική. Ἔοικεν. Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον, ἢ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν, ἣν δὴ ποίησιν ὀνομάζομεν; Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, καὶ ταύτην. Μὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ

11. ἢ καὶ ἡ *q*: ἢ A^1: ἢ καὶ $A^2\Pi\Xi$.

'And to this principle, when it has measured and signifies that some given objects are greater or less than or equal to some others, the contrary appearances are often presented in connexion with the same objects at the same time.' *τἀναντία* is '*the* contrary,' i.e. not 'opposite appearances' in general, but *the* contrary (in any given instance) of the impression formed without the aid of *measurement*: cf. *τἀναντία* in V 453 C, *Euthyph.* 6 A et al. The object A, for example, which is nearer and smaller, appears larger than B: but the *λογιστικόν* discovers after measurement that A is smaller and reports accordingly. We have thus two contrary coexisting impressions of the same object. One of the two impressions belongs to the *λογιστικόν*: does the other also? No, because, as shewn in IV 436 A—C, it is impossible for the same faculty to hold contrary opinions simultaneously in relation to the same objects. Hence the part of soul which *δοξάζει παρὰ τὰ μέτρα* is not the same as that which *δοξάζει κατὰ τὰ μέτρα* (i.e. the *λογιστικόν*). And as the part which believes *λογισμός* (viz. the *λογιστικόν*, cf. 604 D, 605 B) is the best, that which opposes it will be *τῶν φαύλων τι ἐν ἡμῖν*. J. and C. follow Schneider in translating *τῷ αὐτῷ* as instrumental ('with the same faculty to form opposite opinions at the same time'); but it is much more natural to make it the dative with infinitive after *ἀδύνατον*, in view especially of *τὸ—δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς* immediately following. Rightly understood, IV 436 B is also in favour of taking *τῷ αὐτῷ* in this way. For other views of this difficult passage see App. II.

603 A 5 **ἔλεγον**: viz. in *πρὸς Διὸς—ἔχει* 602 C, although Socrates reads more into *πρὸς δὲ δὴ ποῖον—ἔχει* than the mere words by themselves convey.

603 B 7 **τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν κτλ.** See on 602 C.

9 **φαύλη—μιμητική.** Cf. VI 496 A.

11 **ἢ καὶ ἡ.** See *cr. n.* "Inter *ἢ* et *κα* facile *καὶ ἡ* excidere potuit" (Schneider).

603 B—**605** C *If we examine Poetry on its own merits, apart from the sister-art of Painting, we observe that Poetry imitates action. Now in action we often fluctuate between two impulses. When a great calamity befalls us, we are tempted to give way to grief, before the eyes of others; but Law bids us refrain, and try to cure the wound instead of hugging it. That which is best within us readily obeys: whereas the part that tempts us to dwell upon our sorrows is irrational, indolent, cowardly. Yet it is just this peevish, querulous side of human nature which most lends itself to imitation, and whose portrayal in dramatic art the vulgar most readily understand. Poetry is thus the counterpart of Painting; its products are low in point of truth, and it feeds our lower nature. We exclude the Poet from our city on both grounds.*

603 B 12 **μὴ τοίνυν κτλ.** In 605 A Plato seems to think that his procedure

εἰκότι μόνον πιστεύσωμεν ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὸ αὖ
C ἔλθωμεν τῆς | διανοίας τοῦτο, ᾧ προσομιλεῖ ἡ τῆς ποιήσεως μιμη-
τική, καὶ ἴδωμεν, φαῦλον ἢ σπουδαῖόν ἐστιν. Ἀλλὰ χρή. Ὧδε 15
δὴ προθώμεθα· πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικὴ
βιαίους ἢ ἑκουσίας πράξεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ
κακῶς πεπραγέναι καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν ἢ λυπουμένους ἢ χαί-
ροντας. μή τι ἄλλο ἦν παρὰ ταῦτα; Οὐδέν. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐν ἅπασι
D τούτοις ὁμονοητικῶς ἄνθρωπος διάκειται; | ἢ ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν 20
ὄψιν ἐστασίαζεν καὶ ἐναντίας εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δόξας ἅμα περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι στασιάζει τε καὶ μάχεται αὐτὸς
αὑτῷ; ἀναμιμνήσκομαι δέ, ὅτι τοῦτό γε νῦν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἡμᾶς διομο-
λογεῖσθαι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις ἱκανῶς πάντα ταῦτα διωμολο-
γησάμεθα, ὅτι μυρίων τοιούτων ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γιγνομένων 25
ἡ ψυχὴ γέμει ἡμῶν. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Ὀρθῶς γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ'
E ὃ τότε ἀπελίπομεν, | νῦν μοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διεξελθεῖν. Τὸ
ποῖον; ἔφη. Ἀνήρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπιεικὴς τοιᾶσδε τύχης μετασχών,
υἱὸν ἀπολέσας ἤ τι ἄλλο ὧν περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖται, ἐλέγομέν που
καὶ τότε ὅτι ῥᾷστα οἴσει τῶν ἄλλων. Πάνυ γε. Νῦν δέ γε τόδ' 30
ἐπισκεψώμεθα, πότερον οὐδὲν ἀχθέσεται, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἀδύνατον,
μετριάσει δέ πως πρὸς λύπην. Οὕτω μᾶλλον, ἔφη, τό γε ἀληθές. |
604 Τόδε νῦν μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέ· πότερον μᾶλλον αὐτὸν οἴει τῇ λύπῃ

13. πιστεύσωμεν $A^2\Xi$: πιστεύσομεν $A^1\Pi$: πιστεύωμεν *q*. 18. πᾶσιν (sive πᾶσι) ἢ Π: πᾶσιν A^1: πᾶσι A^2. 19. ἦν Ast: ᾗ AΞ: ἢ Π: om. *q*. 28. τύχης Π: ψυχῆς A. 1. τόδε *v*: τὸ δὲ ΑΠΞ: τόδε δὴ *q*.

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in arguing from Painting to Poetry (597 E *n.*) needs a word of explanation and defence. The following argument incidentally furnishes such a defence by deducing from an independent treatment of Poetry the conclusions to which we have already been led by τὸ εἰκὸς ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς.

603 C 15 **ὧδε δή προθώμεθα**: 'let us put it before us in this way.' The object is easily supplied, and in other respects *προτίθεσθαι* is used as in II 375 D, *Phil.* 36 E and elsewhere: so that there is no good reason for suspecting the text. *ὑποθώμεθα* (Richards) has a different and less suitable meaning.

16 **πράττοντας κτλ.** Cf. Aristotle's definition of tragedy as *μίμησις πράξεως κτλ.* (*Poet.* 6. 1449^b 24) and Plato *Laws* 817 A ff. See also Stählin *Stellung d. Poesie* etc. pp. 35 f.

19 **μή τι—ταῦτα**; 'It was nothing beyond this, was it?' I have adopted Ast's conjecture (see *cr. n.*), which Schneider also favours, in preference to omitting ᾖ with *q* and two other MSS, Stallbaum, and Baiter. The imperfect may be a reminiscence of III 399 A—C. The different usages of *μή* with the subjunctive have not yet been thoroughly explained (see *Cl. Rev.* X pp. 150—153, 239—244), but it seems clear that *μή* cannot in interrogative sentences with the 3rd person subjunctive mean 'num,' and the meaning 'perhaps' (as in *μὴ ἀληθὲς ᾖ*) is unsuitable. The only exact parallel to this idiom in Plato is *Parm.* 163 D where Heindorf similarly restores ᾖ, apparently with Waddell's approval. See however on the other hand Goodwin *MT.* p. 93.

603 D 21 **ἐστασίαζεν**. 602 C ff.

24 **τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις**. IV 439 C ff.

603 E 30 **καὶ τότε**. III 387 D, E.

604 A 1 **τόδε**. See *cr. n.* *τὸ δέ*,

μαχεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἀντιτενεῖν, ὅταν ὁρᾶται ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἢ ὅταν ἐν ἐρημίᾳ μόνος αὐτὸς καθ' αὑτὸν γίγνηται; Πολύ που, ἔφη, διοίσει, ὅταν ὁρᾶται. Μονωθεὶς δέ γε, οἶμαι, πολλὰ μὲν τολμήσει φθέγξασθαι, ἃ εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἀκούοι αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν, πολλὰ δὲ ποιήσει, ἃ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτό τινα ἰδεῖν δρῶντα. Οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη.

VI. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀντιτείνειν διακελευόμενον λόγος καὶ νόμος ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ ἕλκον | ἐπὶ τὰς λύπας αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος; Ἀληθῆ. B
Ἐναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς γιγνομένης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα δύο φαμὲν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῷ νόμῳ ἕτοιμον πείθεσθαι, ᾗ ὁ νόμος ἐξηγεῖται; Πῶς; Λέγει που ὁ νόμος, ὅτι κάλλιστον ὅ τι μάλιστα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἐν ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς καὶ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὡς οὔτε δήλου ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν τοιούτων, οὔτε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν

2. ἀντιτενεῖν *q*: ἀντιτείνειν ΑΠΞ. 10. ἐν *q*: om ΑΠΞ.

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though supported by most MSS and retained by Bekker and others, cannot, I think, be right. "Nescias τὸ cum νῦν construendum, an per se pro τοῦτο accipiendum sit. Hoc communi, illud Platonicae loquendi consuetudini repugnat. Contra τόδε offensione caret, et quoniam nexus inter haec et superiora intercedens paullo ante particula δέ post νῦν significatus est, δή—abesse posse videtur" (Schneider).

2 **ἀντιτενεῖν**. See *cr. n.* Schneider and the more conservative editors keep the present; but it is much more difficult to defend such a difference in tense with τε—καί than for example in 601 D. Cf. I 342 A *n.* Stobaeus (*Flor.* 124. 43) has μάχεσθαί τε καὶ ἀντιτείνειν, which may be right.

3 **μόνος** is bracketed by Cobet (*V. L.*² p. 361) and others. Cf. however *Polit.* 307 E αὐτοὶ καθ' αὑτοὺς μόνοι and other examples in Ast *Lex. Plat.* s.v. μόνος.

5 **ποιήσει κτλ.** Richards would write ποιῆσαι, but ποιήσει is much more forcible. The words ἃ—δρῶντα mean 'which he would not like any one to see him do': not "which he would not choose to see another doing" (J. and C.). Cf. ἃ εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἀκούοι αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν. It should be remembered throughout this passage that violent demonstrations of grief did not offend the Greek sense of propriety so much as they offend ours: cf. Bosanquet *Companion* p. 396.

604 B 8 **αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος**: "the affliction itself" (D. and V.): "das Leiden selbst" (Schneider), objectively understood: not "perturbatio" (Ficinus) or "Leidenschaft" (Schleiermacher). See Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 256.

10 **δύο** is of course neuter, but δύο τινέ (*q* Flor. U) hardly makes the gender clearer and ought not to be preferred.

ἐν αὐτῷ. See *cr. n.* αὐτῷ, which Schneider and others retain, has a great preponderance of MS authority, but is not sufficiently precise: for the two principles do not merely belong to the man, but are *in* him: cf. 603 B. This kind of error is a common one in Paris A: see *Introd.* § 5. Morgenstern's conjecture αὐτώ, which Burnet adopts, would refer "ad proxime commemorata πάθος et λόγον, quae diversa et duo esse Socrates iam supra posuit, non nunc demum colligit" (Schneider). φαμέν need not be parenthetical: for εἶναι can be omitted as well as ἐστί, and its presence would have been awkward here, on account of the εἶναι to which δύο is subject. See Schanz *Nov. Comm. Pl.* pp. 33 f.

11 **τῷ νόμῳ**. Richards proposes τῷ λόγῳ in view of λόγος καὶ νόμος above and λογισμῷ 604 D. This conjecture would introduce a false and unpleasing contrast between τῷ λόγῳ and ὁ νόμος. The repetition of ὁ νόμος is for emphasis.

13 **δήλου ὄντος — προβαῖνον**. Cf. *Euthyph.* 4 D and other grammatical parallels in Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 648.

C προβαῖνον τῷ χαλεπῶς φέροντι, οὔτε τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων | ἄξιον 15
ὂν μεγάλης σπουδῆς, ὅ τε δεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅ τι τάχιστα παραγίγνεσθαι
ἡμῖν, τούτῳ ἐμποδὼν γιγνόμενον τὸ λυπεῖσθαι. Τίνι, ἦ δ' ὅς,
λέγεις; Τῷ βουλεύεσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὥσπερ
ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ πράγ-
ματα, ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ προσπταί- 20
σαντας καθάπερ παῖδας ἐχομένους τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ βοᾶν
διατρίβειν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐθίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ὅ τι τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι
D | πρὸς τῷ ἰᾶσθαί τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ πεσόν τε καὶ νοσῆσαν,
ἰατρικῇ θρηνῳδίαν ἀφανίζοντα. Ὀρθότατα γοῦν ἄν τις, ἔφη, πρὸς
τὰς τύχας οὕτω προσφέροιτο. Οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, τὸ μὲν βέλτιστον 25
τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐθέλει ἕπεσθαι. Δῆλον δή. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰς
ἀναμνήσεις τε τοῦ πάθους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὀδυρμοὺς ἄγον καὶ ἀπλή-
στως ἔχον αὐτῶν ἆρ' οὐκ ἀλόγιστόν τε φήσομεν εἶναι καὶ ἀργὸν καὶ
δειλίας φίλον; Φήσομεν μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν πολλὴν μίμησιν
E καὶ ποικίλην | ἔχει, τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν· τὸ δὲ φρόνιμόν τε καὶ 30
ἡσύχιον ἦθος, παραπλήσιον ὂν ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, οὔτε ῥᾴδιον

16. ὅ τε $A^1\Pi$: ὅ τι A^2, sed corr. a manu recenti ὅ τε. 20. αἱρεῖ Ξq: ἐρεῖ A: ἔρρει Π. 21. πληγέντος Π: πλήττοντος A. 23. τῷ (sive τῶ) q: τὸ $A\Pi\Xi$. 24. ἰατρικῇ θρηνῳδίαν Stobaeus (*Flor.* 109. 10) et Plutarchus (*Cons. ad Apoll.* 112 E): ἰατρικὴν θρηνῳδίαν A^2: ἰατρικὴν καὶ θρηνῳδίαν Π et fortasse A^1: θρηνῳδίαν Ξ: ἰατρικῇ τὴν θρηνῳδίαν q. 25. βέλτιστον $A^1\Pi$: βέλτιστόν που A^2. 31. αὐτὸ Ξq et in marg. A^2: om. $A^1\Pi$.

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15 **οὔτε τι κτλ.** The sentiment is repeated and expanded in *Laws* 803 B ff.

604 C 20 **ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ.** Cf. IV 440 B and infra 607 B. The origin of this frequent phrase is, I think, to be sought in the legal rather than, as Schneider supposes, in the military meaning of *αἱρεῖν*. Cf. "voluptatem—convictam superiore libro" in Cic. *de Fin.* III 1. Badham (on *Phil.* 35 D) strangely conjectures that the figure is "borrowed from the draught-board."

ἀλλὰ μὴ προσπταίσαντας κτλ. Cf. (with Stallbaum) Dem. *Phil.* I 40. The curious error *πλήττοντος* for *πληγέντος*, found in several MSS besides A, is perhaps due to a reminiscence of V 469 E.

604 D 23 **πρὸς τῷ ἰᾶσθαι κτλ.** See *cr. n.* In Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s.v. *πρός* it is said that *γίγνεσθαι πρός τι* = "occupatum esse circa aliquid vel in aliquo vel in aliqua re," but no certain examples are given. I agree with the Oxford editors in thinking the dative right as against the accusative, which the German editors retain. Cf. VIII 567 A *n.*

πεσόν. The conjecture *πταῖσαν* (Herwerden *Mn.* XIX p. 340) is worse than unnecessary. *ἀφανίζοντα* agrees of course with the subject of *ἐθίζειν*, which is singular, in spite of *προσπταίσαντας*. We need not (with Apelt *Obs. Cr.* p. 12) write *ἀφανίζοντας* or *ἀφανίζουσαν*: see on I 347 A.

24 **ἰατρικῇ κτλ.** Stallbaum reads *τὴν θρηνῳδίαν* with q (see *cr. n.*). "In dictione poetica articulum etiam minus desidero" (Schneider). The article would be comparatively tame.

26 **τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ** means the *λογισμός* expressed in *λέγει που ὁ νόμος* (B) —*ἀφανίζοντα* (D). Stallbaum was the first to restore *λογισμῷ* (from AΠ etc.) for the *λογιστικῷ* of inferior MSS.

604 E 30 **ἔχει κτλ.** *ἔχει* = *ἐνδέχεται*, as often. The Euripidean drama forcibly illustrates what Plato here says. *τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν* may be regarded as a degenerate variety of the *θυμοειδές*: cf. III 411 A—C and supra 602 C *n.*

μιμήσασθαι οὔτε μιμουμένου εὐπετὲς καταμαθεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ πανηγύρει καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς θέατρα ξυλλεγομένοις. ἀλλοτρίου γάρ που πάθους ἡ μίμησις αὐτοῖς γίγνεται. | Παντάπασι 605
μὲν οὖν. Ὁ δὴ μιμητικὸς ποιητὴς δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκέ τε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν πέπηγεν, εἰ μέλλει εὐδοκιμήσειν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν τε καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος διὰ τὸ εὐμίμητον εἶναι. Δῆλον. Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐπιλαμβανοίμεθα καὶ τιθεῖμεν ἀντίστροφον αὐτὸν τῷ ζωγράφῳ· καὶ γὰρ τῷ φαῦλα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἔοικεν αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ὁμιλεῖν τῆς | ψυχῆς, B
ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, καὶ ταύτῃ ὡμοίωται. καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἂν ἐν δίκῃ οὐ παραδεχοίμεθα εἰς μέλλουσαν εὐνομεῖσθαι πόλιν, ὅτι τοῦτο ἐγείρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ποιῶν ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν, ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει ὅταν τις μοχθηροὺς ἐγκρατεῖς ποιῶν παραδιδῷ τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ χαριεστέρους φθείρῃ. ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς χαριζόμενον καὶ οὔτε τὰ μείζω | οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω διαγιγνώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν C

32. μιμουμένου Π: μιμούμενον A. 3. τε A^1: γε A^2 (sed corr. τε a manu recenti) cum ΠΞ *q*. 11. ποιῶν A^1Π: ποιοῦν A^2. 13. φθείρῃ A^2Ξ: φθείρει A^1Π: φθείροι *q*.

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32 **μιμουμένου.** See *cr. n.* μιμούμενον, if it could be taken as passive, would be better and more pointed; but there is apparently no other example of the present participle of this verb used passively, and we are hardly justified in reasoning from the perfect (μεμιμημένα *Crat.* 425 D) etc. to the present. Schneider thinks μιμούμενον may be active, 'the imitator' being said instead of 'the imitation' ("nor is it easy to understand one who tries to imitate him" J. and C.). But we cannot help feeling that εὐπετές as well as ῥᾴδιον ought to agree with ἦθος. I therefore follow Stallbaum in preferring the genitive absolute μιμουμένου, which has the authority of *q* and several other MSS in addition to Π.

ἄλλως τε—ξυλλεγομένοις. Cf. VI 492 B.

605 A 3 **πέφυκέ τε—πέπηγεν.** It is easy to carry on the negative if we read τε and not γε, which is in all MSS except A^1. πέφυκε πρός, like πεποίηται πρός in 598 B, is here said of the relation of Art to that which it imitates, as appears from ἀλλὰ πρὸς—εὐμίμητον εἶναι. The word πέπηγεν means 'is framed' or 'constructed,' i.q. πεποίηται (598 B): cf. VII 530 D. The infinitive is the old datival infinitive of purpose 'constructed for pleasing' 'to please': see Goodwin *MT.* pp. 297, 310 f. Various unnecessary and unpleasing conjectures have been proposed: the addition of οὐ before τούτῳ (Stephanus), ἡ σοφία αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν πέφυκεν (Cornarius *Ecl.* p. 102): the transposition of πέφυκε and πέπηγεν (Valckenaer on Eur. *Phoen.* 923): and οὐ τοῦ τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν πεπείνηκεν (Richter in *Fleck. Jb.* 1867 p. 147).

4 **εἰ μέλλει—τοῖς πολλοῖς.** See on VI 493 D and cf. Reber *Pl. u. die Poesie* pp. 54—59.

5 **οὐκοῦν δικαίως—ζωγράφῳ.** See on 603 B.

605 B 12 **μοχθηροὺς—πόλιν κτλ.** τούς is not required before μοχθηρούς any more than τούτοις after πόλιν (Herwerden's conjectures in *Mn.* XIX p. 340). With πολιτείαν—ψυχῇ cf. IX 590 E and X 608 B.

μεγάλα ἡγουμένῳ, τοτὲ δὲ σμικρά, εἴδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

VII. Οὐ μέντοι πω τό γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἱκανὴν εἶναι λωβᾶσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων, πάνδεινόν που. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, εἴπερ γε δρᾷ αὐτό; Ἀκούων σκόπει. οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου
D ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν | μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἶσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν

17. εἰδωλοποιοῦντα q^2: εἰδωλοποιοῦντι ΑΠΞ q^1.

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605 C 17 **εἴδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα κτλ.** See *cr. n.* εἰδωλοποιοῦντα seems also to have been the reading of the first hand in Vind. F. The dative εἰδωλοποιοῦντι is retained by Schneider, who makes it agree with τῷ ἀνοήτῳ and regards ἀφεστῶτα as neuter plural. This interpretation, though grammatically tenable, is otherwise unsatisfactory. Plato (in 605 A) has just correlated Poetry with Painting because Poetry also (*a*) produces φαῦλα πρὸς ἀλήθειαν and (*b*) consorts with φαύλόν τι τῆς ψυχῆς. On both grounds, he concludes, Poetry must be proscribed: for (*b*) τοῦτο ἐγείρει—τοτὲ δὲ σμικρά, and (*a*) εἴδωλα εἰδωλοποιεῖ. The chiastic sequence is usual in Plato. If we read εἰδωλοποιοῦντι, Plato assigns only *one* of his two main reasons for the exclusion of Poetry, viz. (*b*), and the correspondence between this and the preceding sentence disappears. On this account Stallbaum and others are, I believe, right in restoring the accusative, and making ἀφεστῶτα, as well as εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, agree with τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητήν. The error—an easy one after διαγιγνώσκοντι and ἡγουμένῳ—affected ἀφεστῶτα also in at least one MS, for Ξ has ἀφεστῶτι.

605 C—**607** A *But the most serious count in our indictment is that Poetry is capable of corrupting, with few exceptions, even men of character and virtue. Tragedy stirs in us just those emotions which we are ashamed to indulge when suffering misfortunes of our own, and the consequence is that we succumb more readily in the hour of trial. The same may be said,* mutatis mutandis, *of comedy also. We shall therefore decline to model our lives after Homer, and refuse to surrender our city to the rule of Pleasure.*

605 C 19 **αὐτῆς.** That is, τῆς ποιήσεως. Cf. VI 503 E *n.*

20 **τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς.** See on 595 B.

605 D 23 **τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων κτλ.** Cf. III 387 D. In ῥῆσιν—κοπτομένους the contrast is between a ῥῆσις or set speech, spoken and not sung, "quales multae in tragoediis, Euripidis praesertim" (Casaubon apud Stallbaum), and κομμοί, which are sung. Hence ἢ καὶ—κοπτομένους, 'or if you like singing and beating the breast,' is perfectly accurate, and we ought not to change καὶ ᾄδοντας into κλάοντας or κλαίοντας (with Ast, Cobet, Baiter) or ᾄδοντας into ἀλύοντας (with Winckelmann). For ἢ καί cf. 599 A *n.* The readings τινὰς—ὄντας—ἀποτείνοντας in *q* and some other MSS are only attempts to obliterate the common irregularity of a singular (τινά etc.) passing into a plural: see on I 347 A. Richards 'suspects' that Plato wrote μιμουμένου—ἀποτείνοντος—κλαίοντος—κοπτομένου. The conjecture is as unnecessary as it is bold.

25 **χαίρομεν κτλ.** Pity, according to Aristotle, as well as Plato, is aroused by Tragedy: see *Poet.* 6. 1449^b 27. With συμπάσχοντες κτλ. cf. Arist. *Pol.* Θ 5. 1340^a 12 ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, and with ἐπαινοῦμεν—διαθῇ *Laws* 800 D ὃς ἂν δακρῦσαι μάλιστα τὴν θύσασαν παραχρῆμα ποιήσῃ πόλιν, οὗτος τὰ νικητήρια φέρει, *Phil.* 48 A τάς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἅμα χαίροντες κλάωσι and *Ion* 535 E. See also on 606 B and III 395 D.

ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅ τι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ. Οἶδα· πῶς δ' οὔ; Ὅταν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τινι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται, ἐννοεῖς αὖ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καλλωπιζόμεθα, ἂν δυνώμεθα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ καρτερεῖν, | ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἀνδρὸς ὄν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ γυναικός, ὃ τότε E ἐπηνοῦμεν. Ἐννοῶ, ἔφη. Ἡ καλῶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ ἔπαινος ἔχει, τὸ ὁρῶντα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα, οἷον ἑαυτόν τις μὴ ἀξιοῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αἰσχύνοιτο ἄν, μὴ βδελύττεσθαι ἀλλὰ χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν. | Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ἐκείνῃ γ' 606 αὐτὸ σκοποίης. Πῇ; Εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο, ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις ξυμφοραῖς καὶ πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρῦσαί τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὂν τοιοῦτον οἷον τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τότ' ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον καὶ χαῖρον· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἅτε οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἀνίησιν τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνώδους τούτου, ἅτε ἀλλότρια | πάθη θεωροῦν, καὶ ἑαυτῷ οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν ὄν, εἰ ἄλλος B ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι ἀκαίρως πενθεῖ, τοῦτον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο κερδαίνειν ἡγεῖται, τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτο αὐτῆς στερηθῆναι καταφρονήσας ὅλου τοῦ ποιήματος. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ὀλίγοις τισὶν μέτεστιν, ὅτι ἀπολαύειν

12. ἀπολαύειν A¹Π: ἀπολλύει ut videtur corr. A².

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606 A 1 **ναὶ κτλ.** It is unreasonable to take pleasure in and praise such exhibitions; for the appetite to which they minister is one which in the case of our own individual misfortunes we are careful to repress. Jackson points out that *ναί* ("ganz recht" Schneider) assents to what Glauco has just said, viz. *οὐκ εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν*, and does not mean *ναί, εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν*, as J. and C. suppose, taking *ναί* as the equivalent of the French *si*.

2 **κατεχόμενον τότε**: viz. *ὅταν οἰκεῖόν τινι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται* (605 D).

5 **τότ' ἐστὶν τοῦτο κτλ.**: 'is on those occasions the part of our nature which the poets satisfy and please.' *τοῦτο* is the subject, and repeats *τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον κτλ.*, while *τὸ—χαῖρον* is in the predicate. A difficulty has been felt because *τότε* now refers to poetical exhibitions, whereas the other *τότε* had a different reference; but the emphatic place of the second adverb seems to place it in opposition to the first, and mistake is made impossible by the presence in the one case of *ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς*, in the other of *ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν*. Cf. also the double reference of *αὖ—αὖ* in 606 C. Madvig conjectures *αὖτ' ἐστι τοῦτο*, Richards *τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό*. I once read *τοῦτό ἐστιν* with *g* and Flor. U, but there is not sufficient reason for deserting the best MSS. On the theory of Tragedy involved in this sentence see 606 B *n*.

7 **τοῦ θρηνώδους τούτου.** See on *τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν* 604 E.

606 B 8 **ἑαυτῷ.** "Plato passes from the rational part of soul to the man himself" J. and C. Hence *καταφρονήσας* below. The antithesis with *ἄλλος ἀνήρ* makes the meaning clear; and a similar transition occurs, as Schneider points out, in VI 486 A: see also note ad loc.

11 **καταφρονήσας—ποιήματος.** He cannot bring himself to despise the whole poem: yet that is the only safe thing to do. From this point of view Plato's own *καταφρόνησις ὅλης τῆς ποιήσεως* is in itself the strongest testimony to the hold which Poetry had on him. See on 595 B.

12 **ἀπολαύειν—οἰκεῖα.** Cf. III 395 C ff. and *Laws* 656 B.

ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα· θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεεινὸν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πάθεσι κατέχειν.
C *Ἀληθέστατα, | ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου,* 15
ὅτι, ἂν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κωμῳδικῇ ἢ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀκούων σφόδρα χαρῇς καὶ μὴ μισῇς ὡς πονηρά, ταὐτὸν ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις; ὃ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ αὖ κατεῖχες ἐν σαυτῷ βουλόμενον γελωτοποιεῖν, φοβούμενος δόξαν βωμολοχίας, τότ' αὖ ἀνίης καὶ ἐκεῖ νεανικὸν ποιήσας ἔλαθες πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις 20

16. ἄν Schneider: ἄν codd. 17. μὴ μισῇς A^2: μιμήσῃς (*sic*) Π et nisi fallor A^1: μιμήσῃ Ξ: οὐ μιμήσεις *q*. 20. ἀνίης Ξ*q*: ἂν εἴης A: ἀνείης Π.

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13 **θρέψαντα—κατέχειν.** Plato and Aristotle agree in holding that Pity is one of the principal emotions to which Tragedy ministers. The point at which they part company is where they begin to discuss the effect produced upon human life and conduct by the indulgence of this emotion in the mimicry of the stage. According to Plato, the emotion grows by what it feeds upon, and becomes more and more troublesome and deleterious in real life, the more we indulge it at the theatre: according to Aristotle, tragedy effects the 'purgation' of pity and its kindred emotions and tends to free us from their dominion in matters of more serious moment (*Poet.* 6. 1449^b 27 et al.). Aristotle hopes to effect by means of theatrical stimulation what Plato would attain by starving the emotions even in play. It is obvious that the Aristotelian theory of the drama was in this important respect developed in direct and conscious antagonism to the Platonic, to which, in other particulars, it owes much: see Finsler *Platon u. die Arist. Poetik* pp. 96 ff. I think it may fairly be argued that Plato's view is not less true to experience than that of Aristotle; for a spectacle which 'purges' the *ἐλεεινόν* in one man may strengthen it in another and make him more than ever inclined to self-pity. On the contrast between the Platonic and Aristotelian views see Butcher *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry*^{2} etc. pp. 237—268, especially 241 f., and for Aristotle's debt to Plato in his definition of tragedy consult the excellent essay of Siebeck *Zur Katharsisfrage* in his *Unters. zur Phil. d. Gr.* pp. 165—180.

14 **ἐλεεινόν.** *ἐλεεινός* and not *ἐλεινός* is the Platonic form of this word: see Schanz *Phaedo* p. VII.

606 C 15 **ἆρ' οὐχ κτλ.** Cf. III 388 E.

16 **ὅτι κτλ.**: lit. 'that whatever jests you would be ashamed to make yourself, but which you are mightily pleased to hear in comic representations, or it may be in private life, and do not hate as bad, you do the same thing' etc. 'Whatever' is treated as equivalent to 'if any': see Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 945. I have followed Schneider in writing *ἄν* or *ἃ ἄν* instead of *ἄν* (see *cr. n.*), although he gives no other instance where *ἄν* appears to do double duty in this fashion. The usage, however, ought not on that account to be pronounced impossible; for cases in which a single relative pronoun forms, as here, the object of two opposing clauses, one representing a hypothetical, the other an actual situation, are extremely rare. We should also remember that *ὅς* is occasionally used instead of *ὅς ἄν* with the subjunctive, even in classical prose, according to the best MSS: e.g. *Laws* 737 B: see also Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 206. A sentence like the present is made easier by the mere existence of such an exceptional liberty of style. For the corruption of *ἄν* to *ἂν* cf. (with Schneider) *Gorg.* 486 E. All other attempts at emendation—and they are numerous—involve too much change: see App. III.

17 **ἰδίᾳ**: i.e. "intra privatos parietes et ab iis, qui artem non profitentur" (Schneider). The word has been held to refer to writings in prose: but see on II 363 E.

18 **αὖ κατεῖχες.** *αὖ* is "item, ut antea *θρηνῶδες*" (Stallbaum). Madvig's conjecture *ἄν* should not be adopted. The second *αὖ* (*τότ' αὖ*) points the contrast between *κατεῖχες* and *ἀνίης*: cf. 606 A *n.*

ἐξενεχθεὶς ὥστε κωμῳδοποιὸς γενέσθαι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. | Καὶ περὶ D
ἀφροδισίων δὴ καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν τε
καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ ἡδέων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἃ δή φαμεν πάσῃ πράξει ἡμῖν
ἕπεσθαι, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιητικὴ μίμησις ἐργάζεται; τρέφει
γὰρ ταῦτα ἄρδουσα, δέον αὐχμεῖν, καὶ ἄρχοντα ἡμῖν καθίστησιν,
δέον ἄρχεσθαι αὐτά, ἵνα βελτίους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἀντὶ
χειρόνων καὶ ἀθλιωτέρων γιγνώμεθα. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως φάναι, ἢ
δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅταν | ἘΟμήρου ἐπαινέταις E
ἐντύχῃς λέγουσιν, ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητὴς
καὶ πρὸς διοίκησίν τε καὶ παιδείαν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων
ἄξιος ἀναλαβόντι μανθάνειν τε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ποιητὴν πάντα
τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον κατασκευασάμενον ζῆν, | φιλεῖν μὲν χρὴ καὶ 607
ἀσπάζεσθαι ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύνανται, καὶ συγχω-
ρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν,
εἰδέναι δέ, ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς
ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν

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606 D 21 **καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων κτλ.** Cf. III 389 D ff., and (for the psychological theory of this passage) supra 602 C *n.* *ὅτι*, which depends on *ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος*, is easy enough if we retain *ὅτι* in C: cf. VI 510 D *οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι κτλ.* and infra 613 D *καὶ αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ὅτι κτλ.* Otherwise *ὅτι* becomes extremely difficult, although Stallbaum and Neukirch (in *Pl. Pol. quaest. phil.* I p. 49) think that *ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστίν* may even then be supplied. The word was accordingly suspected by Ast and bracketed by Baiter. Madvig conjectures *ἔτι*, and Richards would replace *ὅτι τοιαῦτα* by *ἕτερα τοιαῦτα* or *οὐ τὰ αὐτά* (understood interrogatively). The recurrence of *ὅτι* is, however, the strongest evidence in favour of its genuineness both here and above. See App. III. The pronoun *τοιαῦτα* takes its meaning from *ἀφροδισίων* etc. The note of interrogation after *ἐργάζεται* was added by Schneider. On *ἄρδουσα* see VIII 550 B *n.*

606 E 28 **Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέταις.** Dümmler and Stählin suppose that Plato has Antisthenes in his mind: but see on 598 D.

31 **ἄξιος.** Campbell was the first to point out that *ἄξιος*, and not *ἄξιον*, is the reading of Paris A. There is no MS authority of any kind for *ἄξιον*, and it is intrinsically much inferior.

607 A 3 **πρωτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν.** See on 595 C.

4 **ὕμνους—ἀγαθοῖς.** In *Laws* 801 E—802 A the same exceptions are allowed. Even religious hymns would fall under the heading of *μίμησις*, according to Plato's definition of the term: so that it is once more clear that his real quarrel is not with Imitation as such, but only with Imitation of the false and immoral. See on 595 A. For the construction cf. (with Stallbaum) *Symp.* 194 D *τοῦ ἐγκωμίου τῷ Ἔρωτι.* In pp. 55—59 of his *Stellung d. Poesie in der plat. Phil.* Stählin gives an interesting sketch of the kind of Poetry which Plato would have admitted in the *Republic*.

5 **ἡδυσμένην.** The same word is used by Aristotle in a narrower sense, with specific reference to what he considers the *ἡδύσματα* or seasoning of poetry, viz. metre and melody: see Butcher *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry*[2] etc. p. 146 *n.* 1. Here *ἡδυσμένην* points the way to *ἡδονή*; and for that reason 'pleasurable' is a more suitable translation than 'honeyed' (Jowett) or 'highly-seasoned' (D. and V.), although the epithet also suggests a comparison with cookery (cf. *ὄψον ἡδῦναι Theaet.* 175 E). For the sentiment cf. III 398 A f. *αὐτοὶ δ' ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδεστέρῳ ποιητῇ χρῴμεθα κτλ.*

παραδέξει ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. |

B VIII. Ταῦτα δή, ἔφην, ἀπολελογήσθω ἡμῖν ἀναμνησθεῖσιν περὶ ποιήσεως, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα τότε αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπε- 10
στέλλομεν τοιαύτην οὖσαν· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἤρει. προσείπωμεν δὲ αὐτῇ, μὴ καί τινα σκληρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν καταγνῷ, ὅτι παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ. καὶ γὰρ ἡ

9. ἀπολελογήσθω Ξq: ἀπολελογίσθω ΑΠ. 13. ποιητικῇ A¹Π: μιμητικῇ corr. A².

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7 τοῦ κοινῇ—λόγου: 'the principle which the community shall in every instance have pronounced to be the best.' See 604 B—D, where one example of such a λόγος is provided. For λόγος in this sense cf. (with Schneider) *Crit.* 46 B ἐγὼ—ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. In his second edition Ast wished to place a comma after βελτίστου ('that which has ever been judged best by all, viz. reason'). This interpretation lends a certain weight and dignity to the clause; but the other is easier and more natural. Cf. Shorey in *A. J. Ph.* XIII pp. 364 ff. Plato elsewhere provides against what he takes to be the antinomian tendency of Poetry by enacting that the Poet shall παρὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως νόμιμα καὶ δίκαια ἢ καλὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἄλλο, and submit all his works to a state censorship (*Laws* 801 C, D), although in a striking passage of the *Politicus* (299 B, E) he himself insists that freedom is the very life of poetry and every other art. See Reber *Platon u. die Poesie* p. 71.

607 B—608 B *The quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry is nothing new; but, for our own part, we are willing to let Poetry return, as soon as she is proved to be not merely pleasant, but profitable. Till then, we shall use our argument as a charm to protect ourselves against her fascinations; for the issue at stake is greater than it appears.*

607 B 9 ἀπολελογήσθω κτλ. See *cr. n.* The reading ἀπολελογίσθω—*enumerata sunto* or, according to Hermann, *singulatim exputata sunto*—though retained by Hermann and Baiter, is much less appropriate than ἀπολελογήσθω: for the whole of the preceding episode is an ἀπολογία or defence of Plato's attitude towards Poetry in Books II and III (595 A *n.*). ἀπολελογήσθω is also more in accordance with ὅτι εἰκότως ἀπεστέλλομεν: and the words ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἤρει "non tam eorum sunt, qui ius suum exsequi, quam qui excusare se valuerunt" (Schneider). The corruption, which recurs infra 607 D in Π, is by no means rare: see Stephanus-Hase s.v. ἀπολογίζομαι. See also on VI 490 A. On ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἤρει see 604 C *n.* προσείπωμεν δὲ αὐτῇ='let us tell her also.' With this use of προσειπεῖν cf. II 375 E *n.*

13 παλαιὰ — ποιητικῇ. There are few traces of this 'ancient feud' in the extant fragments of early Greek poetry. Pindar furnishes one, *Fr.* 209 ed. Bergk, ἀτελῆ σοφίας καρπὸν δρέπειν (said of the φυσιολογοῦντες: see above on V 457 B). The early philosophers on the other hand were constantly falling foul of Homer, Hesiod and the poets generally on theological and moral grounds: see for example Heraclitus *Fr.* 35, 43, 111, 119 Bywater, and Xenophanes and Empedocles in RP.⁷ §§ 82, 83, 140 A—140 D. The attitude of Pythagoras was equally hostile, if we may trust Hieronymus ap. D. L. VIII 21. Even those philosophers who defended Homer did not venture to take him at his word, but had resort to the allegorical method of interpretation (II 378 D *n.*). The antagonism between Philosophy and Poetry—the latter "immortalising in imperishable creations the traditional faith, the former, just on account of that faith, condemning those creations" Krohn (*Pl. St.* p. 261)—was appreciated in its true historical significance by those Christian apologists who, like Clement, make philosophy a προπαιδεία to Christianity—ἐπαιδαγώγει γὰρ καὶ

λακέρυζα πρὸς δεσπόταν κύων ἐκείνη κραυγάζουσα, καὶ
15 μέγας ἐν ἀφρόνων κενεαγορίαισι, καὶ ὁ τῶν λίαν σοφῶν
| ὄχλος κράτων, καὶ οἱ λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες ὅτι ἄρα πένονται, C
καὶ ἄλλα μυρία σημεῖα παλαιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως τούτων· ὅμως δὲ

15. λίαν Herwerden: δία A. 16. κράτων nos: κρατῶν codd.

αὐτὴ τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, ὡς ὁ νόμος τοὺς Ἑβραίους, εἰς Χριστόν. προπαρασκευάζει τοίνυν ἡ φιλοσοφία, προοδοποιοῦσα κτλ. (*Strom.* I 5. 718 D, 720 A. Cf. Spiess *Logos Spermatikos* pp. 3—5).

καὶ γὰρ—πένονται. The sources of these quotations has not been discovered. They are all from poets, as Schneider holds; but we ought not to take παλαιά too strictly, and infer from it that all of them are very old. Plato's main object is to make out that his quarrel with Poetry is nothing new, for Poetry and Philosophy have quarrelled from the earliest times; and it is therefore inherently probable that the quotations are of very different dates. There is no *a priori* reason why some of them should not be from the contemporary drama; but some of them should be older; and those who refer them all to comedy, such as Ast, Prantl, and Heine (*de rat. quae Pl. c. poet. Gr. intercedit* p. 50 *n.* 4), can hardly be right. Still less is Pflugk justified in citing them as expressions of the indignation which, according to his own chorizontic views, Books II and III had aroused in comic poets (*Zur Lösung* etc. p. 34).

ἡ λακέρυζα—κραυγάζουσα. Cf. *Laws* 967 C, D καὶ δὴ καὶ λοιδορήσεις γε ἐπῆλθον ποιηταῖς, τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας κυσὶ ματαίαις ἀπεικάζοντας χρωμέναισιν ὑλακαῖς. The occasion which provoked this assault upon philosophy was—so Plato tells us—the atheistic teaching of Anaxagoras and his followers about the celestial bodies. Here the λακέρυζα κύων represents of course φιλοσοφία: but (in view of the passage in the *Laws*) it would be unsafe to identify δεσπόταν with Poetry. Probably the quotation is from some lyric poet.

15 **μέγας—κενεαγορίαισι** is presumably also a lyrical fragment, directed against some notable philosopher, or less probably against some philosophical figment "cuius modi Δῖνος in Nubibus Aristophanis est" (Schneider).

ὁ—κράτων: 'the rabble-rout of all-too-sapient heads.' I have combined Herwerden's conjecture ΛΙΑ for ΔΙΑ with my own suggestion κράτων (from κράς) instead of κρατῶν (*Cl. Rev.* X p. 105). τῶν λίαν σοφῶν ὄχλος | κράτων looks like a tragic fragment, and a comparison with *Med.* 305 εἰμὶ δ' οὐκ ἄγαν σοφή and *Hipp.* 518, *El.* 296 γνώμην ἐνεῖναι τοῖς σοφοῖς λίαν σοφήν, suggests that the author is Euripides: cf. also VIII 568 A *n.* The head stands for the whole personality, as in the familiar use of κάρα and κεφαλή in Tragedy and elsewhere (πολλὰς ἰφθίμους κεφαλὰς Ἄιδι προΐαψεν *Il.* II. 55 ἡ μιαρὰ κεφαλὴ αὕτη Dem. *Cor.* 153 et al.: see Blaydes on Ar. *Ach.* 285); and a learned poet like Euripides might the more readily have described philosophers by this feature, because the head, and not the heart or midriff, was believed to be the seat of intelligence not only by Hippocrates, but also by many of the philosophers themselves, including Pythagoras, Alcmaeo, Democritus and Plato: see Diels *Dox. Gr.* pp. 391[a] 3, 391[b] 5, 392[a] 2, 427[a] 8, Zeller[5] I p. 448 and Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* I pp. 148, 313. There are also, I think, traces of a similar view even in popular beliefs: see for example Ar. *Clouds* 1275 f. οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως σύ γ' αὐτὸς ὑγιαίνεις. Τί δαί; | Τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ὥσπερ σεσεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖς. For other views of this passage see App. IV.

607 C 16 **οἱ λεπτῶς—πένονται:** 'the subtle thinkers, how that they are beggars after all.' This quotation is probably from comedy, which abounds in references to μεριμνοφροντισταί, λεπτολόγοι etc. (cf. Ar. *Clouds* 101, 153 al.), and constantly ridicules the poverty and destitution of οἱ σοφοί: see the passages quoted in my edition of the *Apology*, pp. VIII f. There is nothing in the language to justify Schneider in attributing the fragment to a lyrical poet. A MS note in my copy of Schneider cites the proverb λεπτὴν πλέκειν· λεγόμενόν τι ἐπὶ τῶν πενήτων from Photius (p. 215. 12).

εἰρήσθω, ὅτι ἡμεῖς γε, εἴ τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ μίμησις, ὡς χρὴ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐνομουμένῃ, ἄσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, ὡς ξύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. D ἦ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλεῖ ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ σύ, καὶ μάλιστα | ὅταν δι' Ὁμήρου θεωρῇς αὐτήν; Πολύ γε. Οὐκοῦν δικαία ἐστὶν οὕτω κατιέναι, ἀπολογησαμένη ἐν μέλει ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ μέτρῳ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Δοῖμεν δέ γέ που ἂν καὶ τοῖς προστάταις αὐτῆς, ὅσοι μὴ ποιητικοί, φιλοποιηταὶ δέ, ἄνευ μέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν· καὶ εὐμενῶς ἀκουσόμεθα. κερδανοῦμεν E γάρ που, ἐὰν μὴ μόνον ἡδεῖα | φανῇ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη. Πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλομεν, ἔφη, κερδαίνειν; Εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ὥσπερ οἱ ποτέ του ἐρασθέντες, ἐὰν ἡγήσωνται μὴ ὠφέλιμον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, βίᾳ μέν, ὅμως δὲ ἀπέχονται, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως, διὰ τὸν ἐγγεγονότα μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τοιαύτης ποιήσεως ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν καλῶν 608 πολιτειῶν τροφῆς | εὖνοι μὲν ἐσόμεθα φανῆναι αὐτὴν ὡς βελτίστην καὶ ἀληθεστάτην, ἕως δ' ἂν μὴ οἵα τ' ᾖ ἀπολογήσασθαι, ἀκροασόμεθ' αὐτῆς ἐπᾴδοντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὃν λέγομεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπῳδήν, εὐλαβούμενοι πάλιν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τὸν παιδικόν τε καὶ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα. ἀκροασόμεθα δ' οὖν, ὡς

20. καταδεχοίμεθα A¹Π: κατα punctis notavit A². 24. ἀπολογησαμένη A¹Ξ *q*: ἀπολογησομένη A²: ἀπολογισαμένη Π. μέτρῳ ΑΠ: *γρ* τρόπῳ in marg. A². 5. ἀκροασόμεθα nos: αἰσθόμεθα ΑΠ: αἰσθώμεθα Ξ: εἰσόμεθα *q*.

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20 **καταδεχοίμεθα.** *καταδέχεσθαι* is 'to receive home from exile': cf. *κατιέναι* below. *δεχοίμεθα*, which Baiter reads on insufficient authority, is much less expressive and appropriate.

ξύνισμέν γε κτλ. See on 595 B.

607 D 24 **ἀπολογησαμένη.** Plato is hardly likely to let Poetry return on the promise of an *ex post facto* ἀπολογία: she must surely make good her defence before the decree of banishment can be repealed. Hence *ἀπολογησαμένη*, which Schneider and the Oxford editors adopt, is right as against the *ἀπολογησομένη* of A² and a few inferior MSS (followed by Bekker and others).

607 E 30 **εἰ δέ γε κτλ.** The words from *γε μή* to *φανῆ[ναι]* have been found on one of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri, without any difference from the text of A except *οὕτω* for *οὕτως* and *ἐνγεγονότα* for *ἐγγεγονότα* (Grenfell and Hunt, Vol. I p. 52).

33 **τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν.** Ξ has *καλῶν* for *καλῶν*, oblivious of the irony.

608 A 5 **ἀκροασόμεθα δ' οὖν κτλ.** 'We shall listen, I say, in the conviction that this kind of poetry should not be taken seriously' etc. A majority of MSS, including A and Π, read *αἰσθόμεθα* instead of *ἀκροασόμεθα* (see *cr. n.*): but the present *αἴσθομαι* was not used in classical Greek, as Stallbaum successfully proves in his elaborate note (cf. also Kühner-Blass *Gr. Gr.* I 2. p. 354), and if it were, the meaning would still be unsuitable. Neither of the two variants, *αἰσθώμεθα* and *εἰσόμεθα* has any great MS authority, or is at all likely to be right. I formerly adopted Madvig's conjecture *ᾀσόμεθα*, which is in harmony with the Greek tendency to drop the preposition in repeating the

οὐ σπουδαστέον ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ποιήσει ὡς ἀληθείας τε ἁπτομένῃ καὶ σπουδαίᾳ, ἀλλ' εὐλαβητέον αὐτὴν ὃν τῷ ἀκροωμένῳ, περὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείας δεδιότι, καὶ νομιστέα ἅπερ εἰρήκαμεν περὶ B
ποιήσεως. Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ξύμφημι. Μέγας γάρ, ἔφην, ὁ
10 ἀγών, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε τιμῇ ἐπαρθέντα οὔτε χρήμασιν οὔτε ἀρχῇ οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ ἄξιον ἀμελῆσαι δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς. Ξύμφημί σοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ὀντινοῦν.

15 IX. Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς καὶ C
προκείμενα ἆθλα οὐ διεληλύθαμεν. Ἀμήχανόν τι, ἔφη, λέγεις μέγεθος, εἰ τῶν εἰρημένων μείζω ἐστὶν ἄλλα. Τί δ' ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

6. ἁπτομένῃ Π: ἁπτομένη A.

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idea of a compound verb (*ἐπᾴδοντες* and *ἐπῳδήν*, but *ᾄσόμεθα*), and suits the situation fairly well, if we regard *ὡς οὐ σπουδαστέον—δεδιότι* as virtually embodying the *ἐπῳδή* of which Plato speaks and depending directly on *ᾄσόμεθα* ('we will say over to ourselves that' etc.). *ᾄσόμεθα* is both a better and an easier remedy than Stallbaum's *αἰσθανόμεθα*, but the objections to it are that it involves the rejection of *οὖν*, for the "participial clause *εὐλαβούμενοι—ἔρωτα* is hardly enough to justify the resumptive *δ' οὖν*" (J. and C.), and also the rejection of *ὅν* after *εὐλαβητέον αὐτήν* (with Stallbaum and Baiter). For the omission of *οὖν*, we have the authority of Π and several MSS besides: but *ὅν* is in all the MSS except *v* and Flor. RT. (Vind. F has *δν*.) The suggestion *ἀφεξόμεθα*, which Campbell appears disposed to make, has little probability. *ἀκροασόμεθα* seems to me to give exactly the meaning which we require without involving any further change in the reading of the best MSS. I have printed my conjecture because I think it more probable than any other; but it involves too much departure from the MSS to be considered certain. For the sentiment cf. 595 B *n.*

6 **τῇ τοιαύτῃ ποιήσει**: viz. the *ἡδυσμένη* Μοῦσα of 607 A. The emphasis on *τῇ τοιαύτῃ* implies that there is another sort of Poetry which Plato would not exclude. See on 595 A and 607 A.

7 **εὐλαβητέον—ὄν.** *ὅν* is omitted by Stallbaum and Baiter (with *v* and two Florentine MSS). The word must, I think, be rejected, if we read *αἰσθόμεθα*, *αἰσθανόμεθα*, or *ᾄσόμεθα*: for with each of these verbs *ὡς—δεδιότι* must be regarded as the direct object of the verb: but with the reading *ἀκροασόμεθα* there is no difficulty about *ὅν*. The meaning is 'We will listen, I say, in the belief that such poetry etc., and that the listener must be on his guard against it' etc.

608 B 8 **τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείας.** See 605 B *n.*

11 **οὔτε—οὐδέ γε.** Cf. VI 499 B *n.*

608 C, D. *The greatest rewards of virtue have still to be described. We will first prove that the soul is immortal.*

608 C 15 **καὶ μὴν κτλ.** The main thesis of the *Republic*—that Justice alone and by itself is better than Injustice alone and by itself—was finally demonstrated in Book IX. But Justice and Injustice do also, in point of fact, involve consequences: and it is necessary to take these into account, if we are to make the comparison between Virtue and Vice in all respects perfect and complete. Cf. 612 B *n.*

17 **τῶν εἰρημένων.** Nettleship (*Lect. and Rem.* II p. 355) thinks *τῶν εἰρημένων* can only refer to 'the rewards of justice on earth,' in which case we must suppose that this passage and the argument for Immortality which it introduces were written by Plato after 612 A—613 E, where he describes the rewards of virtue and vice while we are still alive. But there is no

ἔν γε ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ μέγα γένοιτο; πᾶς γὰρ οὗτός γε ὁ ἐκ παιδὸς μέχρι πρεσβύτου χρόνος πρὸς πάντα ὀλίγος πού τις ἂν εἴη. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; οἴει ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ το- 20
D σούτου δεῖν χρόνου ἐσπουδακέναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ | ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός; Οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο λέγεις; Οὐκ ἤσθησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυται; καὶ ὃς ἐμβλέψας μοι καὶ θαυμάσας εἶπε· Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε· σὺ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχεις λέγειν; Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γ', ἔφην. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ σύ· οὐδὲν 25 γὰρ χαλεπόν. Ἐμοιγ', ἔφη· σοῦ δ' ἂν ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμι τὸ οὐ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο. Ἀκούοις ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Λέγε μόνον, ἔφη.

21. οὐχ Π et in marg. A^2: om A^1.

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reason why *τῶν εἰρημένων* should not, like *ἐκείνοις* in 612 B, refer to what Plato in 614 A calls 'those goods which Justice by herself supplied' (*ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οἷς αὐτὴ παρείχετο ἡ δικαιοσύνη*): and it is much more natural to assign this meaning to *τῶν εἰρημένων* than to suppose 'that Plato had two plans in his mind as to how to finish the *Republic*.' I can find no sufficient evidence to justify any such idea.

18 **πᾶς γὰρ—ἂν εἴη.** Cf. VI 486 A. Stallbaum follows Bekker in reading *πρὸς τὸν πάντα* with *q* and Flor. U, comparing VI 498 D, *οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός* below and *Phaed.* 107 C. "Videtur—*πᾶς* ad universum tempus, quod omnino dicitur, ab illo verbis *πᾶς οὗτος* etc. significato distinguendum sufficere, ac nescio an consulto scriptor, quum priorem *πάντα χρόνον* necessario definisset, hunc plane infinitum exhibuerit" (Schneider). Cf. Walbe *Synt. Plat. spec.* p. 26.

608 D 22 **οἶμαι ἔγωγε**: sc. *ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς δεῖν ἐσπουδακέναι*. Cf. I 336 E *n.* and App. ad loc.

οὐκ ἤσθησαι κτλ. 'Have you not observed' etc. The light and airy tone with which Plato introduces this momentous topic has often been remarked upon; and we can hardly help feeling that *οὐδὲν γὰρ χαλεπόν* is too audacious to be taken seriously, in spite of Plato's immoveable conviction of the immortality of the soul (see on VI 498 D). The doctrine itself had of course long been an article of the Orphic and Pythagorean creeds (see Rohde *Psyche*[2] II pp. 1 ff. and Laudowicz *Präexistenz d. Seele u. Seelenwand. in Gr. Phil.* pp. 1—29), and we must not suppose (with Thomas Gray) that it is the novelty of the idea which occasions Glauco's wonder. Glauco regards the originally half-theological doctrine of the immortality of the Soul with the same sort of well-bred incredulity which it inspired in most of Plato's contemporaries (cf. VI 498 D with I 330 D, E and *Phaed.* 69 E, 70 A, 80 D), and is astonished that a well-balanced mind should treat it seriously as a philosophical dogma capable of being established by rational argument.

25 **εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε.** See on IV 430 D.

608 D—**611** A *Everything, which suffers destruction, is destroyed by its own peculiar evil or disease, and that which cannot be destroyed thereby is indestructible. Now the evil which is peculiar to the soul is vice, and vice is powerless to slay the soul. We must beware of supposing that the soul is destroyed by bodily disease, unless it can be proved that bodily disease engenders within the soul its own specific evil; and if any one has the boldness to assert that the souls of the dying do actually become more vicious, he must be prepared to shew that vice, alone and by itself, is fatal to its possessor, which is far from being true. Vice would lose its terrors if death were the end of all things. We conclude that the soul is immortal, since neither its own nor any alien evil can destroy it.*

608 D ff. Socrates has already expressed his belief in the immortality of the soul in VI 498 D: cf. also ib. 496 E and I 330 D, E. The proof which Plato gives here has been widely discussed and severely, though often unfairly and unintelligently, criticised by many critics, to some of whom reference is made in the

Ἀγαθόν τι, εἶπον, καὶ κακὸν καλεῖς; Ἔγωγε. | Ἆρ' οὖν E
ὥσπερ ἐγὼ περὶ αὐτῶν διανοεῖ; Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ μὲν ἀπολλύον
καὶ διαφθεῖρον πᾶν τὸ κακὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ σῷζον καὶ ὠφελοῦν τὸ
ἀγαθόν. Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Τί δέ; κακὸν ἑκάστῳ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν λέγεις;
οἷον ὀφθαλμοῖς | ὀφθαλμίαν καὶ ξύμπαντι τῷ σώματι νόσον σίτῳ 609
τε ἐρυσίβην σηπεδόνα τε ξύλοις, χαλκῷ δὲ καὶ σιδήρῳ ἰόν, καί,
ὅπερ λέγω, σχεδὸν πᾶσι ξύμφυτον ἑκάστῳ κακόν τε καὶ νόσημα;
Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν τῷ τι τούτων προσγένηται, πονηρόν
τε ποιεῖ ᾧ προσεγένετο, καὶ τελευτῶν ὅλον διέλυσεν καὶ ἀπώλεσεν;
Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τὸ ξύμφυτον ἄρα κακὸν ἑκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρία
ἕκαστον ἀπόλλυσιν, ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπολεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο γε αὐτὸ
ἔτι | διαφθείρειεν. οὐ γὰρ τό γε ἀγαθὸν μή ποτέ τι ἀπολέσῃ, οὐδὲ B
αὖ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθόν. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη. Ἐὰν ἄρα τι
εὑρίσκωμεν τῶν ὄντων, ᾧ ἔστι μὲν κακόν, ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ μοχθηρόν,
τοῦτο μέντοι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτὸ λύειν ἀπολλύον, οὐκ ἤδη εἰσόμεθα,

30. τὸ δὲ $A^2\Pi$: om. A^1. 31. ἔγωγ' $A^1\Pi$: ἔγωγέ τοὐτό γ' ἔφη A^2. τι καὶ Π: τί A^1: τί δὲ καὶ A^2.

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course of the notes. Plato does not stop to define what he means by 'soul,' nor the different senses in which he employs the word 'death,' and the consequence is that superficial inspection of his reasoning often sees a fallacy where there is only an ellipse. The best preparation for a study of this argument is a careful examination of the proofs in the *Phaedo*, to which Plato himself appears expressly to allude in 611 B: see note ad loc. It will be easier to understand the reasoning of Plato if we bear in mind the following considerations. (1) The duality of soul and body is assumed throughout the whole discussion. (2) It is the individual immortality of the soul which Plato wishes to prove. (In his excellent monograph *Unsterblichkeitslehre Plato's*, Halle, 1878, Bertram appears to me to have conclusively and once for all established this point as against Teichmüller *Die Plat. Fr.* pp. 1—23. Cf. Simson *Der Begriff d. Seele bei Plato* pp. 126—143). (3) The conception of soul as the principle of life, though not expressly enunciated here, is present to Plato's mind (609 D *n.*). The question whether immortality (in the fullest sense of the term) belongs to the entire soul, or only to part of it, is not raised in the course of the proof itself, but from 611 B—612 A, it would seem that the λογιστικόν alone is indestructible (611 B *n.*). At each successive incarnation the λογιστικόν is defiled *ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας*, and (according to *Phaed.* 81 B ff.) the pollution frequently adheres even after death, causing the soul to seek re-incarnation. The ultimate aim is apparently to be delivered from bodily existence altogether, and live *ἄνευ σωμάτων τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον* (*Phaed.* 114 C), but even then the soul would not—so at least I think—seem to Plato to lose its essential individuality and become absorbed. See on the whole subject Simson l.c. pp. 144—154 and cf. 611 B *n.*

608 E 31 **κακὸν—λέγεις;** Richards would add *ἴδιον* or *οἰκεῖον* after *λέγεις*, comparing (for *ἴδιον*) 610 B, and (for *οἰκεῖον*) 609 C, 610 E. It is easy to understand *εἶναι*: 'do you say that each thing has a particular evil and a particular good?' See Schanz *Nov. Comm. Pl.* p. 33.

609 A 5 **διέλυσεν καὶ ἀπώλεσεν.** Throughout this argument, as throughout the *Phaedo*, destruction means dissolution (*διάλυσις*).

6 **τὸ ξύμφυτον κτλ.** The words *ἑκάστου* and *ἀπολεῖ* are bracketed by Herwerden, quite undeservedly. For the statement itself see on 609 E.

ὅτι τοῦ πεφυκότος οὕτως ὄλεθρος οὐκ ἦν; Οὕτως, ἔφη, εἰκός. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ψυχῇ ἆρ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν κακήν; Καὶ
C μάλα, ἔφη· ἃ νῦν δὴ διῆμεν πάντα, ἀδικία τε καὶ | ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀμαθία. Ἡ οὖν τι τούτων αὐτὴν διαλύει τε καὶ ἀπόλ- 15
λυσι; καὶ ἐννόει μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν οἰηθέντες τὸν ἄδικον ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀνόητον, ὅταν ληφθῇ ἀδικῶν, τότε ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, πονηρίας οὔσης ψυχῆς. ἀλλ' ὧδε ποίει· ὥσπερ σῶμα ἡ σώματος πονηρία νόσος οὖσα τήκει καὶ διόλλυσι καὶ ἄγει εἰς τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα εἶναι, καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ἅπαντα ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκείας κακίας τῷ 20
D προσκαθῆσθαι | καὶ ἐνεῖναι διαφθειρούσης εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀφικνεῖται —οὐχ οὕτω; Ναί. Ἴθι δή, καὶ ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον σκόπει. ἆρα ἐνοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κακία τῷ ἐνεῖναι καὶ προσκαθῆσθαι φθείρει αὐτὴν καὶ μαραίνει, ἕως ἂν εἰς θάνατον ἀγαγοῦσα τοῦ σώματος χωρίσῃ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. Ἀλλὰ 25

13, 14 ψυχῇ—νῦν Π et in marg. A^2: om. A^1. 15. ἡ Π: ·ἤ A.
21. ἐνεῖναι A^1Π: διεῖναι ut videtur corr. A^2.

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609 B 12 **ἦν.** "Imperfectum illud tempus indicat, quo res nondum satis cognita, et tamen ita, ut nunc apparet, comparata esset" Schneider. Cf. IV 436 C *n.*

14 **ἀδικία—ἀμαθία.** Vice is the evil peculiar to soul: cf. IV 444 C, *Tim.* 86 B ff. and *Soph.* 227 E.

609 C 18 **ἀλλ' ὧδε ποίει.** *ποίει* means 'picture,' 'represent.' *που οἴει*, which Liebhold conjectures (*Philol.* 1880 p. 169), is wholly inapposite; for the sense requires an imperative. Ast suggests *νόει* or *σκόπει*, but the text is sound: see on VI 498 A.

609 D 24 **ἕως ἂν—χωρίσῃ.** *θάνατον* must here be understood of the *soul's* death, otherwise the parallel with *ὥσπερ —ἀφικνεῖται* breaks down, and the reasoning becomes not merely fallacious, but absurd. We have, in fact, to distinguish between the death or dissolution of (*a*) the body (as described in C above *ὥσπερ σῶμα—εἰς τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα εἶναι*), (*b*) the soul, (*c*) the *σύνολον*, or body *plus* soul. If the soul is mortal, the moment at which it is dissolved and perishes is when the *σύνολον* dies, i.e. (*Phaed.* 64 C, 67 D) when soul is separated from body (cf. *Phaed.* 70 A, 77 B, D, E, 80 D and 84 B). Plato reminds us of this by saying *ἕως ἂν εἰς θάνατον ἀγαγοῦσα τοῦ σώματος χωρίσῃ* instead of merely *ἕως ἂν εἰς θάνατον ἀγάγῃ*. Cf. 610 D *n.*

25 **οὐδαμῶς—τοῦτό γε.** It is strange that Glauco should assent so readily. He is apparently thinking (as in 610 E) of the activity and vitality which wicked men so frequently display; but we may fairly ask 'Why should soul be the only thing which is incapable of being destroyed by its own vice?' It would surely be more true to hold that vice is able to kill the soul just *because* it is able *ποιεῖν αὐτὴν κακήν* (609 B), and Panaetius actually made use of a similar argument in order to prove the soul mortal ("nihil esse, quod doleat, quin id aegrum esse quoque possit. quod autem in morbum cadat, id etiam interiturum; dolere autem animos, ergo etiam interire" Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* I 79). Is *ἆρα ἐνοῦσα—χωρίσῃ* intended as an appeal to experience? Even if we allowed that experience is the proper tribunal, our experience of the effect of injustice on a human soul is limited to a single life; and why should not one soul wear out many bodies and perish at last through its own vice *καὶ ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος* (cf. *Phaed.* 87 B, 91 D. See also Deichert *Plato's Beweise f. die Unsterblichkeit d. Seele* pp. 46—48). These difficulties are serious, and possibly fatal: they have even led some critics to stigmatise the whole argument as a *petitio principii* (e.g. Brandt *Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehre v. d. Seelentheilen* p. 29). Plato does not attempt to solve them here; but

μέντοι ἐκεῖνό γε ἄλογον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν μὲν ἄλλου πονηρίαν ἀπολλύναι τι, τὴν δὲ αὑτοῦ μή. Ἄλογον. Ἐννόει γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅτι οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν σιτίων πονηρίας, ἢ ἂν ᾖ αὐτῶν **E** ἐκείνων, εἴτε παλαιότης εἴτε σαπρότης εἴτε ἡτισοῦν οὖσα, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν σῶμα ἀπόλλυσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ἐμποιῇ ἡ αὐτῶν πονηρία τῶν σιτίων τῷ σώματι σώματος μοχθηρίαν, φήσομεν αὐτὸ δι' ἐκεῖνα ὑπὸ τῆς αὑτοῦ κακίας νόσου οὔσης ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπὸ δὲ σιτίων πονηρίας ἄλλων ὄντων ἄλλο | ὂν τὸ σῶμα, ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίου **610** κακοῦ μὴ ἐμποιήσαντος τὸ ἔμφυτον κακόν, οὐδέποτε ἀξιώσομεν διαφθείρεσθαι. Ὀρθότατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Χ. Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν λόγον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐὰν μὴ σώματος πονηρία ψυχῇ ψυχῆς πονηρίαν ἐμποιῇ, μή ποτε ἀξιῶμεν ὑπὸ ἀλλοτρίου κακοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ἰδίας πονηρίας ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρου κακῷ ἕτερον. Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. Ἦ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἐξελέγξωμεν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν, ἢ ἕως ἂν | ᾖ ἀνέλεγκτα, μή **B** ποτε φῶμεν ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ μηδ' αὖ ὑπ' ἄλλης νόσου μηδ' αὖ ὑπὸ σφαγῆς, μηδ' εἴ τις ὅ τι σμικρότατα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα κατατέμοι,

3. ὀρθότατα Stephanus: ὀρθότατ' ἂν ΑΠΞ *q*. 5. μή ποτε $A^2Π$: μήτε A^1.
8. ἀνέλεγκτα $A^2Π$: ἔλεγκτα (*sic*) A^1. 8, 9. μή ποτε Π: μήτε A.

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a comparison of the present argument with *Phaed.* 93 A—94 B helps at all events to explain his position. Soul is always soul, and no soul is more a soul than any other (*Phaed.* 93 B); hence the soul which is made evil by vice retains its vitality unimpaired. It is in fact the conception of soul as the principle of life which explains (from the Platonic point of view) Glauco's emphatic οὐδαμῶς. Cf. I 353 D τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; Μάλιστά γ', ἔφη, with note ad loc. It is on the essential connexion between 'soul' and 'life' that Plato builds his crowning argument for the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedo* (100 B ff., and especially 105 C, D). Cf. Zeller[4] II p. 827 and infra 610 D *n.*

609 E 30 **αὐτῶν—τῶν σιτίων.** Herwerden (following Ξ) would omit τῶν σιτίων, but the contrast with σώματος μοχθηρίαν is improved by the presence of these words. αὐτῶν is 'ipsorum' exactly as in αὐτῶν ἐκείνων above: 'of food itself')(body.

32 **ὑπὸ δὲ σιτίων κτλ.** Cf. 609 A, B. It is difficult to see where the ἔμφυτον κακόν comes in when the organism is destroyed by violence. Surely fire destroys wood without using σηπεδών as its instrument. The fact is that Plato's theory of a ξύμφυτον κακόν by which and which alone each object is destroyed, if destroyed it be, does not apply except where the object is independent of external influences, and such, throughout this proof, he supposes soul to be. Cf. 608 D *n.* and Brandt l.c. p. 29.

610 A 3 **ὀρθότατα.** See *cr. n.* Vind. F has ὀρθώτατ' ἄν, Vind. E ὀρθότατ' ἄρ': otherwise there is no variant. Schneider alone retains ἂν—λέγεις, but fails to justify the solecism. ὀρθότατ' ἂν—λέγοις, which Hermann and Stallbaum take from Ξ and Flor. V, does not suit the situation here, as κάλλιστα ἂν λέγοις does in *Laws* 897 E. Both here and in *Laws* 656 A (where A has ὀρθότατα λέγοις) the simplest correction is ὀρθότατα λέγεις. For the error see *Introd.* § 5.

8 **ἐξελέγξωμεν.** Richards proposes ἐξελεγχθῶμεν, but the hortatory subjunctive is quite out of place with the passive here. See also on VII 534 C.

610 B 10 **ὅ τι σμικρότατα** is more idiomatic than εἰς ὅ τι σμικρότατα, which J. and C. suggest: cf. VI 509 D and *Symp.* 191 D.

ἕνεκα τούτων μηδὲν μᾶλλόν ποτε ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, πρὶν ἄν τις ἀποδείξῃ, ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἀδικωτέρα καὶ ἀνοσιωτέρα γίγνεται· ἀλλοτρίου δὲ κακοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένου, τοῦ δὲ ἰδίου ἑκάστῳ μὴ ἐγγιγνομένου, μήτε ψυχὴν μήτε
C ἄλλο μηδὲν | ἐῶμεν φάναι τινὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, 15
τοῦτό γε οὐδείς ποτε δείξει, ὡς τῶν ἀποθνῃσκόντων ἀδικώτεραι αἱ ψυχαὶ διὰ τὸν θάνατον γίγνονται. Ἐὰν δέ γέ τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾷ ἰέναι καὶ λέγειν, ὡς πονηρότερος καὶ ἀδικώτερος γίγνεται ὁ ἀποθνῃσκων, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἀναγκάζηται ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν, ἀξιώσομέν που, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει ὁ ταῦτα 20
λέγων, τὴν ἀδικίαν εἶναι θανάσιμον τῷ ἔχοντι ὥσπερ νόσον, καὶ
D ὑπ' | αὐτοῦ τούτου ἀποκτιννύντος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἀποθνῄσκειν τοὺς λαμβάνοντας αὐτό, τοὺς μὲν μάλιστα θᾶττον, τοὺς δ' ἧττον σχολαίτερον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν διὰ τοῦτο ὑπ' ἄλλων δίκην ἐπι- τιθέντων ἀποθνῄσκουσιν οἱ ἄδικοι. Μὰ Δί', ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄρα 25
πάνδεινον φανεῖται ἡ ἀδικία, εἰ θανάσιμον ἔσται τῷ λαμβάνοντι·

22. *τούτου q*: τοῦ ΑΠ: om. Ξ. 24 τοῦτο *q*: τούτου ΑΠΞ. 26. *φανεῖται* A^1Π: *φαίνεται* corr. A^2.

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610 C 18 **ὁμόσε—ἰέναι**: 'dares to close with the argument' not 'with us in argument' (one of J. and C.'s alternatives). Cf. *Euthyd.* 294 D *ὁμόσε ἦγεν τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν*, *Euthyph.* 3 C and *Theaet.* 165 E.

λέγειν ὡς πονηρότερος κτλ. I think it was Dr Johnson who said 'Every man is a rascal when he is sick.' For the omission of the copula with *ὁμολογεῖν* cf. II 374 A *n.*

610 D 22 **αὐτοῦ τούτου.** See *cr. n.* The reading *αὐτοῦ τοῦ*, which has most of the MSS in its favour, is kept by Schneider, Stallbaum and Burnet ("ab ea, utpote suapte vi et natura perimente" Schneider). Hermann and Jowett and Campbell read *αὐτοῦ τούτου*, which is intrinsically far better ('this itself' 'just this' as opposed to the external agencies mentioned below), and might easily have been corrupted into *αὐτοῦ τοῦ*.

ἀποθνῄσκειν—οἱ ἄδικοι. If Injustice kills the soul, which is the principle of life (609 D *n.*), the wicked should die of their own wickedness; for they cannot of course continue to live on after their soul expires. As it is, however, they have to be put to death by others, and (according to Glauco) their wickedness rather increases than diminishes their vitality. The argument may not be conclusive (609 D *n.*); but we are surely not justified in charging Plato (as Brandt apparently does l.c. p. 29) with confounding either here or in 609 D the two notions of physical death and death of the soul.

24 **ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ κτλ.** For the construction cf. III 410 B *n.*

διὰ τοῦτο. See *cr. n.* Schneider defends *διὰ τούτου* by Aesch. *Ag.* 447 *πεσόντ' ἀλλοτρίας διαὶ γυναικός*: but Aeschylus regards Helen as an agent in the death of the fallen Greeks, and the meaning 'on account of' is even more necessary here than in 609 E *δι' ἐκεῖνα ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ κακίας*. Cf. VIII 562 B *n.*

25 **οὐκ ἄρα—κακῶν.** Cf. *Phaed.* 107 C *εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἑρμαῖον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμ' ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς*. The thought expressed in these two passages contains the germ of a new argument for immortality. It might be urged that a future existence is necessary in order that the wicked may pay the penalty for their sins, so that Immortality would become a "postulate of the moral government of the universe" (Deichert l.c. p. 48). Plato

ἀπαλλαγὴ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κακῶν· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οἶμαι αὐτὴν φανήσεσθαι πᾶν τοὐναντίον τοὺς ἄλλους ἀποκτιννῦσαν, εἴπερ οἷόν τε, τὸν E
δ' ἔχοντα καὶ μάλα ζωτικὸν παρέχουσαν, καὶ πρός γ' ἔτι τῷ ζωτικῷ
30 ἄγρυπνον· οὕτω πόρρω που, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐσκήνηται τοῦ θανάσιμος εἶναι. Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ὁπότε γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἱκανὴ ἥ γε οἰκεία πονηρία καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον κακὸν ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχήν, σχολῇ τό γε ἐπ' ἄλλου ὀλέθρῳ τεταγμένον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀπολεῖ, πλὴν ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται. Σχολῇ γ', ἔφη, ὡς γε τὸ
35 εἰκός. Οὐκοῦν ὁπότε μηδ' ὑφ' ἑνὸς ἀπόλλυται κακοῦ, μήτε οἰκείου μήτε ἀλλο|τρίου, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὂν εἶναι· εἰ δ' ἀεὶ ὄν, 611
ἀθάνατον. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

XI. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτως ἐχέτω· εἰ δ' ἔχει, ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί. οὔτε γὰρ ἄν που ἐλάττους γένοιντο
5 μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολλυμένης οὔτε αὖ πλείους. εἰ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀθανάτων πλέον γίγνοιτο, οἶσθ' ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτε τοῦτο οἰώμεθα· ὁ γὰρ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσει· μήτε γε αὖ τῇ B
ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχήν, ὥστε πολλῆς ποικιλίας

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is content merely to suggest this argument: neither here nor elsewhere does he place it in the forefront of his dialectical proof of immortality.

610 E 29 **καὶ μάλα ζωτικὸν κτλ.** Glauco is thinking of the extreme activity and vitality sometimes displayed by the more aggressive kind of villain. A good example is furnished by the career of Dionysius I of Syracuse. With ἄγρυπνον Stallbaum compares "ut iugulent homines surgunt *de nocte* latrones" (Hor. *Epp.* I 2. 32)—an instance on a small and petty scale of the sort of thing which is in Plato's mind.

611 A—**612** A *It follows that the number of souls is always constant, each of them retaining its individuality throughout. We have hitherto represented soul as a composite substance; but the composite cannot easily be immortal; and if we would see the soul as it really is, we must view it apart from the body and those material accretions with which in human life it is clogged and encumbered. Then and only then shall we be able to see its true nature.*

611 A 4 **ἀεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί:** 'it will always be the same souls that are in existence.' *αἱ αὐταί* is the subject, not the predicate (as Teichmüller translates *Plat. Fr.* p. 7). Although *οὔτε γὰρ—πλείους* justifies *ἀεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί* only in so far as concerns the total *number* of souls, *αἱ αὐταί* by itself means more than this, and implies the personal identity of each individual soul throughout all the vicissitudes of its endless existence. The conviction that the life of each particular soul is a continuous sequence of cause and effect stretching from eternity to eternity was firmly held by Plato, and he briefly reminds us of it here because the theory of future rewards and punishments, which he will presently describe, rests on that hypothesis and no other. For the history of this belief before the time of Plato see Rohde *Psyche*[2] II pp. 134—136.

5 **ὁτιοῦν—ἀθάνατα.** All things are either mortal or immortal: hence the immortal, if increased at all, must be so at the expense of the mortal, which will accordingly in course of time be exhausted. Cf. *Phaed.* 70 C—72 E, especially 72 B ff., where a similar train of reasoning is employed to prove *ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι.*

611 B 8 **τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει κτλ.** In its true and essential nature soul is akin to the simple and incomposite: see *Phaed.* 78 B—81 A.

καὶ ἀνομοιότητός τε καὶ διαφορᾶς γέμειν αὐτὸ πρὸς αὑτό. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀΐδιον εἶναι σύνθετόν τε ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ κεχρημένον συνθέσει, ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἡ ψυχή. Οὔκουν εἰκός γε. Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀθάνατον ψυχή, καὶ ὁ ἄρτι λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν· οἷον δ' ἐστὶν
C τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οὐ λελωβημένον δεῖ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι | ὑπό τε τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, ὥσπερ νῦν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα, ἀλλ' οἷόν ἐστιν καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον, τοιοῦτον ἱκανῶς λογισμῷ διαθεατέον, καὶ πολὺ κάλλιον αὐτὸ εὑρήσει καὶ ἐναργέστερον δικαιοσύνας τε καὶ ἀδικίας διόψεται καὶ πάντα ἃ νῦν διήλθομεν. νῦν δὲ εἴπομεν μὲν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ, οἷον ἐν τῷ παρόντι φαίνεται·

17, 18. διαθεατέον Ξq: διαθετέον ΑΠ. 19. ἃ A^2Π: om. A^1.

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10 **αὐτὸ πρὸς αὑτό** goes with *ἀνομοιότητος—διαφορᾶς*: cf. *διαφέρεσθαι πρὸς αὑτό* and the like. The translation 'viewed by itself' (D. and V.) is quite wrong.

12 **ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἡ ψυχή** refers to the tripartite division of soul in IV 435 A ff.: cf. (with Campbell) infra C *νῦν δὲ εἴπομεν κτλ.*, 612 A *νῦν δὲ—διεληλύθαμεν* and (for the use of *νῦν*) *ὥσπερ νῦν* in VI 504 D and III 414 B *n.* It is much less natural to connect the clause with *ἀΐδιον* ("eternal as we have just proved the soul to be" D. and V., with whom Jowett and apparently also Schneider agree. Prantl and others take the right view). Now that he has proved the soul to be immortal, Plato takes the opportunity to suggest a revision of the psychology of Book IV, in which soul was treated as composite (435 A *n.*): for nothing that is composite can well be immortal (cf. *Phaed.* l.c.). According to the theory which is rather suggested (612 A) than fully worked out in this chapter, the so-called lower 'parts' are not of the essence of soul at all, but only incidental to its association with body, and consequently perishable. Cf. *Phaed.* 66 C ff., 79 C, D and the *θνητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς* of *Tim.* 69 C ff. Plato expresses himself with great reserve (612 A), but apparently intends us to believe that soul in its truest nature is *λογιστικόν*, and that the *λογιστικόν* alone is immortal (so also Simson *Begriff d. Seele bei Plato* p. 128: cf. also Grimmelt *de reip. Pl. comp. et unit.* p. 94 and Nettleship *Lect. and Rem.* II p. 357).

14 **οἱ ἄλλοι.** The reference is generally supposed to be to the arguments of the *Phaedo*. Krohn however (*Pl. St.* p. 266) compares *παλαιὸς—λόγος οὗ μεμνήμεθα* (*Phaed.* 70 C), where Plato is thinking of Orphic and Pythagorean beliefs, and suggests that *οἱ ἄλλοι* should here be interpreted in the same way; while Pfleiderer (*Zur Lösung* etc. p. 41) sees an allusion to the *Phaedrus* and *Meno*. That the arguments of the *Phaedo* are included in the reference, is extremely probable both on other grounds, and also on account of the remarkable affinity between that dialogue and the whole of this section; but Plato's words are wide enough to cover all the proofs of immortality current in the Platonic school, whether published or not.

ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν. See on VI 490 C.

611 C 17 **καθαρόν**: sc. from body and its attendant evil: cf. *Phaed.* 81 B ff.

18 **εὑρήσει**: sc. *τις*, which is easily supplied after the verbal *διαθεατέον*: cf. (with Schneider) *Euthyd.* 299 D *οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ δεῖ αὐτὸ ἔχειν—ἐν ἑαυτῷ; καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐδαιμονέστατος, εἰ ἔχοι κτλ.*

ἐναργέστερον—διόψεται. The theory of Justice and Injustice in Book IV rested on a psychology which explained soul not as *καθαρόν*, and by itself, but present in body (cf. 612 A). Plato hints that the new psychological standpoint will give us a new and higher conception of Justice. I agree with Hirzel (*der Dialog* I pp. 237 f.) in holding that this higher conception can only be the Idea. The plural refers to different conceptions of Justice and Injustice, rather than to "their various forms" (as J. and C. explain).

τεθεάμεθα μέντοι διακείμενον αὐτό, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἂν ἔτι | ῥᾳδίως αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, D
ὑπὸ τοῦ τά τε παλαιὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη τὰ μὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ δὲ συντετρῖφθαι καὶ πάντως λελωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων, ἄλλα
δὲ προσπεφυκέναι, ὄστρεά τε καὶ φυκία καὶ πέτρας, ὥστε παντὶ μᾶλλον θηρίῳ ἐοικέναι ἢ οἷος ἦν φύσει, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα διακειμένην ὑπὸ μυρίων κακῶν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἐκεῖσε βλέπειν. Ποῖ; ἢ δ' ὅς. Εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν | αὐτῆς, καὶ E
ἐννοεῖν ὧν ἅπτεται καὶ οἵων ἐφίεται ὁμιλιῶν, ὡς ξυγγενὴς οὖσα τῷ
τε θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι, καὶ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο τῷ τοιούτῳ πᾶσα ἐπισπομένη καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὁρμῆς ἐκκομισθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ πόντου, ἐν ᾧ νῦν ἐστίν, καὶ περικρουσθεῖσα πέτρας τε καὶ ὄστρεα,

23. ἐκκεκλάσθαι Π: κεκλάσθαι A.

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21 **τὸν θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον.** Glaucus, who had originally been a fisherman himself, when transmuted into a sea-god, became a patron god of sailors and fishermen. See Roscher *Lex. d. Myth.* s.v. and Frazer on Paus. IX 22. 7.

611 D 23 **τά τε παλαιὰ—ἄλλα δέ.** For τε followed by δέ cf. II 367 C *n.*

ἐκκεκλάσθαι. See *cr. n.* The reading κεκλάσθαι is found only in one inferior MS besides A. It is rather less suitable in point of meaning, and "quum ἐκκλᾶν perrarum, κλᾶν usu tritum sit, duorum codicum gratia vulgatum mutare durum videtur" (Schneider).

28 **εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς.** Cf. *Phaed.* 79 D ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅταν περ αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη.

611 E 29 **ξυγγενὴς—ὄντι.** Cf. *Phaed.* 79 A ff., especially 80 A, B and *Laws* 899 D, 959 B, *Tim.* 90 A, C. Here we have yet another expression of the profound conviction which inspires the teaching of Plato, that man is an οὐράνιον φυτόν, οὐκ ἔγγειον. Herwerden would omit τῷ before ἀεὶ ὄντι, but the article adds emphasis by making ἀεὶ ὄντι look like a different category from 'the divine and immortal,' which is treated as a unity. Cf. I 334 E *n.*

30 **οἷα ἂν γένοιτο—ἐπισπομένη.** In the light of 611 B, C we may suppose that when the soul altogether follows after the divine it shakes itself clear of the body and the lower parts of soul associated therewith, and appears in its true unity as pure λογιστικόν. Cf. Grimmelt l.c. p. 94 and 608 D *n.*

31 **τοῦ πόντου—ἐστίν.** The imagery, which is of course suggested by the comparison with Glaucus of the sea, reminds us of *Phaed.* 109 B—110 B.

32 **περικρουσθεῖσα** is used with exactly the same meaning and construction as περιεκόπη in VII 519 A. The word is particularly appropriate here, because it might well be used of striking a vessel of any kind in order to shake off the integuments with which it has become incrusted in the depths of the sea. Cf. also the metaphorical use of circumcisa in Cic. *de Fin.* I 44. παρακρουσθεῖσα (Morgenstern) gives a wrong meaning, and περικουφισθεῖσα, which Liebhold suggests, is tame and inadequate.

πέτρας—ὄστρεα is bracketed by Herwerden and Richards, the latter proposing as an alternative to insert καί before ἃ νῦν. The image is scarcely bolder than τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας in VII 519 A, and the comparison with Glaucus easily carries it through. 'Stripped of stones and shellfish—the numerous and wild accretions of earth and stone which in consequence of these "happy" feastings as they are called have fastened themselves about her in her present state, because it is on

612 ἃ νῦν αὐτῇ ἅτε γῆν ἑστιωμένῃ | γεηρὰ καὶ πετρώδη πολλὰ καὶ ἄγρια περιπέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων λεγομένων ἑστιάσεων. καὶ τότ' ἄν τις ἴδοι αὐτῆς τὴν ἀληθῆ φύσιν, εἴτε πολυειδὴς εἴτε μονοειδής, εἴτε ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ὅπως. νῦν δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ πάθη τε καὶ εἴδη, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἐπιεικῶς αὐτῆς διεληλύθαμεν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

XII. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά τε ἄλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
B καὶ οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς | οὐδὲ τὰς δόξας δικαιοσύνης ἐπηνέγκαμεν, ὥσπερ Ἡσίοδόν τε καὶ Ὅμηρον ὑμεῖς ἔφατε, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην αὐτῇ ψυχῇ ἄριστον ηὕρομεν καὶ ποιητέον εἶναι αὐτῇ τὰ δίκαια,

8. ἐπηνέγκαμεν Π: ἐπηινεγκαμεν (*sic*) A.

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earth that she feasts.' Liebhold's conjecture *γῇ ἐνοικουμένῃ* and Madvig's *γῆν ἐστιουμένῃ* or *γῆν εἰσῳκισμένῃ* may be taken as indications of how far these critics are qualified to deal with the text of Plato. Plato means of course that the soul which feeds on earth becomes of the earth, earthy. Man is an *οὐράνιον φυτόν* (*Tim.* 90 A) and should draw his sustenance from Heaven. The best commentary on the whole passage is VII 519 A, B, with the extracts from the *Phaedo* cited ad loc.: cf. also IX 586 A, B *nn.* For the 'happy feastings' see on IV 421 B.

612 A 3 **εἴτε—ὅπως.** For this formula cf. *Phaed.* 100 D and *Laws* 899 B. Plato seems clearly to imply that soul in its true nature is *μονοειδής*, although he refrains from dogmatising on the subject here. See on 611 B.

612 A—**613** E *Now that we have proved Justice to be in itself, apart from all consequences, best for the soul, we may safely dwell on the rewards of Virtue both in life and after death. We revoke the concession which, for the sake of the argument, we formerly made, and restore to Justice the appreciation which in point of fact she does receive from gods and men. The just are dear to the gods and the special object of their providence, but it is otherwise with the unjust. Among men too, Injustice, though for a time it may run well, breaks down before the race is finished; whereas Justice reaches the goal and wins the crown. The honours and prizes which Glauco claimed for successful Injustice fall to Justice, and it is the unjust who suffer the insults and torments which he foretold for the just.*

612 A, B 7 **οὐκοῦν κτλ.** 'Well then,' said I, 'did we not in our discourse clear away the imputations against Justice and abstain from bringing forward the wages' etc. Jackson is inclined—perhaps rightly—to make the sentence categoric and not interrogative. In *τὰ ἄλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα* the word *ἄλλα* refers to the other points raised by Thrasymachus (I 337 A ff.), Glauco and Adimantus (II 358 E ff.), besides the complaint that Justice is usually recommended not on its own merits, but for the sake of its results (II 362 E ff.). For *ἀπελυσάμεθα* cf. VI 499 E *ἀπολυόμενος τὴν τῆς φιλομαθίας διαβολήν*, *Ap.* 37 B, *Phaedr.* 267 D, Arist. *Rhet.* III 14. 1415^{b} 37, 15. 1416^{a} 5 al. Other explanations of this difficult word and the variant *ἀπεδυσάμεθα* are discussed in App. V. Instead of *ἐπηνέγκαμεν*, I formerly read (with Cobet, Baiter and J. and C.) *ἐπῃνέκαμεν*. The scribe of Paris A (see *cr. n.*) seems to have had both readings before him, but to have finally decided in favour of *ἐπηνέκαμεν*, which is in exact correspondence with *μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαινεῖν* II 367 D. All the other MSS read *ἐπηνέγκαμεν* except Par. K, which has *ἐπηνέσαμεν*. *ἐπηνέγκαμεν* should probably be preferred, both on account of the MS evidence, and still more because the aorist seems necessary to balance *ἀπελυσάμεθα* and *ηὕρομεν*. There is no special reason why the *word ἐπαινεῖν* in II 367 D should be echoed here: and it is not employed of Homer and Hesiod in II 363 A, to which *ἔφατε* refers. For the confusion cf. (with J. and C.) *Pol.* 307 A, where some MSS read *ἐπηνέγκαμεν*, and others *ἐπῃνέκαμεν*.

9 **αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην.** See on II 363 A.

ἐάν τ' ἔχῃ τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον, ἐάν τε μή, καὶ πρὸς τοιούτῳ δακτυλίῳ τήν Ἄϊδος κυνῆν; Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, νῦν ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονόν ἐστιν πρὸς ἐκείνοις καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ ἀποδοῦναι, 15 ὅσους τε καὶ οἵους τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ' ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν, C ζῶντός τε ἔτι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἆρ' οὖν ἀποδώσετέ μοι ἃ ἐδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ; Τί μάλιστα; Ἔδωκα ὑμῖν τὸν δίκαιον δοκεῖν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἄδικον δίκαιον. ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἡγεῖσθε, κἂν εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν εἴη 20 ταῦτα λανθάνειν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ὅμως δοτέον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα, ἵνα αὐτὴ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν αὐτὴν κριθείη. ἢ D οὐ μνημονεύεις; Ἀδικοίην μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἰ μή. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κεκριμέναι εἰσίν, ἐγὼ πάλιν ἀπαιτῶ ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης, ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἡμᾶς ὁμολογεῖν περὶ

19. ἡγεῖσθε Π: ἡγεῖσθε A. 22. ἐπειδὴ Flor. C: ἐπειδὴ ἦν A^1Π: ἐπειδὴ οὖν *q*. Pro ἐπειδὴ—ἐγὼ praebent Ξ et in marg. A^2 ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κεκριμέναι εἰσί.

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11 **τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον.** II 359 C *n.*

12 **Ἄϊδος κυνῆν.** See *Il.* V 844 f. αὐτὰρ Ἀθήνη | δῦν' Ἄϊδος κυνέην, μή μιν ἴδοι δβριμος Ἄρης, with Leaf ad loc. Leaf observes that "the name Ἀΐδης here evidently preserves something of its original sense, the Invisible (Ἀ-ϝίδης)." For other examples of the proverb see Blaydes on Ar. *Ach.* 390.

13 **νῦν ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονον.** We may without prejudice consider the question of rewards, now that we have judged virtue and vice upon their merits; and it is even necessary to do so, if we are to take account of all the circumstances of the case. See on 608 C.

πρὸς ἐκείνοις: sc. τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οἷς αὐτὴ παρείχετο ἡ δικαιοσύνη, as it is more fully expressed in 614 A.

612 C 19 **ἡγεῖσθε—κριθείη** represents the general substance, though not the precise form, of the demands put forward by Glauco and Adimantus in II 361 A—D, 367 E. The reference is not more inexact than other cross-references in the *Republic* (see on 502 D al.), and Siebeck is hardly justified in suggesting that Plato's recollection of Book II had grown faint by the time he wrote Book X (*Untersuch. zur Phil. d. Griechen* p. 144). The reading ἡγεῖσθε (see *cr. n.*) has some little support from the inferior MSS as well as from A. It is defensible in itself, and (as Campbell observes) "agrees better with ἔδωκα and δοτέον and with ἀπαιτῶ in the following sentence." But ἡγεῖσθε is on the whole more natural with δοτέον εἶναι and ought probably to be retained. An unfortunate misprint in my edition of the *Text of the Republic* (1897) assigns to Π the reading ἡγεῖσθε (*sic*), and the error is repeated by Burnet in his *apparatus criticus*. In reality Π has ἡγεῖσθε.

κἂν εἰ. See III 408 B.

20 **ταῦτα**: viz. Justice and Injustice.

612 D 22 **ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κτλ.** See *cr. n.* The reading in the text has the approval of Schneider and others. It involves less departure from Π and A^1 than either (*a*) ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κεκριμέναι εἰσίν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν ἀπαιτῶ κτλ. (Hermann), or (*b*) ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κεκριμέναι εἰσίν, ἐγὼ πάλιν (Ast, Stallbaum), or (*c*) ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κεκριμέναι εἰσί, πάλιν ἀπαιτῶ κτλ. (Baiter, J. and C., Burnet). There is no authority for (*c*) except a marginal annotation in A, although Burnet erroneously attributes this reading to Vind. F and Stobaeus. See (for Vind. F) Schneider's note and (for Stobaeus) *Flor.* I p. 402. 22 f. Hense. To (*a*) and (*c*) it may also be objected that the contrast between Socrates on the one hand, and Glauco and Adimantus on the other, requires the presence of ἐγώ as the subject to ἀπαιτῶ: and in (*b*) the jingle ἦν δ' ἐγώ—ἐγὼ πάλιν "valde insuave est" (Schneider).

24 **ἡμᾶς.** The reading ὑμᾶς, which Stallbaum adopts, has little authority,

αὐτῆς δοκεῖσθαι οὕτω, ἵνα καὶ τὰ νικητήρια κομίσηται, ἃ ἀπὸ τοῦ δοκεῖν κτωμένη δίδωσι τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτήν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ διδοῦσα ἐφάνη καὶ οὐκ ἐξαπατῶσα τοὺς τῷ ὄντι
E λαμβάνοντας αὐτήν. | Δίκαια, ἔφη, αἰτεῖ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἀποδώσετε, ὅτι θεούς γε οὐ λανθάνει ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷός ἐστιν; Ἀποδώσομεν, ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ μὴ λανθάνετον, ὁ μὲν θεοφιλὴς ἂν εἴη, ὁ δὲ θεομισής, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὡμολογοῦμεν. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, ὅσα
613 γε ἀπὸ θεῶν | γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἷόν τε ἄριστα, εἰ μή τι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προτέρας ἁμαρτίας ὑπῆρχεν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὕτως ἄρα ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάν τ' ἐν πενίᾳ γίγνηται ἐάν τ' ἐν νόσοις ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν, ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπό γε θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον
B δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ | ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, τὸν τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου. Οὐκοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου τἀναντία τούτων δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι; Σφόδρα γε. Τὰ μὲν δὴ παρὰ θεῶν τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη νικητήρια τῷ δικαίῳ. Κατὰ γοῦν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ἔφη. Τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρ' ἀνθρώπων; ἆρ' οὐχ ὧδε ἔχει, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ὂν τιθέναι; οὐχ οἱ μὲν δεινοί τε καὶ ἄδικοι δρῶσιν ὅπερ οἱ δρομῆς, ὅσοι ἂν θέωσιν εὖ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μή; τὸ μὲν

25. ἃ Ξq: om. A^1Π, sed ante δίδωσι reposuit A^2. 26. τὰ A^2Π: om. A^1. 32. In verbis ἔστι ταῦτα desinit Π. 33. γε Ξq et corr. A^2: τε A^1.

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and is a needless change, for "Socrates ipse adhuc una cum reliquis iustitiam male audire et deos hominesque secus de ea statuere τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα posuerat" (Schneider).

25 **δοκεῖσθαι.** Cf. VI 490 A.

612 E 31 **κατ' ἀρχὰς ὡμολογοῦμεν.** I 352 B.

613 A 2 **προτέρας ἁμαρτίας**='former sin' means the sins committed in a previous existence. Hence the imperfect **ὑπῆρχεν** ('was to him from the first,' i.e. from the moment of his birth).

6 **οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπό γε θεῶν κτλ.** Cf. (with Morgenstern *de Plat. rep. comment.* p. 141) *Ap.* 41 C, D and, for a proof of the divine Providence, *Laws* 899 D ff.

7 **εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν—θεῷ. ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν** is the ethical end for man: see *Theaet.* 176 B—177 A, and cf. II 383 C, VI 500 C, D, 501 B, C, and *Laws* 716 B—D together with the *μελέτη θανάτου* of the *Phaedo* and the old Pythagorean maxims *ἕπου θεῷ, ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ θεῷ*. Cf. also Rohde *Psyche*[2] pp. 163, 285—287.

613 B 14 **ὅσοι ἂν—μὴ κτλ.**: "who run well from the lower end of the course to the upper, but not from the upper to the lower" etc. (J. and C.). Plato is thinking of the *δίαυλος*, and calls the outward and homeward journeys respectively *ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω* and *ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω*. We must suppose, although there seems to be no other authority for the supposition, that the end from which the competitors started was spoken of as 'down' and the other end as 'up.' Schneider suggests that the outward limit may have stood higher, but Greek stadia seem always to

πρῶτον ὀξέως ἀποπηδῶσιν, τελευτῶντες δὲ | καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, τὰ ὦτα ἐπὶ τῶν ὤμων ἔχοντες καὶ ἀστεφάνωτοι ἀποτρέχοντες· οἱ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δρομικοὶ εἰς τέλος ἐλθόντες τά τε ἆθλα λαμβάνουσιν καὶ στεφανοῦνται. οὐχ οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνει; πρὸς τέλος ἑκάστης πράξεως καὶ ὁμιλίας καὶ τοῦ βίου εὐδοκιμοῦσί τε καὶ τὰ ἆθλα παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φέρονται; Καὶ μάλα. Ἀνέξει ἄρα λέγοντος ἐμοῦ περὶ τούτων ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἔλεγες περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων; ἐρῶ γὰρ δή, ὅτι οἱ | μὲν δίκαιοι, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτεροι γενωνται, ἐν τῇ αὑτῶν πόλει ἄρχουσί τε, ἂν βούλωνται, τὰς ἀρχάς, γαμοῦσί τε ὁπόθεν ἂν βούλωνται, ἐκδιδόασί τε εἰς οὓς ἂν ἐθέλωσι· καὶ πάντα, ἃ σὺ περὶ ἐκείνων, ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω περὶ τῶνδε· καὶ αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων, ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐὰν νέοι ὄντες λάθωσιν, ἐπὶ τέλους τοῦ δρόμου αἱρεθέντες καταγέλαστοί εἰσιν, καὶ γέροντες γιγνόμενοι ἄθλιοι προπηλακίζονται ὑπὸ ξένων τε καὶ ἀστῶν, μαστιγούμενοι καὶ ἃ | ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ εἶναι, ἀληθῆ λέγων· πάντα ἐκεῖνα οἴου καὶ ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοέναι ὡς πάσχου-

30. λέγων Ast: λέγων εἶτα στρεβλώσονται (στρεβλήσονται *q*) καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται codd. Pro λέγων γρ λέγοντα in marg. A^2.

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have been level. The use of ἄνω and κάτω is as in περιπατεῖν ἄνω κάτω (Ar. *Lys.* 709), εἶρπ' ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω (Eur. *H. F.* 953), and other examples quoted in Stephanus-Hase *Thes.* s.v. ἄνω p. 1063. The subject of ἀποπηδῶσι is not οἱ δρομῆς, but οἱ δεινοί τε καὶ ἄδικοι: so that τὸ μὲν πρῶτον corresponds roughly to ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, and τελευτῶντες to ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω. This interpretation is that of Schneider and the other editors. A wholly different view is taken by Riddell (*Digest* § 111) and Madvig. They understand τὰ κάτω of the lower, and τὰ ἄνω of the upper parts of the body ("who run fairly with their legs, but with the upper part of their bodies—head, neck, arms—in bad form" Riddell l.c. For the use of ἀπό cf. *Laws* 795 B, 832 E and Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 5. 9). But an allusion to the physiology of bad running is not in place here, and it is difficult to resist the impression that ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω and ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω are significant parts of the comparison. On Riddell's view they are not, for there is nothing in the career of the clever and unjust which can well be illustrated by 'running fairly with their legs' etc. The point is, as τὸ μὲν πρῶτον—ἀποτρέχοντες expressly states, that they do well at first, but collapse before the end, like runners who run well as far as the καμπτήρ, but break down in the second half of the δίαυλος. For the illustration from the games cf. V 465 D *n*.

613 C 16 **τὰ ὦτα—ἔχοντες.** "A metaphor taken from horses and other animals, which let their ears drop when they are tired and overdriven" Thomas Gray. Schneider quotes Photius p. 572. 14 Porson τὰ ὦτα ἐπὶ τῶν ὤμων ἔχοντες· ἐπισείοντες τὴν κεφαλήν· ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἐκλελυμένοι. With οἱ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ—στεφανοῦνται cf. *Pythag. Simil.* 22 in Mullach *Frag. Phil. Gr.* I p. 486 τοῖς μὲν σταδιοδρομοῦσιν ἐπὶ τῷ τέρματι τὸ βραβεῖον τῆς νίκης, τοῖς δὲ φιλοπονήσασιν ἐπὶ τοῦ γήρως τὸ πρωτεῖον τῆς φρονήσεως ἀπόκειται.

21 **ἔλεγες.** II 362 B.

613 D 28 **ἄθλιοι προπηλακίζονται:** "are insulted in their misery" (D. and V.). ἄθλιοι is not altogether predicative ("are miserably insulted" J. and C.), although it goes more closely with προπηλακίζονται than with γέροντες γιγνόμενοι. Schneider translates "und Greise werdend bittere Schmach erdulden müssen."

613 E 29 **ἄγροικα ἔφησθα.** II 361 E.

30 **λέγων.** See *cr. n.* I agree with Ast, Hermann, and Stallbaum in omitting εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται

σιν. ἀλλ' ὃ λέγω, ὅρα εἰ ἀνέξει. Καὶ πάνυ, ἔφη· δίκαια γὰρ λέγεις.

XIII. Ἃ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ζῶντι τῷ δικαίῳ παρὰ θεῶν
614 τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων | ἆθλά τε καὶ μισθοὶ καὶ δῶρα γίγνεται πρὸς ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οἷς αὐτὴ παρείχετο ἡ δικαιοσύνη, τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, καλά τε καὶ βέβαια. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδέν ἐστι πλήθει οὐδὲ μεγέθει πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἃ τελευτήσαντα ἑκάτερον περιμένει. χρὴ δ' αὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι, ἵνα τελέως ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν 5

5. ἑκάτερος Ξ²: ἑκάτερον AΞ¹q.

"quia nec tempus antecedentibus congruit, nec sententiae ratio Socratem singula supplicia enumerare patitur" (Stallbaum). The passage to which the words refer runs as follows: μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, ἐκκανθήσεται τὼφθαλμώ (II 361 E): and εἶτα—ἐκκανθήσονται ('after that'—i.e. after they have been scourged —'they will be racked' etc.) is probably a marginal note intended to remind us of the further tortures specified in the earlier passage. Schneider and the Oxford editors retain the words as a parenthesis, which is, to say the least, exceedingly awkward.

613 E—616 B *But what we have hitherto recounted is as nothing compared with the wages of Virtue and Vice hereafter. Let us hear the vision of Er, the son of Armenius. For twelve days he lay in a trance, during which his soul travelled to a meadow, where he heard the narrative of their experiences from other souls that had fulfilled the millennial period of reward or punishment. In most cases the recompense for good and evil actions was tenfold; but certain crimes were punished yet more sternly, and for some incurable sinners there was no hope at all.*

614 A 5 χρὴ δ' αὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι κτλ. The Νέκυια of the *Republic* is one of the earliest extant Apocalypses, and many of its features reappear in later apocalyptic literature, including that of the early Christian era. See James *Apocrypha Anecdota* in Robinson's *Texts and Studies*. A careful comparison of the myth in the *Republic* with those of the *Phaedrus*, *Gorgias*, and *Phaedo* shews that in spite of discrepancies in detail, the four dialogues conspire to produce what is on the whole a tolerably consistent picture of the destiny of the human soul—a kind of ancient 'Divina Commedia,' as Döring points out (*Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos.* VI pp. 475—490). The sources and affinities of Plato's eschatological myths have been much discussed. Besides the article by Döring on *Die eschatologischen Mythen d. Plato* (*Archiv* l.c.) the student should consult Ettig *Acheruntica* (*Leipziger Stud.* XIII 1891, pp. 251—402, especially 284 ff.), Norden *Vergilstudien* (*Hermes* XXVIII 1893, pp. 360—406), and especially Dieterich *Nekyia* (Leipzig 1893), where the common features in ancient representations of the underworld are clearly exhibited. There are traces of Νέκυιαι before the time of Plato, and the investigations of Dieterich and others have made it clear that the materials of Plato's picture are derived in large measure from Orphic or Pythagorean traditions (Dieterich l.c. pp. 128 ff.: cf. also Norden l.c. p. 374, Rohde *Psyche*² II pp. 91 ff., and Zeller⁵ I 1. p. 450. Dieterich may be wrong in some of his conjectures, as F. Weber tries to shew in his inaugural dissertation, *Platonische Notizen über Orpheus* München 1899 p. 20 *n.*, but the broad outlines of his theory are in my opinion established beyond reasonable doubt). Evidence of Pythagorean and Orphic affinities will be cited in the notes. Cf. Proclus *in remp.* II p. 110 Kroll εἴτε δὲ ἔχει τὰ τῆς ἱστορίας οὕτως εἴτε καὶ μή, ζητεῖν ἄτοπον, τοῦ Πλάτωνος τὰ τοιαῦτα πλάττοντος μὲν οὐδαμῶς, κατὰ δὲ τὴν χρείαν τῶν προκειμένων ἀεὶ παραλαμβάνοντος καὶ χρωμένου πᾶσι μετὰ τῆς πρεπούσης περιβολῆς καὶ οἰκονομίας, ὡς καὶ τῇ Μαντινικῇ ξένῃ καὶ τῷ κατὰ τὸν Γύγου πρόγονον διηγήματι καὶ τῷ κατὰ τοὺς Ἀτλαντικοὺς λόγῳ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίοις. We may well suppose, however, that the imagination of Plato dealt freely with his materials, and the myth of the

ἀπειλήφῃ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὀφειλόμενα ἀκοῦσαι. Λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, ὡς οὐ πολλὰ ἄλλ' ἥδιον | ἀκούοντι. Ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ' B ἐγώ, Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ, ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός, Ἠρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου, τὸ γένος Παμφύλου· ὅς ποτε ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτή-
10 σας, ἀναιρεθέντων δεκαταίων τῶν νεκρῶν ἤδη διεφθαρμένων, ὑγιὴς μὲν ἀνῃρέθη, κομισθεὶς δ' οἴκαδε μέλλων θάπτεσθαι δωδεκαταῖος ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κείμενος ἀνεβίω, ἀναβιοὺς δ' ἔλεγεν ἃ ἐκεῖ ἴδοι. ἔφη δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὖ ἐκβῆναι τὴν ψυχήν, πορεύεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι | σφᾶς εἰς τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον, ἐν ᾧ τῆς τε γῆς δύ' C

7. ὡς $A^2\Xi q$: om. A^1. ἄλλ' Ξq^1: ἀλλ' Aq^2. 8. ἠρὸς $A^2\Xi$: ἦρος A^1: ἠρὸς *q*. 13. οὗ $A^1\Xi q$: οὖν A^2.

Republic bears the unmistakeable impress of Plato's own genius in its artistic finish no less than in its religious and moral teaching.

ἑκάτερος. See *cr. n.* The accusative appears to be in all MSS except *v* K and Ξ^2.

6 **ἀκοῦσαι** is doubted by Stephanus, and bracketed by Ast, Stallbaum, and Baiter. There is nothing offensive in the repetition *ἀκοῦσαι—ἀκοῦσαι* (cf. VI 511 E *n.*), and the second *ἀκοῦσαι* is welcome, if not necessary, as defining the exact nature of the debt ('due to hear,' i.e. 'due to be heard,' like *καλὸς ἰδεῖν* and the like). "The debt which has been incurred in words" (*ἃ ἐδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ* 612 C) "has to be paid in words" (J. and C.). *ὑπὸ* depends on *ὀφειλόμενα* rather than on *ἀκοῦσαι*. J. and C. take *ἀκοῦσαι* as = 'to have related concerning them,' comparing *ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα* VI 496 A and *Lys.* 207 A; but it is more natural to give the word the same meaning as it bears just before.

614 B 8 **Ἀλκίνου—ἀπόλογον.** Books IX—XII of the *Odyssey* were known as Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογοι the 'tales to Alcinous': see Ael. *Var. Hist.* XIII 14 Ἀλκίνου ἀπολόγους [καὶ] Κυκλώπειαν καὶ Νέκυιαν καὶ τὰ τῆς Κίρκης. Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 16. 1455^a 2 and *Rhet.* III 16. 1417^a 13, from which it appears that the whole four books were also called collectively ὁ Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος. There is doubtless an allusion, as the Oxford editors remark, to the *νέκυια* of *Od.* XI, which is itself one of the 'tales to Alcinous'; but the expression has also a proverbial application, being used of a long and tedious story (*ἐπὶ τῶν φλυαρούντων καὶ μακρὸν ἀποτεινόντων λόγον* Suidas s.v. Ἀπόλογος Ἀλκίνου. Other authorities will be found in Leutsch u. Schneidewin *Paroem. Gr.* I p. 210, II p. 13). For the paronomasia Ἀλκίνου—ἀλκίμου see Riddell *Digest* § 323.

Ἠρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου κτλ. The names point to the East. Ἦρ ὄνομα κύριον Ἑβραικόν, says Suidas, and Er is one of the ancestors of Joseph, the husband of the Virgin Mary: see St Luke 3. 28. By some of the ancients, including Clement (*Strom.* V 157 Migne), Er was identified with Zoroaster (Proclus l.c. p. 109). *τοῦ Ἀρμενίου* is of course 'son of Armenius,' not 'the Armenian,' as some ancient expositors imagined (see Proclus *in remp.* II p. 110). Plutarch *Symp.* IX 740 B appears to have read Ἀρμονίου, a reading which was known to Proclus (l.c.), and which commended itself also to the poet Gray: but Ἀρμονίου has no MS authority. Proclus himself adopts the same reading as that of our best MSS, and explains the passage quite correctly in p. 110. 19 ff.

10 **δεκαταίων.** The occurrence of the number 10 and its multiples is one of the Pythagorean elements of the story: cf. infra 615 A, B *εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη* (10^3 years)—*ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου δεκάκις*—*ὡς βίου ὄντος τοσούτου* (10^2 years) *τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου* and *εἰκοστήν* in 620 B. See also on 614 C.

12 **ἀναβιοὺς δὲ—ἴδοι.** Other miraculous stories about the dead or seeming-dead returning to life again and describing what they have seen are given by Proclus l.c. pp. 113—116, 122. Cf. also Rohde *Psyche*[2] II pp. 90—102.

14 **ἀφικνεῖσθαι.** In *Phaed.* 107 D and 113 D each soul is conducted by its *δαίμων* to the place of judgment.

εἶναι χάσματα ἐχομένω ἀλλήλοιν καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὖ ἐν τῷ ἄνω 15
ἄλλα καταντικρύ· δικαστὰς δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων καθῆσθαι, οὕς,
ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσειαν, τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς

16. ἄλλα Ξq: ἀλλὰ A.

614 c τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον κτλ. The situation may be seen from the accompanying plan. *AB* is the *τόπος δαιμόνιος* or *λειμών* (614 E) in which the



judges sit. *BC*, *AC'* represent the two ways by which the souls when they are judged *depart* to receive their rewards or punishments. *DA* and *D'B* are the two ways by which the souls *return* to the meadow to be reincarnated, after their period of reward or punishment is complete. (Ast makes a grave error when he writes "duo ostia, alterum, per quod animae descendunt in corpora, alterum, *per quod e vita redeant.*" None of the four *χάσματα* represent the way by which the souls arrive at the meadow immediately after they leave the body.) The *τόπος* or *λειμών* appears also in the *Phaedo* and the *Gorgias*: *εἰς δή τινα τόπον, οἳ δεῖ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἅιδου πορεύεσθαι* (*Phaed.* 107 D): *οὗτοι οὖν—δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι* (*Gorg.* 524 A). Ettig l.c. p. 306 is inclined to derive the idea from Homer's *ἀσφόδελος λειμών*. We find traces of a *λειμών* also in Empedocles v. 23 Karsten *ἄτης ἂν λειμῶνά* (apparently of the Earth) *τε καὶ σκότος ἠλάσκουσιν*, and in Orphic fragments (e.g. *Fr.* 154 Abel): cf. also Plut. *de fac. orb. Lunae* 943 C *ἐν τῷ πρασιᾷ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὃν λειμῶνας Ἅιδου καλοῦσι* and Plat. *Phaedr.* 248 B (the 'meadow' or 'plain of Truth'). In none of these passages is the meadow a place of judgment for departed souls; but *πεδίον ἀληθείας* is used of the judgment-place in the *Axiochus* (371 B), a dialogue full of Orphic influence; and it is therefore probable that Plato borrowed the meadow from some Orphic or Pythagorean dogma. We ought, I think, to conceive the meadow as situated somewhere on what Plato in the *Phaedo* calls *ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ*, meaning the real surface of the earth as opposed to the misty hollows in which we live: see below on 616 A and cf. Susemihl *Gen. Entwick.* II p. 270. Some of the speculations of the Neoplatonists on this subject are given by Proclus l.c. pp. 128—136: but they are altogether fantastic and useless.

15 **χάσματα.** Roeper (*de dual. usu Plat.* p. 29) would read *χάσματε* ("id est, ut me monuit Usenerus, *χάσματ' ἐχομένω*, a librario male suppletum"). The dual is also found in *q* and Flor. U; but there is hardly sufficient ground for deserting the best MSS: cf. III 395 A *ἢ οὐ μιμήματα ἄρτι τούτω ἐκάλεις; Lach.* 187 A *εἰ δ' αὐτοὶ εὑρεταὶ γεγονότε* (so B) *τοῦ τοιούτου*, and other passages in Roeper l.c. Proclus also has *χάσματα ἐχομένω* (l.c. p. 136. 17). With the two ways (*BC*, *AC'*) by which the souls *depart* after judgment cf. *Gorg.* 524 A *ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὼ ὁδώ, ἡ μὲν ἐς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δὲ εἰς τάρταρον*: also *Phaedr.* 249 A. The 'two ways' were a familiar feature in Orphic-Pythagorean pictures of the other world: for illustrations see Dieterich l.c. pp. 191 ff. and Rohde *Psyche*[2] II p. 220 *n.* 4.

17 **εἰς δεξιάν.** The way to the abode of the blest was generally figured as *εἰς δεξιάν*: see Rohde l.c. and Dieterich l.c. p. 85 *n.* 2, where Dieterich quotes from an Inscription found in a grave in the district of Thurii *χαῖρε χαῖρε δεξιὰν ὁδοιπορῶν Λειμῶνάς τε ἱεροὺς κατά τ' ἄλσεα Φερσεφονείας*. The whole of this Inscription, according to Dieterich, be-

δεξιάν τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν τε καὶ κάτω, ἔχοντας | καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὄπισθεν σημεῖα πάντων ὧν D ἔπραξαν. ἑαυτοῦ δὲ προσελθόντος εἰπεῖν, ὅτι δέοι αὐτὸν ἄγγελον ἀνθρώποις γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ διακελεύοιντό οἱ ἀκούειν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ. ὁρᾶν δὴ ταύτῃ μὲν καθ' ἑκάτερον τὸ χάσμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ τῆς γῆς ἀπιούσας τὰς ψυχάς, ἐπειδὴ αὐταῖς δικασθείη, κατὰ δὲ τὠ ἑτέρω ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἀνιέναι ἐκ τῆς γῆς μεστὰς αὐχμοῦ τε καὶ κόνεως, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου καταβαίνειν ἑτέρας ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καθαράς. καὶ τὰς | ἀεὶ ἀφικνουμένας ὥσπερ ἐκ E πολλῆς πορείας φαίνεσθαι ἥκειν καὶ ἁσμένας εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα ἀπιούσας οἷον ἐν πανηγύρει κατασκηνᾶσθαι καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαί τε ἀλλήλας ὅσαι γνώριμαι, καὶ πυνθάνεσθαι τάς τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἡκούσας παρὰ τῶν ἑτέρων τὰ ἐκεῖ καὶ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ παρ' ἐκείναις. διηγεῖσθαι δὲ ἀλλήλαις τὰς μὲν ὀδυρομένας τε καὶ κλαούσας, ἀναμιμνῃσκομένας | ὅσα τε καὶ οἷα πάθοιεν καὶ ἴδοιεν 615 ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ—εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη—τὰς δ' αὖ ἐκ

23. θεᾶσθαι $A^2\Xi q$: θεάσασθαι ut videtur A^1. 29. ἀπιούσας $A^1\Xi q$: ἐπιούσας A^2, sed ε puncto notatum. 31. καὶ τὰς $A^2\Xi q^2$: τὰ A^1q^1. 2. χιλιετη (*sic*) A^1: χιλιετῆ Ξq: χιλίετιν A^2.

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trays Orphic and Pythagorean influences. Cf. 617 C *n.* The other features (*ἄνω, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, εἰς ἀριστεράν τε καὶ κάτω, ἐν τῷ ὄπισθεν*) are also in keeping with Pythagorean notions: see Arist. *Frag.* 195 (1513^a 24 ff.) *τὸ οὖν δεξιὸν καὶ ἄνω καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἀγαθὸν ἐκάλουν, τὸ δὲ ἀριστερὸν καὶ κάτω καὶ ὄπισθεν κακὸν ἔλεγον, ὡς αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἱστόρησεν ἐν τῇ τῶν Πυθαγορείοις ἀρεσκόντων συναγωγῇ.*

18 **διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.** Presumably they passed up *through* the heavens to the outer surface of the heavenly sphere, as described in *Phaedr.* 247 B ff. Cf. also Proclus l.c. p. 160. 19 ff. **πολλὰ δὲ ἐπορεύθησαν αἱ μὲν κατ' οὐρανὸν συμπεριπολοῦσαι τοῖς οὐρανίοις θεοῖς κτλ.**—clearly a reminiscence of *Phaedr.* 246 E ff.

614 C, D **σημεῖα κτλ.** Cf. *Gorg.* 526 B. *κάτω* is fully explained in the myth of the *Phaedo* 111 C—114 C. Cf. infra 615 A.

20 **πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν** from its correspondence with *τῶν δεδικασμένων* above suggests that our own actions are our doom.

22 **καὶ διακελεύοιντο**='and that they exhorted' corresponds of course to *καὶ διακελευόμεθα* of the *oratio recta.* Stallbaum's explanation ("optativus ponitur loco accusativi cum infinitivo") is untenable; nor is there any good reason for suspecting the text or writing *διακελεύεσθαι* with Eusebius (*Praep. Ev.* XI 35. 5) and others. The optative is much more dramatic and realistic. Cf. VIII 569 A *n.*

23 **ταύτῃ μέν** is explained by *καθ' ἑκάτερον—γῆς* i.e. (see the figure on p. 435) *BC* and *AC'*. Cornarius conjectured *καθ' ἕτερον μὲν τὸ χάσμα*, but *ἑκάτερον* is much more elegant, and forms a better balance with *κατὰ δὲ τὠ ἑτέρω* (viz. *D'B* and *DA*).

25 **ἐκ τῆς γῆς** is not of course 'from earth' (D. and V.), but '*out of* the earth' ('aus der Erde' Schneider). They have suffered punishment *ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ* (615 A) 'in their sojourn underground' i.e. in the bowels of the Earth, as explained at length in *Phaed.* 113 E—114 B.

614 E 28 **τὸν λειμῶνα.** "Articulus locum quasi fama celebratum designat" Schneider. See on 614 C.

615 A 2 **χιλιέτη.** Cf. Virg. *Aen.*

τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εὐπαθείας διηγεῖσθαι καὶ θέας ἀμηχάνους τὸ κάλλος. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, ὦ Γλαύκων, πολλοῦ χρόνου διηγήσασθαι· τὸ δ' οὖν κεφάλαιον ἔφη τόδε εἶναι, ὅσα πώποτέ τινα ἠδίκησαν καὶ ὅσους ἕκαστοι, ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων δίκην δεδωκέναι ἐν μέρει, ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου δεκάκις· τοῦτο δ' εἶναι κατὰ ἑκατονταετηρίδα ἑκάστην, B ὡς | βίου ὄντος τοσούτου τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου, ἵνα δεκαπλάσιον τὸ ἔκτισμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος ἐκτίνοιεν, καὶ οἷον εἴ τινες πολλῶν θανάτων ἦσαν αἴτιοι, ἢ πόλεις προδόντες ἢ στρατόπεδα, καὶ εἰς δουλείας ἐμβεβληκότες ἤ τινος ἄλλης κακουχίας μεταίτιοι, πάντων τούτων δεκαπλασίας ἀλγηδόνας ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου κομίσαιντο, καὶ αὖ εἴ τινας

6. ὅσους $A^1\Xi q$: οὓς A^2. 9. πολλῶν Ξ: πολλοὶ Aq: sed punctis notavit q^2.

VI 748 ff. has omnes, ubi *mille* rotam volvere *per annos* | Lethaeum ad fluvium deus evocat agmine magno. There is little doubt that both Virgil and Plato took the period of 1000 years from some Orphic or Pythagorean source: see Dieterich l.c. pp. 116 ff. It will be observed that the thousand years do not, in the *Republic*, include the lifetime of the soul on earth, which Plato estimates at 100 years (615 B). In the *Phaedrus* on the other hand the entire interval from birth to birth is reckoned at 1000 years (249 A ff., compared with 248 D, E).

3 **εὐπαθείας — κάλλος** suggests the beatific visions of the *Phaedrus* (247 A ff.).

4 **πολλοῦ χρόνου**: sc. *ἐστί*, as in *Laws* IV 708 D *χρόνου πολλοῦ καὶ παγχάλεπον* (Stallbaum). It is worse than needless to insert *δεῖ* (with Liebhold) after *χρόνου*.

5 **ὅσα—ἠδίκησαν**. In Plato, as in Dante, doing wrong to others is the great sin.

7 **τοῦτο δ' εἶναι κτλ.** 'that is,' said he, 'once in every hundred years.' *τοῦτο δ' εἶναι* ('namely') explains *ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου δεκάκις*. This view is simpler and more idiomatic than (with Schneider) to make *τοῦτο=τὸ δίκην δοῦναι ἐν μέρει ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου*.

615 B 8 **ὄντος τοσούτου**. The same duration of human life is postulated also in *Phaedr.* 248 D ff., but retribution in that dialogue appears to be *ἐννάκις*, and not *δεκάκις* as here; cf. 256 E with 248 E. The number 100 is the square of the Pythagorean 'perfect' number 10, so that Pythagorean influence is doubtless at work again. See App. I to Book VIII p. 301, and cf. 614 B *n.* It should also be remarked that the Greeks, like other races, had many stories to tell of the *μακρόβιοι* of early days, and the 'Naturvölker' of historic times were also credited with preternaturally long lives: see the evidence collected by Rohde *Griech. Roman* pp. 218, 236, 247 *nn.*

9 **καὶ οἷον κτλ.**: 'and for example if' etc. *κομίσαιντο* depends of course on *ἵνα*. Plato somewhat awkwardly coordinates his illustration with the principle itself (*ἵνα—ἐκτίνοιεν*): but there is not sufficient ground for expunging *καί* (with q^2, Stephanus and others).

πολλῶν. See *cr. n.* Par. D—followed here by Burnet—has *πολλοῖς*, "quod propter pluralem *θανάτων* ferri nequit" (Schneider). The passage quoted by J. and C. in defence of *πολλοῖς* from *Laws* IX 870 D *τοὺς οὖν τούτων μηνυτὰς ἀναιροῦσι θανάτοις* is not quite parallel.

10 **πόλεις προδόντες κτλ.** So in Virg. *Aen.* VI 620 vendidit hic auro patriam. Antiphon (*de Her. Caed.* 10) names as the three chiefest sins *τὸ ἀποκτεῖνειν καὶ τὸ ἱεροσυλεῖν καὶ τὸ προδιδόναι τὴν πόλιν*. Cf. also Dieterich *Nek.* pp. 66 ff.

εἰς δουλείας ἐμβεβληκότες is parallel, as Schneider points out, to *αἴτιοι* and not to *προδόντες*.

12 **καὶ αὖ—κομίζοιντο**. It is not at first sight clear whether this applies to those who have come *ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*, or to those who, though condemned on the whole account, have done some good actions in their lives, and occasionally shewn themselves just and pious. The latter view is supported by *Phaed.* 113 D *ἐκεῖ* (in Acheron) *οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρό-*

εὐεργεσίας εὐεργετηκότες καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι γεγονότες εἶεν, κατὰ ταὐτὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κομίζοιντο. τῶν | δὲ εὐθὺς γενομένων καὶ C
ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων πέρι ἄλλα ἔλεγεν οὐκ ἄξια μνήμης. εἰς δὲ θεοὺς ἀσεβείας τε καὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ γονέας καὶ αὐτόχειρος φόνου μείζους ἔτι τοὺς μισθοὺς διηγεῖτο. ἔφη γὰρ δὴ παραγενέσθαι ἐρωτωμένῳ ἑτέρῳ ὑπὸ ἑτέρου, ὅπου εἴη Ἀρδιαῖος ὁ μέγας. ὁ δὲ Ἀρδιαῖος οὗτος τῆς Παμφυλίας ἔν τινι πόλει τύραννος ἐγεγόνει, ἤδη χιλιοστὸν ἔτος εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, γέροντά τε πατέρα ἀποκτείνας καὶ | πρεσβύτερον ἀδελφὸν καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλά τε καὶ D
ἀνόσια εἰργασμένος, ὡς ἐλέγετο. ἔφη οὖν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ἥκει, φάναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἥξει δεῦρο.

16. αὐτόχειρος Ast: αὐτόχειρας codd.

μενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ τίς τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος, and is, I believe, what Plato means. Cf. 616 B *n.*

13 **εὐεργετηκότες.** A few MSS, including *g*, have *εὐηργετηκότες*, which Rutherford (*New Phryn.* p. 245) and the grammarians regard as the regular Attic form: but *εὐεργέτηκεν* is found on Inscriptions of the 4th Century B.C. See Meisterhans[3] p. 172 and Kühner-Blass I 2. p. 33.

615 C 14 **τῶν δὲ εὐθὺς κτλ.**: 'about those who died as soon as they were born, and those who had lived but a short time' etc., lit. "about the 'as-soon-as-they-were-born' and the 'short-lived' etc." The *εὐθὺς γενόμενοι* and the *ὀλίγον χρόνον βιοῦντες* were probably two well-recognised categories of the *ἄωροι* (as to whom see Rohde *Psyche*[2] II pp. 411 ff.): hence the article *τῶν*. Cf. Virg. *Aen.* VI 428 *dulcis vitae exsortes*, et *ab ubere raptos*. A *limbus infantum* appears to have been a feature of early Orphic pictures of the underworld (Dieterich *Nek.* p. 158). It is unwise to insert *ἀποθανόντων* (Ast, Stallbaum) or *ἀπογενομένων* (Herwerden, Baiter) after *γενομένων*, or to read <*ἀπο*>*γενομένων* (Cobet), for, as Schneider observes, "de mortuis hic agi in aperto est." Schneider's own interpretation may be gathered from his note "nec nostrates, opinor offenderet *von denen, die eben erst geboren gewesen* etiam non addito *als sie starben*." I agree with Stallbaum in doubting whether *εὐθύς* can have this meaning: and it is safer, I think, to understand *εὐθὺς γενόμενοι* in the ordinary way. Others think that only one category is intended, taking *ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων* as equivalent to *ἀποθανόντων* (Purves, and so also D. and V. "those whose death followed close upon their birth"). But *καί* cannot be so easily ignored.

15 **εἰς δὲ θεοὺς κτλ.** Cf. Xen. *Mem.* IV 4. 19, 20 *παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πρῶτον νομίζεται τοὺς θεοὺς σέβειν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ γονέας τιμᾶν πανταχοῦ νομίζεται; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη*, and Pind. *Pyth.* 6.23—27 and other passages in Nägelsbach *Nachhom. Theol.* pp. 191 ff., 275 ff. The categories of sinners in the *Phaedo* (113 E—114 B) correspond very nearly to those mentioned here. Cf. Dieterich *Nek.* pp. 165 ff.

16 **αὐτόχειρος φόνου.** See *cr. n.* In common with most editors I have adopted *αὐτόχειρος* in place of *αὐτόχειρας*. The error was easy, and the change is slight. Schneider understands *εἰς* before *αὐτόχειρας*, in a different sense from that which it bears with *θεούς* and *γονέας*. "Contorta sane loci interpretatio," says Stallbaum, rightly. *αὐτόχειρ φόνος* (cf. the *ἀνδροφόνοι* of the *Phaedo* l.c.) does not necessarily mean either 'suicide' or 'the murder of near relations' (D. and V.), but merely 'slaying with one's own hand,' 'homicide.' See Jebb on Soph. *Ant.* 55.

18 **Ἀρδιαῖος**: a purely fictitious personage, no doubt, although verisimilitude is preserved by *χιλιοστόν*: cf. *εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη* 615 A.

615 D 23 **οὐδ' ἂν ἥξει.** *ἄν* with the future indicative is scarcely here 'colloquial' (as Goodwin holds, *MT.* p. 66),

XIV. Ἐθεασάμεθα γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν δεινῶν θεαμάτων. ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς τοῦ στομίου ἦμεν μέλλοντες ἀνιέναι καὶ ταῦλλα πάντα πεπονθότες, ἐκεῖνόν τε κατείδομεν ἐξαίφνης καὶ ἄλλους σχεδόν τι αὐτῶν τοὺς πλείστους τυράννους· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιῶταί Ε τινες τῶν μεγάλα ἡμαρτηκότων· οὓς οἰομένους | ἤδη ἀναβήσεσθαι οὐκ ἐδέχετο τὸ στόμιον, ἀλλ' ἐμυκᾶτο, ὁπότε τις τῶν οὕτως ἀνιάτως ἐχόντων εἰς πονηρίαν ἢ μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδωκὼς δίκην ἐπιχειροῖ ἀνιέναι. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, ἄγριοι, διάπυροι ἰδεῖν, παρεστῶτες καὶ καταμανθάνοντες τὸ φθέγμα, τοὺς μὲν διαλαβόντες ἦγον, τὸν δὲ 616 Ἀρδιαῖον καὶ ἄλλους συμποδίσαντες χεῖράς τε καὶ πόδας | καὶ

32. διαλαβόντες $A^1 q$: ἰδίᾳ λαβόντες $A^2\Xi$.

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but has a solemn, half-tragic or poetical effect. There is the usual supply of emendations, such as οὐδ' αὖ ἥξει (Madvig) οὐδ' ἀνήξει (Herwerden), οὐδὲ μὴ ἥξει (Cobet), οὐδὲ δὴ ἥξει (Richards); but the idiom is sufficiently well established (see on VI 492 C), and, as Turner remarks, the variant ἥξοι (in Ξ and three other MSS) is itself also evidence in favour of ἄν.

27 **σχεδόν τι—τυράννους.** Cf. *Gorg.* 525 D οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονότας.

ἦσαν δὲ καὶ κτλ.: not "erant vero etiam aliqui privati ex eorum numero, qui magna perpetraverant facinora" (Stallbaum), but "erant vero etiam nonnulli privati et quidem de genere magnorum peccatorum" (after Schneider). With ἦσαν cf. *Phaed.* 59 B ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος and *Prot.* 315 A.

615 E 29 ἐμυκᾶτο. Cf. Arist. *an. post.* II 11. 94^b 32 βροντᾷ—ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοί φασιν, ἀπειλῆς ἕνεκα τοῖς ἐν τῷ ταρτάρῳ, ὅπως φοβῶνται (quoted by Zeller[5] I p. 451 *n.* 3). See also Plut. *de gen. Socr.* 591 C. The remarks of Proclus on this part of the myth deserve quotation: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα φρικώδεις μὲν ποιεῖ τὰς ποινὰς καὶ ἀπαραιτήτους, ἀνυπερβλήτους δὲ τὰς μοχθηρίας δείκνυσι τῶν κολαζομένων, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα φωνὴν ἀφίησιν ἔμψυχον κατ' αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ κολάζοντα φάσματα δυσαντίβλεπτα καὶ τὰ δεσμωτήρια ἄφυκτα (l.c. p. 180).

29 **ἀνιάτως ἐχόντων.** Cf. *Phaed.* 113 E οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων κτλ. See on II 380 B.

31 **ἄνδρες—ἄγριοι κτλ.** These are the prototypes of the κολάζοντες ἄγγελοι of later apocalyptic literature: see for example Petri *Apoc.* vv. 21, 23 (Dieterich *Nek.* pp. 4 and 60). Cf. also Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* XIII 13. 5.

ἔφη: sc. ὁ ἐρωτώμενος (supra D).

32 **τοὺς μὲν—ἦγον.** διαλαβεῖν· παλαιστρικόν τι (Hesychius). The word is explained in Bekker *Anecd.* 36 as τὸ ἑκατέρωθέν τινος λαβέσθαι. Cf. Hdt. IV 68 διαλελαμμένος ἄγεται, I 114 al. Some malefactors they seized in this forcible way and marched off direct to Tartarus (see on 616 A): others, and among them Ardiaeus, they tortured first, and utilised as παραδείγματα (infra 616 A *n.*). Schneider translates "die nehmen die einen und führten sie abseits," understanding διαλαβεῖν as 'take aside': a usage for which the lexica rightly or wrongly quote Aesch. *F. L.* 41 διαλαμβάνων γὰρ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἐν μέρει. The variants ἰδίᾳ λαβόντες (Ξ and some other MSS), ἰδίᾳ παραλαβόντες (Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* XIII 13. 5 and Clem. *Strom.* V 133 Migne) etc. point to a similar but not identical interpretation: cf. also Proclus l.c. p. 182. 6 ff. διαλαβόντες γὰρ ἄγουσιν οἱ μὲν ἄλλους, οἱ δὲ ἄλλους· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ διαλαβεῖν, οἷον διανείμασθαι τὰς κολάσεις. But τοὺς μέν seems clearly to refer to some of the ἀνιάτως ἔχοντες, and none of this class is likely to have met with gentle treatment at the hands of the ἄνδρες διάπυροι. In *Phaed.* 113 E *all* the incurables are thrown εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν. It may be noted that the reading διαλαβόντες is confirmed by Plutarch's imitation τοῦτον ἡ Δίκη διαλαβοῦσα (*de ser. num. vind.* 565 A).

κεφαλήν, καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδείραντες, εἶλκον παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτὸς ἐπ' ἀσπαλάθων κνάπτοντες καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παριοῦσι σημαίνοντες, ὧν ἕνεκά τε καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσούμενοι ἄγοιντο. ἔνθα δὴ φόβων ἔφη πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν σφίσιν γεγονότων τοῦτον ὑπερβάλλειν, μὴ γένοιτο ἑκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα, ὅτε ἀναβαίνοι, καὶ ἀσμενέστατα ἕκαστον σιγήσαντος ἀναβῆναι. καὶ τὰς μὲν δὴ δίκας τε καὶ τιμωρίας τοιαύτας | τινὰς εἶναι καὶ αὖ τὰς εὐεργεσίας B

3. κνάπτοντες Ξ q^2: κνάμπτοντες A: κνάπτονταις satis trito errore pro κνάπτοντες q^1. 4. ὅτι εἰς Ξ q: εἰς ὅ, τι A. 6. τοῦτον A^2 (addito ω super posterius ο a manu rec.) et q: τούτων A^1Ξ.

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616 A 3 **ἐκτός**: i.e. outside the *στόμιον*. It seems to me quite clear from this passage that the *δαιμόνιος τόπος* is not in the aether, as Proclus appears to suppose (l.c. pp. 128 ff.), but somewhere on the true surface of the earth as described in *Phaed.* 109 E ff.

ἐπ' ἀσπαλάθων κνάπτοντες. *ἐπὶ κνάφου ἕλκων = διαφθείρων· τὸ γὰρ πρότερον οἱ γναφεῖς ἀκανθῶν σωρὸν συστρέψαντες, τὰ ἱμάτια ἐπὶ τοῦ σωροῦ ἔκναπτον· ὁ δὲ σωρὸς ἐλέγετο γνάφος. ὁ οὖν Κροῖσος τὸν ἐχθρὸν περιέξαινε ταῖς ἀκάνθαις καὶ οὕτως ἔφθειρεν* (Hesychius, with reference to Hdt. I 92). In the Apocalypse of Peter v. 30 we read of *χάλικες ὀξύτεροι ξιφῶν καὶ παντὸς ὀβελίσκου, πεπυρωμένοι, καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ ἄνδρες ῥάκη ῥυπαρὰ ἐνδεδυμένοι ἐκυλίοντο ἐπ' αὐτῶν κολαζόμενοι.* The form *κνάμπτοντες* appears in A (see *cr. n.*) and several MSS, but *κνάμπτω* is a bye-form of *γνάμπτω* and means not 'card' but 'bend' (Stephanus-Hase s.v.).

τοῖς ἀεὶ παριοῦσι κτλ. According to Norden l.c. p. 393 the idea that incurable sinners serve as *παραδείγματα* in Hades is probably Orphic or Pythagorean. It meets us also in Pindar (*Pyth.* 2. 21 ff., of Ixion) and in Virg. *Aen.* VI 618 ff. Phlegyasque miserrimus omnes Admonet, et magna testatur voce per umbras 'Discite iustitiam moniti, et non temnere divos.' The fullest exposition of the theory is to be found in *Gorg.* 525 B—D.

4 **ὧν ἕνεκά τε κτλ.** The words *ταῦτα ὑπομένοιεν*, which Schneider still retains after *ἕνεκά τε*, have scarcely any MS support and are an obvious gloss. The construction is *ὧν ἕνεκά τε ἄγοιντο καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσούμενοι ἄγοιντο.*

ὅτι εἰς. See *cr. n.* I formerly, with Hermann and Baiter, read *εἰς ὅ τι*, regarding *τὸν Τάρταρον* as a gloss. But there is reason in Richards' remark that *οἷ* or *ὅποι* would be more natural than *εἰς ὅ τι*: and in any case it is hardly likely that Plato would have omitted to specify the destination of these sinners by its name. Cf. *Phaed.* 113 E (quoted above on 615 E) and (for Plato's conception of Tartarus) ib. 112 A ff.

5 **ἔφη**: sc. *ὁ ἐρωτώμενος* (615 D), as before.

σφίσιν: i.e. to *ὁ ἐρωτώμενος* and his comrades.

6 **τοῦτον ὑπερβάλλειν.** The words *τὸν φόβον*, which Ξ and other MSS add after *ὑπερβάλλειν*, may be genuine, but as they are absent from A, q and several MSS besides, it is perhaps safer to omit them.

7 **καὶ τὰς μὲν κτλ.** At this point Er's own narrative is resumed.

616 B 8 **τὰς εὐεργεσίας**: 'the blessings which they received.' This clearly refers, as Proclus also believed (l.c. p. 185), to the souls *ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ*. See on 615 B, and compare Matthew Arnold's well known poem 'Saint Brandan.'

616 B—**617** D *After spending seven days in the meadow, the souls that had returned from the journey of a thousand years rose up and departed, accompanied by Er. On the fourth day they reached a place from which they beheld a straight light, like a pillar, stretching through all Heaven and Earth, and after a day's journey they saw at the middle of this light the extremities of the chains of Heaven, and stretching from these extremities the spindle of Necessity with its eight concentric whorls, the circles of whose rims as they revolve carry with them severally the fixed stars and all the planets in their order. On each of the eight whorls is perched a Siren, uttering a single note, the eight notes thus produced result-*

ταύταις ἀντιστρόφους. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι ἑκάστοις ἑπτὰ ἡμέραι γένοιντο, ἀναστάντας ἐντεῦθεν δεῖν τῇ ὀγδόῃ πορεύε- 10

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ing in a single 'harmony' or mode. Meanwhile the three Fates, as they assist in the revolutions, keep singing to the Sirens' music, Lachesis hymning the past, Clotho the present, and Atropos the future.

616 B **ff.** The astronomical difficulties in this part of the *Republic* have occasioned a great deal of controversy and discussion. Besides the various editions and translations of the *Republic* in English and German, and the commentaries of Proclus and Theo, the writers whom I have chiefly studied are Grote (*Plato on the Earth's Rotation*), Boeckh (*Kleine Schriften* III pp. 266—320), Donaldson (*Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society*, X pp. 305—316), Susemihl (*Gen. Entw.* II pp. 273—278), Krohn (*Pl. St.* pp. 278—289) and Zeller[5] I pp. 434 f. *nn.* Donaldson's article, to which Dr Jackson first called my attention, although it lacks consistency and clearness, and passes over many difficulties, contains the germ of what I now believe to be the correct theory of the straight light. But nothing that has hitherto been published on the subject supplies at once a full and satisfactory explanation of the difficulties, and it is only through the kind cooperation of Professor Cook Wilson that I have at last been able to form a definite view as to the meaning and solution of this extremely complicated problem. From 616 B to the middle of 617 B my commentary is mainly based on the exhaustive criticisms and investigations which he has sent to me.

The general scope and purpose of the astronomical part of the myth would seem to be to set before the souls a picture of the 'harmonies and revolutions of the Universe' in conformity with which it is their highest duty and privilege to live. Cf. *Tim.* 90 C, D *τῷ δ' ἐν ἡμῖν θείῳ ξυγγενεῖς εἰσι κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραί· ταύταις δὴ ξυνεπόμενον ἕκαστον δεῖ τὰς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ διεφθαρμένας ἡμῶν περιόδους ἐξορθοῦντα διὰ τὸ καταμανθάνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἁρμονίας τε καὶ περιφορὰς τῷ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον*. It will facilitate the study of the details if we observe in advance that Plato's description falls into two well-marked divisions or sections, viz. from *ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρταίους* down to *τὴν περιφοράν* (616 B, C), and from *ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων* (616 C) to the end of the myth. In the first section we have a representation of the outermost or sidereal sphere, girdled by a circle of light, which is prolonged through the poles into a column or shaft of light spanning the Universe from pole to pole and symbolizing to all appearances the cosmical axis. See on line 14 below. In the second section the scene is shifted, and we are introduced to a new picture of the celestial system, including the fixed stars, but without the encompassing girdle of light, assimilated to the poetical and suggestive figure of Necessity and her spindle, the shaft of which again represents the axis of the Universe. The details are fully discussed in the notes, where it is shewn that the two parts of the description cannot from their very nature be combined into a coherent and consistent whole, and that in consequence of their essential inconsistency Plato's passing attempt to reconcile them inevitably fails. See on *ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων* κτλ. 616 C and App. VI.

If the question is asked, 'Does Plato's description embody a serious astronomical theory of the visible heaven and its machinery?' what answer should be returned? The following remarks will indicate the kind of reply which seems to be in harmony both with Plato's general attitude on astronomical questions and with the special peculiarities of the myth before us. (1) The visible heavens, according to the *Republic*, are not the object of true Astronomy. The true Astronomer is concerned with *ἃς τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτὴς ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει* (VII 529 D. See note ad loc.). We may therefore expect imagination and idealism to play a large part in Plato's astronomical pictures, more especially when they form part of a myth. (2) The greater portion of this passage is in reality a similitude representing the celestial system under the figure of the spindle of Necessity.

σθαι, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι τετάρταιους ὅθεν καθορᾶν ἄνωθεν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον φῶς εὐθύ, οἷον κίονα, μάλιστα τῇ ἴριδι προσφερές, λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρώτερον· εἰς ὃ ἀφικέ-

13. *προσφερὲς* Ξ et corr. A^2: *προσφερῆ* A^1.

Now it is clear that Plato deliberately sacrificed the reality of the sidereal sphere when he found it inconsistent with the figure which he had chosen (see on *κύκλους κτλ.* 616 D). And if he could concede so much to his comparison, the question arises, 'Are we justified in regarding *any* of the machinery as seriously expressing Plato's real conception of the mechanism of the heavens?' It will be found on reflection that the only satisfactory and safe reply is that all the machinery, including the material whorls and axis of the spindle, is poetical throughout. This does not of course exclude the supposition that some of the details of Plato's imagery are borrowed from earlier astronomical fancies, and it is highly probable that here, as elsewhere in the myth, he takes something from the Pythagoreans: see on 616 C, D, 617 B. (3) The entire description should in all probability be regarded as "essentially a symbolic representation and not an attempt at scientific explanation" (Cook Wilson). But 'a symbolic representation should stand in some relation to the thing signified,' and in this case all we can reasonably infer from Plato's symbolism is that, according to his belief, the Earth is in the middle: the Sun, Moon and Planets revolve round the Earth at different distances from the centre and with different velocities, participating in the general movement of the heavens and at the same time having a contrary movement of their own. As for the fixed stars, it would seem from the first part of Plato's description that he supposed them to be fixed in the outermost sphere of the Universe, round which he plainly supposes that the circle of the Milky Way extends. See also on 616 C, 617 A.

616 B 11 **καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι κτλ.** 'And on the fourth day they arrived at a point from which they descried extending from above through all the heaven and earth a straight light, like a pillar, resembling the rainbow more than anything else, but brighter and purer.' The souls see the light for the first time on the fourth day after they begin their march, and consequently on the eleventh day from Er's arrival at the meadow. The remaining incidents occupy one day, and it is on the twelfth that Er revives (*δωδεκαταῖος—ἀνεβίω* 614 B). See on *ἔωθεν* in 621 B. As far as the Greek is concerned, *ἄνωθεν* may be construed either with *καθορᾶν* or with *τεταμένον*. In the former case, we should probably have to suppose (with Boeckh l.c. p. 299) that Er's point of view is outside the Universe; but it will be shewn in Appendix VI that there are serious difficulties in the way of this supposition, and the second alternative is to be preferred. It has already been remarked that Plato in all probability thinks of the *λειμών* as somewhere on the true surface of the Earth described by him in the myth of the *Phaedo* (614 C *n.*), and it is apparently along this surface that the souls progress until they come in view of the light. As regards the shape and position of the light, Plato's language is clear and precise. The light is 'straight, like a pillar,' and 'stretched through all the heaven and earth.' The only natural interpretation of these words is that a column or shaft of light spans the entire Universe, like the diameter of a circle, and passes through the centre of the Earth, which, according to Plato, is situated in the middle of the whole (*Phaed.* 108 E ff., *Tim.* 40 B). With *διὰ παντὸς—τεταμένον* we may compare *Tim.* 40 B *τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον* (of the axis of the Universe). The words *μάλιστα τῇ ἴριδι προσφερές* refer, not of course to the shape, but to the colour of the light, as appears from *λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρώτερον*. The correction of *προσφερῆ* to *προσφερές* in A (see *cr. n.*) is late, but *προσφερές* is intrinsically a better reading, and might easily have been altered to *προσφερῆ* under the influence of *κίονα*. In defence of *προσφερῆ* Schneider cites *ἀπωχετευμένον* in VI 485 D, but the two cases are not exactly parallel: see note ad loc. Other views on this passage are discussed in App. VI.

13 **εἰς ὃ ἀφικέσθαι κτλ.** 'At this light they arrived after a day's march forward, and there, at the middle of the light' etc.

FIG. iii.



FIG. iv.



FIG. i.



FIG. ii.

C σθαι προελθόντας ἡμερησίαν ὁδὸν καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτόθι κατὰ μέσον ¹ τὸ

14. προελθόντας *q*: προελθόντες AΞ.

Instead of προελθόντας, A and other MSS have προελθόντες (see *cr. n.*), which Schneider defends by saying that the nominative refers not to all the party, but only to Er and his immediate companions. But even in that case the accusative would be more correct, and in point of fact it is clear from what follows that Er is accompanied throughout by *all* the souls about to be born again. A few other MSS besides *q* have the accusative. If the light is 'straight, like a pillar,' and stretches 'through all the heaven and earth,' it follows that as the Earth is in the middle of the Universe, the 'middle of the light' will be at the centre of the earth. See fig. i on p. 443. No other interpretation of κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς is either natural or easy: see App. VI. It would seem therefore that at the end of the fourth day after leaving the meadow the souls are at the central point both of the Universe and of the Earth, as is maintained by, among others, Schneider and Donaldson (l.c. p. 307); and this view is also in harmony with some of the most important features in the remaining part of the narrative: see on 617 B, 621 A, B.

14 **καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτόθι κτλ.** 'and there, at the middle of the light, they saw, extended from heaven, the extremities of its chains; for this light chains the heavens, holding together all the revolving firmament, like the undergirders of men of war.' The pronoun αὐτοῦ is ambiguous, and as far as concerns the grammar might be referred either to τοῦ οὐρανοῦ or to τὸ φῶς. If we choose the former alternative, αὐτοῦ will be an objective genitive, denoting that which is bound; if the latter, the meaning, as Professor Cook Wilson points out, is 'its chains,' 'its bands,' i.e. 'the chains of which the light consists,' for in the next clause the light is said to be a chain (ξύνδεσμος). The second of these views is on grammatical grounds somewhat more natural than the first; but whichever alternative we adopt, it is clear from the explanatory clause εἶναι γὰρ—περιφοράν, not only that the chains are the binding chains of heaven, but also that it is the light itself, and nothing else, which fulfils the function of binding the Universe together (εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς ξύνδεσμον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ). In what way the light performs this office, Plato indicates by the much-disputed words οἷον τὰ ὑποζώματα τῶν τριηρῶν. The evidence on the subject of the 'undergirders' of ancient men of war has been collected and discussed by Boeckh *Urkunden über d. Seewesen des Attischen Staates* pp. 133—138: see also J. Smith *Voyage and Shipwreck of St Paul* pp. 210—215 and Breusing *Nautik d. Alten* pp. 170—184. It may be taken as established that the ὑποζώματα were ropes and not planks, as some of the ancient commentators supposed (e.g. Proclus *in remp.* II p. 200. 25, a Scholiast quoted by Kroll l.c. II p. 381, and Suidas s.v. ὑποζώματα, who follows a scholium on Ar. *Knights* 279), and also that they were fastened round the *outside* of the vessel; but on the question whether the ὑποζώματα ran round the ship in a horizontal direction, or were passed under the hull, there is more room for difference of opinion. The former view is maintained by Boeckh and Breusing, the latter by J. Smith (l.c. pp. 108 f., 115, 210—215), who reminds us that a similar process, known by the name of 'frapping,' is still occasionally resorted to in the case of wooden ships during a storm at sea (pp. 108 f.). The evidence bearing on this matter has recently been investigated by Professor Cook Wilson (see Report of the Proceedings of the Oxford Philological Society for Hilary Term 1902 in *Cl. Rev.* XVI p. 234), who will shortly publish a detailed discussion of the whole subject. In the meantime he writes to me as follows:—"After careful reading of all the passages quoted by the authorities I feel sure (what one might infer *a priori* from the mechanical conditions) that this method" [i.e. frapping] "was known to the ancients, and was the method used in an emergency at sea, as e.g. in St Paul's ship. I conjecture also that these undergirders first had the name ὑποζώματα, and that if the belts or girdles supposed by Boeckh had this name, it was transferred to them from the true undergirders, which were probably the first and primitive form and remained in use always, even after the trireme belts had been invented." The evidence in short, points to two kinds of ὑποζώματα (*Cl.*

15 φῶς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν τεταμένα· εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς ξύνδεσμον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἷον τὰ ὑποζώματα τῶν

Rev. l.c.), the first employed occasionally under exceptional circumstances, and passing under the hull of the vessel, the second (see Boeckh l.c. p. 137) forming part of the regular equipment of a warship, attached before she went to sea, and running horizontally round the hull. The second variety is clearly represented on a bronze relief of the forepart of a war vessel, said to date from Roman imperial times, and now in the Berlin Museum. The sketch of the relief on p. 443, fig. ii is from a photograph in the possession of Professor Cook Wilson. There is also a (somewhat inaccurate) drawing of the relief in Beger *Thesauri regii et electoralis Brandenburgicii* Vol. III p. 406. (Some writers, and among them J. Smith, have maintained that the longitudinal bands in Beger's picture are only ornaments, and not ropes; but it is quite clear from the photograph that they are really ropes and serve as *ὑποζώματα* of the horizontal kind.) To which of the two varieties does Plato here allude? The words *οἷον τὰ ὑποζώματα τῶν τριηρῶν, οὕτω πᾶσαν συνέχον τὴν περιφοράν*, seem clearly to regard the *ὑποζώματα* as permanent *σκεύη* of warships, holding the hull together in ordinary circumstances, and not merely resources to be employed in times of difficulty and danger; and since the light whose action the *ὑποζώματα* serve to illustrate is (in Plato's view) an essential part of the Universe, the illustration is better and more pointed if the *ὑποζώματα* are also of the more permanent sort. It may also be noted that if Plato had meant the undergirders which pass under the keel he would probably have written *ὑποζώματα τῶν νεῶν*, and not *ὑποζώματα τῶν τριηρῶν*, for the vertical *ὑποζώματα* were not confined to triremes. For these reasons it would seem that Plato has in view such *ὑποζώματα* as are described by Boeckh, viz. girdles running round the hull from stern to stem outside the vessel.

It is clear, therefore, that the light not only passes through the centre of the Universe, but also, since it holds the heavens together, like the undergirders of men of war, round the outer surface of the heavenly sphere.

I have tried to represent the kind of picture in Plato's mind by fig. i on p. 443. The sphere of the heavens—represented by the circle *da'*, which is a section of the heavenly sphere—is virtually compared to a ship. The North pole, which is at *b*, corresponds to the stem, and the South pole, which is at *c*, to the stern of the vessel. The circular light *caba'c* corresponds to the *ὑποζώματα*, *cab* being that part of the light which corresponds to the *ὑποζώματα* on the port side, and *ca'b* the portion which corresponds to the *ὑποζώματα* on the starboard side. As the light in Plato's description passes through the centre of the Universe as well as round its exterior, the comparison of the light to horizontal *ὑποζώματα* would be all the more apposite if we might suppose that these *ὑποζώματα* were brought inside from stem to stern lengthwise and parallel to the ship's length, in a manner corresponding to the position of the straight part of the 'binding light.' But for this supposition there is no evidence, and it is clear from fig. ii that the lower *ὑποζώματα* at least could not have been brought inside, for they are below the water line. We must accordingly suppose that the comparison with *ὑποζώματα* extends only to that part of the light which surrounds the surface of the heavenly sphere. That the ends of the light are brought inside the sphere in *Plato's* picture is clear from the fact that the light stretches 'through all the heaven and earth' as well as round the Universe, and also because the souls see the 'ends of its chains' or bands at the middle of the light itself, which is also the centre of the Universe and Earth. We may presume that the *ἄκρα τῶν δεσμῶν* meet together at the centre, so that *bc* forms one continuous pillar of light stretching from pole to pole. See fig. i on p. 443.

The light was interpreted by some ancient commentators as the axis of the Universe, or a cylinder of aetherial fire surrounding the axis (Theo p. 143 Hiller, Suidas and Photius s.v. *τεταμένον φῶς*: cf. also Proclus *in remp.* II p. 199. 31 ff.), by others as the *γαλαξίας κύκλος* or Milky Way: see Proclus l.c. pp. 130. 4, 194. 19 ff. and Cicero *de rep.* VI 16. According to the view given above, the column of light follows the direction of the axis of the Universe, if, as we may reasonably

τριήρων, οὕτω πᾶσαν συνέχον τὴν περιφοράν· ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων

suppose, *b* is the pole, and although Plato nowhere actually calls it the axis, we may fairly suppose that this is what it symbolises. I have found no parallel in ancient astronomical theories to this conception of a light stretching from pole to pole. The curved part of the light is no doubt suggested by the Milky Way, which was regarded by the Pythagoreans as either identical with, or an emanation from the circle of fire which, according to them, held the Universe together (Zeller[5] I p. 435 *n.* 2). I have sometimes thought that the soul with which in the *Timaeus* the Creator wrapped the body of the Universe without has reference also to the Milky Way as girdling the World; for the Pythagoreans called the γαλαξίας κύκλος the τόπος ψυχῶν. Plato's words are (*Tim.* 34 B) *ψυχὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ θεὶς διὰ παντός τε ἔτεινε καὶ ἔτι ἔξωθεν τὸ σῶμα αὐτῇ περιεκάλυψε.* The parallel is certainly noteworthy, although *περιεκάλυψε* in the *Timaeus* rather points to a complete envelopment of the heavens, and *διὰ παντός* to the universal diffusion of the world-soul throughout the Universe.

616 C 17 **ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων κτλ.:** 'and from the extremities they saw extended the spindle of Necessity, by which all the revolving spheres are turned. The shaft and hook thereof are made of adamant, and the whorl partly of adamant, and partly of other materials.' With this sentence we pass to the second part of Plato's description, in which he tries to depict the movements of the celestial bodies by a new image—that of Necessity and her spindle. Regarded in itself, this image is tolerably clear and coherent, if we are willing to allow a large admixture of supernatural mechanics; but Plato fails to shew how it is to be reconciled with what has just preceded, and no one has hitherto succeeded in effecting the reconciliation, without doing violence to the Greek. See on 616 D, E and App. VI. The rapid imagination of the writer has already escaped from the earlier picture and fallen under the spell of a new conception, and we shall best apprehend his meaning if we consider what the peculiar nature of that conception demands. The ordinary spindle was shaped somewhat as in figure iii on p. 444, in which *a b* is the shaft, and *c* the whorl. (There is no hook in the figure: but its position would of course be at *a*.) The fibres were attached to the hook and twisted into a thread by the revolutions communicated to the spindle by the finger and thumb: see Blümner *Technologie* etc. I pp. 109—120, from whom the figure is borrowed. It is essential to the notion of a spindle that the hook should be fastened to the fibres which are to be spun. For this reason Plato finds it necessary, in using the similitude of a spindle, to attach the hook (ἄγκιστρον) to something which may correspond to the fibres; and he accordingly fastens it to the ends of the chains of light depending from the heavens in his previous image, at the point where these ends meet the ends from below, *κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς*. If we treat this construction as a piece of serious mechanics, Plato's device is open to many obvious criticisms. In fastening the spindle to the *ἄκρα τῶν δεσμῶν* from above, he forgets or ignores the ends from below. It will further be observed that he says nothing about the direction of the spindle: it is merely 'stretched from the ends' of the chains. We shall presently see that the shaft of the spindle symbolises the axis of the Universe, so that—if we are to connect the two images in Plato's mind—it is natural to suppose that the spindle extends downwards, following the line of the light. Here again there are difficulties, the most serious of which perhaps is that, as the axis of the Universe must go through the earth, the effect of attaching the spindle 'at the middle of the light' will be to depress the earth itself below the centre of the whole. But it should be remembered that Plato's object in this passage is not to furnish a scientific account of the celestial mechanism: see below on 616 D, E, 617 A. We are dealing with a work of literature and not of science, and the machinery of a myth ought not to be rigorously scrutinized from the scientific point of view. Inconsistencies of this kind are found to be inseparable from such poetical representations of the Universe. In the present case they arise chiefly from the juxtaposition of two essentially irreconcileable conceptions—that of a sphere girdled and traversed by light, and that of Necessity and her spindle. See on 616 D, E. For the rest, it should

τεταμένον Ἀνάγκης ἄτρακτον, δι' οὗ πάσας ἐπιστρέφεσθαι τὰς περιφοράς· οὗ τὴν μὲν ἠλακάτην τε καὶ τὸ ἄγκιστρον εἶναι ἐξ ἀδάμαντος, τὸν δὲ σφόνδυλον μεικτὸν ἔκ τε τούτου καὶ ἄλλων γενῶν. τὴν δὲ τοῦ σφονδύλου | φύσιν εἶναι τοιάνδε· τὸ μὲν σχῆμα D οἷαπερ ἡ τοῦ ἐνθάδε· νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔλεγεν, τοιόνδε αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐν ἑνὶ μεγάλῳ σφονδύλῳ κοίλῳ καὶ ἐξεγλυμμένῳ διαμπερὲς ἄλλος τοιοῦτος ἐλάττων ἐγκέοιτο ἁρμόττων, καθάπερ οἱ κάδοι οἱ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἁρμόττοντες· καὶ οὕτω δὴ τρίτον ἄλλον καὶ τέταρτον καὶ ἄλλους τέτταρας. ὀκτὼ γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ξύμπαντας σφονδύλους, ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐγκειμένους, κύκλους ἄνωθεν τὰ χείλη |

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be noted that adamant symbolises τὸ ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀδάμαστον (cf. Proclus l.c. II 209. 22), and is the appropriate material for the ἠλακάτη, since in Plato's picture the ἠλακάτη stands for the axis of the whole. ἠλακάτη is not elsewhere found in the sense of the shaft of a spindle: ordinarily it means 'distaff.' See on 616 D, E below. Plato does not inform us in what way the whorl is μεικτὸν ἔκ τε τούτου (*i.e.* ἀδάμαντος) καὶ ἄλλων γενῶν: but I think he means that while the outermost circle, which is the circle of ταὐτόν (*Tim.* 36 C), is composed of adamant, the others, which form collectively the circle of θάτερον, are made, either in whole or in part, of less durable stuff. Herwerden rejects the preposition before ἀδάμαντος, without any reason that I can see.

616 C, D 21 **τὴν δὲ τοῦ σφονδύλου φύσιν κτλ.** The whorl of Necessity's spindle is a composite structure, consisting of eight concentric hemispheres, fitted into one another like a nest of boxes: see below on 616 E. The adverb διαμπερές should be construed with ἐξεγλυμμένῳ.

616 D, E 27 **κύκλους κτλ.**: lit. 'shewing their rims as circles above' ("so dass sie ihre Ränder oben als Kreise zeigen" Schneider). Cf. 616 E τὸν τοῦ χείλους κύκλον. The translation "each concentric circle shewing its rim above the next outer" (D. and V.) betrays a complete misapprehension of the whole passage. Donaldson (l.c.) gives the sense correctly: "shewing their rims on the surface like so many circles." The words νῶτον—ἐληλάσθαι mean 'forming a single whorl, with a continuous surface, round the shaft, which is driven right through the middle of the eighth,' not "and on their lower side all together form one continuous whorl" (Jowett). νῶτον is regularly thus used of the *upper* surface of an object: cf. for example *Phaedr.* 247 B ἔξω πορευθεῖσαι ἔστησαν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νώτῳ. It is important to observe that there is no interval between the different lips: cf. Proclus l.c. II 216. 15 ff. ἡ συνέχεια τῆς ἐναρμόσεως διὰ τὸ μὴ παρεμπίπτειν κενὸν συνεχὲς ποιεῖ τὸ ἐκ πάντων νώτων ἐννοούμενον νῶτον ἀπὸ κυρτῆς εἰς κυρτὴν διῆκον, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἐπὶ τὴν πρωτίστην, and see on 616 E below. On ἠλακάτην Proclus remarks εἰ δὲ διαμπερὲς ἐληλάσθαι διὰ πάντων φησὶν τὴν ἠλακάτην, συντόμως καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐξέφηνεν, δι' ἣν ἠλακάτην τὸν ἄξονα προσείρηκεν, καὶ ὅτι παρὰ τὸ ἐληλάσθαι (l.c. p. 214. 26 ff.). As the usual meaning of ἠλακάτη is 'distaff' and not the shaft of a spindle, I think it not unlikely that Proclus is right in this suggestion. For other verbal plays in the myth cf. 620 E *n.*

In the rims of the different whorls are set the fixed stars and planets in the following order, beginning from the outside (see figure iv on p. 444):—

In the first.	The fixed stars.
,, second.	Saturn.
,, third.	Jupiter.
,, fourth.	Mars.
,, fifth.	Mercury.
,, sixth.	Venus.
,, seventh.	The Sun.
,, eighth.	The Moon.

Cf. *Tim.* 38 C f., where also, as here, Plato is following the Pythagorean order of planets: see Zeller[5] I pp. 426 f. and (on the whole subject of ancient arrangements of the planets) Hultsch in Pauly-Wissowa, art. *Astronomie* and Schaubach *Gr. Astron.* pp. 398 ff. Some later authorities make Plato place Venus before

E *φαίνοντας, νῶτον συνεχὲς ἑνὸς σφονδύλου ἀπεργαζομένους περὶ τὴν ἠλακάτην· ἐκείνην δὲ διὰ μέσου τοῦ ὀγδόου διαμπερὲς ἐληλάσθαι. τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτόν τε καὶ ἐξωτάτω σφόνδυλον πλατύτατον τὸν* 30

Mercury (see for example Diels *Doxogr. Gr.* p. 345), but the order which I have given is in accord with [*Epin.*] 986 C—987 C, and with the views represented by Proclus l.c. p. 219. 3 ff.

This conception of close-fitting concentric whorls, carrying the heavenly bodies in their rims or 'lips,' appears to be unique in ancient astronomy. How was Plato led to devise so original an idea? Possibly in this way. It would seem that the Pythagoreans had already developed the astronomical doctrine of Anaximander into a theory of celestial spheres, maintaining that the stars were "fastened in transparent circles or spheres, and turned round by the revolution of these circles on their axes" (Zeller[5] I p. 415). In order to suit his image of the spindle and whorl, Plato apparently takes these Pythagorean spheres, and cuts them in half, producing a series of hemispheric cups or whorls, in the circular 'lips' of which the celestial bodies are fastened or bound (*ἐνδεδεμένα*, says Theo 150. 14 Hiller: cf. also Proclus l.c. 219. 24).

So far as the Sun, Moon and Planets are concerned, the resulting picture is clear and intelligible, but it is impossible to conceive of the fixed stars as occupying the 'lip' of one of the hemispherical whorls in the way in which the Sun for example may be supposed to do so. Whatever view we hold of the rest of the picture, it is likely that in this particular at least Plato himself did not think his comparison adequate to exhibit the phenomena: for in C above he has already represented the outermost heavens, in which dwell the fixed stars, not as the lip of a hemispherical shell or hollow, but as an actual sphere (*πᾶσαν συνέχον τὴν περιφοράν*). (The inconsistency is noteworthy as shewing that the two images employed by Plato are fundamentally irreconcileable. See on 616 C.) By this and other indications we may be led to suspect that the whole theory of hemispherical whorls is only a device rendered necessary by Plato's similitude. If he had any opinion on the subject at all, he may have accepted the Pythagorean doctrine of spheres; but no conclusion on this matter can be drawn from the *Republic*. Cf. 617 A *n.*

616 E 30 **τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτόν τε κτλ.** According to this reading, which was known to Proclus (l. c. pp. 218 ff.) and is found in all our MSS without any important variation except the omission of *ἕκτου* (line 31) in Vat. Θ, the order of the different whorls in respect of breadth of rim, beginning with the broadest, is as follows:—

1. Whorl of Fixed Stars (first)
2. ,, ,, Venus (sixth)
3. ,, ,, Mars (fourth)
4. ,, ,, Moon (eighth)
5. ,, ,, Sun (seventh)
6. ,, ,, Mercury (fifth)
7. ,, ,, Jupiter (third)
8. ,, ,, Saturn (second).

See fig. iv on p. 444. (This figure, which is a simplified form of a drawing in Professor Campbell's *Plato's Republic*, published by Murray 1902, is intended to illustrate the upper surface of the whorl of Necessity's spindle. The small disc in the centre represents a section of the shaft, and the order of breadths of rim is indicated by the arabic numerals.) What does Plato mean us to understand by the different degrees of breadth of rim? On this subject I formerly wrote:—"The simple and natural explanation is that the breadth of the rims represents the size of the different planets. Each rim must of necessity be broad enough to contain the planet which resides in it, and no reason can be conceived why it should be any broader" (*Cl. Rev.* XV p. 392). In maintaining this view, I supposed that the surfaces of the different whorls were separated from one another by an interval representing the distances between the several planets, interpreting *νῶτον* in 616 E (with Jowett) as the *lower* and not the *upper* side of the entire whorl. But, as Professor Cook Wilson points out, the Greek does not allow of this interpretation, for *ἀρμόττων, καθάπερ οἱ κάδοι οἱ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἁρμόττοντες*, and *νῶτον συνεχὲς ἑνὸς σφονδύλου ἀπεργαζομένους περὶ τὴν ἠλακάτην* (616 D, E) shew conclusively that the individual whorls are fitted closely into one another like a nest of boxes, their upper surfaces forming one continuous plane. Cf. Proclus

τοῦ χείλους κύκλον ἔχειν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἕκτου δεύτερον, τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τετάρτου, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ὀγδόου, πέμπτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἑβδόμου, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ πέμπτου, ἕβδομον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τρίτου, ὄγδοον δὲ τὸν τοῦ δευτέρου. καὶ τὸν μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου ποικίλον, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἑβδόμου λαμπρότατον, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ὀγδόου τὸ χρῶμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑβδόμου ἔχειν | προσλάμποντος, τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ 617 πέμπτου παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις, ξανθότερα ἐκείνων, τρίτον δὲ λευκότατον χρῶμα ἔχειν, τέταρτον δὲ ὑπέρυθρον, δεύτερον δὲ λευκότητι τὸν ἕκτον. κυκλεῖσθαι δὲ δὴ στρεφόμενον τὸν ἄρακτον

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l. c. 216. 8 *μηδενὸς γὰρ ὄντος κενοῦ μεταξὺ τῶν ἐνηρμοσμένων σφονδύλων κτλ.* From this it follows that, if the breadth of a rim is equal to the diameter of its planet, "planets in the same part of their orbit will touch one another, and if we carry out the principle to the centre whorl, the moon will be always touching the earth. Moreover the outer planet will be continually grazing a fixed star" (Cook Wilson). These considerations are fatal to the view which I advocated; and I take this opportunity of retractation. The theory which has most in its favour, as I now see, is that "the breadth of the rims is intended to signify the supposed distances of the orbits from each other" (Jowett and Campbell). "It would be extraordinary," writes Professor Cook Wilson, "that Plato in representing the heavenly system by his whorls should not have represented somehow the distances between the orbits of the heavenly bodies, and the obvious way to do this was by making the thickness of the spheres to which they are attached, or (as he prefers whorls on account of the distaff of Necessity), the breadth of the rims of the whorls, symbolise these different distances." On this view the natural position of the planet will be "close to the outer edge of its rim, and touching the outer surface of its hemisphere." For a further discussion of this subject see App. VI.

The reading in the text is described by Proclus (l. c. II pp. 218–222) as *δευτέρα καὶ νεωτέρα, κρατοῦσα δὲ ἐν τοῖς κεκωλισμένοις* (*κεκολασμένοις*, conjectures Pitra) *ἀντιγράφοις*. Proclus tells us that there was also another reading, *προτέρα καὶ ἀρχαιοτέρα*, which we can see from his description to have been as follows:— *τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτόν τε καὶ ἐξωτάτω σφόνδυλον πλατύτατον τὸν τοῦ χείλους κύκλον ἔχειν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἑβδόμου δεύτερον, τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ὀγδόου, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἕκτου, πέμπτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τετάρτου, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τρίτου, ἕβδομον δὲ τὸν τοῦ δευτέρου, ὄγδοον δὲ τὸν τοῦ πέμπτου.* The origin, authority and interpretation of this reading are discussed in App. VI.

34 **τὸν μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου**: sc. *σφονδύλου χείλους-κύκλον*.

ποικίλον. The epithet *ποικίλον* means 'spangled,' rather than "exhibiting a variety of colours" (D. and V.). The reference is to the heavens 'stellis ardentibus aptum': cf. Proclus l.c. 222. 29 *φησὶ ποικίλον μὲν εἶναι τὸν τοῦ μεγίστου διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἀστέρων ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ κύκλῳ ποικιλίαν* and VII 529 C *n.*

35 **τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἑβδόμου κτλ.** The attributes which belong to the planets are poetically transferred to the rims which they inhabit.

τὸν δὲ τοῦ ὀγδόου. We infer that Plato believed the moon to be an opaque body fastened in the eighth rim and lightened by the Sun. The discovery that the moon shines with borrowed light was ascribed to Anaximenes (Zeller[5] I p. 248).

617 A 1 **τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πέμπτου κτλ.** The second and fifth are Saturn and Mercury, or *Φαίνων* and *Στίλβων*, as they were sometimes called, with reference to their brightness or colour. See the *de mundo* 2. 392[a] 23 ff. Yellow, according to Plato, is a mixture of white and red (*Tim.* 68 B). The third (*τρίτον δέ*) or Jupiter was known also as *Φαέθων*, and the fourth, or Mars, as *Πυρόεις*. Venus, which is the sixth, and comes next to Jupiter in whiteness, had the name *Φωσφόρος* (*de mundo* l. c.). Cf. [*Epin.*] 986 E ff. and Diels *Dox. Gr.* 344.

4 **κυκλεῖσθαι δὲ δὴ κτλ.** Cf. *Tim.* 36 C, D. The whorl of the fixed stars revolves from East to West, bearing with

ὅλον μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν φοράν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὅλῳ περιφερομένῳ τοὺς μὲν ἐντὸς ἑπτὰ κύκλους τὴν ἐναντίαν τῷ ὅλῳ ἠρέμα περιφέρεσθαι,
B αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τάχιστα μὲν ἰέναι τὸν ὄγδοον, δευτέρους | δὲ καὶ ἅμα ἀλλήλοις τόν τε ἕβδομον καὶ ἕκτον καὶ πέμπτον, τρίτον δὲ φορᾷ ἰέναι, ὡς σφίσι φαίνεσθαι, ἐπανακυκλούμενον τὸν τέταρτον· τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τρίτον καὶ πέμπτον τὸν δεύτερον. στρέφεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς Ἀνάγκης γόνασιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων αὐτοῦ

7. αὐτῶν $A^2\Xi q$: αὐτὸν A^1. 8. τρίτον q : τὸν τρίτον AΞ.

it in its revolution the other seven whorls. In this way Plato portrays the apparent daily revolution of the stars and planets. In order to represent the movements of the Sun, Moon and planets in their own particular orbits, Plato says that each of the seven inner whorls is all the while pursuing on its own account a motion in the opposite direction, viz. from West to East. The revolving whorls in the words of Proclus, 'carry round the stars' (*περιάγουσι τοὺς ἀστέρας* l.c. p. 226. 12) which are situated in their rims.

Would the mechanism of Plato's picture really produce the movements which it is intended to portray? The question may be interesting, but is irrelevant. Imaginary machines have imaginary properties; and Plato himself invokes the assistance of supernatural beings to carry on the movements (617 C). The important point to keep in mind, as Professor Cook Wilson observes, is that "Plato has realised that the apparent phenomena are what we call a composition of movements (or velocities). This composition of movements he is not attempting to explain, by giving the sort of machinery which he thought really produced it, but he is endeavouring to make us understand what the movements *are* (not how they originate), by putting the objects concerned in an imaginary machine, the movements of which we can represent to the senses, and which would produce such movements in the objects as they actually have." For similar reasons it is impossible to draw any inference from this passage as to the question whether Plato believed in the daily revolution of the earth. In the *Timaeus*, according to Grote (*Plato on the Earth's Rotation*, pp. 13 ff.), the cosmical axis is "a solid cylinder revolving or turning round, and causing thereby the revolution of the circumference or the sidereal sphere," and necessarily also carrying round with itself the Earth, which is massed or globed round the axis of the whole (*εἱλλομένην περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον Tim.* 40 B. 'Massed' or 'packed' is Boeckh's interpretation of *εἱλλομένην*, with which Grote also agrees; but whether the word really bears this meaning, is another question, which we need not here discuss.) In support of his explanation of the passage in the *Timaeus*, Grote appeals to the myth of the *Republic*; and the appeal would be justified if Plato's figure of Necessity's spindle were intended to explain the *cause*, and not merely to represent the *form*, of the celestial motions. As it is, the *Republic* does not warrant any conclusion either way. Cf. 616 D, E *n.*

7 **τάχιστα μὲν κτλ.** Cf. *Tim.* 38 C, D, 39 C, 40 B and [*Epin.*] 986 E ff.

617 B 8 **ἅμα ἀλλήλοις.** Πλάτων καὶ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ ἰσοδρόμους εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον, τὸν ἑωσφόρον (Venus), Στίλβωνα (Mercury): see Diels *Dox. Gr.* 346 and cf. *Tim.* 36 D, [*Epin.*] 986 E and Proclus l.c. 226. 21. Plato's *language* certainly means that these three bodies travel at the same pace, and if their speed is the same, obviously they cannot complete their orbits in the same period. But it is doubtful whether the contradiction was present to Plato's mind, and Proclus may be right in holding that Plato was really thinking of the periods of the planets (l.c. and *in Tim.* 259 C). See also on 617 B below.

τρίτον δὲ κτλ. See *cr. n.* The article, which was first rejected by Schleiermacher, is probably a dittographical mistake. Schneider, Hermann and Baiter retain it, despite the ambiguity.

9 **ἐπανακυκλούμενον.** The revolution, relatively to that of the whole, is retrograde: hence *ἐπανακυκλούμενον*.

11 **Ἀνάγκης γόνασιν.** Plato means us to imagine Necessity as seated in the centre of the Universe. The notion is

ἄνωθεν ἐφ' ἑκάστου βεβηκέναι Σειρῆνα συμπεριφερομένην, φωνὴν μίαν ἱεῖσαν, ἕνα τόνον· ἐκ πασῶν δὲ ὀκτὼ οὐσῶν μίαν ἁρμονίαν

probably Pythagorean; for Parmenides, who attaches himself to the Pythagoreans in this part of his system (Zeller[5] I p. 572), speaks of a central Ἀνάγκη as the cause of all movement and birth: see Diels *Dox. Gr.* 335. 12 ff. *τῶν δὲ συμμιγῶν* (sc. *στεφανῶν*) *τὴν μεσαιτάτην ἁπάσαις τοκέα πάσης κινήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ὑπάρχειν, ἥντινα καὶ δαίμονα κυβερνῆτιν καὶ κληδοῦχον ἐπονομάζει δίκην τε καὶ ἀνάγκην*, and Zeller l.c. p. 577 *n.* 3. (Zeller identifies this Ἀνάγκη with the central fire of the Pythagoreans.) The same school seem also to have held that Ἀνάγκη surrounds and holds the world together (Diels l.c. 321), and Zeller thinks it is this external Ἀνάγκη of which Plato here avails himself (l.c. p. 434 *n.* 3). But it is quite clear that Plato's Ἀνάγκη is in the middle: see on 616 B and 621 A, B. The interpretation of Plato's symbolism of course is that Necessity and Law spin the threads of life—the life of the Universe as well as that of man. *ἐν τοῖς τῆς Ἀνάγκης γόνασιν* is an echo of *θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται* and the like: cf. Proclus l.c. 227. 12.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων κτλ. *βεβηκέναι* means 'is perched.' Proclus *more suo* assures us that the Sirens are *ψυχαί τινες νοερῶς ζῶσαι* (l.c. 238. 6), but they are of course only a poetic fiction to express the 'music of the spheres.' Cf. *Merchant of Venice* V 1 "There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st, But in his motion *like an angel* sings." Plato goes beyond Shakespeare, setting the angels on the orbs and making them sing. Cf. Milton *Arcades* 63 ff. "the celestial Sirens' harmony That sit upon the nine"—in Plato there are only eight—"infolded Spheres." The seven planets by their movements were supposed by the Pythagoreans to give forth sounds corresponding to the notes of the Heptachord. This was probably the original form of the 'Music of the Spheres.' Later, it was held that the circle of the fixed stars had also a note of its own, and a 'harmony' or mode (see on III 398 E ff.) resulted like that of the Octachord. The underlying idea of the doctrine of the 'Music of the Spheres' was well expressed by Dorylaus when he said the Universe was the 'organum Dei' (Censor. *de die natali* 13: cf. also Milton *Ode on the Nativity* "And bid the bass of *heaven's deep organ* blow"). See also next note.

12 φωνὴν μίαν, ἕνα τόνον: 'a single sound, a single musical note.' "Additum *ἕνα τόνον* per epexegesin est" (Stallbaum). Cf. Proclus l.c. 236. 27 ff. *ἡ μὲν γὰρ μία φωνὴ δηλοῖ τὴν ἀμετάβολον τοῦ τῆς ἐνεργείας εἴδους εἰς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μέλος ὕπαρξιν, ὡς ἑκάστης Σειρῆνος ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἱείσης φωνήν· ὁ δὲ εἰς τόνος τὴν ποιὰν φωνὴν ἐδήλωσεν εἰς ἑνὸς ἀπήχησιν φθόγγου τελοῦσαν· παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τάσιν καὶ ὁ φθόγγος καλεῖται τόνος.* There is also perhaps a slight rhetorical effect, though less than in *τὸ δεινόν, τὸ μέγα* IX 590 A. The reading *ἕνα τόνον* is confirmed by Plut. *de anim. procr.* 1029 C and Proclus *in Tim.* 259 C and *in remp.* l.c. et al. It is difficult to understand *ἀνὰ τόνον*, which Hermann and Baiter read, following *q* and a few inferior MSS. *ἀνὰ τόνον* could hardly mean 'one note each,' as Hermann supposes. With regard to the *ἁρμονία* itself, the pitch of the several notes will of course be determined by the speed of the different whorls (cf. VII 530 D *n.*), so that if we express the notes by the names of the circles which produce them, the *ἁρμονία* will be:—

Circle of the Fixed Stars (*νήτη*)
,, ,, ,, Moon
,, ,, ,, Sun
,, ,, Venus } (*μέση*)
,, ,, Mercury }
,, ,, Mars
,, ,, Jupiter
,, ,, Saturn (*ὑπάτη*)

It is clear that Plato is thinking of a sort of mode (*ἐκ πασῶν δὲ ὀκτὼ οὐσῶν μίαν ἁρμονίαν ξυμφωνεῖν*), but if we understand *ἅμα ἀλλήλοις* strictly, there will only be six notes, because Mercury, Venus and the Sun will each have the same note. Difficulties of this sort might have troubled the later Pythagoreans, but scarcely Plato, least of all in an imaginative picture of this kind. We note however that according to Plato the speed of the planets—except in the case of the Sun, Venus and Mercury—diminishes in proportion to their distance from the Earth. Now we may reasonably suppose that Plato thought the more distant planets took longer to complete their orbit than those which are nearer, so that

ξυμφωνεῖν. ἄλλας δὲ καθημένας πέριξ δι' ἴσου τρεῖς, ἐν θρόνῳ
C ἑκάστην, θυγατέρας τῆς Ἀνάγκης, Μοίρας, λευχειμονούσας, στέμ- 15
ματα ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν ἐχούσας, Λάχεσίν τε καὶ Κλωθὼ καὶ
Ἄτροπον, ὑμνεῖν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Σειρήνων ἁρμονίαν, Λάχεσιν μὲν
τὰ γεγονότα, Κλωθὼ δὲ τὰ ὄντα, Ἄτροπον δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα. καὶ
τὴν μὲν Κλωθὼ τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ ἐφαπτομένην συνεπιστρέφειν τοῦ
ἀτράκτου τὴν ἔξω περιφοράν, διαλείπουσαν χρόνον, τὴν δὲ Ἄτρο- 20
D πον τῇ ἀριστερᾷ τὰς ἐντὸς αὖ ὡσαύτως· τὴν δὲ Λάχεσιν ἐν μέρει
ἑκατέρας ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ χειρὶ ἐφάπτεσθαι.

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it is by no means improbable that in speaking of the speed of the planetary movements, Plato really had in his mind the time occupied by the orbital periods and not the rate of progression of the planets themselves. See also above on ἅμα ἀλλήλοις. In that case the octave will be complete, because in order to complete their orbits in the same time, the Sun, Venus and Mercury will have to travel at different rates of speed. Later writers knew all about the Music of the Spheres, and a choir of eight Neo-Pythagoreans would have had no difficulty in rendering it on a small scale: see for example von Jan's *Mus. Scr. Gr.* pp. 241 ff., 271 ff., 418 f. Cf. also Zeller[5] I pp. 429—434.

617 C 15 **Μοίρας, λευχειμονούσας.** Ettig l.c. p. 309 *n.* 3 thinks this an Orphic trait, comparing *Frag.* 253 Abel Μοίρας—λευκοστόλους.

16 **ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν.** These words are bracketed by Herwerden, on the ground that περὶ τὰς κεφαλάς would alone be good Greek, an opinion which few scholars will share.

17 **Λάχεσιν μὲν κτλ.** Lachesis is the Fate of the Past, Clotho of the Present, and Atropos of the Future: cf. *Laws* 960 C, where Plato approves of the ancient tradition Λάχεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην εἶναι, Κλωθὼ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν Ἄτροπον δὲ τρίτην and Proclus l.c. 244. 20 ff. The positions of Lachesis and Atropos were sometimes interchanged, as for example in [Arist.] *de mundo* 7. 401[b] 18 ff. τέτακται δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ γεγονὸς μία τῶν Μοιρῶν, Ἄτροπος, ἐπεὶ τὰ παρελθόντα πάντα ἄτρεπτά ἐστιν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέλλον Λάχεσις (εἰς πάντα γὰρ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν μένει λῆξις), κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐνεστὸς Κλωθώ, συμπεραίνουσά τε καὶ κλώθουσα ἑκάστῳ τὰ οἰκεῖα: cf. also Proclus l.c. 244.

19 **τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρί.** The right hand is reserved for the outermost whorl, or circle of the Same, which is the more honourable, and itself, according to *Tim.* 36 C, moves ἐπὶ δεξιά: the left for the less honourable circle of the Other, which moves ἐπ' ἀριστερά (ib.). Pythagorean influence is doubtless at work again here: cf. 614 C *n.*

συνεπιστρέφειν: "cum matre simul vertere" (Ficinus).

20 **τὴν ἔξω περιφορὰν κτλ.** The circle of the Same may be taken as the type of that which 'is': hence it is entrusted to Clotho, the Fate of τὰ ὄντα. The courses of the Planets or 'wandering' stars are symbolical of the unknown and (as it seems to us) uncertain Future, so that they are appropriately given to the Fate of the Future, i.e. Atropos. διαλείπουσαν χρόνον means 'leaving intervals' i.e. 'from time to time.' Clotho leaves off occasionally to make room for Lachesis, as Plato explains in τὴν δὲ Λάχεσιν below. Similarly also Proclus l.c. 252. 8.

21 **ὡσαύτως:** i.e. διαλείπουσαν χρόνον.

617 C, D 21 **τὴν δὲ Λάχεσιν κτλ.:** 'while Lachesis lays hold of either in turn, the one with the one hand, the other with the other' ("abwechselnd den einen mit der einen, den andern mit der andern angreifend" Schneider). She turns the circle of the Same with her right hand, the others—here treated as a single περιφορά as in *Tim.* 36 C—with her left. The translation "laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other" (Jowett) is not, I think, what Plato means: for it would seem from what is said of Clotho and Lachesis that the right hand is appropriated to the circle of the Same, the left to that of the Other: see on 617 C. The words ἐν μέρει—if my view is right—belong only to ἑκατέρας ἑφάπτεσθαι and not also to ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ χειρί. As the fate

XV. Σφᾶς οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ἀφικέσθαι, εὐθὺς δεῖν ἰέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν. προφήτην οὖν τινὰ σφᾶς πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τάξει διαστῆσαι, ἔπειτα λαβόντα ἐκ τῶν τῆς Λαχέσεως γονάτων κλήρους τε καὶ βίων παραδείγματα, ἀναβάντα ἐπί τι βῆμα ὑψηλὸν εἰπεῖν· Ἀνάγκης θυγατρὸς κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος. ψυχαὶ ἐφήμεροι, ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ γένους θανατηφόρου. οὐχ ὑμᾶς

Past, Lachesis fitly contributes to both revolutions: for on the Past depends both the Present and the Future. A similar lesson is conveyed by representing the lots and samples of lives as lying in the lap of Lachesis: cf. also 620 A *κατὰ συνήθειαν—αἱρεῖσθαι* and 620 E *n.*

617 D—**619** A *As soon as they arrived upon the scene, the souls were called upon to choose new lives. The order of choosing was determined by lot; but there were many more samples of lives than lots, and every soul was made responsible for its own choice. The moment of choice is the supreme crisis of our fate, and it behoves us to spare no effort to equip ourselves for resisting the attractions of wealth and power, and selecting the better life, that is, the life of virtue.*

27 **Ἀνάγκης κτλ.** Proclus' remarks on the style of this speech deserve attention: *πανταχοῦ μὲν ὁ Πλάτων νοῦν ἡγεμόνα προστησάμενος ὧν φθέγγεται νοερῶν ὄντως ἐπάξια φθέγγεται θεαμάτων· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τοὺς κρείττονας ἡμῶν ἀπεικονίζηται, σαφῶς ἐνθεάζοντι προσέοικε καὶ τοὺς φοιβολήπτους μιμεῖται, ῥήματα ἀφιεὶς ὥσπερ βέλη νοῦ γέμοντα καὶ ὑψηλῶν ἐπιβολῶν· συνεξορμώσης δὲ αὐτῷ τῆς ἑρμηνείας ταῖς νοήσεσιν ἀκαλλωπίστως συνεστραμμένοις μὲν χρῆται φθέγμασιν, ἀπολελυμένα δὲ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων αὐτὰ διίστησιν τὴν ἀπόλυτον μιμούμενος θέαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπ' ἄλλων ἐπ' ἄλλα πηδῶσαν· οἷα καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐργάζεται τῶν τοῦ προφήτου λόγων, ἐν ἐλαχίστοις μὲν ἀπεριήγητα νοήματα συλλαβών, ἀσύνδετα δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα φθεγξάμενος, συστρέψας δὲ τὰ κῶλα τοῖς αἰνίγμασιν παραπλησίως* (l.c. 269). The omission of articles also adds dignity and impressiveness: cf. VII 518 A al.

ψυχαὶ κτλ. Plato loosely calls the souls *ἐφήμεροι*, because their connexion with body is transient. In themselves of course, they are immortal—*ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος* (*Phaedr.* 245 C). The explanation of Proclus is somewhat different, and, as often happens, too recondite: *τὰς μὲν ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχάς, οὔτι γε πάσας, ἀλλὰ τὰς γενέσεως ἐπορεγομένας ἤδη καλῶν ἐφημέρους, ὡς θνητῶν καὶ ἐφημέρων ἀπτομένας* (l.c. 270). *περιόδου* means of course *τῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπὶ γένεσιν περιόδου*, viz. 1100 years (supra 615 A *n.*); and *θανατηφόρου*, 'fraught with death,' 'death-bringing' agrees with *περιόδου*.

617 D, E 28 **οὐχ ὑμᾶς—αἱρήσεσθε.** Cf. infra 620 D, E *δν εἵλετο δαίμονα—φύλακα ξυμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἱρεθέντων.* Each individual soul is accompanied throughout its life on earth by a *δαίμων* of its own. This *δαίμων* is the personification of its destiny throughout that particular life—its *genius* in short, *albus* or *ater* (Hor. *Epp.* II 2. 189), according as the soul is *εὐδαίμων* or *κακοδαίμων*. There are not a few traces of this belief before the time of Plato, e.g. in Heraclitus' famous saying *ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων* (*Fr.* 121 Bywater) in Pind. *Ol.* 13. 28 *Ζεῦ πάτερ—Ξενοφῶντος εὐθυνε δαίμονος οὖρον*, and often in Euripides (examples in Nägelsbach *Nachhom. Theol.* p. 113); and Döring (l.c. p. 489) is no doubt right in holding that the doctrine was not exclusively Orphic or Pythagorean. According to the popular view, which Plato himself is content to make use of in *Phaed.* 107 D *ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἵληχει*, we do not *choose* our *δαίμων*, but are rather allotted to it: cf. *Theocr.* 4. 40 *αἳ αἳ τῷ σκληρῷ μάλα δαίμονος, ὅς με λέλογχεν*, and the fine lines of Menander *ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται | εὐθὺς γενομένῳ, μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου* (Mein. *Frag. Com. Graec.* IV p. 238), together with Homer *Il.* XXIII 79 (*κὴρ*) *ἥπερ λάχε γεινόμενόν περ.* In the emphatic *οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται*, Plato proclaims his dissent from the popular view: the individual is *himself* responsible for his destiny (*ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς—αἱρήσεσθε*). Hence *αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος.* On later, especially Stoic, developments of the doctrine of a *δαίμων* see Rohde *Psyche*[2] II p. 316 *n.* See also on 620 D.

E | δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε. πρῶτος δ' ὁ λαχὼν πρῶτος αἱρείσθω βίον, ᾧ συνέσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ἀρετὴ 30
δὲ ἀδέσποτον· ἣν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς
ἕκαστος ἕξει. αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος. ταῦτα εἰπόντα
ῥῖψαι ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς κλήρους, τὸν δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν πεσόντα
ἕκαστον ἀναιρεῖσθαι, πλὴν οὗ. ἃ δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν. τῷ δὲ ἀνελομένῳ
618 δῆλον εἶναι, ὁπόστος εἰλήχει. | μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰ τῶν βίων 35
παραδείγματα εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν σφῶν θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, πολὺ

30. συνέσται $A^2\Xi q$: συνεστε (*sic*) A^1. 34. ἃ δὲ Ξ: εδε (*sic*) A^1: ἔδει A^2: ἤδε *q*. 35. εἰλήχει A^1: εἴληχεν A^2: εἴληκε (*sic*) Ξ: ἤλεγχε *q*.

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29 **πρῶτος—βίον.** See on 618 A πολὺ πλείω τῶν παρόντων.

30 **ἐξ ἀνάγκης.** The choice, though free, is irrevocable: ἐνεδέχετο γὰρ καὶ ἄλλον βίον ζῆν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως, μετὰ δὲ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἀδύνατον (Proclus l.c. 275).

ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον. "Mortals that would follow me, Love Virtue, she alone is free" (Milton *Comus* 1018 f.). On Platonic principles, a thing *is* in so far as it is good (VI 509 B ff.), so that our truest individuality is nothing more or less than that which is the best and highest part of our nature: cf. the words of Aristotle, who in *Eth. Nic.* X 7. 1178ª 2 πλατωνίζει as follows: δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο (i.e. τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ), εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. We therefore attain our fullest development and enjoy our only true liberty as individuals by becoming servants of Virtue. In the words of Goethe, "Das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben." Proclus' comment, though true and instructive as far as it goes, does not exhaust the significance of Plato's saying: ἀδέσποτον δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μόνον, ἀλλὰ διότι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλευθέραν ἀποτελεῖ τῶν πικροτάτων δεσποτῶν, οἷς ἡ δουλεύουσα τῶν ἀγαθῶν στέρεται πάντων (l.c. 276. 5 ff. Cf. also Pl. *Rep.* I 329 C and especially Xen. *Mem.* IV 5. 3—5). The germ of the Platonic doctrine of moral freedom is to be found in the Socratic οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρός (see on IX 577 D, E): for its sequel, we should look to the Stoic theory of the freedom of the wise man (ἐλευθέρους τοὺς σπουδαίους μόνον Zeno ap. D. L. VII 33): see especially Epictetus *Gnom. Epict. Stob.* 31 ed. Schenkl ἐλευθερία καὶ δουλεία, τὸ μὲν ἀρετῆς ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ κακίας and the chapter περὶ ἐλευθερίας ib. *Dissert.* IV 1.

32 **αἰτία—ἀναίτιος.** Cf. II 379 B ff. and *Tim.* 42 D. The whole of Lachesis' speech is frequently quoted or referred to by later Greek writers (see the references in Schneider's note), and these words in particular became a kind of rallying-cry among the champions of the freedom of the will in the early Christian era (Dieterich *Nek.* p. 115 *n.*). A bust of Plato found at Tibur and dating from the first century B.C. bears the inscription αἰτία ἑλομένῳ (*sic*). Θεὸς ἀναίτιος, together with ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος (from *Phaedr.* 245 C). See Kaibel IGIS 1196 quoted by Dieterich l.c. With the sentiment itself cf. *Laws* 904 B—D.

618 A 2 πολὺ πλείω τῶν παρόντων. Cf. 619 B, 620 C. The combination of κλήρωσις and αἵρεσις, which appears also in *Phaedr.* 249 B, is according to Thompson "a mythical mode of reconciling freedom and necessity—choice being left free under limiting conditions." I think the introduction of the lot is rather intended to account for the conspicuous inequalities between different men in respect of accidents of birth, fortune and the other ἀδιάφορα προηγμένα (to use a Stoic term). *Ceteris paribus*, a soul would presumably select a μετρίως κεχορηγημένον βίον: where it does not, we may suppose, in general, that the κλήρωσις compelled it to choose late. Cf. Plot. *Ennead.* II 3. 15 οἱ κλῆροι τίνες; ἢ—τὸ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τόδε τὸ σῶμα καὶ τῶνδε γονέων καὶ ἐν τούτοις τόποις γίνεσθαι, καὶ ὅλως, ὡς εἴπομεν, τὰ ἔξω. This interpretation is supported also by the case of Odysseus below (620 C). See also on 619 D.

πλείω τῶν παρόντων· εἶναι δὲ παντοδαπά· ζῴων τε γὰρ πάντων
βίους καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους ἅπαντας. τυραννίδας τε γὰρ
ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, τὰς μὲν διατελεῖς, τὰς δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ διαφθειρομένας
καὶ εἰς πενίας τε καὶ φυγὰς καὶ εἰς πτωχείας τελευτώσας· εἶναι
δὲ καὶ δοκίμων ἀνδρῶν βίους, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ εἴδεσιν καὶ κατὰ κάλλη
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἰσχύν τε | καὶ ἀγωνίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ γένεσιν καὶ προ- B
γόνων ἀρεταῖς, καὶ ἀδοκίμων κατὰ ταὐτά· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γυναι-
κῶν. ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν οὐκ ἐνεῖναι, διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλον
ἑλομένην βίον ἀλλοίαν γίγνεσθαι· τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ
πλούτοις καὶ πενίαις, τὰ δὲ νόσοις, τὰ δ' ὑγιείαις μεμῖχθαι, τὰ δὲ
καὶ μεσοῦν τούτων. ἔνθα δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὁ πᾶς
κίνδυνος ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μάλιστα ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως
ἕκαστος ἡμῶν | τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας τούτου τοῦ μαθή- C
ματος καὶ ζητητὴς καὶ μαθητὴς ἔσται, ἐάν ποθεν οἷός τ' ᾖ μαθεῖν

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3 **ζῴων τε γὰρ κτλ.** Did Plato seriously believe in the transmigration of the soul? Teichmüller summarily dismisses the entire theory as unplatonic (*Die Plat. Frage* pp. 1—20), while Susemihl, in harmony with certain ancient writers (see the references in Simson *Der Begriff d. Seele bei Platon* p. 152 *n.*), takes Plato at his word so far as concerns the passage of the soul into new human bodies, but refuses to allow that he could have believed in transmigration into the forms of the lower animals (*Genet. Entwick.* II p. 272). Plato's language is however quite explicit, and there is the less reason for resorting to an allegorical interpretation, because the doctrine was already familiar in Greek philosophical and religious thought (see F. Laudowicz *Wesen u. Ursprung d. Lehre v. d. Präexistenz d. Seele* etc. pp. 12—29 and Rohde *Psyche*[2] II pp. 162 ff.), and is itself in general conformity with Plato's own conception of immortality. The doctrine of transmigration meets us frequently in Plato's dialogues, e.g. in *Men.* 81 A ff.; *Phaed.* 81 E ff., 113 A; *Phaedr.* 249 B; *Tim.* 42 B ff.: cf. 91 D ff. Most if not all of these passages have a mythical colouring, and should therefore be read in the light of the caveat which Plato subjoins to the eschatological myth of the *Phaedo*: *τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστιν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν—ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν* (114 D). That soul is immortal, Plato is firmly convinced: and transmigration he regards as probable, to say the least. Cf. 608 D *n.*

5 **διατελεῖς.** This word, for which Cobet proposes *διὰ τέλους*, is extremely rare in classical Greek, occurring only here and in Soph. *O. C.* 1514.

6 **εἰς πενίας κτλ.** "Expectes *εἰς φυγάς τε καὶ πενίας καὶ εἰς πτωχείας κτλ.*" (Herwerden). The text may well stand. Plato contrasts poverty and exile (*πενίας τε καὶ φυγάς*) with beggary, presumably at home (*καὶ εἰς πτωχείας*).

618 B 10 **ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν—γίγνεσθαι.** Cf. Hom. *Od.* XVIII 136 f. *τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων | οἷον ἐπ' ἦμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*, XVII 322 f. and Empedocles 319 f. Karsten *ὅσσον γ' ἀλλοῖοι μετέφυν, τόσον ἄρ σφισιν αἰεὶ | καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίστατο* with Karsten ad loc. See also on I 335 B.

11 **τὰ δ' ἄλλα:** sc. except *ψυχῆς τάξιν*. In *τὰ ἄλλα* are included *κάλλος, προγόνων ἀρεταί* etc.

13 **μεσοῦν τούτων:** i.q. *μεσοῦντα εἶναι τούτων*, viz. *πλούτων καὶ πενιῶν, νόσων καὶ ὑγιειῶν*. Cf. 619 A *τὸν μέσον—τῶν τοιούτων βίον*.

618 C 15 **τοῦ μαθήματος** and *μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν* are bracketed by Herwerden. The emphatic pleonasm is thoroughly Platonic. Cf. V 472 C et al.

καὶ ἐξευρεῖν, τίς αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα, τὸν βελτίω ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ἀεὶ πανταχοῦ αἱρεῖσθαι, ἀναλογιζόμενον πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα, καὶ ξυντιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις καὶ διαιρούμενα, πρὸς ἀρετὴν βίου
D πῶς ἔχει, καὶ εἰδέναι τί κάλλος πενίᾳ ἢ πλούτῳ κραθὲν | καὶ μετὰ ποίας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἕξεως κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἐργάζεται, καὶ τί εὐγένειαι καὶ δυσγένειαι καὶ ἰδιωτεῖαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἰσχύες καὶ ἀσθένειαι καὶ εὐμαθίαι καὶ δυσμαθίαι, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχὴν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἐπικτήτων τί ξυγκεραννύμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐργάζεται, ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων αὐτῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι συλλογισάμενον αἱρεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀποβλέποντα τόν
E τε χείρω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω βίον χείρω | μὲν καλοῦντα ὃς αὐτὴν ἐκεῖσε ἄξει, εἰς τὸ ἀδικωτέραν γίγνεσθαι, ἀμείνω δὲ ὅστις εἰς τὸ δικαιοτέραν. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα χαίρειν ἐάσει· ἑωράκαμεν γάρ,
619 ὅτι ζῶντί τε καὶ τελευτήσαντι αὕτη κρατίστη αἵρεσις. ἀδαμαντί- | νως δὴ δεῖ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔχοντα εἰς Ἅιδου ἰέναι, ὅπως ἂν ᾖ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἀνέκπληκτος ὑπὸ πλούτων τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, καὶ μὴ ἐμπεσὼν εἰς τυραννίδας καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας πράξεις πολλὰ μὲν ἐργάσηται καὶ ἀνήκεστα κακά, ἔτι δὲ αὐτὸς μείζω πάθῃ, ἀλλὰ γνῷ τὸν μέσον ἀεὶ τῶν τοιούτων βίον αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ φεύγειν τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα ἑκατέρωσε καὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ βίῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν
B καὶ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἔπειτα· οὕτω γὰρ εὐδαιμονέστατος | γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος.

XVI. Καὶ δὴ οὖν καὶ τότε ὁ ἐκεῖθεν ἄγγελος ἤγγελλε τὸν μὲν προφήτην οὕτως εἰπεῖν· καὶ τελευταίῳ ἐπιόντι, ξὺν νῷ ἑλομένῳ,

21. καὶ εἰδέναι Ξq: εἰδέναι A. 10. νῷ $A^2Ξ$: om. A^1q.

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21 καὶ εἰδέναι. See *cr. n.* *καί* is found in several MSS besides Ξ and *q*. Hermann removes the *καί* before *ξυντιθέμενα* and places it before *ἀναλογιζόμενον*, but *ἀναλογιζόμενον* "necessario cum *αἱρεῖσθαι* cohaeret" (Schneider).

618 D 27 αἱρεῖσθαι κτλ. *αἱρεῖσθαι* 'to make his choice' is used absolutely as in 620 A. *πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κτλ.* means 'defining the worse and the better life with reference to the nature of the *soul*, calling that worse' etc. (So also Schneider.) The two parts of *τόν τε χείρω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω βίον* are afterwards taken separately in *χείρω μέν* and *ἀμείνω δέ*, as with so-called 'partitive apposition': cf. 611 D and IV 431 A *n.* Others take *αἱρεῖσθαι* with *τόν τε χείρω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω βίον*, but *αἱρεῖσθαι* is different from *διαιρεῖσθαι* and the possibility of a zeugma is excluded because *τὸν χείρω* precedes *τὸν ἀμείνω* and not *vice-versâ*.

618 E 29 ἐκεῖσε looks forward, of course, to *εἰς τὸ ἀδικωτέραν γίγνεσθαι*. Herwerden's *ἐκεῖ* (=*ἐν Ἅιδου*) is both needless and wrong: for the soul becomes *ἀδικωτέρα*, if at all, during its life on earth: in Hades it is purged.

30 ἐάσει. Ξ and *v*, followed by editors before Schneider, have *ἐᾷ*. The future is easy if the sentence be made independent.

619 B 10 ξὺν νῷ. On *ξύν* see IV 424 E *n.*

συντόνως ζῶντι κεῖται βίος ἀγαπητός, οὐ κακός. μήτε ὁ ἄρχων αἱρέσεως ἀμελείτω, μήτε ὁ τελευτῶν ἀθυμείτω. εἰπόντος δὲ ταῦτα τὸν πρῶτον λαχόντα ἔφη εὐθὺς ἐπιόντα τὴν μεγίστην τυραννίδα ἐλέσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης τε καὶ λαιμαργίας οὐ πάντα ἱκανῶς ἀνασκεψάμενον ἑλέσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λαθεῖν ἐνοῦσαν εἱμαρμένην C παίδων αὑτοῦ βρώσεις καὶ ἄλλα κακά· ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν σκέψασθαι, κόπτεσθαί τε καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν, οὐκ ἐμμένοντα τοῖς προρρηθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ προφήτου· οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν αἰτιᾶσθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τύχην τε καὶ δαίμονας καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ. εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς D τοιούτοις ἁλισκομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἥκοντας, ἅτε πόνων ἀγυμνάστους· τῶν δ' ἐκ τῆς γῆς τοὺς πολλούς, ἅτε αὐτούς τε πεπονηκότας ἄλλους τε ἑωρακότας, οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς τὰς αἱρέσεις ποιεῖσθαι. διὸ δὴ καὶ μεταβολὴν τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς

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11 συντόνως ζῶντι: according to the motto (ἁπλοῦς καί) ἀτενής (VIII 547 E). *συντόνως ζητοῦντι*, which Herwerden conjectured, appears in *q* and Flor. U: but the reading of A is far more characteristic and significant.

619 B—620 D *Many were the instances of hasty and foolish choosing: and many the changes resulting both from choice and from the action of the lot. He who is ever faithful to the life of true philosophy, and whose lot does not fall out among the last, will be happy throughout all time. The spectacle was indeed one fitted to move pity, smiles, and wonder. In most cases, the souls chose in conformity with their previous lives—Orpheus, for example, selecting the life of a swan, Ajax that of a lion, and so on. It chanced that Odysseus had drawn the last lot of all, and after long search he found and joyously laid hold of the peaceful life of a private individual, for he was wearied of all his labours. There were changes from beasts to men, and from men to beasts, and every form of permutation.*

619 C 21 ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας κτλ. Cf. *Phaed.* 82 A f. οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ, and see also on VI 500 D, 506 C. It is interesting to observe that philosophic virtue is not a *sine qua non* for admission to the Platonic heaven. Throughout the whole myth, rewards and punishments are distributed for good and bad actions rather than for knowledge and ignorance (cf. 615 B ff.); and correct opinion or 'Orthodoxy,' in Plato's sense of the word, provided the lines have fallen to it in pleasant places, may well have been both blameless and beneficent on earth. But in the moment of supremest peril (618 B), when we have to choose another life, it is Knowledge, and not 'Orthodoxy,' that prevails. In the *Phaedo* l.c. Plato says that the 'orthodox' probably enter as before εἰς τοιοῦτον—πολιτικόν τε καὶ ἥμερον γένος, ἥ που μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν, ἢ μυρμήκων, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταὐτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους.

619 D 22 ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν: not "according to Er's account" (D. and V.), but 'as one might say,' 'broadly speaking,' i.q. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. Cf. *Laws* 639 E (ξύμπανθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν), 795 D, *Soph.* 220 E, *Phaedr.* 258 E, and [*Epin.*] 976 E. These examples are cited by Grünenwald in Schanz's *Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. Gr. Spr.* II 3. pp. 21 ff.

πολλαῖς τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ κλήρου τύχην. ἐπεὶ εἴ τις ἀεί, ὁπότε εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον ἀφικνοῖτο, ὑγιῶς φιλο-
E σοφοῖ, | καὶ ὁ κλῆρος αὐτῷ τῆς αἱρέσεως μὴ ἐν τελευταίοις πίπτοι, κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλομένων οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε εὐδαι- 30
μονεῖν ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε καὶ δεῦρο πάλιν πορείαν οὐκ ἂν χθονίαν καὶ τραχεῖαν πορεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λείαν τε καὶ οὐρανίαν. ταύτην γὰρ δὴ ἔφη τὴν θέαν ἀξίαν εἶναι ἰδεῖν, ὡς ἕκασται
620 αἱ ψυχαὶ ᾑροῦντο τοὺς βίους. | ἐλεεινήν τε γὰρ ἰδεῖν εἶναι καὶ γελοίαν καὶ θαυμασίαν. κατὰ συνήθειαν γὰρ τοῦ προτέρου βίου τὰ πολλὰ αἱρεῖσθαι. ἰδεῖν μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴν ἔφη τήν ποτε Ὀρφέως γενομένην κύκνου βίον αἱρουμένην, μίσει τοῦ γυναικείου γένους διὰ τὸν ὑπ' ἐκείνων θάνατον οὐκ ἐθέλουσαν ἐν γυναικὶ γεννηθεῖσαν 5
γενέσθαι· ἰδεῖν δὲ τὴν Θαμύρου ἀηδόνος ἑλομένην· ἰδεῖν δὲ καὶ κύκνον μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἀνθρωπίνου βίου αἵρεσιν, καὶ ἄλλα ζῷα
B μουσικὰ ὡσαύτως. | εἰκοστὴν δὲ λαχοῦσαν ψυχὴν ἐλέσθαι λέοντος

33. ταύτην—μίγνυσθαι (620 D) om. *q*. 8. ὡσαύτως. εἰκοστὴν Vind. F: ὡσαύτως εἰκός. τὴν A: ὡσαύτως, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς τὴν Ξ.

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27 **καὶ διὰ—τύχην** 'as well as by the fortune of the lot' is doubted by Herwerden, while Richards calls for *καὶ <οὐ> διά*, relying on 619 B *καὶ τελευταίῳ—ἀθυμείτω* and on 'the drift of the whole passage.' In point of fact, however, Plato nowhere denies that the fortune of the lot affects the issue. On the contrary, his whole theory supposes that it does, for those souls who choose late have fewer lives to choose from: see 617 E, 618 A, 620 C. *ὁ τελευτῶν*, it is true, need not despair (619 B), but none the less is the lot likely to produce *μεταβολὴ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν*. Cf. Procl. l.c. 302. 15 ff. *τούτοιν χρεία δυεῖν, ἑνὸς μὲν τῆς ὀρθῆς κρίσεως περὶ τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ χεῖρον τῶν προτεινομένων βίων, ἑτέρου δὲ τοῦ τὸν κλῆρον μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις πίπτειν· τί γὰρ εἰ καὶ ὁ αἱρούμενος εἴη περὶ κρίσιν ἀσφαλής, ἀλλ' οἱ προτεινόμενοι βίοι διὰ δή τινας αἰτίας οἱ τυχόντες εἶεν;* See also on 618 A and following note.

28 **ἐπεὶ κτλ.** The connexion of ideas is: The fortune of the lot, and our individual choice, are the two influences that affect our destiny: for if our lot is reasonably early and we choose as befits philosophers, it will be well with us. *ἐπεί* "reddit rationem ante dictorum" (Schneider). The sense is surely both plain and satisfactory, although Richards asserts that "*ἐπεί* has no meaning, unless there was an *οὐ* preceding."

619 E 32 **οὐκ ἂν χθονίαν—οὐρανίαν** is explained by 614 B—D: see notes ad loc. In the *Phaedrus* those souls which choose the philosophic life three times successively are "excused from seven of the ten millennial probations through which the rest have to pass" (Thompson on 249 A).

33 **γάρ** is resumptive. For examples of this usage see Shilleto on Dem. *F. L.* 107.

620 A 2 **κατὰ συνήθειαν κτλ.** Cf. *Phaed.* 81 E ff. *ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη, ὁποῖ' ἄττ' ἂν μεμελητηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ κτλ.*

6 **Θαμύρου.** Thamyris and not Thamyras was the usual form of this name, but Plato prefers Θαμύρας: cf. *Ion* 533 C *ἢ περὶ Θαμύρου ἢ περὶ Ὀρφέως*, *Laws* 829 E *τῶν Θαμύρου τε καὶ Ὀρφείων ὕμνων*. The meaning of *τὰ πολλά* ('for the most part') will be seen from the case of Odysseus below (620 C f.).

620 B 8 **ὡσαύτως. εἰκοστὴν κτλ.** The reading *εἰκοστήν* is confirmed by Plut. *Conv. Disp.* VIII 5. 739 E ff. (*διὰ τί Πλάτων εἰκοστὴν ἔφη ψυχὴν τοῦ Αἴαντος ἐπὶ τὸν κλῆρον ἐλθεῖν;*) as well as by Proclus l.c. 265. 20 and elsewhere. It appears

βίον· εἶναι δὲ τὴν Αἴαντος τοῦ Τελαμωνίου, φεύγουσαν ἄνθρωπον γενέσθαι, μεμνημένην τῆς τῶν ὅπλων κρίσεως. τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ Ἀγαμέμνονος· ἔχθρᾳ δὲ καὶ ταύτην τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους διὰ τὰ πάθη ἀετοῦ διαλλάξαι βίον. ἐν μέσοις δὲ λαχοῦσαν τὴν Ἀταλάντης ψυχήν, κατιδοῦσαν μεγάλας τιμὰς ἀθλητοῦ ἀνδρός, οὐ δύνασθαι παρελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ λαβεῖν. μετὰ δὲ | ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὴν Ἐπειοῦ C τοῦ Πανοπέως εἰς τεχνικῆς γυναικὸς ἰοῦσαν φύσιν· πόρρω δ' ἐν ὑστάτοις ἰδεῖν τὴν τοῦ γελωτοποιοῦ Θερσίτου πίθηκον ἐνδυομένην. κατὰ τύχην δὲ τὴν Ὀδυσσέως, λαχοῦσαν πασῶν ὑστάτην, αἱρησομένην ἰέναι, μνήμῃ δὲ τῶν προτέρων πόνων φιλοτιμίας λελωφηκυῖαν ζητεῖν περιιοῦσαν χρόνον πολὺν βίον ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἀπράγμονος καὶ μόγις εὑρεῖν κείμενόν που καὶ παρημελημένον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ εἰπεῖν | ἰδοῦσαν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπραξεν καὶ πρώτη D λαχοῦσα, καὶ ἀσμένην ἑλέσθαι. καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ θηρίων

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from these passages that some of the ancients found a subtle significance in *εἰκοστήν*: but the particular number is probably only a circumstantial detail intended to add verisimilitude to the narrative. See also on 614 B. Herwerden conjectures *ὡσαύτως, ὡς τὸ <εἰκός· . . . .> εἰκοστὴν δὲ* κτλ., and inserts between *εἰκός* and *εἰκοστήν* the words *καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων—μίγνυσθαι* from 620 D. There is however nothing to indicate that the text has suffered dislocation: see on 620 D below.

λέοντος βίον. Ettig (*Acheruntica* l.c. p. 310) explains the choice of Ajax by referring to *Tim.* 91 E *τὸ δ' αὖ πεζὸν καὶ θηριώδες γέγονεν ἐκ τῶν μηδὲν προσχρωμένων φιλοσοφίᾳ*, but the conspicuous feature in Ajax was *θυμός*, and that is why he selects the life which typifies *τὸ θυμοειδές*: see IX 588 E. Cf. Proclus l.c. 316. 31 ff. *ἡ μὲν Αἴαντος ψυχὴ πᾶσαν δηλοῖ ζωὴν ἀνδρικὴν μέν, πλεονάζουσαν δὲ κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν διὰ δή τινα φιλόνικον ψυχῆς ἕξιν, καὶ διὰ ταύτην ἐνδυομένην εἰς ἀνδρικὸν μὲν ζῷον, ἄλογον δέ.* Empedocles, as we are told, held *τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι μετοίκησιν τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ μὲν εἰς ζῷον ἡ λῆξις αὐτὸν μεταγάγοι, λέοντα γίγνεσθαι, εἰ δὲ εἰς φυτόν, δάφνην* (Ael. *Hist. An.* XII 7): see Karsten on vv. 382 ff. of the *περὶ φύσεως*.

620 C 16 **Θερσίτου.** Thersites is the type of the *πονηρὸς ἰδιώτης* in *Gorg.* 525 E. Here, as often in later Greek writers, he stands for the buffoon (*παγγέλοιος ἄνθρωπος διάστροφος τὸ σῶμα καὶ λελωβημένος* Lucian *adv. ind.* 7). Cf. also Soph. *Phil.* 442 ff., Theopomp. *Fr.* 262 in Müller *Fr. Hist. Gr.* I p. 323 and *Pythag. Simil.* 32 in Mullach *Fr. Phil. Gr.* I p. 489, in the last of which passages Thersites and Achilles stand for two opposite types. The different varieties of lives which are illustrated in this passage (*μουσικός, πολεμικός, βασιλικός, γυμναστικός, τεχνικός, μιμητικός*) appear also (as Proclus observes l.c. 319. 25 ff.) in *Phaedr.* 248 D, E. See also Empedocles vv. 384—386 and Karsten ad loc.

πίθηκον. Cf. IX 590 B.

19 **ἀπράγμονος.** Eusebius (*Praep. Ev.* XIII 16. 11) has *καὶ ἀπράγμονος*, which occurs also in one of the Vatican MSS. Cobet would alter *ἀπράγμονος* to *ἀπράγμονα*. The text is quite satisfactory: for *ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου* is virtually a single word: cf. *ἀνδρὶ—σοφιστῇ Prot.* 312 C, *ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα Euthyph.* 15 D, *ἀνὴρ μάντις, ἀνὴρ νομεύς, ἄνδρες δικασταί* and the like. "Sunt *ἰδιῶται πολυπράγμονες*: Ulyssis anima vitam *ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου* e numero *τῶν ἀπραγμόνων* quaerebat" (Schneider).

620 D 22 **καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων—μίγνυσθαι.** See on 620 B. Herwerden's transposition is the less defensible because the words *καὶ πάσας μίξεις μίγνυσθαι* form an appropriate ending to this part of the picture.

ὡσαύτως εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἰέναι καὶ εἰς ἄλληλα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα εἰς τὰ ἄγρια, τὰ δὲ δίκαια εἰς τὰ ἥμερα μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ πάσας μίξεις μίγνυσθαι. ἐπειδὴ δ' οὖν πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους ἡρῆσθαι, 25
ὥσπερ ἔλαχον, ἐν τάξει προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν· ἐκείνην δ'
E ἑκάστῳ ὃν εἵλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα ξυμπέμπειν | τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἱρεθέντων. ὃν πρῶτον μὲν ἄγειν αὐτὴν πρὸς τὴν Κλωθώ, ὑπὸ τὴν ἐκείνης χεῖρά τε καὶ ἐπιστροφὴν τῆς τοῦ ἀτράκτου δίνης, κυροῦντα ἣν λαχὼν εἵλετο μοῖραν· ταύτης δ' 30
ἐφαψάμενον αὖθις ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς Ἀτρόπου ἄγειν νῆσιν, ἀμετάστροφα τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα ποιοῦντα· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ δὴ ἀμεταστρεπτὶ ὑπὸ τὸν
621 τῆς | Ἀνάγκης ἰέναι θρόνον, καὶ δι' ἐκείνου διεξελθόντα, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διῆλθον, πορεύεσθαι ἅπαντας εἰς τὸ τῆς Λήθης πεδίον διὰ καύματός τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ· καὶ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὸ κενὸν δέν-

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23 **τὰ μὲν ἄδικα κτλ.** Cf. (with J. and C.) *Phaed.* 82 A *τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἁρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἱκτίνων γένη κτλ.*

620 D—**621** D *After all the souls had chosen, Lachesis bestowed on each its daemon or genius. Thereafter the choice was ratified by the remaining Fates, and finally by Necessity. In the evening the souls encamped by the river of Unmindfulness in the plain of Lethe, and all, save Er, drank its waters. At midnight, with thunder and earthquake, they were carried upwards to be born; and in the morning Er revived, and found himself upon the pyre.*

The vision of Er is no mere idle tale, that perishes when it is told. If we give ear to its teaching, it will save our souls alive, and both here and hereafter, we shall fare well.

620 E 26 **πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν κτλ.** For Lachesis see on 617 C, D, and for *δαίμονα* 617 D, E *nn.*

30 **ἣν—μοῖραν.** In *λαχών*, *ἐφαψάμενον* and *διεξελθόντα* the individual himself is substituted for the soul: cf. IX 573 B. Proclus (l.c. 346. 9 ff.) interprets *διεξελθόντα* of Er, but this cannot be right. *λαχών* is said with allusion to *Λάχεσις*, from whose knees the lots were taken (617 D). It is appropriate that Lachesis should be the only Fate involved in the act of choice; for the Future is the child of the Past (cf. 617 C, D *n.*). The selection is then ratified successively by the Fate of the Present, and the Fate of the Future, and finally, by Necessity herself, the mother of all three.

31 **ἀμετάστροφα κτλ.** *ἀμετάστροφα* is said, of course, with reference to the etymological meaning of *Ἄτροπος*, and *ἐπικλωσθέντα* in turn alludes to *Κλωθώ*. In the succeeding clause *ἀμεταστρεπτί* takes up *ἀμετάστροφα* again.

621 A 2 **Λήθης πεδίον.** The first mention in Greek literature of the plain of Lethe occurs in Ar. *Frogs* 186 *τίς ἐς τὸ Λήθης πεδίον κτλ.*, but Aristophanes clearly presumes that his audience is already familiar with the idea, and Plato may well have borrowed it from Orphic and Pythagorean eschatologies. Cf. Ettig *Acherunt.* l.c. p. 310 *n.* 6. The *πεδίον Λήθης* was probably a counter-picture to the *πεδίον Ἀληθείας*, of which we hear in *Phaedr.* 248 B: cf. also [*Axioch.*] 371 B. So also Proclus l.c. 346. 19 ff. *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀντίθετόν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ τῆς Ἀληθείας πεδίον τὸ τῆς Λήθης πεδίον, δῆλον· εἴπερ τοῦτο μὲν ἄκαρπον καὶ ἄγονον καὶ αὐχμηρόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ζωῆς πλῆρες, τροφὸν τῶν ψυχῶν—ὡς ἐν Φαίδρῳ (248 B) μεμαθήκαμεν.* For the later history of this conception see Rohde *Psyche*[2] I p. 316 *n.* 2, II p. 390 *n.* 1 and Dieterich *Nek.* pp. 90 ff.

3 **διὰ καύματός τε κτλ.** J. and C. explain this by saying that "they are passing through the pillar of light." I do not think that this idea was present to the mind of Plato, though the souls are no doubt somewhere in this region. The *καῦμα* and *πνῖγος δεινόν* are sufficiently appropriate touches without having recourse to so realistic an explanation.

δρων τε καὶ ὅσα γῆ φύει. σκηνᾶσθαι οὖν σφᾶς ἤδη ἑσπέρας γιγνομένης παρὰ τὸν Ἀμέλητα ποταμόν, οὗ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀγγεῖον οὐδὲν στέγειν. μέτρον μὲν οὖν τι τοῦ ὕδατος πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πιεῖν· τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει μὴ σῳζομένους πλέον πίνειν τοῦ μέτρου· τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ πιόντα | πάντων ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοιμηθῆναι B
καὶ μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, βροντήν τε καὶ σεισμὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐξαπίνης ἄλλον ἄλλῃ φέρεσθαι ἄνω εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, ἄττοντας ὥσπερ ἀστέρας. αὐτὸς δὲ τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος κωλυθῆναι

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5 **Ἀμέλητα ποταμόν.** Cf. Virg. *Aen.* VI 714 f. Lethaei ad fluminis undam *Securos* latices, et longa oblivia potant. Many other parallels are quoted by Dieterich *Nek.* pp. 90—94. As the *πεδίον Λήθης* has its counterpart in the *πεδίον Ἀληθείας*, so also we find traces in Greek legend of a *ὕδωρ Μνημοσύνης* as well as the *ὕδωρ Λήθης* (Paus. IX 39. 8).

7 **τοὺς δὲ—μέτρου** is missing in *q* and several other MSS. "Fortasse supervacanea adeoque inepta haec videbantur alicui, qui statim quemlibet postquam bibisset omnia obliviscentem videret. Sed oblivionis vis et pertinacia varia est. Qui nimium bibit, in perpetuum obliviscitur, qui moderate, discere aliquando seu recordando scientiam repetere potest" (Schneider). *μάθησις*, we remember, is *ἀνάμνησις* (*Phaed.* 76 A: cf. also 75 D and 76 D). It is likely enough that the Platonic doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις* was suggested by earlier Pythagorean beliefs of the same kind (Dieterich l.c. p. 122: cf. also Rohde l.c. p. 186 *n.*).

621 B 8 **ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι.** There is no good reason for transferring to this place the clause *αὐτὸς—πιεῖν* as Herwerden wishes to do. In treating of this passage, Proclus quotes an interesting fragment of Aristotle's dialogue 'On the Soul' (l.c. 349. 17 ff. = Rose 1480^{b} 5 ff.): *φησὶ γὰρ οὖν* (sc. *ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης*) *καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ μὲν ὑγείας εἰς νόσον ὀδεύοντας λήθην ἰσχειν τινὰς καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γραμμάτων ὧν ἐμεμαθήκεσαν, ἐκ νόσου δὲ εἰς ὑγείαν ἰόντα μηδένα πώποτε τοῦτο πάσχειν. ἐοικέναι δὲ τὴν μὲν ἄνευ σώματος ζωὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατὰ φύσιν οὖσαν ὑγιᾳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν σώμασιν, ὡς παρὰ φύσιν, νόσῳ. ζῆν γὰρ ἐκεῖ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτάς, ἐνταῦθα δὲ παρὰ φύσιν· ὥστ' εἰκότως συμβαίνειν τὰς μὲν ἐκεῖθεν ἰούσας ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ, τὰς δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἐκεῖσε τῶν ἐνταῦθα διαμνημονεύειν.* Cf. *Timon of Athens* V 1 "my *long sickness Of health and living* now begins to mend, And nothing brings me all things."

9 **μέσας νύκτας.** The plural, in which *νύκτες* according to Heindorf on *Prot.* 310 D signifies *horae nocturnae*, is regular in this and similar expressions, e.g. *πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν* (*Symp.* 217 D) etc.

γενέσθαι—γενέσθαι. "Is Plato really responsible for the clumsy and ill-sounding repetition of *γενέσθαι*?" Richards, who would omit the first *γενέσθαι* and write *κατὰ μέσας* for *καὶ μέσας*. A similar correction had already been suggested by Herwerden. Plato himself is not in the least averse to echoes of this kind: see on VI 511 E.

10 **ἄνω.** It follows that the souls just before their reincarnation are underground: see on *Ἀνάγκης γόνασιν* 617 B and *διὰ καύματος κτλ.* 621 A and Virg. *Aen.* VI 748 ff. Has omnis—Lethaeum ad fluvium deus evocat agmine magno: Scilicet immemores *supera* ut convexa revisant, Rursus et incipiant in corpora velle reverti.

εἰς—ἀστέρας is an instance—rare in Plato—of an apparently accidental iambic. See Arist. *Rhet.* III 8. 1408^{b} 33 ff. *ὁ δ' ἴαμβος αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν· διὸ μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων ἰαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες* and Cope ad loc. For souls conceived as stars cf. Ar. *Peace* 833 f. *οὐκ ἦν ἄρ' οὐδ' ὁ λέγουσι κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα | ὡς ἀστέρες γιγνόμεθ', ὅταν τις ἀποθάνῃ;* and Plut. *de gen. Socr.* 591 D *πολλοὺς ἀστέρας περὶ τὸ χάσμα παλλομένους* (said of disembodied souls) and 591 F. Similarly the Milky Way which, in the words of Milton, is 'powdered with stars' (*Par. Lost* VII 581: cf. Arist. *Meteor.* I 8), is the abode of certain souls, according to a tolerably widespread tradition, which meets us also in antiquity: see for example Cic. *de repub.* VI 15, 16 and *Manil.* I 753—804. Cf. also Ettig *Acherunt.* l.c. p. 348 *n.* 2 and Rohde *Psyche*^{2} II pp. 95, 213 *nn.*

πιεῖν· ὅπῃ μέντοι καὶ ὅπως εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀφίκοιτο, οὐκ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης ἀναβλέψας ἰδεῖν ἕωθεν αὐτὸν κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ.

καὶ οὕτως, ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ
C ἡμᾶς | ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸν τῆς Λήθης ποταμὸν 15
εὖ διαβησόμεθα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ μιανθησόμεθα. ἀλλ' ἂν ἐμοὶ
πειθώμεθα, νομίζοντες ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν καὶ δυνατὴν πάντα μὲν
κακὰ ἀνέχεσθαι, πάντα δὲ ἀγαθά, τῆς ἄνω ὁδοῦ ἀεὶ ἐξόμεθα καὶ
δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιτηδεύσομεν, ἵνα καὶ
ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς φίλοι ὦμεν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτοῦ τε μένοντες ἐνθάδε, 20
D καὶ ἐπειδὰν τὰ ἆθλα | αὐτῆς κομιζώμεθα, ὥσπερ οἱ νικηφόροι
περιαγειρόμενοι, καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τῇ χιλιέτει πορείᾳ,
ἣν διεληλύθαμεν,
εὖ πράττωμεν.

τέλος πολιτείας ι'.

13. ἕωθεν AΞ *q*: *γρ* ἄνωθεν in marg. A^2. κείμενον A^1Ξ *q*: ἤδη κείμενον A^2.
22. χιλιέτει A^1Ξ *q*: χιλιέτι A^2. Cf. 615 A.

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13 **ἕωθεν.** *ἄνωθεν* (see *cr. n.*), which appears also in *v*, is approved by Richards, but adds nothing to the meaning. *ἕωθεν* is of course the morning of the twelfth day as *μέσας νύκτας* above was the midnight of the eleventh: cf. *δωδεκαταῖος—ἀνεβίω* 614 B and 616 B *n.*

κείμενον. See *cr. n.* *ἤδη* is inappropriate in itself, and has little authority besides A^2.

14 **μῦθος—οὐκ ἀπώλετο.** A Scholiast remarks: *τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς προστιθέναι τοῖς μύθοις ἔθος ἦν, ὅτι μῦθος ἀπώλετο, δεικνύναι βουλομένοις ὡς ἄρα οἱ μῦθοι λέγουσι μὴ ὄντα, καὶ ἅμα ἐρρήθησαν καὶ οὐκ εἰσίν.* (Cf. *Theael.* 164 D and *Phil.* 14 A.) *Πλάτων δὲ τοὐναντίον πανταχοῦ σῴζεσθαί τε καὶ σῴζειν φησὶ τοὺς μύθους τοὺς παρ' αὐτῷ, μάλα γε εἰκότως· τῶν γὰρ ὄντων εἰσὶν ἐξηγηταί, καὶ ὠφέλιμοι διὰ τοῦτο.* (The Scholium is from Proclus I.c. 354. 24 ff.). Plato means that the story of Er is *οὐκ ὄναρ, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἐσθλόν.* A similar play on the proverb occurs also in *Laws* 645 B.

621 C 15 **ἂν σώσειεν.** Cf. III 417 A *n.* The suggestion *δὴ σώσει* (Richards) is unnecessary: see Kühner *Gr. Gr.* II p. 977 b.

621 C, D 20 **αὐτοῦ τε—εὖ πράττωμεν.** I agree with Richards in taking *τε* as 'both,' not 'and,' and the *καί* before *ἐνθάδε* as 'and,' not 'both.' Schneider holds the opposite view, urging that "qui praemia virtutis reportat, eum inter reportandum et sibi et diis amicum esse oportet. Eo igitur tempore sibi diisque amicus ut sit, contendere non magis potest, quam ut vincat, quum palmam fert victoriae." This is true enough, but a similar objection may be made against Schneider's own solution, which makes Plato say *ἵνα, ἐπειδὰν—κομιζώμεθα—εὖ πράττωμεν*: and, with Schneider's construction, the repetition *καὶ ἐνθάδε* is also, as Richards says, 'very weak.' Beginning as if he would say 'both here and hereafter' Plato elaborates the 'hereafter' into *ἐπειδὰν—κομιζώμεθα*, not without some sacrifice of logical coherence.

22 **περιαγειρόμενοι:** i.q. *περιόντες καὶ ἀγειρόμενοι.* Cf. Tim. *Lex. Plat.* s.v. *περιαγειρόμενοι νικηφόροι* and Ruhnken's note. *ἔπαγερμός* was the name for this kind of 'stipis collectio.' The poet Gray proposed *περιαγόμενοι*, but the text is sound. For the imagery from the games see on V 465 D *n.*

23 **διεληλύθαμεν.** J. and C. think there is "a playful suggestion of our having made the pilgrimage ourselves." I do not believe Plato means more than merely 'we have described.'

24 **εὖ πράττωμεν.** On *εὖ πράττωμεν* see the third Platonic epistle ad init. and Bernays *Lucian u. die Kyniker* pp. 3, 88. The *Republic* fitly ends with an adaptation of Plato's favourite phrase of salutation and farewell.

APPENDICES TO BOOK X.

I.

X 597 E. *τοῦτ' ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ τραγῳδοποιός, εἴπερ μιμητής ἐστι, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι μιμηταί.*

Schleiermacher and Stallbaum offer no explanation of the difficult phrase *τρίτος ἀπὸ βασιλέως*. The words are translated by Prantl "in dritter Linie vom Königlichen," and explained by Müller as third, counting from the man "der nach seiner Befähigung, seiner Vorbildung und seinem Berufe vor Allen im Besitze der Ideen ist." According to Schneider the King is "der im neunten Buche als Besitzer der wahren Lust dargestellte Gerechte, der hier als wahrhaft seiender der Wahrheit selbst gleich gesetzt wird" (Translation p. 314). Jowett and Campbell remark "God is here represented as a King. The word is borrowed from the language of the ninth book in which the imperfect shadow of the king is *δημοκρατικός*, *ὀλιγαρχικός*, as here of God the shadows are *ζωγράφος*, *κλινοποιός* etc." Other suggestions are that the phrase means "third in descent from the sovereign" (D. and V.), that the *τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως* is a sort of stage king ("tragic mimicry, as exhibited in the stage king, is at a third remove from the king and the truth, i.e. from the ideal king" J. B. Mayor in *Cl. Rev.* X pp. 112, 245), and finally, that there is a reference to "the Oriental degrees of rank. The painter is not even like the vizier, or the immediate heir to the throne, *δεύτερος ἀπὸ βασιλέως*" (Campbell in *Cl. Rev.* X p. 246). It will be seen that there is little agreement of opinion as to the precise significance of this remarkable expression.

As regards the application of the phrase, it is quite clear, in the first place, that *βασιλέως* is intended to correspond to God. In the descending scale of 'makers' we have (1) the *φυτουργός*, who is God, (2) the *δημιουργός*, and (3) the *μιμητής*: so that the *μιμητής* is *τρίτος ἀπὸ φυτουργοῦ*. Since Plato calls him *τρίτος ἀπὸ βασιλέως*, we are bound to identify the *βασιλεύς* with the *φυτουργός*, unless we suppose that the expression is lacking both in propriety and point. There are also other passages in Plato where God is spoken of as a King, e.g. *Crat.* 396 A, *Laws* 904 A. In the second place, it is equally clear that *τρίτος ἀπό* implies that the imitator is removed by two degrees from 'the King.' Compare Stobaeus *Eclog.* I 178 p. 78 Wachsmuth *Ποσειδώνιος τρίτην ἀπὸ Διὸς* (sc. *τὴν εἱμαρμένην*)· *πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτην δὲ*

τὴν εἱμαρμένην. A careful study of the words employed by Plato will moreover lead us to suppose that the figure is that of a genealogical tree. Thus we have

(1) God			(1) The Idea of Bed,
(2) Carpenter	correlating with		(2) A material bed,
(3) Painter			(3) A picture of a bed;

and just as the picture of a bed is a τρίτον γέννημα ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, so the Painter is τρίτος ἀπὸ βασιλέως πεφυκώς, that is, 'third in descent from the King.' For these reasons the supposed allusion to the βασιλεύς of IX 587 B ff. cannot, in my opinion, be admitted: nor indeed would such an allusion be appropriate on other grounds, for there is no kind of analogy between the μιμητής and the ὀλιγαρχικός, who in 587 C is said to be τρίτος ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ. The translation of Davies and Vaughan 'third in descent from the King' is correct, and the meaning of the phrase is exactly reproduced in the passage cited from Dante in the notes. In illustration of the word βασιλεύς we should quote, not IX 587 B, but VI 509 D, where the Idea of Good, or God (VI 505 A *n.*), is said to be the king of the intelligible sphere. We have already seen that the Idea of Good is the maker of all the other Ideas, and among them of the αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι κλίνη (VI 509 B *n.*, X 597 B *n.*), which according to the present passage is constructed by God. Compare Philo *de mund. opif.* § 23 πρὸς τὴν ἄκραν ἀψῖδα παραπεμφθεὶς τῶν νοητῶν ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἰέναι δοκεῖ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα and ib. § 50.

So much for the application of the phrase and its propriety as used by Plato here. As regards its origin, Campbell's suggestion is in my opinion not improbable, provided we suppose that the allusion is to the third in *descent* from the king. Although the expression does not appear to be found elsewhere in Greek literature, except with more or less explicit reference to this passage of the *Republic*, the words sound half-proverbial, and the omission of the article with βασιλέως suggests, though it does not necessitate, a reference to the Persian monarchy. Cf. *Menex.* 241 D, 244 D, 245 B, 246 A and *Alc.* I 123 B, C, E al. The conjecture of Campbell derives some additional probability from the favourite Stoic comparison between προηγμένα and those who stand next to the King in honour and esteem, although the Stoic comparison does not involve the idea of any genealogical connexion: see Cic. *de finibus* III 52 ut enim, inquit (Zeno), nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem—id est enim προηγμένον—sed eos qui in aliquo honore sunt, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primario loco sunt, sed ea quae secundum locum obtinent, προηγμένα, id est producta, nominentur, with other passages quoted by Pearson *Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes* p. 171. Cf. also Philo VI p. 190 (Lipsiae 1828) νυνὶ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἔξω περιαυγασθέντες λαμπρότητος, ἅτε νοητὸν φῶς ἰδεῖν ἀδυνατοῦντες, πλαζόμενοι διετέλεσαν τὸν αἰῶνα· πρὸς μὲν τὸν βασιλέα λογισμὸν φθάσαι μὴ δυνηθέντες, ἄχρι δὲ τῶν προπυλαίων μόλις ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ θύραις ἀρετῆς, πλοῦτόν τε καὶ δόξαν καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ τεθαυμακότες προσεκίνουν (? προσεκύνουν).

II.

X 602 E. Τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἄττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἑτέρων ἢ ἴσα τἀναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταὐτά.

This is the text of A, to which Schneider and all succeeding editors adhere. The variants τοῦτο for τούτῳ, δή for δέ have little authority, and give us no assistance. The view which I have given in the notes assumes that τἀναντία means the opposite of τὸ φαινόμενον μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον κτλ. in D above. The article is significant; otherwise Plato would hardly, I think, have added it here and omitted it immediately afterwards in ἐναντία. I formerly thought it necessary either to excise the first ἅμα περὶ ταὐτά, or else to add after φαίνεται the words <ὥστε ἐναντία φαίνεται>, in order to make the reference in τἀναντία still more clear; but if ταὐτά is understood as the same objects about which we already have the *false* impression, the difficulty disappears.

It may be urged that σημαίνοντι represents the λογιστικόν as the vehicle of a communication to the soul, and not as itself forming a judgment. Plato himself, however, appears to fluctuate between the two points of view; and the reason is that according to his own psychological theory τὸ λογιστικόν is not merely τὸ μετροῦν, but the part of soul which κατὰ τὰ μέτρα δοξάζει,—μέτρῳ τε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεύει (603 A. See also 605 B, C).

Schneider translates as follows: "huius autem partis ope saepenumero menso alicui, quum illa (pars) maiora quaedam vel minora vel paria esse significat, contraria simul de iisdem videntur." The sense is satisfactory, except that we should have expected Plato to attribute the measurement to the λογιστικόν itself (in harmony with τοῦτο—ἔργον), instead of to the individual making use of the λογιστικόν. But it is grammatically impossible to sever τούτῳ from μετρήσαντι and connect it again with σημαίνοντι, while if (with Müller) we make σημαίνοντι also refer to the individual, we offend against the plain and obvious meaning of the word (cf. VII 524 A).

By Jowett and Campbell τούτῳ is rightly made to agree with the participles, but wrongly separated from φαίνεται. "The dative"—say they—"is in a loose construction with the whole sentence, like a genitive absolute, and is not to be taken with φαίνεται. It would not be in accordance with Plato's use of language, or with the context in what follows, to speak of the contradictions of sense as having anything to do with the rational element of the soul." True; but Plato does not so speak of them, if my view of τἀναντία is right. He merely says that the rational element takes the opposite view of an object from that which is at the same moment entertained by the irrational element. Nor can the dative be employed with the force of a genitive absolute, as is virtually the case according to Jowett and Campbell's explanation.

Two other interpretations have been proposed. According to Stallbaum, the λογιστικόν is divided into two parts, one of which τῷ λογισμῷ πιστεύει, while the other is led astray. Hence it is possible—he thinks—

for Plato to speak of the λογιστικόν as having contrary impressions at one and the same time. But we cannot possibly identify τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς with part of the λογιστικόν: the main purpose of the argument, indeed, is to prove it totally distinct therefrom. Cf. Schultess *Plat. Forsch.* pp. 42—45. Davies and Vaughan translate "But when this element, after frequent measuring, informs us that one thing is greater or less than or equal to, another thing, it is contradicted at the same moment by the appearance which the same things present." This explanation, which appears to be unique, wrongly joins πολλάκις with μετρήσαντι and is certainly fallacious in other respects also.

Schleiermacher suspected corruption, and read τῷ δέ for τούτῳ δέ, translating "Wenn einer aber auch noch so sehr gemessen hat, und nun *bestimmt*" etc., but σημαίνειν is not 'bestimmen.' The conjecture τούτου—μετρήσαντος—σημαίνοντος—due to Richards—removes all difficulty, on the assumption that τἀναντία means—as it is capable of meaning—the same as ἐναντία i.e. 'opposites' and nothing more. I cannot, however, but think such a change far too drastic; and it is reasonable to suppose that the article in τἀναντία means something. The text *may* of course be corrupt—I do not believe it is—, but, if so, it still awaits the healing hand.

III.

X 606 C. Ἆρ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου, ὅτι, ἂν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κωμῳδικῇ ἢ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀκούων σφόδρα χαρῇς καὶ μὴ μισῇς ὡς πονηρά, ταὐτὸν ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις;

All the MSS have ἄν in place of ἄν. There are several other variants in Π and the inferior MSS, but all of them useless for purposes of interpretation or emendation.

That the text has suffered corruption is admitted by all editors, and nearly all critics. By writing ὅ τι ἄν, and transferring the mark of interrogation from ἐλέοις to γελοίου, it is possible to make sense of the passage, if we are willing to allow the common change from ὅ τι singular to πονηρά plural. Cf. Neukirch in *Pl. Pol. quaest. phil.* I p. 48. But the double use of ἄν remains; and ὅτι (not ὅ τι) is proved to be genuine by ὅτι τοιαῦτα—ἐργάζεται in D below: see note ad loc.

The following emendations, which are all of them later than Schneider, appear to me inadmissible on other grounds, and also because they involve the change of ὅτι. (1) ἆρ' οὐχ—γελοίου, ὅ τι ἂν—γελωτοποιῶν; ἐν μιμήσει δὲ—ἀκούων <ἂν> σφόδρα κτλ. (Stallbaum): (2) ἆρ' οὐχ—γελοίου; ὅταν, ἂν—γελωτοποιῶν ἐν μιμήσει δὴ κτλ. (Madvig, Baiter): (3) ἆρ' οὐχ—γελοίου; ὅταν τι ἂν αὐτὸς—γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κτλ. (proposed by me in *Cl. Rev.* IV p. 357): (4) ἆρ' οὐχ—γελοίου; ὅ τι ἂν—αἰσχύνῃ κτλ. (D. and V. with Stephanus). Hermann conjectures (5) ἆρ' οὐχ—γελοίου, ὅτι, ἂν—γελωτοποιῶν ἐν μιμήσει δὴ—ἀκούων <εἰὰν> σφόδρα κτλ., but this has little probability. Although they print the emendation of Schneider, the Oxford editors remark that the simplest change is to

read (6) ἆρ' οὐχ—γελοίου, ὅτι ἂν <ἃ> αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο <ἄν>, ἐν μιμήσει δὴ κτλ. The last suggestion is an ingenious one, and improves both sense and grammar; but the threefold error (omission of ἃ and ἄν and corruption of δή to δέ) is hardly probable, and the sentence becomes very cumbrous. It should be remarked that the absence of μέν after αὐτός is no reason for suspecting δέ: see on I 340 D al. (7) Turner's conjecture ἆρ' οὐχ—γελοίου, ὅτι ἂν <ἃ ἂν> αὐτὸς—ἐν μιμήσει δὴ κτλ. is in principle the same as that of Jowett and Campbell. I have sometimes thought that ποιεῖ should be substituted for ποιεῖς ('that jests, which etc., have the same effect as' etc.), in view of ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιητικὴ μίμησις ἐργάζεται in D. (It should be observed that Ξ and some other MSS read ποιεῖν.) ποιεῖς is however supported by ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις as well as by the explanatory ὃ γὰρ—γενέσθαι. If the difficulty about ἄν is held to be insurmountable, one might suggest ἂν <ἂν> αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο κτλ., regarding ἄν as virtually a single word; but to this and all the other corrections hitherto offered I still prefer Schneider's solution.

IV.

X 607 B. ὁ τῶν λίαν σοφῶν ὄχλος κράτων.

The reading of the two best MSS (A and H) is ὁ τῶν Δία (or rather δία) σοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν. Most of the inferior MSS read διὰ σοφῶν, but a few have διασοφῶν (*sic*).

Those who adhere to Paris A offer one of the two following interpretations: either (1) "der Gottweisen herrschendes Volk" (Schleiermacher, Stallbaum etc.), or else (2) "the crowd of philosophers overmastering Jove" (J. and C., with Schneider). To the first solution it may be objected that κρατῶν remains obscure, that Δία σοφῶν 'wise as to Zeus' is a difficult construction, and that the sentiment itself—unless we suppose it ironical—is rather a compliment to philosophy than otherwise.

Schneider construes κρατῶν with Δία, supposing that the object of the poet's invective is, as before, "sapientia Jovi adversaria et ἄθεος." The order of the words, he thinks may be excused, "in lyrico poeta, quum etiam Plato Leg. L. VII 824 A ἡ τῶν διαπαύματα πόνων ἔχουσα dicere ausus sit." To me, as to many others, the harshness appears too great, even for poetry: it is certainly much greater than ἰδὼν τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῶν τινα Λυδῶν and the like in Herodotus (I 84 al.). The text of the passage in the *Laws* has been disputed. If it is sound, we ought perhaps to print a comma after τῶν, and take the article not with πόνων, but with the following participle χειρουμένων.

There is, as usual, no lack of emendations. Sydenham (see *Cl. Rev.* II p. 229) altered ὁ τῶν to ὥτων, with what purpose it is difficult to see. The suggestion ὁ καὶ τὸν Δία σοφὸς ὄχλος κρατῶν (Bywater) keeps both Δία and κρατῶν. Others retain κρατῶν, but not Δία, proposing instead of Δία σοφῶν either διασόφων (C. Schmidt, Hermann etc. —but the word lacks authority), or ἀκροσόφων (a conjecture of Bergk's, afterwards apparently withdrawn: see his *Poet. Lyr. Gr.*[4] III p. 731),

or ἰδίᾳ σοφῶν (Hermann *Gesch. u. Syst.* p. 309 *n.* 305), or λίαν σοφῶν (Herwerden, Richards). If we read λίαν σοφῶν and leave κρατῶν alone, the participle is very obscure, and Richards hints at the possibility of κριτῶν. I have also thought of κράζων ('the croaking rabble of the overwise').

The view which is taken in the notes has been objected to on the ground that "like caput, κάρα and κεφαλή cannot be, or rather never are, in classical Greek, used for the seat of intelligence—for the 'head' of modern parlance—the reason being that popular opinion among the Greeks and Romans connected intelligence with the heart or midriff, not, as among us, with the head" (*Hermath.* XXIV 255). I think that I have answered this objection in my commentary, but, if any one thinks differently, I would recommend as a δεύτερος πλοῦς that he should provisionally restore the MS reading and interpret it in Schneider's way.

V.

X 612 A. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά τε ἄλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς οὐδὲ τὰς δόξας δικαιοσύνης ἐπηνέγκαμεν κτλ.

ἀπελυσάμεθα is the reading of Stobaeus (*Flor.* 9. 66) and all the MSS except four, viz. ΞΦm and Cesenas M. These have ἀπεδυσάμεθα.

ἀπεδυσάμεθα can hardly be right. The form is rare in Attic, though tolerably common in later Greek: nor is it by any means obvious what ἀπεδυσάμεθα would signify in this connexion. The usual translation is 'we divested ourselves of' (as in τὴν γνῶσιν ἀποδυσάμενος Clem. Alex. *Str.* v 8. 84 c Migne), and γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης (II 361 C) is quoted in its support. But (as Schneider points out) Socrates could hardly have identified himself with the just man in this way, and, even if he did, to what does τὰ ἄλλα refer? What are 'the other things' of which he divests himself in addition to μισθοὺς καὶ δόξας δικαιοσύνης? To this question no satisfactory answer appears to be possible: none, at least, has yet been given.

Schneider himself reads ἀπεδυσάμεθα, but gives a very different explanation, holding that τὰ ἄλλα means the description of τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ πάθη τε καὶ εἴδη ψυχῆς in the preceding books, and apparently taking ἀπεδυσάμεθα as 'we have exposed to view.' For ἀπεδυσάμεθα in this sense we might compare ἀπεδύσαμεν in *Charm.* 154 E: but the middle remains a difficulty.

If ἀπελυσάμεθα on the other hand is sound, it must, I think, be explained as in the notes. The view of the Oxford editors is not very different. Ast's translation 'se liberare' 'defungi' can scarcely be justified on linguistic grounds, and "addito τὰ ἄλλα minus convenit" (Schneider), for it was no part of Socrates' obligation to dwell on the wages of virtue: quite the contrary, in fact. No one is likely to accept the extremely subtle and difficult explanation of Richter (*Fleck. Jb.* 1867 p. 149) "haben wir nicht das Übrige durch unsere Darstellung erlöst—nämlich von den Banden, welche die Materialisten der Tugend auferlegen—ohne Lösegeld hinzubringen?" The possibility of cor-

ruption must be allowed, but the conjecture ἀπεωσάμεθα (Richards, comparing II 366 A τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀδικίας κέρδη ἀπωσόμεθα) is otherwise unsatisfactory, and fails, like ἀπεδυσάμεθα, to explain τὰ ἄλλα. Some may think of ἀπελογισάμεθα. It is best, however, to follow the MSS, in the absence of any convincing emendation.

VI.[1]

X 616 B—617 B. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι down to ἐφάπτεσθαι.

With the exception of the 'older and earlier' reading described by Proclus (see pp. 475 ff. below), there is hardly a trace in this passage of any variant affecting the sense.

A few emendations have been proposed. Thus Schleiermacher conjectures τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν, taking τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ as 'the poles of heaven,' and the chains as the Milky Way (*Translation* p. 621), while Krohn suggests φῶς εὐρύ for φῶς εὐθύ, and the transposition of ὥσπερ κίονα to follow ἄτρακτον (*Pl. St.* p. 283). It is hardly necessary to say that alterations of this kind are in my judgment totally inadmissible: they only reveal the weakness of the interpretation which necessitates them.

The only safe principle of interpretation in this, as in other similar passages of Plato, is to adhere to the natural meaning of the Greek, and abstain from wresting or rewriting the language in support of any preconceived view about the consistency and coherence of the picture as a whole.

I now think it clear that Boeckh's interpretation is irreconcilable with the language employed by Plato. The article in which Boeckh developed his views most fully was originally published in reply to Grote's pamphlet entitled *Plato's Doctrine respecting the Rotation of the Earth* (1860), and is reprinted in his *Kleine Schriften* III pp. 294—320. The essential features of Boeckh's view, which Zeller[6] I 434, 435 *nn.* in the main accepts, are as follows.

The Straight Light is the Milky Way, running round the outer surface of the Heavens, like the undergirders of a trireme. To the question, Why is the light said to be 'straight like a pillar,' when it is in reality circular?, Boeckh replies that it *appears* to be straight from the standpoint of the souls. Er and his companions are, according to Boeckh, outside the world, somewhere beyond the North Pole, and see only the nearer half-circle of the Milky Way: "ein Halbring erscheint aber in der Entfernung dem, welcher ihn von aussen *in derselben Ebene* stehend sieht, als eine gerade Säule" (l.c. p. 306). What is the meaning of διὰ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον? Boeckh's explanation is that the light "verbreite sich durch den ganzen Himmel und die Erde, d. h. über die Erde, wenn man will mit einem leichten Zeugma, durch welches διά auch den Genitiv γῆς regiert: wiewohl ein

[1] This Appendix is the result of prolonged discussions with Professor Cook Wilson, and freely reproduces nearly all his most important arguments.

Zeugma anzunehmen nicht einmal nöthig ist, wenn man nur das διά auf Verbreitung, nicht auf Durchdringung bezieht" (ib. p. 305). The middle of the light is accordingly in Boeckh's opinion at the Pole, and it is from the Pole outwards that 'the extremities of heaven's chains'—αὐτοῦ he refers to οὐρανοῦ—'are extended.' The 'chains of heaven' include not only the light itself, but also two other great circles, viz. the equinoctial and solstitial colures (ib. p. 307). To the ends of these chains is attached the spindle of Necessity, which extends downwards from the North Pole, its shaft representing the axis of the Universe. The meaning to be attached to the breadth of rim in the various whorls of Necessity's spindle is not discussed by Boeckh.

Such, in its main outline, is Boeckh's explanation. It will be observed that he endeavours to combine into a single harmonious whole the two figures employed by Plato—the sphere surrounded by a circle of light, and the spindle of Necessity. But he makes no attempt to shew how the outermost whorl, in which the fixed stars are placed, can coexist along with the revolving sphere (πᾶσαν—τὴν περιφοράν 616 C), so that the fundamental inconsistency of the two images still remains; and even if we should allow, which is far from being the case, that in other respects Boeckh provides us with a single coherent picture, he "does violence to the language" (as Cook Wilson remarks) "at nearly every step." The light, says Plato, is straight, like a pillar. According to Boeckh, it is *not* straight, but curved: only it *appears* straight if seen from a certain point of view. If this was Plato's meaning, why should he not have put it into words? No one will deny that the natural meaning of the words he does employ is that the light not merely appears, but is straight; and he could have had no object in thus leading us on a false scent. Nor is there any indication to make us suppose that the Souls are outside the World. On the contrary, it is tolerably clear that the λειμών from which they start upon their four days' journey (616 B) is on the ideal surface of the Earth (614 C *n.*), and the natural inference is that they march along that surface until they come within view of the light (616 B *n.*). If they travelled upwards to the supracelestial regions, they would have to pass through the very ring of light which Boeckh makes them see for the first time not from below, but from above. That the Souls are in the middle of the Earth, and therefore of the World, at the end of the fourth day after they have left the meadow, is clear from 617 D, 620 E, 621 A, B (φέρεσθαι ἄνω εἰς τὴν γένεσιν), and it is at the end of the fourth day that they reach the middle of the light (616 B). The conclusion is inevitable that the middle of the light is in the centre of the Universe, and nowhere else. Not less arbitrary and forced is the explanation which Boeckh gives of διὰ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον. The phrase τείνειν διά surely means to 'stretch through' and not to 'stretch over,' and the plain meaning of the Greek is confirmed by the close parallel in *Tim.* 40 B τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον. Other objections might be mentioned, but enough has been said to shew that Boeckh's explanation cannot be fairly evolved from the language of Plato, to which, indeed, it is sometimes in direct contradiction.

Of the other views, that of K. E. Ch. Schneider, the editor and translator of the *Republic*, has met with some acceptance, and appears to be favoured, in part, at least, by Jowett and Campbell. The straight light, in Schneider's opinion, stands for the axis of the World, or a cylinder enclosing it. From the comparison of the light to ὑποζώματα Schneider is inclined to infer that the ὑπόζωμα stretched from stem to stern inside the vessel; but the evidence would seem to be conclusive that the ὑποζώματα were applied outside. The chains of heaven he thus describes: "ad medium axem, h. e. ad centrum terrae idemque mundi (cf. ἄνω p. 621 B) pertinentia vincula—ab extremis sphaeris radiorum instar ad fusum Necessitatis circa centrum stantem porrecta et utrinque nexa, quorum vinculorum ope vertente fuso totus mundus cum omnibus sphaeris convertatur." Apparently he distinguishes between the light and the chains, although Plato clearly means them to be identical: κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν τεταμένα· εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς ξύνδεσμον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. On the subject of the breadth of rims Schneider has no view: "über die Breite fehlt noch der befriedigende Aufschluss, und es ist leichter zu sagen, was sie nicht bedeuten kann, als was sie bedeutet" (*Translation* p. 316).

In the notes, the breadth of rims has been taken to mean the distances between the planets. Against this interpretation it might be urged that a wholly different account of these distances is given in the *Timaeus*. In *Tim.* 36 D Plato writes: μίαν γὰρ αὐτὴν (i.e. τὴν ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου περιφορὰν) ἄσχιστον εἴασε, τὴν δ' ἐντὸς σχίσας ἑξαχῇ ἑπτὰ κύκλους ἀνίσους κατὰ τὴν τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τριπλασίου διάστασιν ἑκάστην, οὐσῶν ἑκατέρων τριῶν κτλ. What he means (according to Zeller[4] II p. 779 *n.*) is that if the distance of the Moon from the Earth is counted as 1, the distances of the other planets from the Earth will be:—Sun 2, Venus 3, Mercury 4, Mars 8, Jupiter 9, Saturn 27. (Cf. Macrobius *in somn. Scip.* II 3. 14, where it is said that the 'Platonici' used 'dupla et tripla intervalla' in such a way as to produce these distances: Moon 1, Sun 2, Venus $2 \times 3 = 6$, Mercury $6 \times 4 = 24$, Mars $24 \times 9 = 216$, Jupiter $216 \times 8 = 1728$, Saturn $1728 \times 27 = 46656$.) Thus according to the *Timaeus* the Moon, Sun, Venus and Mercury will be at the same distances from one another, Mercury will be as far from Mars as the Earth from Mercury, Mars and Jupiter will be as near together as the Sun and Moon, and the distance between Jupiter and Saturn will be enormously greater than that which divides any other pair of planets. Between this scale of distances and Plato's arrangement of the whorls according to the breadth of their 'lips' in the *Republic*, there is no kind of affinity: the rim of Saturn's whorl, for example, if it measures his distance from Jupiter, ought to be the broadest of all the rims, instead of being, as Plato here says it is, the narrowest.

In spite of the interval of time which may be supposed to separate the *Timaeus* from the *Republic*, this discrepancy might fairly cause a difficulty if it could be shewn that Plato's representation of the distances between the planets in these two dialogues was based upon empirical data or observation. But in point of fact, in both dialogues

the principle of Plato's arrangement is a certain *a priori* numerical relation, which has nothing to do with facts or probabilities. In the *Timaeus* Plato starts from the two Pythagorean τετρακτύες, viz. 1, 2, 4, 8 and 1, 3, 9, 27, and arbitrarily disposes the planets in accordance with these numbers. His method resembles that of the τῷ ὄντι ἀστρονομικός inasmuch as he 'dispenses with the starry heavens' (VII 530 B *n.*) and regulates the distances by certain 'mathematical numbers,' which he finds ready to his hand. (See App. II to Book VII, p. 166.) The method which he follows in this passage of the *Republic* is analogous, although the actual numbers are different. In a note contributed to Jowett and Campbell's commentary, Mr W. A. Craigie first drew attention to the fact that a numerical principle underlies Plato's order of arrangement of the planets in respect not only of their distances from one another, but also of their colours and velocities, and Professor Cook Wilson has corrected and explained Mr Craigie's law in *Cl. Rev.* XVI pp. 292 f. The law is that each of the three enumerations is "based on combinations which rest on the number 9" (Craigie l.c.).

Let us take first the 'breadth of the lips' of the whorls, i.e. (according to our theory) the distances of the several orbits from one another.

A. "If we write down" (I quote from Cook Wilson's article) "the numbers which express the order of the whorls, and, under each, set the number which its rim has in the order of breadth, and then join 'those σφόνδυλοι whose united numbers produce a sum of 9, we have a symmetrical figure with its centre between the 4th and 5th,' thus :—

No. of σφόνδυλος	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Order of width of rim	1	8	7	3	6	2	5	4."

B. Next, take the order of the colours.

"If we write down the numbers of the whorls in the order in which Plato mentions them when describing their colours we get :—



and there is here also a symmetry of arrangement with regard to the centre (and the centres of the two halves)."

C. Finally, let us consider the order of velocities.

The figure given by Cook Wilson is :—



In this figure the order of velocities is observed; "the group 1 + 8 (= 9) is correlative to the group 4 + 3 + 2 (= 9)," and the number 9 occurs twice in the central group, the members of which, being equal in respect of velocity, "may be considered to have no order."

"If we ask what was the reason of this curious arrangement," continues Professor Cook Wilson, "a not improbable answer seems to be that it was to effect a kind of equable distribution of the magnitudes along the series of the whorls. Now if this were so it would be best not merely to arrange two correlative pairs, as 7 and 2, 8 and 1, symmetrically with regard to the centre, but to make the order in magnitude of the numbers of one pair the reverse of that of the other. Thus in



the distribution is more equable than in



for in the latter we have the two larger numbers on the same side of the centre. Similarly the arrangement

is more equable than

and

than

A glance at diagrams A and B will shew that in respect of the breadths of the rims and their respective colours "this rule of equable distribution is exactly carried out, and the order in magnitude of the numbers in one pair is the reverse of the order in its correlative pair.... In the case of the colours there is an addition to the equableness of the distribution in so far as the sum of the numbers in the first half is equal to the sum of the numbers in the second half."

If this arrangement were found in only one of the three groups, we might reasonably judge it to be merely accidental; but the possibility of accident is almost excluded when we see that the rule is accurately observed in two cases out of the three, and also, with some unessential modifications, in the third. We must therefore suppose that Plato's representation of the planetary distances in the *Republic* deliberately follows an *a priori* principle of symmetry and number, selected chiefly in view of the particular image to which he here assimilates the celestial motions, and suggestive of the balance and equilibrium which ought to prevail in the celestial system. In the *Timaeus* his procedure is essentially the same, but there he accommodates the actual distances to the numerical fancies of the Pythagoreans. The discrepancy between the two dialogues in this particular ceases to surprise us as soon as we realise the way in which Plato went to work (cf. Book VII App. II pp. 166 f.), and in criticising Plato's physical theories generally, we should above all things bear in mind the warning which he himself

throws out in the *Timaeus*: ἐὰν οὖν πολλὰ πολλῶν εἰπόντων περὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως, μὴ δυνατοὶ γιγνώμεθα πάντη πάντως αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ὁμολογουμένους λόγους καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένους ἀποδοῦναι, μὴ θαυμάσῃ τις· ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μηδενὸς ἧττον παρεχώμεθα εἰκότας, ἀγαπᾶν χρή, μεμνημένον ὡς ὁ λέγων ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς τε οἱ κριταὶ φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν, ὥστε περὶ τούτων τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους πρέπει τούτου μηδὲν ἔτι πέρα ζητεῖν (29 C, D).

It remains to discuss the alternative reading of 616 E preserved for us by Proclus.

The parts of his commentary which chiefly concern us are as follows:

(1) διττὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ γραφὴ τῆς ταῦτα τὰ βάθη διοριζούσης λέξεως. καὶ ἡ μὲν προτέρα καὶ ἀρχαιοτέρα τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἀκολουθεῖ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστην σφαῖραν ἀστέρων, τῆς μὲν μείζονα περιεχούσης μείζον τὸ βάθος λέγουσα, τῆς δὲ ἐλάσσονα ἔλασσον. οἷον μετὰ τὸν ἐξωτάτω σφόνδυλον, ὅς ἐστιν ὁ τῆς ἀπλανοῦς—μετὰ τοῦτον δ' οὖν τὸν ἀπλανῆ κύκλον πλατύτατον ὄντα—τὸν τοῦ ἡλιακοῦ σφονδύλου τῶν λοιπῶν ἕβδομον ὄντα τῷ πλάτει διαφέρειν—ἔπειτα <τὸν> τοῦ σεληνιακοῦ—καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης—καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸν τοῦ Ἀρεϊκοῦ—καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸν τοῦ Διΐου σφονδύλου καὶ ἑξῆς τὸν τοῦ Κρονίου, καὶ τελευταῖον εἶναι τὸν τοῦ Ἑρμαικοῦ· καὶ ἁπλῶς κατὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀστέρων καὶ τὸν σφόνδυλον ἔχειν τὸ πλάτος. ἡ δὲ δευτέρα καὶ νεωτέρα, κρατοῦσα δὲ ἐν τοῖς κεκωλισμένοις (κεκολασμένοις coniecit Pitra) ἀντιγράφοις μετὰ τὸν ἐξωτάτω σφόνδυλον κτλ. (Kroll II 218. 1 ff. The reading which Proclus proceeds to describe is that found in our MSS.)

(2) καὶ ἴσως οἱ οὕτως λέγοντες (i.e. the adherents of the 'newer' text) ἔβλεψαν εἰς τὰ ἀπόγεια καὶ περίγεια κινήματα τῶν ἀστέρων, καὶ ἐφ' ὧν πλείονα τὴν διαφορὰν εὗρον, ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ βάθος ἔθεντο πλεῖον τῶν σφαιρῶν—εἴτε δὲ τὴν προτέραν εἴτε τὴν δευτέραν ἐγκρίνοι τις γραφήν, οὐ πάνυ συνᾴδουσιν ταῖς τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα τηρήσεσιν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὅμως ἡ μὲν δευτέρα συμβαίνει πῃ τοῖς τὰς ἀνελιττούσας εἰσαγαγοῦσιν, ἡ δὲ προτέρα τὸ αὐτοφυὲς ἔχει, τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἀποδιδοῦσα τῶν ἐνδεδεμένων ἐν ταῖς σφαίραις ἀστέρων τὰς ἐν τοῖς βάθεσι διαφοράς, πλὴν ὅτι τῆς σελήνης ἡ Ἀφροδίτη μείζων, εἰ καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀπ' ἐναντίας ἔχει· παντελῶς τῶν κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἀστρονόμων τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀκολουθησάντων ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ ταύτῃ καὶ τὰ βάθη διαστησάντων ἀπ' ἀλλήλων (ib. 219. 11 ff.).

(3) τῶν μὲν προειρημένων γραφῶν ἡ προτέρα, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, εἰς τὰ μεγέθη τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν τοῖς πλάτεσιν ἀστέρων βλέπει καὶ οὐδὲ τὰ τούτων μεγέθη διώρισεν ὡς τοῖς ὕστερον ἔδοξεν· ἡ δὲ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα τήρησις τοῖς ἀπογείοις αὐτῶν ἐχρήσατο καὶ περιγείοις εἰς δήλωσιν τοῦ πλάτους τῶν σφονδύλων, οὐδὲ τοῖς ὕστερον τῆς τούτων καταλήψεως ἱκανῶς πιεσθείσης (ib. 221. 28 ff.).

From the first of these extracts we are enabled to reconstruct what Proclus calls the 'older reading.' The text of which he speaks must have run:

τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτόν τε καὶ ἐξωτάτω σφόνδυλον πλατύτατον τὸν τοῦ χείλους κύκλον ἔχειν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἑβδόμου δεύτερον, τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ὀγδόου, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἕκτου, πέμπτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τετάρτου, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τρίτου, ἕβδομον δὲ τὸν τοῦ δευτέρου, ὄγδοον δὲ τὸν τοῦ

πέμπτου. (See my article in *Cl Rev.* xv pp. 391 ff.) According to this reading the order of the whorls, in respect of breadth of rim, will be:—

The whorl	of	the	Fixed Stars	(no. 1)
,,	,,	,,	Sun	(no. 7)
,,	,,	,,	Moon	(no. 8)
,,	,,	,,	Venus	(no. 6)
,,	,,	,,	Mars	(no. 4)
,,	,,	,,	Jupiter	(no. 3)
,,	,,	,,	Saturn	(no. 2)
,,	,,	,,	Mercury	(no. 5).

It will be convenient to discuss, first the meaning, and afterwards the value, of this 'older' text.

What, then, is the interpretation?

We note, in the first place, that the order in which the planetary whorls are arranged according to breadth of rim (Sun, Moon, Venus, etc.) corresponds with tolerable exactness to the order of the planets in respect of apparent size, and that the lip of the outermost whorl may be the broadest because of the number as well as the magnitude of the stars which it contains (cf. Proclus l.c. 218. 6 ff. ὁ τῆς ἀπλανοῦς, περιέχων τοσοῦτον πλῆθος ἄστρων κατεσπαρμένον κατὰ πᾶν αὐτοῦ τὸ βάθος, ὧν ἕκαστον ἀποδείκνυσιν ὁ λόγος μείζονα τῆς γῆς). Secondly, it is clear from what Proclus himself says that the order of breadth of whorl-lips in this 'older' text was really supposed to depend upon the size of the ἐνδεδεμένοι ἀστέρες (τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἀκολουθεῖ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστην σφαῖραν ἀστέρων 218. 2 et al.).

In these circumstances our first impulse is to suppose that the planetary lips are just broad enough to accommodate their planets and no broader, so that the breadth will be in each case exactly equal to the diameter of the planet. In this way I interpreted Proclus' 'older' text in *Cl. Rev.* xv pp. 391 ff.

But there are strong reasons in favour of supposing (with Cook Wilson) that the advocates of this text in antiquity did not make the breadth of the whorl-surfaces equal, but only *proportionate*, to the sizes of the planets. Of the 'earlier' reading Proclus remarks (l.c. II 219. 23) ἡ δὲ προτέρα τὸ αὐτοφυὲς ἔχει. Now it was perfectly understood by Proclus that the surfaces of the whorls are contiguous (II 216. 8 ff.), and knowing this, he can hardly have failed to recognise that if the planets fill the entire rims, they will sometimes touch one another, and the Moon and the Earth will always be in contact. This arrangement is certainly not 'natural,' and we are led to suspect that Proclus had in mind another interpretation of the 'older' reading when he used this epithet, and one in which the orbital distances of the planets would be somehow represented. Now in discussing this subject, Proclus nowhere says that the rims are exactly equal in breadth to the sizes of the planets, and his language is always consistent with the theory that the relationship is one of proportion and nothing more (τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἀκολουθεῖ II 218. 2, εἰς τὰ μεγέθη τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν τοῖς πλάτεσιν ἀστέρων βλέπει ib. 221. 29 et al.). Such a theory might well be

described as 'natural,' for it provides for the orbital distances on a principle which is reasonable enough in such *a priori* physics. "The principle," writes Professor Cook Wilson, "would be a sort of equable distribution of planetary mass, allowing the greater body more space. It would come to allowing the same average of linear dimension of planetary mass to each unit of distance between orbits throughout the system."

Another argument in support of this interpretation of Proclus' 'older' text may be derived from the treatise of Theo. Theo has our text of Plato (see on this subject p. 479 below), and introduces his quotation of the passage in these words: δηλοῖ δὲ τὴν τάξιν τῶν σφαιρῶν διά τε τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἄστρων ἑκάστου καὶ διὰ τοῦ χρώματος ἑκάστου καὶ ἔτι διὰ τοῦ τάχους τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία τῷ παντὶ φορᾶς (143. 14 ff. Hiller). It is clear from this sentence that Theo inferred the size of the different bodies from the breadth of the lips, so that he must have made the breadths of the planetary whorl-lips either equal or proportional to the diameters of the planets. That he interpreted them as equal is very unlikely, for he had before his mind in this part of his work the conception of orbital distances (see e.g. 141. 6), and could hardly have failed to remark on so extraordinary a peculiarity as the absence of any provision for representing those distances, if he really supposed that Plato had not represented them. It is the more improbable that Theo should have passed over in silence so strange a feature because he wrote at a time when the prevailing doctrine was that of a system of spheres whose radii were orbital distances from the centre (i.e. the Earth), and shews himself acquainted with this doctrine in other portions of his commentary, e.g. on pp. 181 ff. The more natural supposition therefore is that Theo, like Proclus, regarded the relationship between the breadth of the lips and the size of the planets as one of proportion and not of equality.

Finally, this interpretation of the 'older' reading throws light on some passages of Proclus' commentary which are otherwise obscure. In 219. 27 ff. παντελῶς τῶν κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον κτλ. (quoted above at the end of the second extract) Proclus implies that the astronomers of Plato's time made the depths of the planetary spheres dependent on the apparent sizes of the planets. Whether the implication itself is true or not, it is unlikely that Proclus would have imputed to any astronomers the complete neglect of orbital intervals, and the only interpretation of the 'older' reading which allows for these intervals is to make the breadth of the lips proportionate to the sizes of the planets. And in 219. 11 ff. (καὶ ἴσως οἱ οὕτως λέγοντες κτλ.) Proclus suggests that the 'older' reading was altered to our text in order to represent the differences between the planets in respect of apogee and perigee. The suggestion seems clearly to imply that he found the orbital distances of the planets represented in the 'older reading,' for "if the χείλη were only equal to the diameters of the planets, how could it be relevant to widen them to allow for apogee and perigee? Clearly it could only be relevant to the correction of a magnitude already representing differences of orbital distances" (Cook Wilson).

These considerations make it highly probable, if they do not absolutely prove, that Proclus' 'older reading' was understood to make the breadth of the different whorl-surfaces proportionate, and not equal, to the diameters of the planets.

We have now to consider the value and authority of this reading as compared with the text of our MSS.

The one reading is described by Proclus as προτέρα καὶ ἀρχαιοτέρα, the other—that which I have adopted—as δευτέρα καὶ νεωτέρα, κρατοῦσα δὲ ἐν τοῖς κεκωλισμένοις ἀντιγράφοις.

The word κεκωλισμένοις, which is a ἅπαξ εἰρημένον, can refer only to the arrangement of the MS in κῶλα to facilitate study and reading aloud: see Dziatzko in Pauly-Wissowa III p. 960. 27 and Birt *Ant. Buchwesen* pp. 180 ff. But as there seems to be no other evidence of the division of Plato's dialogues into κῶλα (see Birt l.c.), Pitra's conjecture κεκολασμένοις 'castigatis' 'corrected' 'edited' may be right.

If Proclus wrote κεκολασμένοις, it would seem that a recension of Plato's text was made about his time, and the 'newer' reading deliberately adopted in place of that which had hitherto held the field. As this 'newer' reading is found in all our MSS, we might even suppose that this recension originated the Archetype, from which according to Schanz (*Stud. zur Gesch. d. Plat. Textes* pp. 23—45), our MSS are all descended, and which Schanz places not earlier than 400 A.D. But even if we should grant all these hypotheses, it by no means follows that the 'older' reading is that which Plato wrote. Against the possibility that the reading of our MSS was a deliberate emendation on the part of the editors has to be set the rival possibility that it rested upon the authority of MSS which were judged by them to be more trustworthy than the authorities for the vulgate text. We have no evidence as to the critical principles followed by the authors of the recension—if recension there was; and in the absence of such evidence, the question between the two readings must be determined by the internal probabilities.

The balance of probability is in favour of the reading of our MSS, as will appear from the following considerations.

In the first place, our text was felt to be the *lectio difficilior*. This appears from the fact that Proclus found it difficult to discern a principle in the 'newer' reading (καὶ ἴσως οἱ οὕτως λέγοντες κτλ.), whereas the 'older' seemed to him easy and natural (ἡ δὲ προτέρα τὸ αὐτοφυὲς ἔχει).

Secondly, it is clear that, whichever text was the original one, it must have been altered into the other by deliberate emendation in order to satisfy some astronomical preconception. And it is much easier to conjecture why the 'newer' reading should have been changed into the 'older' than conversely.

Suppose, on the one hand, that the 'older' reading represents the truth. Why was it emended into our text? The motive cannot have been in order to reconcile the account of the planetary distances in the *Republic* with that which we find in the *Timaeus*; for the 'newer' reading makes the discrepancy between the two dialogues as great as

before. Or was it, as Proclus suggests, to make provision for the apogee and perigee of the planets? This is also improbable, because even a careless reader of the *Republic* (and, we may add, of the *Timaeus*) would hardly fail to see that Plato's general conception of the celestial motions leaves no room for apogee and perigee; and on this account so violent a dislocation, even if it were once made, would be very unlikely to establish itself.

If we suppose, on the other hand, that our text is that which Plato himself wrote, a plausible account can be given of the origin of the 'older' reading. The theory that the breadths of the rims should be proportioned to the size of the planets was considered to be natural (ἡ δὲ πρωτέρα τὸ αὐτοφυὲς ἔχει), whereas the existing text appeared difficult and perplexing: and hence the 'emendation.' Of this hypothesis we have strong *prima facie* confirmation in the treatise of Theo, who retains what (according to our supposition) was the original text, that of our MSS, and nevertheless explains the breadths as depending on the size of the planets. Theo's evidence thus supplies the missing link. The next step would be to alter the text in conformity with the explanation given (though not necessarily originated) by Theo: for if Theo's explanation was once accepted, it would soon be felt that the order of magnitude of the heavenly bodies in the received text was absurd. The corruption may therefore be assigned with probability to the time between Theo and Proclus.

An advocate of Proclus' 'older' reading must on the other hand suppose that Theo's citation of Plato (p. 145 Hiller) has been tampered with. This is of course possible, but much less probable than the rival view.

Finally, the strongest argument in favour of our text is that it conforms to the numerical principle explained above (see pp. 473 f.).

It is highly probable that any alteration of the original text would violate this principle, and in Proclus' 'older' reading it is violated, for the order of breadth in the πρωτέρα γραφή is

1 7 8 6 4 3 2 5.

And it is in the last degree improbable that an emendation of the 'older reading' would obey the 'rule of nines' which holds good in the enumeration both of the colours and of the velocities of the heavenly bodies. As our text does obey this law, the probabilities are that it is no emendation, but proceeds from Plato himself.

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prob. due to a marginal note of approval or otherwise:—II 30 (ἄξιον), II 50 (ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα), I 133 (ὡs οἴεται); due to an explanation, gloss, attempt to fill up the sense or construction etc. 341 D (οὗ προσδεῖται etc.), II 141, 192 f. (ἀλλ' δ—ψυχῇ), I 158 (ἁρμονίας), 525 D (δύο), I 27 (εἴη), 613 E (εἶτα—ἐκκαυθήσονται), II 189 (ἐνταῦθα δὲ πρὸs φαντάσματα), II 222 (ἤ τινος), I 291, 357 (σοφίας), 380 A (τὰ τῆs Νιόβης πάθη), 616 A (ταῦτα ὑπομένοιεν), I 287 (τὴν ψυχὴν

ὄντα), 580 D (τὸ λογιστικόν and λογιστικόν), 616 A (τὸν φόβον); due to the fusion of two distinct readings I 82 (στρεπτοὶ δέ); due to the erroneous repetition of words I 190 (ὅταν μάλιστα). For the occasional interpolation of articles, prepositions, conjunctions and other single words see the critical notes *passim*

Letters frequently added or omitted by mistake:—

Iota subscript wrongly added: I 262, II 127, I 297, II 126, 423, I 29, 304, 505 A, II 138, 337, 342, 612 B, C

Iota subscript wrongly omitted: I 9, 40, 96, 155, 182, II 221, I 331, II 37, 38, 106, 222, 259, 420

ν, final, wrongly added: I 234 (τόν f. τό), II 226, I 234 (οὖν f. οὗ), II 71, 583 C, I 239, 317, 340, 479 C, 484 D, II 3, 501 D, II 126, 547 E, 610 A (ὀρθότατ' ἄν f. ὀρθότατα)

ν, final, wrongly omitted: I 54 (ἔφη f. ἔφην), 179, I 56, 69, 81, 134 (ἄρα f. ἄρ' ἄν), 226, II 21, 49, 564 E, 607 B (δία f. λίαν)

Letters, confusion of:—

α and αι
- α for αι: φαμέν f. φαῖμεν I 58, II 342; πᾶσι f. παισί I 234, II 25; ἅπασα f. ἅπασαι II 140
- αι for α: ἐξαιρεῖν and ἐξαίρειν f. ἐξαρεῖν II 25

γ and τ
- γ for τ: γε f. τε I 152, 290, 578 A, 605 A
- τ for γ: τε f. γε I 24, 58, 120, 326, 578 B, 581 C, II 431; ἠτεῖσθε f. ἠγεῖσθε 612 C; μετά f. μέγα II 7; combined with lipography στρατευομένῳ f. στραγγευομένῳ I 326

γ for λ: γεωργούς f. λεωργούς (?) 421 A

δ for α: διδόντες f. ἅδοντες I 81; combined with dittography, ῥᾴδιον f. ῥᾷον I 94, with lipography, ῥᾷον f. ῥᾴδιον I 49

δ for λ: ἀποδομένων f. ἀπολομένων II 261; δία f. λίαν 607 B; ἀπεδυσάμεθα for ἀπελυσάμεθα 612 A

ε and αι
- ε for αι: ἕτερος f. ἑταῖρος I 133, 254, II 262; οἷόν τε f. οἴονται 387 C; ἐρεῖ f. αἱρεῖ II 411
- αι for ε: αἱρήσεσθαι f. ἐρήσεσθαι II 135; κατηγορεῖται f. κατηγορεῖτε 453 E; ναίων f. νέων II 185

ε and ει
- ε for ει: ἀποκρίνεσθαι f. -ινεῖσθαι I 26, II 39
- ει for ε: ἀντιτείνειν f. -τενεῖν 604 A; ἔδει f. ἔ δὲ II 455

ε and η
- ε for η: δέ f. δή I 45, 108, 279, II 391; μέν f. μήν I 262
- ει for ηι (η): φράσεις f. φράσῃς I 237, εἰ f. ᾗ 458 B, ξυνδεῖ f. ξυνδῇ I 305, cf. I 312, II 412
- η for ε: δή for δέ I 30, 345 D, 573 C: ξυλλέγηται f. -έγεται II 226
- ηι (η) for ει: καταλάμπῃ f. -λάμπει II 59, ἀκούῃ f. ἀκούει 550 A, δοκῇ f. δοκεῖ 579 D

ε for ο: ἔτι f. ὅτι I 275

ει and η
- ει for η: εἰ f. ἤ I 257; γένει f. γένη I 259; καταλειφθέν f. καταληφθέν 496 B; ἀλήθειαν f. ἀληθῆ ἄν II 364
- η for ει: δή f. δεῖ I 194, 533 A; ὑγιῆς f. ὑγιεῖς I 220

ει and ι
- ει for ι: ἐπιλειπούσης f. -λιπούσης I 32, cf. II 262; ἀποτείνουσιν f. -τίνουσιν I 79; εἴη f. ἴη I 96; παράπλειαι f. παρὰ πλέαι I 139; ἐπειδή f. ἐπὶ δή I 188; οἰκείας f. οἰκίας I 252; ἐλλειπῆ f. ἐλλιπῆ II 49; θάλειαι f. θαλίαι 573 D; ἀνείης f. ἀνίης II 415. See also 581 B, II 270 *n.* 1
- ι for ει: στρατιαῖς f. στρατείαις I 172, cf. 318, 319, II 36; ἀνίη f. ἀνείη II 92; παραλιπομένης f. -λειπομένης II 125, cf. 574 D; πιστέον f. πειστέον II 147; παιδίᾳ f. παιδείᾳ II 148

η and ι
- η for ι: εὐδαιμονήσειεν f. -ίσειεν II 97; ναυτηλίαν f. ναυτιλίαν II 222; τήν f. τιν' II 226; κατοικήσειε f. -ίσειε II 338
- ι for η: διότι f. δὴ ὅτι I 169; ἔτι f. ἔτη II 152; ἀπολελογίσθω f. -ήσθω 607 B

λ for π: ἄλλης f. ἁπλῆς I 152

ο and ου
- ο for ου: τοῦτο f. τούτου I 240, 257
- ου for ο: τούτου f. τοῦτο 610 D; σιδηροῦς and χαλκοῦς f. σίδηρος and χαλκός I 196; οὗ f. ὅ 562 B

o and ω

- **o** for **ω**: *ολόμεθα* f. *ολώμεθα* I 169, II 224, 225; *ἄλλος* f. *ἄλλως* I 311; *κατήκοοι* f. *κατηκόῳ* II 38; *ὅσον* f. *ὅσων* 534 A; other instances I 187, 188, 237, 283, 285, 464 B, II 54, 524 D, II 210, 251, 322, 409
- **ω** for **o**: *εἰπών* f. *εἶπον* I 110; *αὐτῶν* f. *αὐτόν* I 213, II 323; *θάμνων* f. *θάμνον* I 237; other examples I 259, 263, 454 E, I 289, 300, 319, II 49, 119, 234, 561 E, 581 C, II 346, 440

o and ωι (φ)

- **o** for **ωι (φ)**: *τὸ αὐτό* f. *τῷ αὐτῷ* I 306; *τό* f. *τῷ* II 258, 411; *τοῦτο* f. *τούτῳ* 580 E
- **ωι (φ)** for **o**: *αὐτῷ* f. *αὐτό* I 257; *τούτῳ* f. *τοῦτο* II 113

π for **τ**: *ποτε* f. *τότε* I 279

π for **τι**: *ἐπ'* f. *ἔτι* 532 B, C; *ποιώμεθα* f. *τί οἰώμεθα* 581 D

πι for **τι**: *ἐπιπονηρότερος* f. *ἔτι πονηρότερος* II 368

στ for **τ**: *διαστάσεις* f. *διατάσεις* I 179; *ἕκαστον* f. *ἑκατόν* II 208

Omission of one of two identical *letters or syllables*:—

ἄλλου τινὸς οὖν f. *ἄλλου οὑτινοσοῦν* I 240; *βαλόντος* f. *βάλλοντος* I 321; *γενήσεται* f. *γενν-* 461 A; *ἔτι μάλιστα* f. *ἑτίμα μάλιστα* II 227; *μελιτουργός* f. *μελιττ-* 564 C; *ξυναιρῇ* f. *ξυναναιρῇ* 540 C; *περιόντες* f. *περιιόντες* II 260, cf. 401; *τοῦ* f. *τούτου* 610 D, *τρίτα* f. *τριττά* 599 A

Omission of words with like ending is not infrequent in Paris A. Instances of, in Paris A or other MSS of the *Rep.*:—

I 67, 80, 87, 102, 104, 115, 119, 123, 162, 164, 355 f. (*καὶ καλοῦ* and *καὶ καλοῦ αὖ*), 603 B (*καὶ ἡ*), perhaps also I 50 (*πράξεως τῆς*) and 439 A, I 271 (*καὶ τινός*). The omission of single words may also be sometimes due to *homoioteleuton*, e.g. *τί* I 86, *ὅτι* I 108, *λεκτέα* I 113, *οἱ* I 142, *τάδε* I 219, *οὖν* I 227, *ἡ* I 240, II 355, *τῶν* I 308, *τά* I 322, *εἰ* I 338, *τῇ* II 116, *ἐν* 604 B, *αὐτό* II 411, *ὅν* 608 A

Omission of words without homoioteleuton:—

I 131, 263 (46 letters), II 49 (41 letters), II 224 (*δῆλον, ἔφη*): of single words without *hom.*, e.g. *ἔχειν* I 71, *ἔφη* I 76, 275, 522 A, *εἶναι* I 88, *ἡμῖν* I 143, *μή* I 149, 286, *ἕκαστον* II 137, *οὖσαν* II 182, *νῷ* II 457. For the occasional omission of articles, conjunctions, particles, prepositions and pronouns, see the critical notes

Words not included in the above lists, erroneously substituted for other words, whether by accident or design:—

ἄγον for *ἀγαθόν* 522 A
ἀδροῦται f. *ἀνδροῦται* 498 B
αἰσθόμεθα f. *ἀκρυασόμεθα* (?) 608 A
αἵτινες f. *αὖ τινες* I 157
ἀκολουθήσειν f. *-θῆσαι* 490 C
ἀκρατοτάτης f. *ἀκροτάτης* 564 A
ἀκρόχολοι f. *ἀκράχολοι* I 187
ἀλλά f. *ἄλλη* I 245
ἄλλοις f. *ἄθλοις* II 48
ἀλλοτρίοις f. *ἄλλοις* I 106
ἀμφισβητήσειε and *ἀμφισβητήσεως* f. *ἀμφισβητήσει* II 44
ἄν f. *οὖν* I 277
ἀναλαμβάνοντα f. *ἀναγκάζοντα* 490 C
ἀνεμόμενοι and *ἀνιμώμενοι* f. *νεμόμενοι* I 166
ἄνωθεν f. *ἔωθεν* 621 B
ἀπεργάζεται f. *-άσεται* 591 C
ἀποδεχόμεθα and *-ώμεθα* f. *-οίμεθα* I 247
ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν f. *ἀποκτιννύναι, ἀποκτείνειαν ἄν* 517 A
ἀπολαβών f. *ἀπολαύων* II 323
ἀπολογησομένη f. *-αμένη* 607 D
ἆρα (or *ἄρα*) *ἡ* f. *ἀρετῆ* II 332
ἄρα f. *ὁρᾷς* II 27
ἀργύρου f. *ἀργυρίου* 547 B
ἀρχῆς καὶ δικάζῃς f. *ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν* II 236
ἀσκεῖται καὶ δοκιμάζεται f. *-εἶσθαι κ. -εσθαι* I 179
ἀσοφώτερος f. *σοφώτερος* I 183
αὐτά f. *ταὐτα* II 237
αὐτή f. *τοιαύτη* II 236
αὐτό f. *τὸ αὐτό* 525 A
αὐτός f. *οὗτος* 516 B
βεβαιωσόμεθ' and *βεβαιωσώμεθ'* f. *βεβαιωσαίμεθ'* I 243
βλίσσειεν f. *βλίσειε* II 253
βουλεύεται f. *βούλεται* 590 E
γοῦν f. *οὖν* 533 E
γυμνοῦσθαι f. *μίγνυσθαι* I 296
δέ f. *τε* 510 E
δέ γε f. *δέ* I 14
δεῖ μηχανήσασθαι f. *διαμηχ-* II 99
διὰ νοῦ f. *διανοοῦ* II 83
διαθετέον f. *διαθεατέον* II 427
διατεταγμένους f. *-τεταμένους* 474 A
διαφέρει f. *διαφθείρει* I 209

διαφέρωμεν f. διαφέρωμαι I 56
διαφεύγουσα f. διαφέρουσα II 199
διενεγκεῖν f. διενέγκοιεν II 41
διηγήσεται f. μιμήσεται I 152
δίκας f. δικαίας 574 D
δοκεῖν f. εὐδοκιμεῖν 423 A
δοκῶ f. δοκεῖ I 113
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ἑαυτοῦ f. ἑαυτόν I 151
ἑαυτῷ f. ἑαυτόν II 244, f. ἑαυτοῦ I 73, f. σαυτῷ I 256
ἐγγένηται f. ἐγγίγνηται I 254
ἔγωγ' f. ἐγώ I 198
ἐγῷμαι f. ἐγώ μοι I 61

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ἑκατέρως f. -ωσε II 42
ἐκείνης f. ἐκείνοις I 327
ἐκποριζούσης f. -ιούσης I 36
ἐκτετμῆσθον f. -τετμήσεσθον II 251
ἔλθωμεν f. διέλθωμεν (after καί) II 138
ἐλλείπεται f. ἓν λείπεται I 2
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ἐπαΐοντας f. -οντες 488 D
ἐπαρῇ f. -αροῖ I 198
ἐπειδὴ ἦν f. ἐπειδή 612 D
ἐπέχοντα f. ὑπ- I 158
ἐπιθυμῇ f. -ῇς II 236
ἐπικουρητικόν f. ἐπικουρικόν I 258
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ἔφην δ' f. ἔφην II 351, 262

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θήσομεν f. οἴσομεν I 340
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R

Readings adopted in the text of this edition, but not found in any of the collated MSS of the *Republic*:—

	Reading adopted	*Reading of Paris A*
I	333 E ἐμποιήσας (Schneider)	ἐμποιῆσαι
	337 E αὐτῷ [εἴη] (Bremi)	αὐτῷ εἴη
	349 B οὐδὲ τῆς <πράξεως τῆς> δικαίας (Adam)	οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας
II	358 E οἷόν τε τι (Adam)	τί ὄν τε
	359 A δοκεῖν (Ast)	δοκεῖ
	361 C ἀπ' (Eusebius)	ὑπ'
	364 C περὶ (Madvig)	πέρι
	,, ἄδοντες (Muretus)	διδόντες
	377 B τύπον (H. Richards)	τύπος
III	387 C ποιεῖ (Hertz)	ποιεῖ ὡς οἴεται
	387 E ὀδύρεται, φέρει (Stallbaum)	ὀδύρεσθαι, φέρειν
	388 C ὅ τέ (Leaf)	ὅτε
	390 A παρὰ πλέαι (Adam)	παραπλεῖαι
	391 E οἱ Ζηνὸς (Bekker)	Ζηνὸς
	392 B ζητοῦμεν (Stallbaum)	ἐζητοῦμεν
	396 E ἁπλῆς διηγήσεως (Adam)	ἄλλης διηγήσεως
	398 A οὔτ' (Adam)	οὐκ
	401 C τις προσβάλῃ (Adam)	τι προσβάλῃ
	407 C ἔφην (Adam)	ἔφη
	407 E ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν· καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ (Schneider)	καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν
	410 B μεταχειρίζονται (Galen)	μεταχειριεῖται
	410 E ἀμφοτέρα (Schneider)	ἀμφότερα
	412 D καὶ ἐκείνου (Hermann)	καὶ ὅταν μάλιστα ἐκείνου
IV	428 C βουλευομένην (Heindorf)	βουλευομένη

		Reading adopted	*Reading of Paris A*
IV	428 D	*ὄντιν' ἂν* (Ast)	*ὄντινα*
	429 C	*αὐτῆς* (Adam)	*αὐτὴν*
	430 C	*μόνιμον* (Stobaeus)	*νόμιμον*
	431 C	*παισὶ* (H. Wolf)	*πᾶσι*
	432 C	*μετρίῳ* (H. Richards)	*μετρίως*
	432 D	*ἰοῦ ἰοῦ* (Adam)	*ἰοὺ ἰού*
	437 B	*ἂν ἀλλήλοις* (Baiter)	*ἀλλήλοις*
	437 D	*ἑνὶ λόγῳ* (Cornarius)	*ἐν ὀλίγῳ*
	439 B	*πράττει* (Ast)	*πράττοι*
	439 C	*ἐγγίγνηται* (Schneider)	*ἐγγένηται*
	440 D	*ἦ* (Ast)	*εἰ*
	442 A	*προστατήσετον* (Bekker)	*προστήσετον*
	443 C	*ὠφέλει* (Ast)	*ὠφελεῖ*
V	454 D	*ἰατρικὸν* (Adam)	*ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα*
	457 B	*γελοίου* (J. G. S. Schneider)	*γελοίου σοφίας*
	459 C	*ἡγούμεθα* (Adam)	*ἡγούμεθα εἶναι*
	,,	*δεῖ εἶναι* (Adam)	*δεῖ*
	461 B	*ἀφήσομεν* (Eusebius)	*φήσομεν*
	461 C	*μηδὲ ἓν* (Cobet)	*μηδέ γ' ἓν* (*μηδὲ γ' ἓν* A^2)
	462 C	*τῷ αὐτῷ* (Wyttenbach)	*τὸ αὐτὸ*
	468 A	*ἑλοῦσι* (J. van Leeuwen)	*θέλουσι*
	477 B	*αὐτὴν τὴν* (C. Schmidt)	*τὴν αὐτὴν*
	478 A	*δοξάζει* (Adam)	*δοξάζειν*
VI	493 B	*ἑκάστας* (van Prinsterer)	*ἕκαστος*
	494 B	*παισὶν* (de Geer)	*πᾶσιν*
	499 B	*κατηκόῳ* (Schleiermacher)	*κατήκοοι*
	500 A	*τ' οὐ* (Baiter)	*τοι*
	501 D	*φήσει* (Adam)	*φήσειν*
	503 C	*ἔπεται καὶ νεάνικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας* (Adam)	*ἕπεται*
	,,	*φύεσθαι* (Adam)	*φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας*
	504 A	*ἄθλοις* (Orelli)	*ἄλλοις*
	504 E	*ἔφη* (Ast)	*ἔφη, ἄξιον τὸ διάνοημα*
	507 B	*καὶ* (Adam)	*κατ'*
	508 E	*γιγνωσκομένην* (Adam)	*γιγνωσκομένης*
	510 B	*ἕτερον* (Ast)	*ἕτερον τὸ*
VII	514 B	*αὐτοῦ* (Hirschig)	*αὐτοὺς*
	516 E	*ἂν ἀνάπλεως* (Baiter)	*ἀνάπλεως*
	517 A	*καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι, ἀποκτείνειαν ἂν* (Adam)	*καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἂν*
	532 A	*ὁρμᾶν* (Ast)	*ὁρμᾷ*
	532 B	*ἔτι ἀδυναμία* (Iamblichus)	*ἐπ' ἀδυναμίᾳ*
	533 A	*δεῖ* (? Ficinus)	*δὴ*
	537 B	*εἰκοσιετῶν* (Schneider)	*εἴκοσι ἐτῶν*
VIII	547 B	*τὼ δ' αὖ, τὸ* (Schneider)	*τὸ δ' αὐτὸ*
	547 E	*κεκτημένη* (Bekker, ? with *v*)	*κεκτημένην*
	551 C	*ὁτουοῦν* (? Ficinus)	*ὁτουοῦν ἢ τινος*
	551 D	*ἀνάγκη* (Ast)	*ἀνάγκη*
	554 B	*ἐστησάτο καὶ ἑτίμα μάλιστα. Εὖ* (Schneider)	*ἐστήσατο. Καὶ ἔτι μάλιστα εὖ*
	559 E	*ὀλιγαρχίας — δημοκρατίαν* (Adam)	*ὀλιγαρχικῆς—δημοκρατικήν*
	562 B	*δ* (Adam)	*οὗ*
	564 E	*βλίττειν* (Adam)	*βλίττει*
	568 D	*καὶ τὰ* (Baiter)	*τὰ*
	568 E	*ἔφην ἐγώ* (Adam)	*ἔφην δ' ἐγώ*

Reading adopted	*Reading of Paris A*
IX 577 D ἀνὴρ (Campbell)	ἀνὴρ
578 C τὼ τοιούτω (Adam)	τῷ τοιούτῳ
580 D δὲ ἰδὲ (Adam)	δεῖ δὲ
581 D τί οἰώμεθα (Graser)	ποιώμεθα
585 A τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω πρὸς λύπην (Schleiermacher)	πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην
585 C ἀεὶ ἀνομοίου (Adam)	ἀεὶ ὁμοίου
,, ἡ ἐπιστήμης (Adam)	ἐπιστήμης
588 A πλέον (Adam)	πλείονι (A^1 : A^2 πλεῖον)
591 D φανεῖται (Iamblichus)	φαίνηται
X 600 D ὀνινάναι (Matthiä)	ὀνεῖναι (A^1 : A^2 ὀνίναι)
603 C ἦν (Ast)	ἧ
604 D ἰατρικὴν θρηνῳδίαν (Stobaeus)	ἰατρικὴν καὶ θρηνῳδίαν (? A^1 : A^2 ἰατρικὴν θρηνῳδίαν)
606 C ἂν (Schneider)	ἂν
607 B λίαν (Herwerden)	δία
,, κράτων (Adam)	κρατῶν
608 A ἀκροασόμεθα (Adam)	αἰσθόμεθα
610 A ὀρθότατα (Stephanus)	ὀρθότατ' ἂν
615 C αὐτόχειρος (Ast)	αὐτόχειρας

Recurrence of the same word at the end of two successive clauses (e.g. εἶναι,—εἶναι) 518 B, 511 E, 614 A, 621 B

Redundancy, pleonasm, fulness of expression etc., features of Plato's style:—329 C, 337 D, 339 A, 341 C, 358 A, 374 D, 421 D, 432 C, 434 C, 462 C, 472 C, I 356, 486 D, 490 A, 505 B, 517 A, 534 A, 555 B, 574 D, 580 A, 583 C, 587 E, 604 A, 618 C

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Subjunctive:—after εἰ 579 D: after ὅς 606 C: governed by ὅταν in a previous sentence 540 E: sometimes combined with fut. ind. after ὅπως 591 D: hortatory, in 1st person 372 E: do. after λέγε 457 C: do. with ὡς ἔοικε 473 B: subj. corrupted into ind. II 412: do. into opt. 472 D, II 53. See also Index I ὅπως, ὡς

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W

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Z

Zeugma 330 E, 344 B, 367 D, 423 E, II 184

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